

WORK **16**
IN
PROGRESS

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HEALTH CARE for profit

THE ARTICLE that follows as a supplement to this Work In Progress represents a departure from previous editorial policy. It had been decided not to include contributions in WIP which, because of terminology used, were not fairly easily accessible to those without a specific training in the area being discussed. The contribution which follows makes use of certain complex concepts, and the terminology used and ideas explored are difficult reading for the non-expert.

The editors nonetheless felt that the article was an important one, making a contribution of contemporary value, and having definite strategic implications. The editors were unwilling to deprive WIP readership of the ideas and information contained in the article because of their complexity, and it was accordingly decided to include it as a supplement to this issue of WIP. There are very few, if any avenues for the publication of this sort of work in South Africa, and this was an added factor in deciding to include this article in WIP.

The contribution is an exploratory one, and does not aim to be definitive or complete. It certainly falls into the category of work in progress. One of the reasons for presenting it in WIP is to elicit comment and response, and the author, David Kaplan, has specifically requested critical comment on the article. This will assist in the development and furthering of a debate which touches on the structure of the South African economy, the likely form of future capitalist development, and the implications of both structure and development.

Comment can be sent to the editors, or directly to

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The editors will consider running similar supplements to WIP if readership feels that these are a worthwhile addition to the Work In Progress project. Readers are asked to let the editorial collective know of their attitude

as far as this is concerned.

Contributors submitting material for inclusion in future supplements should include a non-technical, easily accessible summary of their article for inclusion in the main body of WIP.

SUPPLEMENT

TO

WIP 16

February 1981

SCHOOLS BOYCOTT IN KIMBERLEY

ON SEPTEMBER 8, last year, 112 african scholars were arrested in the Kimberley suburb of West End and charged with public violence. The education crisis in Galeshewe, Kimberley's african township, which had been simmering for more than a month, suddenly burst into the national media which for the next few days focused on what it saw as yet another 'trouble-spot'.

This article is a brief first-hand account which attempts to show at the same time how the events of last year were distorted both by the press, who sensationalised the visible tip of the iceberg, and the state which, armed with a mythology of 'disturbances' which (for instance) blames everything on agitators, sought to disguise their role in the conflict.

The most remarkable aspect of the Galeshewe boycott was the fact that - because of Kimberley's isolation from the main centres (it had been left untouched by the events of 1976), the absence of anything resembling a university and the lack of relevant reading material - the level of political sophistication of the pupils was not high. Yet against parental and less subtle state pressure they were able to unite very effectively.

And after a few weeks of involvement in an act of defiance against the state the initial naivety gave way to a more thorough-going

critique of the system. Where at the beginning the only perceived issue was the educational one, after the boycott, pupils began to relate their grievances with the educational system to the general condition of their community. Thus, while the boycott caused much misery and hardship to the community of Galeshewe it did have the positive effect of helping to create awareness among the younger generation of their situation in life.

The boycott began at two schools - the only government senior secondary school, Tshireleco, and the Catholic Saint Boniface senior secondary - on July 29. The aims of the pupils, subsequently misread and criticised as being unrealistic, were not to demand the immediate abolition of 'Bantu' education. The pupils explained they were boycotting in protest against that system, in solidarity with detained and boycotting pupils in other centres and to draw attention to the desperate need for more and better educational facilities in Galeshewe.

While the national issue of injustice in South Africa's educational system has been dealt with in length elsewhere it is pertinent to mention here that Galeshewe, with an official census population of 66 000, has no technical college or any other institution of post-school learning. The two above-mentioned schools are the only ones offering matric courses, and at St Boniface a pupil failing standard nine or ten is not given another chance and has to leave the school. At Tshireleco, as at most other schools, there is a shortage of just about everything - from qualified teachers to classroom space.

The response of the state to the challenge of the boycott (which surprised them - said one official: 'Things like that don't happen in Kimberley') was at first insensitivity and later severity. This reaction pushed the pupils into a total confrontation which they had not

deliberately sought and which led ultimately to violence and collapse of african education in Kimberley. However, the impression that state officials tried to create of these events was that they were due to the intransigence of the boycotters who had sought violence and anarchy.

The immediate response of the state to the boycott was to tell the pupils to go back to school. But the children, faced with the stony attitude of the authorities, and fired by what they saw as the justice of their cause, massed daily in their thousands and marched jubilantly through the streets of Galeshewe singing freedom songs. They were gradually joined by first the lower secondary schools and later the primary schools until by mid-August, every single educational institution in the township - involving more than 15 000 children - was dormant.

It is important to note that in all their daily meetings and marching there was no instance of violence. Even the chief executive officer of Galeshewe, PJ Roodt, is on record as having made the ironic comment that the demonstrations were conducted in a 'healthy spirit'.

The Department of Education and Training tried every method short of negotiating with the pupils to break the impasse. Their most consistent tactic was to use the school committees to try and urge the children to return. The rounds of meetings all ended in deadlock with the pupils soon realising that the object of the meetings was not to listen to their grievances but to convince them of the wisdom of returning.

Other methods were: literally trying to whip them back into line by cane-charging the pupils, with dogs for backup (the first instance of violence - in late August); detaining students regarded as leaders, though they were all released soon afterwards; suspension threats which proved

hollow when no-one turned up for registration.

The one method they never tried was to accede to the most fundamental of the pupils demands: that somebody of importance from the Department sit down at a table with them, listen to their grievances and at least start to do something about them.

Understandably, therefore, the visit of the Minister of Education and Training, Dr Ferdie Hertenberg, to Kimberley proved the catalyst that brought the conflict situation to a head. The pupils were furious when they heard that the Minister was to visit Kimberley without meeting with them. He was to talk with the community council, the parents, even leaders of the white community, but his visit - an opportunity for some arrangement to be worked out - was a continuation of the policy of ignoring the pupils, seeing them as errant children rather than regarding their stand as legitimate.

It was at this juncture that the press entered the picture.

On the morning of 8 September, hours before the community council was due to meet the Minister, students began assembling outside the Abanto Batho Centre in Galeshewe, piling up their books and singing. The pupils were warned to move on by the security police which they did, dispersing and regrouping at St Boniface school (the Minister's meeting was rescheduled for a 'safer' venue in the centre of town).

At St Boniface they were given ten minutes to disperse by the police who then moved in with batons, dogs and teargas. The students fled in one direction - away from the police, into the white suburb of West End which borders on Galeshewe (St Boniface is between the two).

Residents of West End interviewed later all agreed that the children were fleeing in panic when they entered the white area, pursued

by the police. But what was important to the news media and the state authorities was that black rioters had entered a white area and caused damage to property.

That evening the police issued a statement alleging that several thousand african children had run wild in a white suburb, entering homes and smashing furniture. The press took this up and the following morning it made the headlines of most national dailies. The worst was the headline in the Citizen: 'Black Students Run Amok in White Suburb'. Never was there any attempt to canvass the opinions of the pupils or to provide some background to the events that had been happening for some time before the 'riot' or even to indicate that the police statement was only a claim by a party which actually formed one side in the conflict.

Only several days later did investigations show that the 'damage' was minimal, consisting of a few broken windows where students, trapped inside a house they had hid in by the police, broke through the windows in terror to escape.

For several days thereafter violence billowed in Galeshewe as beerhalls, policemen's houses, schools and commercial vehicles from white-owned firms were hit by arson attacks. Police blamed the pupils for the violence even though it was never proved who did it. About 12 children were charged with arson and attempted arson but the state was unable to convict anybody except one man who had threatened to burn down the home of a policeman. He was fined R300 for 'obstructing a policeman in the course of his duties'.

By the end of the week the disturbances were all over. The press had already lost interest in the sporadic instances of arson and as the children did not oblige by invading another white suburb Kimberley slipped back into obscurity.

The press had finished its role of collecting information for the benefit of the reading public. It had in that time got what it wanted - several columns of the commodity news.

But the community at Galeshewe was left to live through its trauma. A few weeks later the Minister closed all of the schools in Galeshewe and sacked 13 temporary teachers with 24 hours notice. Every pupil had lost a years schooling and some would never return. It was hard to tell how deep the schism between parents and children, created by the education department's politicking where it used the parents (in the form of schools' committees) as a means of getting through to the pupils, ran. The boycott had obviously created mistrust on both sides.

But the fact that the children began to include among their demands that: they return to school this year (which they have done in reasonable numbers), the authorities start to do something about the appalling housing situation, the lack of drainage and the absence of a hospital in Galeshewe, showed that their scope of interest had broadened. In addition, discussions with the pupils have revealed that the boycott has created a new radicalised generation of youths in the isolated city of Kimberley.

COURTS

TREASON TRIAL.

DURING the second half of 1980, 9 ANC guerilla fighters stood trial for their lives in the Pretoria Supreme Court. The charges they faced included one of high treason, and 2 of murder, and on any of these counts the death sentence can be imposed. Unfortunately, the commercial press chose to label the trial the 'Silverton trial', implying that the main issue at stake was the siege of a bank in Silverton in January 1980, and the resultant death of 2 women and 3 guerilla fighters, as well as the injuring of a number of the hostages held in the siege. As a summary of the trial shows, this was only one of a number of issues involved, and at the conclusion of proceedings, all the accused were exonerated from any involvement in the Silverton siege.

The accused in the trial were

1. Mcebithi Johnson Lubisi (28),
2. Petrus Tsepo Mashigo (20),
3. Nephthali Manana (24),
4. Ikanyeng Moses Molebatsi (27),
5. Hloliile Benjamin Tau (24),
6. Phumulani Grant Shezi (24),
7. Jeremiah Radebe (26),
8. Boyce Johannes Bogale (26),
9. Thomas Mngadi (29).

In addition to the charge of High Treason, the accused also faced 2 counts of murder, 23 counts of attempted murder, 1 count of robbery with aggravating circumstances, and 4 alternate charges of participating in terroristic activities (as defined in the Terrorism Act). The charge of High Treason related to a general ANC conspiracy, the aim of which was to overthrow

the South African state. The 2 counts of murder and 21 of the counts of attempted murder related to the siege at the Silverton branch of the Volkskas bank on January 25, 1980, where 3 guerilla fighters held hostages while occupying the bank. In the ensuing police raid on the bank the 3 guerillas were killed, 2 hostages were killed, and a number of hostages were wounded. It was not alleged by the state that any of the accused were involved in the siege; however, accused number 5 (Tau) was charged with planning the attack, while the other accused were alleged to have criminal liability in that they were adherents to a general ANC conspiracy. The state failed to prove its case either as far as the 5th accused's involvement was concerned, or on the liability of the other accused as far as the events at the bank were concerned. On this basis, all accused were found not guilty on the 2 murder and 21 attempted murder charges.

The further two counts of attempted murder, and the charge of robbery with aggravating circumstances, related to the attack on a police station at Soekmekaar early in January 1980.

The 4 alternate counts of Terrorism related to specific acts undertaken by each of the accused.

The first 3 accused, (Lubisi, Mashigo and Manana) were charged and found guilty of the following acts: During 1976-77 they joined the ANC, and subsequently underwent military training in Angola. At the end of 1979 they returned to South Africa, and set up a base in the Tzaneen district from where attacks on targets were planned. On January 4, 1980, the accused together with a certain Lungile robbed a man of his pick-up truck to use it in an attack on the Soekmekaar police station. At about 20h30 that evening the 3 accused with Lungile attacked the police station, firing shots and throwing

hand grenades. During January 1980 the accused were in possession of a number of AK47 sub-machineguns, ammunition, handgrenades and detonators.

Lubisi, Mashigo and Manana did not attempt to deny that they had been involved in the activities listed above. They did however dispute that their intention was to murder when attacking the Soekmekaar police station, claiming that the aim of their mission was 'armed propoganda'. According to Manana, this involved 'the use of weapons for the promotion of propoganda. A certain target, for example a police station, had to be sought out over which there existed a difference of opinion. These places are attacked to show the people we are there'. The Soekmekaar police station was chosen because it was in a region where there had been resistance to enforced removals. The state had been involved in trying to resettle the people of Mkgato, and the attack on Soekmekaar was designed to show those resisting that the ANC supported them in their struggle.

A police witness admitted in evidence that police from Soekmekaar had been armed during the resettlement of the Mkgato, but claimed that this was merely to prevent 'crime and violence' during the operation. He also acknowledged that the people resettled had lived in the area for many years and had 'felt bad' about being moved.

On the basis of the acts the first 3 accused were found to have committed, they were found guilty of High Treason, 2 counts of attempted murder and a count of robbery with aggravating circumstances.

Molebatsi and Tau, accused numbers 4 and 5 respectively, were alleged to have joined the ANC in 1976-77, and thereafter undergone military training in various ANC camps in Angola. They did not deny this, and were

accordingly found guilty of these acts.

The state further claimed that during November and December 1979, they established guerilla bases in Ga-Rankuwa, BophuthaTswana, together with the 3 guerillas who attacked the bank at Silverton. Molebatsi and Tau admitted this, except that they claimed that the bases were not formed with the 3 guerillas involved in the bank siege, but only one of them, Mafoko.

Molebatsi and Tau also admitted that they had been involved in preparations to attack the fuel storage tanks at Waltloo, outside Pretoria, but that this attack had not taken place.

Molebatsi was further charged with being in control of large arms caches at KwaThema, near Springs, and in GaRankuwa. He admitted the latter, but denied control of the KwaThema cache, and the trial judge accepted this.

Molebatsi also denied, and was acquitted of, planning attacks on the Pretoria West and Villieria police stations. Tau denied, and was acquitted of, planning the siege at the Silverton Bank, together with the 3 guerillas who attacked the bank.

On the basis of the acts proved against them, these accused were found guilty of the charge of High Treason.

The sixth and seventh accused, Shezi and Radebe, operated as guerillas in Natal. They were charged with, and found guilty of joining the ANC, undergoing military training in Angola, and returning to South Africa to engage in armed struggle against the state. During December 1979-January 1980 they planned an attack on the offices of the Port Natal Bantu Affairs Administration Board, and were in possession of various arms, explosives and ammunition. They were found guilty of High Treason.

Accused 8 and 9, Bogale and Mngedi, were

charged, and found guilty of joining the ANC and undergoing military training in Angola and, in Mngedi's case, in Russia. On their return to South Africa, in about February 1980, they planned the establishment of a base in the Vryheid district. When arrested in the township of Mondlo, they were each in possession of a Makarov pistol. On this basis, they were both also convicted of High Treason.

Evidence for the state falls into 3 major categories:

- the attack on the Soekmekaar police station;
- the siege at the Silverton bank;
- the specific acts and involvements of each of the accused.

In addition to this, the state also led some general evidence on the nature of the ANC. Their major witness in this regard was Lieut-Col Hermanus Stadler of the security police, who testified that he could be considered something of an expert on the ANC. After being formed in 1912 the ANC, according to Stadler, formed a youth league in 1944 under the leadership of people like Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo. The Youth League introduced a more militant atmosphere into ANC programmes and policies, and during the 1950s demonstrations and passive resistance campaigns occurred.

In the mid-1950s the Congress Alliance was formed, involving an alliance between 5 organisations - the ANC, Congress of Democrats, Coloured Peoples' Congress, South African Indian Congress, and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). The Freedom Charter was adopted as the policy of these organisations after it was drawn up at the Congress of the People at Kliptown.

After the ANC was declared unlawful in 1960, a military wing - Umkonto we Sizwe - was formed (MK or Spear of the Nation), which

involved itself in acts of sabotage. A blueprint for guerilla warfare was drawn up. Under cross examination Stadler conceded that for the ANC to have existed all these years it must be accepted by a large number of black people in South Africa. He referred to the intense rivalry between the ANC and the PAC, but added that 'we (the security police) don't pay much attention to the PAC because it is such a small faction'.

Another major state witness, who may not be identified in terms of a court order, testified that after completing ANC training in Angola, he was appointed head of the ANC's Southern Natal Region. His duties included the arranging of attacks on political, economic and military targets of significance.

During March 1979 he carried out a mission to sabotage the buildings of the Port Natal Bantu Affairs Administration Board, but this failed when a detonator did not go off as planned.

On December 27, 1979, the witness gave himself up to the police. In court, he identified most of the accused as having undergone ANC training in Angola-based camps.

Of interest is the fact that none of the accused disputed their involvement in various military activities of the ANC. The nature of the evidence given by the 6 accused to testify revolved around the following points: an explanation for the reasons for the attack on the Soekmekaar police station; the circumstances in which they came to leave South Africa and join the ANC; and a denial that the ANC would be involved in attacking a target like a bank, or taking hostages. In addition to this general defence evidence, the first 3 accused explained in detail how they planned their attack at Soekmekaar, and how their plans aimed at avoiding killing police and civilians

present in the area; the fourth accused (Molebatsi) specifically denied control over the KwaThema arms cache, and the planning of attacks on the Villieria and Pretoria West police stations, while the fifth accused (Tau) explained the nature of his involvement with the 3 who attacked the bank, and denied any involvement in the planning of that attack.

The defence evidence on the ANC's attitude to civilian targets and the taking of hostages seemed to be confirmed when, shortly after the trial concluded, ANC president Tambo signed a protocol of the Geneva Convention dealing with this issue. The protocol binds the ANC to refrain from directing its war effort against civilian targets, and to the 'humanitarian conduct of war'.

Defence evidence also dealt with the circumstances in which the accused came to leave the country and join the ANC. Accused numbers 2 and 3 (Mashigo and Manana) dealt with the events of Soweto 1976, and explained how that context led to their fleeing the country, and joining the ANC. Molebatsi described the impact that the resettlement of his grandparents had on him as a youth, and how that experience politicised him. He also explained how the effect of the Soweto 1976-77 events had a disruptive effect on daily life, and how it became very difficult to continue anything like a normal existence in that context. And Tau testified how his girl friend had been shot dead on June 17, 1976, and he had found her body covered with newspapers, lying in the street.

After conviction, the defence called Professor Frans Maritz of the UNISA sociology department, in mitigation of sentence. Maritz explained how the actions of the accused made sense within the context of their world view, and how their activities were understandable,

'My argument is simply that they (the accused) acted within a certain situation and that within this situation their actions made sense. Without condoning their actions, they are nevertheless understandable', Maritz told the court. Maritz also noted that the activities of the accused were linked to basic historical dynamics relating to rebellion and change. People try to overthrow governments, and the person who sits in jail today may tomorrow sit in government.

In passing sentence, trial judge de Villiers seemed to accept the evidence given by Maritz, which was not challenged by the state in its cross examination. Judge de Villiers agreed that in many cases the rebel of today becomes the leader of tomorrow. He then went on to pose the question of what the court did with the rebel who is caught.

Dealing with the attack on the Soekmekear police station, he categorised this as an extreme act of treason. The fact that it was a police station seemed to be an aggravating factor for de Villiers, who stated that the police keep law and order in South Africa, which is a country with civilised values. 'If I did not regard their (the Soekmekear attackers') conduct in a very serious light, I would not be doing my duty towards the citizens of South Africa, and South Africa is a civilised country', said the judge.

With these factors in mind, Judge de Villiers handed down the following sentences: "Lubisi, Mashigo and Manana: 'to be hanged by the neck until dead'. Molebatsi and Tau: 20 years imprisonment. Shezi and Radebe: 15 years imprisonment. Bogale and Mngadi: 10 years imprisonment.

On application by the defence, leave to appeal was granted in the case of the first three

accused. It was refused in the cases of Molebatsi, Tau and Shezi. Leave to appeal in the remaining three cases was not applied for.

TERRORISM ACT TRIALS.

Note: The dates which appear at the end of each completed trial refer to the date of sentence or acquittal in the trial. In appeal proceedings, the date refers to date of judgement, while in the case of part-heard matters, it refers to the last court hearing before adjournment.

Mlungisi Elliot Somengamba (24), Monde Dugmore Johnson (24) and Tambo Samuel Mtselu (28).

Charge: The accused were charged with attempting to leave South Africa with the intention of undergoing military training. Somengamba and Johnson pleaded guilty to the charge, while Mtselu pleaded not guilty. Mtselu was separated from the other 2 accused, to be tried on his own.

The 3 accused were arrested in the 'independent' bantustan of BophuthaTswena, allegedly on route to Botswana. It is presumed that BophuthaTswenan authorities handed the 3 over to the South African police.

Verdict: In finding Somengamba and Johnson guilty, the presiding magistrate praised them for their 'co-operative attitude', and said that if it was in his power he would sentence them leniently. The Terrorism Act carries a minimum mandatory sentence of 5 years.

Sentence: 5 years imprisonment each. (Port Elizabeth Regional Court, 30.09.80).

When Mtselu appeared in court, also charged under the Terrorism Act, Somengamba testified against him as a state witness. Mtselu's trial had not been concluded at the time of writing.

Thebo Makunyane (24) and Ephraim Mogale (23).

Charge: The accused faced 2 counts under the Terrorism Act, and 4 further counts of possession or distribution of banned publications.

According to the charge sheet, the first count of Terrorism related to a series of acts which the accused committed with the intention of endangering the maintenance of law and order in South Africa. These acts were listed as follows:

1. During October - November 1977, at Giyane and Potchefstroom, the accused distributed pamphlets "Being black in South Africa today", and "Declaration of war".
2. During 1977, at Nylstroom, the accused taught LD Kutumela and J Monama
 - a) that white men oppressed blacks;
 - b) the history of the ANC and PAC, and that they are the only organisations able to free blacks;
 - c) these organisations recruit people for military training and that they will fight to free the blacks. That they should be helped to free blacks;
 - d) the history and aims of communism and that the aims of communism should be furthered.
3. During 1979, in Nylstroom, the accused formed an organisation called the Communist Advance Movement (CAM). The aims of this organisation were to propagate the principles, promote the spread of, and further the objects of communism;
4. During the period 1977 - 1979, at Nylstroom, Mahwelereng and other places, the accused encouraged the forming of youth clubs to promote unrest and uprising and to instruct the youth in acts of sabotage, and the aims of the ANC and to recruit the youth for military training and as supporters of the ANC;
5. Between April and June 1978 the accused

encouraged BMM Choabi to join the ANC;

6. During September 1979, in Pietersburg, the accused taught CM Nong the history and aims of the ANC, and requested her to further the aims;

7. During October 1979, in Vendeland, the accused produced and possessed a stencil "Come let us unite and defeat our oppressors" for the production and distribution of pamphlets.

In the second count of Terrorism, the accused were charged with recruiting 13 people for military training during the period 1977 to 1979. Those allegedly recruited were listed as

LD Kutumela
JL Monama
SC Dhlodhle
AM Mashishi
MV Morudu
JM Lekalakala
J Makibalo
CM Nong
JD Setshedi
R Ramalepe
J Sejeng
K Lehodi
O Leballo.

Count 3 dealt with the distribution of Mayibuye, an ANC publication; counts 4, 5 and 6 alleged possession of "ANC speaks", "South Africa - no middle road" and "The road to South African freedom".

At the time of his detention Mogale was president of the Congress of South African Students (COSAS); Makunyane was a student at Turfloop University.

When the trial began, the accused pleaded guilty to the first count of Terrorism, and to the counts relating to unlawful possession/distribution of publications. The charge of recruiting people to undergo military training was withdrawn.

Verdict: In finding the accused guilty on the basis of their plea of guilty, the presiding

magistrate found that the aim of the accused was to galvanise the black youth so that they would identify with unrest and uprisings when they occurred. Mogale encouraged the formation of youth clubs in Nylstroom, Mahwelereng and Potgietersrus to provide social facilities and communal services; but his ulterior aim was to provide a forum to train and politicise black youths in the aims of the ANC.

Mogale told LD Kutumela and J Monama that the ANC and PAC were the only organisations which could provide the black man with political rights and military training, and that their aims should be furthered. To this end the 3 of them formed the Communist Advance Movement with Monama as president, Mogale as organiser and Kutumela as secretary.

Sentence: 8 years each.

(Pietersburg Regional Court, 17.10.80).

Njegabantu Sithole (21), Mandla James Sibisi (20), Rematlotlo Moses (21), Christopher Sitembiso Mzuza (20), Stanley Themba Mthembu (19), and 2 youths aged 16 and 17.

Charge: All 7 accused faced a charge under the Terrorism Act. It was alleged that, between July 1978 and August 1979 they conspired to leave South Africa to undergo military training, and incited others to do the same. Sithole faced a further Terrorism charge, where he was alleged to have incited 4 youths to leave the country to undergo military training. This incitement allegedly took place between February and December 1977. Mzuza also faced a charge of dealing in dagga.

Prior to the trial beginning, one of the youths charged brought an urgent application before the Supreme Court. As a minor he was not permitted to instruct a legal representative to appear in his trial without the assistance

of his father. His father, however, refused to allow his son to be defended, saying that 'the boy must take his punishment if proved guilty'. In papers before the Supreme Court the youth sought, and was granted permission to instruct a legal representative.

At the beginning of the trial, the presiding magistrate held that the proceedings would be heard in camera because two of the accused were juveniles.

Verdict: Sibisi and the 16 year old youth were found guilty of attempting to leave the country for military training, and inciting others to do the same. Mzuza was convicted of dagga dealing. The remaining accused were acquitted.

Sentence: Sibisi and the 16 year old: 5 years.
Mzuza: 2 years, suspended.
(Durban Regional Court, 14.10.80).

Ruth Thandi Modise (21), Moses Khosi Nkosi (24), and Aaron Sliu Mogale (21).

Charge: Modise was charged with undergoing military training in ANC camps based in Angola and Tanzania. During 1978 she returned to South Africa; in March of that year, according to the state, she set fire to piles of clothing in Johannesburg branches of Edgars and the OK Bezaers. She was also charged with unlawful possession of arms, explosives and ammunition, and of reconnoitering police stations and a Krugersdorp Bantu Affairs Administration Board office with the aim of sabotaging them.

Nkosi, the father of Modise's child, and Mogale (who is a cousin of Modise), were alleged to have harboured her, knowing that she was a trained guerilla fighter. They were also charged with storing a firearm and explosives belonging to Modise.

Much of the trial revolved round the admissibility of statements made by two of

the accused while in police custody. Modise claimed that she had been assaulted by police who forced her to make a confession; Nkosi said that he made a statement to avoid being tortured: 'I thought that what had been done to others would be done to me too. I had not heard of someone who had been to John Vorster Square who had not been assaulted', he told the court.

Dr Norman Jacobson, a senior Johannesburg District Surgeon, testified that in his opinion 'lengthy periods of interrogation... could constitute an assault. I believe, and I have seen, that the Security Police subject detainees to strenuous interrogation'.

Questioned by defence counsel on how people came to be injured at John Vorster Square, security police witness Edward James Tierney explained that 'the floor is so slippery that a person can fall and injure himself or even fall while sitting on a chair'.

The two statements were accepted by the presiding magistrate as having been made freely and voluntarily, and therefore admissible against Modise and Nkosi.

Verdict: Modise and Nkosi guilty of Terrorism; Mogale guilty of unlawful possession of firearms.

Sentence: Modise - 8 years.
Nkosi - 5 years.
Mogale - 2½ years, suspended.

Notice of an appeal against conviction was given by Nkosi, who was released on R2 000 bail pending the outcome of the appeal. (Kempston Park Regional Court, 07.11.80).

Archibald Monty Mzinyathi (24) and Bingo Bentley (Mbojeni) (46).

Charge: Mzinyathi was alleged by the state to have joined the ANC in 1975 and undergone

military training in the Soviet Union during 1977. The state further claimed that, on his return to South Africa, he was harboured by Bentley (his stepfather) who knew that he was a trained guerilla.

Both accused contested the admissibility of statements they made while in police custody at John Vorster Square, claiming assault and other pressures as the reasons for making confessions.

The 'waarkamer' (truthroom) again featured prominently in this trial, with Mzinyathi claiming that he had been tortured in such a room at John Vorster Square, and security police denying its existence. Allegations of torture in such a room have become common in political trials involving John Vorster Square security police; denials of its existence are equally as frequent from the side of security police.

Mzinyathi raised an alibi in his defence, claiming that at the time the state claimed he was in Russia, he was in reality in a Lesotho hospital as a result of a car smash. He applied to court to be allowed to gather evidence on commission, which would establish that he was indeed in hospital during the relevant period. This would have involved the hearing of evidence in Lesotho, and the application was turned down by the presiding magistrate.

Verdict: Mzinyathi was found guilty as charged. Bentley was acquitted on the grounds that he might possibly not have known that his stepson had undergone military training.

Sentence: Mzinyathi was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment. An appeal against conviction was noted.
(Johannesburg Regional Court, 09.10.80).

Arthur Elliot Phalatse (22), Thabo Simon Ndlovu (19), Jannitjie Malaya Chiloane (24), William Mtwante Mampuru (18), Tshepo Albert Motlana (23), Ezekiel Dupa Masuku (23) and Matone Joseph Masuku (24).

Charge: The accused all face a charge of attempting to leave the country for the purposes of undergoing military training. They were apprehended near Houtkop on the Swaziland - South African border in early July 1980.

In addition to this charge, Dupa Masuku faces additional charges of inciting others to undergo military training, and arranging transport to leave the country.

The trial is due to begin at the end of January in the Pretoria Regional Court.

Ettiene Pilley (18), a 17 year old student, Pinda Menemela (34), Jonas Motaung (36), and Nicodemus Motapo (35).

Charge: Terrorism. Details of the charges had not yet been formulated at the time of writing.

Oscar Mpatha (71), Lawrence Lerotholi (18), Morgan Makubala (19), Aaron Tshengema (28), Peter Kubr (18), Alton Sabuwa (18), Fumanekile Bool (18), Vuyisile Kzaza (19), Johannes Nhlapo (20), Jeffrey Beardman (20), Vuyisile Diba (21), Richard Amaondo (19), Welile Mazothana (21) and 4 youths.

Charge: The accused face a charge of Terrorism, and 2 counts of murder. The state alleges that between August 8 and August 12, 1980, near the Crossroads squatter camp, the accused incited people to damage motor vehicles by throwing stones and petrol bombs, and setting alight the vehicles.

They are charged with assaulting and

injuring 6 people, 2 of whom subsequently died.

The accused are further alleged to have barricaded Klipfontein Road by placing stones, tree stumps and tyres in the street; of marching in singing groups armed with sticks, stones and other weapons; of ordering the closure of black schools; and of congregating in various churches to encourage people to take part in terroristic activities.

The first accused, Oscar Mpatha, is a senior leader in the Western Cape, being organiser of the African Food and Canning Workers Union, and chairman of the Nyanga Residents Association.

Mpatha was detained by police shortly after accusing police of provoking the violence which broke out at Crossroads and Nyanga in August 1980.

The trial is due to begin in the Cape Town Supreme Court on March 3, 1981. When the accused first appeared in court, the proceedings were held in a specially convened court in Pollsmoor Prison.

Dr Fabian Defu Ribeiro (48), Jan Caiphus Mashilo (19) and a 16-year old youth.

Charge: Five charges under the Terrorism Act. Ribeiro is alleged to have incited a number of youths to leave the country to undergo military training, and supplying some of those allegedly incited with money for train tickets to leave South Africa. The other 2 accused are alleged to have made attempts to leave South Africa with the intention of undergoing military training.

At the time of writing, the case had been adjourned for the passing of judgement. (Pretoria Regional Court, 16.01.81).

NAMIBIAN TERRORISM TRIAL.

Markus Kuteka (40) and Henri Kariseb (45).

Charge: The accused were alleged to have assisted a group of SWAPO guerillas by providing them with food and accommodation, and a plan of the buildings of a farm near Grootfontein, where they were employed. The farmhouse involved was subsequently attacked by guerillas on February 17, 1979.

The farm owner, JFL Louw, told the court that the 2 accused had been among his most trusted farmworkers, and both were foremen. Prior to the attack, one of his workers had warned him to be careful because Kariseb was 'SWAPO oriented'. On the day of the attack, he had instructed Kariseb to run to a nearby farm to warn the family there that 'terrorists' were in the area. Kariseb refused to do this, telling Louw to 'save your breath'.

Verdict: The presiding Judge found that, on the night before the attack, Kuteka had fed and accommodated two armed guerillas; the next day he and Kariseb assembled other farm workers in a bush clearing, where they met a group of about 9 guerilla fighters.

The accused were accordingly convicted of Terrorism.

Sentence: In passing sentence, Justice Strydom said that farmworkers had to be made to realise that it was their duty to report the presence of armed insurgents, and not get involved with SWAPO. There had been at least 15 armed attacks on isolated farms in the past few years, and farmers had to be able to trust their workers.

Although the accused were unsophisticated farm workers, no thinking person could be unaware of the aims of SWAPO, said the judge. Everyone knew that SWAPO had no good intentions for Namibia and its people.

Kuteka was sentenced to death.

Kariseb was sentenced to 10 years.

(Windhoek Supreme Court, 13.10.80).

CONTRAVENTIONS OF BANNING ORDERS.

(Internal Security Act).

Aubrey Mokoena (31).

Charge: The accused was alleged to have contravened the banning order imposed on him in 1978 on 5 occasions. The charges emerged from a series of conflicts within the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME), in which Mokoena appears to have played a role. These conflicts seem to revolve around the role of the American Bishop of the AME Church, Bishop Ming, the administration of church finances, and the transfer of priests between parishes. Mokoena was involved in a series of altercations with Bishop Ming over the administration of funds, and SWAPO members of the church in Namibia who had been detained.

Verdict: Guilty on 2 counts, in that during May 1980 Mokoena attended two AME Church meetings. At one meeting, he made a series of introductory remarks, while at the other he asked questions about church financial reports. The presiding magistrate held that attendance at these two meetings constituted a contravention of Mokoena's banning order.

Sentence: Sentence was postponed for 3 years. This means that no sentence will be passed unless Mokoena is found guilty of a similar offence during the next 3 years.

(Johannesburg Regional Court, 09.12.80).

Hiaku Kenneth Rachidi and Aubrey Mokoena.

Charge: The accused were charged with contravening their respective banning orders by communicating with each other. The charges

arose from an incident on November 14, 1980, when they were both arrested at Mokoena's Soweto house.

Charges were dropped against both accused when they appeared in the Johannesburg Magistrates' Court (25.11.80).

Judy Favish (29).

Charge: The accused was alleged to have contravened the terms of her banning order by being at Kirstenbosch Gardens, which falls out of the area she is restricted to.

Evidence before the court was that, on receiving news that her uncle had died, Favish went to walk among the flowers at Kirstenbosch. She was arrested by police as she got out of her car.

Verdict: Guilty. Favish admitted a previous conviction for breaking her restriction order, when she left her area of restriction to buy Chinese take-away food.

Sentence: 6 months imprisonment, conditionally suspended for 3 years.

(Wynberg Regional Court, 06.11.80).

David Russell (40) - appeal.

As reported in WIP 12 (page 47), Rev David Russell was sentenced to 4½ years imprisonment, 3½ years being conditionally suspended, for various contraventions of his banning order. The majority of the contraventions related to Russell's attendance of an Anglican Synod meeting in Grahamstown.

Russell appealed against the sentence imposed, and this was partially successful when all but 14 days of the sentence was suspended. He has now served this sentence. (Cape Town Supreme Court, 05.12.80).

Fatima Meer and Baptiste Marie - appeal. As reported in WIP 9 (page 3) the appellants in this matter were convicted of contravening their banning orders by attending a social gathering. They were each sentenced to 3 months imprisonment, suspended for 3 years.

They appealed against conviction, and in an important judgement the Natal Supreme Court upheld their appeal. In essence, the presiding judges found that the terms of the banning orders were too obscure to have any legal meaning. This related especially to the notion of 'social gatherings' and the prohibition on them in terms of banning orders.

The attorney-general of Natal has applied for, and been granted, leave to appeal against the ruling of the Natal Supreme Court. (Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court, 11.11.80).

Zubeida Juby Mayet (43).

Charge: The accused is alleged to have contravened her banning order by attending a service to commemorate the banning of various black consciousness organisations on October 19, 1977. The meeting which Mayet allegedly attended was held at the Jiswe Centre, Lenasia, on October 19, 1980.

(Johannesburg Regional Court, 12.01.81).

Lawrence Molathlegi Ntlokoa (22).

Charge: The accused, at the time of his restriction the youngest person to be banned in South Africa, is charged with contravening his banning order by attending a commemoration service in Kagiso on October 19, 1980.

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SUPPLEMENT: THE CURRENT 'UPSWING' IN
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CAPITALIST CRISIS: A
RE-INTERPRETATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN
'DEVELOPMENT'.

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EDITORIAL

IF THERE is one unifying theme running through this issue of Work In Progress, it is the focus on health, medical care and their relationship to the various classes in society. This theme was unplanned by the editors, and the submission of 3 articles dealing with the area was largely co-incident.

The contributions on health all point to the impossibility of restructuring health care without a democratic restructuring of other relations in society. Neither the paternalistic efforts of a ruling class dominated Health Department, nor the isolated programmes of 'concerned' members of the medical profession can make much headway in dealing with the two major areas of poor health: in the rural areas where those marginalised from capitalist production and 'reproduction struggle for daily survival, and on the factory floor where the direct producers of capitalist wealth are subject to a range of hazardous conditions and situations. The state of health of all classes in society cannot be reduced to a simple medical question, but is directly related to access to political and economic power, and struggles to maintain or alter that access. The improvement of the quality of health is accordingly tied to changes in the balance of power between classes: struggles over health intersect with and relate to broader struggles in society.

The editors of WIP are very willing to publish further material around the 'health debate', but at the same time would like to refer interested readers to the Critical Health

SABOTAGE TRIALS.

{General Law Amendment Act of 1962}.

Joseph Mavi, Philip Dlamini and Gatsby Mazwai.

Charge: The 3 accused, president and executive members of the Black Municipal Workers' Union (BMWU) were charged with Sabotage after the Johannesburg municipal strike. The charge sheet alleged that they had been involved in the disruption of 'essential services' through organisation of the strike. The Sabotage Act carries a minimum penalty of 5 years, and a maximum death sentence.

The Sabotage Act charges have now been withdrawn by the state, and the accused now face charges under the Riotous Assemblies Act - probably in connection with 'inciting' or 'participating' in an illegal strike.

The trial has been set down to begin on February 16, 1981, in the Johannesburg Regional Court.

A 16 year old youth.

Charge: Sabotage, attempted murder and arson. The accused, a white Pretoria school boy, was involved in throwing a bomb into the Brooklyn Police Station on June 15, 1980.

At his trial, he pleaded guilty to 2 counts of attempted murder and one of arson. The more serious sabotage charge was dropped by the state.

In mitigation, the youth claimed that his anti-government feelings had been developed by a history teacher at his school.

Verdict: Guilty on 2 counts of attempted murder and one of arson.

Sentence: 5 lashes, and 5 years imprisonment, conditionally suspended for 5 years.

(Pretoria Regional Court, 30.09.80).

SOME TRANSKEI TRIALS.

Thembile Magingxa (22).

Charge: The accused faced charges framed under the Transkei Security Act and the Transkei Constitution Act.

The trial was held in camera, although press were given access to a summarised charge sheet, and certain other documents.

The trial appears to have revolved around the preparation and distribution of 3 sets of pamphlets which, according to the presiding magistrate, expressed hatred of the Transkei regime.

According to the charge sheet, one of the sets of pamphlets implied that President Kaiser Matanzima, Prime Minister George Matanzima, and police chief Martin Ngcaba were stooges of the South African government.

Verdict: Guilty of two counts under the Transkei Security Act, and one under the Transkei Constitution Act.

Sentence: 5 years imprisonment, 2 years conditionally suspended.

(Umtata Regional Court, 08.10.80).

William Nelani and Handsome Magingxa (21).

Charge: Transkei Public Security Act and Transkei Constitution Act.

Nelani is former chief counsellor to deposed Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo, who has fled the Transkei bantustan and joined the ANC.

Verdict: Guilty as charged.

Sentence: 7½ years imprisonment each.

(Umtata Supreme Court, 06.11.80).

2 youths, and Leslie Guma (20).

Charge: Arson. The accused allegedly burnt down 5 classrooms at the Nyanga High School near Engcobo. Guma died before the trial began,

as a result of wounds received in a shooting incident after the burning of the classrooms.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: 8 lashes each.

(Umtata Regional Court, 15.09.80).

Florence Mancotywa (48).

Charge: 3 counts under the Transkei Public Security Act. As reported in WIP 14 (page 42), the accused was publicity secretary of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party in the Transkei region; she was also parliamentary representative of Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo prior to his flight from the Transkei.

During 1979 she was detained by Transkei Security Police when hundreds of Sabata supporters gathered in front of the Transkei Supreme Court to demand the release of the then-detained Sabata. After 119 days in detention she was eventually charged. In August 1980 she appeared in court for the sixth time, where the prosecutor again requested a postponement of the trial.

During August 1980 she was reported to have fled from the Transkei, and was subsequently confirmed to be in Lesotho. In an interview she explained that

I was tired. I have been in and out of jail for my political convictions. I was in from 1976 to 1977 for seven months, 1978 to 1979 for another five months. And I knew I would be arrested again when news of a planned coup broke.

Mancotywa, like Dalindyebo, places herself in the camp of the ANC. 'I am fighting apartheid' she says, 'and I cannot fight alone. And I am a democrat. I can't say we want South Africa purely for blacks'.

10 students of the St Johns College, Umtata.

Charge: Holding unlawful meetings in contravention of the Transkei's emergency regulations.

Verdict: Not guilty.

(Umtata Regional Court, 30.09.80).

Patrick Dalindyabo (21) and Theophilus Va (24).

Charge: The accused faced charges under the Transkei Constitution Act and the Transkei Public Safety Act. Dalindyabo is a son of paramount chief Sabata Dalindyabo.

The charges related to the distribution of pamphlets in Umtata and Engcobo during 1979. The pamphlets, which related to the detention of Sabata Dalindyabo, called for a boycott of schools, and referred to President Kaiser Matanzima as a 'poisonous...serpent'.

Verdict: Guilty of injuring the dignity of the Transkei state president.

Sentence: R300 or 12 months imprisonment, half of which was conditionally suspended for three years.

(Umtata Regional Court, 23.09.80).

APPEAL PROCEEDINGS.

Jeremiah Kgokong Majatladi (23), Thami Gerald Mkwazi (38), Ronald Ephraim Mamoepe (18), Lebogang Christy Mokone (18), Petrus Karel Senabe (22), Andrew Mosti Phala (18), Deacon Sikibela Mathe (22), Cornelius Mpheti Leeuw (18), and a 16 year old youth.

As reported in WIP 12 (pp 41-43), the appellants were convicted under the Terrorism Act and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment (Majatladi and Mkwazi), and 5 years (the remaining 7 accused). In the trial proceedings, the presiding magistrate found that Majatladi and Mkwazi conspired to assist others to

leave the country for military training; the other accused were found guilty of either recruiting for military training, or preparing to undergo training themselves.

The appellants argued that

the sole and only interest of Mkwazi in the other men accused with him was to write a story about them in Post newspaper and also to further his career as a journalist.

Mkwazi claimed that it was not his intention to assist others to leave the country for military training.

The other accused appealed on the grounds that

The court should have found that the version of the accused that they wanted their photographs taken so that these could be publicised in the newspapers in the event of their being detained was reasonable and possibly true.

The state, on the other hand, argued that the photographs were taken so that they could be published after the men had left the country for military training.

The appeal was successful in respect of only one accused, namely Deacon Mathe, who has now been released from Robben Island where he was serving his sentence.

(Pretoria Supreme Court, 28.10.80).

Zuelakhe Sisulu, banned president of MWASA. As reported in WIP 10 (page 48), Sisulu was summonsed before a magistrate to make a statement regarding a telephone conversation he had with Thami Mkwazi, who was at that time in security police detention. (Mkwazi was subsequently charged and convicted under the Terrorism Act, and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment. For details of his appeal, see above).

Sisulu refused to answer questions put to him, and was sentenced to 9 months

imprisonment.

He appealed against this, and in the Pretoria Supreme Court it was ruled that the investigating magistrate had not fully probed Sisulu's claim that he should not have to answer questions as they might incriminate him. The matter was referred back to the magistrate.

After re-hearing the matter, the magistrate ruled that Sisulu need not answer questions, and cancelled the subpoena.

(Pretoria Magistrates' Court, 14.11.80).

Godfrey Khumalo.

The appellant in this matter was found guilty of 3 counts of Terrorism, conspiracy to commit murder, and conspiracy to commit malicious injury to property. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.

Khumalo applied to the trial judge for leave to appeal, and although the application was late, leave to appeal against conviction and sentence on all counts was granted.

(Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court, 13.11.80).

Vusenzi Mcongo (19), Mncedisi Siswani (22), Tansanga Klees (22), Khumalele Mhikina (29) and Fazile Mvula (20).

As reported in WIP 9 (pages 4-5), the 5 appellants listed above are currently serving sentences on Robben Island. During 1979 they were charged and convicted of public violence; the charges arose out of an incident in Robben Island prison where certain prisoners allegedly attacked prison officials.

The 5 appellants were convicted in a trial held on Robben Island, and sentenced to further terms of imprisonment ranging from 4½ to 2½ years.

They appealed against sentence and

conviction, and in the Cape Town Supreme court it was found that the trial magistrate had misdirected himself in certain respects. Conviction and sentence were accordingly set aside.

(Cape Town Supreme Court, 20.10.80).

Frederick Phillips (27) and Roger Schroeder (27). As reported in WIP 12 (pages 44-45) the two appellants were charged with Terrorism, but found guilty on an alternative count of arson, and sentenced to 3 years imprisonment. The charges related to the setting fire to a hall in which a member of the Coloured Representative Council (CRC) was due to discuss Constitutional proposals.

An appeal against conviction was noted, and this was upheld. Conviction and sentence were accordingly set aside.

(Cape Town Supreme Court, 27.10.80).

Churchill Luvono (22).

Appellant in this matter was charged and convicted of Terrorism and perjury during 1979. He had given evidence for the defence in the Bethal PAC trial (8 vs Mthopeng and 17 others), and was immediately arrested and charged with perjury. Subsequently he was detained, and eventually charged with Terrorism. The state claimed that he left South Africa and underwent PAC directed military training in Swaziland. On his return to South Africa, it was alleged that he established an organisation called 'Triangle Battle Organisation' which was a PAC cell.

Luvono appealed against conviction, and was successful on the Terrorism Act charge (but not the perjury count). He has accordingly been released from Robben Island where he was

serving his sentence.

INTERNAL SECURITY ACT TRIALS.

Wimpie de Klerk, in his capacity as editor of Die Transvaler.

Charge: Die Transvaler published an article in which Thabo Mbeki, a listed person (and a vice chairman of the ANC) was extensively quoted. The article in question appeared on the front page of the newspaper's .. edition on June 21, 1980. The state then charged that by doing this, the provisions of the Internal Security Act were being contravened.

Before the case came to court, de Klerk paid an admission-of-guilt fine of R75.

Guy Berger (24) and Devandira Pillay (21).

Charge: After being held in detention under section 6 of the Terrorism Act for between 3 and 5 months, Berger and Pillay appeared in court with Mandla Gxanyana (26) towards the end of November 1980. The charge sheet supplied by the state deals only with Berger and Pillay, and it is assumed that Gxanyana will be tried separately.

Berger faces 4 counts framed under the Internal Security Act, while Pillay is charged with 3 Internal Security counts. In addition to these charges, both accused face a further 3 counts relating to the distribution and possession of banned publications.

The first Internal Security Act charge alleges that both accused became members of the banned African National Congress.

The second Internal Security Act charge alleges that the accused participated in ANC activities through the carrying out of a number of acts. The acts allegedly performed by Berger in this regard are listed as follows by the state:

1. During January 1978 he arranged with Lynn Denzig to be a courier between himself and 2 senior ANC members in Botswana, namely Peter Richer and Lauren Vlotman. A secret code was arranged whereby Berger could relay information to Richer and Vlotman.
2. During 1978 and 1979 Berger contacted certain officials of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) in the Eastern Cape, and obtained information from them about FOSATU and black trade union activity in the Eastern Cape. Berger had been asked to obtain this information by Richer, who was a member of the ANC's Internal Reconstruction and Development Committee (IROC). The information supplied was to be used by the IROC to bring FOSATU or individual trade unions into the sphere of influence of SACTU (the South African Congress of Trade Unions), alternatively to discredit FOSATU as possible competition to SACTU in trade union activities in South Africa.
3. On a number of occasions during 1978 and 1979 Berger visited Richer in Botswana, to supply him with information, and with the names of people whom Richer could attempt to recruit for ANC activity.
4. During June 1979 he took Christopher Watters and Robin Rees to Botswana to meet Richer and other ANC members.
5. During 1978 he arranged for a hiding place for himself at the home of Solve Skorge, where if necessary he could hide to avoid arrest or detention. If this hiding place was used, a coded message would be sent to Richer who would organise Berger's escape.
6. He organised and was involved in a series of discussion groups where he attempted to influence participants to accept the principles and policies of the ANC, and to become members, supporters or sympathisers of the ANC.

7. During 1979 he requested Christopher Watters, Mike Kenyon and Devan Pillay (accused number 2) to set up discussion groups in East London to influence the participants to become members, supporters or sympathisers of the ANC.

8. Berger made available to various people certain documents and material to influence them to become members, supporters or sympathisers of the ANC. The material included photocopies from 'ANC Speaks', Sechaba, Mayibuye, 'The story of Simon and Jane', and a tape recorded New Year message from Oliver Tambo.

The acts allegedly performed by Pillay in terms of this charge are listed as follows:

1. Between 1979 and 1980 he recruited a number of people to constitute a discussion group, the aim of which was to influence the members to become supporters, sympathisers or members of the ANC.
2. During 1979 and 1980 he introduced Karthigesan Singerham (also known as Lingham or Rej) to a number of people in East London with the intention of influencing those people to become members, supporters or sympathisers of the ANC. Singerham is an active member of the ANC usually resident outside of South Africa.
3. During 1980 he arranged a secret code with Singerham whereby information on the ANC and its activities could be relayed from the UK to East London. He further arranged with Mike Kenyon to take receipt of these coded messages and pass them on to him, or to decode them if he (Pillay) was not in a position to take receipt of the messages.
4. Pillay made available to various people books and other material with the intention of influencing them to accept the ANC policy, and become active supporters, sympathisers or members of the organisation. This material included writings of Lenin, African Communist,

extracts from Mayibuye, the ANC constitution, Sechaba, the New Year message of Oliver Tambo, and other material.

In this count, it is also alleged that Berger and Pillay initiated and conducted a discussion group of a number of people in Grahamstown, again with the aim of influencing them in favour of the ANC.

The third count under the Internal Security Act relates to furthering the objects of communism, as defined in the Act. To this end the accused are alleged to have set up various discussion groups which propagated the doctrines of communism, and attempted to influence those present to accept the principles and doctrines of communism. To this end, they are also alleged to have distributed certain books and material amongst members of the discussion groups, including Sechaba, the ANC constitution and the Tambo New Year message referred to above.

Counts 4, 5 and 6 are all framed under the Publications Act, and relate to the distribution and/or possession of certain material declared undesirable by the Publications Committees.

The final charge, under the Internal Security Act, is against Berger only. It is claimed that during 1978 and 1979 he wrongfully and unlawfully obtained information about FOSATU and other black trade union activity in the Eastern Cape from Frederick Seuls, Daniel Cornelius Leen and Vee Fook Aschene. It is further alleged that this information could be of use in furthering the achievement of any of the aims of the ANC.

People who appear to have been detained in connection with this trial, and who are still in detention, are Chris Watters, Mike Kenyon, Alan Zinn, and Lynn Danzig.

The trial is due to begin on February 16, 1981, probably in the Port Elizabeth Regional Court.

Themba Shongwe (26), Norman Monyepote (39), Vuyisile Mdleleni (28), Patrick Gaboatloeloe (49), Sipho Nhlapo (18), and John Motana (24).

Charge: The accused face a number of counts alleging that they furthered the aims of the ANC or PAC, and are members of those organisations.

Allegations of assaults on the accused while in security police custody are arising in the trial, and defence counsel George Bizos has alleged that police and state were blocking the defence in the trial. The state failed to make available to the defence statements allegedly made by the accused while in detention, while police had not made available various documents despite subpoenas being served on them.

After initially ruling that the defence were not entitled to relevant statements, the presiding magistrate altered this ruling, and police subsequently made available to the defence certain documentation. (Johannesburg Regional Court).

TRIALS OF GENERAL INTEREST.

Simon Mahlelehlele (21), Irvin Bokwa (21) and Brian Bokwa (19).

Charge: The accused were charged with public violence and arson, in that they allegedly attacked a house belonging to a black police constable in Bochebela Township on May 14, 1980.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: 3 years imprisonment each. (Bloemfontein Regional Court, 22.10.80).

Vusumzi Spielman (18).

Charge: The accused was one of over 30 people who appeared in court during October 1980 in connection with the Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage schools boycott. He was charged under the

Riotous Assemblies Act, with the state claiming that on October 10, 1980, he had been leader of a group which recruited people to go to schools, forcing lower primary school children to leave school premises in support of the boycott.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: 4 years, 1 of which was conditionally suspended.

(Port Elizabeth Regional Court, 23.10.80).

14 Grahamstown youths.

Charge: Public Violence. They were charged as a result of an incident on July 10, 1980, when police used birdshot to disperse boycotting school children.

Themiso Lombo (36), Mbuliso Geelbooi (28), Vuyisile Ndaba (32), Mzwandile Faatjie (19), Mtuzeli Mcekana (31), Vuysile Mahote (35), Donisi Bete (40), Thobili Kili (27), and Thobile Ntsengwana (18).

Charge: Public Violence. The accused were alleged to have been part of a crowd of about 300 which stoned police and police vehicles in Grahamstown on July 26, 1980, and prevented police from removing a corpse lying in the street.

Verdict: Not guilty.

(Port Alfred Regional Court, 19.11.80).

26 youths, most of them under 18.

Charge: Public Violence. The appearance in court of the accused, 25 of whom are scholars in schools in Mahwelereng near Potgietersrus, was a sequel to an outbreak of violence in Mahwelereng late in September 1980.

252 students aged between 12 and 20.

Charge: Attending an illegal gathering. The

charge was a sequel to a meeting at the Thamba Labantu High School on September 12, 1980, which commemorated the death in detention of Steve Biko 3 years earlier.

All accused were permitted to pay admission of guilt fines of between R30 and R50.

262 students.

Charge: Riotous Assemblies Act. All the accused were students at the Ngcalwane High School, Mdantsane.

Defence attorney H Siwisa was unable to represent the accused as he was detained by Ciskeian police shortly before the hearing. (Mdantsane Magistrates' Court, 23.09.80).

Andries Phokoje (37).

Charge: Public Violence. The accused was charged with building a road block on a public road on June 2, 1980, and with others stoned passing buses and cars.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: 3 years imprisonment.

(Bloemfontein Regional Court, 28.10.80).

Asef Tayob (19) and Bainshan Rewasbanker (18).

Charge: Public Violence. The accused were alleged to have been part of a crowd involved in a clash with police on the University of Durban-Westville campus on June 18, 1980.

During December 1980 the charges were withdrawn.

(Durban Regional Court, 10.12.80).

5 youths, aged between 13 and 15.

Charge: The accused allegedly set fire Walmer lower primary school on 5 occasions between February and October 1980.

Verdict: 2 of the accused were acquitted.

3 were found guilty of arson.

Sentence: 7 lashes each, in addition to suspended jail sentences.

(Port Elizabeth Regional Court, 09.12.80).

Benjamin Modise Metsing (24).

Charge: The accused, who is secretary of the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) was charged with malicious injury to property. Metsing, a student at the Soweto Teachers' Training College, tore up his mid-year examination paper. Students had been boycotting classes, and when the principal decided to go ahead with examinations, students felt that they should have been consulted before taking the decision. Other students demanded the examination papers from a teacher and destroyed them, and the accused did the same.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: 18 months, 6 months being suspended. An appeal has been lodged against the severity of the sentence.

(Orlando Magistrates' Court, 22.09.80).

21 Natal pupils.

Charge: Malicious damage to property. The accused were alleged to have damaged windows, washbasins and drainpipes at a Phoenix high school on May 8, 1980.

Verdict: 8 accused were found guilty.

Sentence: Sentence was postponed for 4 years. (Durban Juvenile Court, 17.09.80).

33 Grahamstown people aged between 14 and 36.

Charges: All the charges were related to the urban 'unrest' in Grahamstown during July and August 1980.

Four men and a woman were charged with the murder of a shop owner, Nikaile Mjekula, who was stoned to death on July 26.

Two youths aged 15 and 16 were charged with

malicious damage to property arising from the stoning of a bottle store.

An 18 year old youth was charged with arson in connection with the burning of the Samuel Ntsika Lower Primary School.

Six men and a woman were charged with setting fire to the home of a leader of the Peacemakers vigilante group.

A 23 year old man and two young women were charged with public violence and theft, while nine men aged between 17 and 36 were charged with public violence arising from the stoning of a police vehicle.

Other people were charged with public violence and malicious damage to property. (Grahamstown Magistrates' Court, 12.08.80).

12 teenage school pupils.

Charge: Murder, and public violence. The murder charge arises out of the death of a member of the Peacemakers vigilante group, Alfred Soya, on May 14, 1980. The public violence charge arises out of an incident at the Andrew Moyake school where a group of Peacemakers were stoned when they tried to drive boycotting scholars back to their classrooms.

In cross examination of the leader of the Peacemakers, Richard Mncongo, defence counsel put it to him that since the Peacemakers had been formed in 1979, more than 100 charges of assault had been brought against its members, and more than 84 members of the organisation were currently charged with criminal offences.

In argument, defence counsel also suggested that it was in fact the violent Peacemakers who were the aggressors in clashes with boycotting scholars. When Peacemakers had arrived at a school and attacked scholars there, the scholars had defended themselves with stones, which

were the nearest weapons at hand.

Verdict: One accused guilty of assault.

Eight guilty of public violence.

Three not guilty of all charges.

Sentence: The accused guilty of assault was sentenced to 5 years, half suspended;

Two guilty of public violence were sentenced to 4 years, half suspended.

A 16 year old received 3 years for public violence, 2 years being suspended; five others received suspended 3 year sentences; (Grahamstown Supreme Court, 04.12.80).

The question of the role of the Peacemakers and other vigilante groups needs to be detailed and analysed in a general assessment of the intense conflict in the Eastern Cape. Readers from that area are invited to submit information on this question, and anyone in a position to do an article is asked to contact the editors.

George Sewpersadh.

Charge: Two counts under the Publications Act. The accused, who is the president of the Natal Indian Congress, was charged with having produced and distributed copies of the Freedom Charter.

In evidence, Sewpersadh explained that he had produced copies of the Charter for a conference where he wanted to set out the policies of the Natal Indian Congress, and urge people not to vote in the South African Indian Council elections. The meeting was disrupted, and he had not actually distributed the Charter. He was not aware that the Freedom Charter had been listed as undesirable.

Verdict: Not guilty. In acquitting the accused, the presiding magistrate said that the Freedom Charter was not of such a nature that a reasonable man reading it might think that it was banned. Sewpersadh had not had a guilty

intent in his actions.

(Durban Regional Court, 19.11.80).

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HEALTH CARE FOR PROFIT

INTRODUCTION.

THIS ARTICLE is adapted from a talk given in August 1980. The talk was intended to show the way in which the delivery of health care is shaped by the prevailing economic structures.

In order to make this point, the article probably places too much stress on the way the commodity form has structured the health care system. It is not that anything is wrong in the article as such. It is rather that the article lacks balance if it is seen as an analysis of health care services as part of a complex of social relations.

The concrete understanding of any particular health care service requires more than generalised statements derived from an analysis of capitalism as an economic system. In order to analyse the health service of any one country it is necessary to look at those services in the context of the specific political, ideological, as well as economic processes to be found there.

So, for example, the National Health Service in Britain can only be understood as the outcome of decades of struggle by British workers to force the state to improve their social conditions of existence. Similarly the health services available to urban africans in South Africa should be understood as resulting from the need to keep the black working class sufficiently healthy to do the work required of them, and to control various epidemic diseases that might threaten to spill over into white areas.

The article that follows highlights and explores one of the determining features of health services under capitalism, namely their commodity nature and the impact that this has. In time, a much fuller examination needs to be made of the position of health services in the full complex of political and economic forces at work in our society.

WHAT FOLLOWS is written by a medical 'outsider' who is neither medically trained nor in the process of receiving such training. But the writer is nonetheless concerned about health and about disease. This extends to a concern about South Africa as a whole, which undoubtedly contains an enormous amount of sickness - in both the broad and the narrow sense of the word. A concern with sickness in society necessitates finding both explanations and solutions - for society as a whole as well as for disease.

It is seldom challenged that medicine, as a science, and medical care as a practice, hold within their grasp the power to overcome sickness and disease. If you are sick, go to a doctor who will cure you. This is amongst the conventional wisdoms of our time. It is for this reason that anyone concerned with health and disease must examine and understand the position and function of the medical profession. Perhaps the outsider, looking in, may see and understand things which are not as easily perceived by those within.

For structures (and undoubtedly the medical world is a structure) tend to have their own internal logic. If this were not the case they would simply collapse. But this logic tends to trap those who live and work within the structures. Because the structure is internally rational, it comes to be seen as inevitable, as

natural, as the only possible structure.

This is the case with the medical profession and with the system of health care. Both have a purpose and a function: to provide medical care to those who need it. To this end, a number of things must and do happen. The actual care is provided by doctors, nurses and others trained for specific tasks. In order to prepare them for their jobs, there is a system of medical education, where medical practitioners are taught what they need to know. There is a code of ethics to ensure that doctors and others behave in a way which is consistent with the interests of their patients. There is a professional body to make sure that doctors behave according to the ethics prescribed and to look after their interests. There are general practitioners for general complaints, and there are highly trained specialists for more complicated matters. There are medicines to prescribe for some diseases, and there are surgical procedures for coping with others. And there is medical research to ensure that the level of competence and knowledge continually improves.

The whole structure is neat, tidy and well-ordered. Everything has its place and everybody knows their place. There may be minor disagreements and dissatisfactions, but these are seen and dealt with in the logic of the structure as a whole. It may be that some feel that there is a need for more doctors, or for more money to be allocated to health care in rural areas, or that the pay for black doctors should be the same as that for whites; some may even feel that the conduct of the doctors in the Biko case should be subject to scrutiny by the Medical Council. But basically, seen from the inside, the

system is sound and rational. It is the way things are done. It represents the 'natural' order of medicine. The outsider looking in, however, may see the world of medicine somewhat differently. The outsider may see a world of apparently crazy contradictions.

CONTRADICTIONS IN THE WORLD OF MEDICINE.

THE outsider may see a system in which, despite all evidence to the contrary, both the population at large and the medical profession believe that doctors and drugs can successfully cure disease, and that diseases are primarily caused by germs. This is, of course, sometimes true. The eradication of smallpox is one of the wonders of the modern world, and medical science did it. But what of the TB epidemic that is ravaging the African population in South Africa, especially in the rural areas? There may be a scientific explanation for the disease, and drugs may cure individual cases, but the epidemic continues. Much the same is true of measles, gastro-enteritis and other infectious and contagious diseases which inflict such a toll on the oppressed and exploited in South Africa.

While it is true that medical science can cure individual cases, it is clear that solutions on a broader level lie elsewhere. For example, in England from 1850 onwards, there was a continual and substantial decrease in the child death rate from infectious diseases. It is now generally accepted that most of these improvements arose from improved standards of living, and it has been argued that ninety percent of these improvements came about before the introduction of antibiotics and immunisation. Yet many of the underdeveloped countries spend a large

proportion of their annual budgets on drug purchases in the hope of some technological miracle that will rid them of disease.

The other side of this coin looks very similar. White South Africans, generally a very affluent group, have the dubious honour of ranking with the highest as victims of degenerative diseases. It has been said that the wealthy dig their own graves with their teeth! This is only a partial truth. It is not only what they eat, but also what is drunk, smoked and breathed that sends the affluent to premature graves. Again, there seems to be little that medical science can do to combat this.

There is as yet no convincing evidence that hospitalisation increases one's chances of surviving a heart attack. Yet vast sums of money are spent on expensive cardiac units, and in the United States it was estimated that by 1980 one tenth of that country's nurses were employed in staffing those cardiac units.

This paradox, involving both rich and poor, stems from the same contradiction. The great illnesses of our time are social in nature. For the poor, sickness derives primarily from their poverty, and the living conditions that this poverty (and powerlessness) imposes. For the wealthy, the process of degeneration is built into the lifestyles that are learnt from an early age. It is a strong person indeed who can resist all the pressures from peers and from advertising to consume the junk that is on sale - to smoke, drink and compete in such a way that it is only surprising that the wealthy do not die earlier than they in fact do. And it must be remembered that patterns of consumption are ultimately determined by the nature of the production of goods - which is production for

profit, not health. The whole vast weight of a consumer-oriented society drives members of the ruling and middle classes to a fate of obesity, physical decay, lung cancer and cardiac arrest.

Rapid industrial growth for profits rather than human progress takes its own toll on health in the form of pollution which deforms the world and breeds a variety of environmental diseases which are, as yet, only vaguely understood. Workers in factories are exposed to special hazards of noise, radiation and poisonous chemical dust which affect not only them, but also their families and unborn generations.

The great epidemics of our time are caused more by sickness in the social fabric than by viruses and bacteria, and it is in social restructuring and change that solutions are to be sought. Yet the world of medicine attempts to stem the tide of disease by treating its victims one by one, and then sending them back to be re-infected by the social plague.

MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND THE DRUG INDUSTRY.

THE ATTEMPT to entice us into believing that medicine can cure ailments is bolstered by the massive growth of medical technology, a kind of modern witchcraft, the function of which is perhaps to reassure us that the witchdoctor is throwing the bones as skillfully as possible. But the actual impact of medical technology on illness is limited in the extreme.

A closer look at drugs and the drug industry is also necessary. Clearly, drugs are an important weapon in the battle against disease. But clearly also, as the Thalidomide case shows, unless they are carefully controlled drugs can be positively harmful. With this in

mind, one would expect to find a carefully controlled process of research, production and prescription of drugs. In fact, what exists is little short of anarchy.

At most only a few hundred drugs are required for all circumstances, and major drug innovations are few and far between. A very small handful of really new drugs come onto the market each year. Yet there are 35 000 brand names currently on sale in the USA, and something like 60 000 in Mexico. Many of these are undoubtedly useless, positively dangerous, or just pointless duplications of other, almost identical compounds. Furthermore, the only major source of information about all these drugs is the drug industry itself. Manufacturers can hardly be expected to provide the most objective information about their products. In this situation, rational decision-making about which is the appropriate product to prescribe for any particular illness, is well-nigh impossible. In this context, it is not surprising to learn that in the United States the drug industry spends the equivalent of 3 000 dollars per physician per year on promoting its products through a mixture of sophisticated, subtle and hard sell techniques.

Again, we are met with a contradiction. Drugs are potentially useful, yet the manner of their production and distribution is such as to lessen the benefits that they offer.

There is another important contradiction in the world of drugs. Those who can least afford them are those who pay the most for them. The drug companies, as a rule, get a return on their investment that is one hundred percent higher in the 'third world' than it is in the developed capitalist countries.

There is, as a bizarre example of this profiteering, a now infamous case from Colombia in South America. Here it was found that the active ingredient of the drug Diazepam was overpriced by 5 478 percent as compared to its cost on the open market. This is not a freak example, but simply the extreme case of a very common practice.

This reveals another massive contradiction. If medical care is the correct response to ill-health and disease, then one would expect to find that most resources are directed to where there is most disease. Yet this is not the case, either in South Africa or elsewhere. For it is the poor who suffer most from preventable and treatable diseases, yet it is also the poor who have least access to health care. By far the majority of doctors in private practice work in the wealthy, white urban areas. The annual expenditure on the monstrous new Johannesburg Hospital is not much different from the combined health budget of all the bantustans. Yet there is no evidence to suggest that the new Johannesburg General makes any significant impact on the health of the population that it serves.

MEDICAL TRAINING.

THERE are other strange contradictions that emerge from the way in which resources for health care are allocated. One of these relates to the type of medical training that exists. There are a whole range of tasks and operations currently undertaken by doctors which could be more than adequately carried out by people with much less, and therefore cheaper, training. Yet on the pretext of 'maintaining professional standards at the highest level', these tasks are restricted to

the medical profession. A double wastage of resources occurs: doctors spend much of their time on work that could be done by others, while people who with very little extra training would be more than competent to carry out these tasks are actually prevented from doing so.

A SUMMARY THUSFAR.

ONE COULD go on listing the contradictions between the apparent function of the world of medicine, and the actual practice that is found. But the point has been made, and it is necessary to move beyond description. Firstly, however, a summary of the points covered may be useful.

It has been argued that the science and practice of medicine, although internally coherent, is actually riddled with contradictions when examined from the point of view of one concerned with health rather than medicine, and with the place of medicine within society at large. Amongst these contradictions are

1. that medicine is believed to be the cure for illness, yet illness is social in its origin, and medical care is primarily concerned with treating the individual;
2. that there is a vast expansion in medical technology, yet little clear proof that this has any major impact on disease. The drug industry provides a classic example of medically-related technology that is organised in such a way as to undermine the concrete benefits it could offer;
3. that medical practice and medical education are both irrationally organised if the aim is to make the best use of existing resources to provide adequate health care to the population at large;
4. that those who are sickest, which co-incides with those who are poorest and

without power, have the least access to medical care of either a public or private nature.

TOWARDS AN EXPLANATION.

THE REST of this paper attempts to explain the contradictions described above. Their resolution (as with their explanation) is complicated, but perhaps a step down that road is to understand rather than just to describe. There are no simple solutions, such as those proposed by Ivan Illich, one of the more famous critics of contemporary medicine and medical practice.

Illich starts from a presupposition that technology itself is oppressive. His analysis of various aspects of society have led him to a simplistic and flawed equation. He believes that technology leads to industrialisation, which inevitably gives rise to bureaucracy and bureaucratic control of the consumer. For Illich, medicine is just another bureaucracy, in which the doctors use and manipulate the consumer - in this case the patient - for their own ends. Thus he believes that health care systems actually cause illness, through damage done by doctors and medicines. (This is referred to as iatrogenesis, or doctor-induced disease).

Damage is caused by creating a dependence on the health system, so that people lose their ability to look after themselves. Thus, for Illich, health care systems become self-perpetuating bureaucracies, creating more illness than they cure, ensuring that people will come to rely on them more and more.

For Illich, the solution is simple: destroy the technology, destroy the health care systems, de-doctor society, and people will regain their autonomy and learn to care for themselves.

But, contrary to what Illich argues, technology is not 'bad' - or for that matter 'good' - in any abstract sense. The way technology is used, and the nature of the society it is used in, determines its nature. Health care systems do not of themselves create illness and dependency - but they often do not fulfil their stated aims. It is not that medicine has no contribution to make in creating a healthy world - only that it can neither do so by itself, nor lead the struggle to restructure society.

How then does one explain the contradictions described above? There is no one single, simple explanation, but there is one set of factors which so dominate health care as it exists that these factors are a basis for explanation.

HEALTH CARE AND THE COMMODITY FORM.

IN BRIEF, the nature of health care, as with almost every other aspect of capitalist society, is shaped by its commodity nature. This means that health care is something to be produced, to be bought and sold, to be exchanged at a profit.

- A commodity has a number of basic properties. 3 of these are that
1. it is produced by human endeavour and labour;
 2. it is sold for a certain price through the mechanism of the market;
 3. it must have a use, as well as an exchange price. Consumers must feel that the commodity has a use, that they need it, or else it would not be bought and sold.

Most simply stated, the entire economic system in which we live is based on the production and distribution of commodities. Almost everyone who earns a living is involved in the process of producing commodities or

selling them. The commodity form affects the nature of things that are produced and sold; but at the same time, professional services (like legal assistance and medicine) are also shaped by the commodity form which dominates capitalist society.

A number of factors flow from this commodity form which dominates society. Firstly, if you need something you have to be able to pay for it. Secondly, if you are involved in producing or selling commodities of commodity-imprinted services, your target group is those who can afford to pay for what is offered. Thirdly, if you can convince a group that they need something - be it Coca-Cola or a type of tranquiliser - then you have a market for your commodity. This market will exist even if the commodity is not strictly necessary, or even if it is positively harmful. Certainly it cannot be denied that daily life is filled with attempts to

CONTRADICTIONS IN HEALTH CARE AND THE COMMODITY FORM.

TO RETURN to the world of medicine - and investigate whether the strange paradoxes described earlier cannot be explained by starting from the premise that health care is dominated by the commodity form: health care is produced for sale to individuals (who else would buy it?). Equally important, it is produced for sale to individuals who can afford to buy it. This in-itself is enough to explain why medical practice is oriented to individual patient care. Further, it explains why the medical profession concentrates on curative rather than preventive medicine. The consumer (in other words the patient) does not want to buy medical care when he/she is well: the patient simply wants to buy health

from a doctor when sick. Many of those types of preventive care which exist, such as cancer screening, pap smears, and the general check up, are also compatible with the individual patient-care model which derives from the commodity form.

From this basic premise we can also understand why health care services and doctors are concentrated in the rich urban areas. This is where the market is greatest. It is where people can most afford to pay for medical services.

It is here too that we discover why such a high proportion of resources are directed to complex technology, while vast numbers of people do not have access to even a basic minimum of health care. It is the type of consumer which, to some extent, determines the type of product or service which will be offered. The wealthy, who can afford to pay for health care, have their basic health needs met by the adequate nutrition and hygiene that goes along with a higher standard of living. As such, their medical requirements are mainly for specialist treatment, and the sophisticated technology that goes along with specialist care.

The contradiction between the generally simple skills that are required to provide basic health care to the masses, and the highly specialised nature of medical training, is also explained by the commodity form. The extensive training which doctors receive - both in terms of time and money spent - confers on them the right to charge high rates for their service. Furthermore, it is in the interests of the profession to see that other people, who would be equally capable of doing some of the work that doctors do, are prevented from undertaking such work. Seen in this light, the organised arm of the medical profession,

far from protecting the public by ensuring the highest standards, is little better than a medieval guild, operating a closed shop to look after the interests of its members and to protect them from competition.


The contradictions, the apparent craziness described above, can also be viewed as the result of a conflict between the potential use of medical science and medical care, and its actual practice. The potential use is that it can explain illness and its physical causes, and point the way to a successful battle against disease - although much of this battle must be fought outside the realm of medicine. It can relieve the pain of individual sufferers, and it can care for, and sometimes heal those who are suffering from disease or injury. This is its potential use, and as such it has a great contribution to make. For no-one can deny that the need is there.

On the other hand, the practice of health care has come to be dominated by quite another set of factors. It is determined by the fact that in our society it has been structured by the commodity form, a service to be sold at a profit. Medical science has taught us to see illness as nothing more than the technical malfunction of a machine, which is our body. The cure is therefore sought in a visit to the doctor, who is the body mechanic. He or she fiddles with a few parts, and maybe takes a couple out. The cure is seen as resulting from a technical intervention at the level of the individual patient.

But if sickness is diagnosed and treated as an individual matter, the social causes will never be understood. If cure rests with doctors, the social restructuring necessary for building a healthy society will be obscured.

It must be understood that health is not simply a problem for doctors, or of one's own personal lifestyle. When it is understood that health cannot be bought, that no-one should be allowed to make a profit from disease or create disease from making profit; when it is understood that the struggle for a healthy society involves all progressive individuals - both personally and as a social commitment, then it will also be understood that the medical profession cannot be left with the impossible and misleading task of solving the problems of disease.

Cedric de Bear.



CHOLERA - A TROPICAL DISEASE?

THE YEAR 1980 saw the outbreak and spread in South Africa of an infectious disease that has been virtually absent for at least ten years. Cholera, a disease primarily related to inadequate water supplies, recently struck this country. In the last decade there have been only five reported cases¹, and these acquired the disease outside the country. Last year, however, there were 940 reported cases and 17 deaths within South Africa. To date, more than 23 people have died and there have been over 1 300 cases since the epidemic began in October 1980.²

The epidemic first hit the overcrowded Swazi 'homeland' known as KwaNgwane, and from there has spread to other parts of the eastern Transvaal, areas of Lebowa, Gazankulu, Eikenhof, Brits, Soweto, parts of Natal and the Orange Free State.

The current outbreak of this disease is reported to have originated in Mozambique, and is said to have been aggravated by the fact that africans in rural areas 'know no political boundaries and move freely from South Africa to Mozambique and back'.³ It has also been blamed on the 'neglect and breakdown' of health services in neighbouring countries, and on the ignorance of the people who have been affected.⁴

In this article the author hopes to describe what cholera is, discuss why it has affected the areas that have been struck by the disease by using one particular area as an example,

describe the response of the Department of Health, the reasons for this response and its inadequacies, and finally to put the whole matter in perspective. This will be done by briefly discussing ill health and underdevelopment, and also by discussing the origins of public health in Europe and the similarity to present measures being taken in South Africa. Finally the author wishes to show that the solutions to the diseases of underdevelopment, such as cholera, lie neither in the provision of medical care, nor of an adequate water supply, but must of necessity entail the overcoming and prevention of the very social, environmental, political and economic factors that have resulted in poor health.

UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND HEALTH

IT IS well known and accepted that poverty-stricken people suffer from a wide range of preventable diseases. These diseases of poverty include malnutrition, tuberculosis, typhoid fever, and more recently cholera.

Proponents of community medicine often argue that good health will follow from the provision of basic services such as adequate sanitation and a clean water supply, adequate housing, a reasonable level of nutrition, education and basic health services. It has been shown that the major decreases in the death rates and infections suffered by poor people and the working class have resulted from environmental improvements.⁵

The conventional proponents of community medicine, however, still see poverty as inevitable and, therefore, concentrate on improving the conditions in which the poor subsist. Poverty is seen as the problem of the poor, from which they must be taught to escape. The answer is seen in terms of self-help projects with 'community

involvement'.

The solution proposed, however, does not take into account the causes of poverty itself, and the need for overcoming those. It thus condones poverty as inevitable and concentrates on assisting the poor to cope with their problems. The majority of conventional community health workers follow this line of reasoning.

A more radical analysis of poverty in South Africa is enlightening. The poverty presently found in rural areas was not present when whites first arrived in this country. Rather, it has arisen from the 'progressive underdevelopment which has resulted from the interaction of an indigenous economy in which the surplus produced was redistributed to the community, and an intruding colonial cash economy, backed in the final instance by the guns of the settlers'.⁶

The african people in the rural areas were progressively driven off the land and forced into a meagre 13% of the land. Large proportions of the male population were forced into the cities to work on the mines and later the factories: this was achieved by compelling africans in rural areas to pay cash taxes, such as poll, hut and dog taxes, for which money was required. The indigenous economies degenerated under the pressure of overcrowding, erosion, and the loss of able-bodied men. The reserves became a reservoir from which migrant labourers were drawn when needed for the South African economy. They also became dumping grounds for the old, the infirm, and the unemployed.

The development of the powerful South African capitalist economy has taken place at the expense of the destruction and underdevelopment of the rural areas.⁷ Only by appreciating the historical context in which illness and death in these areas has become so common, can one begin to tackle the real causes of ill health

in South Africa.

CHOLERA - THE DISEASE

THE CHOLERA organism, known as *Vibrio cholerae*, only infects humankind. The infection is acquired through the use of water that has been contaminated with the organism by the faeces of an infected person. The polluted water can infect people when it is drunk, when it is used to prepare food, or even if raw vegetables have been washed with it. Direct spread from one person to another is very rare.

There are two main types of the organism - that causing the current epidemic is known as the El Tor biotype. Infection with this type of the organism may be very mild, and as many as 50 to 75% of the people infected with the organism may feel only slightly ill, or not ill at all. These people, however, may still excrete the organism and infect others. They are thus known as 'carriers' of the disease.

A few hours to five days after swallowing the organism, the symptoms (feelings of illness) of the disease begin. This usually starts with sudden severe diarrhoea without pain or blood, and may be followed by a bout of vomiting. The characteristic stools, initially brown, become clear with mucous and are described as 'rice-water stools'. The hands and feet of the infected person may become cold, and the eyes may become sunken due to the loss of salt and water.

A tremendous amount of fluid is lost, and if not replaced rapidly, the sick person may die from shock. If, however, the water can be replaced, then death should not occur. It is thus very important to give these people lots of water, which should contain specified amounts of salt and sugar: one litre of water should be mixed with eight level teaspoons of sugar and one level teaspoon of salt. This solution should

be given to those suffering from the disease even before they get taken to the hospital or clinic. At the clinic the person must be further rehydrated and treated with an antibiotic.

Measures to control the spread of the disease are important and should be introduced rapidly. Information about the disease, how to recognise it, how to deal with it, and how to prevent it, should be made available. Emphasis should be laid on the fact that it is due to poor water supply and political factors such as forced population relocation and overcrowding. Only by overcoming these will the disease be eradicated. As shown in the rest of the article, this particular aspect of the control of cholera in South Africa has been neglected for reasons which will be made clear.

In the short term, the washing of hands and food in uncontaminated water is necessary. Water for drinking should be boiled and water supplies should be disinfected with certain chemicals. Stools and vomit should be disposed of far away from any water source, and pit toilets should be dug if not already present.

Although a vaccine is available against cholera, it is largely ineffective as it lasts for less than six months and is only successful in 50 to 60% of the people vaccinated. It is thus considered to be unwise to vaccinate vast numbers of people as it gives them a false sense of security and may inadvertently influence people to relax their precautions against eating or drinking unsafe foods.⁸

Cholera is thus essentially a mild disease: few people who become infected actually get seriously ill from it. In addition it is a far less important cause of death and illness in South Africa's rural areas than many other diseases - such as malnutrition, measles, and tuberculosis. It is thus of interest that

so much attention has been devoted to this disease recently, while numerous others continue unabated.

CHOLERA - THE BACKGROUND

CHOLERA is not a new disease, although it has only recently affected South Africa. As long ago as 400BC writers described epidemics with symptoms typical of cholera. Vasco da Gama's expedition was probably struck with cholera in 1490, and British colonial forces in India lost thousands of soldiers from the disease in the 18th and 19th centuries.⁹ Cholera has long been common in West Bengal and Bangladesh, and there have been numerous outbreaks of the disease throughout south and southeast Asia. The disease has also spread to other parts of the world such as Europe, the United States, and Africa.

During the colonial period, cholera spread through east Africa along the trade routes, leaving hundreds of thousands dead - another disastrous consequence of imperialism. Cholera epidemics occurred in the United Kingdom in the 1830s and 1840s. In the 1850s, during the period of rapid urbanisation and industrialisation in Europe, over 140 000 people died in France, 24 000 in Italy and 20 000 in Britain because of cholera.¹⁰ The last major cholera epidemic in the West occurred in 1866-7. The disease has thus not been limited to 'tropical' countries, but has struck wherever the prevailing conditions are suitable for its spread.

In 1961 a wave of cholera epidemics spread across the world. It started in Asia and spread westwards. The massive population shifts resulting from the Pakistani-Indian war in 1971 led to thousands of deaths and continued the further spread of the disease. The organism

spread to Africa at about this time and since then the disease has spread rapidly across the continent. Angola, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe have all had major cholera problems in the past decade, and it is not surprising that the disease has now reached South Africa.

Cholera is one of the many diseases labelled as 'tropical'. However, as has been shown 'tropical' diseases have frequently struck non-tropical areas such as Europe and the United States. By calling a disease 'tropical' the authorities can claim it is natural in a given area, and thus deflect the responsibility for actually creating the circumstances in which diseases, such as cholera, can flourish.

Doyal states that¹⁰

Contrary to common belief, (these) diseases of underdevelopment are not necessarily bound up with the tropical conditions in the geographic or climatic sense. Cholera, plague, leprosy, smallpox, and many intestinal parasites have all thrived in Western Europe in the past. Indeed, there is a striking similarity between disease patterns in underdeveloped countries today and the experience of the industrialised capitalist countries in the nineteenth century. In the third world, infant mortality rates, child wastage rates (deaths before 15 years), life expectancy and the incidence of major communicable diseases all show a clear parallel with nineteenth century Britain. Yet these diseases now associated with underdevelopment have long since disappeared in the metropolitan countries

- primarily because many of the conditions predisposing to these diseases of underdevelopment have been improved substantially.

CHOLERA AND WATER


THE RELATIONSHIP between cholera and water has been long known. John Snow, the 'father of epidemiology', studied cholera and water supply in the mid-19th century. During the cholera epidemic in London in 1853-4 he proved that the disease was being spread by a water company

which did not purify the water it supplied (because it was cheaper), and which had become infected with human waste matter. Snow proved his theory graphically by breaking the pipe


supplying the contaminated water - resulting in a massive decrease in the number of cases of cholera.¹¹

Cholera is a 'water-borne' disease, is

The Spread of Cholera South Africa 1980



This map and the one on the next page from Department of Health, Epidemiological Comments, November, 1980.



the infecting organism is found in the water itself. It is, therefore, found in areas with poor water supply and sewage removal.

The value of sanitation is demonstrated by two examples. First of all, cholera has been transported to Japan and various European countries on a number of occasions, but the disease has not spread because of the relatively high standard of sanitation in these countries.¹² Similarly,

the conditions under which the vast majority of South African whites live will prevent their succumbing to the disease. Secondly, carefully evaluated studies in the Phillipines have shown that the only way to overcome cholera is through the provision of clean water.¹²

Thus it can be shown that 'the very existence of cholera and its spread is an indicator of the inadequacy of sanitation'.¹² Although a

pure water supply will not guarantee good health, an inadequate water supply will ensure poor health.

CHOLERA AND KANGWANE

CHOLERA has occurred in the last few months in many areas of the country. It originated, however, in the eastern Transvaal, and this area depicts very clearly the types of conditions

necessary for the spread of the disease. The relationship between underdevelopment and poor health is shown by examining cholera and the area in which it started.

The eastern Transvaal region, the focus of the present cholera epidemic, was described in a recent Department of Health publication on cholera as 'picturesque, mountainous area which nestles a very fertile valley abounding in estates and farms of various sizes. Crops grown consist of vegetables (cabbages, tomatoes, and tropical fruit and citrus) but there are also vast sugar plantations'.¹³

In the same publication, KaNgwane, the Swazi reserve, is mentioned in passing, but little detail is given to this part of the eastern Transvaal in which the disease has flourished.

KaNgwane presently consists of three separate areas in the eastern Transvaal, strategically located on the borders of Swaziland and Mozambique. The three areas are known as Nkomazi, Nsikazi, and a 'new area'.¹⁴ The total area of land in KaNgwane was 20 301ha in 1973, and with the consolidation proposals for the 'homeland' the land mass is to be increased to 391 000ha.¹⁵ The population density in 1977 was estimated at 57,5 per square km.¹⁶ Other sources estimated the population density as 144 people per square mile in 1970.^{17a} In the rest of South Africa the average population density was 35 people per square mile.^{17a}

The quasi-government BENS0 report states that the present density is 'indeed high for a predominantly rural population'¹⁶ and with the forced relocation of people into KaNgwane it will increase substantially.

The number of people in KaNgwane was 117 890 in 1970 and it was estimated that there would be 213 900 people in KaNgwane by 1977.¹⁶ At the same time the Swazi population outside

of the reserve was estimated at 390 600 in 1970 and 439 200 in 1977.¹⁶ Clearly the population in KaNgwane is being dramatically increased by the government policies of forcibly relocating people into the reserves.

The BENS0 report describes this population relocation programme as being 'the resettlement in KaNgwane of Swazi from badly situated Black areas or other Black states'.^{17b} It continues by saying that 'since a start was made with the buying of farms in the newly added area, the resettlement of Swazis has started in earnest'^{17b} (author's emphasis).

This massive influx of people has led to the formation of numerous squatter towns. Many of the squatters were labour-tenants who were forcibly removed from white-owned farms in adjacent areas. Many of the people are extremely poor and have no access to land.¹⁸

The most common employment in the area is to work as farm labourers or forestry workers, who together make up 41,3% of the economically active population.¹⁹ The BENS0 publication states that 'the men especially apparently prefer to work as migrant workers outside the country when their own farms cannot satisfy their requirements'.²⁰ Interestingly the same publication states that the Nkomazi area of KaNgwane is mainly a stock grazing region but that dry-land crop production is possible 'but is severely restricted by population pressure'²¹ (author's emphasis). In addition, the Nsikazi region is fairly densely populated and very little agricultural land is available for agricultural planning.²² It is thus not surprising that even those who have some land in KaNgwane 'cannot satisfy their requirements'.

The considerable increase in population has led to major problems in providing housing and services. BENS0 mentions that the two

proclaimed towns of Ekulindeni and Eerstehoek 'could not nearly keep pace with resettlement'.²³ In addition squatter towns have developed around Kabokweni, Matsulu, Kanyamazene and in areas where new towns are being planned.²⁴

It is against this background of population relocation and the resultant population pressure that the spread of cholera in KaNgwane should be seen. The massive increase in population with totally inadequate facilities is clearly a major factor in the spread of the disease.

Officially opening the second session of KaNgwane's legislative assembly, Dr Willie Vosloo, Deputy Minister of Plural Relations and Development, acknowledged that the provision of services was under considerable strain. 'The Swazi people, who are clearly experiencing a national awakening, are still flocking to the territory in their thousands',²⁵ (sic) he said. He stated further that because so many people had moved into the area, services became inadequate, and the highest degree of administrative skill was needed to prevent a collapse. In its turn, this would create still greater inadequacies in the services available to the area's residents.²⁶

'As far as we are concerned resettlement is a political bomb', said EJ Mabuza, the chief minister of the Swazi 'homeland'. He claims that KaNgwane has absorbed 150 000 people in the last few years, and adds that 'some resettlement areas have no amenities whatsoever, no running water, no sewerage system, no schools and no clinics. Many of the people have no jobs. Some people have to drink dirty water. They think we are responsible. There is no message we can get across to them until their problems have been attended to'.²⁷

It appears that the administrative collapse Vosloo had warned of, had occurred, but as Pretoria desires, the inadequacies are blamed on

the KaNgwane authorities and not on the central government.

It is ironic that some of the people who have been moved to KaNgwane have ostensibly been moved in order to promote their health. Residents of Doornkop in the eastern Transvaal were moved to KaNgwane because it was said that they did not have proper water and sewerage facilities and that the place was a health hazard.²⁷ It seems apparent that present conditions are far worse, but the health hazard is now possible further away from the white residents of Doornkop.

One of the two areas of KaNgwane that has been particularly affected by cholera has been the township of Matsulu. This township is located at the southwest corner of the Kruger National Park, between the Crocodile and Nsikazi Rivers. The township is partly administered by the KaNgwane authorities, and has been described as a 'disaster', with houses containing 10 to 15 people in each, packed closely together.²⁸ There are at least 11 000 squatters near Matsulu township, some of them having been recently moved off white-owned farms throughout the eastern Transvaal. Other squatters have been there for months.²⁸

The township of Matsulu obtains its water from reservoirs containing water piped from an irrigation canal known as the Malelane-Crocodile Poort irrigation canal. It is this particular area of the Crocodile River that was initially infected with the cholera organism and was responsible for the outbreak of the disease.²⁹

The Department of Health was actually warned months ago by one of its own officials that epidemics were a grave danger in the squatter settlements of the KaNgwane 'homeland' - however, the warning was not heeded and a pure water source was not provided in the area.²⁸

It is not clear who in particular is

responsible for the water supply in the area:

9.2. Water Authorities

Here much the same applied as far as sheer numbers of authorities were concerned. In all there must be also about five different water authorities, or levels of authority, dealing with the canal and the rivers in the area. These include Local Irrigation Boards, the KaNgwane Department of Works, the Local Administration Board, the Department of Water Affairs, the Department of Health, Welfare and Pensions.

Under the circumstances it was sometimes difficult to establish exactly WHO is responsible for WHAT:WHERE.

So, for example, the canal was sometimes closed (shut off) to repair a leak in the system. The warning that this would occur did not always reach the estimated 10 - 12 000 people living at Matsulu in time. Under normal circumstances this can be very unpleasant. During a cholera outbreak it can be disastrous.

In the presence of an empty reservoir the inhabitants are obliged to seek other water sources - and the closest alternative is the open river. The canal water was cut off on two known occasions, first on 10 October and again on 17 October.³⁰

Clearly adequate water supply and sewage disposal is not available to the people in the township. Many of the other sufferers of the disease in the early stage of the epidemic were workers on farms and mines in the area. At least one inmate at a prison farm also suffered from the disease.³¹

The cholera outbreak has been exacerbated by climatic conditions. In the hot summer months people require more water to drink and this has been aggravated by the rains which have washed human waste matter into the rivers and canals from which water is drawn.

In addition to the bureaucratic backwardness in providing proper water, the authorities have laid the blame on the individuals involved, and not on the state's inability or lack of willingness to provide these basic facilities. Just before the cholera outbreak there had been problems with the water purification in Matsulu, and in addition many people preferred to draw water from the river which was nearer and wasted less time waiting in queues at the water points.²⁸ The Chief Director of the eastern Transvaal Administration Board felt the blame could be shifted away from the state by saying:²⁸

It is a matter of education - these people have been drawing water from rivers all their lives.

THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

THE RESPONSE of the state, through the Department of Health and the Department of Water Affairs, has been interesting. Plans were made over seven years ago by the South African Institute of Medical Research for the possibility of a cholera outbreak in South Africa.⁹ More than a year ago, Department of Health officials prepared an in-depth report on how to deal with cholera should it spread to South Africa.³² The state thus acknowledged that conditions in certain areas of South Africa were so poor as to easily facilitate the outbreak and spread of cholera. Yet nothing was done to alter those conditions which have now led to the epidemic.

When asked why nothing had been done to provide clean water for squatters in Matsulu and other nearby areas, Dr John Hoyland said, 'the squatters are a problem of the KaNgwane government - I cannot speak about them'.²⁸ Dr Hoyland is the regional representative of the Department of Health, and advises the KaNgwane authorities on health matters. He also said that 'as far as the squatters are concerned there are other factors involved which have nothing to do with us'.²⁸

The response of the Department of Water Affairs has been notable, in that few, if any, statements have been made on the issue of water supply in KaNgwane and elsewhere. The Department also did not seize this opportunity to 'win the hearts and the minds of the people' by providing a pure water source to KaNgwane, a relatively small area. It seems that the demands by other communities and squatter settlements for proper water supply and sewage removal, which would follow the installation in select areas, would

be too great for the state to meet.

It seems that no authority is willing to accept responsibility for the poor conditions, yet the blame must lie with successive generations of government in South Africa that have forcibly removed people from their land, disrupted the indigenous subsistence economies, depleted the rural areas of able-bodied people, and taken them to work on the mines and in industry, and forcibly relocated people into overcrowded and unproductive pieces of land.

Doyal states that¹⁰

both the extent of contemporary health problems (in the underdeveloped world) and also the evident failure to combat them, must be seen not as a 'natural' and unavoidable part of life in the third world, but as a consequence of a particular form of capitalist expansion.

The applicability of this point to the underdeveloped rural areas of South Africa needs little further discussion.

THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

THE DEPARTMENT of health initially attempted to conceal aspects of the cholera outbreak,³³ and Department officials agreed to discuss only 'cholera in general', and not particularly in the eastern Transvaal. They also would not identify the specific areas of the lowveld that were involved.³⁴ The Department of Health also instructed hospital officials in Mectorspruit, KaNgwane, Nelspruit and Barberton, not to talk to the press.³⁴ The Progressive Federal Party spokesperson on health was said to have stated that the epidemic was far more serious than the official disclosures led to believe, and that the government should 'come clean' on cholera figures.³⁵ More recently the state Health Department has been accused of covering up news of the spread of cholera to Natal and areas of the Orange Free State.

The Department denied that they had hidden anything from the public and said that they had, in fact, 'made the public over-anxious about the issue' by its revelations of every notified case.³⁵

The Department considered the outbreak in a serious light because it was a 'strange disease' which killed and 'deprived people of their joy of life', it taxed the time and services of the limited number of health personnel, and it was a pointer to defects in environmental health.³⁶

The citizens of Nelspruit were annoyed by reports that cholera had reached epidemic proportions in the lowveld, as tourism in the area was suffering.³⁷ The town clerk accused the Department of Health of spreading panic with reports of cholera. Even one or two veld schools which normally function in the area were temporarily closed. The Department of Health stepped up its public statements and encouraged tourists not to avoid the eastern Transvaal as long as they took basic precautions to avoid contracting the disease.

The Department of Health vaguely threatened to take legal action against anyone who did not help it with its medical hygiene and education programmes to combat the disease.³⁸ The Department also advised against employing africans from surrounding territories and stated that they might take such action as preventing visitors to a house where there had been a case of cholera or preventing communal beer-drinking.³⁹ These measures were aimed at ensuring that the disease did not spread from the areas in which it originated, to the surrounding white areas.

The Department of Health became particularly involved in investigating the source of the outbreak and attempted to limit the spread of the disease. One of the constraints in dealing with the problem was the duplication of administrative responsibility in the area:⁴⁰

Co-ordinated action requires co-ordinated authority. This was not always easy to ensure in the face of at least five health authorities operative in the afflicted area:

- The Department of Health, Welfare and Pensions of the RSA
- The Transvaal Board for the Development of Peri-Urban Areas
- The KaNgwane Department of Health and Welfare
- The Transvaal Provincial Administration
- certain local authorities.

Besides attempting to isolate the source of the infected water, the Department devoted its energy to a programme of public education. People were advised to wash their hands before eating and after going to the toilet, to wash fruit and vegetables with treated tap water, to boil water before drinking, and to build pit latrines.⁴¹ Over 500 000 pamphlets in various languages were distributed through garages along routes to the northern and eastern Transvaal.⁴² On investigation by the author it was found that in many cases these were not given out by garage attendants as they were not told what to do with them. In addition, the pamphlets were sometimes not in local languages - for example, near Pietersburg the pamphlet appeared in Xhosa, Swazi, Venda and Tsonga, but not in Northern Sotho, which is the predominant language spoken in the area. These pamphlets stated:⁴¹

Drinking water is the main source of cholera infection. The germs responsible for cholera are found in the stools of human beings. Because of lack of hygiene these germs get into the drinking water.

The impression given is that people are deliberately unhygienic. As with such health education, individuals are accused of ignorance and little attention is given to the social and economic realities that leads to diseases of this nature.

The Department of Health also issued a statement that 'epidemiological information

BEWARE OF CHOLERA PREVENT CHOLERA HLOKOMELA LEFU LA CHOLERA THIBELA LEFU LA CHOLERA

Drinking water is the main source of Cholera infection. The germs responsible for Cholera are found in the stools of human beings. Because of lack of hygiene these germs get into the drinking water.

After drinking or handling this water, the patient develops a large number of liquid stools. Because of severe fluid loss shock and also death can occur.

TO PREVENT CHOLERA:

Metsi a nowang ho sona sesasa se seholo sa tshwasetso ya cholera. Dikokwana-hloko tse jarang cholera di fumanwa mantleng a batho. Ka baka la tihokeho ya bophelo ho hihlekileng dikokwana-hloko tse di kana metsing a nowang.

Kamora hore a nwe kape a tshwara metsi ana, mokudi o ba le mantle a metsi (letshollo). Ka baka la ho lhekela ho batho, hwa makedikedi mmeleeng, mokudi a ka tshwa ho ho tshwa kape a shwa.

HO THIBELA CHOLERA:

Eng. R. Botha
67-4-1966

between South Africa and the health departments of the national states are being separated and therefore totals on cholera patients cannot be given'.⁴³ By making this separation government authorities firstly can claim that the vast majority of cases have occurred 'outside South

1. Use only boiled, clean or treated water.
1. Sebetsa feela metsi a bolilwang, a tshwariwang, a hlophileng kape a sebediswang.

2. Wash your hands before handling food.
2. Hlatswa matsoho pele o tshwara dijo.

3. Wash your food with clean or treated water.
3. Hlatswa dijo tse tse ho metsi a tshwariwang kape a sebediswang.

4. Use a toilet or a proper place for iron, wells, rivers and streams, and not the open field.
4. Hlophela tshwariwang kape tshwariwang a nwe a baka ho ditso, ditsoho ho matsoho a nwe a nwe ho tshwariwang kape.

laholera aho leshwara kape metsi a bolilwang, a tshwariwang, a hlophileng kape. Sebetsa feela metsi a bolilwang, a tshwariwang, a hlophileng kape. Sebetsa feela metsi a bolilwang, a tshwariwang, a hlophileng kape.

Metsi a a nwe aho aho tshwariwang kape a tshwariwang kape.

Zwitsahlil zwil vhangho dvedza la cholera, zwil wena laho matsoho a vhangho.

Zwitsahlil hawil zwil nbe di dthana madal nge athani ho a shaya mdhwa ya ngudu-matshole.

Metsi matsoho a nwe metsi matsoho matsoho a nwe, a tshwariwang kape, a tshwariwang kape, a tshwariwang kape, a tshwariwang kape.

U THIBELA LA CHOLERA:

VIMBELA ICHOLERA THOGOMELANI DWADZE LA CHOLERA THIVHELANI DWADZE LA CHOLERA


1. Sebetsa metsi a bolilwang, a tshwariwang, a hlophileng kape.
1. Hlatswa matsoho pele o tshwara dijo.

2. Sebetsa matsoho pele o tshwara dijo.
2. Hlatswa matsoho pele o tshwara dijo.

3. Hlatswa matsoho pele o tshwara dijo.
3. Hlatswa matsoho pele o tshwara dijo.

4. Hlatswa matsoho pele o tshwara dijo.
4. Hlatswa matsoho pele o tshwara dijo.

4. Hlatswa matsoho pele o tshwara dijo.
4. Hlatswa matsoho pele o tshwara dijo.



Africa', and secondly that it is the responsibility of the 'Black national states' and their health departments to deal with this and other health problems. This categorisation of statistics according to area of origin is being applied to all other notifiable health conditions as well

(see table below). This table, and tables 1, 2 and 3 reproduced from Epidemiological Comments, Dec, 1980.

TABLE 1. NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS BY CONDITION AND REGION / BLACK NATIONAL STATES.

REPORTING PERIOD JANUARY TO NOVEMBER 1980

CODE	CONDITION NAME	REGIONS					BLACK NATIONAL STATES					INDEPENDENT BOPHE					GRAND TOTAL			
		HEALTH EAST	CAPE WEST	CAPE NORTH	OF RSA NATAL	OPS	TYL SOUTH	TYL NORTH	TOTAL	SELF - GOVERNING CIS KEE	GAZAR EULU	KWA ZULU	LEBO WA	QUA QUA	KAN GWARE	THAT SWANA		TRAN SKEI	VLNDA	
0020	TYPHOID	49	54	15	112	54	201	641	1330	36	165	456	427	0	675	39	102	59	1956	3254
032	DIPHTHERIA	2	6	0	7	0	21	0	26	3	0	2	2	0	1	0	0	8	44	
030	LEPROSY	3	2	3	14	6	36	2	66	1	0	7	4	0	3	0	2	17	83	
064	MALARIA	2	3	2	281	1	59	1175	1523	0	131	684	13	0	354	0	0	86	1468	2991
055	MEASLES	2134	1162	398	1780	793	3169	584	10000	358	77	2234	1369	0	215	631	541	128	5553	15557
034	NEISSERIAL INFECTION	31	661	31	32	18	110	12	895	6	0	18	19	0	7	13	3	3	74	461
045	POLIOHELYTIS	10	9	2	11	1	12	4	49	6	2	13	4	0	3	1	20	0	49	97
037	TETANUS	10	2	10	38	6	30	13	109	3	7	51	27	0	18	2	11	1	120	224
011	TB PULMONARY	5127	6527	1651	2977	2233	11306	897	30728	1914	202	2982	904	0	558	1331	2545	157	10623	41151
013	TB MENINGES	37	33	12	23	7	55	2	159	19	0	11	2	0	1	6	27	1	67	220
010-4	TB TOTAL	5257	6813	1695	3060	2256	11465	902	31443	1955	202	3058	913	0	570	1353	2614	188	10953	42296
0701	VIRAL HEP TYPE A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	4
0702	VIRAL HEP TYPE B	6	3	0	1	0	0	1	11	0	0	0	0	0	9	1	0	0	10	21
0705	VIRAL HEP TYPE NON A - B	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
0709	VIRAL HEP UNSPEC	136	253	55	266	43	485	14	1252	24	3	66	23	0	36	53	15	5	225	1107
070	VIRAL HEP TOTAL	144	262	55	267	43	485	45	1301	24	3	66	23	0	48	54	15	5	238	1539
	TOTAL	7838	8975	2211	5802	3178	15588	3360	46752	2392	597	6580	2801	0	2094	2043	3313	170	20339	67091

ALL STATISTICS ARE SUBJECT TO UPDATING AND REFLECT AVAILABLE INFORMATION AS AT RCN DATE (02/12/80)

In summary then, the role of the Department has been to attempt to suppress information about the disease, to attempt to prevent the spread of the disease to white areas, to shift the responsibility for dealing with the disease and its causes firstly onto the individual and secondly onto the 'Black national states' and away from Pretoria. At the same time the Department has neglected to do anything about the more common and dangerous preventable diseases found in rural areas.

Clearly, however, the Department of Health cannot possibly eradicate the disease and it 'is likely to be present for a long time yet - quiescent at times, only to break out and spread with renewed intensity'.⁹ The Department cannot overcome the diseases of underdevelopment, such as cholera, because it does not tackle the causes of diseases such as this. In fact, to tackle them would be to tackle the South African state and the political and economic factors which preserve the status quo.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND DISEASE

THE DEPARTMENT of Health has also taken this opportunity to publicise its primary health care programmes and to boast that South African services are better than many elsewhere. This emphasis on primary health care and preventative medicine gives the impression that the Department has the correct approach and is doing all it can to promote health for all people in South Africa. As we have already seen, this is not the case. In fact, it is notable that the Department has shown little interest in other preventable diseases which occur commonly in KaNgwane:⁴⁴

KaNgwane is susceptible to most of the diseases commonly occurring in developing countries. Those most prevalent are venereal disease, bilharzia, tuberculosis, malaria, other infectious and parasitical diseases, and typhoid fever. The last mentioned and infectious hepatitis result from poor standards of sanitation and water supply in KaNgwane (author's emphasis).

A startling fact is that more than 20% of the cases of typhoid fever reported from throughout

the country in 1980 occurred in KaNgwane, in which fewer than 1% of the total population of South Africa live.⁴⁵

Tuberculosis is rife in KaNgwane, the number of cases occurring there being more than double the rate for the rest of South Africa, and higher than in any of the other 'homelands'.⁴⁵ Although figures of officially reported cases of any disease must be viewed with caution, it is clear that KaNgwane is susceptible to many diseases. However, little, if anything, has been done to overcome the basic factors leading to the high rates of the diseases of underdevelopment in that, and other, areas.

Why then has there been such a flurry of activity relating to cholera? It seems that the fear of cholera, which has connotations of a rapidly spreading fatal disease, has become the prime influence in all this activity. Fear of the disease spreading to 'white' areas is the major factor in the massive press publicity and attention that the disease has achieved. In point

of fact, cholera is a relatively minor disease, and far less important as a cause of death and illness than numerous other diseases. There were, for example, over 40 000 cases of tuberculosis in South Africa in 1980⁴⁵ but this disease has not received even a fraction of the publicity given to cholera. Infantile gastro-enteritis, a major killer of infants in rural areas, has received little, if any, attention from the health authorities because it poses no threat to the white population of South Africa.

The origins of public health in Europe, as well as the origins of the colonial health services, offer much to explain the current focus of activity on cholera.

Public health services in Europe began in an attempt to prevent the privileged classes from succumbing to the diseases of the poor:⁴⁶

The 'condition of the working class' was a topic of considerable concern in Britain throughout the nineteenth century. The ill health of the urban proletariat posed an immediate threat of infection to the inhabitants of the wealthier parts of town, while at the same time epitomising the danger of the slums as a breeding ground for a wide range of social problems... Attempts by the expanding central and local state apparatus to solve these problems were concentrated on public health measures - the control of disease through the provision of clean water, sewerage disposal, and some slum clearance.

Thus, the factor which led to the starting of public health programmes was not concern for the poor exploited masses who suffered from the diseases, but rather fear of catching these infectious diseases from the poor, and also concern that the working class would become sick and, therefore, far less productive.

With regard to cholera in particular Doyal continues by saying that⁵⁷

it was fear of infectious disease in general and - after the epidemics of the 1830s and

Table 1. POPULATION ESTIMATES BY HEALTH REGION, 1970 - 1980. (x 1 000)

YEAR	H E A L T H R E G I O N							TOTAL H/Regions
	<u>Cape</u>	<u>Cape</u>	<u>Cape</u>	<u>Natal</u>	<u>O.F.S.S.</u>	<u>Transv</u>	<u>Transv.</u>	
	<u>East</u>	<u>West</u>	<u>North</u>			<u>South</u>	<u>North</u>	
1970	1 564,2	2 184,7	588,6	2 191,6	1 689,0	5 641,2	901,3	14 760,6
1971	1 583,6	2 211,9	595,9	2 223,7	1 702,9	5 754,0	919,3	14 991,3
1972	1 603,3	2 239,4	603,3	2 256,2	1 716,9	5 869,8	937,7	15 225,8
1973	1 623,3	2 267,2	610,8	2 289,2	1 731,0	5 986,3	955,4	15 464,2
1974	1 643,4	2 295,4	618,4	2 322,7	1 745,3	6 106,0	975,5	15 706,7
1975	1 663,9	2 323,9	626,1	2 356,7	1 759,6	6 228,0	995,8	15 953,2
1976	1 684,6	2 352,8	633,8	2 391,2	1 774,1	6 352,5	1 014,9	16 203,9
1977	1 705,5	2 382,1	641,7	2 426,2	1 788,7	6 479,5	1 035,2	16 458,9
1978	1 726,7	2 411,7	649,7	2 461,6	1 803,4	6 609,0	1 055,9	16 718,0
1979	1 748,2	2 441,6	657,7	2 497,7	1 818,2	6 741,1	1 077,8	16 981,5
1980	1 769,9	2 472,0	665,9	2 534,2	1 833,2	6 875,9	1 098,5	17 249,6

YEAR	N A T I O N A L S T A T E S						TOTAL H/Regions R.S.A.	
	<u>Ciskei</u>	<u>Orange</u>	<u>Kwazulu</u>	<u>Lebowa</u>	<u>Qwa qwa</u>	<u>Kapuvana</u>		
1970	353,6	274,3	2 156,1	1 113,2	25,4	121,8	14 760,6	18 884,2
1971	375,8	298,8	2 242,1	1 169,8	31,7	124,4	14 991,3	19 224,3
1972	397,6	306,5	2 331,5	1 229,3	39,6	128,8	15 225,8	19 658,3
1973	421,6	324,0	2 424,5	1 291,8	49,4	131,6	15 464,2	20 187,1
1974	447,1	342,5	2 521,2	1 357,5	61,6	135,3	15 706,7	20 571,8
1975	474,1	362,1	2 621,8	1 426,6	76,8	139,1	15 953,2	21 053,7
1976	502,7	382,7	2 726,3	1 499,1	95,9	143,1	16 203,9	21 553,7
1977	533,1	404,6	2 835,1	1 575,4	119,7	147,1	16 458,9	22 073,9
1978	565,3	427,7	2 948,1	1 655,5	149,3	151,3	16 718,0	22 615,2
1979	599,4	452,1	3 065,7	1 739,7	186,3	155,6	16 981,5	23 188,3
1980	635,6	477,9	3 188,8	1 828,2	232,5	160,8	17 249,6	23 771,8

Table 2.

THE ANNUAL NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS OF ALL FORMS OF TUBERCULOSIS PER HEALTH REGION AND NATIONAL STATE, 1971 TO 1979, SOUTH AFRICA.

Year	HEALTH REGION							
	Cape	Cape	Cape	Total	O.F.S.	Transv.	Transv.	TOTAL
	East	West	North		South	North	N/Regions	
1971	7 813	5 875	1 956	6 734	1 841	12 885	3 834	48 988
1972	8 165	6 874	2 178	7 671	1 889	14 376	2 927	43 192
1973	7 695	6 608	1 713	7 589	1 779	13 512	1 816	48 784
1974	9 863	7 521	2 814	7 383	2 135	13 624	1 824	43 564
1975	10 818	7 548	1 627	8 173	1 933	13 867	1 829	45 795
1976	8 111	7 217	1 469	7 411	2 811	13 987	1 624	42 558
1977	6 884	7 236	1 716	6 618	2 429	13 626	1 444	39 873
1978	6 282	7 541	2 158	6 383	2 561	13 855	1 837	39 738
1979	5 933	8 618	2 113	4 698	2 788	18 884	1 361	40 507
1980								

NATIONAL STATES

Year	Ciskei	Caprivi	KwaZulu	Lebowa	Qwa qwa	Karungu	Total	TOTAL
							N/Regions	R.S.A.
1971	94	-	1 859	-	-	-	48 988	42 861
1972	129	105	1 862	45	-	-	43 192	45 324
1973	362	312	3 327	1 421	-	6	48 784	46 132
1974	488	332	2 929	1 574	-	-	43 564	48 887
1975	1 294	499	3 453	1 778	-	-	45 795	52 819
1976	1 554	543	3 242	1 582	-	-	42 558	49 441
1977	1 093	442	2 216	1 458	-	-	39 873	45 074
1978	1 267	467	2 887	1 597	-	123	39 738	45 199
1979	1 563	373	3 883	1 581	169	678	48 587	47 866
1980								

1840s - of cholera in particular, which motivated middle-class support for public health legislation. Cholera was no respecter of the social status of individuals. It attacked the poor and the respectable middle-class indiscriminately (Author's note - in those times parts of working class and middle class areas were supplied with the same water). Thus, for the middle-class in Victorian cities, public health reform was an important form of self-defence against contagion spreading outwards from the slums.

It was also felt in Victorian England that disease and ill health made people poor, and that disease therefore increased the number of people requiring poor relief. This is an additional reason for public health legislation.⁴⁷

The origins of colonial health policy reflected similar priorities:⁴⁸

The East African medical department was instructed firstly to 'preserve the health' of the European community, secondly to keep the African and Asian labour force in reasonable working condition, and lastly to prevent the spread of epidemics.

Similar reasons have been put forward to explain the public health approach to dealing with cholera in South Africa. It is interesting that private companies have printed, at their own cost, health educational material on cholera,⁴² so as to prevent the loss of work resulting from workers contracting the disease.

CONCLUSION

IT IS clear from the article that cholera cannot be viewed merely as a tropical disease, but must be seen within the context of a web of migrant labour, forced resettlement, overcrowding and poor community services. These factors must be seen as resulting from the development of capitalism and the apartheid policy in South Africa.

The article has attempted to discuss the origins of the cholera outbreak in South Africa,

the nature of the disease itself, the major area in which it has occurred, and the activities of the Department of Health in dealing with the epidemic. Historical factors relating to cholera were looked at in order to show that this is largely a disease related to underdevelopment and has not been limited to so-called 'tropical countries'. A focus on the origins of public health was given in order to demonstrate some of the factors influencing the state in dealing with the present epidemic.

Finally, it is hoped that through this paper people will gain an understanding of the relationship between underdevelopment and poor health, and will realise that cholera is but one example of many diseases related to underdevelopment. It thus becomes apparent that the solution to cholera lies neither in the provision of health services, nor merely in the development of sanitary living conditions, but implies the eradication of the unequal access to wealth, resources, and political power which are present in the country. Only when the majority of the people control the resources which influence health will health for all be promoted.

Anthony Zwi

It is hoped that an article of this nature provides information that can be used by communities and other groups to understand the relationship between ill health and socio-political factors in our society. Through this understanding issues related to health may serve to provide a starting point for community action.

Any committee or group wishing to obtain further information on cholera or other prevalent diseases, may contact the editors who will put them in touch with resource people.

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Table 3.


THE ANNUAL KNOWN INCIDENCE RATE OF ALL FORMS OF TUBERCULOSIS PER HEALTH REGION AND NATIONAL STATE, 1971 TO 1979, SOUTH AFRICA, PER ESTIMATED 100 000 POPULATION.

<u>Year</u>	<u>H E A L T H R E G I O N</u>							<u>Total</u>
	<u>Cape</u> <u>East</u>	<u>Cape</u> <u>West</u>	<u>Cape</u> <u>North</u>	<u>Natal</u>	<u>O.F.S.</u>	<u>Transv</u> <u>South</u>	<u>Transv.</u> <u>North</u>	
1971	493	266	328	303	108	223	417	273
1972	509	271	360	348	105	245	312	284
1973	474	295	381	328	103	228	198	263
1974	551	328	326	318	122	223	187	277
1975	650	325	268	347	110	223	184	287
1976	481	307	232	318	158	219	168	263
1977	389	384	267	273	136	218	148	242
1978	364	313	332	256	142	198	174	238
1979	338	363	321	188	137	223	126	239
1980								

	<u>N A T I O N A L S T A T E S</u>						<u>TOTAL RSA</u>
	<u>Ciskei</u>	<u>Gasankulu</u>	<u>Kwazulu</u>	<u>Lehewa</u>	<u>Qwa Qwa</u>	<u>Kapenosa</u>	
1971	R.C.	v	83	-	-	-	223
1972	R.C.	R.C.	80	R.C.	-	-	231
1973	R.C.	96	137	118	-	-	229
1974	R.C.	97	116	116	-	-	238
1975	273	138	132	125	-	-	281
1976	389	142	119	184	-	-	229
1977	285	188	78	92	-	-	284
1978	224	189	66	97	-	R.C.	288
1979	261	83	98	91	91	431	286
1980							

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KANGWANE

THE CREATION of the new KaNgwane bantustan is a prime example of the process of 'ethnification' of the South African population that the South African state has undertaken in the service of the apartheid policy. It is an artificial creation that is meant to be on a path to 'nationhood' and 'independence'. The KaNgwane region was formerly known as the 'homeland for the Swazi', and lies on the borders of Swaziland and Mozambique.

BENSO calls it the 'youngest of the self-governing Black states in South Africa'. The bantustan has already had a stormy history of constitutional and political infighting and backstabbing that led, with the inevitability of 'divine' (central state) intervention, to the institution of a KaNgwane Legislative Assembly in October, 1977.

BENSO has the rare directness to admit in their KaNgwane Revue (sic) that even compared to other bantustans 'KaNgwane, ..., is still a backward area'.

The KaNgwane region is, as is inevitable with the process of ethnification and consolidation, a vast relocation area, characterised by the physical and mental misery that accompanies removals. In 1970 the population (de facto - living within the region itself) was said to be 117 890, with another 390 600 Swazi living outside the region. BENSO estimates for 1977 were respectively 213 900 (!) and 439 200. The farce of South African statistics can be gauged by BENSO's later calculations, giving a de facto population of only 159 882 for 1980 (see Table 6 in the article on Pensions, in this issue).

In this issue two articles deal with aspects of life in KaNgwane - the one below on agriculture, and the article on cholera.

CASH CROPPING IN KANGWANE

INTRODUCTION

CERTAIN contradictory trends are apparent in the agricultural development policies/directions being followed in the bantustans.

On the one hand there is an attempt to foster the development of a class of petty farmers and peasants, who would have a vested interest in the 'homeland' system. Control over this section of the bantustan population would be possible through control over the means of production, in this case the allocation of land.

On the other hand, a contradictory trend of the establishment of large-scale, profit-oriented estates growing cash crops, is visible. This direction would directly undermine that of the small farmers.

The establishment of the estates turns the rural bantustan population into wage labourers rather than subsistence agriculturalists and peasants involved in a market economy to some extent. The latter direction (of estates) would mean that peasant controlled land, unable to compete viably with these estates, could have their role as food producers done away with and have their land acquired for cash crops. More cheaply produced food can then be 'imported' from capital intensive, mechanised and large-scale white-owned agriculture in the rest of South Africa.

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
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Also, as more and more land gets used for cash crops in the reserves, so more and more people are deprived even of whatever meagre subsistence they were sking out, and are turned into rural wage labourers. Thus, the conditions that have created structural unemployment in white-owned agriculture with the abolition of the labour tenant system, are being repeated in the rural areas of the bantustans themselves.

Structural unemployment had made areas of control (the bantustans) necessary, areas where the unemployed could be 'kept' away from the urban areas. Now the slim chance of that control succeeding through creation of a

- (1) Lomati Sugar Project
- (2) Tonga Sisal Company
- (3) Figtree cotton project
- (4) Progressive farmers
- (5) Labour Bureau/Magistrates Office, Tonga
- (6) Proposed new sisal scheme - 2 000 ha



stable class of subsistence and peasant farmers, is being eroded.

The material presented here deals only with the agricultural aspect. Although it is still too early to see the full effects of such a contradiction as that indicated above, I would suggest that there is at least a tendency such as that sketched out.

I have concentrated specifically on one region of KaNgwane (the 'homeland' for the Swazi people of the eastern Transvaal) - the Nkomazi region, just north of the Swaziland border and adjoining Mozambique.

CASH CROPPING

THERE ARE three major cash crops grown in the Nkomazi region of KaNgwane: sisal, cotton and sugar. Land is also being cleared for a future coffee project.

All these crops are labour intensive in their cultivation, and require large numbers of unskilled labourers. Most of this labour is provided by women.

Another feature is that all these crops are centrally managed on an estate basis. There has been no division of land under these crops into small, individually-owned plots. The exception is the cotton project where there are individual farmers, and there are plans to ultimately divide the main estate into smaller farms. Whether this will, in fact, take place remains to be seen.

SISAL

SISAL, at present, covers an area of some 1 600ha. This project was started in 1964 by the Department of Agriculture, and was run by this Department until September, 1980.

Prior to that date, the scheme employed 420 people of whom about 75% were women. The

wages paid were R2,09 per day.

In September last year, the sisal scheme was taken over by the local development corporation and a private company called Measured Farming (Pty) Ltd. They formed a new company called the Tonga Sisal Company. Tonga Sisal is owned jointly by the KaNgwane Agricultural Company (KLM) and Measured Farming (MF), each with 50% shareholding.

The KLM, in turn, is jointly owned by the Corporation for Economic Development (CED, previously the Bantu Investment Corporation) and the local development corporation (KEDC - KaNgwane Economic Development Corporation), and has its office in White River.

This takeover had severe consequences for the labour force. They were all dismissed. This dismissal created quite a furore and the workers complained to their chief who took the matter up with the KaNgwane government. As a result, the KaNgwane 'cabinet' requested that the workers at least be given a months notice. This was granted. It was envisaged in September that they would rehire, from the same people who had been dismissed, only 217. Wages, too, were to be slashed down to R1,40 per day (minimum) - a cut of some 50%. Said an official of MF: 'It is not fair on MF' to expect them to pay people starting employment with them the same rate it had taken the Department of Agriculture 15 years to achieve (!). One may well wonder if it will take MF 15 years before they reach R2,09 a day. The Department of Agriculture manager, incidentally, has been retained by MF.

For the past six years there has existed the practice of doing the cutting and transportation of sisal leaves to the local shredder through sub-contractors. There are five such

sub-contractors. They are paid for the amount of leaf they deliver, and from this sum they must pay whatever labour they employ. The wages paid to such labourers are substantially less even than those paid in the employ of the Department. An example: One contractor, who employs 56 people (28 men and 28 women), pays the men R1,64 a day and the women R1,13 a day. Making use of such sub-contractors, I was told, 'gets rid of surplus labour'. Sub-contractors will continue to be used after the KLM-MF takeover.

I would suggest that the reason for using sub-contractors specifically for cutting may also be due to the fact that this labour is not required every day of the year. Because there are times when the cutting is done, it is easier to rely on sub-contractors rather than hire and retrench labour according to the season. In any event, it cuts the labour costs substantially.

There are also plans to expand the area under sisal. This included expanding the existing crop, as well as opening up a new area of approximately 2 000ha on the Swaziland border. This is a particularly sensitive topic as it involves the moving of people to accommodate the scheme. The land for this proposed scheme is also very fertile.

According to the KaNgwane Agricultural Department this scheme and removals would only be undertaken with the consent of the people concerned ('The people' usually refers to the chief, and presumably he can be persuaded to consent). Measured Farming was said to be 'working very closely with the director' (of agriculture) on this new scheme, but MF has reiterated that it would be done only with the consent of the people. (What would probably happen is that the state would

initiate the new scheme - clear ground, move people, etc - and then hand over to MF who would make money on the venture).

SOME MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

MEASURED FARMING have their head office in Meritzburg. They also control the marketing of sisal in South Africa through their agency the National Sisal Marketing Committee. This body (NSMC) sets the quota for all sisal growers and determines where the fibre will be sent. For example, at Tonga, once the leaves have been shredded and the fibre packed and graded according to its length, the NSMC tells them to which factory the fibre must be sent. In this case it is usually to Pietersburg, but they have in the past sent fibre to Johannesburg, Durban and even Cape Town. The main consideration is the distance, so that all sisal growers should pay more or less the same on railage.

MF has justified their takeover and cost cutting measures, saying that if this had not been done the alternative would have been to close down completely - then no-one would have any jobs at all. MF are very reluctant to acknowledge that they have any ownership stakes, and claim that they are only doing the management, and are being paid management fees. This is not true.

MF's Transvaal operations are handled by a subsidiary in Heidelberg called Floracadia (Pty) Ltd.

Most of the locally marketed sisal is bought by Haggi Rand and Amalgamated Packaging Industries (API).

Last year Tonga Sisal produced 770 tons of fibre and it is hoped to increase this to 1 200 tons within the next five years.

COTTON

THIS CROP covers an area of about 200ha. The cotton scheme was started by the KEDC in October, 1977. The land here is leased for a period of 12 years from the local chief at a rate of R2 000 per annum. The money goes to the local tribal authority. After the 12 years have expired it is envisaged that this project will be split up and handed over to individual farmers, who would each get a plot of 20ha.

Apart from this project, there are at present 7 'progressive farmers' with plots of 20ha each, adjoining the cotton project lands. These farmers have been given massive loans by the KEDC to grow cotton. Their land is not included in that leased by the project, but is also allocated by the chief. Only one of these farmers actually grew cotton last year.

The labour force fluctuates widely. The picking season lasts from about April through to August/September. During this time about 400 people are employed, but this can rise to 900 during school holidays, as school children are employed. For example, in July, 1980, there were 386 labourers, of whom only 46 were men. During the holidays, there were about 900.

Wages for picking cotton are paid on a quota basis - 5c for each kilogram of cotton picked. A fairly good days work can yield 40kg, which means R2,00 a day, but that is heavy going. The cotton project does struggle to find enough labour, particularly during the height of the picking season. People in the nearby village (Figtree) seem to be reluctant to work on the cotton fields and management is highly critical of 'the laziness of these people'. As a result they have to hire a 7-ton truck from Rent-a-Bakkie to fetch labour from as far as 30km away.

THE 'PROGRESSIVE FARMERS'

ALTHOUGH theoretically independent of the project they are effectively controlled by it. Only one farmer actually grew cotton last year.

He was given a loan of R21 000 by the KEDC. This included the cost of installing an overhead irrigation system, clearing bush, ploughing, building a store room. The labour he employs is also paid for out of his loan. He has ten years in which to repay this loan. The ploughing, crop spraying and transportation to the gin (where the cotton is separated from the seeds), is all handled by the main project.

For all these benefits, however, this farmer is very disgruntled as he does not know what the state of his finances are. All the bookkeeping is done by the project. Money from his cotton sales is held by the project, and the project makes deductions from this amount for overheads incurred, which is calculated by the project. For example, if the project did two hours ploughing on his land, he has no way of knowing whether he was being charged for that or whether they were overcharging him. He also claimed that he had not been allowed to see what the exact costs of his overheads were, and feels that the cotton manager is trying to plot his downfall. He is only given an allowance of R50,00 a month by the project. They keep the rest, presumably to pay off his loan. The KEDC say that money from the 'progressive' farmers' cotton sales are paid direct to the farmer.

This same farmer who did not know the state of his finances had reportedly made a nett profit of R4 000 last year.

This 'progressive' farmer employs, during the picking season, some 30 to 40 labourers as well as about 30 school children over weekends, depending on their availability. He

pays 5c a kilogram as well. The money to pay this labour was included in the loan, and he has to draw money from the main project in order to pay his labour. Presumably after the first year this is deducted from his cotton sales. The point is, though, he does not control that money at all. In fact, he is allowed no initiative as far as his cotton is concerned.

While 16ha from his 20ha farm is devoted to cotton, the remaining 4ha are set aside for his private use. Here he grows vegetables, which are marketed locally and does very well indeed. He has the added advantage of being able to use the sophisticated irrigation system set up for the cotton.

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

THIS FARMER produced some 250 bales of cotton last year. Each bale weighs between 160kg and 180kg. Cotton is railed to the gin in Barberton about 150km away.

SUGAR

THE LOMATI sugar project was started in 1966 with the opening of the sugar mill in Malelane. The intention was to convert the land use, which was at the time being used for subsistence farming, eg growing maize, into sugar farms, managed by small farmers. The land was ploughed without the consent of the existing 'owners' and caused much resentment. As none of these previous owners show any interest in growing sugar, the estate remained in the hands of the Department of Bantu Affairs, and was then handed over to the KaNgwane government in 1978.

This project covers an area of 219ha and employs about 200 people, most of whom are women. The lowest wage, which is the scale which most people are on, is R1,40 a day for women and R1,50 a day for men. The workers must also provide

their own rations and bring their own implements, eg hoes, pangas, sickles, etc. The working day lasts from 07h00-09h00 to 17h00 with an hour for lunch, in a five day week.

Cane cutters are paid slightly more, and are drawn from the ranks of the existing labour force. They are paid R1,88 for women and R2,04 for men. Wages increase slightly depending on the length of service. Men are always paid more than women.

Wage Increases over the Years

	1977	1978	1979	1980
Maintenance:				
male	R1,20	1,26	1,45	1,56
female	R1,08	1,13	1,30	1,40
Cutters:				
male	R1,50	1,64	1,90	2,04
female	R1,44	1,51	1,75	1,88

Maintenance workers deal mainly with irrigation, ie controlling the flow of water through the furrows from the main canal.

GENERAL INFORMATION

ALTHOUGH difficult to measure, unemployment is high in this region of KaNgwane. There is a labour bureau at Tonga - next to the magistrate's office and recruiting is done about twice a week. Most times people gather at the bureau only to be told that no-one is recruiting. By September, 1980, only about 500 workers had been recruited although 1 988 had by that time registered as workseekers since January, 1980 (2 145 in 1979). On each recruiting day there are crowds of at least 500 people hoping to get jobs.

KaNgwane - Nkomezi region anyway - supplies the eastern highveld areas. This includes power stations (eg Kriel) and industries. ISCOR (Vanderbijlpark) also recruits from this area.

In spite of this high unemployment, most men refuse to work on the local agricultural projects because the pay is so bad. This fact is somewhat disparagingly referred to in the 1978

BENSO report:

The KaNgwane government finds it difficult to recruit workers for the agricultural projects. The men especially apparently prefer to work as migrant workers outside the country when their own farms cannot satisfy their requirements (1978:36).

The figures supplied above refute this piece of racial stereotyping and bias.

THE DSG/SARS RESOURCE CENTRE.

The Southern African Research Service, in conjunction with the Development Studies Group, has recently set up a resource centre dealing with information on current Southern African affairs. The resource centre consists mainly of newspaper clippings which are gathered from a number of national and local newspapers. The centre has a contemporary focus, and is kept as up to date as possible.

The areas in which information is gathered are broadly categorised as follows:

- SOUTH AFRICAN STATE AND STATE RESTRUCTURING.
- ARMED RESISTANCE AND POLITICAL TRIALS.
- EDUCATION AND URBAN REVOLT.
- BANTUSTANS.
- URBAN ADMINISTRATION AND HOUSING.
- LABOUR AND ECONOMY.
- RENTS AND TRANSPORT.
- SPORT.
- COAL AND GOLD MINING.
- SOUTHERN AFRICA.
- HEALTH.
- POLICE, ARMY, BOSS.
- RIGHT-WING VIOLENCE.
- AGRICULTURE.
- INSTITUTIONS AND ADMINISTRATION OF LAW.
- PRISONS AND PRISONERS.
- DETENTIONS AND BANNINGS.

Within each major category, there are a large number of sub-categories containing more specific information.

The resource centre is available for use by community groups, researchers, students and scholars, as well as other interested individuals and organisations.

People wishing to work in the resource centre, or obtain more information about it, should contact the resource centre staff member at

9 South Court,	or write to
40 Jorissen Street,	PO Box 93174,
Braamfontein,	2143 Yeoville,
Johannesburg.	Johannesburg.

Telephone: (011)725-2835

LABOUR ACTION

African Telephone Cables (Brits): About 700 african workers went on strike in support of a demand for a pay increase of R1,00 an hour, on 6 January, 1981. They also demanded the reinstatement of a Mr Tinta, who was allegedly fired because he was suspected of being behind the strike.

The next day police were called in and teargas used to disperse the strikers. Eighteen strikers were arrested for allegedly intimidating workers who wanted to return to work. Moses Mayekiso, secretary of the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU, a FOSATU affiliated trade union), denied this charge.

Management sent a letter to the striking workers, stating that they had voluntarily resigned by walking out, but that those who wished to, could re-apply for their jobs on 8 January.

A spokesperson for the workers told a reporter from the RDM that they would not re-apply unless their demands were met (08.01.81). However, by 9 January the managing director of ATC reported that 300 people (85% of the morning shift) had re-applied for their posts and been accepted - the same managing director had denied the day before that there was in fact a strike taking place.

Lion Match (Pretoria): 220 workers went on strike on 5 January after demanding a 70% wage increase by 13h00 that day. The managing director said that management had been taken by surprise by the walkout, but were willing to negotiate should the workers return to work and appoint 10 representatives. By 7 January,

however, 'negotiations had broken down' (RDM, 09.01.81), and all 220 workers were dismissed. The MD said that the workers had 'dismissed themselves by their own actions' in not returning to work in time for the management's ultimatum of 14h00, 7 January.

All 220 returned to work, however, on 12 January, after an agreement with management on a wage adjustment (RDM, 13.01.81). The 12th January had been a new ultimatum date set by management; workers returning on that day would be accepted without broken service. Those not would be dismissed. Management would not reveal the amount of the wage adjustment.

Meanwhile, a report in the RDM (13.01.81) indicates that the Lion Match Company's economic growth is going well. Sales went up in 1980 by 25%, and profits went up by between 42% and 50%. Who is getting the bulk of that increase, we wonder?

Toyota Marketing (Sandton/Wynberg, Johannesburg): The entire workforce (more than 200 workers) struck against a management instruction that workers who failed to complete a particular work quota would face disciplinary action, and could ultimately be fired. This took place in October, 1980.

The instruction to meet quotas caused strong reaction amongst workers, but negotiation with management led the company's liaison committee to tell the workers that the quota system still stood, and those not meeting it faced dismissal.

It was then that the workers went on strike, demanding that the liaison committee return to management and negotiate a change in the instructions. They were all summarily dismissed, and told that they could reapply for their jobs on 3 November.

Management told a Star reporter that the quota system had been introduced in reaction to what had appeared to be a go-slow strike amongst workers for the previous two weeks. A spokesperson for the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) denied this, saying that management always pushed workers too hard at that time of year, in order to catch up with production. A similar strike had occurred in October, 1979, for the same reason (see WIP 10).

Management stuck by its story, saying that only 95 workers had been sacked, all members of a group who had been on the 'go-slow strike'. Adcock, the managing director, claimed that the quota system had been negotiated through the liaison committee some months before, and had been approved by the workers. The 95 who were not meeting it were dismissed. The workers, however, saw this as a deliberate attempt to get rid of some of them, many of whom were active members of MAWU. They cited evidence that indicated management had for some while been employing outside workers and telling them to 'wait at home until they were needed' (Star, 31.10.80).

This action has been seen as a continuation of Toyota Marketing's long history of disagreement with the MAWU, which it refused to recognise because the union is not 'registered'. Workers feared the management's offer to re-employ people on 3 November would result in union members being weeded out, as had apparently happened in October, 1979.

In a significant reversal of company policy, management met with MAWU and FOSATU representatives on 31 October. They agreed to reinstate all workers and to recognise MAWU. Negotiations between MAWU and management continued into December.

From 13 to 16 December eight workers

allegedly did not come in to work overtime. Adcock was away so the manager of the department suspended them with full pay until Adcock's return on January 5. When they tried to return to work they were refused entrance. All the warehouse workers then stopped work in protest. Adcock later met with MAWU and FOSATU representatives, explained the company's position, and said the eight would be dismissed. The strike continued in support, with the eight demanding that overtime be voluntary and not compulsory (7 January).

By 9 January the entire workforce had joined the strike. Adcock complained that they had been 'intimidated' into striking. MAWU dismissed this complaint, pointing out that the frequency of strikes in the plant indicated something seriously wrong between management and workers at Toyota.

A report on 10 January indicates that MAWU's demand for all workers to be reinstated, including the 'Toyota eight', was being rejected by management. The Star report on 15 January has it that Adcock is firm in his resolve not to rehire the eight, and that 132 workers striking in protest against the dismissals would not return until the eight were rehired. The conflict continues.

(Latest: Moses Mayekiso of the Metal and Allied Workers Union (secretary), said that the union's Shop Steward Committee for the Kew and Wynberg industrial area, representing about 1 500 workers, had come out in support of the 132 dismissed workers. He appealed to other workers not to take the jobs of those dismissed (ADM, 17.01.81). A few days later two MAWU shop stewards were detained by the security police. They were released after two days in detention for questioning. The two men, Sidney Zulu and Wilfred Sihlangu, are amongst the 132 dismissed

workers).

BMW Motorplant (Rosslyn, Pretoria): About 1 000 workers stopped work on November 27, 1980, in support of a demand for a wage increase of 50c an hour. This follows an extended six week period when the company's 'employee's council' had been negotiating an increase. Workers had lost faith in its ability to adequately negotiate their demands. The National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber workers had been organising at the plant but does not represent a majority of the workers, so could not negotiate on their behalf. The workers returned to work, however, on 1 December having been given a 35c an hour increase.

CDA: Mercedes-Benz (East London): Workers downed tools in protest over the firing of a fellow worker (in December, 1980). This follows a long period of tension over wage demands, a spokesperson for the unregistered SA Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) said. The majority of the workforce at CDA belong to the registered National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers (NUMARWOSA), although SAAWU is also active there. SAAWU committed itself to 'appropriate action' in the new year on the wage issue.

More information needed.

Raleigh Cycles (Springs): Two men were dismissed for allegedly fighting, on 27 November, and 800 workers went out on strike in protest over the dismissals. The day before, two other workers were also said to have been fighting and had merely been warned against doing it again. The two who were dismissed for the same behaviour were less skilled than the other two, and it was believed among workers that discrimination

against less skilled workers had taken place. The 800 were then dismissed.

By 3 December about 300 of these workers had been rehired. The remaining 500 were threatening to bring an urgent application to court, through their union (the Engineering and Allied Workers Union), against the company for locking them out and thus preventing them from returning to work. Steve Friedman of the ADM noted that this would be an important test case of an aspect of industrial law (03.12.80).

The lock-out continued on 12 January when the workers returned after the break over the 'festive' season, expecting to be rehired. They were told that they had been dismissed. About 20 police with dogs were there to reinforce the message. Security police were also called in to 'help' (Star, 13.01.81).

A later report by the Star again refers to threatened court action by union representatives (15.01.81).

(Latest: For previous coverage of this firm and its labour policies, see WIP10:32. The Engineering and Allied Workers Union - FOSATU-affiliated - has taken the case before the industrial court, only the second case to be heard by the court. The EAWU claim that Raleigh had broken an agreement to rehire all the dismissed workers in the new year and that the management is effectively locking the workers out. On the 23rd January it was reported that the court was reserving judgement in the case. The court was also asked to grant the workers interim protection against replacement until their final decision. 'The court decided it could not make a ruling on this application before deciding on the question of its jurisdiction, so the interim protection could not be granted' (ADM, 24.01.81)).

Datsun-Nissan (Rosslyn, Pretoria): 3 500 african workers struck on 6 November, 1980, over a pay dispute and in protest against the company's liaison system, and also over the issue of payment of their annual savings. The entire factory was closed down for the day and white workers were told to go home. Police were called in.

By 10 November they were all back at their jobs after a two day shutdown of the factory. The NUMARWOSA had recently begun organising at the plant. A spokesperson said that the workers had been dissatisfied with their wages for some time, and that this was the real cause of the strike. This dissatisfaction had become more apparent and marked once the eastern Cape motor workers had received 'substantial rises' after striking in Uitenhage (RDM, 11.11.80). The differential that now existed between them and Rosslyn workers was cause for complaint.


The demands for wage increases were likely to resurface again.

Metal Box (Rosslyn, Pretoria): On 23 December, from 500 to 1 000 workers went on strike after a pay dispute with management. They were not satisfied with pay increases that were to come into effect from 1 January, 1981.

They were also not satisfied with their works committee, which they rejected as 'toothless' when it came to negotiating with management.

They were also striking in solidarity with workers in the press department who had been sacked.

The strike continued until the Christmas break, but most workers had returned to their jobs by 7 January, 1981. Negotiations for higher wages were taking place with management



at the factory, through four representatives, three of whom were from the workers' council.

More information needed.

Kumek West Rand Dairy (Roodepoort): 230 milk delivery men went on strike on 29 November, 1980, because of a wage dispute. Posthumus, the managing director, said negotiations were already under way.

More information needed.

Creamline Dairy (Florida): 90 milk delivery men went on strike early in December, 1980, in a demand for higher wages. Management reinstated only 30 of them, saying that the rest were 'troublemakers' who had intimidated the others, and who had 'discharged themselves' by their own actions.

The general secretary of the Food, Beverage and Allied Workers Union, operative in that

company, attempted to negotiate with management about the reinstatement of the workers, but without any success. Management had refused any discussion. They immediately started employing new workers in place of those fired.

The union said that they would be seeking legal advice.

More information needed.

Anglo American Corporation (Head Office, Johannesburg): About 30 cleaners boycotted the newly desegregated canteen in December, 1980, on the grounds of racial discrimination. They have been told to change out of their work clothes before entering the canteen 'in the interests of the majority of diners' (Star, 30.12.80).

Management has refused to revise the policy.

German Club (Pretoria): On 28 December, 1980, workers held a sitdown strike over working conditions. Twelve members of staff were then dismissed, and police called in to 'prevent (them)... from allegedly inciting others to strike' (ADM, 30.12.80).

'The whole thing is being settled amicably', a spokesperson for the club told the ADM. 'We are getting officials from the Department of Labour to come in to discuss the matter' (sic).

Metal Bag Manufacturers (Pietermaritzburg):

The National Textile Workers Union has reported on conditions in this factory to the Department of Labour (October, 1980).

Women work for 52 hours per week for sometimes as little as 16c per hour. If they come late on Saturdays a full day's pay is deducted.

They are given no protective clothing to wear, no soap, no canteen facilities, and only half an hour for lunch.

Pay increases followed the union inquiry - pushing the wages up to R16 per week for women, and R21 for men. Workers see these increases as still being very unjust, and see that the company is simply cashing in on the high unemployment rate in Maritzburg.

SMS Timber (Vereeniging): A staff of 300 are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with wages and working conditions according to a spokesperson for the Paper, Wood and Allied Workers Union, and conflict could break out into the open (ADM, 30.09.80). Already there had been numerous meetings and work stoppages.

Grievances are that wages are well below the minimum accepted under the Wage Act; that protective clothing is not provided; that

safety measures are not enforced and many workers are involved in serious accidents; that no workers's compensation is allowed them; and that management has been antagonistic to union activities.

Van Zyl, the manager, denied that any grievances existed among the workers, saying they were 'extremely happy', and that women did not need higher pay as they are 'not the breadwinners anyway'.

SA Ceramics (Boksburg): A shop steward was fired on 11 July, 1978 for being 'negligent in her work and influencing others' (Star, 21.10.80).

She took Bailey, the manager, to court for alleged victimisation, pleading that she had been fired after he had discovered that she was a member of the Building Construction and Allied Workers Union, and that she had been organising members.

Nothing further has been reported on this case.

SARH (Johannesburg): 1. The 22 000 strong Railway Artisans Staff Association lodged a claim for a 12 1/2% wage increase with the Minister of Transport on 17 September, 1980. We have no further information on this.

2. Train drivers staged a go-slow strike on 2 and 3 October, causing 'congestion and confusion' on about 20 Witwatersrand trains. SAR management had been in touch with the SA Footplate Staff Association, who represent the drivers. Dissatisfaction was about pay adjustments, and about rest periods. A spokesperson for the SAR expected these dissatisfactions to be sorted out.

More information needed.

Fedics Food Services (University of the North):

The catering staff at the University of the North (Turfloop), employed by Fedics Food Services, went out on strike on 30 September, 1980, in an attempt to get more reasonable wages. They are paid R50 a month for a 7 day week, according to a spokesperson.

The hungry students started helping themselves from the main kitchen, and are estimated to have caused damage and loss of about R30 000.

The staff returned to work the following day after an assurance that their grievances would be considered.

More information needed.

Pick and Pay (Rendburg): 70 workers were required to pay a fine of R1 each towards a fine of R240 imposed by health inspectors on the store after finding it unclean (October, 1980). Two workers refused to pay the fine, and were threatened with dismissal, and not allowed to use the toilet facilities (!).

The store manager said that the fine had been imposed because the workers were not keeping toilets clean after 'repeated requests'. Workers countered that they could not be expected to 'deal with food and customers and clean toilets as well', and that management should appoint a second cleaner for the toilets as the single cleaner could not cope (Sunday Express, 02.11.80).

On 31 October the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union of SA sent a strong demand for the refund of the money to the workers, citing the fact that fining of workers is illegal in terms of the Wage Act and carries a possible R200 fine.

Management then agreed to refund all the money, and to take no further action against

the two who had refused to pay in the first place.

OTH Bayer (Bayer): Long-standing grievances about working hours and overtime pay came to a head when a group of workers assaulted a man they claimed was a 'company spy', late in November, 1980.

Management then selected a particular department at the plant and asked the 18 workers in it to identify the attackers. They had refused to do this, saying that they did not know, and had all been fired.

SAAWU was representing the workers and was to start negotiations with management on 26 November.

More information needed.

South African Airways: 1. Cabin crew planned a stay-away over Christmas, 1980, in order to bring attention to their grievances - long hours because of staff shortages, the unsympathetic attitude of superiors, and no compensation for extra-long shifts. They had been complaining for months, but nothing had been done to alleviate the situation.

On 19 November, the SAA Staff Association asked them to air their grievances through official channels so that they might receive attention.

On 5 December, staff were still dissatisfied, saying that the SAA management was not moving fast enough in looking into their grievances, nor taking cognisance of all of them. The mass stay-away had collapsed because of lack of organisation, and alleged threats of dismissal.

Further information needed.

2. Cargo workers at Jan Smuts complained bitterly about working conditions that had not been changed for three

years despite their temporary and 'disgusting' condition (RDM, 22.11.80).

A SAA spokesperson would not comment. More information needed.

Cato Ridge Abattoir (Cato Ridge): 18 workers allegedly resigned on 11 December, 1980, following allegations of theft of a carcass, and the assault of one worker by a security officer.

The manager, de Kock, denied 'all this fuss'. He stressed that the resignations had not led to any slow down at the abattoir (and hence did not need to be taken seriously? - eds).

Pellow and Co (Selby, Johannesburg): 15 white machine workers laid down tools on 1 December, 1980 in protest against 'being forced to teach blacks to take over from us' (Star, 02.12.80).

More information needed.

Unico Chemicals (Johannesburg): Between 20 and 40 of the total 80 african workers went on strike on 19 November over pay.

By 20 November most were back at work. The Department of Manpower Utilisation had advised the company to take the strikers back.

A spokesperson for the company admitted that this was the second time members of its workforce had downed tools over higher pay, but denied that it was important. 'The incidents have been caused by one or two of the boys (sic) who have been inciting the others against the company' (RDM, 20.11.80).

Palmyra Tsisiris Line (Durban harbour): A strike occurred on the Antigoni Tsisiris, the third on ships in the Palmyra Tsisiris Line in less than three weeks (September, 1980).

Fourteen crew members alleged that the

hull of the 24-year old Antigoni Tsisiris was leaking; that it was infested with rats and cockroaches; that the drinking water was contaminated; and that water rationing was imposed. They succeeded in gaining a court order to get the ship attached.

They also claimed that they had not been paid for the last 3 1/2 months and are suing their employers for wages and overtime pay totalling R185 000.

The matter will be taken up in court in South Africa. More information needed.

Siemens (Rosslyn, Pretoria): About 300 workers downed tools on 15 December in support of an across-the-board wage increase.

They returned to work on the 17 December while their union, the Electrical and Allied Workers Union of South Africa, conducted negotiations with management.

The general secretary of the union, Nicholson, saw the strike as being the result of comparisons of pay with increases accorded the eastern Cape workers.; of comparisons with pay of other workers employed by motor companies in the area; and of 'the general mood in Rosslyn at the moment' (RDM, 18.12.80) (Rosslyn has been hit by at least four strikes in the space of a few months).

More information on the outcome of the negotiations needed.

Siemens workers had previously been on strike in July, 1980, also on the wage issue (see WIP 14, page 49).

SASOL I Natref Refinery (Sasolburg): 1. A further incident has occurred in SASOL's stormy labour history - refer back to WIP 14, pages 51 and 52 for past events.

A police constable was stoned and battered

to death by more than 200 angry workers on 24 October, when he tried to arrest several suspects on charges of possession of dagga.

Three men were arrested, two with bullet wounds. The dead man had fired two shots from illegally possessed firearms before dying. Further investigation revealed that the firearms had been stolen property.

A fourth man was arrested for stealing a second constable's service revolver.

2. Eighteen welders who had been offered work at SASOL, were turned away upon arrival because they were 'Coloured', and SASOL has no accommodation for coloured workers (ADM, 30.10.80).

Krom River Apple Co-operative (Grabouw):

This strike was reported on in depth in WIP 13, pages 23-5.

15 young men were arrested and charged with incidents related to the strike (incidents of stone throwing and damage to property) for higher wages during April, 1980. They originally pleaded guilty to the charges, but it was later alleged that the admissions had been made under duress. A doctor testified that marks on the accused indicated electric shock burns and torture. The accused had pleaded guilty for fear of further abuse.

The doctor had been called by the Food and Canning Workers Union (FCWU) (Star, 28.10.80). A doctor called as witness by the public prosecutor contested these findings. The trial was then postponed to December 18.

The magistrate accepted the findings of the defence doctor. A plea of not guilty was entered for the workers, and 13 of them were acquitted of the charge. The remaining two were convicted of public violence and sentenced

to 18 months imprisonment, suspended for 5 years (Star, 19.12.80).

Diamond Cutting Industry: White artisans in this industry are putting on pressure through their Diamond Workers Union to keep blacks out of the skilled areas. They fear being phased out of their jobs and undercut by incoming black workers.

A first attempt by employers to increase the range of work done by african, indian and coloured workers led to an 11 week strike by white artisans in 1976. This was only resolved when restrictions were formalised, allowing black workers to handle only rough diamonds up to 1,69 carats in weight, and sawn diamonds of up to 0,85 carats.

Recent attempts by employers to adjust these restrictions and allow black workers to handle larger diamonds have again been strongly opposed by the white union (ADM, 02.10.80). Pressure from the employers comes because the industry is running short of skilled labour (and to cut costs, no doubt), while pressure from the union continues because of the fear of being phased out.

The present restrictions will now extend to 31 October, 1981, in response to union negotiations. The conflict in the industry continues.

See WIP 7, page 53 for earlier information on the diamond industry.

Kleenem Brushworks (Newclare, Johannesburg):

An earlier incident was reported on in WIP 12, page 8.

On 5 November, 1980, more than 300 workers went on strike. At the centre of the dispute was a wage clerk who, it was said, subjected the workers to persistent racial insults and

arbitrary wage deductions. They also demanded a wage increase over the present R20 a week for men and R15 for women.

Management agreed to transfer the wage clerk, but workers were angry that no concession had been made on their wage demand.

A Star reporter was forcibly removed from the factory premises.

Moni's and Fatti's (Bellville and Isando):

A further item of interest can be added to WIP's in-depth report of the Fatti's and Moni's labour unrest (WIP 10, pages 33-4; WIP 11, page 28).

Management has signed a non-racial recognition agreement with two unregistered unions - the Food and Canning Workers Union (FCWU) and the African FCWU. This agreement goes so far as to lay down working conditions and wages, rather than simply recording recognition of the unions.

The two unions view this move as being of 'significance for progressive employers and the trade union movement' (ADM, 15.11.80).

The recognition stands 'for an indefinite duration'.

Bull Brand Foods (Krugersdorp): About 400 workers stopped work on 11 December, 1980, in protest against the 'retrenchment' of five of their union shop stewards. They alleged that this amounted to victimisation against the Food, Beverage and Allied Workers Union (FBAWU).

Management denied the victimisation claim, saying that 100 workers had had to be retrenched because of the rising cost of meat; that the company had been 'compelled' to take this action rather than raise product prices; and that they had been unaware of the appointment of the five

as shop stewards by union members.

-More information needed.

Meat Boycotts: The managing director of Rumevite, a major stock feeding company, Dr Gerrit Louw, has accused meat boycotters of 'committing sabotage' (according to a Star report, 20.09.80). 'People who support the meat boycott in whatever form are committing sabotage against farmers and the country', he is reported to have said.

He also called for restrictions on press coverage which 'encouraged' the boycotters' activities.

Not only had boycott calls been made in support of the striking meat workers in Cape Town, but also by various consumers' groups in protest against the very high meat price in South Africa, and apparent mis-management of the meat industry.

Union Steam Bakery (Kroonstad): The strike of about 80 workers in July, 1980, was reported on in WIP 14, page 48. They struck initially for a wage increase, but struck again after their leader, Dennis Bloem, had been fired and detained.

Dennis Bloem has been found guilty (early in September) of allegedly intimidating his co-workers and for stopping them from doing their duties, and of threatening to kill or injure those defying him. A fellow worker who had been detained with Bloem, Jakobo Lephuting, was found not guilty and discharged. Bloem was sentenced to 250 days or a R250 fine.

Bus Company Workers

1. Putco Bus Company (Johannesburg): For previous coverage of events, see WIP13:34-5; WIP14:53-4. Since this coverage two major developments have occurred.

Firstly, in November, 1980, Putco management expressed its willingness to recognise the unregistered trade union, the Transport and Allied Workers Union (TAWU), to which the majority of Putco workers belong. On 19 November, after four months of attempts at recognition, an agreement was signed between TAWU and management. A spokesperson for TAWU described this as a 'procedural' agreement - and said that a further accord was to be negotiated 'at a later stage'.

A RDM reporter viewed this as a significant breakthrough for Putco, citing the fact that during the June/July strike, Carleo, the managing director, had refused to talk to the striking workers, despite demands from them that he do so.

Secondly, in December, 1980, 780 workers - the full workforce - went on strike for the second time that year. It appears that management's 'recognition' of TAWU had at that stage done nothing to alter the working conditions at Putco. Grievances included the following:

- anger at the slow pace of government machinery to settle wage disputes (as all passenger transport is defined as 'essential service', it is not possible for drivers to strike 'legally'. First grievances have to be taken up by the Department of Manpower Utilisation, and then, if no satisfactory resolution is found, they are passed on to the Wage Board for a hearing);
- anger that the 15% wage increase by the Wage Board in December (in laying down new minimum scales) would scarcely cover inflation costs, let alone allow for a change in the standard of living of those workers;
- frustration at the company's 'indeba' method of resolving conflict, involving a liaison committee;
- job insecurity as many drivers were being fired; and

e. anger and frustration at the fact that Vorster, the Putcoton depot manager, responsible for alleged arbitrary hiring and firing, and for allegedly insulting treatment of workers, had not been removed from his post, despite an undertaking by management during the June/July strike to investigate all complaints against him.

The men went out on strike on 17 December. All were fired. On 19 December newspapers carried reports of police presence; Putco officials apparently emphasised that they had not asked police to take any action. However, 12 drivers were taken by police, and released on 23 December.

TAWU met with management and presented worker demands that all 780 workers be reinstated. Despite this not being allowed, roughly 700 workers had returned to work by 23 December. 27 of the remaining workers, who had re-applied for their jobs, were refused re-employment. These included members of the Drivers' Action Committee, which has close ties with TAWU. A union spokesperson said that management was trying to 'pick off worker leaders' and also 'dividing workers by setting those who have got their jobs back against those who haven't' (RDM, 24.12.80).

The 27 workers were allowed to appeal against the company refusal of re-employment, firstly through the liaison committee (at which a TAWU representative was allowed to be present), and thereafter through management. We have no information as to how many, if any, of the 27 were re-employed.

A company spokesperson told a Star reporter that the two strikes had cost the company hundreds of thousands of rands. 'The final figure had not yet been calculated, and when it had it would not be released to the Press... it could run into six figures' (Star, 02.01.81). There

was also a rumour from management that the increased drivers' wages would result in increased bus fares for commuters (January, 1961).

2. Daveyton Bus Drivers: Bus drivers on the east Rand threatened to go on strike on 17 October, 1980. Demands included permission to join a union, overtime pay for Sundays and public holidays, and a six-day week.

A meeting amongst members of the Daveyton Bus Drivers' Committee, the East Rand Administration Board, and the Daveyton Community Council, solved most of their grievances, and the strike was averted.

The bus drivers have joined the Transport and General Workers Union, but this will not be recognised by the ERAB until it is 'registered'.

3. KwaZulu Bus Service: 55 bus drivers went on strike on 22 January, 1981. They were demanding the dismissal of a certain inspector who had dismissed one of their colleagues.

A police spokesman said that the driver had assaulted a child and hence had been dismissed.

Later during the same day the drivers went back to work. It is not known what happened to the inspector.

4. Bloemfontein Municipality: 75 bus drivers went on strike early in November, 1980, for a 75% wage increase. As workers providing a 'utility service' they were then arrested under the Riotous Assemblies Act. Bloemfontein Municipality refused to take any strikers back into employment. By 7 November the transport manager, Chris Naude, was already recruiting new staff.

On 22 November strikers were told that they could re-apply for their jobs. Re-employment, however, was selective, and an angry crowd in

Mangaung township stoned the bus driven by one of the re-employed drivers, allegedly shouting 'let's kill that driver', 'where is that sell-out' (Star, 13.11.80).

On 20 November a memorandum was presented to the Bloemfontein City Council by residents of Mangaung township, demanding the reinstatement of all 75 workers. This demand was not met.

On 26 November residents again demonstrated solidarity with the fired strikers by boycotting the bus service and walking to work. Police were present, and a number of 'suspects' were reportedly detained.

The police said that the Bloemfontein City Council could be 'in hot water' for not warning the drivers about section 14 of the Riotous Assemblies Act which prohibits strikes in 'essential services' (see the report below).

5. Mpumalanga Transport (Hammarsdale, Natal):

On 30 October, 1980, 44 bus drivers went on strike in protest against the dismissal of one of their fellow drivers the day before. They were arrested and detained - for not carrying out 'essential services', and for not negotiating through the 'proper channels'.

Many buses could not be used that day because their ignition systems had been tampered with, according to a company spokesperson. Additional charges of malicious damage to property were added to those the drivers already faced.

By 14 November 25 of the 44 workers had been re-employed.

The court case was heard for the first time on 28 November. The defence lawyer maintained that the Mpumalanga Transport Company (the KwaZulu Transport Company (Pty) Ltd) was liable to a fine of more than R10 000 for failing for the past three years to display a notice stipulated under the Riotous Assemblies Act, outlining the

employees' rights and duties. The magistrate argued that this was irrelevant to the case.

More information needed.

Tubatse Ferrochrome (Steelpoort, Transvaal):

A strike by the entire labour force of 400 took place on 16-7 September, 1980, on the question of changes in the law governing pension schemes. The workers reacted to the possibility that these changes might 'prevent them from withdrawing their pensions on premature termination of service'.

WH McGruder of Union Carbide (joint owners with General Mining of Tubatse) denied that the strike had been over the non-re-employment by the company of ten workers who had resigned in order to claim their pensions.

McGruder said that workers viewed the pension scheme as a savings scheme, and as legislation on this matter is likely to be retrospective, 'workers who had joined pension schemes expecting to recover their contributions might be denied this' (Star, 16.10.80). This would 'lead to considerable worker unrest'.

Some unions are also believed to be opposed to these suggested changes relating to company contributory pension schemes, as they feel that with mass unemployment workers need pension contributions while they are unemployed and not to have their contributions frozen until retirement date. The state, on the other hand, could see such frozen private contributions to be likely to lessen the load on state-provided old age pensions (see the article on the old age pensions in this issue).

Firestone (Port Elizabeth): Some 1 500 workers at this plant downed tools in protest at the proposed government legislation 'to stop employees withdrawing pension contributions when they change jobs' (Star, 25.01.81). See the report

above .

The first shift to stop work did so on Sunday night apparently. They were joined by later shifts.

Further complaints related to the alleged detention of a fellow worker on Saturday, 24 January, by the security police; a rejection of the liaison committee system.

Management said that they would be willing to pay out pension contributions, but the workers would first have to resign, seek re-employment, and work for a further year before they could re-join the pension scheme operative in the firm. 'We are the ham in the sandwich - it's not really a company thing', said managing director GP Morum (RDM, 27.01.81).

Carlton Hotel (Johannesburg): On Monday, 19 January, the entire housekeeping staff at the Carlton Hotel (in which the Anglo American Company has a large stake) went on strike for a few hours over the dismissal of two fellow workers. Workers believed that the dismissals had been part of a campaign against the Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union (CCAWUSA members) at the hotel. CCAWUSA is a non-registered union.

Pat Burton, general manager, said that the dismissals had been over theft, and that management would not negotiate with the union over this matter.

Workers said that they returned to work after the week's notice that had originally been given the fired workers was changed to a month's wages.

On Tuesday, 20 January, 500 workers (250 according to Burton), went on strike for three hours over reinstatement of dismissed workers, union recognition (the Hotel, Liquor and Catering Trade Employees Union - 'part of the CCAWUSA'). Burton said that white employees had 'done the

strikers' work' (more commonly known as the practice of 'scabbing').

Later in the week it was reported that union executive members, led by MLCTEU chairperson, Hamilton Makadama, had met with Carlton management, and that the union may be recognised (RDM, 24.01.81).

Angus-Hawken Fluid Sealing Engineering (Rosslyn, Pretoria): The workers (about 400) at this plant went on strike on Friday, 16 January, demanding wage increases of 35c to 65c an hour (probably to R1,25 an hour, and not of R1,25 an hour as one report would have it).

Management agreed to R1,00 a week increase, refused by the workers. It seems that the workers were paid off on Tuesday, and then told to re-apply for their jobs.

A report on Monday, 26 January, said that not only was the strike over (settled over the weekend), but the number of workers who had been involved had decreased to 150(!). No explanation is given of this enormous discrepancy.

Sappi Fine Papers (Enstra, Springs): Workers say about 1 000 employees at Sappi were involved in a strike over minimum wages (management say about 300 workers went on strike). Sappi employs about 2 300 workers at the Enstra mill. The strike started on Wednesday, 21 January, and ended on Monday, 26 January, after management had agreed to negotiate new wages with the FOSATU-affiliated Paper, Wood and Allied Workers Union (PWAWU). The workers had also complained about hostel rents and short meal hours.

Tension over representation and wages had been building up over time, and one PWAWU meeting had been broken up by the security police.

On Tuesday 27th January, it was reported (RDM) that management had turned down the union request for a 200% increase (initially

300%). The union thereupon withdrew from the negotiations saying that they were there as intermediaries, and that management would have to announce the rejection to the workers.

Management said that the lowest paid worker at Enstra earns R246 a month (including cash benefits, and 'normal overtime'), while the average wage for hourly paid workers was said to be R330 a month. Management added that the workers would not be paid for the time they had been on strike.


Montana Hypercellars (Durban): Some 30 workers went on strike over the reinstatement of fellow workers and recognition of their union, the National Federation of (Black?) Workers. The union's Matthews Oliphant said that the firm had been firing union members at the rate of two a day. The strike resumed on 19 January after Israel Khuzwayo, chairperson of the 'newly recognised' workers committee was fired. Management refused to comment.

A later report (RDM, 22.01.81) said that negotiations had reached stalemate, but that half the 22 striking workers had been re-employed.

Pretoria Precision Castings (Pty) Ltd (Waltloo, Pretoria): On Thursday, 22 January, between 150 and 250 workers walked out, demanding an extra 35c to 65c on the R30 an hour they were earning (this was claimed to be the highest wage). The workers were initially sacked, and then reinstated with management promising to look into wages.

Some of the workers are said to be represented by the United African Motor Workers Union.

Feltex Foam and Automotive Products (Pty) Ltd (Rosslyn, Pretoria): Workers went on strike briefly over a demand that their annual wage increase be brought forward. Management had



A Noticeboard displaying the names of companies with factories at Rosslyn, near Pretoria, GaRankuwa, Mamelodi, and Winterveld. This industrial area, home of many of the multinational companies investing in South Africa, has been the scene of many of the recent strikes in South Africa.

agreed to this, and workers returned to work on Thursday, 22 January.

SA Fabrics (Rossburgh, Natal): 600 workers of the SA Fabrics factory went on strike over wages. They had been on strike for three days on 21 January.

Most workers earn R50, and had rejected an offered increase of 5%. Despite a National Union of Textile Workers recommendation that they return to work while negotiations are in progress the workers have said they will remain on strike until their wage demands had been met.

More information needed.

Coates Brothers (Durban): Management refused to negotiate with the union representing the workers at this firm making printing ink. The union involved is SAAWU. Workers went on strike demanding the reinstatement of a fellow worker and the recognition of the union.

Members of the rival TUCSA-affiliated typographical union also had to stop work as a result of the walkout.

More information is needed on this strike that apparently took place (or started) on 26 January.

Eastern Cape: Strikes in this politically and economically volatile part of the country have been covered in several back issues of WIP (see, for example, WIP7:22-9; WIP11:11-21; WIP13:25-31; and individual items in the 'labour action' sections; also see the South African Labour Bulletin 6, 263, 'Working for Ford?'). Once again there have been so many strikes that we will present a chronology of some events since the last issue of WIP appeared, rather than covering individual strikes.

This period has seen the decline from prominence of the community-based Pebco organisation, while the focus has shifted to this umbrella organisation's constituent parts

(mainly the Residents' Associations), and other organisations (eg, the Port Elizabeth Students Council, Pesco). In Uitenhage the equivalent civic body (to Pebco), the Ubco, has been more active, with its greater worker participation (which, in Pebco's case, had turned on the figure of Thozamile Botha, now banned and living in exile, supporting the ANC).

The schools boycott in the eastern Cape has only this year, 1981, shown signs of a lull. This action by school students has kept the political climate tense, with buses being stoned and burnt, security police being threatened and mobbed, and community councils coming under attack.

In the trade union field conflict has continued between FOSATU-affiliated unions and other unions, primarily the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU). The latter (SAAWU) has apparently experienced phenomenal growth in this region of South Africa, despite the repeated and prolonged detention of its leadership, organisers and members by the central state and by the local branch, the Ciskei security police (the CIS). It has not been possible to provide all the details of the inter-union conflict.

September

13-20: The UAW (the FOSATU-affiliated United Automobile and Rubber Workers Union) accused the Pebco-linked Ford Workers Committee (FWC) of being 'elitist and middle-class'. This followed moves by the FWC to form a rival union to the UAW (which immediately had a newspaper label of 'black consciousness' attached to it), to be called the Motor Assemblies and Components Workers Union (MACWUSA). During the week many workers cancelled their shop orders for the UAW. The MACWUSA interim leader was Dumile Makhanda.

21-30: Bus workers from Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth rejected the in-company (management formed) unions, the Bay Busworkers Union (BBU) and PE Tramway and Busworkers Union (PETBU - for coloureds). These workers were mainly members of the Transport and Allied Workers Union (TAWU - affiliated to the Confederation of Unions of South Africa, CUSA).

October

1-11: MACWUSA was said to be planning to ask for company recognition at Ford. The union said that it also had membership at General Motors and was to establish a branch at VW in Uitenhage.

Manpower Utilisation Minister, Fanie Botha, flew to East London for meetings on trade unions and strikes, with management.

Thozamile Botha formally linked himself to the ANC, and started a speaking tour of the USA by addressing the United Nations on the day of solidarity with South African political prisoners, 10 October.

12-18: MACWUSA officially launched and stated itself to be committed to 'a union role in the community as well as in the factory'. Although predominantly african in membership MACWUSA is non-racial in constitution, and against registration.

The UAW said that MACWUSA's support was mainly in the Cortina plant of Ford, where about 500 of their (UAW) members had joined the new union. The UAW repeated its 'white collar' accusation, while MACWUSA said that only four out of 23 executive members were white-collar workers.

Full-time union elected, but company paid, shop stewards were elected at VW, following on Ford's announcement that they would institute

such a scheme with the two FOSATU-affiliated unions recognised by them (UAW and the National Union of Motor Assemblies and Rubber Workers, NUMARWOSA, of Freddie Sauls). The danger with this system being that shop stewards may become identified with management who pays them. Sauls said that he had asked for such a scheme in 1974.

19-25: Rumours that VW had been hit by sit-down strikes regularly since the major unrest at the plant and in the eastern Cape generally, was denied by management who did, however, admit one departmental strike. FOSATU unions claimed rapid growth in the Uitenhage area.

SAAWU, claiming to represent half the 3 000 workers at the Frame Group's Consolidated Fine Spinners and Weavers (at East London), said through national organiser Thozamile Gqweta, that many complaints had been received from the workers. These related to hours and wages; assaults; insufficient medical attention; dismissals; and discrimination against women.

On Friday, 24 October, workers in the chocolate-moulding section of the Wilson-Rowntree factory went on strike, to be joined by the full workforce of more than 1 500. Management claimed intimidation of some workers, while the workers said that many grievances existed (such as discrimination against africans in favour of coloured workers).

On Saturday the entire workforce was dismissed and told to re-apply for jobs on Monday, without loss of pension benefits. Management did add that not all workers would be re-employed.

26-31: Monday (27th) saw the return of about 1 000 workers, and a reported 2 000 workseekers (once more underlining the difficulty of worker

action and organisation in a mass unemployment situation).

Management denied dismissals (workers had 'dismissed themselves', a phrase heard so often in the last year that it cannot but be a central directive), and also denied that selective re-employment would take place. SAAWU said that management had signed on unemployed people about two weeks before the events as stand-by labour, and that striking workers would not return until the entire workforce was reinstated. Management was to meet with SAAWU.

About 3 000 workers had attended the SAAWU-called meeting in the East London city hall over the weekend to discuss workers reinstatement at Wilson-Rowntree, but also at Ray-Lite Batteries, National Converter Industries, and Border Boxes. Trade union meetings in Mdantsane, within the Ciskei bantustan and just outside East London, had been banned by the township council. Subsequently SAAWU held meetings in Duncan Village which falls outside the Ciskei, but these were also stopped.

Management at Wilson-Rowntree accused SAAWU of 'inciting' workers not to return to work. This SAAWU denied, pointing out that workers had taken their own decisions. The union had been told by Wilson-Rowntree that they would not re-employ all the workers.

On Wednesday, 30 October, all workers returned. Gqeta of SAAWU said that Wilson-Rowntree management would look at grievances in the chocolate-moulding section, where the strike had started.

At the end of October it was announced that three FOSATU unions in the motor industry were to merge - the NUMARWOSA, UAW, and the Western Province Motor Assembly Workers Union. This followed state permission for NUMARWOSA to enrol workers on a

'fully non-racial basis'. Members of the unions endorsed the decision early in November.

November

1-8: On Sunday, 2 November, Thozamile Gqeta was detained by the Ciskeian security police (the second time that he had been detained by this body). Brigadier Charles Sebe, secretary of the notorious Ciskei Intelligence Service (CIS) and brother to the Ciskei's chief minister, said that the detention was in connection with 'disturbances at schools' (the first of many strange statements from this man). The detention came shortly before Gqeta was to have addressed workers at SA Chloride, after an in principle decision by management at this foreign-owned company to recognise SAAWU, if they had the support of the workers.

Employers said, after a meeting of the East London Chamber of Commerce, that they would deal with unregistered unions (referring to the African Food and Canning Workers Union, AFCWU, and SAAWU, the most active unions in the city). R Alison of the Chamber of Commerce said that earlier policy of non-negotiation had been laid down by Manpower Utilisation Minister, Fanie Botha.

Sisa Njikelana (SAAWU) was detained by the Sebe Brothers' CIS, on 5 November. He was also due to address Chloride (SA) workers if SAAWU won the referendum being conducted there.

SAAWU won the referendum overwhelmingly, polling 95,2% of votes cast at the firm.

A joint statement by the AFCWU, SAAWU and the Western Province General Workers Union (WPGWU) condemned the detentions of unionists. Both Bonisile Norushe and Oscar Mpatha of the AFCWU were still in detention, as well as the SAAWU unionists. The unions were joined in the protest by the National Federation of Black Workers (NFBW), another breakaway group from the Black

Allied Workers Union (BAWU).

Brigadier Sebe raved on:

Their arrest has nothing to do with trade unionism. They are involved in student protest in the Ciskei. We are up to our necks with student protest in the Ciskei.

On Friday night, 7 November, 19 (six women) trade unionists were detained as they crossed the 'border' of the Ciskei into Mdantsane township. Brigadier Sebe described as 'purely coincidental' that South African security police should arrive in Mdantsane soon after the detentions (the distinction between the branches of the state in question would seem to be more in form than in content). Said Brigadier Sebe:

I strongly resent the suggestion that we were being used by the South African Government to do a job for them.

Having picked up the officials at a roadblock we took them to Mdantsane charge office, and were met there by (SA) security policemen who were on their normal rounds.

Sebe said that these people, too, were detained in connection with 'schools unrest'.

The unionists detained were from the AFCWU, the Food and Canning Workers Union (FCWU), SAAWU and the WPGWU. The six women were released and told to report to the police on Monday, 10 November.

9-15: The women unionists were interrogated and then released. Brigadier Sebe said that charges against the unionists were being framed (sic). They were being held under the Ciskei's Proclamation R252.

Five days after their detention the 13 trade unionists were released. Four unionists remained in detention, three of them in the eastern Cape, and Oscar Mpatha in Cape Town.

On 14 November grievances at East London Furniture Industries reached a head. Workers

(about 170) demanded recognition of their democratically elected SAAWU sponsored workers' committee, instead of the liaison committee or a company approved parallel union. They called management to a meeting at lunchtime to hear their grievances. These related to health precautions, protective clothing, wages, working hours, etc.

The Department of Manpower Utilisation was called in by the firm and asked for a list of grievances, and for representatives to be elected. The workers responded by telling the Department officials to get the list of grievances from management as they had told them of their complaints. The Department officials were also said to have threatened the workers with three years imprisonment or R1 000 for striking illegally.

Management then ordered the workers from the premises, telling them to collect their pay and to return to work on Monday, 17 November, for 'selective rehiring'. Workers say that five security policemen were inside the East London Furniture Industries factory when they were paid off.

16-22; On November 18, four SAAWU members employed by Border Passenger Transport were detained by the CIS.

On the same day workers at East London Furniture Industries refused to collect their pay as they 'still regarded themselves as company employees'. SAAWU general secretary, Samuel Kikine, said that management refused to negotiate, referring the matter to the industrial council for the industry. Workers had returned to work on the previous day, on the deadline set, but had been locked out with selective re-employment taking place.

SAAWU threatened a boycott of furniture sold by the firm during Christmas. Much of the furniture manufactured by the firm is exported

to Zimbabwe. It also came to light that the parallel union involved is the registered National Union of Furniture and Allied Workers (NUFAW), whose assistant general secretary, AJM Groenewald, said that they (the union) had a closed shop agreement and that SAAWU 'has no legal right to approach any employee in the furniture industry to discuss terms with them'.

Brigadier Sebe finally came straight and admitted that unionists had been, and were being detained for their union activities. It was said that six members of SAAWU were in detention under R252 at the time (19.11.80), four of them workers from the Border Passenger Transport. Thozamile Gqweta was unable to appear in court in East London on 'incitement to strike' charges because of his Ciskeian detention.

MACWUSA expressed solidarity with SAAWU over the detentions.

23-30: Xolani Kota, acting secretary of SAAWU in East London, announced that a nation-wide petition would be launched, calling for the release of the unionists.

On Thursday, 27 November, Collondale Cannery (East London) workers, who had refused to collect their pay, made an attempt to get their jobs back. Manager Cordner Tilney said that replacements had already been hired. He had spoken to the workers (AFCWU members) in the company of security police. Lordner Njozela, a dismissed employee from the firm, was briefly detained and questioned by the security police. (For more details on this dispute, see WIP15:44-5).

December

1-6: East London chairperson of the AFCWU, Welile Mzozonyana, was detained by the CIS for the second time.

FOSATU issued a statement condemning the

detentions and calling for the release of the unionists.

7-13: An Unemployed Workers Relief Fund was reported to have been launched by SAAWU, specifically for members of SAAWU and members of non-registered unions working closely with SAAWU, who had been dismissed from the various strike hit firms. SAAWU also stated that they would be working closely with the newly formed unions for farm and domestic workers.

The Collondale workers once again refused to collect their wages, now some four months after the strike started. The National Union of Distributive Workers (NUDW) offered their support to the AFCWU and the FCWU in their struggle at Collondale.

It was reported that Thozamile Gqweta and Sisa Njikelana had been admitted to hospital after going on a hunger strike while in detention. They had called it off but threatened another hunger strike if they were not released.

Four SAAWU members at Wilson-Rowntree were detained by the CIS, under R252, for 'furthering the aims and objects of a banned organisation, the African National Congress' (said Brigadier Sebe).

Workers at Wilson-Rowntree staged a brief stoppage in protest at the detention of their fellow workers, and SAAWU blamed the company and the South African authorities for the detentions.

A day later, 12 December, after the solidarity stoppage, another Wilson-Rowntree worker was detained.

14-20: All the detained unionists were released, without being charged. Their detention had probably been part of attack on union (specifically SAAWU) activity in the eastern Cape, as well as being linked to the Ciskeian

'referendum on independence' - the detentions would have both prevented possible union mobilisation against the referendum and served as a warning to anyone who contemplated abstaining or voting 'no'.

January, 1981

It appears that the various strikes have continued into the new year, although nothing has been reported on them in the Transvaal.

SAAWU is reported to be maintaining the rapid growth of last year.

Readers in the eastern Cape should please send us material on the labour situation in that region.

For information on the charges against Oscar Mpetha, the veteran Cape trade unionist, see the Courts section in this publication.

Some trade unionists who have been detained in the eastern Cape during the past months:

Bonisile Norushe (AFCWU) - RSA
 Thozemile Gqweta (SAAWU) - Ciskei (twice), RSA
 Sise Njikelana (SAAWU) - Ciskei, RSA
 Xolani Kota (SAAWU) - Ciskei
 Wilson Sidina (WPGWU) - Ciskei
 Robert Gqweta (SAAWU) - Ciskei
 Lawrence Tuluma (SAAWU) - Ciskei
 Bangunzi Sisingo (SAAWU) - Ciskei
 Humphrey Maxgwanga (SAAWU) - Ciskei
 September Mpakati (SAAWU) - Ciskei
 Oria Ndingayi (SAAWU) - Ciskei
 M van Green (FCWU) - Ciskei
 Karel Schippers (FCWU) - Ciskei
 Alfred Noko (AFCWU) - Ciskei
 Welile Mzozonyama (AFCWU) - Ciskei (twice)
 Qwasha (AFCWU) - Ciskei

This list is incomplete. It does, for example, not include the names of the many factory workers who have been detained because of their union activities.

NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY - BACKGROUND.

THE PAST year has seen considerable union activity among workers employed in various sections of the newspaper industry. Activity has revolved around 3 trade unions - the

South African Society of Journalists (SASJ), a predominantly white journalist society, the recently constituted Media Workers' Association of South Africa (MWASA), and the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union of South Africa (CCAWUSA).

The issues and intensity of action have not followed any cohesive pattern or been drawn from any single cause. They have stemmed largely from growing dissatisfaction over how the Argus/SAAN corporations run their newspapers, and demands have ranged from unprecedented wage increases by the SASJ, to MWASA demands questioning the control and function of newspapers in current South Africa.

The root of the problem appears to lie in the fact that SAAN and Argus, which have a virtual monopoly over the english-language press, are essentially as exploitative and conservative as the companies they scold in their pages. (SAAN and Argus are interlocking companies, with Argus owning 40% of SAAN).

The unions referred to above represent newspaper journalists and distributors (drivers and street sellers). Print workers fall under the South African Typographical Union (SATU). Both SASJ and SATU have access to long-established negotiating channels. SATU is a party to the National Industrial Council (NIC) covering the entire print industry, while SASJ and newspaper managements have formed a conciliation board of which individual newspapers are members and signatories.

SATU.

SATU IS ONE of the oldest South African trade unions. Originally formed by immigrant English printers, the union has retained its basic craft nature and is a highly bureaucratic,

benefit-oriented organisation.

It was the first union to form an industrial council with management, and negotiates wages, working conditions and benefits 'on behalf of' all print workers. It is a TUCSA affiliate with a parallel coloured union, and received permission in February 1980 to organise african workers and extend benefits to them. An african branch of the union had existed for 10 years but was disbanded in 1956. Until February, workers paid a nominal fee to the NIC and had a medical scheme and funeral benefit scheme set up for them.

The union has attempted to organise as widely as possible, while management has been so keen for workers to join the union that it has filled forms in for them, claiming that employers 'know all the information and some of them (the workers) don't write'.

It is this group of workers that MWASA is attempting to incorporate into its organisation.

SASJ.

THE SASJ WAS formed in the late 1920s. Its conciliation board with management was constituted in the mid-1940s. Until 1977 it was basically passive, accepting a wage scale considerably lower than that found in commerce and even teaching. The union registered in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act in the early 1970s.

In 1977, following a change in leadership, the SASJ deregistered, and reconstituted itself as a non-racial body. It currently has a black membership of about 60.

MWASA.

BLACK journalists, reacting against their exclusion from the SASJ, and prompted by a need to establish their own negotiating channels to

cover their interests, formed the Union of Black Journalists in the early 1970s, strongly motivated by the ideology of black consciousness.

It refused to join the SASJ on the basis that co-operation was useless since the SASJ had done nothing for black journalists, who had their own specific problems. It was banned in October, 1977.

In 1977 the Writers Association of South Africa was formed, and in October, 1980, following a highly successful strike at the Post newspaper, it reformed as MWASA, with the aim of incorporating all black workers in the newspaper industry into its organization. A determination to deal with management in the newspaper industry as an independent body on its own terms is one of the cohesive elements of its history.

In 1977 WASA applied to join the conciliation board set up between management and the SASJ. SASJ offered half its seats (despite the fact that its representation was around 700, and WASA's 200). Management encouraged the groups to form a common front. WASA eventually refused to join the board on the grounds that to do so would dilute its stand, and that it required its own negotiating channels to serve its interests. Management refused to deal with two bodies, as it failed to recognise the different needs of the two groups. Management's refusal to comply with the WASA demand, despite claims of an unofficial recognition of the organisation, lies at the root of the dispute during the recent strike over strike pay. MWASA claimed that management's refusal to establish negotiating channels had led to the strike, and that it was, therefore, its responsibility to pay for it. Management contested this on the grounds that it would set a dangerous precedent and violated fundamental principles of industrial relations. Nevertheless, the

Post strike of August, 1980, forced management to deal directly with the union, although it claimed that it was dealing only with staff and their demands.

UNION ACTION

THE STRIKE had considerable implications and repercussions. Wages at the newspaper were lower than on other newspapers. This was because it was not a signatory to the SASJ conciliation board agreement, and negotiated directly with management. The strike came after a four month arbitration hearing in which the SASJ took management to a hearing in which the SASJ contested the management claim that it could not afford the 6% across-the-board and 22.5% total salary increase that it was demanding. Although the union did not win its demands it did win a 10% across-the-board increase for all editorial workers who had been with the same employer for one year, and a further 4% to be distributed at the discretion of the editors.

Although the journalists' material victory was not total, the arbitration decision did much to reinforce the hard line approach the SASJ was beginning to take. It also brought embarrassing information over entrenched discriminatory practices to light. Chief among these was information concerning the journalist category of Cadet B. This category referred to people, predominantly black, without matriculation certificates, recruited as journalists at a lower wage scale than others.

Normally cadets are recruited and trained and a conciliation board agreement governs the first five years of their employment. They then progress on the basis of merit. This, in itself, is a contentious issue for MWASA. Initial schooling for whites and blacks creates inequalities reinforced by the fact that

English is a second language for many black journalists, who, therefore, remain on lower levels because they do not meet the standards set by a white management aiming at white audiences.

One of MWASA's demands is for specific training programmes and institutions to be set up to eradicate the effects of Bantu Education. Another is for a far larger say in the types of decisions concerning standards, terminology and other editorial decisions affecting black writers fundamentally, but over which they have no control. As a result of arbitration Cadet B was done away with. The practice was especially rife on small papers like the Cape Herald.

The Post strike placed wages on a par with SASJ scales, and reinforced the commitment to confrontation being felt by journalists in various sectors of the profession.

The most important feature of the strike was that it included a variety of workers besides journalists. Telex operators, librarians joined the strike while cleaners, typists and telex operators all received increases. The dispute obviously emphasised the need for organisation among other categories of workers on the paper, governed by Industrial Council agreements but wholly unrepresented. The Cape Herald strike that began some three months later and also included a variety of workers, again demonstrated the growing spirit of dissatisfaction among media workers as a whole.

The two month long MWASA strike started in sympathy with the Cape Herald workers and ended after severe confrontation threatened both the unity of the SASJ and the existence of the chief 'black' newspapers (since banned through state action).

This was because of the strike action itself, but more a result of the conflict it brought to the surface, and of the fundamental

threat newspaper managements felt when confronted by an articulate and powerful organisation, questioning its very right to manage. In the words of one journalist: 'Argus must be throwing parties now that Post and Sunday Post are banned. They can publish the Sowetan and retrench the people who are too vocal and dangerous'.

The strike itself focussed on two areas of conflict: the more direct one over recognition and strike pay, and the more complex conflict over actual control of the press. Considering that 50% of the english-language newspaper readership is black, and that management views its potential future market as being predominantly black, MWASA is implicitly demanding a far greater say over editorial policy in drawing attention to this fact and to the discrepancy that exists between who controls the papers and who reads them.

The strike pay issue was one that MWASA lost. It held out for two months over the principle that management had caused the strike by refusing to recognise the organisation; although the fact that SAAN, Argus and MWASA did sit down and negotiate, was a victory for MWASA.

The conflict in SASJ (see below for details) were apparent in the inconsistent and disunited activities of the journalist members during the strike. Initial support was clear: the SASJ supported the strikers and refused to do their work. As the strike went on financial support was also given. When the Post journalists were fired, major tensions erupted. Thirteen ROM journalists stayed away from work for a day in protest against the sackings. Fifty others picketed the Star building, but the support for the MWASA journalists was by no means clear or unanimous.

By that stage the strike seemed to be stuck

on the insoluble issue of strike pay, which many felt was fairly destructive as it would win nothing concrete for future generations, and the extended strike was damaging in that 'township news' was not being widely reported and the flow of information was being inhibited.

The strike may be over, but the issues are by no means resolved; the conflicts which have erupted within and between organisations and against management, are, under the present newspaper structure, apparently unresolvable.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

October

24: 22 of the 24-member editorial staff on the weekly Argus-owned Cape Herald newspaper went on strike after a breakdown in talks between the Staff Action Committee and management. The Cape Herald chapel is an affiliate of MWASA. The demands by the editorial staff, which were also made on behalf of the classified advertising and messenger staff, included increases similar to those won by the Post (Transvaal) staff after their 8 day strike in August, 1980 (see WIP14:51).

27: The entire Cape Herald staff, including messengers, drivers and typists, went on strike demanding the automatic implementation of increased salary scales.

Hal Miller, managing director of the Argus Group, refused to discuss the staff's complaints until they returned to work. MWASA issued a statement supporting their Cape Herald colleagues.

For the first time in its 15 year history, the Cape Herald failed to appear.

28: The striking Cape Herald workers received their pay cheques which excluded payment for the days they were on strike (a total of R2 174 was deducted from the pay of 28 workers in their

October pay packets). Strikers once more refused to return to work until their pay demands had been met.

Against the background of picketing and talks of strikes in the newspaper industry, the SASJ (which opened its doors officially to blacks in 1977, and represents the majority of white journalists on the english-language newspapers) negotiated a 16% pay increase with Argus and SAAN managements.

Approximately 1 100 editorial employees were awarded a 12% increase (across-the-board), and a 4% increase on the wage bill for merit. The increases were to be implemented from January, 1981.

The Cape Herald workers rejected the SASJ's negotiated salary scales and continued their strike (in demand for higher salaries and wages to be implemented immediately for all categories of workers).

Various MWASA chapels (branches) held meetings to consider supportive action to be taken unless the demands of the striking workers were met.

29: The Star chapel of the SASJ resolved that if members of MWASA went on strike they would express solidarity with them by not doing their work.

The Western Cape Traders' Association said that it would recommend to its 2 000 members not to sell the Cape Herald and to refuse to place advertisements if the paper was produced before a settlement was reached.

Members of the Post chapel of MWASA met Argus management and demanded that Cape Herald workers' pay demands be met immediately, and that they be paid full salaries while on strike.

30: Editorial and other staff members of Post

(Transvaal) and black journalists on the Star went on strike in solidarity with strikers on the Cape Herald. Argus management still refused to meet the Cape Herald strikers' demands.

Telegrams of support were sent to the Cape Herald strikers by the International Federation of Journalists, the MWASA branches at the Cape Argus, Post (Tvl), Post (Natal) and the editorial chapels of the Rand Daily Mail, the Sunday Tribune and the Star.

SAAN chapels of MWASA asked SAAN management to influence the Argus Printing and Publishing Company to promote a settlement between the parties.

Hal Miller argued that the Cape Herald, a signatory to the SA Newspaper Press Editorial Conciliation Board, was bound by the terms of the Conciliation Board (CB) agreement for salary increases to be implemented from January, 1981. He said Post (Tvl), as opposed to all other Argus newspapers, had never been a signatory to the CB, and no formal agreement had ever governed the salaries and working conditions of its editorial employees.

31: The convenor of the Action Committee of the Cape Herald Staff Association, A Salie, responded to Miller's statement, stating that clerks, telephonists and advertising personnel were also on strike, and these workers were not represented on the CB (only journalists were represented on the CB, and hence the recent arbitration award to all SASJ journalists was not applicable to all the Cape Herald newspaper strikers).

November

01: Thousands of pamphlets were distributed in Soweto urging a community boycott of Argus Group

newspapers.

02: Executive members of MWASA met and called for a national strike of all its members. It was emphasised that all Cape Herald journalists had switched membership from the SASJ to MWASA and that non-editorial staff on strike were not represented on the CB. MWASA demanded that

- the situation on the Cape Herald be resolved;
- all the workers be paid for the time they had been on strike because of management's responsibility for the present situation;
- management talks to MWASA elected representatives.

Star editorial staff decided against any strike action in support of striking black journalists.

03: The strike spread to black journalists on the SAAN-owned RDM and Financial Mail, and to two Natal papers, the Daily News and the Sunday Tribune, bringing the number of papers affected to seven and the number of press staff to about 100.

04: One Daily News reporter and one member of the Tribune Herald staff joined the strike called for by MWASA.

The Sunday Tribune SASJ chapel affirmed its support for its colleagues in MWASA, and decided that

- reporters would disassociate themselves from assisting in the production of the Tribune Herald;
- sub editors would work to rule on Tribune Herald copy, until black journalists are back on the payroll and paid in full for the period they had been on strike.

The Sunday Tribune and the Daily News staff formed a strike relief fund.

Black journalists from the South African

Press Agency (SAPA) joined the strike by colleagues from 12 newspapers. These were -

Argus-owned: Post (Tvl); Sunday Post; Star; Cape Herald; Sunday Tribune; Daily News; the Sowetan.
SAAN-owned: Rand Daily Mail; Financial Mail; Sunday Times; Sunday Express; Soweto News.

The SAAN chapel of the SASJ decided not to fill in on jobs normally done by their MWASA colleagues.

05: MWASA representatives and the Argus and SAAN groups met for talks and failed to reach agreement. Management still refused to pay workers for time they had been on strike. The National Council of the SASJ warned that the strike could jeopardise the future of newspapers aimed at black readers, disrupt relations between all black newspaper employees and employers, and permanently damage relations between black journalists and the established english-language commercial press in South Africa. Their statement said that the nationwide strike was largely due to a lack of real management responsiveness to the needs and wishes of black journalists over a long period of time. The SASJ requested a meeting of the CB to discuss the strike.

06: White journalists at SAAN defied a warning from SAAN management that they would be dismissing themselves if they refused to do the work of their striking black colleagues. They resolved to continue with their refusal to do work normally performed by the striking black journalists until the strike was settled. A resolution passed by the SAAN chapel blamed the crisis in the newspaper industry on the failure of management to recognise the needs and aspirations of black journalists and to create avenues for black advancement.

10: Daily Dispatch black journalists went on

strike until the Cape Herald grievances were settled.

In Natal 13 black organisations expressed support for MWASA and formed a Media Workers Support Committee.

11: 6 Cape Herald strikers returned to work - 14 remained on strike.

The Staff Action Committee of the Cape Herald met with management who refused to accede to the committee's demands for employees to be paid for the period of the strike and for the new pay scales to apply from November 1. Management was only prepared to regard the strikers' period of absence as leave, and to put the negotiated increases into practice from January 1.

13: Joint statements issued to foreign correspondents in South Africa by COSAS, NUSAS, the University of Witwatersrand's Black Student Society and the South African Students' Press Union (SASPU) declared support for MWASA's demands. MWASA decided to exempt the Voice newspaper from the call for a newspaper boycott because it is wholly owned and controlled by black people. As such, MWASA claimed it was not affected by the strike against english-language newspapers.

17: Daily Dispatch journalists returned to work.

18: 2 of the 3 striking reporters on the Daily News went back to work. MWASA received support from 4 student organisations at the University of Witwatersrand, the president of SACOS, the Islamic Council of South Africa, the Athlone Business and Professional Association in Cape Town and the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) in Britain.

20: End of the 3 week strike at the Cape Herald newspaper. Management did not accede to the demand for strike pay and the implementation of salary scales from November 1. An agreement was reached on pay scales for messengers. Black journalists on other papers continued their strike.

21: 1 700 to 1 800 workers (drivers, delivery men and street sellers) from Allied Publishing went on strike following a dispute over abusive treatment meted out by Johannesburg's area manager. The chief complaint was that the area manager had fired 3 workers and assaulted one of them in the process. Their demands were

1. the reinstatement of the 3 dismissed workers;
2. the removal by demotion or transfer of the area manager to a position where he could no longer have contact with, or authority over, Allied workers;
3. the recognition of the grievance procedure which had recently been signed by the parties.

Following a meeting at which the shop stewards were addressed by MWASA representatives, the shop stewards added to their demands that they were in sympathy with the MWASA strikers, and that their grievances should be settled speedily.

A series of talks between shop stewards and management did not lead to resolution of the dispute. Management agreed to only one demand - recognition of the grievance procedure.

They agreed to reinvestigate the dismissals and the conduct of the area manager. Management stated that they had no standing in the MWASA dispute - despite the fact that some directors of SAAN and Argus are also directors of Allied Publishing.

Workers were handed letters from management saying that they would be dismissed if they

did not return to work. A small group of representatives went to managing director Mitchell who refused to talk to them. He said that the dispute was now in the hands of the Board of Directors and communication was to be handled through the Transvaal Provincial manager, Mr Miller (director of Argus). Miller refused to consider unconditional reinstatement of the 3 dismissed workers, and the removal of the area manager. Assurances were given that on the ending of the strike investigations into these issues would occur.

Following an ultimatum from management, the workers returned to work on 24.11.80.

26: Post (Transvaal) workers were given an ultimatum that they would lose their jobs if they did not return to work the following day. 70 Post workers out of a total staff of 260 were on strike.

27: 2 Post journalists returned to work. 68 Post strikers were dismissed for not returning. 3 members of Durban's Sunday Tribune lost their jobs after ignoring management's ultimatum.

A meeting of SAAN's editorial chapel of SASJ voted 55 - 20 against a motion proposing a one-day strike in sympathy with fired journalists. A motion was passed condemning Argus for provocative action and welcoming SAAN's more conciliatory attitude.

The Star's chapel of SASJ passed a resolution regretting the dismissal of 68 Post strikers and 3 Sunday Tribune strikers.

28: 50 journalists employed by SAAN staged a 6 hour picket of Argus in Johannesburg in support of the 68 sacked from Post. 13 SAAN journalists stayed away from work and were suspended as a result of this one day strike.

This strike was followed by 2 days of internal hearings at SAAN, involving a number of senior staff members.

29: The Post management stated that they were prepared to re-employ all the striking staff with no loss of service benefits, but would not concede to paying strikers for the period of the strike.

December

02: About 22 black journalists at the Cape Times, the Cape Herald and the Argus began a 2-day strike in sympathy with the sacked Post employees.

05: Journalists on the Argus and Cape Times decided to compensate their 22 black colleagues who were suspended without pay for going on strike for 2 days. The Argus and SAAN chapels of the SASJ both made R200 available from their funds for the black journalists suspended from the Argus and Cape Times.

The South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU) issued a statement supporting striking journalists at SAAN and Argus-owned newspapers, and demanded reinstatement of the 71 sacked Post and Sunday Times employees. Sam Kikine, general secretary of SAAWU said that

this did not necessarily entail support for MWASA. SAAWU is a non-racial organisation and will not support organisations which are closed to some races.

18: At a joint meeting of the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) and MWASA, officials of the NIC strongly opposed a proposal (supported by Sisulu) that the white-owned newspapers should be boycotted. The proposal was finally withdrawn. M.J. Naidoo, vice president of NIC, undertook to look into the matter of NIC sharing a platform

with MWASA. NIC shuns and abhors all forms of racism, while MWASA is a racially exclusive body with a clause in its constitution excluding whites from membership.

The NIC opposition to a boycott of newspapers ran contrary to that of the Natal Council on Sport (NACOS) which directed its affiliates not to talk to journalists who were not members of MWASA. However, several NACOS officials are also officials or ordinary members of NIC, and affiliates of NACOS still spoke to all journalists. The president of SACOS, Hassan Hova, decided that SACOS would continue talking to all journalists.

23: The Argus Company was advised by the director general of the Department of Interior that the validity of the registration certificate of Post (Transvaal), Saturday Post, Sunday Post and the Sowetan had lapsed because they had not been printed and published for over a month. This occurred simultaneously with the ending of the dispute between MWASA and the SAAN/Argus management.

24: Black journalists started work. It was agreed that returned strikers would not be paid for the period they had been on strike.

29: Argus Company applied to the Department of Interior to re-register Post, Sunday Post and the Sowetan after it had lost a court application to declare the certificates of registration valid.

In this context, MWASA president Zwelakhe Sisulu and Natal regional secretary Subramoney were both placed under house arrest and issued with 3-year banning orders in terms of the Internal Security Act.

Subsequently Northern Transvaal MWASA executive member Marthe Tsedu was banned for

3 years, as were acting president Phil Mtinkulu and fellow executive member Joe Thlolos.

Argus management was informed by the Department of Interior that should they go ahead and apply for the re-registration of the suspended papers (excluding the Sowetan), they would be banned in terms of the Internal Security Act. Argus management accepted this as state closure of the papers involved, and did not pursue with the applications to re-register Post and Sunday Post.

INDUSTRIAL HEALTH

INDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND THE STATE

IN 1976, the Erasmus Commission of Inquiry into Occupational Health found that 'industrialists spend very little money on and do not devote much time to the prevention of occupational diseases'.

Since then, the picture does not appear to have changed very much. Last year, Dr E Bougas, former Transvaal chairperson of the SA Society for Occupational Health, estimated that of South Africa's 30 000 factories, fewer than 1 000 had basic industrial health facilities. Prof Ian Webster, director of the National Centre for Occupational Health, added, 'I wouldn't say that regular monitoring (of industrial health hazards) has increased very much since the Erasmus report' (Star, 21.08.80).

Because monitoring is so scanty, not even the experts in the field would venture a guess as to the true incidence of occupational disease in South Africa. But a series of press exposés last year provided alarming evidence about conditions in a number of industries. For instance, 13 of a group of 18 lead-using firms failed to meet standards accepted overseas, and many of their workers had blood lead levels high enough to cause anaemia, nerve damage, and kidney disease. Likewise, 40 000 asbestos workers were reported to be working in environments sufficiently dusty to pose substantial risks of lung scars, or asbestosis. Studies of several mercury-using factories found that one-fifth of their workers appeared to have absorbed potentially disabling quantities of the heavy metal. These findings

echoed those of the Erasmus Commission Report four years earlier, which had documented shocking conditions in industry after industry. Despite the limitations of the evidence, it seems fairly clear that a sizable proportion of South Africa's workforce is working in hazardous environments, and that many workers needlessly suffer disease or death as a result.

This state of affairs is not simply the outcome of ignorance or apathy on the part of employers. It is the consequence of apartheid capitalism and minority rule, which together encourage employers to neglect workers' health and deny the workers a means of redress. The increasing attention being given the issue reflects the changing labour needs of industry, no longer so compatible with pitchforking ill workers onto the scrapheap. While the present balance of economic and political power remains in place, however, workers are unlikely to receive the full measure of protection they deserve.

INDUSTRIAL HEALTH AND EMPLOYERS INTERESTS

IN PRACTISE, action on industrial health in South Africa has reflected the interests of employers, collectively if not always individually. Despite the broadly unsatisfactory picture, it is a fact that there have been improvements in industrial health over the decades past. However, these have generally occurred at a pace and in a manner which suited employers. The interests of employees would have dictated much more vigorous action, but when these clashed with those of capital, the latter prevailed.

A number of examples can be cited to illustrate how the needs of business have been linked both to the promotion and neglect of industrial health. Here we will examine three: the situation in the mines, the legislative exclusion of farmworkers, and the regulations

governing noise.

1. Mining: In the early years of the century, South Africa's mines were fearsomely hazardous places in which to work. Burrowed into the earth at a frantic pace, with little or no regulation, they were full of dust from rock-breaking and frequently with noxious gases from blasting and machinery. At one stage, the average working life of gold miners was seven years, by which time their lungs were too scarred by pneumoconiosis to continue work. The loss of unskilled black miners was bearable, because there were plenty more where they came from, but the loss of the scarce imported white artisans was far costlier, and they could not be segregated away from the hazards. The consequence was a large-scale effort to reduce dust levels, with ventilation machinery and extensive research, and major improvements followed.

Yet even today, autopsies on long-serving miners show three-fourths to be suffering from compensable occupational diseases, though in many cases mildly enough that they were not aware of the symptoms. This suggests the mines have improved conditions to the point where most of the work force is able to carry on for a full working life, the optimal condition from their point of view. What happens to workers afterwards is not their concern.

2. Farm workers: The manner in which legislation is moulded so as not to disturb influential employers is seen in the statutory exemption of farm workers from the protection of existing industrial health law. Farmworkers face particular hazards from zoonoses (animal-borne illnesses), pesticides, and farm machinery, yet they enjoy no statutory safeguards at all in either the 1941 Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act, or in its 1967 industrial health amendments.

When those Acts were passed, farmers were utterly dependent on cheap migrant labour or labour tenants. They had little interest in protecting their workers' health, since they were so easily replaced, and a positive incentive to neglect it, due to the cost of the necessary sanitary facilities, safety devices, training, etc. The white farmers and boss-boys were less vulnerable to the ailments, since they had less contact with the hazards and better living conditions. Thus the law could ignore ordinary farm hands, avoiding provoking an important political group in the process.

3. Noise regulations: The clearest link between industrial pressure and the softening of legislation can be seen in the case of industrial noise. Though they are not often enforced, noise is one of the few areas where South Africa's industrial health regulations are relatively strict. Thanks largely to the efforts of one dedicated official, the allowable noise limit has been fixed at 85 decibels, the level most medical authorities regard as necessary to protect hearing. (In normal circumstances, noise above 80 db causes pain).

However, industry has protested these restrictions vociferously, claiming they were impossible to meet at a reasonable cost. Consequently, the 'B' regulations unveiled last year by the Department of Manpower Utilisation set a new noise limit of 90 db. That may not appear much more, but in fact it allows around three times as much noise (the decibel scale is logarithmic, and an increase of just 3 db represents twice the quantity of noise). On hearing of the proposed relaxation, one industrial hygienist commented, 'If it goes through, there will be a lot of deaf workers walking around'.

ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM

AS THE above examples suggest, the roots of the problem lie in the labour patterns which have prevailed under apartheid capitalism. To begin with, the migrant labour system helps make it easy to ignore industrial health questions. A generous supply of unskilled labour is a characteristic feature of underdeveloped capitalist economies, but the extremely low wages and the pattern of oscillation between city and 'homeland' found in South Africa make it particularly cheap to shuffle away and replace workers who fall ill. As Adler noted

It is cheaper for management to replace injured workers than to improve the protection for them. This is of course truer for those workers who are employed in unskilled and semi-skilled positions, where the migrant labour system and the absence of formal collective bargaining rights allow workers to be available in large numbers at a low price (Adler, 1979).

A striking example supporting this view was cited in the Star's industrial health series, which reported the case of a ferro-manganese producer who failed to reduce his workers' exposure to the alloy despite four years of findings by the National Centre for Occupational Health that many of its workers had too much of it in their blood for safety (Star, 21.08.80).

Migration also tends to hide the true extent of occupational diseases because many of them develop slowly and many do not appear until a worker has been repatriated to his or her reserve. 'If blacks die of tuberculosis in Lesotho and Transkei, nobody gets very worried here because they don't see the deaths', commented labour lawyer Halton Cheadle (Star, 20.08.80). In the case of asbestosis, for instance, the vast majority of cases reported are white, while the vast majority of the industry's workers are black, suggesting many cases go undiagnosed. This view was confirmed by analyses of autopsy

records on black asbestos miners, which found some degree of asbestosis in 70% of them between 1959 and 1964, and in more than one third from 1975 to 1977 (Star, 22.08.80).

Moreover, the prevalence of cheap migrant labour and consequent colour-bar restrictions have helped to minimise the role played by harder-to-replace skilled workers in South African industry. As Wilson showed, pressures to minimise costs in this environment led to a capital-intensive pattern of development and efforts to keep down the number of skilled whites employed at apartheid-bloated wages (Wilson, 1969:181). As a result, South Africa has a substantially smaller proportion of skilled workers in its labour force than do other countries at similar stages of industrial development (ICS, 1979).

The tendency to neglect workers' health is compounded by the abysmal ignorance of health hazards on the part of many employers, and their desire to cut corners. Soon after the Star's industrial health articles appeared, a battery maker phoned the paper to say that he had not realised the lead in his plant's air imperilled the 280 workers off the production line as well as those on it! While this was an extreme example, many other employers also show a startling ignorance of the hazards their workers face, and try to minimise the sums they spend on them, according to the makers of safety equipment. 'They want the minimum protection allowed by law', says one, 'They're not conscious of protecting the workers'.

Of course, such short-cutting becomes understandable in view of the costs involved in preventing industrial diseases. Despite the inadequacy of their programmes, some lead-using firms put the share of recent capital spending on industrial health at 35 to 50%, while at

Rand Mines' newest asbestos factory, R1,6-m was spent on ventilation equipment. These sums should be kept in perspective, as they partly reflect efforts to make up for a history of neglect, but they nevertheless give some indication of the effect industrial health spending could have on a firm's profits.

Besides the economic element, a contributing factor to the problem is the neglect of industrial health by the medical profession. This is a reflection of medicine's traditional orientation towards curative rather than preventative practice (Savage, 1979). Wits, Pretoria and Stellenbosch have only recently added industrial health sections into their undergraduate medicine curricula. South Africa's four other medical schools appear to have no industrial health experts on their staffs. As a result of these deficiencies in training, experts agree, most doctors are not equipped to diagnose industrial diseases, whether in family practice or hired by a factory.

The general pattern of neglect which has developed has been permitted by another key failure: that of trade unions. Abroad, unions have been powerful forces for industrial health legislation and improvements, but in South Africa the white trade unions which dominate the movement have long since been bought off militancy with a share in apartheid's profits. They have become, in the words of several observers, little more than 'glorified benefit societies'. On industrial health matters, 'trade unions in South Africa have tended to abdicate their responsibility to their membership by leaving prevention within the four corners of the Factories Act' (South African Labour Bulletin, 1980:1).

No counter-balancing influence has been available to the black majority of the workforce. Until 1979, they were excluded from the official

industrial relations system, and they remain largely unorganised. Of course, they are also excluded from the political system altogether.

RESTRAINTS ON THE STATE.

IT SEEMS fairly clear that the balance of influences goes a long way to explain the pattern of action on industrial health by the state. However, in the absence of case studies based on archival records, it is difficult to cite positive evidence of this. Instead, we shall have to settle for tracing the association between the interests of employers on particular issues and the political outcomes.

The clearest association is the wholesale exemption from industrial health legislation of many of the worst endangered workers. Those excluded are generally in categories of employment traditionally dependent on high rates of migrancy, rapid labour turnover and low wages. Farming, cited above is one; domestic work another. Altogether, the Erasmus Commission estimated that 5,75 million of South Africa's 9 million workers were not protected by law against health hazards on the job.

A web of subtler connections between industrial interests and state action appears to exist as well. The Erasmus Report itself represented an offensive in a 15-year battle between the Departments of Health and Labour (now Manpower Utilisation) for responsibility over industrial health. Contrary to normal procedure, however, no white paper was ever published by the government in response to the Commission report, and its recommendations were shelved for four years.

The inaction was a result of bureaucratic guerilla warfare by the Department of Labour against the Erasmus recommendation that Health take over industrial health control. Labour

forced the issue up to Cabinet, which pushed it back to the bureaucrats and the Public Service Commission. The battle was not just one of bureaucrats, however, but should be seen as one where they acted as surrogates for their respective constituencies. The Health Department represents doctors and health professionals like industrial hygienists, who have a natural interest in greater demand for their services. Labour, on the other hand, traditionally maintained close links with industry and white unions, which as noted above had been indifferent to health issues. In this struggle the Labour men consistently argued that the Health Department would prove over-zealous in standard setting, and that this would impose excessive costs on individual firms and generally slow economic growth.

Perhaps the most evident indication of sensitivity to industrial interests is the lack of priority accorded industrial health by the government. Despite the wide-ranging exclusions, the legislative framework governing industrial health grants sufficient regulatory power to enforce effective standards. Yet this has never been done, for a variety of reasons which seem to suggest a lack of real urgency.

First of all, sufficient manpower has never been allocated to enforce existing regulations. Some 65 factory inspector positions have been authorised within the Department of Labour, but only 30 have been filled. While the full complement would probably prove sadly inadequate - the UK maintains 4 000 factory inspectors - the number actually available appears farcical. There is only 1 inspector for every 1 000 factories. In consequence, present and past officials of the Labour Department have stated that many factories are visited only every other year, and when the inspectors do arrive, they often have time for only a cursory

inspection. (Star, 20.08.80).

Secondly, the responsible Department has repeatedly displayed hostility to worker initiatives to improve industrial health conditions. The Metal and Allied Workers' Union has several times had difficulty in finding out from inspectors the standards used in its members' factories. In a case where it actually requested an investigation by a government inspector into whether some members handling fibreglass might develop dermatitis, the official refused to divulge the result. His reply to the union summed up the Department's paternalistic approach to industrial health: 'It was strictly a matter between the employer and the Government'. (Star, 20.08.80).

Third, the standards employed by the Government have generally been rather permissive. The lead standard, for instance, is three times that allowed in US plants, and one-and-a-half times that permitted in West Germany. Generally, the Labour Department has adopted the 'Threshold Limit Values' adopted by the US Conference of Intergovernmental Industrial Hygienists some years back. In many instances, particularly in the health-conscious US, these have been superseded on the basis of subsequent research.

REASONS FOR STATE ACTION.

IN VIEW of the factors militating against action, it may seem surprising that there is any industrial health legislation on the books at all, or that improvements in working conditions have taken place. Despite the absence of organised working class pressure for action, however, the collective interest of employers has provided a rationale both for state action and for gradual improvements in health standards.

The importance of the issue appears to have grown with the role played by the skilled

worker in the economy, as has been the case elsewhere. 'Look at the history of the Factories Acts in the UK,' says Mr Cheadle. 'When you're losing skilled labour in ghastly accidents, you get attention to factory safety'. The reasons are not hard to find when one examines the differences in replacement costs between skilled and unskilled workers. A study by P-E Consulting found that it costs a firm R150 to replace an unskilled worker, but R2 000 in search costs, administrative costs and lowered productivity to replace a school leaver, if a replacement can be found at all. (Star, 20.08.80).

Another factor which may have lowered resistance to industrial health improvements has been the steady oligopolisation of South African industry. Small firms tend to find it particularly difficult to afford the expensive equipment needed to meet health regulations. Larger, oligopolistic ones can better afford it, and have the market power needed to pass on the costs to the consumer. Traditionally, small firms have been seen as the laggards on industrial health, while authorities have generally rated large firms as doing much more.

Clearly it is not in the interest of any firm to be the only one in its industry to increase its costs through industrial health measures, when its competitors do not do so and thus gain a market advantage. The position is different, however, if the state regulations aim at forcing all to do so, thus enabling them to protect their skilled labour without suffering relative disadvantage.

THE LATEST PROPOSALS

THE MOTIVES for state action can be glimpsed in practise in the latest proposal for legislation on industrial health. The bill, which would give

the Department of Health power to draft and enforce industrial health regulations, was circulating in the bureaucracy late in 1980 and was leaked to the press in January, 1981.

The legislation was precipitated by the revision of industrial relations law under way, in line with the state's new strategy for economic growth. The strategy reflects an awareness that there is now a shortage of skilled workers so severe that many technical positions are going begging. To fill the gap, and to attempt to allay black discontent, the state and business jointly aim to create an elite of skilled black workers, significantly expanding the skilled proportion of the labour force. Since it pays to conserve rather than replace skilled workers, especially when they are in short supply, the protection of their health has assumed a higher place on the agenda.

This was recognised by the body which detailed the new industrial strategy, the Wisahahn Commission. The Commission, which was close to the Labour Department, recommended in Part Three of its report that an enlarged Industrial Health and Safety Division be established in the Manpower and Utilisation Department. However, in further bureaucratic skirmishing after the report, Manpower Utilisation ceded the responsibility to the Department of Health, which immediately began to brush up its long-prepared post-Erasmus legislative plans.

These calls for a new Occupational Health Act, which transfers the Factory Act's authority for granting companies industrial health from Labour to the Health Department and local authorities. Inspectors of all three of these agencies will enforce the Act, requiring the 'best available method' of meeting health standards. The draft Act also sets up a National Advisory Committee to advise the Minister of Health about

standards, and industrial health works committees in individual factories.

The bill represents an improvement on the present setup in a number of respects. It is much more specific in its prescription of employer duties and ministerial power. Furthermore, it covers all workers, including farm and domestic workers. Most important, the transfer of responsibility to a health-oriented department from an industry-oriented one should mean a greater degree of expertise and a lesser degree of permissiveness. (Certainly this has concerned disgruntled Labour Department staffers who estimate that the bill will cost industry R130-m in the first year of operation and R250-m annually thereafter).

Yet the Bill does not alter, and in one important respect worsens, the basic defect of the status quo. It retains a paternalistic approach, in which responsibility for industrial health rests with the government, not workers. It even takes away the right of workers to petition the courts for a review of inspectors' decisions, by declaring the official conclusions final unless they are shown to be in bad faith. While the National Advisory Council and plant councils make some provision for worker representation, the workers are to be appointed. The National Board members will be chosen by the Minister of Health - the same man who clamped a fundraising ban on one trade union federation to raise industrial health questions, FOSATU - while the plant councils will be named by the owners. These arrangements hardly suggest that worker representatives likely to press for action will be chosen.

While it is true that for the foreseeable future the majority of the workforce is likely to be unorganised and thus reliant on the state for health protection, the enforcement arrangements under the new Bill also provide cause for

concern. They are even more drawn out than under the Factories Act, with no less than six administrative proceedings possible before an employer lands in court. There he will face a maximum penalty even lower than the present one of R600. Health Department officials say their aim is persuasion, not litigation, but the weakness of the threats they make will not enhance their persuasive power.

Moreover, carrying out the provisions of the Bill will impose a vast administrative burden on the Health Department. While their use of local authority and Labour Department inspectors will ease the manpower crisis somewhat, the Department will still be charged with visiting the 30 000 factories regularly, as well as approving the extension of old plants and the building of new ones. It will also have to draw up regulations for the myriad of industrial health hazards known.

Fulfilling these discretionary roles effectively will require an enormous commitment of manpower and funds. It is unlikely that these will be forthcoming in the necessary measure. The likely consequence is that Health will prove tougher than Manpower in a minority of more urgent cases, while in the majority the sheer pressure of work will force it to rubberstamp conditions and regulations, such as Manpower Utilisation does at present. This underlines the importance of allowing as much as possible of the responsibility for occupational health to rest with the workers, the people with the strongest interest in it, and the only ones who are in the plant every day.

CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR MORE RESEARCH

THE NEWEST proposals are only the latest in a series of laws touching on occupational health. One of the first laws passed by the Union

Parliament was the Factories Act of 1911. This was followed by the Factories, Machinery and Building Works Act of 1941, amendments to that Act in 1967, and the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act of 1973.

It would be useful to investigate the background and influences behind these Acts. Some hypotheses suggest themselves - such as that the 1941 Act might have been prompted by war-induced labour shortages - but many more could probably be culled from the record. All papers relating to the 1911 and 1941 Acts, including Cabinet papers and Departmental correspondence, should now be open under the 30-year rule. While those on the 1967 and 1973 legislation remain closed, many of the individuals involved are still around and happy to talk. It might also be worthwhile to consult the records of the Occupational Safety Division of the Department of Labour on its never-ending battles with industry for more action and within government for more personnel. An understanding of the origins and implementation of industrial health legislation would deepen our knowledge of the complex relationship which exists between capital and the state in South Africa.

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Small Business Development Corporation - comment

THE SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

THE Small Business Development Corporation (the SBDC) was launched at a meeting on 27 November, 1980. This meeting was attended by representatives of state and large-scale capital. For example, in attendance were:

- Dr Gerhard de Kock (senior Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank and Co-ordinator of Constellation Affairs);
- Dr Anton Rupert (prime mover of the SBDC, and head of the Rembrandt Group);
- Dr Conrad Strauss (MD of Standard Bank, SA);
- Dr Wim de Villiers (General Mining/Federale Mynbou);
- Tony Bloom (Premier Milling);
- Murray Hofmeyr (Anglo American);
- Prime Minister PW Botha;
- Dr Piet Koornhof (Minister of Co-operation and Development).

Prime Minister Botha placed the SBDC within the 'constellation of states' strategy, and the SBDC was said to have arisen out of consultation between the state's Special Constellation Committee, Dr Rupert, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), and financial institutions.

The SBDC was planned to have authorised capital of R50-m (from the state through the IDC), and R50-m from private capital. To date pledges of more than R57-m have been received from the private sector (for example, it has been reported that the Tongaat Group is to invest R1-m, while it is believed that Anglo American, Gold Fields, Sanlam and the Rembrandt Group are each to invest R5-m), and latest estimates put the total amount to be invested by the state and private capital at R150-m.

The Development and Finance Corporation (formerly the Coloured Development Corporation) and the Indian Industrial Corporation and activities of the IDC related to small businesses will be taken over by the SBDC. Rupert's own Small Business Development Corporation was to change its name to Small Entrepreneurs Ltd.

The formation of the SBDC is no new move in either state or private action to stimulate capitalist business ventures for all the black groups. Dr Anton Rupert, to whose initiative the SBDC has been attributed, places it within the context of the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC, 1969), the 'Agency System' (1969) which allowed 'white' capital into the bantustans on an agency basis to the BIC over a long period before being transferred to africans, the Tripartite Agreement System (1974) which was supposed to allow bantustan citizens to participate in ventures set up by white business through the local Development

Corporation, and the latest 'regional development' moves across bantustan borders.

There are, however, a few aspects of the creation of the SBDC that need to be commented on:

Firstly, it has been placed squarely within the policy of separate development (apartheid) and uncritically accepts the separationism of that policy. So, for example, Rupert talks of the 'national aspirations of the black peoples', and holds that 'economic reasons brought him (sic) (the africans - SARS) from his own areas and only economic reasons can keep him there';

Secondly, as has been the case with previous moves in the same direction, the SBDC is being set up by large-scale (monopoly) capital in South Africa. (Previous undertakings include aid to small-scale sugar growers in Natal², agricultural projects in KaNgwane, and the activities of the Urban Foundation, to mention only a few). Why it is being undertaken has been partly stated by Dr Rupert - a. job creation; and b. 'the expansion of the free enterprise system'. While much has been made of the low returns on the money invested in the SBDC, one should add that c. economic necessity has been behind at least some such schemes (for example, the sugar farming scheme in Natal²).

While Dr Rupert correctly notes that

²This project undertaken by agricultural capital in Natal, including the Tongaat Group's involvement through the Sukumani Development Corporation, seems to have been forced on them because of the shortage of land suitable for cane growing in the hands of large-scale capital. It involves financial, technical, transport, milling and marketing assistance (and a consequent dependent relationship) to small-scale african sugar cane growers, primarily in the Ndawadwe district of KwaZulu.

'large companies do not create jobs (hardly a surprising statement, considering the mass of empirical and theoretical material on the subject), he neglects to point out the very reason *why small businesses have not been able to 'absorb' those incapable of finding employment in the dominant, large-scale (monopoly) sector of the economy. That reason is to be found in the precariousness of small-scale capitalist activity, where markets, tastes and demands, and costs (for example) are completely dominated by the few largest companies in each economic sector.*

It is, therefore, hardly likely that this trend will be reversed in South Africa (out of philanthropic motivation). Where small-scale capitalists are likely to have a measure of success will be in situations of complete domination by and dependence on the 'patrons' of their activities - domination through financing, marketing, transport, choice of goods produced, and how they are produced (technology). In other words, these small-scale capitalists whose existence is profitable to monopoly interests are likely to survive.

The other important motivation advanced by Dr Rupert is that of creating or maintaining a belief in the advantages (seen by and benefiting a mere handful of black people) of the 'free enterprise' system. This strategy has been called 'investment by the private sector ... as an insurance policy for South Africa's stability...' How this is to be achieved when the 'free enterprise' system is one in which a small number of people are employers of labour and, hence, enjoyers of wealth, rather than workers and creators of wealth, is not clear. Coupled with this is the precariousness of the position of even the few who will benefit from such a scheme. In other words, conversion to 'free

enterprise' will be limited to the few who find it profitable, and while they find it profitable;

Thirdly, it is not clear whether the SBDC is going to fit what is known as the 'informal sector' into their project. (The 'informal sector' refers to that group of economic activities that are either illegal or not recognised formally, such as backyard mechanics, shebeen managers, pavement sellers, etc). If they do not recognise this sector of the economy, it leaves out probably the vast majority of small businesses, and if they do this sector represents the most precarious set of economic activities with least chance of steady and noticeable job-creation for the millions of unemployed and under-employed in South Africa. The 'informal sector' is not only dependent on expansion and contraction of 'formal' economic activity, but is open to prosecution by the state and local authorities.

Finally, the SBDC will consolidate the 'non-racial' aspect of South African capitalism, attempting to incorporate a few black people as very junior partners, but leaving intact the major arenas of conflict and oppression in South Africa (primarily the system of labour exploitation through the migrant labour system).

-Southern African Research Service.

magazine, which is involved in these questions on an ongoing basis. Details of Critical Health appear in an advertisement on page 34 of this WIP.

Because of the gap in time since the last issue of WIP, the regular features on labour action and courts are somewhat longer than usual. Both of these sections remain descriptive rather than explanatory or analytical, and while certain conclusions can be drawn from the number of strikes and work stoppages, as well as the nature of trials taking place, the editors are aware of the need for a more detailed evaluation of these areas of conflict and struggle. This is a gap in WIP coverage which will be hopefully rectified in the future.

This WIP introduces a new feature, in the form of a supplement. Details of the nature of the supplement, and the reasons for its introduction, occur in the publication.

The article involved in this supplement takes an exploratory look at the current structure of the South African economy, and its relationship to the world capitalist system. From this perspective, certain suggestions are made about future paths of development South African capitalism is likely to follow.

The article is particularly concerned to understand why, in the context of an international capitalist crisis, the South African economy is showing signs of growth. The author, David Kaplan, argues that measures undertaken to deal with the international crisis are the principal cause of the current 'upswing' in the South African economy. In particular, Kaplan looks at mechanisms used to offset a fall in the rate of capitalist profit, and indicates some of the effects involved in dealing with a falling rate of profit. These

arguments are then related to the position of gold as a monetary standard in the international capitalist economy, and hence to the significance of gold mining within South Africa.

Concluding that gold mining will play an expanded role in the South African economy, compared to the manufacturing sector, Kaplan criticises those authors who argue that restructuring of the South African economy will necessarily revolve around manufacturing. He goes on to suggest that in a situation where manufacturing is dominated by multi-national corporations, it is doubtful whether South Africa could significantly increase its export of manufactured goods.

A number of recent arguments have suggested that restructuring of both state and economy in South Africa have been related to the needs of an expanding manufacturing sector - involving a reliance on semi-skilled stabilised labour rather than unskilled migrants, and an increased internal market for consumer goods. It is with this in mind that certain assessments of the Wiehahn and Riekert proposals, and the restructuring associated with PW Botha's government, have been undertaken. The importance of Kaplan's article is that it points out that it is by no means certain that South Africa will follow the path of expanding its manufacturing sector at the expense of mining. As Kaplan concludes:

Eurocentric models (ie models derived from the history of capitalism in Europe) prescribe a single path to capitalist development - that of industrialisation.... As the world's principal producer of gold and with a mining sector which is domestically owned and controlled, the trajectory (path) of capitalist development in South Africa is likely to follow a significantly different path.

Overseas subscribers will note an increase in WIP subscription rates. This is unavoidable due to very large increases in the cost of international postage from South Africa, introduced from January 1, 1981. The subscription increases do no more than absorb the rise in postal costs, while the cost of the publication itself remains the same. The editors regret this increase, but it is necessary if WIP is to remain financially self-sufficient in terms of production and distribution costs. An option for those who find it hard to afford the new rates is to find a group wishing to read WIP, and to order one or two copies for the whole group.

As far as South African subscribers and distributors are concerned, we are able to hold WIP at its old rates, despite increases in printing and paper costs. But this is dependent on the prompt payment of outstanding monies. As previously explained, money received on one edition pays for production and distribution of the next, and it is accordingly most important for distributors and subscribers to submit collected or owed amounts as soon as possible.

-THE EDITORS.

THE CURRENT 'UPSWING' IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITALIST CRISIS; A REINTERPRETATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN 'DEVELOPMENT'

1. INTRODUCTION.

THIS PAPER attempts to situate the current economic 'upswing' in the South African economy in the context of the ongoing economic crisis which is plaguing the international capitalist economy. I will argue that the two phenomenon are integrally linked. The principal features of the international capitalist crisis and, even more centrally, the measures hitherto taken to resolve this crisis, are the principal factors contributing to the present 'upswing' in the South African economy.

The first section of this paper outlines the major features of the international capitalist crisis and the measures taken to counteract it. The second section examines some aspects of the current 'upswing' in the South African economy. In the final section, in the form of a critique of some writings on the subject, some implications of the future trajectory of capitalist development in South Africa are drawn.

Clearly, there are highly complex issues involved, and a short article can only hope to provide some fruitful points for departure.

2. PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CAPITALIST CRISIS.

I WOULD suggest that the following are the central specific features of the current crisis:

a) This is indeed an international and capitalist crisis. The downswings and (to a lesser extent) the upswings in the economies of all the advanced capitalist countries are

closely synchronised.

b) The recession of 1974-75 was preceded by a long period in which the rate of profit was tending to fall in the advanced capitalist countries. In the post-recession period, rates of profit were increased somewhat, but not dramatically.

c) The upswing following the severe recession of 1974-75 has been weak, hesitant and of short duration.

d) Inflationary pressures are international and endemic. They are only somewhat moderated when recession deepens.

e) The crisis is associated with a changing configuration of imperialist forces. This is often summarised as 'a decline in the hegemony of the United States'.

These features are all closely inter-related. However, for ease of exposition, I will deal with each in turn.

a) Capitalism is an international system and severe recessions - 1929 for example - have always been experienced simultaneously in virtually all capitalist countries.¹ In the more minor recessions however, contractions in one country were frequently offset by expansion in other countries. The expansion of exports served to limit the recession in the former. But the 1974-75 recession was felt everywhere in the capitalist world, if not in the same magnitude. Of the OECD countries, the decline in industrial production from peak to trough was greatest in Switzerland and Japan (about 20%) and least in Sweden (4%), Canada (7%) and Spain (10%).² However, the degree of synchronisation was very marked.³

The capitalist character of the crisis is revealed most starkly by the fact that none of the principal planned economies suffered a decline in industrial production in 1974-76.

While their rate of growth certainly declined, it was still distinctly positive.⁴ The universality and synchronisation of the recession amongst the developed capitalist countries is a testimony to the growing internationalisation of the capitalist system. This internationalisation has acquired a whole new dimension with the spectacular rise of the Multinational Corporations (MNCs), particularly post-1960, and the contemporaneous development of the international capital and money markets - notably the Eurodollar market.⁵ One major consequence of these developments, significant for the analysis here, is that national monetary policies are likely to be rendered far less effective.⁶ The Eurodollar market allows for the rapid and unregulated switching of currencies, while national credit controls can be circumvented by companies borrowing abroad. Similarly, MNCs are able, using internal accounting changes, to transfer moneys into anticipated strong currencies.⁷ At the same time, and for the same reasons, as nationally based monetary regulation has become increasingly ineffective, the possibilities for private 'speculation' in currencies has much increased.⁸

b) The measurement of profit rates is difficult and there is no universal agreement of profit trends. However, most studies of the rate of profit have revealed a general tendency for the rate of profit to fall from circa the early 1950s. This is particularly true for the rate of profit in the principal capitalist country - the United States.⁹

The 'recovery' of the rate of profit in the 1974-75 recession and the subsequent period was real, but by no means restored profit rates to their post World War Two peaks. Again, this is particularly true of the

United States.¹⁰

The explanation for the movement in the rate of profit, which is indeed the capitalist crisis, cannot be attempted here. But it does seem to provide a striking verification of the Marxian thesis of a tendency for the rate of profit to fall in capitalism. This tendency occurs, in terms of Marx's analysis, as a consequence of a rising organic composition of capital unless offset by an equal increase in the rate of surplus value.¹¹ Economic crises can function so as to restore the rate of profit in three primary ways. First, by the 'devalorisation' or indeed open destruction of capital - bankruptcies, plant closings, etc. Second, through raising the rate of surplus value - growing unemployment allowing for a limiting of wage increases, reduction in strike activity, etc. Third, through a reduction in the prices of raw materials, purchased mainly from the Third World.

All three occurred as a consequence of the 1974-75 recession, but to a limited extent. A number of raw material price decreases were recorded, but 'energy-related' commodities rose substantially in price.¹² Unemployment expanded significantly, and even in the 'recovery' period stood at historically high levels in the OECD countries.¹³ This did allow for a tightening of labour discipline and real wage deductions in a number of cases¹⁴ - but labour organisation was such as to ensure that this was not of a sufficient magnitude to restore the rate of profit to its former levels.

The key issue is that of capital devalorisation - and here lies the explanation for the post 1974-75 period. The devalorisation of capital was distinctly limited. There were a few large-scale bankruptcies,¹⁵ but the

effects were largely limited to the smaller capitals. The 'corporate structure', monopoly capital of the large trusts, was little affected.

The underlying reason for the limited effect of the recession in terms of capital devalorisation must rest with governmental counter-cyclical economic policies.¹⁶ Various forms of monetary 'pump-priming' and deficit financing served to ensure that the level of output for the economy as a whole did not fall too catastrophically, while the harder hit monopoly corporations were, in addition, accorded forms of direct subsidy.¹⁷ These subsidies allowed them to continue in production.

With the capital stock largely intact, excess capacity, which had characterised production prior to the 1974-75 recession, continued in the 'recovery'.¹⁸ The subsidised survival of Chrysler and many of the European car firms, for example, meant that the most efficient corporations were unable to operate at full capacity. The continuance of excess capacity therefore limited the extent to which the rate of profit rose in the 'recovery' period.

c) The limited recovery of the rate of profit in the post-recession period was the principal factor underlying the weakness of the international capitalist economy.

As was outlined above, this limited recovery in the rate of profit is to be located in limited reductions in primary commodity prices, limited increases in the rate of surplus value and, in particular, in a severely 'retarded' devalorisation of capital. The net effect was to ensure that reinvestment in productive activities was severely curtailed. This further encouraged investments of a more

speculative character.

d) Inflation is a complex phenomenon, and no attempt is made to provide an explanation here. But it does seem that inflation, which once again is a phenomenon of international capitalism, is linked to two principal factors. First, the economic dominance of monopoly corporations, and second, to expansionist monetary policies pursued by capitalist governments.¹⁹

Firstly, the absence of competition has allowed the larger firms considerable leeway to utilise their power to unilaterally raise prices without fear of retaliation.²⁰ Thus, even in a recession, larger corporations will tend to reduce their output, but increase their mark-up in order to maintain profitability levels.²¹ A recession will moderate price increases, principally via the effect of a declining demand on the competitive sector and reductions in the prices of raw materials as demand falls.²² Generally, only when the recession really deepens, and the larger corporations collectively have massive excess capacity, will this tend to provoke major price reductions in the monopoly sector.

Secondly, the expansionist monetary and fiscal policies of the advanced capitalist countries have led to a massive expansion of the money supply - both nationally and internationally - and this is particularly true of the United States post 1958 (see below). There is indeed a relation between the expansion of the money supply and the persistence of inflation. The development of international monetary and capital markets have provided an additional impetus, particularly by allowing avenues for the circumvention of tight money policies.²³ The massive budget deficits of the advanced capitalist countries in 1975-76

were the real reason for the subsequent 'recovery'. But they added further impetus to inflation.

Apart from the state's general monetary pump-priming, in order to maintain the level of total demand, the other principal mechanisms designed to limit the recession by reinstating the rate of profit are also clearly inflationary. Direct subsidisation of inefficient firms, tax reductions on company profits, assuming more of the costs of private capital eg by subsidising or taking over scientific research, and various unproductive state expenditures which allow an outlet for capitalist production eg defence, all contribute to inflation. The persistence of a condition of stagflation (if not slump-flation) - the coexistence of stagnant production and rising prices - reflects the contradictory character of capitalism in its monopoly phase, viz a tendency for the rate of profit to fall which produces stagnation, and an opposing set of counter-tendencies, primarily initiated by the state, which produce inflation.

These are structural, and hence endemic features of advanced capitalism. If inflation persists in the advanced capitalist countries - the continuing devaluation of paper currencies - this will clearly have major long-term repercussions for South Africa, the world's principal producer of gold.²⁴

c) But the value of the key official currency, the international currency, the US dollar, is of particular importance. The declining value of the dollar is one reflection of the limitations of US imperialist hegemony.

The agreement reached at Bretton Woods in 1944 had as its bedrock the convertibility of the US dollar into gold at the fixed price of \$35 per ounce. This price had in fact been set as early as 1934 when the Roosevelt Administration,

in the context of the US holding massive gold stocks, had raised the price of gold. It had arbitrarily stopped at \$35 per ounce.²⁵

The strict convertibility of the dollar into gold depended on two basic factors. First, maintaining a continuing supply of newly-mined gold, which could be purchased at that fixed price, ie a regulation of the gold market such that newly-mined gold would be offered to the Central Banks at \$35 per ounce. Second, and closely interrelated, that the supply of dollars was restricted. The latter was the crucial condition - an over-supply of dollars would lead to a swapping of dollars for gold and a drain upon the US gold reserves.

The US, in particular, sought to control the market for newly-mined gold by attempting to enforce sale through the Central Banks or the IMF at the fixed price of \$35 an ounce - a policy which was strongly opposed by South Africa.²⁶

But the crucial factor which finally destroyed the Bretton Woods Agreement was the persistence of massive US Balance of Payments deficits. Whereas in the first decade or so after the War there was a severe dollar shortage internationally, this gave way to ever larger dollar surpluses.²⁷ The key turn-around date was 1958. In that year, US gold reserves fell below the level of its official liabilities denominated in dollars. At the same time the US Balance of Payments produced a very large deficit. From this date, large outflows of gold from the US continued unabated, as dollar holders sought to exercise their right to acquire gold.

The US responded by progressively and unilaterally cutting the links between the dollar and gold. This occurred in three major steps. In 1961 the 'Gold Pool' was created

whereby several European countries made a commitment to sell some of their gold stocks in order to maintain the dollar price for gold. In 1968 the US ended its commitments to private holders of dollars who now could no longer acquire gold for their dollars. In 1971 the 'gold window' was closed to official purchasers as well.

In very broad terms, both the persistence of the US Balance of Payments deficit, and the measures taken as a consequence by the US to cut links between the dollar and gold, are to be understood in the context of US imperialist hegemony. At the same time, it points to some of the limitations inherent in this hegemonic position.

The Balance of Payments deficit must be understood, in part, as a consequence of US military expenditures. Such expenditures, particularly during the Vietnam War, led to a massive drain of dollars abroad directly, while indirectly funnelling much of the R and D, skilled personnel etc away from the production of marketed commodities.²⁸ US 'aid', special trade relations with 'strategic' countries like South Korea and Taiwan, and other factors linked to the US imperialist presence made further contributions to the deficit. The challenges to US hegemony - the direct resistance of Cuba and Vietnam for example, and the challenges posed by its economic rivals, the other developed countries, were severe threats to that hegemonic position and inter alia contributed very significantly to the deficit.

But the US response reveals that, while challenged and circumscribed, its hegemonic position within the international capitalist system has, in essence, been maintained.²⁹ Instead of abiding by the rules of Bretton Woods and exercising expenditure reductions in

order to limit its payments deficits, so stemming the outflow of dollars - a policy which would have entailed economic restraint at home and/or curtailment of US 'activities' abroad - the US has essentially adopted what became known as 'a passive strategy' for the Balance of Payments. In essence, this strategy - given elaborate theoretical justification by the economic 'establishment'³⁰ - was that the US should continue to run its economy at an 'optimal' level. The resultant outflow of dollars abroad would have to be 'absorbed' by other countries. The 'pressure' on other countries, notably the advanced capitalist country rivals of the US, arises in two ways. First, they would be forced to buy dollars in order to maintain the value of the dollar because the dollar represented much of the backing for their own currencies. Second, an effective devaluation of the dollar or revaluation of their own currency would severely jeopardise their trading position vis-a-vis the US. Finally, a severe monetary crisis, brought on by a major decline of the dollar, would jeopardise the whole international economy.

The economic rivals of the US have thus been forced to accept a situation whereby the US runs persistent deficits, and to absorb the resultant dollar surpluses.³¹ But the fact that the major capitalist country operates outside the monetary rules, in order to ensure its continued hegemony,³² has injected a tremendous note of uncertainty into monetary relations and the stability of the system. There clearly are limitations to the process of dollar absorption and the spectre of a monetary collapse is consequently a real one. In addition the outflow of dollars has added tremendously to international liquidity, and is the principal factor in the rapid growth of the Eurodollar

market. To reiterate, these developments have made a significant contribution to fuelling international inflation. Monetary inflation, and the threat of a monetary collapse, are the principal factors encouraging 'alternative' forms of wealth holding.

The major conclusions to be drawn from the above analysis are summarised here:

Inflation, the devaluation of monetary assets, is a persistent and a structural feature of advanced capitalism. It has its roots in the very structures of capitalism. Firstly, as a consequence of monopoly control of markets; secondly, as a result of governmental policies designed to ensure the maintenance of demand; thirdly, at an international level, as the consequence of a massive increase in international liquidity which must be grounded in an analysis of US imperialist hegemony.³³ At the 'national level', it represents the outcome of forces, principally directed by the state, designed to counteract the tendency of profit rates to fall. At the 'international level', it reflects the persistence of, but at the same time growing threat to, US imperialist hegemony.

One consequence of the latter feature has been the instability and devaluation of the dollar - the international reserve currency. There is an analogy here with the situation of the early 1930s. In 1931 the devaluation of the key reserve currency, the pound sterling, led to the first substantial price increase for gold.³⁴ While British hegemony in the imperialist system was uncontested, a strong currency could ensure a fixed relation between it and gold. Devaluation of the pound sterling reflected the decline in British imperialist hegemony. With American imperialist hegemony undisputed and the dollar strong, a similar period of a fixed price

for gold could be maintained. The challenges to US imperialist hegemony in the contemporary period have once again lifted the ceiling on gold.

At the same time as monetary assets have been subject to devaluation, the rate of profit in direct productive investment has been low and declining. This decline was only partially reversed by the major recession on 1974-75, and the fact that the reversal was only partial was due primarily to the limited valorisation of capital. As a consequence, capital is searching desperately for profitable avenues for 'investment' in order to ensure an adequate return.

Since neither productive investment, nor monetary assets yield adequate returns, the search has been directed elsewhere.³⁵ A wide range of possibilities exist - property, antiques, certain raw materials, etc, and even more crucially, gold and silver.

The US has now cut all effective links between the dollar and a fixed quantity of gold. The controlled market for gold gave way to a two-tier market, and now effectively a free-market for gold. The price of gold is not now subject to any major manipulation designed to limit its exchange price. Thus, so long as these features of advanced capitalism which I have analysed as structural, persist, the international exchange price for gold, its overall purchasing power in terms of national currencies will tend to remain strong. While large fluctuations are indeed very likely, since this is now a speculative market and subject to many determinations,³⁶ the underlying trend for the gold price is likely to remain strong.

That this increase in the price of gold is not likely to be a passing phenomenon, since it is linked to structural features of contemporary

capitalism, has major implications for the trajectory of future capitalist development in South Africa.

3. PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE CURRENT UPSWING IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY.

THE FIRST fruits of the increase in the price of gold are to be seen in the current upswing in the South African economy.

Two features of the upswing stand out. Firstly, the high rate of economic growth, which has accelerated lately. Real GDP rose by

3,75% in 1979, and in the first half of 1980 real GDP was 8,5% higher than the corresponding period of 1979.³⁷ Industrial production in June 1980 was fully 13% higher than a year earlier.

This is in marked contrast with the steep declines for the same period registered for most of the developed capitalist countries.³⁸ The second outstanding feature of the upswing is its duration. Three years of uninterrupted expansion made it one of the lengthiest upswings of the post-World War II period - exceeded only by the upswing lasting from September 1961 to April 1965.

There are some signs of the rate of growth moderating in the short term. Capacity utilisation in manufacturing is at high levels,³⁹ skilled labour is in ever-shorter supply, export industries are likely to perform poorly as a result of the weak economic position of the advanced capitalist countries and finally, interest rates are likely to rise. However, at present there is little danger of a major economic downturn.

The key impetus to the upswing and the reason for its long duration and likely continuance is, of course, provided by the higher gold price. It is worth charting, albeit briefly, the principal ways in which the gold price has acted as a stimulus to the economy.

First, it has added substantially to government revenue. In 1971 government revenue from gold mining (tax and share of profits) was about R120-m.⁴⁰ By 1975 this had risen to R745-m, but it declined to R320-m in 1977.

In 1978 the state's share rose dramatically to R937,3-m.⁴¹ In 1979 state revenue rose 82% to R1 703-m (state assistance to marginal mines declined 70% to a mere R8-m),⁴² and in the first 6 months of 1980 the amount paid was R2 006-m - an increase of 222,5% over the same period in 1979.⁴³

This has allowed for easier taxation policies in regard to the rest of the economy, and provides much leeway for future tax concessions in the event of an economic downturn.

Second, as a direct contribution to GDP, gold's share rose from 5,7% in 1970, to 8,7% in 1978 and 9,7% in 1979.⁴⁴ Further increases are anticipated for 1980. Total mineral earnings rose from R1 563-m in 1970, to an estimated R14 000-m to R15 000-m in 1980.⁴⁵

Third, the indirect contribution gold mining has made to the rest of the economy by providing a source of final demand.⁴⁶ The multiplier is said to be large, and the domestic value added component of gold mining production is as high as 93,7% - with the import leakage thus very low.⁴⁷ The domestic value added is likely to have risen as the mines employ a higher proportion of local labour and as more intermediate and capital goods are produced locally. There is also some indication that foreign shareholding has declined marginally.⁴⁸

Finally, and most critically, the increased price of gold has had a profound effect on the Balance of Payments. South Africa's trade surplus was approximately R3 786-m in the first 7 months of 1980 - or 26% higher than in the same period in 1979.

'...this year's surplus (1980) is entirely attributable to buoyant gold export earnings'.⁴⁹ The gold price has more than kept up with international inflation and comparing gold and oil prices over a 10 year period from 1970, gold has increased more.⁵⁰ The terms of trade including gold stand at 138 - as compared to 1 000 for 1972.⁵¹ Moreover, the market value of South Africa's official gold stocks also increased substantially.

In the past, economic upswings have been limited in their duration and extent by emerging 'foreign exchange bottlenecks'. As the economy has expanded so has the propensity to import, while to a lesser extent exports have increasingly been diverted to the home market. Abstracting from gold, this phenomenon is already very evident.⁵² The non-gold current account is significantly adverse, and has been since the beginning of 1979.⁵³ But the high price for gold has produced a substantial surplus, and official calculations show that a gold price of \$570 per ounce will be sufficient to sustain a growth rate of 5,5%.

But the higher gold price has even more significant implications which go beyond its immediate impact. The medium to long term implications for capitalist development in South Africa are equally profound.

The higher gold price has occasioned very significant gold mining reinvestment. The capital expenditure of the gold mines rose from R448,3-m in 1978 to R689-m in 1979 - an increase of 53,7%.⁵⁴ In the first 6 months of 1980 capital expenditure has been estimated as increasing by a further 21%.⁵⁵ While the surge in gold mining investment has been most dramatic, increased investment is also very significant in other mining - particularly coal. Capital expenditure by the mining industry as a

whole rose from R693-m in 1978 to R1 013-m in 1979,⁵⁶ and according to the President of the Chamber of Mines could top R3 000-m in 1981.⁵⁷ The value of new mining ventures already announced and scheduled to commence production on or before 1985, is well in excess of R6 000-m at current prices.⁵⁸

The effects of this massive capital expenditure will be felt after a number of years. It will provide impetus to accelerated growth throughout the economy and ameliorate any downturn that might occur. The boom in South Africa post-1962 was the outcome of both the crushing of popular resistance and the removal of any immediate political threat, but also the increase in mining investment which occurred during the mid-1950s.⁵⁹ There is a significant lagged relationship between increases in mining and non-mining investment.

Increased capital investment has been far more significant in gold mining than in manufacturing. For the year ended June 1979, gross domestic fixed investment in gold mining rose 23%, and for the year ended June 1980, it rose 39% - a massive increase coming on top of a major increase the year before. In manufacturing, gross domestic fixed investment declined by 9% in the year ending June 1979. By June 1980, it had increased by 27% - but this is less significant given the declines in 1976 and 1977.⁶⁰ One of the features of the present upswing was the initial slow rate of growth of fixed investment in manufacturing. While this rate of increase has picked up very markedly recently, this has been after years of decline, and for the metal and engineering industries, for example, projected capital investment for 1980 is still below the figures for 1974-76.⁶¹

Whatever the final outcome of the different sectoral investments, it seems clear that mining,

and gold mining in particular, has an increasing relative role to play in the future - both in terms of contribution to GDP, and even more especially as an earner of foreign exchange.

This broad conclusion is further underlined by the increasing concentration of gold mining on the lower grade ores. Grams per ton milled declined steadily from 13,28 in 1970, to 10,03 in 1974, 8,19 in 1979 and 7,45 grams in the first 6 months of 1980. This has had the effect of firstly very substantially increasing total mineable reserves, and secondly of substantially extending the working lives of the existent gold mines. As a consequence, all previous predictions about future output and the exhaustion of gold deposits have had to be substantially revised.⁶² The perennial prediction of the coming exhaustion of the gold mining industry, so often made in the past and upon which much of South Africa's economic policies have historically been partially based, again proves to be a mere chimera.

4. CONCLUSION.

THE EXPANDED role for gold mining, and mining in general, in the South African economy will critically affect the whole pattern of social relations in a wide variety of ways. I want here to only broadly sketch out some implications for the overall process of capitalist development. In particular, I want to examine critically some of those writings which have seen South African development as necessarily bound up with the expansion of manufacturing.

In the early 1970s, while the US was finally closing the 'gold window' and before any substantial increase in the gold price had occurred, the influential Reynders Commission reported on South Africa's export trade. Through the 1960s, the manufacturing industry which was

a substantial net importer, had grown faster than the primary industries of agriculture and mining, both substantial net exporters. This had produced a 'structural imbalance in the Balance of Payments'.⁶³ The dynamic sector in the economy, manufacturing industry, was thus likely to be severely curtailed in its future growth, in the absence of greater export earnings. The solution was seen to lie in the rapid growth of manufactured exports.⁶⁴

The Commission's analysis and conclusions in this regard were readily accepted by a number of writers operating within a Marxist framework. Writing in 1978, by which time the price of gold had already risen very substantially, Simon Clarke reiterated the Commission's view:⁶⁵

If South Africa is not to rely on a continuing run of unlikely accidents to sustain accumulation, it is necessary to solve the basic problem of the South African economy: the problem of the uncompetitive nature of South African manufacturing industry on world markets.

For Clarke, as for the Reynders Commission, the expansion of manufacturing exports was the crucial sine qua non of further South African capitalist development. Increases in the price of gold were, in Clarke's analysis, simply relegated to the never-never land of 'unlikely accident' and given no further consideration, while the Reynders Commission reached its conclusions with reference to a forecast of an increase in the gold price to \$80 per ounce - a forecast considered optimistic.⁶⁶

But their analysis of the immanent crucial 'barrier' to further capitalist development in South Africa was not simply inadequate as a consequence of a refusal to consider the possibility of a substantial rise in the price of gold. Both Clarke and the Reynders Commission present an analysis of the manufacturing sector and its export propensities that is highly

questionable.

Clarke's analysis of why the South African manufacturing sector had not up to 1978, and will not in the foreseeable future, be able to increase its export earnings, rests on a view of the labour force as 'indisciplined':⁶⁷

....the weakness of South African manufacturing was never a technological weakness but always has been a weakness in the social relations of production. Thus South Africa has been technologically backward because capital has not installed modern technology (sic!). This is certainly in part because labour in the past was cheap, industry was protected, and the labour force was not highly skilled. However modern technology also requires a 'disciplined' 'responsible' work force, and this South Africa did not have.

Faced with this, Clarke states that capital and the South African state will be forced to undertake a process of 'restructuring'. 'This restructuring involves primarily the intensification of labour and the tightening of work discipline in the manufacturing sector'.⁶⁸

The crisis is therefore one of production, particularly production in the manufacturing sector, which finds its expression as an acute monetary and balance of payments crisis:⁶⁹

In their attempts to resolve this crisis, capital and the state in South Africa have to take the initiative in intensifying the class struggle, tightening labour control at the point of production and increasing the reserve army by the creation of a relative surplus population. At this level there is no possibility of compromise, no basis on which concessions can be made to defuse the growing political crisis.

Each of these suppositions is highly dubious. By what standards is South African industry technologically backwards? Most centrally, what is meant by a 'disciplined' and 'responsible' labour force? Surely, throughout the 1960s and up until at least the Durban strikes of 1973, the period that Clarke

is concerned with in respect of the development of manufacturing, South Africa had, from capital's viewpoint, an extremely 'disciplined' and 'responsible' work force? This can be measured in terms of strike activity, trade union regulation, the functioning of labour allocation mechanisms, etc.⁷⁰

The Reynders Commission's analysis of the barriers to exporting on the part of the manufacturing sector stipulated a number of factors - a lack of export consciousness, the small size of firms, lack of knowledge, activities geared to import replacement and a rapid rise in domestic demand:⁷¹

....the Commission has concluded that the industrial philosophy of a fairly significant number of local businessmen is not adjusted/attuned to exporting, and they are not equipped mentally, psychologically or physically (plant, equipment etc) to enter this market.

When the Commission made reference to the labour force, it tended to stress the shortage of skilled labour, the inadequate training of blacks, statutory barriers to 'Black advancement' and the gap between earnings and productivity. Labour 'indiscipline' or its equivalent did not feature in its analysis.⁷²

One very central feature of South African manufacturing, namely the presence of extensive foreign ownership and control, nowhere features in Clarke's analysis of the barriers to increased manufacturing exports. This is not at all surprising. Clarke's analysis of the 'Crisis' in South Africa⁷³ concludes an article designed to deny the validity of a so-called 'fractionalist analysis of South African capitalism', the so-called fractionalists having put particular emphasis on the divisions existent between foreign and local/national capital in South Africa's historical development.⁷⁴ Clarke strongly denied the validity of this distinction,

and substituted an analysis based on 'capital in general' in which no distinction is made between such fractions.⁷⁵

The Reynders Commission, working within a Neo-Classical theoretical framework, also has no concept of foreign capital central to its analysis of the operations of South African manufacturing industry. But, at a significant number of points in its report, the Commission records empirically the importance of this division.

Thus, in respect of the automobile industry, the Commission noted that⁷⁶

Apart from cost disadvantages, local manufacturers/assemblers are all tied to overseas principals who are generally unwilling to allow the local firms to export. This state of affairs must be regarded as disadvantageous...especially as regards exports.

In regard to the factors impeding South African capital goods exports to less developed countries, the Commission again noted the importance of foreign ownership and control:⁷⁷

There is also the fact that a not insignificant proportion of the manufacturing sector is controlled by international concerns; which naturally (sic) give first priority to internal operations. The result of this practice is that South African subsidiaries of some international concerns do not export at all, although it is also true that others, because of their international character, are exporters of some significance.

In respect of firms which utilised imported research and development in the form of franchises etc, these were frequently accompanied by restrictive clauses:⁷⁸

Market restricting clauses...limited the ability of local users to benefit from economies of scale by exporting; this was particularly valid in those cases where the user had achieved some success in the domestic market - the restricting clause precluded him (sic) from expanding his operations and achieving greater success... It was furthermore submitted that South Africa was at times looked upon as an

outlet for relatively obsolescent products, techniques and processes which would have in any case have left little leeway for local users to compete in the international market even if there were no restrictive arrangement. Lastly, it was stated that where the product was composed of a number of components, the user was allowed to manufacture a limited range only and then required to import from the supplier at high prices certain vital components which were relatively easy and lucrative to manufacture.

Foreign subsidiaries were often reluctant to export:⁷⁹

Witnesses also alleged that the actions of many of these subsidiaries were determined by the interests of the parent company eg should the local subsidiary wish to export it might be precluded therefrom by the fact that the parent company already had a plant in the territory concerned.

And, in respect of foreign subsidiaries overall:⁸⁰

In regard to subsidiaries of foreign concerns, the Commission was told that only a small number of these participated actively in exports, and that in these cases only a relatively small percentage were positive exporters, ie exported more than they imported...Moreover, very few of them which manufacture intermediate goods had investigated the exporting of their products to the parent company...A large number appear to be restricted to the local market or are restricted to export to certain countries only. No statistical evidence is available to substantiate these tendencies, but the Commission is satisfied that on the whole, they do present a fairly valid picture of the situation.

In a world in which almost half of all trade is conducted by MNCs, and with about 40% of international trade by capitalist countries accounted for by intra-firm trade or trade with related parties,⁸¹ it is clear that the operations of MNCs play a critical role in the regulation and limitations confronting countries' capacities to expand their export earnings. It would seem clear that, in the case of South African manufactured exports, and the Reynders Commission findings support this albeit that specific micro studies are lacking,⁸² exporters

are constrained by a range of technological agreements that prohibit/inhibit export, by the 'unwillingness' of subsidiaries to export to markets where another subsidiary is already in existence, and the general global profitability considerations of the MNCs which regulate inter-affiliate trade. The other side of the coin is that the high import propensity of the manufacturing sector, just as its low export propensity, cannot be seen apart from extensive foreign ownership and control which tie subsidiaries to import from Head Office, or other related subsidiaries, even where such products are locally available.⁸³

Foreign control - whether exercised via a majority or minority ownership or via forms of licensing agreements - is particularly prevalent in the South African manufacturing industry. In agriculture foreign participation is very small, while in mining, although foreign firms are not insignificant, the sector is in the contemporary period predominantly owned and controlled by South African capital.⁸⁴ Apart from dividend payments, the earnings of the mining houses are not subject to significant remission abroad.

Backward and forward linkages are likely to be effected with domestic producers and not subject to transfer pricing.⁸⁵ At the level of research, development and technical contracting, the South African mining industry is itself pioneering much new innovation. The Chamber of Mines is at present directing a major 10-year programme of collaborative research which has already yielded many significant innovations.⁸⁶ Technological 'independence' is thus far more pronounced in this sector than in manufacturing and the subsequent remissions abroad in the form of technology payments will be far less than in manufacturing.⁸⁷

The expansion of exports from the mining sector, gold mining in particular but not excluding other mineral products such as coal - in the situation of higher 'energy' prices, is thus not only likely to continue, given the context of the continuing international capitalist crisis, but is indeed, from the standpoint of capital, likely to contain considerably greater 'benefits' than an expansion based on manufactured products. Moreover, in a world in which international trade amongst capitalist nations is dominated by the MNCs, it is by no means certain (contrary to what Clarke argues) that any amount of 'restructuring' performed at a national level can yield a significant expansion in manufactured exports.

Eurocentric models prescribe a single path to capitalist development - that of industrialisation. But, precisely because such industrialisation can today only occur at the 'periphery', under the domination of the MNCs, ie what is frequently termed 'dependent industrialisation',⁸⁸ the development of manufacturing tends to accentuate rather than mitigate the Balance of Payments crises that accompany high rates of growth.⁸⁹ As the world's principal producer of gold and with a mining sector which is domestically owned and controlled, the trajectory of capitalist development in South Africa is likely to follow a significantly different path.⁹⁰

David Kaplan

FOOTNOTES.

1. But even in 1929 a few countries, eg Sweden, did not experience major decline in output.
2. OECD: 'Perspectives Economiques' No. 19, July 1976.

- 3. With the exception of the UK, which had its lowest industrial production in the 4th quarter of 1974, all the OECD countries had their lowest industrial production within the first 3 quarters of 1975.
- 4. United Nations: 'Economic Survey of Europe in 1976', New York. Quoted in Mandel, 1978:147.
- 5. For a simple account of the development of the Eurodollar market, see Tew, 1977, chapter 13
- 6. 'National monetary management has been made more difficult mainly because of the increased opportunities (and profitability) opened up by Eurodollar dealing for arbitrage operations. In this way it has increased the internal constraint on the use of monetary policy as a weapon for internal economic stabilisation...' Strange, 1976:186.
- 7. Murray, 1980:76-77. In 1973, the German Bundesbank calculated that changes in methods of payment by MNCs had been responsible for a very significant movement in the Balance of Payments.
- 8. Of course, Central Banks too can and have been involved in speculation.
- 9. See in particular Nordhaus, W: 'The Falling Share of Profit'. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity No. 1, 1974. For the UK see Glyn and Sutcliffe, 1972, and The Economist, September 6, 1975. For references to studies inter alia on West Germany, Italy and France, see Mandel, 1978:24-26.
- 10. See Business Week for Quarterly tables on the profitability of US corporations.
- 11. In Marx's analysis the rate of profit r is given by the following formula:

$$r = \frac{s}{c+v}$$
 Dividing through by v ,

$$r = \frac{s/v}{c/v + 1}$$
 ie the rate of profit varies proportionately with the rate of exploitation and inversely with the organic composition of capital.
- 12. The increase in oil prices was not the principal cause of the onset of capitalist crisis in the developed countries. It did contribute to it, but the falling rate of profit, the root cause of the recession, was already evident well before 1973. With substantial investments in energy projects

- which are only viable at a high price for energy, many advanced capitalist countries, and particularly the important 'energy' companies within them, are not likely to welcome a fall in oil prices.
- 13. Mandel, 1978:88.
- 14. Eg in the US real wages for workers tended to fall.
- 15. Eg the WT Grant company in the US or the Kohjin company in Japan.
- 16. Also with the banks according credit very liberally to their larger customers. Castells 1980:116.
- 17. Governmental support for 'lame ducks' results not pre-eminently from 'political factors', but from the fact that their survival is often a sine qua non of maintaining an integrated national economy. The loss of British Leyland, for example, would have manifold effects upon all of British capital, increasing Britain's degree of integration into the world economy.
- 18. Mandel, 1978:94.
- 19. The power of organised labour is often invoked as a further, if not principal factor, causing inflation. With wage increases lagging well behind price increases for several years now in many of the advanced capitalist countries, this explanation is hardly adequate. Demands for wage increases are often defensive - a reaction to, rather than a cause of price rises. However, the power of organised labour has acted as a break on capital's power to reduce the level of real wages and so raise the rate of profit via cost cutting. Castells puts it this way: 'Because markets are controlled largely by monopoly capital, corporations are able to impose the prices they want. The increasing cost of living triggers workers' demands for more wages at the level of production. The wages obtained through struggle and bargaining will be added by monopoly capital to the prices charged for commodities. This does not mean that workers' demands are the cause of inflation, as capitalist propaganda argues. What it does mean is that one of the causes of inflation is that corporations find it increasingly difficult to raise their profits through direct exploitation and therefore raise prices for the whole society in order to preserve their privileges'. Castells, 1980:64.
- 20. *ibid*:62.

- 21. *ibid*.
- 22. In the 1974-75 recession, prices of raw materials tended to decline and so moderated inflation.
- 23. See Strange, 1976:186.
- 24. 'The major factor causing the exceptional rise in gold price has been the world demand for gold as a hedge against economic uncertainty and, in particular, currency weakness, with the price of gold accelerating in terms of all major currencies'. Chamber of Mines, Presidential Address, 1979. At the same time, industrial demand for gold has been price inelastic.
- 25. Strange, 1976:67.
- 26. *ibid*:69.
- 27. Total official dollar balances were \$3-b in 1949, \$10-b in 1960, and \$51-b in 1971.
- 28. This point was made as early as 1963, by the so-called Fairleigh-Dickinson study - Fatemi, NS, T de Saint Phalle and GM Keefe: The Dollar Crisis. Fairleigh-Dickinson University Press, 1963.
- 29. For an analysis of US monetary policy which clearly examines this as an aspect of US imperialism, see Block, 1978.
- 30. Economists associated with this strategy include Kindelberger, Krause and Salant.
- 31. This absorption is not 'complete' since much of the dollars were required to finance expansion in world trade.
- 32. There are some signs that this 'monetary hegemony' may eventually be challenged by a European currency, the European Monetary Unit. See Fitt, Fair and Vigier, 1980:postscript to part 2.
- 33. The distinction between national and international is not clear cut.
- 34. Between 1884 when significant gold production in South Africa began until 1932, with the exception of the years 1919-24 when gold earned a fluctuating premium, the money price of gold was fixed.
- 35. One manifestation of this has been the massive rise of loans to the LDCs.

36. Especially in respect of changing interest rates, which affect the opportunity cost of holding gold in the form of interest payments foregone.
37. South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, September 1980:6.
38. For the same period, the US decline was 7.3%, the UK 6.4% and West Germany 1.5%. Barclays Bank: Business Brief. September 1980:7.
39. *ibid*:2.
40. Bureau for Economic Policy and Analysis: 'The Gold Price Bonanza', No. 25, March 1980.
41. Chamber of Mines. Annual Report, 1978:8.
42. Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3, no 2, March 25, 1980:4.
43. Chamber of Mines: Newsletter. Vol 3, no 6, September 22, 1980:3.
44. Bureau for Economic Policy and Analysis (BEPA), *op cit*.
45. Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3, no 7, page 1.
46. BEPA *op cit*.
47. Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3, no 7, page 5.
48. Chamber of Mines. March Report, 1979:1.
49. Standard Bank Review, September, 1980:4.
50. BEPA *op cit*.
51. SARB, Quarterly Bulletin, September 1980: table 9.1.
52. 'The sustained current account surplus during a period of cyclical upswing did not conform to the historical cyclical pattern, according to which surpluses emerge during the advanced stages of cyclical downturns and disappear relatively early during the subsequent upswings... The progressively larger surpluses up to the first quarter of 1980 were predominantly the result of an exceptionally strong rise in the price of gold'. South African Reserve Bank: Annual Economic Report, 1980:19.
53. 'When gold is excluded, the balance on current account has deteriorated significantly since early 1979'. Standard Bank: Review. September 1980:2.
54. Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3, no 2, page 4.
55. *ibid*, Vol 3, no 6, page 3.
56. South African Reserve Bank. Quarterly Bulletin. September 1980: table 5.32.
57. Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3, no 7, page 1.
58. *ibid*.
59. For which the decisive precondition was the defeat of the working class in the post-war period.
60. Standard Bank Review, September 1980:4.
61. Stats, September 1980:141. Figures derived from SEIFSA: Survey of New Capital Investment in the Metal and Engineering Industries in 1979 and Projections for 1980.
62. The Chamber now estimates that gold production will be steady at approx. 700 tons per annum until 1987. It will then decline to 350 tons by the end of the century. But this is based on gold prices which are fairly conservative. Chamber of Mines. Newsletter. Vol 3, no 1, 1980:2.
63. Reynders Commission (RC): 15.
64. '...even a maximum exploitation of South Africa's mineral wealth will not adequately provide in (sic) the foreign exchange needs of the country, so that the extent of manufactured goods will have to be increased as rapidly as possible'. RC:19.
65. Clarke, S. Capital, Fractions of Capital and the State: Neo-Marxist Analysis of the South African State. Capital and Class, Summer 1978: 69. (SC). In the accompanying footnote, Clarke quotes Reynders with unreserved approval.
66. *eg see* RC:246.
67. SC:70.
68. *ibid*.
69. *ibid*:71.
70. Further points could be made about Clarke's political conclusions and a reductionism in respect of the class struggle.
71. RC:273.
72. *ibid*.
73. *ibid*.
74. *eg see* Davies, R, Kaplan, D, O'Meara, D and Morris, M: Class Struggle and the Periodisation of the State in South Africa. RAPE no 7, 1977.
75. Absence of this distinction, I believe, leads Clarke to ultimately ignore imperialism altogether - both historically and in the contemporary period.
76. RC:232.
77. RC:219.
78. RC:610.
79. RC:611.
80. RC:609. *ie* it affects not only the propensity to export, but also raises their propensity to import.
81. Murray, 1980:chapter 2.
82. *ibid*. A related party is one in which a firm has anything above 5% shareholding.
83. Thus, the 'foreign connection' is just as vital in the explanation of the high import propensity of the manufacturing sector (something that Clarke, and to a lesser extent the Reynders Commission simply accept as intrinsic) as an explanation of its low export propensity.
84. Particularly with the rise of Anglo-American to dominance.
85. For reference to low import propensity see footnote 47.
86. *eg see* Chamber of Mines: Annual Report, 1979:13.
87. See RC here, chapter 14.
88. *eg* N Poulantzas.
89. As has most clearly happened in the case of Brazil.
90. But 'development' should be understood not

as development for all, but as capitalist development. For example, even with the current upswing, employment is growing at less than half of the rate of population increase. Sahlan Economic Survey, quoted in the Financial Mail, 31.10.80:505.

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