BEN JACOBS & THE CIVICS: MAYEKISO RESPONDS

WORK IN PROGRESS

WIP 88 · APRIL/MAY 1993



THE PEOPLE GO TO THE POLLS

Can the ANC win?

Editorial comment

Get out the vote!

So we're finally going to be able to vote. And although it may take another year, it is important that those of us who are committed to democracy prepare NOW for a decisive election victory.

You might think it's a little premature to be talking about elections when there are still so many issues to resolve around the negotiating table.

But we have two very valid reasons for focussing NOW on the elections that lie ahead:



● Regardless of who wins, South Africa cannot afford a narrow election victory. A hung parliament would be disastrous.

If a new government is to address the expectations of the people, it must have the mandate to move swiftly and boldly. It must be able to act, secure in the knowledge that it has the support of a substantial majority.

That's why this edition of WIP looks critically at the challenges facing the left — in particular, the ANC — as we move towards election day. Because we believe it is vital that the pro-democracy movement identifies the obstacles that lie ahead, so that victory is not only certain — it is decisive.

● But perhaps the most important aspect of the election is that ALL South Africans participate. It's not just about who wins — it's about the fact that everyone who is eligible to vote, does so.

And therein lies the challenge: To ensure that every adult South African is able to get to the polls, feels safe enough to make their cross, and is secure about the outcome. This, really, is the essence of a free and fair election.

To ensure this happens, we need to throw our support behind attempts to mobilise those South Africans who have never had a say in running their own lives. The unorganised. People in rural areas. People too scared to vote. People who have not only been disenfranchised by apartheid, but also disorganised and disempowered.

If we wake up the day after a free and fair election to hear we have won, we need to be able to say: This is the will of the people.

And if we wake up to hear we have lost, we need to be able to say: This, too, is the will of the people.

Because, for the first time in South African history, it will not be the most powerful who hold the reins. It will be the most popular.

— Chris Vick

Work In Progress
No 88 • April/May 1993
Published by the Southern African Research Service (SARS)
PO Box 32716, Braamfontein 2017

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COVER PHOTOGRAPH: Olivier Samson
REPRODUCTION: Wits University
PRINTING: Perskor

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PHOTO: NIGEL DENNIS (ANC DIP)

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LIONS OF THE DESERT

Problem? What problem?

THERE IS NO *POLITICAL* REASON why it should not have gone ahead — that's the official ANC line on the controversial visit by ANC Youth League (ANCYL) leaders to Israel at the height of the deportation debacle there.

The ANC's Aziz Pahad, whose Department of International Affairs approved the trip, is adamant they did the right thing. "We had no second thoughts," he says. "Once it was OK'd by the relevant political organisations in the area, we had no problem with the tour."

But it was the timing of the 12-day study mission by the ANCYL delegation that puzzled activists in SA and the occupied territories, and drew some angry criticism.

After being locked out on the sidelines of international concern, the Palestinian struggle had again moved centre stage earlier this year after Israel deported 417 Palestinians to southern Lebanon. In late January the eight ANCYL members toured Israel as guests of the SA Union of Jewish Students (SAUJS).



PHOTO: NIGEL DENNIS

■ **Aziz Pahad**

The idea for the mission had originated with the SAUJS last June. The ANCYL gave it a lot of thought, says ANCYL spokesperson Parks Mankahlana, but "in the end we felt it would be helpful to go and see for ourselves what was happening in the Occupied Territories." He says the trip had been cleared months earlier with Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) leaders in Tunis.

Mankahlana acknowledges that individuals in the ANC and the Youth League disapproved. One of them was ANC national executive member Ahmed Kathrada, who felt peeved enough to publicly criticise the visit.

"There is no principled opposition to visits," he later told *WIP*, "but the expulsion of the Palestinians made the timing most unfortunate. If this had come to the ANC NEC, many people would have opposed it and I certainly would have been one."

Pahad disagrees. "I don't know why he's unhappy. Nobody has put forward any substantial political argument which we can debate and see if we made an error, if it was an error," he says.

The delegation toured Israel for 12 days. It met with several Israeli government leaders, Palestinian negotiator Faysal Husayni, as well as Israeli and Palestinian students. The Young Lions ventured into the Occupied Territories at the tail-end of the trip, visiting Bir Zeit University and a refugee camp.

Before leaving Israel, the youth caused a stir with a statement opposing official relations between the ANC and Israel, and advising against a visit there by ANC President Nelson Mandela.

Among the reasons cited were the continuing human rights violations by the Israeli government and its efforts "to subvert a genuine resolution of the question of nationhood for the Palestinian people".

The controversy has a background that goes beyond the Palestinian issue.

There are doubtful murmurings about the ANC's commitment to extend — as opposed to receive — solidarity in this current phase of new age politicking. Early in 1991, popular organisations in Brazil were reportedly disturbed by the cold-shoulder they received during a top-level ANC visit.

Lately, the Angolan crisis has drawn mainly subdued declarations from Shell House.

— *Hein Marais*

RECONSTRUCTION

Disaccord over new accord

COSATU'S ATTEMPTS TO develop a Reconstruction Accord with its affiliates and its allies (*WIP*87) have not gone without protest.

Some of the federation's smaller affiliates have expressed concern at the way the accord is being negotiated. The Transport & General Workers' Union's education department, for example, has circulated a 12-page document which questions both the content of the accord and the process surrounding its development.

In hard-hitting language, the T&G document warns of the dangers of "holding hands with the bosses" and argues for greater worker participation in drawing up an accord.

It argues that an accord should not be drawn up in consultation with business. "The Reconstruction Accord must be decided upon by Cosatu, the ANC and other workers' democratic forces," it says. "Cosatu must campaign for the ANC to agree to implement this programme once they are in government."

The document says the accord must become "an emergency programme to end oppression and exploitation" and include:

- nationalisation without compensation "of all public assets privatised by the government"
- an agreement that all government ministers, officials and MPs be paid the same wage as skilled workers
- a total ban on retrenchments
- the abolition of VAT
- a minimum wage for all workers
- public works schemes
- and a relief programme for workers in rural areas.

The T&G document compares the 'toenadering' between Cosatu's leadership and big business to agreements being negotiated between the ANC and the National Party.

"It seems the real aim of the accord is to bring workers on board the multi-party bandwagon to the new SA. The aim is to get organised labour behind the new deal which the 'bosberaad' has written and which will be made official in another Codesa."

The document is critical of the stance adopted by the Cosatu leadership, which it accuses of "sitting in committees with the bosses ... debating with the bosses, drinking with the bosses, eating with the bosses, talking with the bosses, planning with the bosses. When they appear on TV it is even difficult to tell who is the boss and who is the worker because they are all wearing suits and ties.

"This confusion gets worse because, despite all their differences, the bosses and the worker leaders on TV end their discussion by saying they are all in agreement on the main points." *W*

● *See Page 20: No blank cheque for the ANC*

LAND CLAIMS

Give me a home where the rhino don't roam

THE ENDANGERED BLACK rhino now has a secure refuge in the Augrabies National Park on the Orange River, thanks to land made available by the SA Defence Force (SADF).

But the people who 20 years ago were forcibly removed from that land — Riemvasmaak in the northern Cape — are still waiting to return.

The Riemvasmaak community, uprooted and dispersed in 1973-74, has applied to the government's Advisory Commission on Land Allocation (Acla) to have their land returned. But it seems admirers of the black rhino jumped the queue.

The pastoralist Riemvasmakers were first encountered in 1923 by white missionaries, but it was the later attentions of apartheid bureaucrats that brought disaster. The community's 'cosmopolitan' character led to family members being classified into different racial groups.

By the mid 1960s, the apartheid authorities had declared the area a 'black spot'. The first group, classified as Xhosa, was removed to Welcomewood in the Ciskei in 1973, even though some of them spoke only Afrikaans at that point. Next on the list were those classified as Nama — after their livestock was sold and their homes burnt, they were dumped 1 300km away in Namibia.

The last (coloured) group was herded to other northern Cape towns like Marchand, where the survivors recently elected a Riemvasmaak Coordinating Committee to start reclaiming their land. Through their lawyer they have informed Acla that they intend to submit a claim for the return to the land.

The Riemvasmaak community say they do not oppose nature conservation. But they are disturbed that the government can allow the SADF to allocate their land to rhinos without even consulting them or waiting for the outcome of their Acla hearing. *W*

— Sue Powers, SPP

MALAWI

Unity is strength

SHOCKED BY THE KENYAN opposition's failure to dislodge strongman Daniel Arap Moi, three exiled Malawian opposition groups have disbanded and formed the United Front for Multiparty Democracy (UFMD).

"The Kenyan situation has taught us that division can be very costly and disastrous," commented Gray Kamyambeni, former chair of the Malawi Freedom Movement (Mafremo).

Disunity in opposition ranks played a large role in Moi's election victory late last year — a lesson learnt by Mafremo, which has joined the Socialist League of Malawi and the Malawi Democratic Movement. Plans are afoot to merge the new UFMD with the internally-based United Democratic Front (UDF).

Malawi's opposition is now pulling out all stops to win the referendum called by 'Life President' Hastings Banda, one of the most enduring autocrats on the planet. Squeezed by foreign pressure and emboldened domestic resistance, Banda late last year unbanned opposition parties and announced a March 15 referendum.

"It is quite clear to me and to everyone else that people here do not want a multiparty system of government. They want one party, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP)," Banda said at the time.

The unbanning surprised Malawians who recalled Banda's earlier vow that returning exiles would become "food for the crocodiles". "I guess the *Ngwazi* (Conqueror) will now have to apply for food relief to feed his crocodiles," quipped one exile after the about-face.

Opposition groups are battling to remove obstacles aimed at denying them a referendum victory. They have managed to get the referendum postponed to June 14, thanks to interventions by major aid donors and the UN. But Banda still insists on using two ballot boxes in the referendum — one to hold 'yes' votes and the other for 'no' votes.

The opposition rejects this and want the ballot to be secret.

Recently, Banda told Malawians that "when the time for the referendum comes, opposition parties will learn a bitter lesson." Whether this was a boast or a threat is not yet clear. W

— SARDC News/Hein Marais

ANGOLA

From Russia — and SA — with love?

WHO IS SUSTAINING THE armed revolt launched by Angolan election losers Unita seven months ago?

Reports that SA mercenaries are fighting for the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) have diverted attention from strong indications that South African hands have once again bolstered Unita leader Jonas Savimbi's bid for power.

The authoritative London newsletter *Africa Confidential* reports that "recent SADF-Unita collaboration dates back to Savimbi's visit to Pretoria on 17-18 September". He met with Foreign Minister Pik Botha and President FW de Klerk. Later, he held talks with Defence Minister Eugene Louw, Deputy Minister Wynand Breytenbach and SADF chief 'Kat' Liebenberg.

Before leaving the government guest house, Savimbi reportedly requested a meeting with Gen. Jannie Geldenhuys, a former SADF chief.

"On Savimbi's return to Angola, his election speeches became far more belligerent and he ruled out the possibility of defeat," notes *Africa Confidential*.

"US intelligence sources in Luanda believe Savimbi chose the military option in mid-September last year. This raises the question of how much SADF logistical support and tactical advice he was given and through what channels it was mediated.

PHOTO: THE STAR

■ **Jonas Savimbi**

"The South African operation was sophisticated enough to warrant the SADF's leasing of six Antonovs (freight planes) from Russia for the duration of the election campaign and for some time afterwards, according to intelligence sources in Zimbabwe. The Antonovs are understood to have made a series of flights to Jamba, Mavinga and other Unita centres."

Meanwhile, David Martin of the Harare-based Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC) reports that a senior US diplomat has admitted privately in a briefing that Washington has evidence that Unita is purchasing arms from Russia.

Martin quotes another Western diplomat as saying: "They are desperate for hard currency and have become the new international mercenaries." According to the US diplomat, Unita is paying for the arms with diamonds from northern Angola that it launders through Zaire. W

— Africa Confidential/ SARDC News

briefs



ERITREA

Going it alone

YOU WOULDN'T KNOW IT from reading the SA press, but history is being made in Eritrea. On April 23, Eritreans will vote in a referendum that will almost certainly see this territory of Ethiopia become an independent country.

It will be the first time since the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) that the post-colonial boundaries of Africa are redrawn, making concrete on our continent the powerful eruption of nationalist forces that is giving cartographers — and politicians — headaches the world over.

The Eritreans, who live along the Red Sea coast of Ethiopia, have long maintained a separate cultural identity from the Tigrayan, Amhara and Oromo peoples of Ethiopia. After a bloody battle fought by troops of Ethiopian emperor Menelik II in 1895, Italy colonised two territories in the Horn of Africa that Ethopia never really controlled. Eritrea was one of them.

After the British Army helped liberate the area from Italian fascism during World War Two, Eritrea found itself federated to Ethiopia — a state of affairs that angered Eritrean nationalists enough to lead to the launching of an armed struggle in 1961.

An emphasis on self-reliance, strengthened by the intermittent support of a shifting gallery of sponsors, saw the Eritreans defeat the powerful Ethiopian military on the battlefield in May 1991. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), leftish in political orientation, formed the Provisional Government of Eritrea which today runs the territory as an independent country in all but name. The EPLF is by far the strongest military force in the Horn, and perhaps in the whole of East Africa. It is reported that Ethiopia 'proper' functions administratively largely thanks to personnel seconded by the EPLF to the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Force (EPRDF) which drove the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam from power in 1991.

So why hold a referendum when the outcome seems certain? It follows on a "commitment made in 1981, to have an internationally observed referendum and to abide by the results," says Paulos Tesfagiorgis of the Centre for Human Rights and Development in the Eritrean capital of Asmara. "It is the exercise of a basic human right, the right to determine the political future of your country."

The vote, though, is a formality. After a long war that galvanised Eritrean nationalism in both social and political terms, that is perhaps no surprise. Still, the EPLF is taking no chances. The referendum question has done away with the earlier options of independence, confederation and incorporation, and poses a vote for independence or nothing.

Relations with Ethiopia are likely to remain strong, though on a more equal footing than before — Eritrea, after all, separates Ethiopia from the sea.

And relations with a future ANC government? The Eritrean struggle for independence was vehemently opposed by the ANC in exile, often with open vilification. That seems to be changing.

"We always argued for a united country," says Aziz Pahad of the ANC's Department of International Affairs. "But if (independence) is the will of the people, then we accept this," he says. W

— Hein Marais

EX-CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Scrapheaps of history

A TOWN IN THE FORMER Czechoslovakia, freshly liberated from the onerous yoke of communism, now stands face to face with a capitalist system that wants to relegate it to the scrapheap of history — literally.

A group of US companies wants to raze the town of Chabarovice to get at 100 million tons of coal just a few yards below the surface.

But the townspeople don't like it. Mayor Zbynek Hrom explains: "We're from old Europe. We don't think only about money, but also about where we're from."

However the village isn't quite paradise. On one side there's a chemical waste dump; on another lies an old strip mine now used as a landfill; on a third lies an active coal pit.

The consortium of a local mining company and US-based Atlantic Partners & Waste Management would move all the village's residents to newly-built houses five to eight kilometres away, and has promised to restore the land to a usable state when mining is finished, perhaps in 25 years.

Sound too good to be true? The villagers think so. "What's the difference between a communist government that wants to come in here and destroy the countryside and a private company?" asks Hrom.

"One's richer and is willing to pay a lot of money to be able to do it." W

— Dollars and Sense

personally speaking

Your last thought before you fell asleep last night?
I wish I could have more time with my children.

Your biggest fear?
What if something happens as my children grow up into adults and don't turn out to be the kinds of adults one would like all South African children to be? Then I would wonder, was it worth it?

If you could give FW de Klerk some advice, what would it be?
That he should just be honest about things. He would do a great deal of good by saying to his own constituency that the ANC is right. It might make him unpopular with some people but it would ease a lot of tension. Actually, it would be so nice for him to join the ANC...

What do you do like to do in your free time?
Read, listen to music, write.

What do you think will be the most difficult obstacle to overcome in the transition to a true democracy?
Besides having to deal with the fears of the white right, the next most difficult obstacle will be the question of nonsexism.

Within all the political parties, there are still meetings with only one or two women — and yet in the Codesa declaration we say we've committed ourselves to a nonsexist country. It's something we must keep bringing up consciously.

Who would you most like to have lunch with?
I can't think of any one particular person, except maybe my president (Nelson Mandela).

Complete: I always wanted to...
Have a lot of time, in a nice house to write poetry, prose and just improve my writing skills.

Baleka Kgositsile

Baleka Kgositsile, secretary-general of the ANC Women's League since April 1991, would probably classify herself as a mother before a political activist. Devoted mother of five, emersed in the struggle since she went into exile in 1975, she sees her work as an avenue to secure a stable future for the children of South Africa

PHOTO: ELMOND JIYANE (DYNAMIC IMAGES)

What was your biggest challenge when you got into the women's league when you returned to South Africa?
To pull together a leadership that had come from 30 years of illegal existence as a liberation movement. Different individuals within the leadership came from such different experiences over those 30 years. To pool all those experiences and create a team with a similar approach to our tasks was quite a challenge and it took us a long time to get on the same wavelength.

What makes you laugh?
Jokes. I'm always looking forward to someone telling me a joke or funny story to make me laugh at every situation in life, especially (Jacob) Zuma, that comrade is forever telling funny stories...

What makes you cry?
Seeing the street children in Hillbrow. Thinking about them and what put them there. Half the time you don't want to think of it so you just look at them without seeing them. You feel so helpless.

Your least favourite politician?
(Eugene) Terre'Blanche.

The most important person in your life?
I have so many important people in my life; starting from the family, to my political comrades, my leadership is so important to me. My little boy, who's going to be seven on Sunday, is certainly somewhere on top of the list.

What motivates you to continue to fight each day?
Just the challenge that one has to get on with making one's contribution to building the future of this country, which is the future of our children. We owe it to our children.

How do you feel about Winnie Mandela?
My god! I feel sadness about her on the whole. I feel here is somebody who has been like a lot of our people — a victim of the system. But not only a victim, a product of the situation we are all trying to address. Whichever way you approach a particular moment that she features in, there is that tragedy around her as a person.

How would you describe the average male ANC member?
A committed comrade who takes a lot of things for granted as far as gender issues are concerned. The aspect that becomes important about their maleness is gender sensitivity. I think there are a lot of sweeping statements and assumptions that the ANC is a nonsexist, gender-sensitive organization. On average, ANC male cadres are quite ignorant of the gender issue and take it for granted that it's not a problem.

If you could, what would you change about yourself?
I would improve my ability to express myself ... I might feel very strongly about something, and because I get too angry, I am unable to convey my thoughts. I wish I could be one of those who remain calm all the time.

What is the most important lesson a mother can teach her child?
One is to respect other people for their humanity not for their status or their labels. The second is honesty — frankness and openness about one's views. People often don't express themselves and this leads to complications.

What worries you?
People who keep giving me certain responsibilities which I feel should be given to more capable people.

Describe yourself in five words or less...
I love life, but there is a whole chunk of it I am unable to enjoy at the moment — the ability to enjoy the beauty of the country. Go out, take long walks in the bush, listen to the birds, create literature. Those are the things one missed in one's growing up, because you were tucked away in some township. Also to sing, because that is another thing I love to do.

What aggravates you?
Male chauvinism! But also how other women themselves can complicate the situation in terms of actually addressing the issue of womens' emancipation.

What is your definition of a feminist — and would you describe yourself as one?
I consider myself a feminist of a certain type. For me feminism means a preoccupation with issues that can give true emancipation to women. It can be any type of activity as long as it is raising certain issues, sensitising and conscientising people, generating thinking and debate, and bringing these issues into the political and religious organisations. For me this is positive feminism.

But I have priorities. The oppression of women affects black and white, but because of the history of this country, black women have experienced their own oppression in a specific way. I'm not going to say that I'm not worried about the concerns of white women, most of whom have not a very bad time compared to black women. But my major priority is the plight of the majority of black women.

Is the women's league a feminist organisation?
Our priority is political at the moment. However, it does not make us abandon women's issues and we continue to point out weaknesses we experience within the movement and in society in relation to the actions of men. We realise we can't bring about change for women without addressing the political problem.

What do you see as the role of women in the "new" South Africa?
Gradually the role of women will change. We should all make sure it does change, and the women's league exists to see to that. You can't change the role of women overnight, as there are certain disabilities and handicaps that have been imposed on women for generations. There has to be affirmative action so we can empower our women to get involved in all areas of government. And the situation will improve only if the new government implements the programmes that women themselves propose. W

● *Interview by Francine Joselowsky*

PHOTO: GILL DE VLIEG

The people go to the polls

More than 21 million South Africans will be eligible to vote in the first democratic elections. Who are they? Who are they likely to vote for? *Work In Progress* probes the polls...

Will the ANC win?

Hein Marais

LATE LAST YEAR, AND WITHOUT A hint of comedy, an NP cabinet minister sat trying to convince a wincing interviewer that his party could win the election. Numbers can be magical things, and in his hands they ran along these lines: The NP takes 90% of the coloured and Indian vote, 85% of whites and 12% of blacks ... and forms liberated SA's first government. Was the minister on drugs?

"If you want your dreams to come true, don't sleep," goes a saying.

From whatever angle you scan the run-up to elections, formidable hurdles still separate the ANC from the kind of election victory it needs to deliver on even a fraction of the promises that have sustained its liberation struggle.

Worse — a combination of sustained blunders, bad luck, foul play and poor preparation might still trip up the ANC's bid for power. It's not as if the transition has been spared such hitches. Clearly, now is a bad time for dozy reveries and delusions of certainty.

■ The numbers game

But first we need to clarify the numbers we're slicing. How many voters (18 years and older) are there? Pollsters are adding a pinch of salt to the 1991 census figures, which also do not include the TVBC states. Neil Higgs, a researcher with Research Surveys says simply: "It's fraught with hazard." He claims to have enhanced the census figures with other survey data, and says there are 21.6 million voters. The Development Bank of SA (DBSA) last year adjusted the 1985 census figures; it says there are 21 million voters. Asked to choose between the two sets, Higgs says: "I just don't know." So, let's stick to the DBSA figures ...

Number of voters

Blacks ("RSA")	**11.1 million**
Blacks (TBVC)	**3.3 million**
Whites	**3.9 million**
Coloureds	**2.0 million**
Asians	**0.6 million**
TOTAL	**21.0 million**

Now imagine ... The ANC wakes up the day after the election with 39% of votes cast, just slightly ahead of the NP with 34%. Spirited flirtation and selling of souls ensues. The NP kisses and makes up with the IFP (6%) and talks the white right (4%) into a coalition that holds 44% of the vote. The PAC (5%) and Azapo (2%) decide to leave the ANC to stew in its own juice, and hang on to their swing votes in a hung parliament. SA becomes Italy. An out-to-lunch scenario?

Worst-case scenario ANC and NP vote

Assuming the following voter turnout: whites (85%), coloureds (75%), Asians (65%), blacks (60%) ...

	votes cast	ANC %	ANC vote	NP %	NP votes
Blacks	8.6 mil	60%	5.16 mil	6%	0.52 mil
Whites	3.3 mil	0.5%	0.02 mil	85%	2.80 mil
Coloureds	1.5 mil	15%	0.23 mil	80%	1.20 mil
Asians	0.4 mil	15%	0.06 mil	80%	0.32 mil
Total	**14.1 mil**	**39%**	**5.47 mil**	**34%**	**4.84 mil**

• The DP, IFP, right wing parties and a small percentage of spoilt ballots account for the rest of white votes. The PAC, Azapo, IFP, homeland parties and 10% spoilt ballots account for the balance of black votes.

Such an outcome presumes some serious disasters of the ANC's own making, and a range of dirty tricks and structural pitfalls that will require concerted countermeasures.

Because more than 70% of potential voters have never cast a vote, polls provide us with a rare preview of voter inclinations. Though it is inadvisable to read poll findings too literally at this stage (see Pinning the tail on the donkey, page 16), it's when you join the dots and trace trends that they become eloquent.

Research Surveys' Jan Hofmeyer is finding political affinities dividing radically along racial lines — especially, but not only, between blacks and whites. "At the ordinary person's level, the basis for consensus has been eroded in the last two years," he says. ANC support among blacks remains steady at 70% and over, peaking as high as 85% among Xhosa-speakers, and lowest among Zulus.

Among coloureds and Indians it's stuck around 10%. Among whites it has not crossed the 1% mark. According to Markinor's Christine Woessner, "in three years the ANC simply has not won white friends."

Whatever the contours of its support base, the ANC is doubtless the most popular organisation in the country. But, as Steve Friedman of the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) reminds, "the ANC's Achilles heel is that support does not necessarily translate into votes."

What fouls up the simple conversion of sympathies into votes is a throng of variables, some of them distressingly hefty.

The NP's biggest boon — and the ANC's nightmare — is a low turnout of black voters. It's one thing asking people their opinion, it's another whether they'll turn up to vote.

If the white parties hammer their election machines into shape, and the NP musters an 'Anything-but-the-ANC' panic vote, voter turnout among whites might reach 85%. The same feat is very unlikely among black voters, more than 3 million of whom live in the TBVC states. Even in the best circumstances, effective voter education, campaign logistics and transport to voting centres will amount to a major challenge. In parts of SA, they're a nightmare of snags.

■ Down on the farm

The rural vote might be central to a convincing ANC victory; support in the Ciskei and Transkei alone could top 85%. In other areas rural residents have largely escaped the violence and the tide of cynicism and exasperation it has brought. If ANC promises and esteem have lost some of their gleam in the urban townships, they still glisten in rural SA.

The political sentiments of rural black voters remains one of our society's many secrets. They might be conservative in places, and locked into serf-like dependence on white farming communities. Yet those are the very zones where apartheid is decidedly undead. The question — for the PAC as much as the ANC — is whether those voters can be reached, instructed in voting protocol and brought out to vote. If the turnout in rural SA is 15% under, say, a national average of 70%, as many as 800 000 votes (largely ANC and PAC) are lost. Guess who smiles.

■ Peril and doubt

The absence of free political activity is a major barrier. The ANC is de facto outlawed in Ciskei and Bophuthatswana — just as it is in northern Natal and rural KwaZulu, a fact unlikely to be corrected by a mere decree from Ulundi. In other parts of Natal organised IFP campaign activity is unthinkable. In most black townships the chances are poor that we'll see NP politicians going on the stump.

Parts of townships — particularly squatter areas — are carved up into fiefdoms of various sorts (by chiefs, squatter lords, civics, militant youth), making access for political campaigns a controversial and explosive matter.

Kneejerk radicals might disagree that this is a problem; after all, why should the enemy be allowed in to plunder and buy off black votes? They're wrong.

One of the trends Hofmeyer spotted is a "growth of cynicism towards politicians and politics" — in black communities especially "you find a mix of anger and despair", he says.

This blend of uncertainty and insecurity surfaces in the alarming number of voters who either refuse to disclose their voting intentions to interviewers or shrug and choose the 'don't know' box. Twenty five percent of urban blacks polled in Research Surveys' latest survey fell in this category, which swelled to 60% in the Durban area.

Come election day, the insecurities that thicken the township air will be the liberation movement's biggest foes. If campaigning — indeed, the act of voting — is allowed to become associated with violence and intimidation, we might yet witness a tragic twist to the SA liberation struggle ...

Faced with the prospect of a gauntlet of violence to or from the voting centre, and unconvinced that each vote is necessary, meaningful and secret, it is not improbable that a lot of voters might 'stay-away' on election day.

■ The ironic 'stay-away'

There undoubtedly will be a fierce swirl of rumours, arm-twisting and compulsion preceding the election — much as anywhere else. It's when these aspects turn violent that things become sticky. Balaclava terror will continue and perhaps intensify as election day approaches. Like now, the origins of the violence will be diverse, no matter how conspiratorial a mindset we impose. But it takes a special kind of giddiness to pretend that 'third force' type activities will not be part of the mix.

It will also take more than prayers and solemn pledges to keep the monster at bay. The antidote will have to include:

- beefed up National Peace Accord structures and initiatives
- more international monitors
- behind-the-scenes communication and dispute resolution channels that stay open despite the campaign mudslinging and grandstanding
- and the realisation that martial campaigning, intimidation and the notion that muscle + rants = votes will kneecap the liberation movements, not the NP.

In this context statements like

PHOTO: JOHN LIEBENBERG (SOUTHLIGHT)

■ The Namibian experience: Even with all the checks and balances, Swapo didn't get that magical 67%

that of Sanco's Dan Mofokeng, when he warns "white parties" against campaigning in black townships, are foolish and counterproductive. Turning up the heat with threats and coercion will not get the vote out.

Every three black voters that do not vote mean three votes lost to the liberation movements (two of them the ANC's). The advantage goes to the NP: the margin between it and the ANC shrinks, and its footing in a power-sharing government becomes firmer.

■ Converts and doubters, unite!

Because the SA liberation struggle took as its central motive (and motif) the 'right to vote', there's an assumption that it will be easy to rouse people to exercise that liberty. Think again. Because, strangely, a country that is virtually on hold because of the biggest political drama in its history seems to be losing some of its faith in politics and the power of a vote.

"People have to be convinced that this is their chance to bring about change," says one ANC election strategist. Researchers are busy dredging for election issues likely to make black voters vote. For urban residents they are listing security, jobs, education, housing and health, in that order. In rural areas it shifts to jobs, food, water, education, health.

But there's a snag: the ANC is in a bit of a Catch-22. It has to cool the inflamed expectations of supporters and calm the nerves of capital while at the same time campaigning as the one party that will make a radical difference. That's quite a juggling act.

■ Chink in the armour

Packaging the issues and nailing together campaign platforms is one thing. But this is one election that is more likely to be won or lost at the level of gut-feelings and memories. "Don't underestimate the emotional impact of that moment in the ballot booth," advises the CPS's Louise Stack. "Is the vote seen as a national liberation election?" Hofmeyer of Research Surveys also stresses the emotional factor. "You can't shake off the impact of history and tradition — and the ANC has a lot of both," he says.

With the major parties looking towards the advice of heavyweight UK and US election strategists (see page 14), the campaigns will probably follow recent trends and orbit around notions like stability, change, fear, trust and history. If the ANC tries to counter attack by relying on ponderous policies and splitting hairs — instead of sticking to symbols, tradition and broad stroking rhetoric — it could trip itself up badly.

History is the chink in the NP's armour. "Emotions are crucial and apartheid must be deployed as an emotional issue — the NP-apartheid connection has to be stressed," is how an ANC strategist puts it. History versus revivalism. Change versus more of the same.

■ Let's make a deal

The planned Reconstruction Accord (See page 20) proposed by Cosatu holds good promise for the liberation movements. Despite its flaws, it might do what the Patriotic Front failed at — to forge a unity of purpose and action among the oppressed. Its attraction for the ANC lies in the fact that it could sway non-ANC supporters into planting their X next to Mandela's picture.

■ Let's make out

Will the ANC philander for the sake of a few votes? There is a chance that it will try to cobble together new (d)alliances in the hope that they will sway parts of the soft NP vote in coloured and Indian ranks. The danger is that this might alienate some of its own hard support.

The SACP alliance, though, seems to pose less of a problem than newspaper scribes would like to believe. Dominant wisdom in ANC ranks is that abandoning the alliance will traumatise hard support, but bring no guarantee of winning new followers from elsewhere. Lately, SACP stalwarts have been proudly quoting a recent Markinor poll of urban blacks which showed an extremely low rejection rate of the SACP — 5% in fact.

PHOTO: GISELE WULFSOHN (SOUTHLIGHT)

■ Popular opinion: The ANC's Achilles heel is that support does not necessarily translate into votes

■ Who did you say you are?

The ANC Youth League has been insisting that everyone over 16 get to vote (Joan of Arc's youth was one example it frequently invoked to illustrate the virtues of teenagers). But the age requirement will be 18. Demographically, this hurts the liberation movements because the bulk of the black population is under 18.

Agreement is not final, but it is virtually certain that voters will need ID documents to cast their ballots. Home Affairs claims to be issuing 30 000 new ID documents a week. But by the end of January approximately two million potential black voters still *did not have the documents* — and that's excluding the TBVC states. Unless things speed up markedly, Home Affairs will need 67 weeks to make up that backlog. We can expect a flurry of concern about "deliberate delays" in the issuing of ID docu-

ments, as well as confusion over what documentation 'citizens' of the TBVC states will require.

The alarm is warranted. But a go-slow in the issuing of voter identification is a pretty transparent sort of election fraud — and everyone will be looking out for it. Eventually a back-up form of identification will also get the nod and ID-less voters will be able to cast their ballots.

It's more likely that a lack of confidence in the voting process itself will deter many voters or even influence their vote. Genuine trust in the secrecy of the ballot is perhaps the surest armour against political thuggery and the anticipated intimidation of domestic and farm labourers by their employers. Instilling that trust will be a central task of voter education and a major duty of the media.

■ Just sign here

"The more complicated the ballot paper," says Stack, "the more spoilt ballot papers you'll have" — and the wider the NP smiles become. In the Angolan election (with its 4.5 million registered voters), there were half a million spoilt ballots. Of those more than half were left blank, so intimidated and confused were voters.

The ANC wants a black and white form to avoid the kaleidoscopic confusions around party colours that plagued the Namibian vote. The form will sport the symbol of the party plus the name and picture of its leader (a hint that both it and NP plan to 'personalise' their parties around the charisma of their respective leaders). The NP is pushing for a list of parties broken into two rows, with it and the ANC at the top of each. The ANC rejects this, arguing for a single row, presumably in alphabetical order. (Presumably, too, the PAC is quietly kicking itself for not having named itself the All-African Congress — AAC — back in 1959.) The rule of thumb: the simpler the form, the more votes count.

■ It ain't over until ...

All in all, clear heads and verve separate us from that worst-case scenario.

If the Zimbabwean and Namibian elections teach us anything it's that the confidence of your supporters doesn't necessarily translate into reality. In Zimbabwe the 'smart' money was on Joshua Nkomo's Zapu, but it got side-swiped by Robert Mugabe's Zanu.

In Namibia, it seemed as if Swapo merely had to have its name on the ballot form to win that magical 67%; it got 10% less. In both settings, ethnic identification had a major hand in upsetting the smoothed logic of pundits.

Whatever the Machiavellian schemes, crazy plots and desperate blunders that kicked in and held up the past three years, we're now locked into a kind of structural brinkmanship. Our economy is on the verge of becoming terminally stunted. The nation-building project seems in worse shape than it was three years ago. Morbid symptoms are flying thick and fast. We're approaching the point where all the king's horses and all the king's men couldn't stick things back together again.

There's no Marshall Plan that will underwrite our reconstruction, no likelihood of an economic boom that will propel us from the margins of the world economy towards where the action is, no "salvation from beyond". Turning our society around from the slow, messy slide it's on will require resolve and the capacity to act. A hung parliament will probably just push SA over the brink.

Likewise a Government of National Unity with the ANC and NP roughly balanced and tied into a five-year wedlock. "The NP strategy is to make sure that *power sharing is not simply* based on the logic of 'You've got the numbers, but we've got the guns and the civil service'," says CPS's Steve Friedman. "They want to base it on the realities out there."

If the NP gets within 10% of the ANC, the balance of forces shifts radically. "Then you can't just tell them to take it or leave it when they start flying off the handle."

There's enough at stake to make this a pretty messy affair — before, during and after the vote. Complaints and excuses are going to be no substitute for prevention and prowess.

What SA cannot afford — and should not allow — is the disaster of the liberation movements tripping over their own bootlaces. Sekunjalo! W

Stick your neck out

With all these election predictions flying around, WIP conducted its own informal poll — asking a range of South *Africans to stick their necks* out and predict the outcome of the first democratic election.

THE PROFESSIONAL POLLSTERS

- **Donald Simpson (Potch University political analyst): ANC coalition: 50% plus; NP: 25%; PAC/AZAPO: maximum 5%; CP: 7% (31% of the white vote); IFP: 10% (more than 50% in Natal)**
- **Wim Booysen (describes himself as "the only true independent political pundit")**

ANC: 55-61%; NP: 20-26%; IFP 7-11%; PAC and CP 1% each

The higher the percentage poll the better for the ANC; the lower the percentage the better for the NP

- **Prof Tom Lodge, Wits University Political Studies Dept: ANC coalition:65%; NP: 20%; the rest: 15%**

THE POLITICOS

- ***Weizmann Hamilton*, Marxist Workers' Tendency of the ANC: ANC: 65%; NP: 30.1%; IFP: 4.9%**
- **Baleka Kgositsile, ANC Women's League: "Mandela is more popular than the ANC. But the ANC could win more than 66% of the vote."**
- **Alan Hendrickse, Labour Party: ANC: 60%; NP: 30%; IFP: 10%**

- **James Motlatsi, NUM president: ANC: 60% plus; NP: 27%; IFP: 15% maximum.**

THE NO-COMMENTS

- **Cunningham Ngcukana, Nactu: "It's a delicate topic — predicting a winner could be seen as supporting that party."**
- **John Bishop, broadcast journalist "It would show allegiance to a political party and damage my credibility as an unbiased reporter (sic)."**
- **Doctor Khumalo, Kaizer Chiefs soccer star: "The situation does not allow people to express their opinions openly ... someone might want to kill me if I say who will win."**

THE LAST WORD

- **Willem Kleynhans (Unisa)**

Shocked at the presumption that an election would be held this year, he declared: "This country is in a mess. I don't know if there will be an election — there is so much confusion and so many stumbling blocks. We don't even have any proper political parties in this country. We still have to teach millions of third world voters how to decode a ballot sheet. I would not risk my reputation to make such a prediction." W

PHOTO: THE STAR

PHOTO: CEDRIC NUNN

elections

On the campaign trail

The ANC is tapping Bill Clinton's campaign advisors for ideas. The National Party's talking to Saatchi & Saatchi. So what kind of election campaign will South Africans end up with?



PHOTO: NIGEL DENNIS (ANC DIP)

■ **The ANC campaign: A focus on the movement's ability to change society**

Andrew McDonald

"OUR WEAPON HAS TWO edges: one is the spirit of gradual reform, the other is revolution".

This, a statement often repeated by supporters of the French socialist Jaures, captures the current debates within the ANC and the moment many of its cadres have long dreamt of — the eve of elections.

For an organisation facing its first election, the ANC has already shown a high degree of flexibility in meeting the demands of modern electioneering.

It has tapped into the recent British and US election experiences and had personal briefings with British consultants Philip Gould & Associates. Gould, advisor to the British Labour Party, also played a significant role in Bill Clinton's successful presidential election campaign in the US.

Gould's experiences in the British election — where the Labour Party lost to the Conservatives — are useful for the ANC, despite the vast differences in the two scenarios.

He told the movement's election strategists how the Conservatives had hammered home one message in the run-up to the elections: that even though things were bad in Britain, they would get worse under a Labour government.

Gould referred to a "reservoir of fear" created by the Conservatives. In the last week before the elections, this reservoir was tapped — and a vicious, scathing and often personal attack was launched against the Labour Party and its leadership.

This served to reverse the tide of support which Labour had been recording in all the polls — prompting pollsters to suggest that Labour had lost purely because it was unable to assess the depth of fear for change.

After the Conservative victory, virtually the entire Saatchi & Saatchi campaign — strategies, visuals and all — was shipped across the Atlantic Ocean to help George Bush's flagging fortunes.

The central theme for the Republicans was precisely the same: no need for change "'cos things are going to get worse if you change them". This time the message didn't work — and Bush has gone back to the bush.

The election consultants' score: Gould & Associates 1, Saatchi & Saatchi 1.

Into Africa

And so to South Africa. At the moment there's little doubt that with Saatchi & Saatchi backing them, the National Party will be hoping to create a deep distrust of any opposition — especially the ANC.

The NP seems to be suffering from the delusions of power created by the March 92 referendum, which has led it to think it can exist as a party without a constituency to whom it must be accountable. The party also tends to see the transition as a Nat-led journey with their opponents as junior partners.

As one analyst puts it: "The Nats have replaced their policy — be it on negotiations or the economy — with a

series of faltering steps. This gives them the space to even go back on agreements reached in the negotiations."

So how is the NP likely to fight an election? Apart from the themes Bush and Major relied on — fear of change — the NP will be relying on a range of electioneering strategies.

But the major focus will be on what is called 'The List'. Because the elections will be run on a proportional representative system, each party will draw up a list of candidates. It will be able to send to parliament the top percentage of its candidates in relation to the percentage support it obtains.

The NP sees the list as an excellent propaganda piece and has given the task of overseeing the process of drawing it up to its National Information and Management Committee (NIMC). The NP intends finalising its list by May this year. NIMC chair Dawie de Villiers has called for the list to reflect people from all the voting districts and especially to include women, blacks and people with special talents.

And the ANC?

The ANC will go into the election leading an Electoral Front and has adopted a complex democratic process of drawing up its 'list'.

In the meantime ANC strategists have been emphasising that in any electioneering the C in ANC will have to stand for 'Competence and Confidence in bringing about Change'. This means an emphasis on these qualities, rather than harping on apartheid's horrors.

The movement's strategists agree that the ANC will not be able to dwell on the majority's struggle against apartheid as the cornerstone of its campaign — instead its ability to change society will be of critical importance.

The Chilean left faced a similar dilemma two years ago when it was advised that it could not win the referendum by campaigning on Pinochet's record of assassinations and missing persons. Instead, economic modernisation was identified as the key issue.

This means an emphasis on a programme of 'structural reform' as opposed to liberal reform programmes. The Reconstruction Accord proposed by Cosatu is being supported as the basis on which such a structural reform programme could be carried out. It will also form a significant part of the ANC's election platform (see separate article on page 20).

Conventional wisdom within ANC circles has it that big business will prefer a narrow ANC victory which would give the political process new legitimacy, thus attracting new investment — but be unable to bring about fundamental change.

The election machinery

The key battle within the ANC has been the development of elections structures. Whereas the Nats have been able to hand all electoral preparatory tasks to the NIMC, the ANC's Elections Planning Commission continues to battle for the organisation's resources and structures to be placed under a single command for election purposes.

"The tension between being a national liberatory movement and a political party continues to bedevil the ANC," said a senior member of the organisation. At the centre of the ANC's preparations is a highly dynamic group working under Popo Molefe and drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of the MDM.

This group's perspectives of shaping the organisation into a powerful modern party machine is held back by many of the fiefdoms created in exile or more recently.

Perhaps the organisation's major weakness, even during its underground period, has been its inability to draw its different strengths into a single focus.

In the past the ANC has had problems getting its military sections to work with its political sections. Now the problem is to get its different departments working together.

Contrast this with the NP, whose executive director, Olaus van Zyl, is in charge of all activities which fall under the NIMC. The NIMC has been handed the entire elections brief, including fund-raising and aspects relating to negotiations. W

Trying to prevent a dirty war

Everyone seems to know at least one election fraud story. Cemeteries being used to recruit voters. Boxes stuffed with ballot forms. Or the Mexican village where residents performed their civic duties so well that over 600 votes were cast — even though the total population was just 125.

But the emergence of 'new democracies' has seen election fraud elevated to an art form — something South African political organisations will have to bear in mind in the coming months.

Wits University researcher Craig Charney has identified the following as key factors in the election process:

- **publicity and documentation**
- **multi-party control**
- **judicial review**
- **international monitoring.**

Charney has a shopping list of election dangers and solutions. A key concern, he says, is the voters roll, which can easily be manipulated. If a roll becomes a requirement in South Africa's first democratic election, he argues, then there should be numerous voter registrations bureaux — including mobile ones. Also vital are clear procedures for challenging unjustified inclusions or exclusions.

To avoid intimidation he suggests a strong publicity campaign around the fact that the vote is secret. Allowances should also be made for postponing elections in areas where intimidation/violence is severe.

He makes several proposals on how to counter dirty tricks on election day itself. These range from multi-party monitoring of every stage of the vote to marking voters' hands with indelible ink after voting.

The vote-counting stage is critical, and Charney's suggestions here include publishing the results of every polling station, not just the whole constituency. Discrepancies in counting should be grounds for cancelling the results if they could affect the outcome. W

elections

Pinning the tail on the donkey

PHOTO: SAMSON SELEPE

Experts can't get the weather right, so what chance do they have with election polls? **HEIN MARAIS** forecasts overcast conditions on election day ...

POLLSTERS HAVE BECOME THE unsung seers of our age — announcing the discovery among voters of hidden anxieties, alarming trends, fear, loathing and (too often) sheer immovable apathy.

But in a world where experts still can't accurately predict the weather three days in a row, just how reliable are opinion polls? And in a country dizzy with rumours, do we need them?

Opinion polling as we know it began in 1935 when former journalism lecturer George Gallup began a series of week-by-week national polls in the US which continue to this day. "Fact finding in the realm of opinion," was how he described the enterprise.

The nuts and bolts of polling had been forged by a crisis in capitalism a decade earlier: in the 1920s producers had found themselves stuck with excess productive capacities and shrinking markets. They needed to uncover new markets and establish consumer appeal in a hurry to stay in business. Market research became all the rage and provided the methodology that public opinion polls would draw on.

Today, polls have become the weapon of choice for political parties — for if promises are made to be broken, then opinions are made to be changed. And polls straddle that process by crunching the numbers, measuring the opinions, and making "scientific" deductions that enable politicians to set about consolidating or changing voters' opinions.

Check my stats

They emerged in SA politics only in the late 1980s but became a virtual fad after February 1990, with a handful of polling firms (Human Sciences Research Council, Markinor, Research Surveys) leading the way.

Because polling is a business (almost R2 000-million worth in the UK last year), you would expect its practitioners to puff their chests when quizzed about accuracy. In the "engine room" of Research Surveys in Cape Town you're ushered through rows of whirring computers, past mounds of printouts towards research consultant Jan Hofmeyer who will eventually tell you, with a beguiling smile: "No matter what you do to avoid the hiccups and snags, polls in SA cannot be as reliable as in a sophisticated Western country."

Days later, after reciting the precautions taken to ensure accuracy, another pollster leans forward, almost whispering: "I'd be very wary of those numbers."

The precautions seem formidable. Questions are designed and asked in sequences aimed to gain the trust of the respondent (the basic principles having been perfected with sex surveys in the US). The sample — the 1 000 or so people being interviewed — is assembled with statistical methods to ensure it is representative.

Interviewers are selected, trained and deployed in ways least likely to alienate respondents. In some townships, official permission is sought from civics. Pilot surveys are done to detect pitfalls beforehand. Control surveys are done afterwards to doublecheck data. And so on.

Amusing rules of thumb emerge. "You don't drive into a township in a nice white car — unless you to want to be mistaken for a state official," says De Wet Schutte, an HSRC pollster.

Black communities are often blitzed: interviewers try to drop in, fill their quota of interviews and leave before word gets around. In Cape Town, the HSRC says it finds conservative whites most responsive to well-



■ **X marks the spot: No-one really knows what's going to happen when voters get into the booth**

dressed coloured men: "They don't bother giving him a hard time because they assume the 'boss' sent him and he doesn't really know what's going on," explains Schutte. Another polling firm finds elderly black women the most effective interviewers in black communities: "They override a whole bunch of suspicions and resistance in one go."

The surprising thing about polls is that they seldom go wrong because too few people are interviewed. A sample of a few thousand can accurately reflect the opinions of a hundred million or more people. Yet you can interview half the country's population and still end up with a disastrously wrong poll!

Counting beans

The secret to accuracy is what the bean counters call *representativeness*, which is determined by two major factors: *randomness* and *distribution* width.

● Randomness means simply that each person in the target community must have an equal chance of being interviewed; the interviewees (the sample group) must be chosen absolutely at random.

● Distribution width means that the sample group must reflect in correct proportion the various subgroups in that community. (If women aged 18 to 21 years constitute one third of people in the area being polled, they should be one third of the sample group and so on.)

In SA, that's the easy part of polling: getting the basic methodology right. "There are other problems," cautions Louise Stack, a researcher with the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS). "It's nothing deliberate, nothing conspiratorial," she says, but a catalogue of hitches plague the pollster – and the poll reader. "All the limitations," says the HSRC's Johann Mouton, "are so much more pronounced in SA." He advises that poll results be interpreted "cautiously — some more so than others, though".

Markinor polls urban and rural whites (by telephone), only urban blacks (face-to-face) and of them it reaches squatters but not hostels. It has not administered public opinion polls to coloureds and Indians. Research Surveys' Omnicheck poll reflects the opinions of rural and urban dwellers, though rural areas are polled only twice a year.

HRSC polls are "on the whole confined to SA outside the TVBC states", says Mouton, which "makes the forecast even more risky. Lately, HSRC has been polling in Venda and Ciskei — but not Transkei and Bophuthatswana,, which knocks 2.6 million voters out of the equation (1.6 million of them Xhosas, among whom the ANC polls about 80% support elsewhere).

Rural SA is another twilight zone. Mouton says HSRC polls are "to a large degree" representative of rural areas. The problem, as a Research Surveys pollster points out, is that "there is rural and there is rural". The HSRC follows the census definition which means that Esikhawini township outside Empangeni is regarded as "rural", just like a "deep rural" settlement in northern Natal.

The bias against rural public opinion polling is financial: it's simply too expensive.

The irony is that the most comprehensive rural polling — market research, actually — is done by corporations. A major soft drink manufacturer or brewery knows what the brand sentiments of residents in Jane Furse or Nongoma or Ipopeng are. But their opinions about political matters remain unexplored by pollsters.

Nommer asseblief

Then there is the telephone poll. Until 18 months ago, the HSRC was still polling blacks in this way, which meant it was gauging the opinions of a very narrow segment of people. Nowadays it does face-to-face interviews, making its last five surveys (according to Mouton) "as representative as you can come".

And, lest we forget, there are the idiosyncracies that make SA, well, SA. "How accurate can you get when this sort of thing happens?" asks Hofmeyer, wistfully. "In a certain homeland, police arrest your fieldworkers, accuse them of recruiting for the ANC and toss them out. Or the civic in a Vaal township stops you, takes you to an impromptu civic meeting where the questionnaire is scruti-

Double jeopardy: How popular is the IFP, really?

Levels of IFP support have been a bone of contention for years. Until late 1991 pollsters were finding Mangosuthu Buthelezi's party unable to hoist its support into double figures. In 1992, however, the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) began detecting what appeared to be a significant swell of support for Inkatha.

In the October 1992 HSRC poll, IFP national support peaked at 11%, with black support rising to 15%. Support in rural Natal went as high as "45-50%", HSRC general manager of information, Dr Johann Mouton, told WIP.

What is baffling is that HSRC polls are the only ones spotting this 'groundswell'. Research Surveys, for example, finds IFP support "nationwide at 3% — it's never gone higher," according to research consultant Jan Hofmeyer. "The highest we've seen it go is 15% in rural Natal."

So what's going on? Some numbers sleuthing might help. The Development Bank of SA (DBSA) pegs the total number of voters in SA (including the TVBC states) at 21 million, 14.4 million of them black. (Research Survey's Neil Higgs warns that the 1991 census figures are "fraught with hazard"; they still find, for example, less than 1 million residents in Soweto!) According to the DBSA, there are 3.8 million Zulu voters and 3.5 million Xhosas. This leaves 7.1 million other black voters.

The HSRC's October 1992 poll found 0.4% of potential Xhosa voters and an average 0.8% of other black voters (excluding Zulus) saying they would vote for the IFP. Only 37% of Zulus chose the IFP. Using the DBSA voter figures, that translates into 1.4 million Zulus. Likewise, one gets 15 000 Xhosas and 60 000 other blacks who might be regarded as likely IFP voters — a total of 1.48 million or 10.2% of the 14.4 million black voters. Yet the HSRC claims 15% of blacks support the IFP — one third more than its figures seem to add up to.

But here's the rub. The HSRC doesn't poll Bophuthatswana and the Transkei where there are about 2.6 million black voters, according to the DBSA — none of them Zulus. So, with almost 20% of black voters excluded from the HSRC calculations (among whom Research Surveys finds IFP support averaging well under 1%), the IFP share of black support becomes inflated.

Research Surveys' Jan Hofmeyer argues that it's "misleading" not to estimate political support in those territories. "There's enough indication of what you'll find if you went there, namely very high ANC support."

Likewise, the October poll found 11% national support for the IFP among voters of all race groups — which translates into 2.3 million 'votes', using the DBSA figures. The HSRC found 3.4% whites (133 000 'votes'), and less than 1% coloureds (generously 10 000) and Asians (5 000) supporting the party. Add to those 148 000 'votes' the 1.48 million black 'votes' calculated above and the IFP scores 1.63 million 'votes', or 7.8% nationwide support. "To be honest," an HSRC source told WIP, "when I look at the figures, the IFP comes out closer to 7% nationally." But even 7% is way more than the roughly 3% IFP support measured in other polls ...

Like many pollsters, political sociologist Mark Orkin is puzzled by the levels of IFP support cited by the HSRC. "Through 1991, the HSRC measured the same levels of Buthelezi and IFP support nationally as everyone else," he says. What intrigues Orkin is that the jump in HSRC-measured IFP support seemed to coincide with researcher Lawrence Schlemmer taking over as general manager of the social dynamics section at the Council. Schlemmer was formerly secretary of the Buthelezi Commission and director of the Inkatha Institute. "In February 1992, Schlemmer said his 'fingertip feeling' — his words — was that Inkatha would probably command around 15% support nationally," Orkin recalls. "Miraculously, ever since then the HSRC has found double figure support for the IFP."

Orkin observes that the council is using generous estimates of how many Zulus live in rural Natal (the IFP's biggest support base). The calculations and sample weighting of its February 1992 poll assumed that rural Zulus made up 17% of all black voters. Eight months later, HSRC computations were assuming that rural Zulus constituted 23% of black voters. They had increased by 6% the only segment of voters among whom the IFP has appreciable support — which 'pushed' IFP support among blacks up by at least 2%.

A trend other pollsters are noticing is that the IFP is experiencing a constituency shift. "The IFP has a lot more support among whites than among urban blacks," says Woessner, whose latest figures show 4% whites and 2.4% urban blacks saying they'd vote IFP. Lately Hofmeyr has also found whites keener on the IFP than on the Democratic Party. "Whites want blacks in power that they think they can trust — they think Buthelezi and the IFP fit that bill," is how he reads the trend. — *Hein Marais*

(Despite several requests by phone and fax, Prof Schlemmer did not grant WIP an interview)

nised and you're told: 'OK, but we'll tell you who to interview.' Or — and this happens often — fieldworkers are held up at gunpoint and harassed, mostly by legal authorities of an area."

Any poll has a built-in mystery section: respondents who refuse to answer, or opt for the 'don't know' or 'uncertain' categories. UK pollsters generally find 3% of respondents refusing to disclose their voting intentions. Markinor is finding about 15% 'don't knows' and 'refusals'. Likewise, the HSRC's recent polls. Lately, Research Surveys is finding a dramatic increase — up from 13% to about 25%.

In Durban, 50% of black men and 60% of women declined to reveal their political sympathies in a February poll. "In SA, where political opinions can become a matter of life or death, these become very significant," Hofmeyer believes. Fear and intimidation seem to be warping dramatically the political information reflected by polls.

Festooned with footnotes

The bottomline — as most pollsters announce before you've even flipped open your notepad — is that polls come festooned with footnotes. In SA, they cannot pinpoint that so-and-so has 40% support. In polling jargon: "We do not regard a single percentage point as having absolute value."

What they can do is determine trends, trace the ebb and flow of political sensibilities. "Within certain parameters you can make certain deductions," says Louise Stack of the Centre for Policy Studies. But, as Mouton cautions, "in the socio-political environment we live in, we must be even more cautious about how we interpret them".

Even where polls have become institutions, they remain dogged by controversy. The loudest critics tend to be politicians whom the polls show to be running behind. And sometimes they're right. In last year's British elections, all the major polls showed the Labour Party ahead right up to voting time. Of course, history ignored the polls and John Major stayed in 10 Downing Street.

So bruised was the collective pride of British pollsters that they

commissioned a special inquiry into why the numbers came out wrong by 8.5%. Investigators rummaged through the data and emerged with explanations for a 5% error. Some voters had deregistered because of poll tax (mostly Labour), others had refused to disclose their intention (and voted Conservative), and others switched their vote in the final days after having had memories of the last Labour government rekindled by Conservative Party propaganda.

In SA, the margin of error probably will be much greater; already it hovers around 10%, compared to the internationally accepted 3-5% by which polls under- or over-estimate support. This would compound Stack's fear that, in the run-up to elections, polls could have very powerful effects, especially if they are reported inaccurately.

"Polls tend to affect how you think other people feel or might vote, and this can end up affecting how you'll vote." This is known as the 'bandwagon effect' — the idea that some people will switch their vote just to support a winner. But some US pollsters dispute the thesis. "If there were a 'bandwagon effect'," says one critic, "polls would always underpredict the margin of victory" — which they don't.

The 'bandwagon effect' and assumptions about the immaturity of the electorate are why, in SA, opinion polls cannot be publicised in the last six weeks before a vote. It's then that the "politically immature, the *draadsitters* are likely to be influenced", says the HSRC's De Wet Schutte. Stack agrees: "Right now people need the time to think for themselves and decide what they want to do." On the other hand, no-one pretends anymore that elections somehow measure the 'virginal' political choices of citizens, untouched by the heaving come-ons of politicians and media. Elections have become spectacular odes to the art of persuasion, and polls form an integral part of the spectacle.

Given the novelty and unevenness of opinion polling in SA — not to mention the complex realities pollsters try to convert into data — one expects controversy. Still, as the HSRC's Schutte reminds, polls are at the moment our "only indication of where political support lies".

As we waddle towards our first non-racial democratic vote, politicians will be scrutinising poll results — much as their forerunners inspected the lie of the bones or the entrails of small farm animals for clues about their futures.

Already polls seem to have undergirded the grandstanding of Buthelezi and his IFP (see box). They have hushed the NP's bluster about winning the vote. They might also have smoothed the ANC's election strategy with realism. What that yields, come election day, we will see. For now though, South Africans at least have a glimpse, smudgy as it is, of compatriots' political sensibilities. It certainly won't bring us closer together. But it might give fair warning of some surprises ahead. W

PHOTO: GILL DE VLIEG

Levelling the pollsters' playing field

There are lies, damned lies, statistics and *opinion polls*, Benjamin Disraeli might have said, had he lived into the electronic age.

Opinion polls come in all shapes and sizes. Like reputations, they can lead to foolish over- and underestimations. Like statistics, they can be deployed creatively to encourage certain perceptions.

Sure enough, by the late 1960s political polling and its reporting in the US had attracted furious criticism. Pollsters answered with a call for 'minimal disclosure' standards in news releases that publicise poll results. These included:

- **the identity of who sponsored the survey**
- **the exact questions asked**
- **a definition of the population sampled**
- **the size of the sample**
- **what the margin of error is**
- **whether interviewing was done face-to-face, by telephone, etc**
- **when the interviews where done in relation to relevant events.**

In SA, where the political opinions of most citizens remain less than transparent (and untested in the voting booth), political polls might take on exaggerated importance in the months ahead.

A recent poll indicated that more than 80% of white voters didn't want an interim government. Blaring headlines and anxious comments followed. But, says CPS researcher Louise Stack: "If you look at the question that was asked, you find the wording emotional and strong — in fact, you'd have to be crazy to have answered 'Yes'."

Her advice is simple. Pollsters and reporters owe it to voters to pass on polling information in as demystified and accurate a form as possible. 'Minimal disclosure' standards might be a good start.

— Hein Marais W

elections

Reconstruction pacts: no blank cheques for the ANC

PACTS BETWEEN PARTIES WILL form a vital part of any election campaign — and for the ANC, support from the trade union movement is going to be vital.

Cosatu's support for the ANC will not, however, come in the form of a blank cheque; the trade union federation is pushing for a 'reconstruction accord' which will tie any future government in to making far-reaching changes to the SA economy.

Although the reconstruction accord would form part of the ANC's manifesto, it is more than just an 'election deal' and has a life beyond the first democratic poll.

Cosatu sees it as a framework within which organisations of the poor and working people will themselves reconstruct the economy in the future. It describes the accord as an "instrument with which we intend to harness and redirect resources to meet the needs of broader society — while at the same time empowering grassroots organisations to direct their future and destiny".

Cosatu's idea is that the reconstruction programme should be seen in three parts:

- an election platform outlining the broad areas around which the election campaign is based. It would be a brief document covering constitutional, social and economic areas. It would form the basis of an ANC election platform, and Cosatu's support for the ANC in the election would be conditional on the ANC committing itself to the programme. It would be a signed document, binding on all parties.
- a reconstruction accord — a detailed document covering the same areas as the election platform — which will emerge after wide consultation and will probably only be finalised after the elections.
- a programme which outlines how and when those agreements in the accord will be implemented; what role the civics, trade unions, youth etc will play; what constraints a new democratic state might face and how to deal with these from the point of view of workers and the poor.

The programme would be specifically directed at practical steps to 'reconstruct the economy' and would embrace — as far as possible — a wide layer of youth, civic, religious, small business, women and cultural organisations. Already Cosatu has had discussions with the ANC, SACP, civics, students, youth and some religious organisations on the accord.

All these organisations accept the idea of the accord in principle — for example, it will be central to the SACP's April "strategising conference". When the accord is eventually signed, it will not be a Cosatu document, or even an alliance document, but an accord of all organisations who support it.

The ANC has a two-pronged approach to the accord. It envisages taking the first accord — signed with Cosatu and other anti-apartheid organisations — and using it as a basis for negotiating another accord with organisations and interests (especially big business) outside the ranks of the mass democratic movement. W

— WIP correspondent

Vote up! Vote up!

Voter education is a new 'growth industry' in South Africa. At least 30 local organisations have already launched voter education programmes, while a host of international agencies are also interested in investing in 'democracy'.

But there is still much confusion. And until electoral procedures have been negotiated and an electoral act passed, basic questions cannot be answered, such as:

- **what kind of identity documents people need to vote**
- **what ballot papers will look like and**
- **what mark people will have to make on ballot papers.**

Last year, the Independent Forum for Electoral Educators was set up to coordinate voter education. According to Matla Trust's Barry Gilder, all the major players in voter education are part of the forum. These include the Trust, the SA Council of Churches, SA Catholic Bishops' Conference, Idasa and the Centre for Development Studies/National Democratic Institute's Project Vote.

A fulltime administrator has been appointed to coordinate the forum, which meets approximately every six weeks. Four commissions — dealing with training, media, election monitoring and formulating submissions to an independent electoral commission — meet more regularly.

Project Vote and Matla Trust are the two biggest players in the field at present. Project Vote has already used a $1-million grant from the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to develop voter education kits. These include mock ballot boxes, voting booths and a training manual. The kit urges voter trainers to link voting to better education, jobs, housing and peace.

Gilder says Matla Trust needs R30-million to implement its "education for democracy" programme, which includes teaching people what concepts like accountability and democracy mean. W

— Kerry Cullinan

The world's most powerful trade unionist

The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) recently sent its largest delegation ever to South Africa to investigate violence. **KERRY CULLINAN** spoke to ICFTU general secretary ENZO FRISO

Being face to face with the most powerful union leader in the world is quite a daunting experience. Yet Enzo Friso is not an intimidating man — disciplined is a better description: "I don't smoke or drink. I watch what I eat, and I do exercise almost every day."

Friso is a "citizen of the world". Born 65 years ago in Padua, Italy, he has not lived in his home country for over 20 years. "I was divorced in Mexico, I remarried in Indonesia. My son was born in London. My wife is Lebanese and we speak to one another in French." Today Friso is based at the ICFTU's headquarters in Brussels, but travels widely. "But don't ask me what a country is like," he says ruefully. "What I can tell you about is airports, hotels and conference centres."

Friso started off in the socialist-aligned Italian federation, the CGIL. In 1950, he became a founder member of a breakaway federation, the social democratic CISL. He first started working for the ICFTU in 1962, and has risen steadily through the ranks. After being posted to various countries, particularly those in Latin America, Friso was appointed assistant secretary of the confederation in 1984. Last year, he was elected general secretary.

While he respects the views of South African trade unionists who are sceptical of the ICFTU, he is angered by suggestions that the ICFTU is an "imperialist organisation".

"I have spent 10 years in Latin America fighting the worst, most exploitative regimes. People must not tell me I am the general secretary of an imperialist organisation!"

The imperialist label comes from the fact that the anti-communist American trade union federation, the AFL-CIO, is one of the ICFTU's biggest members. But Friso is quick to point out that the AFL-CIO left the ICFTU in 1969, saying the organisation was "too left". It only rejoined in 1982.

"In terms of members, the Nordic, German and British Trade Union Council (TUC) combined outnumber the AFL-CIO, so it is not correct to say the AFL-CIO dominates the ICFTU," says the confederation's information officer, Luc Demaret.

Friso adds that perceptions about the ICFTU are influenced by "which side you were on" during the cold war days when there were two powerful world confederations, the ICFTU and the communist World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The SA Congress of Trade Unions (Sactu) was close to the WFTU, and this has influenced many South Africa trade unions.

Today the WFTU is a mere shell, with a handful of members from countries such as Cuba, North Korea and Romania. In contrast, the ICFTU has 164 affiliates from 117 countries, representing 113-million workers.

The ICFTU is obviously keen to woo Cosatu into its ranks, as Cosatu is the strongest union federation in Africa. Cosatu will decide on ICFTU membership at its next congress, but it appears many of its national office bearers are more amenable to the ICFTU than before.

North-South solidarity

The ICFTU has been severely affected by the economic recession and has lost many members through retrenchments. In addition, "we are up against multi-nationals creating `free zones' throughout the world. And by this they mean union-free zones. It is very difficult to organise these workers, who are so poor that they are [materially] better off now that they are being exploited by foreigners," says Friso.

A strong principle of ICFTU policy is North-South solidarity. Last year, the confederation called for a "global solidarity pact".

"This simply means if industrialised countries want to tackle the problem of unemployment in their own country, they must also address it in developing countries," explains

Friso. "But only God knows how difficult it is to have a global approach with the rise of Nazism, fascism, racism, nationalism."

The legacy of Thatcherism has meant that the rich get richer and the poor get poorer "both within and between countries". Conservatives have also "exploited the collapse of communism as a victory of the market system". But the west is far from healthy.

"During the past five years, industrialised countries have lost $70-billion in exports per year at a cost of 2 700-million jobs a year. Industrialised countries can increase internal demand for their products, but not enough," says Friso.

"No government has a solution to its economic crisis [as it is a world crisis]. As a result, all ruling parties are losing credibility as, no matter what their ideology, they cannot solve their economic problems in isolation."

But politicians do not seem to be able to see this. "The quality of politicians is not the same as ten or 20 years ago, when we had statesmen who could tell people the truth without losing face. Today we have apparatchiks who are only concerned with winning the next election."

Friso believes the trade union movement is a vital part of any plan to improve the economy: "I firmly believe that the sense of solidarity achieved by linking workers around the world means that the trade union could become a most important instrument in economic recovery."

He points out that "never before have we received so many applications for membership from developing countries". Last year, 40 federation applied to join the confederation.

But Friso is realistic about the limitations of trade unions in developing countries, especially in Africa, and warns against the really poor being ignored.

"Trade unionism in Africa was exported from France and Britain during colonialism. In Britain, wage earners are the majority of the population and have an important political role to play. In Africa, wage earners are a minority, and not necessarily the poorest. The real proletariat lives in the rural areas."

In Africa, wage earners are a minority, and not necessarily the poorest. The real proletariat lives in the rural areas

African trade unions

While many African national centres are now part of the ICFTU, "in too many countries, unions are still controlled by the uni-party system", says Friso.

Malawi is one example. Since Malawian trade unionist Chakufwa Chihana was sentenced to two years' hard labour late last year after being convicted of 'sedition', the ICFTU has mounted a campaign to stop aid to the country until it recognises human and trade union rights.

"There are some difficulties on this issue with the World Bank and IMF, but we have succeeding in persuading the EEC in particular that it is a waste of money to assist countries where there is no democracy or control. Otherwise you are merely helping the family of the head of state with taxpayers' money. Some of these so-called heads of states have more money in their bank accounts than their country's external debt. This was the case with Marcos in the Philippines, and with Mobutu in Zaire."

The ICFTU has also been trying to persuade the IMF to abandon its Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in Africa, which countries have to undertake in order to qualify for loans.

"We are absolutely against the IMF's policies of structural adjustment programmes as they do not take into account the social dimension. [Democratising a society] has to be approached very carefully. Democracy is not elections. Free elections are the starting point. But the army and the bureacracy also have to be democratised."

A little progress has been made in Zambia. "We held a meeting on the SAP and invited the IMF and the World Bank. They started to understand our viewpoint. They agreed that trade unions have the right to be consulted. This does not mean they will listen, but for the first time there was dialogue."

Despite his cynicism about politicians, Friso is full of praise for ANC president Nelson Mandela. "I was very impressed. I have seldom seen someone so serene and realistic in a difficult situation. He also tries to understand the problems of the white minority. And he is able to control the young people ... although I don't know for how long."

Friso's last words are on South Africa: "I really trust human beings, even here. The majority of whites are ignorant. If they visited hostels, they would be really ashamed to be white.

"South Africans have a great chance to solve their problems. They shouldn't miss it if they want to avoid

PHOTO: NIGEL DENNIS (ANC DIP)

■ **Enzo Friso (centre) and other ICFTU delegates meet the ANC's Nelson Mandela**



GRAPHIC: RHETT MARTYN

Campus rape: Catch 22 for women

Enough is enough, say university students who fall victim to sexual harassment and rape. And a combination of educational workshops and guerilla tactics is ensuring they get their message across loud and clear

Diana EH Russell

The harassment of female students is becoming a major issue on university campuses around the country, with increasing numbers of students taking a stand — particularly against campus rapists.

"Sexual harassment and rape have become more visible at our university," says Rhoda Kadalie, recently-appointed gender co-ordinator at the University of the Western Cape. "But at the same time we are finding increasing numbers of women are taking action against the perpetrators.

Yet, she adds, the more the perpetrators are confronted, the more they try to intimidate the women.

"But women are refusing to be intimidated."

One example of this was a picketed organised at UWC last year after a male student — expelled from a residence after being accused of attempted rape — was spotted back at the residence. The male student had a particularly violent record: he had tried to rape a female student, then kicked her and beat her on the head with a metal dustbin lid. She was saved by other students, but still had to be hospitalised and treated for a broken ankle, among other things.

The attack, and the female students' protests, led to even more women being threatened. "We are watching each of you, especially at night," they were told. "If you keep trying to get (the rapist) off the campus, we'll get you!"

Some male students even threatened to kill some of the women. But the women were undaunted. They proceeded to testify against the perpetrator at his trial and continued to demand his removal from the campus.

Change in attitudes

The change in women's attitudes, according to Kadalie, is due to training workshops on sexual harassment and violence against women organised by herself and other concerned women and men on campus, as well as educational programmes in the residences and self-defence demonstrations for

Lulu Diba's story

Lulu Diba, a 31-year-old single mother of two, has a relatively well-paid job in one of the 'homelands', where she also resides. This is her story

I was raped in 1980 in my first year as a social work student at the University of Zululand. A third year student started making advances toward me soon after I arrived at the university. He said he wanted to have an affair with me. I told him politely that I was new at the university and still exploring things. I said I didn't love him and that I had a boyfriend back home — which was true. Although I turned him down, I took him to be my friend.

Early in my first year the student association organised a Saturday night outing to the beach for the social work students. I don't usually drink much, but I became quite drunk with the mixture of beer and wine I drank on that occasion. I was talking with my girlfriend when this third year student called my name through the window, telling me he would like to speak to me outside.

Because I was drunk, it's hard to remember exactly what happened after that — but I must have gone outside, where he raped me. I remember fighting and screaming, and running away. The denim pants I was wearing were removed, so I was half naked when I ran away. Three friends of his ran after me and one of them slapped me. After a while my girlfriend went outside to look for me. She saw the men running after me so she shouted and swore at them. They told her they were trying to dress me.

My girlfriend then helped me to get dressed, though we couldn't find my shoes. I was so exhausted when we got into the bus that I slept all the way back to school. Later, when I realised I had been raped, I cried. Then I went to report what had happened to the warden, who encouraged me to report it to the police.

Rude and careless

I was taken to the charge office on Monday to report the rape. The police took a statement from me, then referred me to the district surgeon. He was an Afrikaner who made matters worse by being very rude in the way he asked me questions when he examined me. He said he was sick and tired of students being so careless. He said we asked to be raped and that we were not supposed to walk alone at night. He also caused me a lot of pain when he examined me. Because it was already two days after the rape, he could not find any semen or other evidence, so he was annoyed that I had not come to him sooner.

The police sergeant was even worse. He told me he would also like to have "a taste". "I will come to your room," he said. "I will be gentle with you". I cried because I was so surprised and upset by his saying these things. He was a black man of about my age, so I expected sympathy from him.

On Tuesday the Student Association met to discuss what had happened. The rapist was not there, but the other three guys who had chased me were. Two of them were my classmates and the other was in his third year, as was the rapist. The three of them admitted that their friend had raped me, but they said they were innocent and had not harmed me. They said they had just been trying to dress me, since I was half naked. They were asked why, in that case, one of them had slapped me. The Student Association members were very angry with the three men and wanted to beat them up. They told them that human beings — particularly people training to be social workers — are not supposed to be involved in such behaviour, and that it is important to care for fellow human beings.

I told the warden I did not want to pursue matters with the police because I wanted to avoid the questioning in court as well as publicity

women. These training sessions, women's greater activism, and publicity about sexual assault at other campuses, have resulted in an increasingly enlightened and supportive stance from the UWC administration.

An action by women at UCT in 1989 also resulted in the setting of mechanisms to deal with sexual harassment on that campus. In the UCT case, some women (presumably) distributed an anonymous leaflet that declared: "RAPISTS BEWARE!!!..... THE EYE OF CASTRATION IS WATCHING YOU." Their warning was addressed to four alleged student rapists whom they named, as well as to all the other rapists at UCT. The leaflet writers also castigated the administration for their "delaying tactics" in handling a reported rape. It ended with a picture of a pair of open scissors superimposed on a man's genitals.

Results of action

After the furore had died down, this simple but radical action led to an unprecedented period of discussion on the campus about sexual harassment, as well as administration-sponsored studies of the problem, culminating in the release of a Final Report on sexual harassment at UCT in October 1991, and new policies to handle cases of sexual harassment on campus. This report has, in turn, stimulated greater awareness and reforms on some other South African campuses. More recently, UCT's Deputy Vice-Chancellor Dr Mamphela Ramphele has initiated numerous national workshops on sexual harassment and violence against women at universities.

The story told on these pages by Lulu Diba (not her real name) conveys what it can be like for sexual assault survivors on campuses where there is still a punitive and victim-blaming approach to this problem [see boxed story]. It also shows how such sexist attitudes and treatment compounds the original trauma of the rape itself. And, because Diba's experience occurred in 1980, her story reveals how long the effects of rape can persist.

To report or not to report, that is the question! As Diba's story shows, both reporting and not reporting can

■ **Education: UCT's Dr Mamphela Ramphele has organised workshops on harassment**

be hazardous for survivors. Diba is one of the tiny minority of rape survivors to report her experience to the police and to the university authorities. Her experience also sheds light on why rape is so seldom reported.

Although some people reacted to Diba's disclosure of rape in a supportive way, most responded negatively — sometimes viciously so. Some belittled the seriousness of the rape, most blamed her for it, and almost all the authority figures who handled her case let her down completely in one way or another. She subsequently became a publicly stigmatised figure on campus.

Reporting is hazardous

On the other hand, for the majority of rape survivors who do not report to the police and/or to the university authorities, and who frequently tell no-one, the second trauma occurs as a result of their festering secret. After being revictimised by people's reactions to her disclosure, Diba felt she had to become secretive about the assault.

The trauma of being raped by a member of one's own relatively closed community is often significantly greater than when rapes are perpetrated by outsiders. Because of this, many survivors of acquaintance or date rape at universities drop out, as Diba reported that other survivors had done at the University of Zululand. For two years after the rape, Diba "had to see my rapist all the time," which made me feel like crying. She also had to see his three collaborators, two of whom were in her class.

about being raped. I feared that news of the rape would reach my father's ears. My father is very strict and he would have been very hurt to know I had been raped.

I asked the warden if the university's disciplinary committee could handle the matter, and he agreed to this.

Each faculty at the university was represented on this committee. I was very honest and I admitted being drunk at the time. Although students are allowed to drink, these lecturers were very judgmental towards me. They considered me immoral for being drunk. And because the rape happened when I was drunk, they said that I asked for it. Their judgments made me feel that it was partly my fault.

'That is the one...'

Life on campus became very difficult. Students would point at me and whisper to each other: "That is the one it happened to." This sort of reaction made me cry. A friend of the rapist — one of the guys who had chased me — used to mock me. He would say to the rapist loudly as I passed by: "Here is your girlfriend. Man, you were so lucky to have fucked her. I also wanted to fuck her." And when I happened to meet the three who chased me during a lecture or at the student centre, they would say, "Come here, you bitch!"

My performance in school dropped during this time. But the student counsellor was very supportive of me. One of the women lecturers was also very concerned. She said she appreciated that I did not drop out of the university as other students had in these circumstances. But I certainly did not find it easy to stay. Although the rapist admitted to the head of the social work department that he had raped me, he also said that I had enjoyed it! It was all very humiliating.

Two months later, I received a letter from the Disciplinary Committee saying that because there was no eyewitness to the rape, they could do nothing about it.

For the next two years, I had to see my rapist all the time. I pretended to ignore him but seeing him made me feel like crying. Before the rape I used to attend films and parties at the university, but I stopped doing these things. I did not feel easy with people any more. Still I managed to pass my exams at the end of the year.

Eleven years later, the trauma is still with me. Not a single month passes without my thinking about it. It has made me very moody. I do not want to communicate with anyone. I feel such anger about what happened.

To this day, the rape is still my secret. Because I was blamed for it at the time, I always think people will be judgmental if I tell them. Our men want us to be pure, so I never tell any of my boyfriends I was raped. The problem is not about my loosing my virginity. It is that being raped leaves a stigma. People do not sympathise with you. Instead they say you wanted it. Any black man who knows that I have been raped would lose interest in me.

Sometimes I say to my girlfriend, "I've got something I want to share with you." She says, "What is it?" Then I tell her something else. I haven't even told my sisters. After we lost our mother in 1979, I became a parent to them. They look up to me and see me as a mother who does no wrong. When one of my sisters went to study at another university, I told her to be careful and not to drink too much at parties. She wondered why I said these things, but I could not explain it to her.

I first had sex when I was 20 years old, and I used to enjoy it. I was not shy then, but now I am very shy. After the rape I lost interest in sex. My affairs last only three or four weeks. I am very protective of myself because I do not want to be hurt again, so I don't become very involved in my relationships. I have good relationships with women and with men who aren't my boyfriends. I am thinking of going to a sex therapist to help me with my problems.

I feel very lonely. I spend most of my time with my two kids. I am very suspicious of men when it comes to my six year-old daughter. I

feel like crying because she has big legs like me, and the man who raped me liked my big legs. He said I had a beautiful figure. She looks like me, which makes me very afraid for her.

I know another woman who was gang-raped by students at the University of Zululand in 1983. One of the rapists was her former boyfriend. She has scratches from the rape, but when she went to get treatment she told the doctor they were caused by an accident.

When I was at the university, gang rapes were called "test matches". Test matches involved a girl's boyfriend inviting her to visit him. When she accepted, he would put brake fluid in her drink which would knock her out. Then he and his friends would rape her. They did this to girls for very petty reasons; for example, if a woman's boyfriend thought she was too stubborn or felt she was too high for him. This was a way of punishing her, of bringing her down.

Men think it is all right for them to rape women, and that only bad women are raped. Women are not supposed to walk alone at night, to be drunk, etc. If they do these things, they are seen to be asking for rape. Rape makes the woman an outcast. Such thinking shows that our society is quite sick.

Postscript

Nine months after the interview, Diba commented as follows:

"Sometimes I'm angry about it and sometimes I'm confused. There are times when I cry for no apparent reason. I think it would have been less traumatic if I had not had to see the culprit every day. And the remarks that were made by his friends were very hurtful and embarrassing. I was also greatly affected by the attitude of the head of the social work department and his staff, and by the letter I received from the disciplinary committee. Their message was clear: I had asked for the rape. Because I had to pass my studies, I tried to shove this problem away.

"I feel much better since I talked to you, but the scar is still with me."

In the rare event that male students are punished for raping female students, some members of the university community take the side of the rapists — blaming the survivors for their downfall. Rape survivors have to cope with the hostility that commonly results.

When rapists are not punished, this is a public slap in the face for the survivors, adding public and private humiliation to their pain. When rape survivors are not believed, they are also likely to be seen as trouble-makers, man-haters, dangerous fabricators who deserve to be ostracised. And when rape survivors are believed, many members of the university community pity them, regarding them as damaged goods, psychological basket cases, or women who hate men (a terrible sin in a patriarchy, no matter how misogynist the men are).

The men who run most universities are often even more reluctant than the police to punish male members of their communities. In addition, university authorities — in an attempt to suppress negative publicity — frequently discourage rape survivors from reporting to the police. Universities often end up reinforcing rape survivors' silence rather than implementing justice. University administrators do not want their institution to earn a reputation as dangerous places for women students. This could have severe economic repercussions as well as undermining universities' intellectual reputations. Hence administrators often protect their universities' reputations at the expense of sexual assault survivors — particularly if they can find some grounds to question their voracity by casting aspersions on their characters and behaviour.

This strategy minimises any damage to the university, as long as other members of the community do not mobilise too much support for the survivors.

Denigrating survivors also discourages others from reporting — another positive outcome from the point of view of administrators.

In Diba's case, the Disciplinary Committee at the University of Zululand took two months to decide against supporting her rape charge for lack of an eyewitness to corroborate it. This ludicrous standard is also enshrined in South Africa rape law. In any event, there actually were at least three eyewitnesses who admitted to an entire class that their friend had raped Diba. Furthermore, according to Diba, the rapist admitted his crime.

The pervasive problem of sexual assault on campuses is finally being given some much-needed attention in South Africa. But not enough! The story of one survivor shows how the pattern of victim-blaming devastates and continues to devastate those in need of support following an attack. Diba's desire to tell her story after so many years reveals the desperation generated by her community's rejection of her as the innocent target of a sadistic crime. Through her communal silencing she has been compelled to live in a permanent state of anguish.

Investigations need to be undertaken at all South African universities, the results made public, and methods of dealing with rape and other forms of sexual violence must be greatly improved so that the interests of the survivors and potential survivors (ie all females at the institution), not the rapists, are given the priority they deserve.



■ The men who run most universities are often even more reluctant than the police to punish male members of their communities

dossier

A Bill of Rights

How does the National Party's Bill of Rights show up against the ANC's? With the help of the National Association of Democratic Lawyers, **WIP** puts them both in the dock.

The National Party says		The ANC says
Detention for up to 10 days under state of emergency. Further detention to be authorised by court order. Detainees have right to be given reasons and to have access to doctor and lawyer.	**Detention without trial**	No detention without trial, banishment or house arrest. Detention only during state of emergency – but detainee must have access to lawyers, name must be gazetted and detention must be reviewed after one month by review board headed by supreme court judge.
Retained as 'acceptable form of punishment' but only for those over 18. Right to appeal.	**The death penalty**	Abolished.
Entitled to same rights as men. No law may discriminate against women or limit right to equality. Laws may be passed to bring about equality.	**Women's rights**	Equality of men and women in all aspects of life including employment, education and family. No discrimination on grounds of gender, single parenthood or legitimacy of birth.
No direct reference. However, reference to equality before the law regardless of sex, creed etc.	**Gay rights**	No direct mention of gays, but reference made to prevention of harassment, discrimination or oppression on basis of 'sexual orientation'.
Only during state of emergency, which can be declared if state security is threatened by invasion, war, insurrection or riotousness.	**Suspension of rights**	Only during state of emergency, which can be imposed for maximum of six months. Decision to impose emergency supervised by national assembly, and extension of emergency must be approved by assembly. Resolution needs two-thirds majority.
Right to form, join and participate in trade unions. Right to collective bargaining and to strike. State reserves right to prohibit strikes in public sector and essential services.	**Workers' rights**	Right to trade union activity. Employers legally bound to provide clean and safe workplace and provide equal pay for equal work. Equal access to employment, training and advancement.
Freedom of speech, movement and association guaranteed, but state has right to license newspapers and other forms of communication. Rights may be limited during emergency.	**Freedom of association**	Right to freedom of association, religion, movement, conscience, freedom of assembly and peaceful protest Full right to conscientious objection against military service.
All equal before the law. No-one can be prejudiced or favoured because of race, colour, language, sex, religion etc. Laws may be passed to advance specific communities or individuals.	**Equality before the law**	All equal before the law. All have right to fair trial and free defence if unable to pay. Active steps to ensure accused aware of charges and not prejudiced through illiteracy or lack of understanding.
All have right to use language of their choice and participate in whatever cultural life they choose.	**Culture and language**	Afrikaans, English, Ndebele, Pedi, Sotho, Swati, Tsonga, Tswana, Xhosa and Zulu recognised by state, which acts positively to further development. One or more language may be designated for official use.

debate

PHOTO: SAMSON SELEPE

Civic activist 'Ben Jacobs' set the cat among the pigeons in *WIP*86 with his criticism of Sanco's centralised structure. **MZWANELE MAYEKISO** responds by arguing for a decentralised but still relatively tight approach to national civic co-ordination

Organising civics: We need a tight federation

HOW ARE WE TO STRENGTHEN THE civic movement when we are battered by repression, intransigent local government structures, inappropriate development policies and the prospect of our movement actually fading once democracy is established?

The answer is to help balance the uneven development of the civic movement by building a strong though flexible and accountable national body — the SA National Civic Organisation (Sanco).

One of the most eloquent and thoughtful recent articles on the national civic movement was "Heading for disaster?" in *WIP*86, by 'Ben Jacobs'. It is a pity he (she?) does not use a real name because the right to make controversial and critical commentary about Sanco is not questioned.

Sadly, Jacobs' piece bears an extremist title, but the article is well-formed about internal dynamics and problems in the civic movement. As an insider in the formation of the national civic body in late 1991 and early 1992, I believe it is an article to be taken with the utmost seriousness.

Jacobs' critique of Sanco flows from a central claim which I believe also to be true: our unitary structure is much less desirable than a federal structure. Indeed I attended the Sanco launch in Port Elizabeth in March 1992 with a mandate from Civic Associations of the Southern Transvaal (Cast) to support a federal structure. Delegates debated this topic openly — and in the end Cast was the only affiliate to support the federal position.

Jacobs gives the reason most delegates chose: "Sanco could not be a federal organisation if it supported a unitary state (the contrary example of Cosatu was ignored)".

It is good to take Cosatu as an example because it is based on relatively tight, not loose federalism. Moreover, shopfloor-grounded trade unions have sectorally-specific interests (eg the metalworkers deal with each other in a single union), whereas civics have quite common interest across South Africa.

Jacobs makes too much of differences between civics when so many basic, lowest common-denominator campaigns have yet to be won. There was fear by some delegates — well-founded in many instances — that the present regime would use divisions and unevenness within the civic movement to structure local government or development projects and policies in a top-down manner.

This is also a danger with a unitary structure if the leadership is incompetent — the key is to keep communication, accountability and the long-term interest of the entire civic constituency at heart. But Jacobs is correct in demanding more recognition of local autonomy. He/she argues: "The 'c' in Sanco denotes the singular, giving rise to the absurd notion that a civic (which represents local interests) can be a single national body". True the name should have been SA National Civic Organisation.

But the point is to go beyond a debate over simple unitary versus federal autonomy, and try to define exactly how a tight federal structure, with bottom-up policies, would combine local autonomy with what is needed from the unitary vision: the ability to

provide a national framework from which all of us can identify the road ahead on various issues. A tight federal structure would permit this, and the struggle for Sanco in the years ahead is to move in this direction.

Several problems will be overcome if we take this route. For example, while it may be useful to have a Sanco national office gaining resources from funders this should not prevent (and even compete with) local civics raising their own funds. There are still funders who will not support individual local civics but will help the national body. With time for good discussions about funding — as well as every other constitutional issue — the confusions that emerge on autonomy can surely be resolved.

Similarly, Sanco should not have national membership cards — local civics should have cards (and charge a small fee to members) and should pay an affiliation fee to their regional offices. The region should then contribute to the national office.

Finally, for administrative and communication purposes there remains a need for a strong national structure. But the optimal approach is tight federal, not tight unitary or loose federal. This is clear if one considers the vital need to structure campaigns and national political policies in the optimal manner. Indeed regions and zones exist in large part to co-ordinate events. Jacobs slates Sanco for ignoring regional diversity and neglecting "the fact that grassroots struggles are about different issues in different areas".

This is too strong a generalisation, and Jacobs backs it up only by citing Sanco's call for a national bond boycott. The boycott was a national Sanco initiative undertaken last July. The campaign was initiated not by the executive, but by the General Council — representative of all 14 Sanco regions — and reaffirmed by the discussion in the face of public opposition even from ANC president Nelson Mandela.

Jacobs argues that "(the boycott) was appropriate in some of the main metropolitan areas" but not in others where banks never made loans or where civics were negotiating with banks for new loans. Jacobs ignores the fact that the boycott was about ensuring national democracy (by pressing the banks to pressure the government).

As a national formation, Sanco represents a diversity of regional interests. Apartheid-capitalism has created vastly uneven development between town and countryside, and Sanco must be sensitive to those differences. But to conclude that a national bond boycott was inappropriate simply because of uneven development, is to imply that conditions everywhere must be equal if any national policy is to emerge. That will never happen.

Aim to bargain

Instead, a key objective of the bond boycott was to get banks to come to the bargaining table — to at least open up the possibility of further loans, concessions and a uniform banking Code of Conduct for both rural and urban areas. Addressing uneven development was in fact a primary goal of Sanco's negotiating team.

In sum, Jacobs has done a service by pointing out that our constitution is not a good constitution. This is in part because at the launch there was not sufficient time to debate issues. Not much effort was put into arranging constitutional proposals to fit the conditions on the ground. In the end the constitutional work was deferred until the next sitting of Sanco's member delegates, and at that stage all his/her criticisms will be raised.

Having said all this, however, there is no justification for the conclusion that Sanco may be "heading for disaster". The rationale is contained in Jacobs' concern: "With Sanco up and running, what is happening on the ground? One hears local leaders saying things like, 'We cannot do anything now. We are waiting for Sanco National to decide on the direction' — which never happened in pre-Sanco days. But by the same token some areas ignore Sanco and carry on as if nothing has changed".

There are clearly flaws in the existing system, but my own fear is that Jacobs' proposal — an ideal-type of "loose federations at regional and national levels" — may weaken the civic movement and lead to personal regional fiefdoms and baronies along the model of KwaNatal (Buthelezi's loose federalism) or of the political tragedies unfolding within Russia and Somalia.

Finally, Sanco must be a stronger organisation, and that requires a strong organisational structure. Reasons why Sanco is presently weak include the fact that the leadership is overlapping with other progressive forces; tensions exist between some local civics and ANC branches (and other political organisations); and the capacity and resource problem.

Sanco is still young, there are plenty of logistical problems, and the structures are not as firmly interrelated as they could be. As in the case of the young Cosatu, or the ANC after unbanning, these are normal growing pains.

In this case building the civic movement through loose federalism is utopian. As a comrade within Sanco structures, Jacobs should bring the concerns to his/her civic, his/her regional structure, and the national, in addition to writing for Work In Progress. For it is problematic to only critique the civic movement on paper without going all-out to fix it from the inside. WIP

• *Mayekiso is organiser-on-leave from Alexandra Civic Organisation.*

PHOTO: PAUL GRENDON (SOUTHLIGHT)

international

Getting high on the peace-pipe thing

What happens when old foes get together? In El Salvador, guerillas and generals sit down together to work out their own peace agreements ...

Tina Rosenberg

HERE IS ONE RESULT OF THE Salvadoran peace process: guerilla leader Roberto Canas and defence minister Rene Emilio hovering near a tray of shrimp chilled by an eagle-shaped ice sculpture. More guerillas and military officials mingle over caviar and smoked salmon.

The room is a Supreme Court chamber used a year earlier for the trial of nine soldiers on charges of murdering six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter. Where the jury was closeted there is now a tray filled with meatballs. A cheese and pate board stands in the place of the defendants.

Times have changed in El Salvador.

This reception marked the close of a two-day conference in the capital, San Salvador, that gathered all the sides in the peace process – guerillas, peasant leaders, soldiers, government officials, right-wing oligarchs – to talk about how to live together in the modern world. They heard from panels of politicos from the Americas and Eastern Europe, some of whom were human rights activists and many of whom used to shoot at each other.

It was a bumper gathering of war criminals, large and small.

The conference was televised live on Salvadoran TV and throughout the Americas. More than 600 Salvadorans sat through panels by their compatriots and such foreigners as Polish Communist Party official, Aleksander *Kwasniewski. Also present were:*

● Colombian politician Antonio Navarro Wolff, a London School of Economics-trained leader of the M-19 guerillas, who led his troops down from the mountains in 1990; they melted their guns into a peace memorial. Wolff is now one of the most popular politicians in Colombia and could become the next president.

● General Hector Gramajo, the Guatemalan defence minister who both committed some of the worst human rights abuses in Guatemala's history and saved the country from a military coup. He talked about new centres for democratic education he sponsors in Guatemala.

How times have changed

● General Fred Woerner, who had been commander in chief of the US Southern Command and spent years guiding the strategy of the Salvadoran military in its anti-guerilla war, overlooking its brutality and corruption. Woerner was quick to admonish his former charges: "They are not guerillas but Salvadorans," he said of the former Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). "They have changed, and it is up to the military to do the same."

I had not been in El Salvador since 1989, when Salvadorans awoke at five o'clock to the sound of mortar fire. Even following the peace process in the news had not prepared me for how much has changed. In his speech on the first morning of the conference, Joaquin Villalobos, the FMLN's top military commander, said the guerillas needed to ask the nation's pardon for their part in the conflict. He called for a new revolutionary model – one based on a balance of power and national consensus.

Right-wing politicians also called for dialogue and respect for the law. Three years ago, use of these phrases would have qualified the speaker for a human rights award. Today, they are part of standard discourse. But I had the nagging feeling that the Salvadorans were once again putting one over on the foreigners by aping their military officials who made lucrative careers out of telling gringos what they wanted to hear, mouthing phrases about human rights and hearts and minds to win US funding for the war.

The conference ended with a speech by defence minister Ponce. He talked about living within democratic rules, about the need to submit military power to civilian control. "We accept it for national stability," he said. It was an astonishing speech – democratic, conciliatory, a ringing endorsement of the peace process. Ponce omitted only one small point: that the principal obstacle to the Salvadoran peace process is Ponce himself.

The peace accords began with a ceasefire early last year and the formal

PHOTO PANATECA

■ **The enemy within: Woman shot by a government sniper during a demonstration in San Salvador**

end to the war on 15 December. As part of the process, two commissions have been working:

● A Truth Commission has collected testimony on murders and human rights violations committed by both sides during the 12-year war and will soon publish its report, which is supposed to make public the names of accused perpetrators.

● The Ad Hoc Commission wrote a report that recommended purging 102 army officers implicated in human rights violations. Among those on the list, which has not been officially released, are defence minister Ponce and his second in command, Juan Orlando Zepeda. Both are accused of complicity in the Jesuit murders.

Members of both commissions have received numerous death threats, and a few have left the country; even president Alfredo Christiani's life has been threatened. In early January, bowing to pressure, Christiani announced that he would let the 15 highest-ranking officials on the Ad Hoc Commission's list stay: Ponce and seven others would remain in their jobs, possibly until the end of Christiani's term, and another seven would go into golden exile in diplomatic missions. Army officials and their defenders applauded the idea as a way to "preserve stability and avoid acts of violence by the purged". This is the triumph of peace talk; three years ago this extortion would have been phrased slightly differently: "Push us and we'll kill you." But the new world order has arrived in El Salvador.

Extraordinary alliance

Guerilla leader Villalobos signed off on the deal; while publicly praising the peace accords, he had quietly approved letting Ponce keep his job. In exchange he wanted the government to pick up the cost of bodyguards and trucks for top FMLN commanders, and that mid-level fighters be given good coffee-land and salt mines. A charitable explanation for this extraordinary alliance is that Villalobos realises that money is power in El Salvador and wants to assure jobs for his troops – some of whom have done nothing but fight since they were children. A more cynical explanation is that he wants to establish the left as a player and show

Angola – fellow nation and friend

FANNIE PHAKOLA, a former ANC chief representative in Luanda now working for the movement's Department of Political Education, argues for genuine solidarity with the people of Angola

It was just a few days after Angola's declaration of independence that the first Umkhonto we Sizwe cadres touched down on Angolan soil.

They arrived on the presidential plane, and Agostinho Neto welcomed them declaring that his country was 'the firm trench of African revolution'.

It was 1975. Our continent was ripe with change, but Angola was still taking a huge risk in offering facilities to MK — no other country in Africa could openly accept the presence of our army.

On top of this, the MPLA's position was far from secure. Unita, backed by the SADF, was threatening to topple the new government and had advanced to a few hundred kilometres from the capital.

Looking back now, I don't think any of us could have dreamed how much the people of Angola were going to contribute to our struggle in the years that followed. They sheltered us in their territory. They gave us material and psychological support. They stood firmly behind the ANC and the South African people on regional, continental and international platforms. Together, we fought colonialism and racist oppression.

Cuito Cuanavale

Perhaps the greatest victory as a combined force was at Cuito Cuanavale. Namibians, Angolans and Cubans fought alongside each other to rout the SADF — a defeat which was to mark a turning point in the history of Angola, Namibia and South Africa.

Even in defeat, the South African government tried to turn Namibia's independence into a victory over MK, insisting that our camps in Angola be closed. But we went along with the agreement — preventing the regime from stalling independence, and allowing the Namibian people to take us all one step closer towards the total independence of Southern Africa.

That was in 1989 — a year which the

then-president of the ANC, OR Tambo, described as "a year of heroic dispersals". Addressing our troops at the formal MK withdrawal from Angola, he pointed out that the Cubans were dispersing to the west, Swapo was dispersing to the south and MK was dispersing to the east.

Now, in 1993, MK has itself been dispersed to the south. We are home, most of us, to enjoy the fruits of our struggle. And the prospects for a democratic transformation, given certain conditions, have never been so visible.

Remember our comrades

But while we prepare for that transformation, we should not forget to cast our eyes to the north-west — towards Angola, towards our comrades there. We should not forget their contribution in the past, nor should we blind ourselves to what is happening in the present.

PHOTO NIGEL DENNIS (ANC DIP)

Once again, Angola is at war because of rebel Unita forces. And once again we hear allegations that the SADF is giving them support. It is because of this that the Angolan people are still suffering in their thousands. Despite having won that country's first-ever democratic election, the MPLA is in renewed confrontation.

■ **Fannie Phakola**

As is often the case, the international community is silent — despite the fact that the elections were free and fair. The United States, in particular, still refuses to recognise the MPLA as the legitimate government.

But what can we as South Africans do?

Well, the ANC has already resolved to pledge and display its solidarity with the people of Angola. This is a profound expression of our appreciation for the sacrifices Angola has made.

And even though our own struggle for peace and democracy is at a crucial stage, we cannot remain passive observers of the situation in Angola.

The Angolan solidarity campaign needs to be intensified. It needs to become part of all our lives, part of our *general campaign for peace and democracy* not just in South Africa but in the whole continent.

Because Southern Africa will know no peace until the conflicts in Angola, Mozambique and South Africa are resolved.

Aluta continual

that he is a man with whom the right can work. And since Villalobos has reason to worry that the Truth Commission's report will implicate him in several killings, he may be trying to make some new political friends now.

But his position has split the FMLN. Some of the movement's mass organisations have stopped paying their dues. Other former guerilla leaders were horrified and took out full-page advertisements in the Salvadoran press favouring total compliance with the peace accords – meaning they wanted Ponce out and Villalobos to shut up.

Solidarity

I moderated a panel with two Poles. One had been the right-hand man of Lech Walesa during Poland's martial law period; the other had assisted General Wojciech Jaruzelski during the 1989 round-table negotiations that led to Poland's first free elections. When Jaruzelski imposed martial law in 1981, Zbigniew Bujak was a 27-year-old electrician at the Ursus Tractor Factory and the leader of Solidarity's Warsaw chapter. He was the top Solidarity leader to escape capture. For four and a half years he was the most wanted man in Poland, shifting from safe houses in a series of disguises as he directed the loose confederation that was the outlawed union.

Aleksander Kwasniewski is the same age, a playful and quick-witted former journalist who joined the Communist Party in 1977 and served as a minister during the 1980s. He ended the decade as one of the party's most important negotiators at the round-table talks that eventually handed the keys over to Solidarity, and he now chairs the party of former Communists.

From their opposing camps the two men have come to agree on almost everything. "Compromise is not a sign of weakness; it is a sign of strength," Kwasniewski told the conference. "How did the Communists make the transition to democracy?" one Salvadoran asked him. "I'm the leader of the biggest party in the parliament," he replied. "Who says we don't like democracy? I like democracy very much."

One can get high on such talk, but there were occasional reminders that the conference was, after all, only talk. One Salvadoran, exasperated at hearing the phrase "no winners and no losers" once too often, took the floor. "This is not a football game that ended in a tie, gentlemen," he said. "We had 80,000 deaths here."

The sword and the cross

It was apparent that much has not changed. An invitation to former Argentine president Raul Alfonsin – who had staged historic trials of military officials for the crimes of the "dirty war" – was withdrawn when Ponce threatened to keep the army away. El Salvador's supreme court president, Mauricio Gutierrez Castro, told the audience that European human rights activists are motivated purely by guilt over colonialism and not to be taken seriously. "It is very damaging for a country that needs confidence in its organisations to be criticised by someone who arrives having read four books on human rights and the United Nations report," he said to enthusiastic applause.

On their last day in Salvador, Bujak and Kwasniewski hired a taxi and drove around the country for four hours. In the late afternoon they returned – horrified at the wooden shacks, at the barefoot, dirty children and the women walking for miles with plastic jugs of water on their heads.

That night we went to the house of Pablo Tesak, a Slovak immigrant who came to El Salvador in 1939 and built a snack-foods empire. Tesak is one of the country's few industrialists with a reputation for treating his workers well, but when we were driven to his house I was sandwiched between two armed guards, and his mansion in the hills overlooking the capital is a fortress behind two high gates, guarded by more men with guns. Tesak was showing us his pool when the Poles motioned me aside. "We take back what we said at the conference," Kwasniewski whispered. "We are in favour of violent revolution after all..." W

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culture

The way of the white hand

The art of being black — part two. **IVOR POWELL** looks at the way white artists have influenced the way black artists work

THE VISUAL ARTS IN THIS COUNtry's townships are in a state of deep crisis that becomes all the more troubling the closer we come to the naming day of the new South Africa.

But the crisis is not new. In the first part of this article, I argued it is in fact something structurally present in the history of both society and 'black' Western style art in South Africa. As such, the fine arts are both a symptom and a locus of the power relations which have shaped the cultural and political wasteland in which we are living.

The bottom line here is that black art in South Africa has always proceeded according to rules made up by whites. It rests, in the first place, on the destruction and denigration of indigenous artistic traditions and, in the second, on the co-option of art makers to a Western sense of artmaking and content. Relatedly, but most importantly, it rests upon an accommodation to an art market which is not only made up almost exclusively of whites, but which also necessarily reflects and imposes the values of whites on to the production of black artists.

In his introduction to the *Neglected Tradition* exhibition, held at the Johannesburg Art Gallery in 1988, curator Steven Sack made the point that black artists in the early decades of the century worked largely inside *what was essentially a cash economy*. Note how fraught the term 'artist' is in this context. We are discussing object makers who were working either in the aftermath of the collapse or destruction of tribally based artistic methods, or working in part outside of those methods. We are talking about artists and art practices that emerged after the artists were killed off — figuratively and literally.

These artists were operating — insofar as they worked for white markets — within a situation governed by supply and demand. They were producing works to meet the requirements of a market which knew pretty much what it was looking for. These were not the kinds of buyers whose approach was conditioned and underpinned by respect for either the integrity of the object or the authenticity of the artist's expressiveness. The mystique of the artist's consciousness held little value.

■ **Noria Mabasa's The Policeman: Breaking down the apartheid of South African art**

These buyers had the feel of the curio market about them. Where the eternal white tourist in Africa (as often as not living 'full-time' on the continent) buys objects as tokens or evidence of travels or presence.

Enough Europeans

Sack cites the white collector CG Damant on the subject of his patronage of sculptor Samuel Makoanyane:

About this time he produced a few figures modelled from Europeans .... They excited some interest because the likenesses were very good, but I felt constrained to advise Samuel against this type of work, pointing out to him that, to really establish himself, he should produce models of his own people, in their various daily occupations .... I lectured him continually on the desirability of the men and women he saw about him, in his village and in the fields. I was certain there would be a constant and growing demand for this and I was proved entirely right. Samuel saw the point and followed the advice; he ceased to make any more Europeans and settled down to making various types of Basuto, for which he became known far and wide.

The quotation yields two important points. First the obvious one: the presence of the white hand in the artistic practice of the black sculptor. The second is a very pointed variation on the first: Makoanyane was expected to

work within clearly specified constraints dictated — literally — by his market. As a black sculptor the 'appropriate' range of subject matter for his work was listed for him. The burden of Damant's lecture was that Makoanyane should produce "models of his own people in their various daily occupations" — for consumption by "another people".

Now, let us imagine a scene which has a mentor or patron of Anton van Wouw advising his protegee, "Anton, stick to models giving likenesses of your own people", because there would be a "constant and growing demand" for work in this vein. Improbable, no?

Had such an intervention occurred, our well-meaning advisor would not only have earned some backchat, but he would have been wrong. As a white artist in SA, Van Wouw's position was fundamentally different from Makoanyane's. As Van Wouw's bank balance confirmed, there was a very lucrative market for white artists' renditions of black people. Irma Stern, Maggie Laubscher and a host of other white painters of the African amply demonstrate that the same rules simply did not apply to white and black artists. Whites were expected to become *masters* and *mistresses* of the entire spectrum of subject matter provided by the SA environment. Blacks, on the other hand, were expected to function within a system that prefigured dramatically the notion of "own affairs" unpopularised by former president PW Botha and his happily forgotten cronies.

It is worth lingering at this point. As I write, I am sitting with two books in front of me, both dealing specifically with art made by black South Africans.

One is the *Neglected Tradition* catalogue. The other is EJ de Jager's *Images of Man*, which deals with the University of Fort Hare's collection of contemporary black art.

Paging through these books with a jaundiced eye, it is striking to note the amazing scarcity of images of whites in these paintings by black artists – at least until well into the 1980s.

In the *Neglected Tradition* catalogue only two (three at a pinch) of the more than 200 images so much as include identifiable representations of white people. The pattern is pretty much the same in De Jager's book, though the sweep of my generalisation is, thankfully, checked by two salutary qualifications.

One is that during the 1980's something did change in terms of the subject matter executed by black artists. Particularly with the emergence of the naive proto-tradition in the work of artists like Tommy Motswai, Noria Mabasa and Doc Phutuma Seoka (and, one might note, with the beginnings of palpable liberation in this country, and the reactive stirrings of self-doubt among the white population at large), the apartheid of SA art began to break down.

The second qualification is a positively joyful one. It is that Namibian graphic artist John Muafangejo and, to a lesser extent, other of the Rorke's Drift artists never played by the unwritten rules. I will return to Muafangejo later. But it is worth noting now that his vision was always conditioned by laws higher than those of the land. In defiance of all norms, his histories and his contemporary scenes were remarkable: they were routinely exactly as racial or non-racial as the subject demanded.

■ **The Official**

Uncomfortable history

I admit that it is a curious and uncomfortable kind of art history I propose here. Art history as an exercise in race classification; art history as a corpse count. But there is a point to this.

Allow me to hammer you over the head with it: the realities inhabited by South African blacks are conditioned by the presence of whites in virtually every respect. Whites account for around 20% of the population. Nearly all blacks encounter whites daily — most often as employees. Whites occupy the pre-eminent positions in nearly all fields of society. They buy up nearly all the marketed production of SA's artists, whether black or white.

Yet they occupy less than one half percent of the broad canvas of art produced by SA's black artists. Hardly a white is depicted anywhere. It's all townships scenes and rural idylls and big-eyed children and the funkier paraphernalia of township life. And religion, of course — lots and lots of religion.

A little strange and unbalanced, is it not? Of course, this peculiar imbalance is explained by an art market whose buying end is almost exclusively white.

But there have been individual collectors within the black community. Steven Sack, again in his excellent and provocative introduction to the *Neglected Tradition*, tries valiantly (though one suspects without much conviction), to make something out of the case of John Koenakeefe Mohl, whose work is "to be found in numerous private collections in Soweto".

One might also note that during the cultural Indian summer of the 1940s — the era of Sophiatown and Alex — when a definitively urban, post-tribal township based culture was maturing, something akin to a 'class' of black collectors did begin to

emerge. Actually, it was around this time that artists like Gerard Sekoto and George Pemba were producing perhaps the most authentic work yet to have emerged from the township tradition. It was probably the only time to date when art was convincingly in step with the life of lived culture. Then, the dementias of Chairman Verwoerd came down like a sledgehammer on the collective head of the emergent township culture. From then on the only significant collectors and commissioners of colour were those that Verwoerd had invented: the corrupt regimes which he and his successors installed in the various homelands. And the senses of identity which they sought to foster by commissioning and buying art, were seldom in step with those of the population at large.

To this day, the situation has barely changed. I am aware of only one art gallery — outside of the community centres — in the whole of Soweto. Even it has a somewhat insecure existence and may, for all I know, have been cancelled due to lack of interest by the time this article goes to print.

No space on the wall

Collagist Sam Nhlengetwa tells a story which may serve to cast the situation into a sharper kind of relief. Nhlengetwa was already relatively successful, having persevered his parents' initial resistance to him becoming an artist of some note. One day he presented his mother with one of his works ... and she rejected the offering.

"You've got to understand two things," Nhlengetwa observes wryly. "One is that there is no space on the walls in the average township house for paintings. The other is that what space there is, is reserved for calendars and pictures of the Virgin Mary".

In fact, Nhlengetwa is one of a growing body of artists working within the townships to address the problems I am referring to in more or less conscious ways. He explains his choice of the collage medium — his source materials include news photographs and pictures from old editions of *Drum* magazine — by saying he wants to get away from styles and visions of the townships "imposed from the outside". He wants to work with the reality, or as close to the reality as he can get.

"My aim," he says. "Is to reclaim the images of the townships for the people who live in the townships. To use our own pictures of ourselves to make art about ourselves." Nor does the re-imaging process stop there. Nhlengetwa is equally conscious of the essential symbiosis of artist and patron. He actually travels from door to door, not only persuading residents to invest in his work, but also striving to educate them about the potential importance of art in their lives and in their community as a whole. He claims that with such an investment of effort, he is now approaching sales of around 40% 'black' to 60% 'white'. This ratio is more or less unique among township artists.

I mention the case of Nhlengetwa to illustrate that things are beginning to change in the arenas of township art. Moves are afoot to reclaim the image of townships and their inhabitants from the clammy grip of apartheid and white money. And there is a growing awareness of just how complex and how fraught the practices of artmaking actually are.

■ ...and The Soldier

To return to the archaeology of SA art: counter-examples like that of Nhlengetwa's practice or Matsemela Manaka's gallery not withstanding, the art market has traditionally been overpoweringly dominated by whites. The advice given by CG Damant to Samuel Makoanyane in the 1930s has rung forth through the decades: "... that he should produce models of his own people, in their various daily occupations ... the men and women he saw around him, in his village and in the fields. I was certain there would be a constant and growing demand for this and I proved entirely right ..."

The point to be reiterated here is that township art did not grow out of an indigenous expressive tradition. It was, as I argued in the first part of this article (see *WIP* 87), essentially an importation. This can be read from the fact that the earliest known black artists (in post-tribal tradition) worked in basically naturalistic styles — and naturalism is definitely not part of the Southern African indigenous heritage. This art was not simply borne of the expressiveness of the artists: it was shaped by the economy it had to slot into. It was commodity production.

Essentially, images of blacks to be consumed by whites. Whites, whose relationship to the blacks who were being imaged was predicated on the relationship of conqueror and conquered, master and slave. Whites who as often as not pass a whole life without ever entering the townships pictured for them. Whose overarching ideological endeavour as a class was to justify their ascendancy and naturalise themselves — distinctively, mind you — in the subcontinent. Who, at every step, introduced the styles and suggested the forms of art which the black artists explored. Whose versions and visions of Africa and Africans, artists were required to concretise and confirm.

The implications of this relationship serve as the launch pad for the concluding part of this article, in the next issue. W



GNURs or no GNURs?

What we need is real power, not just constitutional power

THE DEBATE OVER A MULTI-PARTY Interim Government of National Unity (an IGNU) and a subsequent Government of National Unity and Reconstruction (GNUR) is raging inside the ANC and beyond.

Those opposed to the package feel it is a capitulation to the National Party's power-sharing proposals. No GNURs is good GNURs, they say.

On the other side, many of those supporting the package deny that it has anything to do with 'power sharing'.

I don't particularly want to get into this debate here. I would prefer to look at the terms of the discussion, because it seems many of the proponents and opponents of the package have tended to fall into the same set of assumptions.

In brief, there has been a tendency to think of political power as being more or less equivalent to portfolios in a future cabinet.

Of course, who occupies what cabinet post is an extremely relevant matter. Sharing out cabinet posts on a proportional basis among parties scoring over 5 percent will certainly be a major concession from our side, even if it is only for a limited duration.

Nevertheless, I believe there are good arguments for considering an IGNU and a GNUR. They can help to stabilise the transitional process. The concession can help to speed up the negotiations process and get us to the watershed event of a one-person one-vote election. Despite certain 'power-sharing' features, IGNUs and GNURS will also introduce important features of majority rule.

Not all good news

But there are also many potential pitfalls in this arrangement.

Decision-making is going to be difficult at best. The arrangement might well help to sustain largely discredited and marginalised forces. Cabinet ministers who are hostile to democratisation will be liable to drag their heels and generally use their positions to undermine progress.

All of this is possible. We should be honest about it, and we should certainly not oversell in public the virtues of this kind of transitional arrangement. It is a compromise (in my view an intelligent and principled one) that can take us forward. But it is a compromise, and we should have the honesty to say so.

But let us suppose that the ANC wins 98 percent of the vote in the Constituent Assembly. Or let us suppose that we stick firm and actually win our demand for an immediate majority rule dispensation.

Let us suppose that one way or another, in the transition phase itself, the ANC has a clean sweep of cabinet posts. Does that mean the ANC will have a monopoly of political power,

PHOTO: ANDREW MOHAMED (ANC DIP)

■ **Put your head on a block: Martial arts demonstration at an MK camp in Tanzania**

that 'power will have been transferred to the people', or that we can talk, in the fullest sense, of 'majority rule'?

Under a full, majority rule constitution (something for which we must continue to struggle fiercely) a decisive election victory gives the majority party the right to rule — but not necessarily the power to do so.

It is this crucial distinction between constitutional right and actual physical capacity that has tended to get lost in the debate around IGNUs and GNURs.

What about the army?

If the ANC has a clean sweep of cabinet posts next year, we will quickly discover that we are still 'sharing' power. For instance, we will find that we have inherited an SADF with a complement of 800 000 soldiers, most of them white males. (This is the figure for the combined reserve, serving conscript and permanent SADF forces).

What do we do with that reality?

Well, there is plenty that can and must be done. A profound phased reconstruction of the army is necessary.

But why are we not throwing at least some of the collective passion we have devoted to IGNUs and GNURs into thinking about this kind of question?

When it comes to armed forces in our country, we are still stuck on the extraordinarily limited notion of 'integration' (a suspect term, with a fine colonial heritage if ever there were one!) Obviously integrating our few thousand MK cadres and others into a single, new and more representative army will need to be one dimension of a multi-dimensioned strategy on armed forces.

But why are those who are passionately outraged by the notion of an ANC-majority transitional government — which includes other parties — not more outraged by the simplistic idea of 'integration' of armed forces? 'Integration', on its own, will produce a terribly distorted and most unfavourable power-sharing arrangement in the army.

Real power

So why the inconsistency? It has, of course, to do with a very narrow assumption about power. It is an implicit assumption that real power lies where the constitution defines it to be. The summit is the president and cabinet. Win the presidency and the cabinet and everything else clicks into place, right? NO, WRONG!

Power is like the capitalist's capital (it very often is his capital). It can rapidly change its shape and location. One day it is a factory, the next day shares on a stock-exchange, or money in a Swiss bank.

This was the experience of the socialist experiment in Chile in 1970-3. In a majority rule constitution with a directly elected president, the Popular Unity alliance (mainly communists and socialists) won the 1970 presidential election.

The left candidate (Salvador Allende) won 36,2 percent of the vote. The right-wing candidate won 34,9 percent, and the centrist Christian Democrat won 27,8 percent.

Under the majority rule dispensation Allende, albeit with a majority of less than 40,000 votes and a minority in the National Assembly, had the right to constitute his own Popular Unity cabinet. This he did.

Nationalisation & agrarian reform

The Allende cabinet then pursued an extremely progressive set of policies including the nationalisation of copper and other mining operations, major automobile, engineering, steel, textile and cement plants, shipyards and banks. Agrarian reform saw more than 3 000 estates expropriated in three years and handed over to peasants' committees or state farms.

All of this was perfectly constitutional and absolutely admirable. But it was way in advance of the effective power of the socialist government and the popular forces supporting it.

Although the government occu-

Longing for home

Yes, there are still Umkhonto we Sizwe cadres out there. MK officer FRANCE MOHLALA (below), on a visit home from his camp in Uganda, speaks to KERRY CULLINAN about army life

PHOTO: KERRY CULLINAN

France Mohlala has returned home twice since the ANC was unbanned, and each time his home village of Mankweng near Pietersburg has held a welcome home rally for him.

"I have to tell them this actually is a farewell rally, as I still can't come home yet," says Mohlala.

But the home that he left four years ago for the MK camps in Uganda is never far from his mind. "You can't fool yourself and say: 'In six months I will be home'. The best approach is to imagine that you will be away for a very long time, and then time will not pass so slowly."

Mohlala, who was first president of Mankweng Youth Congress and a UDF organiser in the Northern Transvaal, left the country in March 1989 after spending three years in detention. Although he had always wanted to do military training, Mohlala was finally pushed to leave when, on the day of his release, he was charged with assaulting a warder.

***The assault occurred after he had* heard that a fellow detainee, Alf Makaleng, had died. According to Mohlala, Makaleng died because warders took 14 hours to take him to hospital after he had collapsed.**

Mohlala went straight to Uganda, were he did "the usual military training". He has also been sent on courses in regular warfare. Today he holds the rank of captain in MK: "Part of the transformation of MK from a guerilla army into a regular army has been the introduction of rank," he explained.

Is political training necessary?

Another point of debate in MK's transformation was whether cadres still needed political training. "The future army must not be politically biased, but we decided to intensify the political part of training in preparation for integration [with the SADF]. To us, MK cadres are politically conscious volunteers."

Uganda is difficult for new recruits. "It is very hot and wet. I am not naturally very dark, but I have gone more Ugandan in colour! A lot of cadres suffer from malaria when they first arrive." In addition, there are shortages. "Let me just say that comrades do not have enough of what they need, although in terms of food, things are not that bad."

But there are also positive aspects. "We have quite a bit of time for leisure. There are lots of sporting and cultural events." But with relaxation comes some sadness. "When people are relaxing, they think a lot about home. If anyone says they enjoyed being in exile, that person would be lying."

The closest cadres get to home is the camp political discussions about developments in South Africa. "We have had intense discussions about negotiations. People were worried when the armed struggle was suspended — a number of cadres felt the movement was compromising too much.

"Consultation [about the suspension] was not done very thoroughly. The decision was taken before it had been seriously discussed. There was dissatisfaction, but ultimately cadres were convinced of the correctness of the decision, although the timing and process were a problem."

Another problem is the fact that troops have to wait for two to three months before they are visited by ANC leaders to be briefed about the situation.

Mohlala hopes he and his comrades will be home in time to vote, "but that depends on agreements reached at the negotiating table".

He did not seem aware that the ANC was opposed to postal votes, and said the election process and MK's role in preparing for elections still had to be thoroughly discussed.

Asked whether the MK cadres felt forgotten, Mohlala admitted that "that feeling was always there", and that people were "concerned about their fate, once they returned home".

UNEMPLOYMENT AND CRIME

"There is always the question of people coming home to unemployment and turning to crime... When we are told of cadres being arrested for committing crimes, we see this as inevitable if comrades don't get help — although part of this is a campaign to discredit MK and the ANC."

One thing that struck Mohlala on his brief visit to SA was the fact that many activists are disillusioned with the ANC, and that key aspects of organisation were sometimes in the lands of inexperienced people.

"Every cadre in exile wishes to be home to build organisation — especially when we read that it is weak. The question of people being ANC members and sitting down is a mistake. Winning elections means that a very serious struggle needs to be waged.

"Our approach as soldiers is that high morale is a necessary part of our life. One factor the enemy always checks when planning an attack is morale. The will to build structures needs courage. The will to win is very important. If you are disillusioned, the pace will be slower." W

PHOTO: ANDREW MOHAMED (ANC DIP)

■ **Talking 'bout a revolution: MK recruits at a camp in Tanzania attend a class in communications**

pied the constitutional summit of power, power is not an institution or a presidential palace. Power can relocate. The right-wing regrouped in other centres of power — in the National Assembly, in the judiciary, in the media, in the economy and critically, in the armed forces. New, extra-constitutional power summits were forged.

In September 1973 the right-wing — with imperialist support — overthrew the Allende regime in a bloody counter-revolution.

This does not mean, as some have argued, that armed struggle is the only path to socialism. But it does mean that you should never advance way beyond your real strength. And it does mean that power must be consolidated in depth and across a broad range of institutions.

On the left in South Africa, we have devoted too much time and passion in the last few months to the issue of transitional constitutional arrangements, and too little time to serious consideration of how we will begin to reconstruct — not just the constitution or the economy *and social services, but also,* critically, the bureaucracy and the armed forces.

GNURs or no GNURs, they need to be not the only news. W

Are we part of the same society?

The liberal intervention by Louw and Stadler (*WIP* 86) on the debates on civil society, reminds me of the abuses and mistakes that we on the left make when dealing with theory and practice. Stadler's fundamental mistake is not to take into account that the state operates within a particular global economic frame. The welfare state has to be contextualised in a particular period of capital accumulation and the arrival to political power of a liberal hegemonic bloc. That correlation of forces is no longer in existence. However, what Stadler could have argued is that the realisation of that type of political system will come out of many popular struggles, in which the state and capital in SA will recognise the need for some type of welfare system.

Civil society is for Louw the stage where everything should happen, without any policy of 'dirigisme'. It is fine to think that market forces should determine all 'action', but what is the price to pay? His liberal thinking is good enough to shape an economic structure that relates to the state and individuals in civil society, but it pays lip service to the nature of people's co-existence within those structures.

A great deal of thinkers on the left are engaging in the debate on civil society, as if civil society was a political party which you can manipulate and move in a specific direction. Reading the current debates on civil society in SA, you feel they are talking about the party/state/civil society which takes over daily life.

For me, it is difficult to conceive the state in simplistic terms of civil and political society. Such categories, as defined and examined by the classics (e.g. Marx and Gramsci) are political categories. And politics is part of a praxis: a praxis of struggling for social justice and equality. In this sense, the frontier between civil society and political society is not only a creation of our imagination, but also should not preclude us from doing the right thing: engaging in the politics of contestation whenever it happens, either in the realm of the state (i.e. political society) or of civil society, fighting to eliminate exploitation and oppression.

In SA, the struggle for radically democratising the state will continue taking place in these two regions: political and civil society. On the one hand, we should struggle for establishing a new legal framework that recognises each individual as an equal bearer of rights and obligations. On the other hand, the conflicting nature of human co-existence never ends in civil society. People will fight to allow its different subjectivities to exist, from the gay question to the Zulu question. Ideologies will also have to engage in debates — liberals and socialists. Social spaces will also clash — urban SA and rural SA.

I am talking about a war of hegemonies, of redefining the social contract between the rulers and ruled. For those of us on the left this will include the need to create alliances, in which we will continue pushing for a radical democracy in the state. But, I am afraid to say, that agenda is never-ending.

— Daniel Nina, Vista University, Port Elizabeth

The 10% solution

I have just finished reading Mike Morris's piece, 'Who's In? Who's Out?' in *WIP* 87. I agree with its thrust completely, and would like to offer an illustration from the sector of South African society with which I am best acquainted: university education.

Despite the endless talk of 'transformation' and the return to high-profile, well-paid university positions of a number of celebrated exiles, university education in SA remains exclusionary, elitist, and apparently dedicated to keeping out talented black men and women rather than including them. The 'university exemption' system guarantees that only a handful of each black age group will even be eligible for university admission; and the impossibility of transferring one's credits from technikons or teachers' colleges to universities forever excludes those who have not done well enough in their matric exams.

Tertiary education is not the most important sector of our society, by any means, but it is a sector in which a dramatic opening of opportunities to the disenfranchised majority could be achieved with relatively minor alterations in the existing rules.

One final comment: Morris refers to the unequal society being born as the "50% solution". In the light of the actual numbers, it might be more accurate to refer to it as the "10% solution".

— Prof Robert Paul Wolff, University of Massachusetts, USA/University Scholarships for SA Students

■ The 10% solution: University education remains elitist and dedicated to keeping out talented black men and women

Letters under 300 words receive priority. *WIP* reserves the right to edit letters.

BOURGEOIS FOLLIES

Say what you like about bourgeois democracy, but at least it provides a good laugh now and again — which is more than we can say about the dictatorship of the proletariat, isn't it?

To wit: recently a Labour MP in the British Parliament was lamenting teachers' lack of imagination when confronted by a roomful of bored students. In my days, he lectured, I used to teach Latin and held kids' rapt attention by making that dead language live again. How? came the challenge from the back benches.

Before you could say a-one-two-three-four, the MP was being called to order for belting out The Beatles' *Yellow Submarine* - in Latin. He made it to the third verse.

BLISS?

So far, ours might not have been the most triumphant of liberation struggles, but we've been damn good at acronyms ... Mosa, Wosa, Mawu, Fawu, Powa, Potwa — you create it, we name it.

The power-sharing deal (or whatever it's called this week) has now plonked us down in the epoch of GNUs, or Governments of National Unity. And it seems as if the first one is going to be an Interim Government of National Unity and Reconstruction — or an IGNUR, for the slow-witted among us.

Now it's bad enough that IGNUR is only two typos away from being IGNORE. But worse, if we assume the ANC is going to be part of it, we could end up with IGNURANC. As in "IGNURANC is bliss"?

LET THEM EAT PORK!

Sometimes one has to wonder about this last Superpower we earthlings are stuck with.

You remember the TV news images of US troops storming onto a beach in Somalia late last year, rushing a shed and promptly arresting four Somali layabouts? Turned out they were actually the guards of the Pakistani commander of United Nations forces!

Then, in early March, the US military decides to try something different for a change, and drops food instead of high explosives on a foreign country — in this case Bosnia, where thousands of Muslims are freezing and starving to death.

A week later the US Defence Department admits that at least one third of the food drop contained pork. "We reckon if they don't want to eat it, they won't eat it," a spokesperson was later quoted.

BRAAIVLEIS, SUNSHINE AND INVENTORIES

At that big bush bilateral, government negotiators trotted out the usual complaints about MK, arms caches, etc. The gist of it was: disband MK, provide us with a full list of all MK staff and equipment, and stop recruiting MK cadres.

Perhaps distracted by the lush scenery and the promising aromas wafting up from the braai pit, the ANC negotiators at first were caught off guard. Until Cyril R waded in.

OK, he smiled,, no problem. But then let's see the SADF provide a breakdown of personnel (including secret operations staff, military intelligence and other troopers of the twilight), plus a detailed inventory of equipment and arsenals, down to the last 7.62mm bullet. And, if you don't mind, stop recruiting for the SADF.

Some throats were cleared. And then, quicker than you can yell "Kos is oppie tafel!", the assembled hagglers found something else to talk about. Let's see a few more of those, Cyril — we need them ...



BLINDED BY THE LIGHT

One of the many nightmarish features of the war in Bosnia is the systematic campaign of mass rape carried out against women. According to the European Community, as many as 20 000 women have suffered this fate at the hands of soldiers — mainly those belonging to the Serb forces.

These atrocities have drawn verbal disapproval but generalised inaction on the international front. Apathy is bad enough.

But in early March the Pope finally spoke out. As reported by the BBC, he prefaced his comments with appropriate protests against the outrage — then launched a volley of directives and threats at rape victims who might be considering *abortions*.

First we witness hatred of women expressed physically as mass rape.

Then we hear the spiritual beacon of millions of people round off the violence verbally by condemning these women to be confronted for the rest of their lives with a nightmare made flesh. Lord help

Reconstruct
A Work in Progress supplement



■ **Although banks and civics are talking, grassroot struggles against banks continue. So said Sanco president Moses Mayekiso at *Reconstruct's* first anniversary. Planact's Andrew Boraine and the Perm's Denis Creighton (right) look on**

Sanco monitors banks

SANCO IS APPLYING SYSTEMATIC PRESSURE ON BANKS TO become more 'user friendly'. And some Sanco affiliates, like the Tembisa Civic Association, have begun to take action against 'unfriendly' banks.

Sanco's role as a watchdog of financial institutions has developed since it threatened a bond boycott in August last year. Since then, a number of meetings have been held between Sanco leaders and bankers.

At one such meeting Sanco president Moses Mayekiso pointed out that, in 1992, "the banks used more than a billion rands of largely pensioners' money to buy foreign banks with branches in the Cayman Islands, Panama, Guernsey and the Isle of Man".

But back home, said Mayekiso, ordinary people were getting a raw deal:

- Banks were making huge profits by demanding high interest rates and service charges.
- Only 9% of informal businesses get credit from the banks.
- Banks were redlining certain residential areas, refusing to give housing loans in these areas.
- Banks financed shoddily built houses, for which township residents were then expected to pay large amounts.

In contrast, local banks were involved in propping up the government, he added, pointing out that members of the Council of SA Banks (Cosab) hold government loans of over R13-billion.

In a bid to address the problems Sanco and the Perm reached an agreement on 7 February. This commits both parties to actions such as initiating community development trusts, and education and training programmes. In return, Sanco has agreed to try to instill in its members the ethos of repaying loans and has exempted the Perm from any bond boycott or mass action.

An agreement with the Association of Mortgage Lenders (AML) is also on the cards. However, at the time of going to press, a number of outstanding issues first had to be addressed. These include redlining, procedures to deal with arrears, the flight of capital from SA and banks' responsibility for defective homes.

Banks clearly favour agreements as they want to draw Sanco into the policing of bond repayments. But Mayekiso has made it clear to the AML that, "in exchange for our signature endorsing our constituents' involvement in sorting out repayment problems .... we need to know that other issues that deeply concern us will be addressed". Until the AML has given Sanco a timetable for addressing these issues, said Mayekiso, civics would be "unable to endorse any cooperation". ■

FOCUS ON FUNDING

CONTRIBUTIONS

***Reconstruct* was initiated by the Urban Sector Network to raise issues related to urban development. Contributions should be sent to:**
Kerry Cullinan
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Braamfontein 2017

Dancing to the donors' tune?

Foreign funding is a way of life in South Africa.
KERRY CULLINAN examines some of the problems its raises

ALL FOREIGN AID HAS STRINGS attached. While many 'strings' are ideological, most are economic. Some developed countries are simply looking for new markets for their goods to ensure employment in their own countries.

The Canadian government agreed to fund a housing development in East London last year, for example, provided that Canadian firms were used to implement the project. The Swedish government is extending Namibia's railway lines using Swedish technology and experts.

An ANC government would be expected to repay its 'debts' by preferential trade agreements with countries that supported the anti-apartheid struggle. European donors have already indicated to the ANC that once sanctions are lifted, the movement must buy European equipment and vehicles — not Japanese.

But not all 'strings' are bad. And there is no denying that South Africa owes a lot to donors. John Campbell*, a South African consultant for the Dutch donors Novib, says that "it is easy to forget that without foreign funding of the UDF etc, the current political developments may have been impossible".

It is clear that reconstructing a new South Africa will be impossible without international help. But South African organisations must assess the strings that are attached and the impact these 'strings' will have on the kind of society we are trying to build.

Empowering communities

A key test is whether funds empower or weaken countries. The World Bank/IMF structural adjustment programmes, for example, have weakened many countries. Canadian economics professor, John Loxley, even describes structural adjustment as "a new form of imperialism".

South Africa has yet to deal with foreign aid on the scale of World Bank or IMF loans. But already there have been complaints.

One example of a controversial intervention by a foreign funder was in the health field last year. Mike Sinclair of the Kaiser Family Foundation – founded by Henry Kaiser, a former US State Department officer based in Pretoria – threatened the Progressive Primary Health Care Network with a funding cut if they joined the SA Health and Social Services Organisation. According to SAHSSO publicity secretary, Dr Aslam Dasoo, "This put numerous health care projects at risk. It derailed a major political initiative, and exposed the manipulative agenda of some foreign funders."

Community based organisations (CBOs) have complained that donors direct funds through NGOs instead of directly to CBOs. CBOs argue that this makes them dependent on NGOs, even though the NGOs raised the money on their behalf.

For Campbell, who has worked for donors for many years, there are two possible ways around this problem: "Firstly, funds could be channelled through an independent trust, which has community leaders as trustees. A percentage of the money could then be set aside for the CBOs to buy services from the NGOS."

"The second possibility," he says, "is to set up a tripartite contractual arrangement involving the donor, CBO and NGO. All parties would have to agree to the project, and it would be easy to see who breaks the contract. This would pull CBOs in much more and allow them to be in control of the money."

Campbell adds that "donors are acutely aware of the debate, as many CBOS accuse them of undermining community structures". But many CBOs must also bear part of the blame, he says: "They often don't apply directly to donors for funds and they often don't deliver."

Finn Pedersen, special project officer for a coalition of progressive Scandinavian donors called Interfund, does not believe funds should be given directly to CBOs.

"It would be a mistake to make civics project implementers, for example," says Pedersen, a Dane, who has worked in many parts of Africa. "Civics have an important political role to play as a catalyst for local government, for example. They should concentrate on that, rather than on fundraising."

He believes that South African organisations have a lot to learn from the mistakes made by developmental NGOs in Central America. "Part of what went wrong in Nicaragua was that civil society did not develop. A lot of grassroots organisations forgot about their political role and became absorbed in project implementation. As a result, the progressive forces were on the defensive.

Financial control

One of the reasons why more CBOs do not get direct funding is their poor track record of financial control. In the 1980s, donor agencies were generally barred from entering the country, so they had no proper relationship with the recipients of their funds.

The state of emergency forced many activists into hiding. Organisations were raided. Money and property went missing, and 'the regime' was always blamed.

But Campbell says "things are much tighter now". Audited state-

PHOTO: ANNA ZIEMINSKI

■ **Resident power: Civics should concentrate on local politics not fundraising, say funders**

ments from an internationally recognised firm are a must. Donors also try to ensure that organisations have competent treasurers or qualified financial officers. In cases where an organisation has a viable project but is inexperienced, donors may call in a consultant to help set up a financial system.

Interfund safeguards its funds by ensuring that it has a contract with the recipient organisations, visiting projects regularly and getting detailed reports. It generally co-funds projects with other donors.

"There is a commitment from donors to ensure that financial systems work," says Campbell. "But the relationship is often more complicated. There is an ethos that organisations can spend money as they like, and that donors should not interfere."

For donor agencies, who have to be accountable to their constituencies back home, the easiest route is to channel money through NGOs, which employ skilled staff who can draw up and motivate budgets and balance their books.

While there are calls for organisations to become self-sufficient, Campbell says many community organisations are simply not sustainable. Some are performing functions normally undertaken by governments in developed countries, yet they have no tax base from which to work.

For Pedersen, self-sufficiency is too narrowly defined: "It is not simply about earning your own money, but about becoming better at fundraising and public relations. For example, how often do you see Planact in the newspapers? They need to improve their public relations, not only to promote themselves but also to improve their fundraising drives."

Funding 'fashion'

Some organisations argue that donors undermine projects by continually changing their funding priorities. Funding 'flavours of the month' at present are gender and the environment, while funds for the print media, para-legal, human rights and political organisations are drying up.

Campbell acknowledges that this is a problem. First dependency on funds was established, then when funding priorities changed "these organisations had their future decided for them".

The problem is broad, he adds: "Development agendas [in the south] are driven by northern donors, and solving this is very difficult. In global terms, the donors' priorities often make sense. But scale and perspective are a problem. Try telling people in the homelands about sustainable rural development when their plots are too small to sustain anything."

At the same time, if the south wants to determine its own agenda, it has to become better organised and prepared to challenge the north, says Campbell.

Pedersen understands the fear that South Africans may have of outsiders "interfering too much". For him, one way around this is for local projects to have a much closer relationship with donors.

"I think it is a mistake, for example, for Kagiso Trust to disengage with northern fundraising NGOs and to deal directly with governments at the European Commission (EC). Kagiso Trust cannot deal directly with the EC without the assistance of popular forces in Europe such as Oxfam and not be taken for a ride."

Capacity building

For both Campbell and Pedersen, there is an urgent need to improve local organisations' capacity to plan and implement development projects. Interfund has made training projects one of its priorities, and is looking into assisting to set up a network to train people in basic organisational skills.

Campbell points to disorganisation within structures that needs to be ironed out before progress is made: "There are abuses of time and vehicles as well as a lack of proper job descriptions, assessments, employment contracts and affirmative action. Activists are often employed by organisations because of their struggle record and not because of their skills." ■

** Campbell speaks in his personal capacity*

PHOTO: ELMOND JIYANE (DYNAMIC IMAGES)

■ In demand: Over half of Kagiso Trust's funds go to education-related projects

Kagiso reaches out

Kagiso Trust is the country's biggest non-governmental agency that dispenses foreign funding in the country. **KERRY CULLINAN** speaks to KT's deputy general secretary **HORST KLEINSCHMIDT** about its progress and problems

What is the scope of your work?

KT works in the fields of education, youth, health, rural development, income generation, media and water provision. It bases its credibility on being accountable to communities and community organisations. It is an entirely South African operation with SA staff and trustees.

Last year, we transferred R297-million to over 300 projects. Our work is administered through five regional offices in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth and King William's Town. We have a staff of 69 people. The money comes overwhelmingly from the European Commission (EC) and to some extent from other sources like the Japanese government.

How do you relate to other donor agencies?

KT likes to see itself collaborating with other agencies to ensure a wider impact on society. We are worried about the plethora of organisations coming into the country and looking for their favourite project. This causes the effect of a thousand pinpricks, but little overall impact.

There needs to be far greater co-operation to develop a programmatic approach. We need to draw in foreign agencies to synchronise development.

We probably have more aid agencies per square inch in SA than other African countries have experienced in any part of their history. And many more are coming in.

There are also over 14,000 NGOs in South Africa, which KT is committed to nurturing .

We are looking forward to a new government with a philosophy and national strategy for development, so that we can engage with that government to achieve developmental objectives.

How does an organisation qualify for funds?

Firstly, we don't look for projects. Projects approach us. There is a whole booklet of criteria that have to be complied with. The overwhelming requests are from projects in the broad field of education. Over 50% of all funds go to education relating projects, including bursaries.

A fundamental objective is that funds should go to the most disadvantaged people, namely rural people and women. There are not that many projects from rural areas yet, which shows our weakness and also the weaknesses of those areas.

When looking at a project, we have to ask not just how it delivers to people on the ground, but also what the structure itself looks like. Many delivery structures are dominated by whites.

If we are to address development, we have to ask who has power in that organisation, in other words who is on the board? We also need to look at the top staff. People often say: "Oh well, we now employ blacks", only to find it's the person who makes the tea and the driver.

How do you ensure that projects control funds properly?

One cannot compromise on accountability, both to those who receive and to those who give the aid.

When an application reaches us, a fieldworker will assess the project in terms of careful criteria, that have

recently been upgraded.

After the project officer is satisfied with the project, it goes to a regional review. If it passes that, it comes to national review panel, which builds a case for presentation to a particular donor. After that, it goes to the donor.

Once a project gets approval, only 60% of the funds is transferred. An acceptable narrative and financial report is expected before another 30% of the money is released, and then 10%. Any project that gets over R5,000 has to be audited every year.

All applications must come from groups that have a committee. Cheques need to be co-signed by at least two people. We sign a 13-page agreement at the end with the project. This covers every aspect of financial control.

We have taken action against projects who violate this agreement. We have impounded property of projects. We have threatened and taken legal action.

Is there any attempt to move away from depending on foreign funds to tapping local resources?

What we try to do is to unlock local funds for specific projects. In the National Water and Sanitation Programme, for example, the IDT and DBSA put in money after we had done so. This is being run by an independent board.

Before there can be greater collaboration with the DBSA, some important changes have to take place within that organisation. Some shifts are taking place within the IDT. We will base our future collaboration with the two bodies on how these changes manifest themselves. We will also see what the new state says about these organisations. We hope in future to unlock funds from the corporate sector, but have had very limited success so far.

How do you try to encourage projects to become more self-sufficient?

We must move away from putting money into projects where no consideration is given to generating income, even if it is very little. The true meaning of development must mean that somebody has learnt something so that they can become economically viable. We now expect 25% of the total cost to come from the community. Labour can be counted as part of this contribution.

■ Horst Kleinschmidt: A fundamental objective is that funds should go to the most disadvantaged people, namely rural people and women. But there are not that many projects from rural areas yet, which shows our weakness and also the weaknesses of those areas

Some community leaders feel that donors weaken community organisations by directing money through service organisations (SO), and not directly to communities. How do you see this?

This is a critical and sensitive debate, and the problem will grow as these SOs become stronger. It is crucial to see whether SOs can remain in dialogue with urban and rural communities, and whether community organisations can continue to assert their objectives.

If you give money to an SO, how do you ensure that it services a community?

We deal with civic projects, for example, then SOs give value-added service to those projects. But many people feel the SOs are determining needs and dominating community based organisations (CBOs). Many meetings take place after communities are dissatisfied with SOs' services.

CBOs have mooted the idea that SOs be given no money, but receive funds from an independent trust where communities have a say and can ask an SO for particular training or services, which are 'bought' from service organisations. This would avoid SOs dominating.

Has it been too easy for South African organisations to get access to funds?

Yes. There may have been good political reasons for this, but if we are serious about what we are trying to achieve we must seriously move away from this easy access.

We will do ourselves an enormous favour if we become properly accountable and professional. I think we must insist that more training is done that is aimed at ensuring we deal honourably, frugally and properly with funds. There has been massive misuse.

KT has been controversial in the past, with people claiming that it is ANC-aligned. How have you tried to get rid of this label?

KT was born out of resistance politics, so it falls within a certain political ambit. Now that we are becoming a development agency, we have to deal with that image. We believe the best way to overcome it is not by pious policy statements, but through action and by demonstrating that we will support any project that meets the challenge of development.

This is not to say we will be tricked into supporting projects simply to prove that we are not ANC-aligned.

KT was able to start functioning as a sensible development organisation after 1990. Before that, staff were on the run, files were regularly stolen from the offices etc. One can level many criticisms at the way things were done then. ■



PHOTO: ROGER BOSCH (SOUTHLIGHT)

Mozambique's cathedrals in the desert

In war-torn Mozambique, some aid agencies have virtually replaced local government. **HEATHER HILL** reports

IT IS NOT EASY TO GET TO THE VILLAGE of Almada, but then not many people want to go there. This settlement on the western border of Mozambique is accessible only by a rough dirt track that cuts through bush and maize fields. Almada's usual visitors, in any event, usually arrive in powerful four-wheel drives — the sort of vehicle that, throughout this poverty-stricken country, heralds the ubiquitous aid agency.

In this case, the benefactors are Oxfam Canada, a branch of the venerable UK-based organisation whose name is synonymous with Third World aid. Almada, 30km east of the Mozambican border post of Machipanda, had existed for hundreds of years before the 16-year civil war turned it into a virtual ghost town. In 1990, when peace began creeping back into Mozambique, Oxfam Canada began an "integrated project" — incorporating health, education and agriculture — to re-establish it as a safe, productive, permanent settlement.

Almada was rebuilt brick by brick in the months leading to the signing of the ceasefire agreement in Rome last October. The residents, drawn by the relative safety emanating from the Beira corridor 15km to the south, had no more than what they wore or could carry. Their government — bankrupt, disorganised and far away in Maputo — was of little help to them.

Enter the aid agencies. Thanks to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like Oxfam Canada, Almada now has a school, health clinic, staff housing, working boreholes and a dam. The NGOs, whose numbers soared from fewer than 10 in the early 1980s to some 200 today, are flourishing in the fertile compost of poverty, illiteracy, displacement and war. During the 1980s they evolved into a paragovernment as the official structures grew ever more ineffectual. Indeed, without the NGOs the plight of Mozambicans would resemble Somalia.

The price you pay

But there is a steep price to pay for the world's alms, both economically and socially. Mozambique has become the most aid-dependent country in Africa. According to the World Bank, donor funds constituted a massive 65,7% of Mozambique's gross national product (GNP) in 1992.

The hope is that, with the ceasefire, Mozambique will regain its pre-war status as one of the eight most industrialised countries on the continent. But with last year's drought still creating massive food shortages, the focus of donors is on supplying emergency food relief and basic provisions like seeds and tools for returning refugees. Long-term reconstruction is still a blueprint in the hands of the United Nations (UN) and the European Community.

Dependency syndrome

Although Mozambique characterises the worst case scenario of donor dependency, the syndrome affects all southern African countries. Botswana, whose diamond mines make it the success story of post-independence Africa, is still the biggest per capita aid recipient in the region (R320 per person in 1990).

Zimbabwe, one of the few sub-Saharan countries that has not increased its dependency on aid, may soon reverse that trend. Flooded with

donations last year when the combined effects of structural adjustment, drought and government mismanagement produced an historic crisis, Zimbabwe continues to cry for more.

"Although widespread famine was averted in 1992, the situation in 1993 still requires substantial donor support," president Robert Mugabe disclosed in February. "Indeed the aggregate macro-economic outlook of the country is very fragile. The need for assistance in these circumstances remains."

A way of life

Donor dependency appears to have taken root across Africa. Donors and recipients — from the World Bank to the village NGO; from state president to local headman — are engaged in a sort of chess game of give and take where it is mostly the recipients who lose.

After three decades of trial and error by the aid industry in this region, one of the biggest lessons learned is that nothing is free; there is a price for everything exacted somewhere down the line. At the most basic level, this means food. NGOs learnt the hard way, after shattering fragile local economies by flooding the market with the very commodities farmers were producing or inadvertently creating a thriving black market in relief goods.

The result was food-for-work programmes and constructive sales of food aid. In Almada, for example, food-for-work took the form of brick-making and construction. "They [villagers] will work hard because they know this is the only way they will get food," explains Armindo Guiliche, Oxfam's project co-ordinator. "If you gave them food all the time, they wouldn't work."

Another major problem in the aid dispensary is the potential for the abuse of power. "The weight or influence of several NGOs [in Mozambique] is so great in certain areas that they cause tense situations with local authorities," says a 1991 report by the UN Development Programme.

"There are regions where separation, lack of dialogue, lack of co-ordination and lack of planning between the international NGOs and the government are extremely severe, thus producing a negative impact on the population."

No control

British author Graham Hancock characterises the problem of out-of-control aid projects as "cathedrals in the desert". In his classic expose, "Lords of Poverty" (1989), Hancock chronicles the "roads that end in rivers and then continue blithely onward on the other side, silos without power supplies, highly sophisticated equipment that no one can use installed in remote places, aquaculture projects producing fish at $4,000 (R12,000) per kilo for consumption by African peasants who do not even earn $400 (R1,200) a year ... such blunders are not quaint exceptions to some benign and general rule of development. On the contrary, they are the rule."

And if the ruling class of poor countries live like kings, the same can be said, although to a lesser extent, of the lords of poverty — the aid workers

Greasing palms

The third prong in the aid misadventure is corruption. A shocking amount of aid money disappears into politicians' and officials' pockets. But, as Zausmer points out, "it takes two". He is referring to the practice by some NGOs of short-circuiting the slow government bureaucracy by offering a cash pay-off to an official.

"A decision goes up and up before anything can happen. If you're an NGO trying to get out 40,000 tonnes of groundnuts, you may try and get them out however you can. But the country still has laws. Because there is a war doesn't mean there is no government or no laws," Zausmer says.

And if the ruling class of poor countries live like kings, the same can be said, although to a lesser extent, of the "lords of poverty" — the aid workers. Located on the high end of Africa's economic apartheid, they enjoy a lifestyle out of reach to them in their home countries. With access to foreign currency and freed from most import duties, they can reap a small financial windfall during their tour of duty.

One moral emerging from the aid free-for-all in Mozambique is the importance of policing the NGOs, a few of which are rather dubious. Ernst Schade, resident representative of Redd Barna (Norway's Free the Children), said he came across "an NGO in Inhambane that consisted of one man *and five cattle*".

"The negative feeling about NGOs is because of those bad apples," says Schade. "The government should scrutinise who's who and what's what. It should define what an NGO is." ■

• *Heather Hill is a journalist based in Zimbabwe.*

World Bank reports ignore complexities

Should South Africans do business with the Bank, given its poor track record, ask **PATRICK BOND** and ***MARK SWILLING***

THE WORLD BANK IS THE FOREIGN funder whose development policies carry the greatest weight — even if these policies are often clouded in what former Bank chief economist Stanley Fischer calls a Bank/IMF "culture of secrecy" characterised by "few checks and balances".

Yet the Bank's five Urban Missions to SA, under the direction of South African Jeff Racki, have been surprisingly forthcoming with data.

Indeed, in addition to hanging out with establishment technocrats, Racki and his associate, Juneid Ahmed, have been anxious to interact with suspicious civic leaders and technical experts. Prominent ANC urban experts have also accompanied the Bank missions in their travels. It has been possible to direct critical questions to the Bank, even if answers are not terribly satisfactory (Racki has so far declined the Urban Forum journal's invitation to reply to a detailed critique of his 1991 reports).

But the crucial question, after four lengthy Urban Sector Aides Memoire have been tabled, is whether doing business with the Bank makes any sense, given its abysmal track record and its views of urban development.

Consider two recent Bank reports. First, an October 1992 "Wapenhans Task Force" internal report on portfolio performance concluded that 37% of Bank projects were completed "unsatisfactorily" in 1991, and more than 40% of Water Supply and Sanitation projects had "major problems". (An earlier suggestion that the Bank finance a R1-billion upgrade of the Soweto-Southern Johannesburg sewage system has been replaced by a DBSA funding process accountable to the Central Wits Metropolitan Chamber.)

Wapenhans also conceded a variety of valid borrower complaints (mainly from Third World finance ministries):

- "Bank staff know what they want from the outset and aren't interested in hearing what the country has to say";
- "After all the documents have been signed, the Bank can change philosophy again";
- "The Bank overpowers borrowers, and the country negotiating team often doesn't have the strength to resist";
- "The staff rigidly insists on as many conditions as possible, some of which reflect insensitivity about the political realities in the borrower country."

Ignoring political realities

Secondly, and consistent with the complaints above, the most recent Bank Urban Economic Mission (Aide Memoire, 12 February 1993) has parachuted into several hot local debates with clean-looking analysis, seemingly unaware of the potential political implications. Examples include the Regional Services Council (RSC) corporate tax, the urban land market, the need for a "compact city" and the inner-city crisis.

- The RSC corporate tax, says Bank fiscal expert Jim Hicks, has "questionable" effects on efficiency, sustainability and equity (probably true). But the RSC budget has, in the Wits Metropolitan Chamber for instance, become the primary site of struggle over redistribution of wealth within a region. Thus Bank advice to axe the



RSC fund would disempower civics.

• In Soweto, notes Bank economist Kyu Sik Lee, land prices compare to those of Sandton and Randburg. Although this bizarre outcome results partially from "the crowding of the black community into a limited area, the dynamics of the economic activities in Soweto suggest that the prices are now reflecting an economic demand for land in the area and is not necessarily a legacy of apartheid regulations", says Lee.

At the precise time Lee wrote those words, SANCO was battling to force the Association of Mortgage Lenders to address the township "negative equity" crisis (bond repayment obligations are higher than the house's market value). How a redlined housing market rife with developer fraud can accurately reflect the "economic demand for land" is beyond comprehension. In his attempt to glorify the present Soweto economy, Lee ignores this dilemma.

• Lee praises Soweto because it maintains some informal sector vitality and offers hope for retrenched workers. He does not mention the black small business crises (eg in the taxi industry and Fabcos crises). .And by ignoring township income levels and corporate retailing power (eg Southgate Mall), Lee offers only meagre reforms (eg "African style market places") for township small businesses.

Worse, he concludes that "low income housing development in the 'available land' between the central city and townships should be avoided". This undermines Civic Associations of Johannesburg efforts to force the Johannesburg City Council to open up buffer-strip land.

Indeed, Lee suggests "densification should take place within the existing townships" instead of through a more compact city — a conclusion that can only rest on assumptions such as that Alexandra only has 134,000 residents (a figure only half that Racki inserted into his mid-1992 report).

• A final example shows the Bank's methodological limits. Apartheid, not racial capitalism, still gets the blame for SA's urban problems. Where market forces are the clear culprit — eg Johannesburg inner-city decay resulting from factors such as tenant overcrowding due to high rents, landlord refusal to maintain buildings and bank redlining — the Bank has little to say.

To engage the structural causes of urban poverty (or even the simple Actstop demand that poor people have a right to live in the inner-city) would mean identifying problems that cannot be solved with market-oriented solutions.

Undermining community efforts

The danger in all this is that forthcoming billions of rands from the Bank could wash away the efforts of communities to construct their own futures in the most effective way. Racki's long overdue Bank Urban Infrastructure Mission report will point to huge investment projects (such as site and service for shack settlements). But no public housing investment and no 'social housing' demands by the state will be examined, much less championed.

There are a few rays of hope. The latest report regularly calls for a more equitable distribution of urban resources. For example, the goal of the city must be to contribute "to the development of a labour-intensive production structure".

This Bank rhetoric sounds fine. But it must be considered alongside the agencies' export-oriented macro-economic vision, which nearly everywhere splits the urban working-class into a fraction of "insiders" served by the market, and masses of peri-urban, slum-dwelling "outsiders".

US AID consultant George Peterson explained such a linkage between cities and macro-economic policy to a 1991 Johannesburg conference: "It aims to eliminate or reduce urban food subsidies and price controls, abolish requirements that part of export food production be diverted into the domestic market, reduce the urban wage structure in cases where government pays or mandates above-market wage levels, and re-allocate government capital investment away from subsidies for urban industrial production and public service provision."

This "agenda", as Peterson calls it, has been applied to 90% of poor African countries consistent with "Structural Adjustment" measures. For South Africa it goes entirely against the grain of the long-standing progressive movement agenda.

Thus for the World Bank, US AID, and various northern governments there is a much greater need than in any other country on earth to co-opt SA progressives (eg through capacity-building assistance not related to policy). If the city is the new unit of economic control, civics and their allies will continue to be given special attention.

That requires two sorts of reactions by progressive opponents:

• Renewed emphasis on international solidarity aimed at learning lessons of battles against the Bank (along the lines of the Harare-based South-South-North Network, which USN organisations and Sanco are now being invited to join);

• New ventures into radical policy research allow us to contend with caravans of Bank missions which have little sense of the complexities of current debates. ■

Rooting out corruption

THERE HAVE BEEN FEW CASES IN South Africa's history where an organisation or a donor has charged someone for misappropriating funds. Yet what kind of a new South Africa can we expect if our future bureaucrats are already schooled in the art of corruption?

A partner in an auditing firm which checks the books of many progressive organisations, says he has "seen more fraud in the last three years [since the ANC was unbanned] than ever before".

"People are getting away with more now. Somehow in the past, although there were many problems, there was a sense that this was the people's money;" he says. "Now there is a sense that it is donors' money and if it goes missing, no-one cares."

PHOTO: ELMOND JIYANE (DYNAMIC IMAGES

KERRY CULLINAN

Although auditors usually mention financial irregularities in their reports to organisations, they often find nothing gets done to sort these out. And donors keep on pouring in money.

Much of the money his firm sees going astray is either waste or "soft corruption", says the auditor. Examples of this include:

- abuse of resources, especially telephones and vehicles;
- organisations of ex-activists which do very little;
- funds squandered on things such as resource centres, that are not used.

Major corruption

However, from time to time the auditors uncover major corruption. A few years ago, a large client's employee was found to be cashing the organisation's cheques. She had opened an account with a similar name to the organisation, stole its cheques and popped them into her account. In this case, the organisation has laid a charge against her.

■ Administrators play a vital role in the running of an organisation. But they are generally undervalued, underpaid and lack training

The auditor warned organisations to be careful of cheque fraud like this, which he says is on the increase. Signs organisations should look for are cheques that go missing in the post or blank cheques stolen from cheque books.

"It seems to be relatively easy for people to get false ID books, open accounts and deposit cheques into these accounts. I recently dealt with a case where a person took thousands of rands from an organisation by getting an official to sign a few blank cheques," he says.

Administration is vital

One of the things that makes stealing money relatively easy in organisations is the fact that people fail to take administration seriously.

Organisations do not recognise the value of good administrative skills and don't pay enough to attract good administrators. Jobs are often given to activists who don't have the necessary skills.

"Then organisations spend thousands on auditing fees because their books are such a mess, when they could have put that money towards employing a skilled person," said the auditor.

Organisations are in the process of setting up a training unit to try to rectify the problems. Ideally, they would like to train people who have some formal training which can be adapted to suit organisations.

Controlling expenditure, budgets, self-sufficiency and proper reporting are some aspects that this training will cover.

Aside from training, other measures to curb cash going missing include:

- keeping a remittance book, where everything from cheques to goods that come into an office, is entered;
- controlling petty cash;
- curtailing receipt books. ■

Victims of funding fashion

Advice offices face closure as funders' priorities change, reports

REHANA ROSSOUW

PHOTO: GILL DE VLIEG

■ The days of free advice are numbered

ADVICE OFFICES IN THE CAPE Peninsula have been hard-hit by funders' change in focus to development work — four have closed in the past year. And unless the remaining eight find funds, more will disappear by the end of the year.

The Advice Office Forum, an umbrella body which co-ordinated the activities of Cape advice offices and trained their staff, disbanded in December 1991 when its funding ended. The remaining eight offices are now cooperating to find alternative funding sources.

The offices, based in residential areas across the Peninsula, assist residents with housing, employment and welfare problems. But funders, who want their money to empower marginalised communities, are no longer convinced that advice offices are a worthwhile investment. They are critical of the lack of productivity in advice offices and the impact they have on their communities' development.

"Advice offices are a millstone around funders' necks," says funding consultant John Campbell bluntly. "Traditionally, they have been crisis centres, responding to day-to-day issues in their communities. We have long expected them to transform into centres of development, but this is just not happening."

Kagiso Trust (KT) has imposed a moratorium on funding advice and civic offices until a national investigation has been completed. "In South Africa, development is more than just delivery of goods," says KT director Eric Molobi. "We are looking for a change in social relations, giving people access to mainstream society."

The Social Change Assistance Trust (Scat), which funded advice offices for almost a decade, told six Peninsula offices last year that they would no longer get support. Scat spokesperson Mpho Ndebele would not comment as the decision was still "under discussion".

Move to confront funders

On average, advice offices need R30 000 a year to cover rent, salaries and telephone costs. The remaining advice offices have joined forces in the Advice Office Collective (AOC) to confront funders in an attempt to make them change their minds.

The offices complain they were not given sufficient warning by funders of the cuts and insist that their work is developmental. "The funders are wrong when they say we are not developmental," says a Cape Flats advice office worker, who assisted 143 people in February alone.

"We have empowered people and taught them to take control of their lives. I no longer have to constantly contact the rent office of the welfare department for clients. We teach them to do it themselves.

"But in the past year, we received no assistance for special projects or staff training. All the development work we've undertaken we have paid for ourselves."

Bias against cities

Advice offices are also fighting a perceived "rural bias". They believe funders have cut off funds simply because the advice offices are urban-based. They say community problems they deal with are probably harsher in rural areas, but more widespread in cities.

Fundraising in their own communities has brought few returns, as offices have only arranged minor events like cake sales and dances. Asking clients for donations is also not feasible, staff feel, as this would exclude the most disadvantaged.

The AOC has asked for meetings with funders to try to make them change their minds. The offices are convinced their survival is essential to help communities survive the transition to a new SA.

"Even if the new SA comes tomorrow, people will still have problems with rent, work and social welfare. They don't know what their rights are, and we must be there to assist them. Many people trust us more than their political organisations to help effectively sort out their problems." ■

■ **Women are the leading force behind moves to build homes for slum dwellers**

India's slum dwellers

HEIN MARAIS

PART OF A VISITING team of slum dweller activists from India, Jockin (he prefers not to use his surname), heads the three million member National Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF).

Late last year, he paid his third visit to squatter communities in SA, and it was clear that he was not here to entertain locals with nice-warm-feelings development fables.

"Before independence we had nothing," he said. "It was like here. We believed that if only we could have democracy, we'll have milk and honey on the streets." But, he warned, "the poor and women were the two main groups who India failed after independence."

Instead India's poor had found themselves sandwiched between statal neglect and an avalanche of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and voluntary groups. Most vulnerable were those trapped on the margins of society, such as the homeless and unemployment.

One of the groundbreaking moves to end this dependency was launched in Bombay, a city where almost half the 11 million residents live in squatter settlements. Slum dwellers answered a series of evictions by painstakingly locating 7,000 acres of vacant land. By occupying patches of land, they figured out by a process of elimination which parts were not being used, whether the owners were around and why they were vacant. They then approached the authorities for approval to build basic dwellings on the land.

The big challenge was to finance families' efforts to build homes. Banks were out of the question. And service organisations? "Well," said Jockin, "they don't mind paying 200,000 roupees for a car, but don't you ask them for a loan."

The Mahila Manila ("Women Together") group then devised a user-friendly scheme with a minimum of administrative hurdles. They converted the savings culture that existed in communities into a local housing bank. Community members, led by women, assumed responsibility for the scheme.

Women lead

"Until then, women were dogs to us," Jockin admitted. "We call them out to a demonstration and they come with 200 children and then we send them home". Today the NSDF tries to maintain a 60% women to 40% men ratio at leadership level.

Soon two banks were up and running: a housing bank where slum and pavement dwellers could get home loans, and an "emergency" bank to help people weather short-term crises.

Several settlements jointly designed four compact model houses and an exhibit was presented to the housing ministry. After much armtwisting, officialdom gave the initiative the nod. Slum dwellers then built houses at half the cost estimated by government.

The experience forged a dynamic relationship between Mahila Manila, the NSDF and an unorthodox NGO called Sparc (Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres). Rather than position itself as the provider of funds and expertise, Sparc has struck up an innovative partnership with the NSDF.

"With the government, we play a game," explained Sparc. "It thinks the NSDF is an agitationist front and they'd rather talk to middle-class women like us. So they give us money for research. We give the task to the NSDF, which produces good stuff and uses the money to mobilise, then we translate the research into the usual jargon and feed it back to the government."

The Bombay scheme's success has led this trio to apply it across India. This was difficult because of numerous social divisions, with pavement dwellers at the bottom of the pile. The antidote was to popularise the term "slum dweller" as a catch-all.

Today, the NSDF operates in 14 cities, with three million members. Work hinges on identifying human resources in a community, then building and sharing them with other communities through exchanges — "people living and working in another community", not sitting in seminars and workshops, Jockin points out.

The people decide

Their aim is to see each slum community equipped with a communal chest of finance, skills and experience. The guiding mindset is simply: "We don't mind taking help from others, but we make the decisions about our lives."

As Sparc's Sheela Patel puts it: "After years of deprivation and isolation, poor communities have learnt only to react ... it is only after a great deal of exploration and support that they have

Whew!

To all the readers who sent in entries to our Laptop Computer Competition we say: Thank you! You've sure kept us busy sorting through all your replies...
The draw for the competition had not been held at the time of going to press.
But don't despair — the winner's name will be published in the next edition of *Work In Progress*, and the lucky reader will also be advised by post.
In the meantime, have you seen our next competition?
Details are on the back page ...

WORK IN PROGRESS

This R3 500 video camera could be yours!

Dear friend

Haven't you always wanted your own video camera - your own simple, easy-to-use way of recording the times of your life? Well, *Work In Progress* has decided to make it easy for you: We're offering this state of the art Sony Video 8 Camcorder to a lucky reader who takes out a subscription to our magazine.

All you have to do is complete the subscription form inside this edition of *Work In Progress* and send it to us, along with your subscription fee. Your name will then go into the lucky draw, to be held on May 28th. The winner of the competition will be announced in *WIP* 90, which will be published in mid-July.

But don't leave it until the last minute - get your entry in as soon as possible!

PS: If you already subscribe to *Work In Progress*, you can still stand in line to win the prize. Just introduce us to a friend and get them to subscribe too. Tell the friend to include your name on the subscription form, and both names will go into the draw. That way, you both have a chance to win!

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