WORK IN PROGRESS

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

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1983

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INDEX

K IN PROGRESS 26 - April 1983

DITORIAL

ewhere in this publication a
thcoming SARS book - SOUTH
ICAN REVIEW 1 - is announced.
contributions to this book -
which there are over 20 - largely
us on the theme of 'restructuring'
South African society.

With the coming to power of
PW Botha faction of the National
ty, the political conditions for
lose alliance between monopoly
ital and government were created.

Since then, South African society
experienced a process of change,
ch has largely been undemocratically
osed from above by the ruling group
its allies. It is this process
change which has been termed
structuring'.

The content and nature of
tructuring has been hotly debated:
s it involve reform or cosmetic
nge? To what extent does
tructuring go hand in glove with
reased repression and control?
come a traditionally conservative
authoritarian body like the
ltary has played such a prominent
e in the restructuring process?

These are some of the issues
en up in the Review, which
tains six general areas where
tructuring can be seen. Each
tion comprises a number of
icles written by different
tributors, which look at
e of the major trends and
tesses currently occurring
South Africa. While the
k does examine restructuring
1982, its content and
lysis is not limited to one
r: the contextualisation
current crises in South
ica necessarily involve
h historical and background
erial.

The sections of the Review
l with the following areas:
TH AFRICA'S CHANGING RELATIONSHIP
SOUTHERN AFRICA: Contributions
er South Africa's destabilisation
icies on the sub continent,
ibia, the role of the SADF in
southern African conflict, and
the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC).

THE ECONOMY, in which South Africa's changing position in the world economy is examined, and the process of the monopolisation of the economy is discussed. In two case studies, the question of skill shortages and african income and employment are considered.

POLITICS: Economic decentralisation as a basis for constitutional change; the bantustans; resettlement; the President's Council and local government; and the changing class basis of the National Party are some of the contributions in this section.

LABOUR: A detailed sector by sector break-down of strikes in 1982 forms the major part of this section. Union involvement in the strikes is also detailed. This is supplemented by a discussion of the response of established registered unions to the changing labour dispensation.

REPRODUCTION: Crisis in health, housing and education, and the state's response forms the theme of this section.

WOMEN: The changing position of women in regard to legislation, employment and the home is discussed in this section.

State and capital have responded to the generalised societal crisis in both subtle and crude ways. This mixture of restructuring, increased control and repression grants more importance to analytical material which tries to make sense of a complex situation. The SOUTH AFRICAN REVIEW, as an overview of aspects of restructuring, is designed to fill one of the gaps in the understanding of contemporary South Africa.

'STATE HOMES FOR SALE': re-examining home ownership

Government has recently decided to sell off 500 000 Black Affairs and Community Development controlled houses. Will this necessarily have a stabilising effect on those who buy these previously rented houses? ALAN MABIN discusses the relationship between home ownership and the creation of an african middle class.

'The new home-ownership scheme involving the sale by the Government of 500 000 State-owned houses has been hailed all round as "one of the most stabilising steps that has been taken in many years"' (Rand Daily Mail, 05.03.83).

'Dr Nthatho Motlana, chairman of the Soweto Civic Association, and the Urban Foundation both saw it as having stabilising effects' (Rand Daily Mail, 04.03.83).

With banner headlines the daily press has welcomed the new 'home ownership' *scheme announced* by Dr Piet Koornhof and Pen Kotze, the Ministers of Co-operation and Development and of Community Development.

It seems that not only the Urban Foundation and the Sowęto Civic Association, but also the critics of state housing policy, are in agreement about the effect of this policy. All agree that the extension of house ownership is likely to stabilise the population of the cities, not only geographically but socially: home ownership is almost universally seen as encouraging conservatism, as an integral part of the creation of a 'middle class'.

On one hand the Urban Foundation enthusiastically promotes home ownership in order to develop a property-owning african middle class who will champion the virtues of 'free enterprise', while on the other hand the left has traditionally seen home ownership as diversionary for the working class, aspirations towards home ownership 'false consciousness' not in the tr interests of the working class. Although the programmes of the righ and the left have differed radicall in supporting and rejecting home ownership respectively, these progr eventually rest on the same analysi that home ownership encourages stab and conservatism.

As the South African state tak its largest-ever step towards selli off state-owned retail housing, it becomes essential to re-examine hom ownership and its implications.

THE STATE'S PROGRAMME

The South African state's involvem housing grew rapidly from the 1920s onwards, as municipalities and cent government departments assumed eve responsibility for the investment capital in housing. The heyday of housing construction in South Afri was in the 1950s and 1960s, when m of the housing units which the gov ment now plans to sell were built. crucial aspect of this development that the state retained control ov housing and, through numerous offi in the townships and housing estat collected the rents paid. Throughout the 1970s the state continually sh its housing policies, until now, in 1983, the 30-year, 60-year and 99- leasehold schemes have culminated Koornhof-Kotze proposal to sell practically all the rental housing left in the hands of the Bantu Aff Administration Boards (BAABs) and the Department of Community Develo Tenants will effectively be forced buy their houses or face 'drastic increaaes' (RDM, 04.03.83).

STABILITY, SECURITY, PROPERTY?

There is a myth which dies hard th

me ownership necessarily means
eater stability, greater security and
commitment to property among home
mers. Imagine (or live) the situation
a family which has been on the waiting
st to rent council housing on the Cape
ats for many years. Eventually the
mily gets a house or flat. To move
Port Elizabeth they would have to go
rough a waiting list all over again.
Rental housing can, under specific
rcumstances, tie people to one place,
one job, just as effectively as
nthly payments on a bond used to buy
home. The outright owners of houses,
ee of bonds, are the only people who
ve any real freedom to move,
rticularly when there is a shortage
housing.
Again, someone who owns a home is
pposed to have greater security than
meone who rents. But a default on
nd repayments reveals just how thin
at security is when the title reverts
a building society; while someone
o lets out the rooms of a house in
weto always has the money to pay
e whole (or most) of the rent to the
st Rand Administration Board.
iction is thus relatively uncommon.
In conditions when 'home owners'
nd it hard to make ends meet, let
one make bond repayments, private
operty in housing does not necessarily
hance stability, security, or a sense
commitment to the principle that
uses should be 'owned' by their
cupants.

LITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF WORKING CLASS
ME OWNERSHIP

tthew Edel, in a review of different
teas of home ownership, points out that
rking class home ownership is an
omaly if one takes literally the
tion that workers have nothing to lose
t their chains. Thus owner-occupiers
st be defined as 'not working class',
r the home must be defined either as
othing' or as a 'chain'.
The oldest left position, which
llows from Engels in The Housing
estion, is that the home is a chain
ich binds workers to few employers and
avy costs, and (more recently) to an
eology of home ownership and
nsumerism. The problem is that such
ains seem to arise just as much from
me rental situations and from some
ownership situations, and perhaps even more so from conditions in the workplace (such as low wages). One might, indeed, argue that workers would in some circumstances reduce the weight of their 'chains' through home ownership rather than renting.

Home owning workers can also be seen, however, as somehow removed from the working class: the worker with a house is privileged. Therefore, the home owner is distanced from the working class politically as well. An absurd conclusion of this line of argument might be that if all factory workers owned their houses or flats, there would be no working class. Here class, in other words, is defined on the basis of relations of consumption and not relations of production.

These approaches to the implications of home ownership are not fully satisfactory. They fail to analyse the role of housing as part of the historically determined needs of workers - in which the advances of capitalist production and struggles by workers enter into the determination of what kind of shelter, and under what conditions, is 'necessary' to the reproduction of workers. Taking this view, housing and the forms through which workers gain access to housing (ownership, rent, etc) are the subject of individual and collective struggle: we must then question why workers at certain times seek to acquire ownership of their housing (rather than simply arguing that in so doing, workers display 'false consciousness').

Of course, much of the time workers do not get what they want, whether it is houses to own, rent, or live in free of the strictures of private property. Capital and the state determine how, where, on what conditions, and at what price housing is available, subject to the outcome of 'struggles around the built environment' as David Harvey puts it.

In recent years in many capitalist countries less and less housing has been produced and rented by the state. Increasingly, people who live in the cities of the capitalist world have been forced to look away from the state as the source of their housing. This process has been described by Michael Harloe as the 'recommodification' of housing, by which he means that from a situation in which much housing was supplied by the state, people in

capitalist cities now find themselves forced to seek housing which they purchase or rent in the market rather like any other commodity - except that it is their largest single item of expenditure.

This recommodification is typified by the Thatcher government's policy of selling off council housing in Britain. The same process is taking place in South Africa, culminating now with the state selling off hundreds of thousands of houses previously rented by BAABs, city councils and the Department of Community Development.

Why this recommodification of housing has occurred is not the subject of this article, but suffice it to say that recession, the fiscal crisis of the state and the restructuring of capital are obviously connected with the shift away from state-supplied housing.

The process of recommodifying housing in South Africa has advanced through at least three phases since the late 1960s:

1. The state simply ceased, or practically ceased, its direct involvement in the construction of urban housing, forcing hundreds of thousands of people to provide their own housing - which many have done in squatter settlements. Renting a piece of land in the Winterveld or hiring private contractors to lay foundation slabs in Kroonstad is what self-help really means under these conditions. Far fewer people have been able to borrow from employers and institutions to build and buy in more established areas.
2. The state, especially at the local level, began to plan and manage (though not to construct) new housing schemes for sale instead of rental. The classic example is the Cape Town City Council's scheme at Michell's Plain.
3. Increasingly the state has begun to lease on long-term or to sell its existing rental housing stock. This would not have been possible without the acute housing shortage brought about by the effects of earlier state policies, since building society and other institutional lending is dependent on a ready ability to resell houses on which bond repayments are in default.

Koornhof-Kotze Homebuilders?

HOUSING AS COMMODITY AND HOME OWNERSH

Simply because the state decides to
its houses and flats to their current
tenants does not mean that all tenan
will become or, more importantly, re
home owners. As a housing market
develops in places like Kagiso, Sebo
and Daveyton, many former tenants wh
have bought their houses relatively
cheaply will sell out at enough prof
to buy a couple of new household
appliances and thereafter rent their
homes from private landlords - until
they are evicted or forced out by
unaffordable rents.

As purchasers of homes default
bond repayments their houses will be
resold to other buyers - perhaps
landlords again. It is inevitable t
a concentration of ownership will oc
The South African state is now heavi
engaged in turning housing back into
commodity. The process does not mea
home ownership for all, despite the
enthusiasm of the daily press in tha
connection. Much housing will come
be rented from landlords on a privat
market instead of from the state.

A tight private rental market a
changes in influx control laws, maki
'adequate housing' the control on ac

o the cities, will force people out of own altogether. Rather than dividing he working class between those who wn and those who rent, it may mean a ear division between the middle asses who can own homes and profit in e housing market (through speculation d high rents) and the working class o gain minimal benefit or lose from e process.

There are many implications for ganising in these developments in the using question. People will have to velop new means to deal with the oblems of the private housing market, ivate landlords and the associated securities. In some other countries rker housing co-operatives have formed cope with the situation. Certainly, ere will be new dimensions to all rms of collective organising in the rking class areas of South African ties.

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STAY-AWAYS: Soweto 1976

In the last edition of WIP, it was argued that work stay-aways, as a weapon of struggle, are not mass strikes but demonstrations. GLENN MOSS examines the 1976 stay-away campaigns in this light, and concludes that they failed in tactical terms.

The work stay-aways called for in Soweto between August and November 1976 represent the high point of mass participation in the township revolts of that year. The level of support gained for each of the four stay-aways differed, and is impossible to calculate with any accuracy. But the numbers supporting a stay-away demonstration is not necessarily its most important feature. John Berger has suggested that 'State authorities usually lie about the number of demonstrators involved. The lie, however, makes little difference. (It would only make a significant difference if demonstrations really were an appeal to the democratic conscience of the state). The importance of the numbers involved is to be found in the direct experience of those taking part in or sympathetically witnessing the demonstration'.

SUPPORT FOR THE STAY-AWAYS

Without placing any undue emphasis on reported support for the stay-aways of 1976, it can be said that the August and September campaigns gained considerable sympathy in Soweto, while the November call was largely ignored.

On the first occasion in 1976 when a stay-away was attempted (4 - 6 August), some Johannesburg firms reported absenteeism of 50 - 60%, with one large department store admitting absenteeism of 75%. In the food, motor accessories, tobacco, rubber,

electrical, hotel and finance sectors, absentee rates of between 30 and 50% were reported.

The second call was made for the period 23 - 25 August, and estimates of Soweto residents absent from work ranged between 70 and 80%. The third, and numerically most successful stay-away called by the Soweto Students' Representative Council (SSRC) covered the period 13 - 15 September. Within Soweto, it was estimated to be up to 80% effective. Spot checks carried out at various Johannesburg concerns indicated absentee rates as follows:

Premier Milling	50%
Advance Laundry	50%
OK Bazaars	50 - 70%
Checkers	60 - 70%
Edgars	20 - 50%
Wits University	80%
Jhb Transport Department	90%

As far as the planned five day stay-at-home called for at the beginning of November, it is widely accepted that this gained very little support from Soweto residents.

WORKING CLASS INVOLVEMENT

Through its calls for township residents to stay away from work for specific periods, the student-led resistance was able to broaden its base of original support considerably, drawing in employed workers, petty bourgeois elements, and even hostel dwellers in some cases.

The stay-away campaigns involved and affected the majority of Soweto residents in the second half of 1976, and represent the pinnacle of student leadership. But this does not, in itself, mean that the tactics of the stay-away are without problems.. Brooks and Brickhill, in a book on the 1976 revolt, seem very uncritical in their acceptance of the stay-away tactic: 'It is apparent...that the contribution of the black working class to the 1976 uprising was a major one. Both the successful efforts of the students to win black workers to their side and bring them into action, and the much less successful efforts of the authorities to split the workers themselves...implicitly recognised the central importance of the role of the black working class. In acting (or choosing not to act) this class indicated its independence of mind, readiness to sacrifice when the need arises, its common commitment to the cause of liberation'.

In a previous article on stay-aways (WIP 25), it was argued that the stay-away is a more limited tact than, for example, a mass strike. T limitations do not necessarily make the stay-at-home or demonstration strike invalid as a weapon of strugg But they do suggest that the tactic be subject to scrutiny and assessmen rather than uncritical acceptance.. 1976 Soweto stay-aways provide a useful focus in assessing the stay-a or demonstration strike.

AIMS OF THE STAY-AWAYS

The Soweto stay-aways had the feature of demonstrations rather than mass o political strikes. The demands put forward in the campaigns were popula democratic* rather than specifically working class. The action of stayin away from work had a symbolic, and sometimes quasi-religious component, and the mode of organisation almost exclusively involved pamphleteering and attempts to enforce the stay-at-home at transport centres.

This is not to deny the validity or importance of demonstrations. Th involve a flexing of muscles on the part of their organisers and participants, and take on considerab importance at the beginning of perio of mass struggle. Demonstrations ma indicate the balance of power betwee various classes and interests in society. But as John Berger put it, 'Demonstrations express political ambitions before the political means necessary to realise them have been created'.

Whatever the intentions of the organisers and participants, the sta aways could not have brought capital production and distribution to a hal

* Popular democratic demands are no class specific. They are made by 'the people' or 'the oppressed', rather than the working class, and are addressed to ruling class power or the 'oppressor'.

gionally based - usually in one wnship - and called as symbolic ows of strength, they may well have rt individual firms. But they could ver strike at the capitalist ruling ass as a whole. Neither could they ve overthrown the state. A student y have expressed a widely-held timism when he or she said 'If we t the parents on our side, we can ll out a strike; if we call out a rike the economy will collapse; if e economy collapses we will have ack rule in 1977'. But this could t have been the effect of a set of monstration strikes, no matter how de-spread or well organised.

There is some hint that the weto student leadership believed at an ever-extending campaign of ay-aways could ultimately overthrow e state. In much the same way, the h Africanist Congress claimed in 1960 at 'Our movement knows that when we thdraw our labour the whole structure h South Africa) will come falling wn'.

But it is not whether the tivations or intentions underlying e stay-aways could succeed that is of levance here: a different basis of sessment is called for. It needs to asked whether the stay-at-home monstrations created conditions for re advanced struggle and organisation.

GANISING THE CAMPAIGNS

e first issue to be probed involves e manner in which the stay-aways were ganised. Some of the stay-at-homes lled for between 1950 and 1961 volved careful organisation over a riod of time. For example, the e-day stoppage in May 1950 was ceded by a thorough organisational ild-up, 'with the Council of Non-ropean Trade Unions (CNETU) playing vital role. They stressed that a refully planned programme of ganisational work leading up to e event was essential for the pilisation of workers. The build-consisted of ANC and trade union anch meetings followed by mass wnship meetings, culminating in a ss rally at Market Square, hannesburg, a week before the strike'.

The 1976 stay-aways were organised a semi-clandestine manner. For most the whole period involved, all township meetings were legally prohibited, and the police presence within Soweto was extensive. The call for township residents to stay at home was invariably made through pamphlets, distributed on a door-to-door basis - although small meetings (for example with hostel inmates in September) and public calls through the press also occurred.

This was probably the only way in which stay-away calls could be made. The stay-aways were themselves illegal and found to be an element of sedition in a trial which followed the township rebellion.

A meticulous and detailed build-up to the stay-aways was largely absent - indeed, it was probably impossible in the conditions of the time, given their illegal nature and the mass police presence in the township. This lack of actual organisation was made worse by the non-involvement of trade union bodies in the planning, calling and implementation of the stay-aways. In the 1950 - 61 period, first CNETU and then the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) were actively involved in the organisation of the stay-aways called by Congress organisations. In a survey of the 1961 stay-away called to coincide with the first Republic Day celebration, a case was advanced for a crucial link between unions and stay-away calls: 'Workers who are organised into trade unions are more responsive to a political call than unorganised workers. Their trade union activity has given them heightened political consciousness and they also respond more readily when the appeal is made on a factory basis as opposed to a residential basis as they feel that *there is less chance of dismissal if* the whole factory is involved'.

With one rather limited exception, there is no evidence of any union participation in the Soweto stay-aways. The exception involves the Black Allied Workers' Union (BAWU), which claimed to have assisted in the organisation of the stay-away demonstrations. According to BAWU, 'Black workers, under the basis and aegis of Black Allied Workers Union and brother unions, obeyed and collaborated in the call and launch of 4 stay-away strikes'.

The only evidence to substantiate this claim involves a link between a BAWU official - Drake Koka - and the

SSRC. According to a senior SSRC official, Koka assisted the SSRC in drafting the pamphlets calling on township residents not to go to work. He also had some of these typed and duplicated for the SSRC. This certainly does not constitute a union presence in the organisation of the stay-aways.

TOWNSHIP STAY-AWAY OR FACTORY STRIKE?

Calling for the withdrawal of labour on a residential, rather than a factory basis, has certain implications. Some of these were mentioned in a previous article (WIP 25:33-34), especially regarding the surrender of initiative to employers, and the ability of police and army to break the stay-away through township action.

But there is another important effect of a residentially-organised withdrawal of labour. For the class make-up of the factory and the township, of the trade union and the community organisation, is not the same. It is not as if the choice between them as places of struggle is a purely technical one, based on convenience or tactical considerations. This position seems to lie at the core of Brooks and Brickhill's suggestion that the stay-at-home reflects a tactical approach to what is in effect a general political strike: 'In view of the difficulty of organising on the shop floor...stay-at-homes have been organised on a township rather than a work-place basis'.

However, the township community has a different class composition to the factory floor. A withdrawal of labour organised on a factory or shop floor involves exclusively working class action. A township based stay-at-home, on the other hand, can never be class specific in its demands or participants in the way that a factory-based strike can.

The implications of this are clearest in the content and demands of a stay-away campaign. To include and mobilise all classes and strata within the township the demands formulated can never be class specific, but enter into the area of popular-democratic or national struggle.

Popular-democratic struggle involves class alliances, rather than exclusively working class activity: hence, in South Africa, this relates to 'national liberation' rather than cl struggle. But every set of class alliances poses the question of the relative weight of those partially antagonistic interests which make up the alliance. It is accordingly inadequate merely to assert the importance of working class participation in a popular-democrati national struggle. The relative wei and organisational strength which those competing interests making up the alliance have must also be probe

To some extent, the presence of SACTU and its affiliated unions inserted a working class component i the stay-aways called by the Congres Alliance during the second half of t 1950s. But in the absence of an organised working class presence in the 1976 stay-aways, it is much more difficult to assess the class composition of the stay-at-home campaigns.

DEMANDS MADE

One indication of the class composit of the stay-aways lies in the conten of the demands put forward. The fir stay-at-home was called for 4 - 6 August, very shortly after the SSRC had been formed. The SSRC planned, on the first day of the stay-away, t march to John Vorster Square police station, Johannesburg, and there demand the release of all those det in terms of security legislation. It was hoped that those staying away fr work would join the march to Johann burg, thereby swelling its numbers.

The other demand made - involvi both the proposed march and the act work stay-away - was for a total scrapping of the bantu education system. In the 16 June demonstrati the key demand was for the scrappi of Afrikaans as a medium of educati instruction, although even then the had been calls to end Bantu Educati But by the beginning of August 1976 Soweto students were demanding a total abolition of Bantu Education.

The first stay-away clearly indicates the demonstrative nature the activities associated with it - especially regarding the march on Johannesburg. This march appears t have been the main purpose Soweto's adult population not to go to work on 4 August.

Soweto residents march on John Vorster Square in the August stay-away

The second stay-at-home call - ddressed to 'parent-workers' - efers to the stay-away campaigns as the third phase of...struggle against he oppressors'. The call was again or the abolition of Bantu Educatio nd the release of those detained by ecurity police: this time, the verthrow of oppression' was also ted as a reason to stay away from rk. Parent-workers of Soweto were horted to stay away from work if ey were 'proud of the soldiers of beration' they had given birth to: f you go to work, you will be inviting rster to slaughter us, your children.. u are giving Vorster pretext for rdering us. Please do not allow rster to instigate you to murder ur own children'.

The slogans for this stay-away were way with Vorster. Down with pression. Power to the people'.

In the third stay-at-home under amination (13 - 15 September), parents d workers were called on to stay at me as 'proof that you are crying th us over those cruelly killed by e police and those detained all er the country in various prisons without trial'. In addition, the SSRC noted its protest against the shooting of people by police; arrests and detentions; the killing of three detainees; train accidents; and 'the cutting down of our parents' wages who had stayed away from work in sympathy with their killed sons and daughters'.

The stay-away called for 1 - 5 November was to indicate that 'Blacks are going into mourning for their dead'. In addition, the demand was made for prime minister Vorster and police and justice minister Kruger to resign; for all detainees to be released; and for police to remain in their barracks during the course of the stay-away.

The politico-ideological content of the stay-aways thus falls into two major categories:

demands for an end to Bantu Education, the release of detainees, resignation of government ministers, and an 'end to oppression';

protest against police activity, wage deductions, deaths in detention and train accidents.

The context for both demands and protests is one of solidarity: parent-

workers were called on to symbolically support their children, and mourn those killed in the general uprising.

The demonstrative and solidarity component of SSRC activity is well indicated in a pamphlet issued shortly after the November stay-away, in which 'ALL FATHERS AND MOTHERS, BROTHERS AND SISTERS, FRIENDS AND WORKERS' are called on to abstain from end-of-year celebration:

'ALL THINGS THAT WE ENJOY MUST BE SUSPENDED FOR THE SAKE OF OUR KIDS WHO DIED FROM POLICE BULLETS.
-NO CHRISTMAS SHOPPING
-NO CHRISTMAS CARDS
-NO CHRISTMAS PRESENTS
-NO CHRISTMAS PARTIES
-NO SHEBEEN DRINKING'.

This boycott or prohibition of the symbols of Christmas celebration was called for the following reasons:

'1. Soweto and all Black townships are now going into a period of MOURNING for the dead. We are to pay respect to all students and adults murdered by the police.
2. We are to pledge our solidarity with those detained in police cells and who are suffering torture on our behalf.
3. We should show our sympathy and support to all those workers who suffered reduction of wages and loss of jobs because they obeyed our call to stay away from work for three days.
4. We should stand together and be united in the demand:
CHARGE OR RELEASE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS!
5. WE MUST BE FREE!

MOBILISING TOWNSHIP RESIDENTS

The way in which township residents were mobilised for the stay-at-homes is of importance in assessing their impact on participants. They were called on a residential basis. As such, they were not, and could not have been, class specific in the people they mobilised. The basis of a residential stay-at-home is an alliance of interests, aiming to reach a broad spectrum of township residents regardless of their class position.

The content of the stay-aways, as far as can be gauged from the pamphlets issued, was broadly-based, and is best described as popular-democratic. Township residents were mobilised as 'the people' in opposition to ruling class power. Pamphlets were addressed to 'Parent-workers'; 'The people of South Africa'; 'To you all: Parents; brothers; friends and all workers'; 'Blacks'; and, in one case, 'To All fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, friends and workers, in all cities, towns and villages in the Republic of South Africa'.

Sections of some pamphlets were specifically addressed to workers. For example, a pamphlet issued after the second August stay-away argued th

'because of the monopoly of knowledge exercised by the factory-owners and their managers, we the workers will not know how much was lost by these money makers....Well, that we will lose...wages is a fact but we should not cry over them. We have to rejoic over the fact that while we lost these wages, we dealt the Racist Regime and Factory-Owners a heavy blo They Lost Their Profits'.

On the other hand, an SSRC press statement issued on 4 November 1976 after the failure of the November stay-away - addressed itself to non-working class elements. This statem captures particularly well the ambigu in the students' mobilisation of Soweto residents:

'We, the students of Soweto and your children, wish to extend our praise, thanks and appreciation of the stand that the Soweto business men showed during the stay-at-home strike. The men complied with our humble request even though it meant loss of sales a profits. They sacrificed their busi in order to join hands with us in th struggle. Power to all business men and women. We wish to make it clear that we are not in any manner against the Black peoples business...Bravo t all black businessmen and taxi owner who stood with us. We are your children: sons and daughters who ar prepared to lay down our young lives that you may be free'.

The demands put forward as part the stay-away campaigns indicate th residents of the Soweto township wer mobilised as 'the people' against

uling class power. This is clear from examples quoted above, and through the use of slogans like
'United we stand';
'Vorster and Kruger: resign; you have mismanaged Azania. You have plunged the country into violence and loss of human life';
'Black People let us be one';
'Away with Vorster!!! Down with oppression!!! Power to the People!!!';
'To all black people of Azania we say: Take heart, have courage. Victory is ours!'

ORKING CLASS CENTRALITY?

The weight and importance of different class interests in the stay-aways has been the subject of differing interpretations. Brooks and Brickhill argued that the 1976 stay-aways occupied a central role in mobilising the adult community for action, as workers rather than parents', and that by the September stay-at-home the student leadership had 'widened the scope of their propaganda to include an issue which directly affected workers as workers (the loss of pay during the second strike) and the question of safety on the railways'. In these terms, they conclude that the contribution of the black working class to the 1976 uprising was a major one'.

Rather more critically, Baruch Hirson claimed that 'The students never really learned how and when they could call on the working class to join them', and that the stay-aways were not 'launched in order to improve conditions in the worker's household. Strikes of finite duration, announced at the inception as being for a limited period, cannot win any betterment for workers. Nor had any of the SSRC demands been pitched at securing concessions from the employers'.

These two conflicting interpretations of the stay-away campaigns - especially regarding the working class content of the demands - take one to the very heart of the *1976 Soweto stay-at-homes.* On the one hand, it has been argued that the support given to the student demands indicates the centrality of the working class to the uprising. On the other, it is claimed that at most, workers responded to the student calls as parents and township dwellers, deeply concerned about their children and the level of repression in Soweto.

On the face of it, the pamphlets which called forth the stay-away campaigns support both these positions. Township residents were mobilised as 'parents', 'workers', 'parent-workers', 'the people', and 'Blacks'. But the mere language of a campaign is not sufficient to assess its content. This is a serious problem in probing the Soweto stay-aways. Called for in a period of intense crisis, largely as demonstrations of solidarity and support, there is little indication of any organisational intervention between mobilisers and those mobilised.

The stay-at-homes took place in an atmosphere of extreme crisis. Students had been killed by the police, the level and intensity of violence was high, and the state's repressive organs were being experienced by township residents as an occupying force. This gave rise to the demonstrative or protest aspect of the stay-aways - which involved an immediately-experienced rejection of daily conditions on the part of township residents.

The township location of the generalised crisis meant that, at least initially, large numbers of residents would support demonstrations and protests against visible manifestations of state power - police, bantu education, large-scale arrests and detentions. The failure to consolidate this into an organisational presence and set of relations between 'the people' and student leadership is indicated by the collapse of the November stay-away. Brooks and Brickhill touched on this difficulty when they wrote that 'The fact is that by the beginning of November the uprising was beginning to wind down... The black working class had come out massively on at least three major occasions within a relatively short space of time. The issues had been very immediate, the tide of anger had been rising....This time the call for *a strike came when the tide was* receding'.

EMPLOYER RESPONSE

Many employers initially adopted a

fairly sympathetic attitude to the stay-aways, and in some cases paid workers for periods when they were not actually present at work. However, as time passed, employer attitudes hardened, and well before the November stay-away the Transvaal Chamber of Industries advised their members not to pay workers for periods of absence due to stay-away calls. In mid-October, the Chamber circularised its members, saying that 'Employers in general were very sympathetic at the start of the unrest towards those black employees who did not report for duty. However, with the effluxion of time, employers' attitudes hardened to the extent that their feelings today can be stated as being "NO WORK, NO PAY"'.

Marching through Soweto, 4 August 1976

It was also suggested to employer by the Transvaal Chamber of Industries that they circularise workers before the November stay-away, setting out their position on absenteeism. A proposed circular was provided for black workers, written in English and certain african languages. It read as follows:

'TO: THE BLACK WORKERS
FROM: THE TRANSVAAL CHAMBER OF INDUSTRIES.
You have been given pamphlets by the Agitators who say:
Parents: "Co-operate with your children"
Workers: "Stay away from work".
The Transvaal Chamber of Industries is the place where your employers meet to talk about the problems of their factories. All the things that worry them are talked about there and that is where they discuss together what can be done to make things better for their factories and for their workers.

After the first problems in Sowe The Transvaal Chamber of Industries told the Government of all the things which they felt should be done to make things better for their black workers.

Now the Transvaal Chamber of Industries wants to tell you what will happen if you listen to these Agitato and how badly these agitators make yo suffer when you listen to them.

Firstly: There are many factori which, for some time now, have not been as busy as they used to be. Som factories could even close down or work short-time, but they are trying keep going so that you can keep earning your pay.

Secondly: Therefore, if you stay away from work, you are harming yourself as well as your employers.

Thirdly: You know that there are many black people who do not have jobs and who could easily take your place.

Fourthly: If you stay away from work it is your family and your children who will suffer.

You must be strong and come to work so that you can earn money for your family and your children to buy food, clothing and other necessities. Your well-being depends on your worki with us; listening to the Agitators will not improve your position.

WE REPEAT:
KEEP YOUR JOB AND IGNORE THE AGITATORS

This indicates another difficulty ith a residentially-based stay-away. f a whole factory goes on strike, here is some protection for workers gainst victimisation. All the triking workers are able to support ach other, and there may be union tructures of protection and support. n the case of a residentially-based tay-away, not all factory employees ill necessarily heed the call. Some ay be resident in townships not ffected by the stay-away, and rotection for absentee workers against ictimisation is almost non-existent. orkers dismissed or penalised for dhering to a stay-away call confront mployers as individuals, not as a olidly organised group. With this in ind, it can be suggested that the ransvaal Chamber of Industries pamphlet eproduced above must have had some ffect on workers. It is one thing o risk victimisation over a emonstration stoppage once, when ensions are running high in the ownships and some employers are showing ympathy with township residents. But hen workers are called on to repeat his risk time and time again, with no tructures of protection, and when mployers are adopting a threatening ttitude, it is no surprise that the ive-day stay-at-home called for ovember 1976 failed.

NFORCING THE STAY-AWAYS

t has been suggested above that the umerical success of the first three tay-away campaigns can best be nderstood in the context of the eneral political crisis in Soweto t the time. Wide-scale support or the campaigns did not imply any rganisational component, nor did the ontent of the demands involve the ong-term interests of those staying way from work. The organisational tructures necessary to turn ndividuals into committed social ctors in a struggle did not develop n Soweto at the time.

This failure in strategy can be een in the way of enforcing the tay-aways, where the withdrawal of oweto residents from the economy for hort periods was seen as more important han the manner in which this was chieved. This is not to suggest that ntimidation or coercion can account for the support given to the first three stay-aways. These factors can never explain mass participation in a withdrawal of labour.

Nonetheless, there is evidence that the youth attempted to enforce the stay-at-homes in a vigorous manner; this indicates that it was the fact of not going to work, rather than its effect on participants and organisation, that was uppermost in the minds of those calling for the stay-aways.

It has already been suggested that stay-away demonstrations are best assessed in terms of the advances they make organisationally and their effect on consciousness of participants. In these terms, it is not merely the number of people who stay away from work which is important. The way in which they are organised to stay away, and the effects of this in strengthening organisations, is crucial. The vigorous way in which the 1976 stay-aways were enforced, especially at township railway stations, indicates that the youth was more concerned with the fact of withdrawing labour, rather than deepening and strengthening organisation within the township.

CONCLUSIONS

Earlier it was argued that the Soweto stay-aways were demonstrative in character. It was never likely that their immediate demands - which were sometimes vague and abstract - would be met by the state; and it was never possible that residentially-based stay-at-home campaigns called for symbolic periods could halt capitalist production and bring down state power.

It was suggested that stay-aways, as demonstration stoppages, were best assessed in terms of their abilities to create conditions for more advanced forms of struggle and organisation. The key questions which were therefore posed around the 1976 stay-aways were: did they involve organisational advances, and what was their effect on the consciousness of participants?

Essentially, it has been argued that the Soweto stay-aways were not successful in tactical terms. This is not because they failed to achieve their stated objectives, but in terms of the assessment criteria set out

above. The manner in which the stay-aways were called - involving the use of pamphlets and some house visits - did not allow for the intervention and involvement of other organisational structures in the campaigns. This created a context in which new organisational initiatives did not emerge, and where already existing structures were neither deepened nor strengthened. The fact that those calling the stay-at-homes were ultimately not subject or responsible to those they were mobilising, limited the possibilities for a democratic extension and consolidation of organisational initiatives.

Equally importantly, the student leadership saw the success or failure of stay-away campaigns in numerical terms. This led them largely to ignore the question of how best to call and implement a demonstration campaign. Throughout the period of the four stay-aways, there were incidents of coercion which implied an over-emphasis on keeping people from work for a few days, rather than advancing conditions of struggle.

In these terms, one must question the success of the 1976 Soweto stay-aways, in that they were unable to create new and more advanced conditions of struggle and organisation. Neither can it be said that the stay-at-homes strengthened the working class in relation to other township-based classes.

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TIC REVIVED:

n editorial in WIP 25 commented on
e re-formation of the Transvaal
dian Congress (TIC), and raised
me questions about its relationship
non-racialism and ethnicity. Since
en, the editors have received a
itique of the decision to
-constitute the TIC. Extracts
om this contribution appear below
'The Case Against'. This is
llowed by parts of an interview
ich *SASPU National conducted*
th members of the Transvaal
ti-Saic Committee (Tasc), which
s instrumental in the decision to
vive the TIC.

he case against

e relationship between class and race
d therefore the class struggle and
tional struggle has been the central
sue confronting the political
vement in South Africa. The
minance of monopoly capitalist
lations has resulted in an
ntensification of the class struggle.
t the Transvaal Indian Congress
IC) is organising indians in the
ansvaal on a populist, not a class
sis. It is therefore unable to
ntribute to the decisive class
truggle.

The President's Council (PC) proposals
volve an attempt to create a black
iddle class which will exclude
fricans. It is based on an ethnic
dea where the various ethnic groups
uld form a 'grand alliance' with
e ruling class. The attempt is
us to co-opt indians and coloureds
nto the side of whites and thus smash
nity between indians, coloureds and
fricans.

The PC, together with the
ntustans, divide the black population
nto various ethnic groups and within
ch ethnic group there would be a
ctor of the petty bourgeoisie
d/or aspirant bourgeoisie which would
ssume leadership positions.

In opposing the government, various people within the ranks of the oppressed have made the PC proposals the major focus of their struggle and as such see the constitutional proposals in isolation. This has led to an essentially ethnic response. Responding in a piece-meal fashion promotes the forces of ethnicity and thus falls in line with state strategy.

Proponents of the TIC argue that due to the Group Areas Act, the oppressed classes have been split on an ethnic basis and it thus becomes a strategically motivated condition that mobilisation and organisation also occur on this basis. This is *ridiculous. The history of struggles* waged by the oppressed indicates that these were not ethnically-oriented. Also, there is a fair illustration of attempts by the 'different' oppressed groups to work together.

It is misleading to speak of organising in your own areas. Are we talking about organising in your 'own areas' from a regional point of view? Surely this is not a question of logistics since in practice proponents of TIC are engaged in ethnic selection because they consciously select indians from every corner of the Transvaal.

Let us now look at some of the other motivations put forward by proponents of TIC. They have argued that its revival is necessitated by the fact that the indians do not have a political organ as such and that TIC would help to play this role. This logic is unscientific especially when one asks the question whether indians do need a separate political organ. Are indian aspirations different to other oppressed groups? Also we must recognise that amongst indians there exist antagonistic classes and that the overwhelming majority of indians are working class. Just which class interest is TIC advocating.

If the vacuum referred to is in regard to ethnic political organisations then it is true that such a vacuum exists. However, there is no such vacuum when it comes to non-ethnic political activity.

The criticism based on ethnicity which has been consistently levelled since the idea of TIC was first mooted, has been continually rejected by arguments claiming that ethnic symbols

are not used (eg WIP 25 editorial: 'the categorisation of the TIC as "ethnic" needs to be assessed... whether it manipulates ethnicity and racial symbols in its activities'). This is however contrary to their practice of using indian songs and values just in order to make politics more relevant for indians.

The problem with using symbols is that there always remains the danger that these symbols would entrench themselves and thus frustrate any future attempts to create coherency in ideological terms. There is an obvious question to be asked of TIC. Is the rank and file membership going to be exclusively 'indian'? If this question is answered in the affirmative then surely their claim to be non-ethnic is a lie.

Since we are working towards creating a unitary, non-racial, democratic society then surely the process of struggle should encompass these aims. It is essential to *create a single nation. This is* partly what the struggle is about, and this means transcending the arbitrary divisions the state has forced upon the oppressed. We should not allow the state to determine the nature and pace of our struggle because the state has promoted ethnic groupings. We should not use divisive groupings as a weapon in our struggle. We cannot fight ethnicity with ethnic organisations.

The proponents of TIC are essentially petty bourgeois and have petty bourgeois interests at heart. As recently as 1980 they wanted to participate in SAIC for 'tactical' reasons. Who is to say that these people will not revive this collaborationist position once TIC has entrenched itself?

Proponents of TIC constantly speak about the proud heritage of TIC in its struggle since its inception at the turn of the century. However, one must look critically at both the policies and strategies of TIC prior to its dissolution in 1964. There is rarely a meeting addressed by proponents of TIC which does not refer to Gandhism as its spiritual force. However, Gandhi's role in relation to the indian working class has been questioned by historians.

The vanguard of Gandhi's political initiatives throughout his stay in South Africa was always the merchant class and not the workers. It may be argued that his intention was to unite the 'indian community' regardless of class antagonisms. However, the danger of his actions were only perceived when the class interests of the petty bourgeoisie clashed with those of workers, as was inevitable. Thus the Indian Congress remained in the hands of the merchant class from its inception until 1946 when a radical leadership under Dr Dadoo was able to take control.

Surely the very obvious divisive and debilitating effect of organising on an ethnic basis is apparent? However, it is more than divisive, it is extremely dangerous (the role of the petty bourgeoisie in the TIC up 1946 indicates this). Yet it is the petty bourgeoisie to which proponents of the TIC pander in their statements from public platforms and newspapers. There is no attempt at a class analysis in their public stance, and *this is the only way they can be* judged.

the case for

Q: The recent Tasc congress decided to revive the Transvaal Indian Congress. Why?

A: At the congress it was decided that there was a need for a fully-fledged political organisation. The reasons for this must be seen in terms of the anti-Saic campaign. This campaign dislodged the reactionary and collaborationist hold over the Indian community in the Transvaal, throwing their ranks into complete chaos and disrepute.

But by the close of the campaign it had become evident that we could no longer make gains by mobilising public support through mass meetings and distributing newsletters, and that we needed to create the basis for ongoing political organisation and activity. Only in this way could we provide the community in which we are based with consistent political, moral and intellectual leadership.

Q: How can an essentially Indian

ased political organisation advance he struggle for a non-racial ociety?

: To achieve a non-racial and emocratic South Africa, we need to nsure that the methods used to chieve these ideals are successful in uilding grass-roots unity. We must ot confuse goals and methods nor hould we mistake the consciousness f political activists and ntellectuals for the consciousness f the masses.

The physical separation of the ppressed people has imposed limitations n us and we have been forced to rganise in our separate communities. uring the '70s activists negated hese factors and confused their deals and the consciousness of ntellectuals for the community's s a whole. At that time, students ere forced to take the political nitiative at national level since he people's leaders were banned, ailed or exiled. Thus the rganisations functioning then ailed to win mass popular support n our communities. The other ide of their isolation from a ass base was the popularity of local anagement committees set up by the tate.

: There have been criticisms that the IC is an ethnic body. What is your eeling on this?

: The criticisms are unfounded and raught with misconception. We elieve an organisation can only be ccused of being ethnic if it evokes mongst its supporters an ethnic dentity - if it encourages ethnic eparateness and protects and dvances its own separate and orporate group interests.

When the TIC is mentioned, hat comes immediately to mind is not thnicism, but historical events nd symbols rich in meaning - the ongress of the People, Defiance ampaign, Congress Alliance, names ike Mandela, Dadoo, Naiker and so on.

The TIC since the late 1940s as been closely associated with the truggle for liberation from all orms of oppression and exploitation or all the people of South Africa.

: Instead of reviving TIC, why did you not form a new political organisation?

A: We have already established why it is necessary to form a political organisation. Some who agree that this is necessary have disputed our decision to revive the TIC.

Forming a new political organisation with another name will not, in our view, be politically as effective as reviving the old TIC. The TIC is an organisation deeply rooted in our community with many people still supporting their proud history in the struggle for a non-racial and democratic South Africa.

A new political organisation would have to prove itself anew and spend a great deal of time and energy in an attempt to establish its legitimacy at a mass level.

TIC supporters say that those opposed to its re-formation must show that this will separate the indian community from broadly-based struggles. They claim that the evidence points in the opposite direction, and that the recent anti-Saic campaign recalls campaigns of the 1950s where struggles were linked across racial or ethnic barriers.

Some of those in favour of re-forming TIC acknowledge that it will be dealing with a largely non-working class constituency in the Transvaal. But they argue that the mobilisation of middle class elements against co-option by the state is vital. Failing this, the ruling class attempt to incorporate the indian middle class will go unchallenged. They claim that their opponents in effect advocate ignoring non-working class constituencies, leaving them available for incorporation into government's black middle class strategy. This abandonment of non-working class issues, it is claimed, undervalues the importance of popular-democratic struggle.

The issue of the TIC is a controversial one. It goes to the heart of the relationship between national and class struggle, the meaning of non-racialism and the place of organisations with uni-

racial constituencies.

The Transvaal Anti-Saic Committee acknowledges that some of these issues are difficult: 'The ethnic tag may well have some disadvantage particularly as it could be misunderstood by people deeply committed to the ideal of a non-racial society and is also open to manipulation by our political foes. We however are convinced that the advantages of this initiative outweigh the disadvantges'.

WIP would be keen to receive further comment on these issues.

MADNESS AND LABOUR

The relationship between mental health and work is not one that is often considered. In this article, GRAHAME HAYES argues that the organisation of work under capitalism causes mental health problems, and that there is also a clear relationship between unemployment and madness. The breakdown in mental health of both employed and unemployed workers is in the first instance socio-economic, not psychological.

In South Africa workers experience unhealthy conditions at their places of work - factories, shops, farms - and also where they live - townships, squatter camps, mine compounds. Thes conditions and the wider social conte in which they occur have to do with h work is organised in contemporary capitalist South Africa. This articl will try to analyse some dimensions o the social context of work which rela to the mental health of workers in South Africa.

There has been a fair amount written in relation to the physical health problems of certain jobs; for example, the predisposition to mesothelioma from working in asbestos factories, and diseases contracted fr contact with some fertilizers and insecticides in farm work. Even a government commission (the Erasmus Commission) agrees that not enough time and money is spent on industrial and occupational health.

There has also been some work done on the living conditions which workers experience in their communiti and the health problems which result from these social conditions. Workin class communities have inadequate housing, poor sanitation, very little electricity, inadequate recreational

facilities, and these deprived material conditions give rise to health problems - typhoid, tuberculosis, etc.

Most work on the health problems of workers has concentrated on industrial workers at their places of work, and on the physical effects of their working conditions. Less research has been done on other categories of workers with respect to health considerations, and just about nothing has been done on the relationship between working class jobs and mental health. The relationship between working class conditions generally and mental health or psychological well-being has been almost totally ignored.

This article will therefore concentrate on the area of mental health in relation to the working class, both at their place of work and in the wider social context in which these jobs occur.

Thusfar, the only area which has relatively consistently been reported on in the commercial press in South Africa and internationally has been the issue of unemployment, and the negative psychological effects associated with it like depression and a sense of helplessness. In the hope of generating discussion and research in the area of the psychological effects of working class life, some other issues will be discussed. Some of the more important considerations in understanding the relationship between mental health and working class life are

+ the general problem of relating mental health and working class life;
+ working conditions in contemporary capitalist South Africa;
+ unemployment and mental health;
+ work and mental health in society.

MENTAL HEALTH AND WORKING CLASS LIFE
— A history of madness

It is often forgotten that our attitudes and 'treatments' of the mad* are relatively recent. Up until the mid-18th century the mad were not treated in special institutions, and in fact were not treated at all. The mad along with other 'social deviants' and 'misfits' - the unemployed, petty criminals, and the 'lazy' - were confined in what were called 'houses of correction'. The intention of these early institutions was primarily to keep these groups out of society so that they could not be a disruptive influence on the general functioning and law and order of the society. There was also an attempt on the part of the authorities to get these 'social deviants' to develop appropriate attitudes to work and the maintenance of social order. It was only towards the end of the 18th century that certain humanitarians within the medical profession made a case for separating the mad from others contained in these houses of correction. It was at this point that the mad were housed in separate institutions - asylums - and treated by medical doctors.

What is important about this is that prior to the medical involvement with the mad, they were seen as part of society. Unless they were violently disruptive, in which case they were chained up in the houses of correction, they were left to go their own way in society. This often involved travelling from one town to the next, living on the fringe of

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* I have chosen the word 'mad' in this article as sometimes synonymous with mental health problems, but more often indicating more severe mental health or psychological problems. This word - madness - is very seldom used in modern psychiatric or psychological circles. It has been chosen here because the usage of the word relates to a period in the history of society when mad people were considered as part of society, and not as a separate group which needed the services of 'experts' - doctors and psychologists. Once the mad were socially separated, literally into asylums, a whole new language arose to describe their problems. They were seen as 'sick', with certain 'symptoms' which in turn were related to specifiable 'diseases'. And today we have a whole barrage of psycho-medical terms to describe mental health conditions, or madness - schizophrenia, psychosis, personality disorder, psychopath, autism, and so on into the hundreds. It is to avoid the association with this way of understanding people with psychological problems that I chose the word 'madness'; it is also the term used when madness still had a clear social connection.

society. What is also significant for our purposes is that these mad people, as well as the other 'social deviants' mentioned earlier, were predominantly from the poorer classes.

Although arguments trying to understand the relationship between madness and working class conditions are complex and incomplete, we can at least be sure that the beginnings of the social separation of the mad into asylums had more to do with social and economic reasons, than with the medical treatment of 'sick' people. This is sometimes hard to accept these days because we too easily say that mad people have something wrong with themselves, either in their 'heads' or in their 'brains'. We have also come to accept that 'experts' can 'cure' these 'sick' people. The 'experts' are often medical doctors, psychiatrists and psychologists. We have come to see madness as something which mysteriously comes upon us, and about which we can do very little as common working people.

This is not to deny that people go mad for reasons that are difficult to explain. However, if madness cannot be related to the social context in which it occurs, it is difficult to make sense of it. But exactly how madness and mental health relate to the lives we live under capitalism and apartheid in South Africa is not clear. The history of madness at least reminds us that we need to re-locate the social context of madness in a much more thorough way than is sometimes suggested by mainstream psychiatry and psychology in South Africa. The next sections of this article will try to relate madness to the social context of racial capitalism in South Africa.

WORKING CONDITIONS IN CAPITALIST SA

Marx argued that the capacity to create objects through work was a distinctly human activity. Blocking this (alienation and estrangement from this activity) results in people feeling divorced from themselves as *happy and integrated human beings*. This relates to the criticism that under capitalism our working lives have become increasingly controlled and managed/supervised. Workers in this country have clearly felt separated from the products of their labour, if only at the level of being economically estranged from the commodities they produce. For example in a motor assembly factory in Durban there is a large sign at the end of one of the assembly lines which says: 'Be proud of the cars you produce'. In view of the wages paid in the motor industry, this relationship of 'pride' is about the only attachment that workers could have to these new cars and trucks! In terms of the division of labour in the factory the workers don't really produce any complete object; this sign reflects the irony of capitalist production and is an insult to the workers.

This example, in itself irrelevant is an instance of a range of contradictions which confront workers at the factory and in the townships. The extent to which any one incident results in a particular response, or set of responses of a psychological nature, is very difficult to determine. What does seem clear however is that the totality of the work sphere has a detrimental effect on workers' mental health. As indicated earlier, working conditions also have a significant effect on the physical health of workers, but it is not intended to go into this here*. For example, in conditions like hypertension (high blood pressure) and heart disease it becomes very difficult to separate what is a physical as opposed to a mental health problem.

There are no exact figures about the incidence rates of various psychological conditions suffered by the working class, but there are some general indications of what their mental health problems are. It seems that there is a high incidence of what could be called bodily related mental health problems. These are hypertension, heart disease, ulcers and alcoholism. The less bodily related mental health problems are depression, helplessness, anxiety and high suicide rates. All these conditions from hypertension through to unsuccessful suicide attempts are treated, if they are treated at all, in outpatient clinics of general

* See in this regard Critical Health number 8, 1982, entitled 'Work and Health'.

hospitals and psychiatric outpatient clinics. Sometimes factories have their own outpatient clinics and hence workers get some treatment from these services. As health services in South Africa are grossly inadequate for black working class people, we could predict that many of these conditions are never treated until they are very far advanced. This seems to be validated by the relatively low life expectancy of black working class groups.

All the above suggests that working conditions, and working class life in general in South Africa, affects the mental health of workers in a serious way. What needs to be done is to draw more direct links between certain specific working conditions and the resultant mental health problems. This is important for understanding more fully the conditions under which workers live, and also to be able to develop appropriate responses in changing these conditions.

The above account of the mental health problems of workers in South Africa, together with the more detailed incidence rates from England and America, show that the working class experience more (quantity), and more severe (quality) mental health problems than any other social class. It is evident that more and more ordinary working people are finding it very difficult to cope in capitalist society.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND MENTAL HEALTH

One of the most significant aspects of contemporary capitalist society is the very high rate of unemployment which seems to be built into the system (structural unemployment). Most research on work in our society has tended to concentrate on people with jobs, although some of these jobs are not directly wage earning, for example housewives. With unemployment levels as high as they are at the moment it is important that we analyse what is happening to these people. The current USA unemployment figure is just above 10% - which means ten million people - and it is predicted to rise to about 11,5% before the end of the year. In South Africa it is very difficult to get accurate statistics for black working class groups, as a lot of unemployment is 'hidden' in the 'independent homelands' and reserves. Also, the unemployment figure increases at a daily rate as more and more companies and factories close down, and/or retrench large sections of their work force. While the working class bears the brunt of these retrenchments, unemployment is starting to be felt in all social classes in South Africa. One study in a section of the Vulindlela area indicates an unemployment rate of 30% and broken down further reveals a rate of 40% for women and 20% for men. The current figure quoted on unemployment in South Africa is most often in excess of 10%, with state statistics invariably lower than more independent sources. How are these millions of people coping with being unemployed and what are the mental health implications of having no job?

The commercial press has carried quite a few articles over the last few months on unemployment, and has often stressed how workers have changed during periods of unemployment. It has been said that unemployed workers become depressed, apathetic, frustrated and this has sometimes been translated into aggression and hostility, and that generally their mental health has deteriorated.

What seems clear from some of the work I have done in and around the Pietermaritzburg area, is that while more specific mental health problems arise in work situations, the problems associated with unemployment are far less specific. Here people affected seem to be drawn into a process of madness. This madness often manifests itself as a 'general mental confusion' - those affected will be unclear about where they are and what they have been doing recently, and will give a poor account of themselves and their family and community relations. This mental confusion is also sometimes associated with feelings of depression.

It is important to bear in mind that a lot of these features of madness cannot be simply related to the experience of unemployment and its psychological implications. The material social conditions of unemployment are equally important in so far as they can also give rise to mental confusion, depression, etc. Because a person is out of work and hence not earning a wage they are often very undernourished, and this in itself can give rise to mental health problems like mental confusion, disorientation, depression, etc. A number of black working class people who end up in state psychiatric hospitals are picked up by police in a confused, unruly and toxic condition. The toxic condition is usually the result of excessive drinking coupled with poor nourishment, and sometimes made worse by excessive dagga smoking. From this it should be clear that mental health problems and madness in some of the unemployed working class is a combination of the psychological responses to being unemployed as well as the social context of this life of unemployment. This is especially so in black psychiatric units.

A further consideration which emerged from this research is that working class family/household units in the townships are finding it increasingly difficult to sustain themselves in relation to even a meagre standard of living. The increased strain of supporting unemployed family members and friends is not being withstood. If a worker is unemployed and mad, the chances of getting a job in that condition are very slight, and this person becomes increasingly dependent on hand-outs from the family group. The difficulty of sustaining the mad unemployed worker is thus a very real problem, which the black working class family is finding more and more that it cannot deal with adequately and socially. This new 'intolerance' to the unemployed and mad is related more to economic and ideological factors than to the psychological effects which these people might show. What is being argued here is that the problem of madness and unemployment is primarily a social and economic problem before it is a problem of mental health or psychology. We must not confuse the effects which people show in this cycle of unemployment and madness with the social, economic and political determinants which give rise to certain mental health problems.

If a person is unemployed and mad, one way for the family to rationalise its 'intolerance' of the person's social situation is through saying that the problem is one of mental health and that this will be better dealt with and 'cured' by admitting the person to a psychiatric hospital. This is not a judgement on the family groups which do this, but rather shows that while previously the family and community may have more easily dealt with and tolerated mad and unemployed people this is becoming just about impossible.

This process of social intolerance and final admission to some psychiatric unit is consistent with the case records of a high proportion of the inmates in the black - especially african - wards of psychiatric hospitals in Pietermaritzburg. While some patients come from surrounding townships and communities there is also a large proportion from the rural areas. These people from the rural areas/reserves are sometimes referred directly from their homes via the local hospital services, but also are part of the massive numbers of people 'illegally' living in the townships and cities. They come to the cities in the hope of finding work, and to escape the appalling conditions of underdevelopment and poverty in the 'homelands'. They usually find it extremely hard to cope in the urban areas and hence are subject to massive personal and social stress which can result in mental

health problems and madness, resulting in their being admitted to a psychiatric hospital.

So it is not only work which results in mental health problems in capitalist South Africa, but also and rather unexpectedly the lack of work which seems to give rise to some of the more serious mental health problems and madness.

WORK AND MENTAL HEALTH IN SOCIETY

What has been said in this article might be unfamiliar to a number of people involved in the struggle against apartheid and capitalism, who are often engaged in areas which directly relate to production and its social conditions - for example trade union organising, the law and racist/unfair labour practices, housing, etc. The 'secondary' characteristics of capitalism and racism in this country which relate more indirectly to the work sphere are seldom discussed or written about, let alone seriously researched and debated. These secondary features refer to those aspects which stand once removed from the primary economic organisation of wages, working conditions, monopoly capitalism, etc, and have more to do with relations such as the mass media, culture and art, psychological life and leisure. The concerns of this article refer mostly to the secondary characteristics of capitalism in South Africa. These must not necessarily be seen as second in importance, but are second in that they cannot exist apart from the basic political and economic organisation of society.

As was pointed out in the beginning of this article, the lack of sense of the history of madness has resulted in us seeing madness as some separate experience or condition which has little to do with the daily activities and struggles of our ordinary working lives. We have handed over our psychological life and/or mental health problems to a group of 'experts' - psychiatrists and psychologists - who on the whole, and especially in South Africa, believe and make us come to accept that our psychological problems are of our own personal making and don't have very much to do with the social and economic conditions of our society.

If some of the arguments and connections about mental health and work are correct, and reflect with some accuracy the situation as experienced by the working class in South Africa today, then the traditional 'help' from psychiatrists and psychologists offered in hospitals, outpatient clinics and private practice is out of keeping with the problems that they are trying to 'treat and cure'. This is not to say that there is no mental health component to the problems which workers encounter, but rather to ensure that social problems are not reinterpreted as personal and individual problems to which we must adjust and cope. Mental health workers need to be educated about the social conditions which give rise to the problems of mental health and madness, and also be made aware of the limits of what can be achieved given the social context within which workers live and work.

A final point relates to the production/work sphere and its social organisation. If mad people are to be integrated into the labour process, and there is no reason why they should not be under different arrangements of working life, then the social organisation of work is going to have to change significantly. Mad people are not psychologically and socially disturbed or disabled all the time, and therefore have a role - albeit at times limited - to play as working members of their society. Given the present social arrangement of work, it is ludicrous to suggest the integration of mad people into the work sphere. It has so far been suggested that the present social arrangements of work tend to drive the working class mad, rather than being able to integrate mad workers.

Capitalism in South Africa is caught in a contradiction of continuously needing workers, but at the same time these workers are finding it difficult to survive the working conditions of capitalism. Furthermore, when individual workers are no longer able to cope with the conditions of their jobs they are often fired, and then become subject to the cycles of madness and labour that I have tried to outline.

The problem of work/labour and madness can be seen as the reverse

side of the more dominant political and economic struggle in capitalist South Africa. Progressive movements and organisations are going to have to confront the issues posed by the relationship between madness and labour in the creation of a more just and free society. It is hoped that the issues raised in this article have gone some way to addressing the relation between labour and madness.

SOUTH AFRICA DESTABILISED....

'Under no circumstances would the Government allow South Africa to be destabilised by hostile elements in the sub-continent, the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan said last night.

General Malan said certain states in Southern Africa were intent on destabilising the region - and wanted to drag South Africa into the same mess in which they now found themselves.
(Rand Daily Mail, 11.08.82).

Mr Malan denied that South Africa was pursuing a 'policy of destabilisation of its neighbours and said that, on the contrary, it was countries like Mozambique... that were bent on destabilising the Republic through acts of terror.
(Rand Daily Mail, 16.08.82).

Machel responds

Mozambican President SAMORA MACHEL responded to Malan's allegations in an August 1982 speech. He suggested that the only threat Mozambique poses to South Africa is as an example of an alternative form of society.

A few days ago, the South African regime alleged that Mozambique is threatening it by concentrating sophisticated weapons on its border. What are these sophisticated weapons that the regime is referring to?

We do not represent a threat to anyone, neither militarily nor economically. No sensible person could think that an underdeveloped and poor country like ours, with so many wounds of war still bleeding, could threaten the sovereignty, territorial integrity or stability of any state, especially a power like South Africa.

In fact the only thing the regime has to fear is our example. This, yes.

What is the sophisticated weapon that the regime refers to? The answer is the work we are doing. What is this work?

Giving worth to women, as mothers, as wives, as educators, as companions and comrades, the example of protecting them and loving them as symbols of affection and peace, as the guarantors of future generations. This is what South Africa fears.

The sophisticated weapon is making the home the centre of fulfilment and not, as in South Africa, a prison and a guarded residence.

The sophisticated weapon is having children as the only privileged sector of our society, keeping the best for them, keeping the most beautiful for them. It is surrounding children with love and affection, innocence and happiness, and not, as in Soweto, making them targets for police brutality and murderous weapons.

The sophisticated weapon is guaranteeing all citizens the right to study, culture, health, justice, progress, to the benefits of society. The sophisticated weapon is putting our resources into carrying all this

out and not into the manufacture of weapons, the production of death.

The sophisticated weapon is the people's right to create their own history, by directing their own destiny, by exercising their sovereign power.

In short, the sophisticated weapon that really threatens apartheid is the alternative of civilisation that our society now represents.

For this reason, the survivors of the Soweto massacres feel at home in Mozambique. For this reason, the intellectuals, the artists, the scientists, victims of South African racism and fascism, feel fulfilled working amongst us.

The sophisticated weapons are the UNESCO conference, the Dollar Brand and Myriam Makeba concerts.* The sophisticated weapon is a woman, a scientist like Ruth First. They are men and women of all races who do not see colours, regions or tribes, and who identify with the same ideals of equality, fraternity, harmony and progress.

Because it is socialist, Mozambican society defines people and their fulfilment as its strength and reason for existence. On the African continent, and especially in southern Africa where the scars and wounds of slavery and colonialism, historically predominantly European and white, are still felt and present, we have built a Party, a nation, a way of life in which colour does not matter, race does not matter, region or tribe does not matter.

Everything that causes unnecessary division has begun to fade from people's consciousness. This is the sophisticated weapon that threatens apartheid.

Ours is not a society in which races and colours, tribes and regions coexist and live harmoniously side by side. We went beyond these ideas during a struggle in which we sometimes had to force people's consciousness in order for them to free themselves from complexes and prejudices so as to become simply, we repeat, simply people.

For this reason, in the war against the colonial system we were able to distinguish between the Portuguese people and Portuguese colonialism. In the war against Rhodesia we were able to distinguish between what was the white community and the minority rebel racist regime.

We say in all sincerity that the white South Africans, the boers, are not our enemy. They are not foreigners in their country nor in our continent. They are African people, like us.

It was racism and fascism that deformed the mentality of South African whites, that led them to cast themselves in the role of 'the chosen people'.

It was racism that made them unable to regard themselves as normal South African citizens, equal to all other South Africans, equal to everyone else in the world.

For this reason, it is the South African whites themselves who are the victims of their complexes and prejudices. They are the very ones who cut themselves off from the community of all South Africans and set themselves apart as a privileged minority, as a superior race to be preserved.

This logic is what has led to the obsession of systematically dividing South African society up into races, colours, tribes and bantustans, into special and non-special foreigners, even to the ridiculous extent of having 'honorary whites'.

Within this logic, in order to define themselves as South Africans, they must defy the nationality and identity of all other South African people.

It is they who alienated themselves from their identity as African people.

Our enemy is apartheid. Our enemy is fascism. Our enemy is a small handful of interests hiding behind a barbaric ideology and philosophy in order to safeguard their privileges.

The destruction of the stronghold of apartheid will come from inside South African society. The destruction is spurred on by the blood of white martyrs like Neil Aggett and Ruth First.

We repeat what we have already said: apartheid will fall when children from the white suburbs join hands with black children from the bantustans and the Soweto

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* Translator's note: UNESCO-sponsored conference on social science held in Maputo in August 1982. Exiled South African musicians Dollar Brand and Myriam Makeba have both given concerts in Mozambique.

ghetto, with Indian and coloured children, and all of them describe themselves simply as South African children in a country that is theirs equally.

Our nation is historically new. The awareness of being Mozambicans arose with the common repression suffered by all of us under colonialism from the Ruvuma to the Maputo.

FRELIMO, in its 20 years of existence and in this path of struggle, turned us progressively into Mozambicans, no longer Makonde and Shangaan, Nyanja and Ronga, Nyungwe and Bitonga, Chuabo and Ndau, Macua and Xitsua.

FRELIMO turned us into equal sons of the Mozambiacn nation, whether our skin was black, brown or white.

Our nation was not moulded and forged by feudal or bourgeois gentlemen. It arose from our armed struggle. It was carved out by our hard-working, calloused hands.

Thus during the national liberation war, the ideas of country and freedom were closely associated with victory of the working people. We fought to free the land and the people. This is the reason that those, who at the time wanted the land and the people in order to exploit them, left us to go and fight in the ranks of colonialism, their partner.

The unity of the Mozambican nation and Mozambican patriotism is found in the essential components of, and we emphasise, anti-racism, socialism, freedom and unity.

FORTHCOMING FROM SARS

SOUTH AFRICAN REVIEW 1

In early February 1983 over 40 social analysts met in Johannesburg. Out of their weekend meeting, convened by SARS, a new book emerged - the South African Review.

Written around the theme of crisis and restructuring, the first edition of the Review covers six areas in which the restructuring of South African society is evident:

THE ECONOMY
POLITICS
WOMEN
LABOUR
REPRODUCTION (health, education, housing)
SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONSHIP TO SOUTHERN AFRICA

Concentrating on the state's response to a generalised crisis in society, each section contains a number of articles analytically reviewing trends of 1982.

The SOUTH AFRICAN REVIEW is published jointly by SARS and Ravan Press.

Expected publication date is May 1983.

Enquire at your local bookshops, or contact SARS directly.

LOOKING AT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Many agricultural development projects can be found in South Africa's impoverished rural areas, but, as DAVID COOPER argues in this article, these projects differ widely in form, content and effect. In a survey of development projects, he suggests that the key issue involved is not production and employment, but democratic organisation for production.

INTRODUCTION

In this paper we look specifically at agriculturally based projects. The most common issues which concern such projects are those of land and of production. In examining these issues we are specifically interested in the class relations associated with the land and its control, and the effect of class relations on production.

In discussing these development projects, we are specifying an intervention into a rural community. Although many (agricultural) development agencies would like to believe that such interventions are neutral, they are most decidedly not. In general, rural communities are divided by clashes between rural groups and/or classes. In South Africa's bantustans divisions exist over the control of the scarce land available for production.

The rural areas have been rendered backward through deliberate state policy. The level of response to any initiative indicates a general desire by the majority of the people to engage in production. It is structural conditions, a lack of resources and control over the land, and a lack of effective representation of rural residents which prevents production from taking place.

Although this paper deals only with development projects (ie intervention by an outside organisation) it is important to relate these projects, firstly, to the rural conditions in the bantustans, and, secondly, to forms of organisation which don't rely on outside intervention.

In the first instance development projects are concerned with only a tiny part of the bantustans, and, secondly, cannot be looked at in isolation from these regions in general. Agriculture in the bantustans has been deliberately underdeveloped through the demands for labour of South African industry and agriculture in the twentieth century. Peasant production was smashed as control of developing urban markets fell into white hands. Reduced to a largely subsistence base, the land has become hopelessly overcrowded without any meaningful infrastructure to allow it to be maintained, let alone developed. Even the state's own recommendations for stabilising the bantustans (eg the Tomlinson Commission recommendations), have been largely ignored in all but form. The level of government spending in the bantustans has always been woefully inadequate to support their populations.

With structural changes in industry and agriculture, a growing surplus population exists in the bantustans. Having undermined the productive base to extract labour, it is now imperative for the state to recreate a productive base to absorb the surplus population. This ideological imperative gives great importance to agricultural projects - an importance beyond their real extent.

THE ROLE OF TRIBAL AUTHORITIES

The assumption development agencies make is that the tribal authority is representative of the people. However, given the level of coercion that exists in rural areas, organising activity is more frequently a front for coercing people to support the bantustan authority or a party. In the case of the tribal authority the fact that they are paid government officials carrying out government decrees clearly indicates the antagonism that can exist between tribal authority and community (Daphne, 1982a).

All land in rural areas is controlled

by tribal authorities, who are agents of the state, and as such responsible for local government. The tribal authority is in a position to exercise considerable control over the lives of rural people. Many of these controls are central in affecting agricultural production.

PROJECTS, AUTHORITIES AND PARTIES

Some development projects are intentionally aligned with the tribal authority, especially those undertaken by state and quasi-state bodies. Many capitalist organisations also use this means of organisation. Other bodies unintentionally allow the tribal authorities to have control over rural projects, thus having the same effect of reinforcing the status quo. Only a small minority of development organisations attempt to generate alternative forms of organisation which can be truly representative of their members and which attempt to resist the domination of the tribal/business elite in rural areas.

The ideological component of rural agricultural projects is thus generated through the issues of control over production. This is the same as that promoted in education, in health, in business, and in small industry. In all these cases, the supremacy of the state as the provider/controller, and the promotion of a small class of privileged producers is the ideological cornerstone of state policy.

The alignment with the state is a major means of promoting class differentiation through the projects. The other is alignment with a political party. Development projects often seek the authority of local government, and frequently work through such government. In many of the 'homelands' local government is closely aligned with the party. Officials, like chiefs, are often party members, and in some cases, membership of the party is a requirement for belonging to a development project.

PROBLEMS AND PRINCIPLES OF ORGANISATION

Development is, in the first instance, about organisation. It is about producing real changes in people's lives through their method of organisation. In rural bantustans many organisations exist - the church, school committees, gardening groups, farmers' associations.

Providing material resources like seed, tractors, is essential for production in rural areas. However, a careful balance must be maintained between the provision of these resources on the one hand, and resources like skills training and organisational input on the other. It is the way resources are used, rather than their absolute quantity that matters. At the same time, all rural projects concerned with agriculture must participate in production, for this is a basic requirement for rural organisations to offer their membership. It is only through succeeding in production that local organisations can be truly strong and take meaningful control over their land.

What is important is that progressiv organisations do not attempt to support projects in areas where these projects are likely to fall into the control of the tribal authority and state agencies. Progressive development agencies need to select the areas where rural people have demonstrated resistance to the state and where democratic local structures have been established. Local strength of organisation must be built upon, so that democratic organisation can lead to resistance to state control in other area The widespread resistance to betterment schemes in the 1950s and 1960s indicates the level of mass organisation that is possible in rural areas.

Development work is largely undertaken by state and quasi-state bodies. The areas where private organisations work is relatively small, and its impact on organisation is also limited. However, one must measure this impact qualitatively - ie the degree to which such organisation can be used as an example which can be replicated in many similar instances.

Development agencies or projects concerned with promoting democratic organisation stand the best chance of progress in areas where the tribal authority is weakest or most closely aligned with the interests of rural people.

Clearly, the tribal authority, the state, and the political party of the governing elite are not equally strong in all areas. Where they are weakest, effective democratic organisation can provide a base for people to take control over their production. Where the level of mass organisation is strongest, some government support may in fact be drawn;

rural people, although dominated by the state, exercise some control over government services if their level of organisation is good.

For agriculture, existing organisations are very important for development. They form the base from which development or underdevelopment takes place. Almost all productive rural organisations are small and weak. This is to be expected given the nature of agriculture in the bantustans. These organisations reproduce the class relations of rural society. For example, those organisations which draw on state support as a means of organising play a part in justifying the role of the state.

For instance, in the Transkei, an organisation of women's clubs called Zenzele exists. In order to obtain a piece of land for a communal garden, a group must belong to Zenzele. Zenzele claims to be a democratic, open organisation. In fact it is hierarchical in structure, and connected to both a political party, the Transkei National Independence Party, and the bantustan authority.

Gardeners must pay membership to Zenzele, and must in fact support its ideological position when its office bearers (usually wealthier, educated women) are sent to national meetings, or when party officials come and attend a celebration function. Frequently gardens collapse because of clashes between 'leaders' and members of Zenzele. Other gardens survive because the need for food is so great, while in a few cases real struggles for organisational control take place. A frequent tactic of groups involved in gardening who resist control is to organise gardening in individual homesteads. Thus, one must examine the content of organisation, not only its form.

GENERAL TRENDS IN 1982

Progressive organisations involved in rural work in 1982 have seen that organisation with a view to the redistribution of power is the central issue of development work. The difficulty involved in redistributing power in rural areas has led to a clearer understanding of what is involved in the establishment of rural organisations to promote development. The provision of training to all members of organisations rather than to committees only, is seen as one way of promoting democratic organisation.

1982 has seen a resurgence of interest in rural production projects. These projects have been carried out largely by four groups - state and quasi-state bodies; the private sector; universities; and private and church organisations (non-profit). There are many links between the first three groups, especially, but we can examine each sector separately, bearing in mind that we are attempting to analyse the consequence of development projects on social relations and class formation in rural areas.

STATE, QUASI-STATE AND BANTUSTAN BODIES

The state operates in all the rural areas of the bantustans. Work is carried out through agricultural officers. Although individual officers may attempt to work through democratic means, officers are there to carry out state policy. This means they work through the tribal authority and advise 'full-time' farmers - often those who live on Trust land, or those closely associated with the tribal authority. The affect of extension work is usually to reinforce the position of the tribal authority by placing more organisational resources in their hands.

Extension officers do, however, make contact with a lot of small organisations and can promote the effectiveness of these if they are prepared to work democratically with these organisations.

In the Transkei, Ciskei and Lebowa, 1982 has seen the introduction of tractor services on a much larger scale.

In the Transkei a R20 per head tax was instituted to pay for these tractors. The tractors plough for those who can pay for them. However, in the region the tractors are ploughing on a block basis; in theory those who do not pay for the ploughing have the lands planted for them on a share-crop basis - the government taking 50% of the crop. Clearly, this form of production without organisation can only lead to a strengthening of the tribal authority in its control over land. In practice large land areas have been ploughed but not planted because of the inefficiency of the system. Residents are being asked to pay for ploughing they did not request.

The move is also sinister in that the bantustan authority has a policy of

promoting full-time farmers. By introducing production in this way, it is easier to take land away from non-users, and to give it to those who are supporters of the bantustan.

There are also some projects where production is both successful and under government control. An example of this is the Mahlangu area of Lebowa, where a large maize and bean producers co-operative exists. Production is quite high, with individuals' land areas being ploughed, planted and harvested by the co-operative. The individual plotholder has no say at all over production and is allowed a few bags from his/her crop. In 1980/81 the individual plotholder got nine bags of maize, while the remainder - as much as 100 bags - went to pay co-op expenses and purchase new equipment which individuals see as belonging to the chief and the government. Control is so strong that individual growers are not allowed to harvest their own crop. Although many people wanted to harvest crops themselves, they had to wait for hired combine harvesters to do the job - at a cost of R40 000 because this was the 'modern' way to do it according to the government advisers to the co-operative.

Most quasi-state production projects are carried out by the Corporation for Economic Development or its bantustan equivalent. Mostly these have been registered as separate bodies - Agricor in Bophuthatswana, Lebowa Agricultural Company, Tracor in the Transkei, etc. The CED (and its agents) have three types of projects - commercial farms, service projects, and agency projects (providing finance). In total CED finance up to 31 March 1982 amounted to R82 766 000. Of this R31-m went to farmer aid - the rest was on state farms. This must be compared with investment in industry of R304-m in 1982.

Most of the CED projects are state farms. One of the more successful projects of a state corporation is the Agricor maize production project (Shiela, Mooi-fontein). The project operates in the western Transvaal. It extends the production of white-controlled maize farming to Trust land in Bophuthatswana. Agricor organises production through african contractors who are financed by Sentraal-Wes Ko-operasie, a white maize co-operative. The contractors get inputs from the co-op and plant individuals' land on a voluntary basis. Agricor then acts as a marketing board, to buy the maize. Agricor boasts that the projects have made Bophuthatswana self-sufficient in maize.

The projects all operate on Trust land where land is allocated through the tribal authority. Most of the families have land, so there is less shortage than in most areas. The preconditions exist to establish a better off class of people, and Agricor has exploited this opportunity.

Contractors are selected and advised by Agricor and the co-operative, and are effectively under their control. No projects have been established on tribal land near the Trust areas, where people are involved in the projects only as seasonal labourers. The contractors are the main beneficiaries of the scheme.

Agricor is now planning rural service centres to extend organisation for production to other projects: health education, water supply, housing, and co-operative vegetable production. This is a clear attempt to create a class of settled people on rural land. Agricor is involved in other development projects at Taung irrigation scheme and at Thaba Nchu. All these projects take place on bantustan controlled land, and Agricor selects the farmers who are to be involved.

A different type of government project operates in the Ciskei. While ideologically attempting to perform the same function as Agricor, that of creating an image of the self-sufficient state, the approach is different. The Ciskei government hired a firm of consultants - Loxton Venn and Associates - to manage an irrigation scheme in the Tyefu tribal area, along the Fish River. With virtually free access to development capital, the consultants planned a productive unit based around a core farm, for a number of selected full-time farmers. The farmers are selected by a planning committee, made up of the consultants and the tribal authorities, and are strongly controlled by the core farm which is run by the consultants. Profits from the core farm allegedly go to the tribal authorities and it is seen as the means of providing future development capital. The majority of the community are allocated 0,25ha plots for vegetable production.

Under the close supervision of management, these schemes have been quite productive. They also place power in the hands of the Tribal Authority. It seems that this model is one favoured in the Ciskei and in the Transkei, where

a large irrigation scheme at Ncora exists on similar lines. The nature of the control is such that the consultants 'would envisage a long-term role here in the form of overall managing agents. It takes a long time to train people and training is an important aspect ... The manager of the scheme at Ncora then went on to outline the aims of the scheme: '... upliftment of people in the area; training Transkei middle class and subsistence farmers in modern farming methods; to provide employment; etc' (Daily Dispatch, 13.08.82).

One of the basic elements of this and other schemes is to provide a total package of services and then to control their use. The independence of the people is thoroughly discouraged in the interests of planned production and national growth. Similar schemes are springing up in all the bantustans. It is important to understand the effect of such schemes on class relations and the ideological role they play. Sebe, of the Ciskei emphasises that rural development is a priority:
'More courses for headmen on rural development would be arranged. Together with extension officers they must become fearless teams of developers' (DD, 12.05.82).

All development projects would see the provision of credit, inputs and marketing as necessary. The degree of centralisation of this planning suggests that people in the bantustans are to be involved only in the carrying out of plans drawn up through the state. It is a form of production which suits the interests of the central state and of capitalists particularly well. It does little to extend the control that people have over production, and will lead to the long-term failure of such schemes.

The farm centre at Kerschel, Transkei

PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT

Private sector involvement has been mostly through tri-partite agreements between bantustans, the CED and the company. Tea growing in Venda, coffee production in Gazankulu, and sugar in Kwazulu are three such examples. Mostly, land is taken over by the company, which draws labour from the displaced residents of the area.

Sugar in Kwazulu is different. The South African Sugar Association (SASA) has played an important part, making up to R10-m available to 7 819 small growers without insisting on prior changes in land allocation. This scheme has proved very popular - firstly, because there has been no insistence on minimal land sizes; and secondly, because cane growing is easily incorporated into the system of migrant labour (labour demands are very seasonal and time of cutting is flexible).

SASA emphasises that it is a development agency. It sees the main aim as being 'the creation of employment and...maximisation of production'.
Although wider problems, such as land tenure, education, health, and nutrition must be tackled, the SASA Fund says it is making a meaningful contribution to development in Kwazulu and Natal (in 1981 the Fund acted as co-ordinator of water supplies in drought struck Kwazulu).

The fund also provides an extension service, and has built training centres for assisting cane growers, other producers, and wider educational programmes.

In all instances the development of cane has been administered through the sugar mills. The mills work through the Tribal Authority. In some areas cane growing has spread to a lot of people, in others it has been limited to a tribal

elite. There has been a conscious effort to cater for as many people as possible, but no limit on land size has been set. Thus an induna with 10ha of land stands to benefit far more than an individual with 0,5ha. The major impact of the SASA involvement has been to reinforce the position of the tribal elite.

Given that capitalist businesses have been involved, it has probably been the most successful development programme in any bantustan. The major beneficiaries have no doubt been the sugar companies, but a large change in the rural economy has taken place.

In one Kwazulu area, Ndwedwe, development has been very vigorously pursued by Tongaat sugar mill. Every available piece of land has been planted, mostly at high cost and with little benefit to the grower. The average income from cane growing has been virtually static (at 15% inflation) since 1977. It stood at R460 per grower per annum in 1981/82.

Tongaat sees that 'successful reform of land tenure is the most important element in bringing about meaningful improvement in production'. In other words, that successful farmers can take over the land of less successful ones. The Ndwedwe district has been chosen for trial changes in introducing a new form of lease or freehold tenure (Natal Mercury, 02.11.82).

At present Tongaat plants, sometimes weeds, and harvests the cane. Most smallholders see their cane as belonging

Agricultural officer in Sekhukhuneland

to Tongaat, and attempt to use their la in the production of food crops as well

One of the major benefits of cane development has been the provision of infrastructure by the state. The major reason for development does seem to be benefit to the sugar companies. In all areas where the cane is grown many high value food crops could also be grown, i the same investment in infrastructure a providing resources was made.

However, the extension of capitali into rural areas is the major prospect for rural landholders, and one that greatly affects power relations in rural areas. In the case of Ndwedwe, it seems that co-operation with the Tribal Authority has been less vigorous than in other areas, and the more likely change will be to produce a growing class of independent middle class producers, traders and contractors. In other areas as in Reserve 9, the SASA has worked through the Tribal Authorities.

All costs should have been recovere in the first year, but in fact a loss of R3-m was shown because of the drought

UNIVERSITIES

University institutes have become involved in implementing development projects in 1982. ADRI (the Agricultura Development and Research Institute) at Fort Hare and INR (the Institute for Natural Resources) at Natal University, are two such instances. Both these institutes have drawn funds from the private sector.

The INR scheme is more interesting. Being based at an English-language university one would expect INR to have liberal intentions in development. Their strategy has been to use a firm of consultants - Loxton Venn and Associates - as experts in setting up the project. All the initial reports place great emphasis on communication, consulting the people, and participation So far two phases of the scheme - locating a broad project area, and beginning precursor trials - have been undertaken at a cost of about R90 000. Loxton see the scheme as of great importance to the problems of Kwazulu and southern Africa, and offer their services willingly - at a rate of R245 per field day for a senior consultant, or a mere R23 per office hour.

In their planning great emphasis is

laced on studying soil and other natural esources. They pay little attention o the aspect of how the communication s to be carried out.

The plan emphasises that their role is esearch and planning - mplementation is up to the Kwazulu overnment. Seven precursor trials have een started - two on communal land, four n chief or induna land, and one on a commoner's' land. The trials involve ntroducing commercial forestry and ntensive cattle farming as a way of ealing with overstocking and overuse of rees. The project is managed by Loxton.

The scheme is implemented through hree committees - two made up ntirely of INR and Kwazulu government fficials, and the third involving the ocal Tribal Authority (members of this ommittee were elected at a tribal eeting). It is clear that so far the cheme's major beneficiaries are the ribal elite. Women wanted to start commun al garden adjoining one of the rrigation schemes on the chief's land. hey were allowed to do this provided hey paid for diesel for the irrigation ump and offered to work free on the roject on the chief's land.

The most significant point about his project is that, rhetorically, it ets out to solve real development roblems; yet the approaches that it ollows lead to a strong reinforcement of he power relations in the community. echnology and capital are placed in the ands of the elite.

The ADRI project at Fort Hare imilarly involves working through the ribal Authority. It attempts to ncourage development through available fficial channels. A river basin is egarded as the basic unit for analysis nd planning. The project places emphasis n research and planning, but little ttention is paid to the way in which the cheme is to involve the participants.

A project which takes a different pproach is the Mpukunyoni project in atal, which has close links with the niversity of Zululand's Centre for esearch and Documentation. Although the inks are supposedly to do with 'action esearch', the ideas for the project argely originate with the Centre. nother interesting aspect of the project s its close links with the Anglo merican Corporation, which is launching cassava for starch programme in the rea. The project began with an offer rom AAC, and is funded by the

A communal garden, Lusikisiki, Transkei

Corporation's Chairman's Fund.

The project strongly emphasises 'community organisation through physical programmes'. It has taken place in four phases - initiation; physical expansion, research (cassava planting) and survey of needs; organisation; and broadening development programmes. The main emphasis is on creating a physical basis for organisation to take place around, and then building organisation to take physical development further.

The tribal authority is seen as antagonistic to the needs of farmers' groups:

'At the outset of a development project or at the initiation of an association it is essential to have the permission, but not the involvement, of the chief and indunas. Without authority, activities and meetings can be prohibited and organisations will be unable to get going. With over-involvement of the tribal authority on the other hand, the project or association will be hijacked and dominated by the chief and indunas. Very few of the ruling hierarchy are prepared to participate in groups such as farmers' associations unless they can control them. Once the induna of a ward becomes the chairman of an association, people will be unwilling to fully voice their opinions. During meetings they will be unable to see him as the elected chairman of their association, and will continue to view him as an administrator with very real powers over their daily lives. It will be impossible for a majority of people to

vote in an alternative chairman and the democratic process will stagnate! (Daphne, 1982:12-3).

The project sees the creation of long-term alternative organisation as its major priority. Thus, development is not seen in terms of production or employment, but of who controls development. This concern is expressed in practice. The project takes the side of its participants. It sees itself 'initiating self sustaining processes and structures which can become independent of the development agents ... democratically run farmers associations have the potential for this handing over of responsibilities'. The associations are to come together in a union.

It is aware of the challenges this presents to the Tribal Authority and sees it as essential to be prepared to meet these challenges. So far, the Mpukunyoni project has achieved little in terms of production compared with the Agricor or SASA projects, but it has achieved a fundamental structural change in the relations of production in an area with strong tribal allegiances.

In conclusion to this section, an important reason why universities are getting involved in development projects is funding. Companies can get tax exemptions for university grants.

INDEPENDENT AND CHURCH ORGANISATIONS

Few other projects share this concern with organisation as a central issue. The Environmental and Development Agency (EDA) project in Herschel spells out an equally strong stand in the formation of independent associations. The project provides for scarce resources to be shared equally by members. The centre provides all the usual inputs of agriculture through a Farm Centre, selling services like tractor work and seed on a non-profit basis to members.

In this project membership is open to all, provided they belong to organised farmers' groups. The project operates from one village, but has member groups in five other villages.

More important is the impact the project has on organisation in the district. Because of its clear support for democratic organisation it serves as a stimulus to this form of organisation. The project is run by a committee made up of representatives of the member associations. The committees meet regularly and play an important part in the organisation of activities. The project is entirely locally run, with a lot of support from EDA staff.

The project has made a significant impact on food production in Sunduza and other villages, especially since all land use is equally distributed among participants. Research has been kept to a minimum, and much of the initiative for programmes comes from local people, rather than from planners. The project has many problems, but it makes a real attempt to create an alternative form of democratic organisation; it largely by-passes government channels. In 1982 skills training became a major concern of the project, and the project now aims to train committee and other members to take complete control of the centre. The project has operated on a relatively small budget (about R120 000 over four years, including all capital equipment and salaries).

It must be borne in mind that the project is tiny compared with those mentioned above, and that its organisational approach is certainly unknown to people involved in sugar growing in Kwazulu, or maize growing in Bophuthatswana.

There are other small, independent projects like Mpukunyoni and EDA operating in different parts of South Africa's bantustans. Most of them are localised projects. Examples are Isinamva in the Transkei, Driefontein and Helwel in Kwazulu. Few take a strong line on organisation, concentrating rather on the provision of resources or on production.

One of the more interesting projects is the Church Agricultural Project (CAP) which operates adjoining the Msinga district of Kwazulu. CAP operates from a white-owned farm, and has had a difficult relationship with ex-labour tenants from Weenen who now live an overcrowded and impoverished life in Kwazulu. The tenants regularly graze their cattle on CAP's farms. CAP has also been involved in starting small, organic gardens on the Kwazulu side of the Tugela river. The project is very complex, not least because of the personalities involved and the fact that it operates in one of the most difficult districts of South Africa. The project became involved in 'food for work' programmes, and many of its difficulties are associated with attempting to deal with the severe economic plight of the

communities where it works.

Another project in Kwazulu which operates over a wide area is the Africa Co-operative Action Trust (ACAT). This is a Christian based organisation which supports saving clubs in Kwazulu, the Transkei and the Ciskei. Its work is both missionary and productive. ACAT works through chiefs and extension officers to establish some 1,600 clubs in Kwazulu with membership of 20 000. People save to buy inputs for package programmes which ACAT has formulated. Inputs are supplied through commercial organisations which profit from sales. It would also be interesting to know who benefits from the interest earned in savings and whether this is discussed with clubs. ACAT, in its annual report, notes that a number of savings clubs are dormant. The fault, they claim, lies with insufficient staff. ACAT also works closely with the Kwazulu Development Corporation (KDC) which it sees as having close links with meeting the real needs of Kwazulu's people.

To conclude, it seems as though development projects can be usefully considered in terms of their association with the state and its bantustan branches, and with the organisations they work through. Development of agriculture is not only a matter of production and employment, but more especially a matter of organisation for production.

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CRITICISING CONVENTIONAL ECONOMICS

Since the coming to power of the PW Botha administration, more and more has been heard about 'free enterprise', a 'free market' and 'market forces'. Indeed, one is asked to believe that if only capitalism was not so constrained by government and legislation, poverty and racism would disappear.

FUAD CASSIEM examines the economic theory which lies behind this kind of thinking. Conventional economics is one of the most mystified and jargonised of social theories, and Cassiem has attempted to present it simply and with a minimum of technical jargon.

Through a critique of orthodox economic thought, Cassiem is able to show that the policies which it puts forward can neither eradicate racism in society, nor alter the grossly unequal distribution of income which is part of South Africa's class and racial structure.

'Free enterprise and a free market benefit all that is best in capitalism. They especially benefit the consumer. We, therefore, welcome the government's moves towards these freedoms'.
-Chairman of a large industrial group.

'The shifting of a significantly larger proportion of the country's resources into defence....can be regarded....above all as a guarantee of the system of free enterprise'.
-Paratus, magazine of the Defence Force.

The aim of this article is to attempt a critique of conventional economic thought in a society where strong racial divisions exist. It is not a vulgar or crude attempt at dismissing orthodox economics altogether. To assume that orthodox economic theory only attempts to justify and mystify capitalist relations would lessen our understanding of the capitalist economy itself.

In recent years, state economic policy has witnessed a shift towards the principles of the free market. This is evident in official statements, government commissions, and the growing partnership between government and the private sector (as shown in the Carlton Centre and Good Hope conferences).

The free market is an economic system which bases itself on the belief that free choice exists, and that individuals act in their own self-interest. The allocation and distribution of resources is therefore decided through the operation of the market. Proponents of the free market system argue that the role of government intervention in the economy should be kept to a minimum.

The recent shift in state economic policy towards a free market perspective raises a number of questions for the path of South Africa's economic development.

To understand the implications of current economic policy, it is necessary to know something about the background from which such policy measures come. Broadly, current economic thinking takes its cue from neoclassical or orthodox theory which bases itself on the ideology of a free, fluid and competitive market.

This is the basis for the emerging alliance between big business and the state. This alliance is based on the hope that free enterprise will generate growth and thus contain the pressures and contradictions which show themselves in the form of strikes, education boycotts, etc. At the same time, the emergence of a black middle class is seen as essential to give legitimacy to South Africa's racially engulfed capitalism.

It is therefore important to trace the origins of this orthodox or neoclassical ideology and evaluate what it has to say. Its implications

for the mass of society, in particular regarding the distribution of income, is the major concern of this article.

NEOCLASSICAL (ORTHODOX) ECONOMICS

Modern neoclassical theory dates from the 1870s. It takes as its starting point the individual unit. The individual is seen as the key decision-making unit.

The theory suggests that individuals acting through markets make decisions rationally, that is, they maximise their own self-interest. It is assumed that since human wants or desires are unlimited, and resources are limited, people will attempt to maximise their interests. Orthodox economics is therefore defined as the study of scarce resources to meet unlimited ends.

Individual units or agents refer to firms or consumers, and are assumed to behave in response to the market mechanism. So within the terminology of neoclassical economics, 'Rockefellers and share-croppers are both households, GM and the corner grocery are both firms'.

Rational decision-making means that consumers maximise utility (satisfaction), and firms maximise profits subject to certain constraints.

Utility is simply another word for usefulness and expresses the desire of consumers who buy commodities. Since each person's utility differs, that is to say it varies with the amount of satisfaction gained from a commodity, it is a subjective concept. Orthodoxy assumes that the maximisation of utility is the ultimate good, and the way to achieve this is through a competitive market economy.

The essence of rational behaviour, according to orthodox economics, is the maximisation of either utility or profits by units or agents.

This theory can be traced back to Adam Smith's notion of the 'invisible hand', which refers to the free-play of market forces. According to Smith, every person is naturally self-interested. This means that if each individual works towards his own self-interest, it will be to the interest and betterment of society. The welfare of society is therefore seen as bound up with that of the individual. The 'invisible hand' (ie the market) thus promotes the maximum growth and welfare for society as a whole.

How, according to this theory, does the market or free enterprise operate? The market is set to operate if buyers and sellers are able to establish a market and trade profitably with each other. One of the necessary conditions is that buyers and sellers must be able to agree on a price for a given commodity. A second condition of free enterprise is that prices should respond to and be determined by the forces of supply and demand.

Now the idea of the invisible hand should be more apparent. The price system is the arena of self-interest, and sellers and buyers interact through the market, by responding to price signals. Sellers whose aim is to maximise profits will increase the output of their product when prices rise. On the other hand, buyers who attempt to maximise satisfaction will purchase more as prices decrease. Thus supply and demand pull in opposite directions. If supply exceeds demand prices fall, and vice versa. Prices, in other words, act as signals or pieces of information to buyers (consumers) and sellers (firms). They then adjust their actions in relation to changing prices.

What follows from this is that the price system decentralises economic decision making, since buyers and sellers acting as atomised or isolated individuals respond to prices.

It is argued that a market system works because it provides signals (prices) and if people are rational, they act on these signals. This is the essence of the market or decentralised decision-making, which was earlier referred to as the 'invisible hand'.

If the market is allowed to operate in a free and competitive manner through the forces of supply and demand (which determine prices), resources will be allocated efficiently and the economy will reach 'equilibrium'. Equilibrium is reached when supply balances with demand, the notion of equilibrium suggesting a

state of harmony and peace.

On this logic, if everything is left to the market society will be ultimately harmonious, and resources will be allocated efficiently. It follows that all phenomena which disturb the market (or act as obstacles to the forces of supply and demand) are regarded as imperfections. Orthodox economics operates under very strict assumptions and conditions; if they do not exist, there are serious disturbances in this model of the way the economy works.

CHOICES AND CONSTRAINTS

To expand on some important neo-classical propositions, and to understand their implications, one has to examine the theory in greater detail.

Essentially the economy is seen as being made up of two interacting decision-making units. These are individuals (or households) and firms. Individuals supply their labour to firms who in return produce goods (or outputs) which people demand.

Since individuals supply their labour, they receive a return. This is the wage. On the one side, firms pay labour in terms of its productivity. This part of the theory claims that each individual will be rewarded in terms of the contribution they make to the firm's output. On the other hand, individuals choose freely between leisure and work (the choice of not supplying labour obviously implies the freedom to choose starvation). Finally, conventional economics attempts to integrate the demand for labour and supply of labour, and once again the market determines an equilibrium wage.

This theory of the way in which income is distributed is thus part of a general theory of prices. Distribution is determined by market mechanisms, and individual agents interact through markets. The theory assumes a competitive economy where different individuals have initial endowments, 'a polite and covert way of referring to property holdings'. Initial endowment refers to an individual's money income and other resources.

What conventional theory is really saying is that people make choices within certain constraints, and that the constraints are technical rather than social matters. Everything else, for example initial endowments, preferences and technology, fall outside the economic system and are simply taken as given.

If we take all these factors (initial endowments, preferences and technology as given), then the allocation of resources is determined by the market. This implies that we cannot change the real world. So the income of any individual depends on his/her initial resources and the price that they can command on the market.

More recently, neoclassical theory has suggested that individual earnings are determined by investment in education and on-the-job training. Through this it is argued that poverty and inequality result from the failure of individuals to invest in themselves.

In short, conventional economics bases itself on individual choice and markets which determine prices. Prices play a central role in deciding what is produced, how it is produced, and also how personal income is distributed. This results in a theory which 'relieves politics and property of any responsibility for the existing division of earnings and patterns of consumption, no small coup in the ideological fray'.

A CRITIQUE OF CONVENTIONAL ECONOMICS

Orthodox economics takes the existing social system for granted. It is basically a theory of how markets work and allocate resources. Within this framework it analyses tendencies towards equilibrium, which means it searches for harmony among different units, agents, classes, etc. It rules out class conflict and assumes that change is smooth and gradual. This stems from the subjective and individualistic nature of the theory.

If we take any given distribution of resources and income, it is possible to show within the logic of orthodox theory that the operation of the free market maximises the returns of different agents. The problem, however, is that unless you can show

that the existing distribution of income is fair, you cannot come to a moral justification of the market mechanism.

The distribution of income is supposedly determined by the market. Orthodox theory accordingly rules out specific institutional mechanisms or the relations between classes or the role of the state, which is assumed to play a passive role. 'Thus these economic phenomena are above politics, and beyond interference by the state or any other interested parties, and since the state cannot have much effect, it also has little responsibility for the present economic ills of society'.

Since orthodox theory takes individual endowment as given, it cannot explain where these endowments come from and how preferences are determined. Hence a serious answer to the problem of maldistribution of income cannot be found. Orthodox theory 'simply states that an individual chooses to do (and have) what he most prefers to do (or have) at any point in time. This is obviously completely circular. People do what they most prefer to do. What people most prefer to do is what they do. There is no way out of this circularity without a theory of what determines people's tastes and how they do or do not change over time'.

A more serious criticism of conventional economics suggests that it cannot analyse social change since it takes the existing social order for granted. Thus, changes in the global economy, the development towards monopoly capitalism are outside the bounds of orthodox economics and hence regarded as irrelevant.

Since orthodox analysis places emphasis on resource allocation, it is regarded as institution-free. 'In other words, the analysis can be given an organisational interpretation which can incorporate any desired framework; it is consequently immediately applicable both to present-day economies of complexly institutional persuasions, and to economies of the past whose institutional structures have long since disappeared'.

This a-historical approach of orthodox economics makes it unable to analyse change, how society is changing and what forces cause change. It's individualistic nature denies it the possibility of grasping why different societies exist, and transition takes place from one form to another (eg feudalism to capitalism). It has been suggested that 'individualism is a theoretical obstacle to the comprehension of the reality of classes, of the appropriation by one class of the unpaid labour of the other'. Individuals cannot be analysed in isolation from the society they live in. So-called units or agents are part of a social structure, individuals exist within classes. This brings up the notion of power (ie to extract wealth). The individual as an entity is unable to control the environment or variables around his/her existence.

Orthodox economics gives priority to exchange relations, ie to the buying and selling of commodities through the market. Orthodoxy is in this sense basically interested in understanding a certain aspect of social reality and not its totality. It fails to deal with the links between different spheres of society, ie production, exchange and distribution. It concerns itself with how consumers maximise utility, how firms maximise profits, how governments allocate resources.

These are not unimportant questions, but they involve only one sphere of social systems and relegate all else to outside forces. Orthodox or conventional economics thus results in a misconception of the inner reality, of the way in which society works.

ORTHODOXY: RELEVANT OR NOT?

How does this conventional way of looking at economics affect a racially-based society like South Africa? More specifically, what is the relevance of the neoclassical framework to altering the inequality in income distribution?

The burning question of income distribution confronts most societies. But South Africa is an unusual case because active state legislation has woven itself into the very texture and fabric of society.

What is of immediate interest is the relatively recent shift in

state policy whereby an offensive has been mounted to give more play to market forces within South African society.

Although the word 'income' has many meanings, it still represents the simplest overall measure of different standards of living between various population groups. Income differences represent differences in purchasing power (ie the ability to buy commodities in the market). However, it should be borne in mind that a single index like income cannot capture the impact of racism in all its forms, ie politically, ideologically, culturally, socially and economically. Nevertheless, racism does take on a dominantly economic form and is rooted in the economic system, especially when workers enter the labour market.

In so far as race discrimination is concerned, the standard neo-classical response is that it is a result of individual tastes or preferences. It is like saying that some people have a taste for cakes as opposed to bread. Discrimination is relegated to a simple choice-making problem - choosing one alternative means excluding the other.

Orthodox economists try to separate various forms of racial discrimination, such as pure wage discrimination, consumer discrimination, employer and employee discrimination. But this separation misrepresents reality because the different forms of discrimination are not independent of each other. 'The processes are not simply additive but are mutually reinforcing. Often a decrease in one narrow form of discrimination is accompanied by an increase in another form, since all aspects of racism interact in a unified manner'.

Treating preferences as given does not really explain much. It just results in circular arguments. Moreover, a major weakness of the orthodox response to discrimination is its inability to recognise the power factor exerted by the state, capital, institutions, and the role of classes.

To meaningfully understand the problem of racism one has to go beyond the individual and the market, and seek an analysis of wider forces shaping society.

While conventional economic thinking suggests that income is governed by individual worth and ability, the mode of economic development in South Africa tells us that the ability to accumulate wealth and income has been systematically curtailed from the dominated black population.

Conservative economists, the arch-guru being Milton Friedman, see racism as irrational, and argue that competition between employers eliminates race discrimination. Since employers are profit maximisers, race, colour and creed are unimportant. Thus the race factor is not a rational criterion in the decision to maximise profits. Employers, on this argument, think in terms of minimising costs only. If black labour was cheaper, employers as rational profit maximisers will hire more black as opposed to white labour. Capitalism is therefore the answer to race discrimination.

Liberal economists are more cautious about the ability and efficacy of the market and thus, in part, pin their hopes on state intervention to eliminate discrimination. The state, according to these theorists, should intervene as a last resort, when the market fails.

The difference between liberal and conventional economics is thus not substantial, but one of degree, for liberal economists do not see the state and private sector as antagonistic but as supportive of one another.

Friedman's philosophy suggests that all regulatory controls by government on behalf of the public should be abandoned and the market mechanism allowed to work freely. Government intervention merely usurps individual freedom and therefore capitalism and the market are necessary conditions for political freedom.

In contrast to this, Macpherson suggests that capitalism is not a necessary condition for political freedom since the market does not inherently lead to offsetting of political power by economic power. 'What can be shown is an inherent probability in the other direction, ie that the market leads to political power being used not to offset but reinforce economic power. For the

more completely the market takes over the organisation of economic activity, that is, the more nearly society approximates Friedman's ideal of a competitive market capitalist society, where the state establishes and enforces the individual right of appropriation and the rules of the market but does not interfere in the operation of the market, the more completely is political power being used to reinforce economic power'.

If Friedman's model of capitalism and freedom is viewed with respect to Chile, then one witnesses capitalism woven with repression. Similarly, with respect to South Africa where the dominated majority is excluded from the political process, the free market cannot resolve conflict. In terms of the conventional model, discrimination takes the form of free choice: the interests of the dominant minority are therefore maintained by their freedom to exclude blacks.

South Africa, as opposed to more advanced countries, is more reliant on blatant racism and repression. Thus, the freedom to exclude blacks from certain jobs, trading centres, residential areas, educational opportunities etc, is a freedom which the white minority uses to discriminate and turn the patterns of accumulation to their own interests. The free forces of the market function on their behalf.

STATE REFORM AND ECONOMIC ORTHODOXY

The state has certainly moved ahead with its reformist policy in a number of spheres; the labour market (Wiehahn and Riekert), education and training (de Lange), co-optation through the President's Council, etc. To tackle each of these on their own is not within the scope of this analysis. However, some of the general claims made by the free marketeers can nonetheless be questioned.

The central claim of the intellectual vanguard of conservative economic thinking is that the removal of government intervention in the economy will lead to rapid growth and a stable black bourgeoisie.

What needs to be noted is that South Africa's occupational structure includes only about 97 000 blacks in the top occupational categories (professional and administrative). Even within this category a sizeable number are teachers and nurses. Hence, with a mere 3% of blacks at the top end of the labour market, the growth of a viable middle class seems trivial.

What kind of impact can the proposals flowing from the Wiehahn, Riekert and de Lange reports - which give the appearance of de-racialising society - have?

Statistically, at a growth rate of 5%, no more than 8,7% of the economically active black population would occupy 'supervisory' or 'mental' positions by 1990. According to Rob Davies, this restructuring in the labour market 'will lead to a situation in which the "vanguard" of the black population "overtakes" the rearguard of the white population'. The ruling class in South Africa is a small cohesive group and since their domination has been historically rooted and asserted, there is no reason why some blacks cannot be coopted as partners without altering the logic and form of racial capitalism. In fact, this is in the interests of the state and capital so as not to disturb the equilibrium of the existing social order and thereby contain disruptive change.

It is also suggested that educational reforms can alleviate the earnings gap between black and white. Since blacks accumulate a *lower stock of human capital*, the market rewards them with lower earnings. However, this can only explain part of the earnings gap.

If we consider the implications of the de Lange proposals for income distribution, it is evident that the emphasis is shifting to the individual, the community and capital to finance education, thereby shortening the length of formal education. What this means is that income differences between races can increase instead of narrow since those that cannot be subsidised will be made more vulnerable. This kind of perception stems from the individualistic basis of human capital theory which fails to look at variables like race, class, sex, etc, which are outside of the

individual's control.

At this particular time, the domestic economy is going through one of its slow growth phases. This means high unemployment, inflation and a squeeze on living standards. What does this mean for those free marketeers whose hopes are pinned on the ideology of growth and non-discrimination? While it cannot be denied that economic growth provides a means to re-distribute income and absorb more workers into the labour force, it is equally true that years of unprecedented growth have not resulted in a significant material improvement for the black working class.

To change the pattern of income distribution or the share of the national cake requires fundamental shifts in political decision-making and priorities. And this is inconceivable within the present political power base.

IN CONCLUSION

Any theory which attempts to explain and understand the reality of society and not merely tinker with surface aspects has to look at the historical, institutional and structural development of that society. The very opposite has been the fate of conventional neoclassical economics which views racism as external to the economic system. It simply substitutes a psychological explanation such as 'tastes for discrimination' and thus renders orthodoxy quite tasteless.

Radical analysis has certainly cast greater light by attempting to provide a mutually interactive theory of race and class in its investigation of capitalism.

It has to be grasped that capitalism is a system of power enforced through the state and the market. And in a society where legal and political institutions give land, capital and the labour of the working class to one section of the population, market forces will only consolidate that power.

Capitalism is what it is because some have capital and others do not. Those without capital have to subordinate themselves and work for those that possess capital. This is the point that neoclassical economics misses.

For South Africa with its complex socio-economic order, the orthodox economist can offer very little apart from piecemeal tinkering with the economy. Orthodoxy relies on the maximum free play of market forces to enable individuals to enhance their earnings. But this merely shifts the burden. For to admit that racism and inequality are structurally generated means that their eradication involves uprooting the socio-economic structure of society. In this sense the conventional neoclassical position can be regarded as an apology for the status quo since it defends certain institutions and privileges.

If the alliance between the state and big capital believe that market forces can resolve inequality, it is treading a dangerous path. There is indeed a strong ideological offensive at work to show that capitalism provides the path to milk and honey. But honey is derived from bees that sting. Those stung by the state's bee will be the poor, the uneducated, the unemployed and marginalised workers.

SOME READING

Those interested in exploring some of the issues in this article will find some of the following of interest:

R. Davies, 'Capital Restructuring and the Modification of the Racial Division of Labour in South Africa', Journal of Southern African Studies, 5 (2), April 1979.

F Green, 'Ideology, Knowledge and Neoclassical Economics: a critique', in Issues in Political Economy, (ed) F Green and P Nore.

S Himmelweit, 'The Individual as a basic unit of Analysis', in Economics: an anti-text, (ed) F Green and P Nore.

CB Macpherson, Democratic Theory: essays in retrieval.

E Nell, 'Economics: the revival of political economy', in Ideology and Social Science, (ed) R Blackburn.

M Reich, 'The Economics of Racism', in The Capitalist System, (ed) RC Edwards et al.

FORTHCOMING

THE REPORT OF THE SURPLUS PEOPLE PROJECT

The most up-to-date and comprehensive account of forced removals in South Africa yet published.

Since the early 1960s the South African state has uprooted and relocated well over 3,5-million people in the name of apartheid. It is estimated that at least 2-million more face the threat of removal. The people who have been moved have, with the exception of a tiny number of whites, been black: debarred from participating in the government that enforces the regulations which govern these removals.

Despite the massive scale of these removals, and their devastating effect on so many South Africans, by 1980 only one detailed study on relocation had been published: Cosmas Desmond's 'The Discarded People'. And while the press was playing an active role in high-lighting issues such as the Crossroads affair, there was little coverage of the rural areas, where access was difficult and removals were often taking place with no publicity at all.

The Surplus People Project was initiated in February 1980 in an attempt to investigate and publicise removals on a national level. Their five-volume report, shortly to be released, is the most up-to-date and most comprehensive account of forced removals in South Africa yet published.

VOLUME ONE contains a brief overview of forced removals, a historical background to the process, a detailed section on removals and the law and a section on the questionnaires used in the SPP fieldwork.

VOLUME TWO covers the eastern Cape and concentrates on the Ciskei, where some of the worst conditions in the country occur - extremely high unemployment, little economic activity, a very dense population and a particularly reprehensible bantustan administration.

VOLUME THREE covers the western Cape, northern Cape and Orange Free State: thousands of people are endorsed out of the western Cape alone every year in an attempt to implement the Coloured Labour Preference Area policy.

VOLUME FOUR covers Natal, where farm evictions and group areas removals have already been very extensive, but removals for the consolidation of KwaZulu have barely begun, and there are still some 189 black spots to be moved.

VOLUME FIVE covers the Transvaal with its six bantustans, where the position is so confusing that in some areas even the people living there are unsure whether they live in Gazankulu or Lebowa, Venda or Gazankulu, Lebowa or KwaNdebele.

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INFORMATION labour legislation

PAUL BENJAMIN discusses some important changes in labour legislation during 1982; and CLIVE THOMPSON looks at the implications of recent decisions made by the Industrial Court.

By the standards of recent years there was little change in the labour statutes in 1982. In both 1979 and 1981 the Labour Relations Act was extensively overhauled, but in 1982 only one amendment of consequence was enacted. Proposed further changes to the Act were published for comment late in the year and the National Manpower Commission circulated two memoranda which indicated its thinking on further changes to the industrial relations system. 1982 also saw the publication of the Rabie Report which had direct consequences for the labour field with the enactment of the Intimidation Act.

THE 1982 LABOUR RELATIONS AMENDMENT ACT

The major part of this Act was devoted to altering certain of the powers of the Industrial Court. The Court was established as a result of the recommendations contained in the first part of the Wiehahn Commission Report. It was envisaged by the Commission as being a quick and cheap way of resolving industrial disputes. The Court was to be chaired by Wiehahn himself, but he resigned before he could hear a case and was replaced by one Parsons, a magistrate.

The Court, in its judgements, has manifested a singular view of its powers and functions. It held, in a 1981 case, that it was not a Court of the first instance, that is, that it could not be approached directly but only on appeal. In the Court's view, the correct *procedure for parties wishing to* resolve disputes by legal means, is to refer it to the appropriate institution under the Labour Relations Act. In an industry with an Industrial Council (IC) the Council would have to be approached. In other industries the party would have to apply for the establishment of a Conciliation Board. Only once an attempt has been made to settle the dispute at this level can the Court be approached.

This clearly makes nonsense of the Court's role as a convenient means of resolving labour disputes. It has made itself a court of appeal that can only be approached once the involved procedures in the Act have been exhausted.

One effect of this view is that the Court cannot give interim relief while the matter is being resolved in one of these bodies. For instance, if a dispute concerns the dismissal of workers the Court could not order the reinstatement of the workers until the resolution of the dispute.

The Minister of Manpower has previously possessed the power to grant such relief in the form of a 'status quo' order. Where the dismissal of workers is in dispute he could order the re-employment of the workers, pending the resolution of the dispute. Where the dispute concerns a change of conditions of work, the employer can be ordered to restore the previous conditions.

These powers have now been given to the Industrial Court. Once a dispute has been referred to an Industrial Council or application has been made for the establishment of a Conciliation Board, a party may ask the Court to grant such an order.

This change is clearly a response to the unsatisfactory development of the Industrial Court and the fact that it has been so infrequently used in the last three years. For the strategy initiated by the Wiehahn Report to succeed it is essential that unions utilise the statutory mechanisms for dispute resolution.

A well-functioning Industrial Court is viewed by the state not only as a means of avoiding industrial unrest, but as a flexible institution allowing for swift responses to changes in the labour climate. This is not to say that the potential use of these new remedies will not have the effect of acting as an important threat to employers not to take certain actions in particular industrial disputes.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT

Far more interesting are the changes contained in a Bill published for comment in August 1982. In terms of this Bill unregistered trade unions will be able, for the first time, to apply for Conciliation Boards.

A Conciliation Board is a meeting held between management and labour under the chairpersonship of a Manpower Department official and, generally, in respect of a particular dispute.

A party to a dispute may apply to the Minister for the establishment of such a Board. If the application is granted, the other party is obliged to participate in the Board. If the Board cannot settle the dispute the work force will be able to stage a legal strike. The Minister enjoys a discretion as to whether to grant the application. If the dispute is in an essential service or if it concerns an unfair labour practice, the Minister must grant the application, provided certain criteria are met. In all other cases the Minister may establish, or refuse to establish, the Board. Where the Minister is aware of a dispute, but neither party applies for a Conciliation Board, he may require the parties to participate in one.

Currently, a registered trade union may apply for a Conciliation Board in a dispute where it is representative of the workers. Groups of employees who are not members of a registered union could make such an application but the Board could only deal with the dispute in respect of the workers who had actually made applications. In terms of the proposed changes an unregistered union may now apply for a Conciliation Board, if it represents more than half the workers.

The Conciliation Board, together with the Industrial Council, forms the basis of the South African industrial relations system. These structures were both created by the initial Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924.[2] While the Industrial Council allows for ongoing negotiation and dispute resolution, the Conciliation Board is intended for the resolution of particular disputes. A recent illustration of its use is found in the recognition dispute in 1981 between the Chemical Workers' Industrial Union and Colgate-Palmolive. Here the union used the Board as a way of forcing a recalcitrant employer to meet with the union. The outcome of the dispute was that the union gained recognition from the company. More recently, the Mine Workers' Union applied for a Board in its dispute with the Chamber of Mines.

While it is dangerous to read too much into legislative changes, what this represents in state terms is a significant change to one of the key institutions of its industrial relations framework. In 1979 unions with african membership were allowed for the first time to register. In return for the advantages of participation in, inter alia, the Industrial Council system it was assumed they would register and thus submit to the 'controls' in the Act. This did not occur to the extent that the state had counted on and in 1981 many of these 'controls' were extended to unregistered unions.

In one way this proposed change is a logical consequence of the changes made in 1981. As the 'controls' in the Act apply to unregistered unions, the potential use of the Conciliation Board is no longer needed as a means of inducing unions to register.

THE INTIMIDATION ACT

One of the findings of the Rabie Commission into security legislation was that the law dealing with acts of intimidation, particularly in situations of political and industrial unrest, was not severe enough. As a result the new Intimidation Act was passed in 1982 which defined a wide range of actions as being intimidation, making perpetrators liable for imprisonment of up to ten years and/or a fine of up to R20 000.

Intimidation covers a number of acts committed with the intention of getting somebody else (not necessarily the person to whom the act is done) to do something or not to do something, or to change his opinion or to adopt a certain opinion. It will amount to intimidation if this is attempted by violence or threats of violence or by causing damage or threatening to do so. The damage threatened need not be physical and can, for instance, be financial. These types of actions will not amount to intimidation where the person involved can prove he has a 'lawful reason' for committing the act.

The state has not been slow to use this legislation in industrial

situations. By the end of 1982 numerous cases were pending against union activists in northern Natal and on the east Rand for alleged acts of intimidation committed during strikes. (To date - March 1983 - only one of these cases has resulted in a conviction. In most cases the charges were withdrawn - often even before the case began. In the Transvaal Donsie Khumalo, charged with intimidation during a strike at De Luxe Laundry, was acquitted. In the eastern Cape two workers were charged under the Act - one received a suspended fine of R200, or 120 days, and the other was acquitted.

Lawyers defending workers in these cases have commented on the lack of convictions. Speculation is that the state has insufficient evidence for the charges to stick. Their experience has been that managements have used 'impimpis' (informers) to testify as to having been bribed or threatened to go on strike. When the case reaches the court the impimpi is often no longer prepared to testify.)

This is not the limit to the Act's potential use. It has, clearly, been designed to cover a wide range of activities, such as the threat of economic boycotts against particular employers. At this level, the Act can be seen as a response to the significant number of boycotts launched by unions and conducted with community support.

DEVELOPMENTS IN CASE LAW[3]

One particularly significant development took place in the interpretation by the South African courts of labour legislation. A dismissal of a worker for trade union activity is victimisation and an act of victimisation has no legal force or effect.

This has been part of our law for a considerable period of time but in a number of judgements since 1975 the courts have held that despite this they could not order the employer to re-employ the workers. The ironic situation, therefore, existed that if an employer threatened to victimise the workers a court could restrain him from doing so, but that once the victimisation had taken place the courts could do nothing to assist the workers.

This situation has now been altered by a judgement in the Transvaal Supreme Court. The courts will be able to order employers to take back into employment workers who have been dismissed in circumstances amounting to victimisation. In addition, the employer may well be liable for the workers' wages for the period during which they were unemployed.

The irony of this situation is that this right was accorded to workers in a case involving an individual white worker in the early 1950s. It has taken the courts another 30 years to accord this right to black workers.

NOTES

1. That is, of course, not to say that the use of the court per se by unions represents any victory for the state. The possibility does exist for gains to be made through the selective and strategic use of the court. The strategy of the state can only succeed if the use of the Court, or any other institution, is seen as a substitute for organisational struggle.
2. On this see Davies, R - Capital, State and White Labour in South Africa (Harvester, 1979:162-9).
3. National Union of Textile Workers v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd. The judgement was an appeal from the case reported in the 1982 Industrial Law Journal at 39.

RECENT LABOUR CASES

In the past few months there have been three cases decided in the Industrial Court with important labour implications. Two have involved the new section 43, or 'status quo', provision in the Labour Relations Act (see previous article by Paul Benjamin, p 46), while the third involved an unfair labour practice.*

In Southern African Society of Journalists (David Bleazard) v Argus, SAAN and others, the SASJ applied to court for an interim order requiring the newspaper companies to remain members of a negotiating forum which the parties had been using for the past 40 years, and to negotiate in

good faith towards the conclusion of a 1983 agreement covering the journalists' terms of employment. The newspaper companies had given notice of their intention to leave the forum because they were unhappy about the way it was functioning, and intended to bargain instead with journalists on an individual and regional basis.

The court found for the journalists and the effect of the decision was that an employer was ordered to bargain with an unregistered but representative union on terms of employment. As the court qualified its findings, the decision is of procedural rather than substantive importance. The court noted that a section 43 order lasts for a maximum of 90 days only and does not finally determine the issues between the parties. Accordingly, although at a full and final hearing it might not decide that a failure to negotiate constitutes an unfair labour practice, the court was prepared to restore the status quo which existed before the dispute arose (and therefore the established bargaining practice) on an interim basis. The dispute has yet to be finally settled.

In Metal and Allied Workers' Union (MAWU) v Stobar Reinforcing Pty Ltd, 50 workers had been dismissed for allegedly participating in a 'go slow' (which falls within the definition of a strike in the Labour Relations Act).

Although the decision is not unequivocal, the court intimated that dismissals in a collective context should be for just cause only (ie because of incompetence or misconduct by the worker, or because of the operational requirements of the enterprise). The court also found that the onus of establishing just cause lies with the employer. In the event, the court found that Stobar had not established the misconduct which it alleged and all those dismissed were reinstated in their jobs pending a final settlement.

Read with the SASJ decision, it appears that the court has made it procedurally easy for an applicant to get status quo relief if the other party (usually management) has changed the employment relationship unilaterally.

In National Union of Textile Workers (NUTW) v Braitex Pty Ltd, the company had attempted to push through a number of labour changes unilaterally: several retrenchments, elimination of a bonus system, and others. The union, which had a limited recognition agreement, resisted these actions and brought a number of alleged unfair labour practices to the industrial court. The company acceded to the claims under court pressure and agreed to a deed of settlement, which was made an order of court. This involved a number of interesting provisions. These included an undertaking by the company to inform the union of any proposed changes in the terms of employment one month in advance, and also to afford bargaining rights to the majority union at the company only. The court has therefore sanctioned bargaining at plant level, despite the existence of an industrial council in the particular industry. The company also agreed to reinstate the retrenched workers and to pay R40 000 to those affected by the company's actions.

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* 'Unfair labour practice' means
(a) any labour practice or any change in any labour practice, other than a strike or a lockout which has or may have the effect that
(i) any employee or class of employees is or may be unfairly affected or that his or their employment opportunities, work security or physical, economic, moral or social welfare is or may be prejudiced or jeopardised thereby;
(ii) the business of any employer or class of employers is or may be unfairly affected or disrupted thereby;
(iii) labour unrest is or may be created thereby;
(iv) the relationship between employer and employee is or may be detrimentally affected thereby;
(b) any other labour practice or any other change in any labour practice which has or may have an effect which is similar or related to any effect mentioned in paragraph (a).

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labour action

EASTERN CAPE
Company: Britas Bakery
Date: 25 February
Workers: 240
Union: Food, Beverage and Allied Workers
About 200 van assistants were asked to work overtime due to a power failure. They refused and went home, leaving 40 drivers without their delivery crews. The drivers also decided, under the circumstances, to go home.

The Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage area was hit by a scarcity of bread during the weekend. On Monday morning the workers were still on strike. Retailers arrived to collect their bread, and the drivers again decided to go home.

The following day, however, the strikers returned to work. According to management the dispute had been amicably settled and promised that no disciplinary action would be taken against the workers.

Company: Eastern Cape Agricultural Co-op Creamery (Queenstown)
Date: 9 March
Workers: 179
Union: African Food and Canning Workers' Union (AFCWU)
The entire workforce downed tools in protest against management's refusal to recognise the AFCWU. All workers were dismissed, and management stated that new workers had been employed. Two members of the AFCWU have been charged under the Intimidation Act as a result of the strike (see section on labour legislation).

The union has drawn attention to the working conditions at the creamery. In addition to workers being insulted there have been several cases of assault. One worker's jaw was broken when he arrived late for work. Another was shot in the leg at work, and then dismissed. Foremen at the creamery carried guns (RDM, 16.03.83).

Company: Fry's Metals (near East London)
Date: 24 February
Workers: -
Union: South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU)
A work stoppage occurred at this firm, previously owned by Chloride (SA). Chloride was the first company ever to recognise SAAWU. The new owners at Fry's decided to honour the recognition agreement on Chloride's advice. Both management and the union have declined to comment on the reasons behind the stoppage, although it has been suggested that it is over union recognition (RDM, 26.02.83).

Company: OK Bazaars (Port Elizabeth - Walmer, Main Street and Greenacres branches)
Date: 20 February-9 March
Workers: over 100
Union: Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union (CCAWUSA)
Workers at the OK Main Street cafeteria stopped work in protest at the dismissal of one of their colleagues, Betty Dali. Staff at the Greenacres and Walmer branch cafeterias joined the strike shortly afterwards. OK Bazaars and CCAWUSA were in the process of negotiating a recognition agreement when the strike began. Management was under the impression that an agreed appeal procedure over dismissals was already valid, although the agreement had not yet been signed.

According to management, workers agreed to return to work on 23 February pending an official appeal over the dismissal. The workers did not return on that day. By 26 February OK suspended recognition talks pending the outcome of the strike. This put future bargaining relationships between OK and the union in serious jeopardy.

The union denied that it had promised OK that the strikers would return to work pending an appeal. CCAWUSA claimed that the fact that it had not lodged an appeal was not a breach of any agreement between itself and the company.

According to CCAWUSA there had been no agreement providing for implementation of any part of the talks until the final recognition agreement was signed.

By 9 March management was still adamant that it would not reinstate Betty Dali. The workers decided at that point to end their three-week strike. That day 66 of the 113 strikers returned to work. CCAWUSA's Emma Mashinini said that she was confident that the recognition talks were not in danger.

The following day all of the workers returned to work. They were not paid for the period during their strike. Their dismissed colleague, Betty Dali, was being treated for nervous stress after she had heard of management's decision not to re-employ her.

According to a union spokesperson, however, the strike had shown management 'the role a union plays'. He said that Betty Dali's case would still be pursued by the Johannesburg office.

TRANSVAAL

Company: Gallo (Bedfordview)
Date: 1 February
Workers: 100
Union: CCAWUSA
Following two brief strikes during October and January (see WIP 25:46) a further week-long strike occurred at the warehouse of Gallo Africa (a subsidiary of the Premier Milling Group) during the first week of February.

It was sparked by the retrenchment of four workers, including a union shop steward - most of the workers are members of CCAWUSA. Workers had previously asked that they be consulted over retrenchments and they felt that the motive behind these was victimisation.

The strike, which took place during recognition talks with CCAWUSA, began on Tuesday 1 February. After refusing to return to work the 100 strikers were dismissed.

Later in the week, after talks with the union, Gallo agreed to reinstate the workers - other than the four who had been retrenched. The return to work was delayed as workers initially refused to accept the condition that they sign 'final warnings'. However, they returned to work the following Wednesday.

Preparations are now being made for a referendum amongst workers at three Gallo plants where they will vote on whether they wish CCAWUSA to be recognised as their representative union.

Company: Glendower Golf Course (near Johannesburg)
Date: early March
Workers: ?
Union: -
Two greens at this golf course were dug up during the night by dissident caddies. According to notes left near the greens the caddies were dissatisfied because some competitors in the R40 000 Kodak Classic golf tournament had brought their own caddies, a number of them being white. The damage was extensive. About 200 shovelfulls of turf had been dug up and workers spent about two hours patching up the greens (N Witness, 03.03.83).

Company: Landdrost Hotel
Date: 22 March
Workers: 100
Union: CCAWUSA
Employees stopped work in protest against management's appointment of a worker outside of the hotel staff to a position. When management agreed later that day to transfer the newly appointed employee and give the job to a Landdrost staff member, the strikers returned to work (RDM, 24.03.83).

Company: Putco
Date: 16 February
Workers: 250
Union: Transport and General Workers' Union and the Transport and Allied Workers' Union
Putco bus drivers went on strike in protest against the fact that management refused to transfer or dismiss a senior company official from the Wynberg depot. Bus services from Alexandra to Sandton, Johannesburg and Ferndale, and from Johannesburg to Randburg and Sandton were affected by the strike. Thousands of passengers had to use alternative means of transport that day. The drivers returned to work the following day after management agreed to hold talks over the matter.

No further news.

Company: Screenex Wire Weaving (Alberton) (For previous coverage see WIP 25:47)
Date: 10 December 1982
Workers: 140
Union: Metal and Allied Workers' Union (MAWU)
MAWU has declared a dispute with Screenex over the dismissal of workers who struck in protest against retrenchments. The union alleges that the company is guilty of 'an unfair labour practice' in dismissing the workers. In terms of the Labour Relations Act the dispute must be referred to the Industrial Council before it can be heard by the Industrial Court. If the Industrial Council fails to settle the dispute within 30 days, it may be referred to the Court.

However, Screenex is refusing to participate in the Industrial Council over the matter. It is unlikely now that the matter will be settled within the stipulated time, which leaves the Industrial Court as the only alternative for resolving the dispute (RDM, 10.03.83).

Company: The Star
Date: 24 March
Workers: About 150
Union: Media Workers Association of South Africa (MWASA)

More than 150 workers at the Star newspaper went on strike on Thursday 24 March in protest against the dismissal of a colleague. The dismissed worker had been given a final written warning in September last year for allegedly threatening the life of a black supervisor. Management promised to suspend their decision pending the outcome of an appeal lodged against the dismissal, but refused to allow the worker involved to resume work.

The following day, Star management informed the strikers that they were considered to have dismissed themselves by going on strike.

Company: Sunnyside Park Hotel
Date: 22 March
Workers: 30
Union: CCAWUSA

Workers struck in sympathy with workers at the Landdrost Hotel (see above).

Company: Towers Hotel
Date: 22 March
Workers: 50
Union: CCAWUSA

Workers struck in sympathy with the demands of other workers at the Landdrost Hotel (see above).

Company: Unilever (Boksburg) (For previous coverage see WIP 22:31; 23:54; 24:51)
Date: September 1982
Workers: about 1 000
Union: Food, Beverage and Allied Workers' Union

Negotiations, resulting out of the strike, reached deadlock. An independent arbitrator was called in in January 1983 to settle the dispute. As a result of this intervention the company has promised to pay increases from the end of March (Star, 09.02.83).

NATAL

Company: Natal African Blind Society
Date: February 1982
Workers: 56
Union: -

The workers were charged as a result of a strike last year. They were found guilty of trespassing when they returned to work after having been fired. The workers won their appeal against the suspended sentences they had been given.

Company: Ninian and Lester
Date: 9 March
Workers: 300
Union: National Union of Textile Workers (NUTW)

For previous strikes see WIP 21:55 and 23:51.

The workers downed tools because they objected to the dismissal of a senior shop steward. A further grievance was that the police had been called in to remove the man from the premises (N Witness, 10.03.83).

No further news.

Company: Safeguard (a Grindrod subsidiary)
Date: 28 February
Workers: ?
Union: CCAWUSA

Workers downed tools on Monday in support of a R350 per month minimum wage. They returned the following day after management had promised that an announcement about their demands would be made on Wednesday 2 March. This did not occur. On Friday management offered a R5 increase but workers refused this. The following Monday the workers decided to call off their strike pending a meeting which management was expected to address.

CCAWUSA was unable to hold talks with management as the company twice refused a request by the union to do so (RDM, 08.03.83).

Company: Turnall Ltd
Date: 10 March 1982
Workers: 50
Union: SAAWU

For background see WIP 22:32.

A settlement between the firm and the workers was reached after lengthy negotiations. The talks were the result of a strike over recognition when management fired 50 workers. The settlement was reached with neither side conceding the validity of the other's case (Star, 12.01.83).

Company: *Vleissentraal*
Date: July 1982
Workers: 85
Union: Sweet, Food and Allied Workers' Union

Workers struck in protest against the

dismissal of three shop stewards. According to the workers the shop stewards had been dismissed because of their union activity. Management denied this and said that the workers were being retrenched.

The company agreed to re-employ 30 of the dimissed workers in early March 1983. The workers have hailed this as a tremendous victory for them over their employers.

The union had referred the matter to the Industrial Court but the employers decided to re-employ the workers before the matter reached the Court.

According to union sources management was swayed by a recent judgement against Stobar Reinforcing (see WIP 25:48 and section on labour legislation above), compelling employers to reinstate workers who had been dismissed unfairly. Management has denied this (Star, 03.02.83).

MINING
Company: Winkelhaak Gold Mine (Evander)
Date: May 1982
Workers: 29
Union: National Union of Mineworkers
Eleven african gold miners were convicted for their involvement in an illegal strike which occurred at the mine in May 1982. Five men received three-year jail sentences, half suspended for five years; and one man received another two-year term, with nine months suspended.

Charges were withdrawn against 13 workers, one other was in hospital and four men did not appear. Warrants were issued for their arrest.

SOUTH AFRICAN TRANSPORT SERVICES (SATS)
Company: SATS (for background see WIP 24:46-8)
Date: 30.08.82 - 10.02.83
Union: General Workers' Union (GWU)
In August last year hundreds of Port Elizabeth dockers began a go-slow in an attempt to force SATS to meet with their representatives to discuss local working conditions. Union officials and members of a workers committee had unsuccessfully attempted to meet with SATS representatives for nearly a year.

Union members were questioned and harassed by Railway Police after they resigned from the in-company Black Staff Association, and some even alleged assault.

The workers were all sacked a few days after starting the go-slow and ejected from their hostels. For six months they refused to collect money owing to them, and regularly met to discuss their position.

They gained hope from the setting up of a committee by the Department of Transport Affairs to investigate the SATS, and submitted written evidence in support of their demand for talks between their representatives and SATS.

The International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), which had corresponded with SATS and government officials on the dispute for months, also submitted evidence, and attempted to do so in person as well.

By February this year the committee had not released its findings and it was clear nothing was to be gained from continuing the strike.

The international slump in shipping had hit South African ports and the trickle of traffic passing through Port Elizabeth meant the strike may have been a blessing in disguise to SATS. There was no reason for SATS to alter its position on the dispute, and the workers therefore decided to collect their money and accept their dismissal.

General Workers' Union secretary, Dave Lewis, says the organising of railway workers in the future - which represents the taking on of the state - will only be possible within a broader federation of unions. This is one of the motivating factors for the GWU'S interest in unity talks.

STATISTICS
The official figure for the number of strikes which occurred during 1982, was released by the Minister of Manpower early in March. There were 338 strikes involving african workers during 1982.

The Minister told parliament that 174 of the strikes arose from wage demands, while 21 strikes arose from wage demands coupled with other demands. Causes for the remainder were demands for the reinstatement of dismissed workers; conditions of employment; and recognition demands (RDM, 08.03.83).

Figures released by the Stellenbosch University's Professor Willie Bendix and Eddie Nicholson, put the number of strikes at over 200, involving 120 000 workers and occurring over 323 000 workdays. 45% of the strikes were over wages and 48% were closely related to wages (RDM, 15.01.83).

Industries which were most strongly affected by strikes were metal, motor, and textile. Strikes in the metal industry in the Transvaal represented 31% of the total number of strikes, while 11% of the strikes were in the motor industry and 9% in the textile industry.

Yet another source has put the number of strikes during 1982 at 281, involving 189 022 workers. It is pointed out that the number of strikes decreased from 342 in 1981. However, the number of people who took part in strike action has increased since 1981, with 92 842 being involved during that year.

The level of union involvement in strike activity during 1982 was dominated by the Metal and Allied Workers' Union (MAWU), the Commercial and Catering Workers' Union (CCAWUSA), the National Automobile and Allied Workers' Union (NAAWU), and the National Union of Textile Workers (NUTW). MAWU was involved in 46 strikes, CCAWUSA in 43 strikes, NAAWU in 28, and the NUTW in 11 strikes during 1982. There were 64 strikes where no union was involved. (The figures in the last two paragraphs were given in a paper on 'State, Reform and Working Class Resistance' in the forthcoming SARS Review of 1982 - see advertisement in this WIP).

courts

TREASON TRIALS

Cedric Radcliffe Mayson (53).
The accused faces a main count of high treason, with alternative charges under the Terrorism and Internal Security Acts.

The state alleges that Mayson conspired with the ANC to commit certain acts with the aim of overthrowing or coercing the government of South Africa.

Inter alia, Mayson is charged with having discussions with ANC officials; with distributing a tape of a speech made by ANC leader Oliver Tambo; and assisting various people to leave South Africa illegally so that they could undertake ANC or SACTU activities.

During July 1981 Mayson allegedly met ANC member Thabo Mbeki in London, where he received the following instructions: to investigate the setting up of area political activities in South Africa to co-ordinate ANC activities; to obtain information about churches and other bodies with a view to infiltrating them on behalf of the ANC; to encourage a boycott of government-created institutions; to advise people to refuse to serve in the SADF; to recruit people for the ANC; to determine targets for sabotage; to examine the possibility of storing weapons in churches; to obtain information about various people in South Africa and supply this to the ANC.

During September/October 1981 Mayson allegedly held discussions with Jabu Ngwenya, Frank Chikane, Auret van Heerden, CF Beyers Naude and someone referred to as Norman on the possible formation of ANC political committees within South Africa.

At his trial, Mayson pleaded not guilty to all charges. Former BOSS spy and now security policeman Karl Edwards testified for the state. He claimed that he joined the ANC in 1977, and set up an escape route to Botswana, established a courier network and gathered intelligence for the ANC.

During 1976 he assisted a banned person, Chris Wood, to escape from South Africa, and the following year delivered a letter from Wood to Mayson. This letter urged Mayson to make use of the escape route to help people leave South Africa illegally.

Edwards claimed that Mayson had admitted that he had assisted Horst Kleinschmidt to leave South Africa illegally.

Mayson disputed the validity of a confession he made while in security police detention on the grounds that it was not made freely and voluntarily. He told the court that before he made a statement, security police forced him to strip naked, handcuffed his hands behind his back, and he was then verbally abused in this position. His hair was pulled out during an interrogation session, leaving him with a bald spot. The magistrate who took Mayson's statement admitted in court that he had noticed a red patch on Mayson's head, but had not

inquired about it because Mayson had said that he was making the statement voluntarily.

Mayson told the presiding judge that he believed there was a possible role for the ANC in South Africa, and that it should be unbanned. He said that where the aims of the ANC concurred with the gospel, he supported the ANC. However, it had never been his intention to further the aims of the ANC.

The state called 13 police witnesses on the circumstances in which Mayson came to make a confession. Twelve of these witnesses denied that Mayson had been kept naked in security police offices on the first weekend of his detention. However, one police witness admitted that Mayson had been kept in security police offices over the weekend.

Presiding judge Van der Walt ruled that Mayson's statement was inadmissible as evidence.

At this stage, the state applied for a six week adjournment, but this was opposed by the defence. The state argued that they needed the time to locate a key witness, Auret van Heerden, who had disappeared. Van Heerden is alleged to have received ANC material from Mayson, and discussed the creation of ANC committees with him.

Mayson had been in custody since November 1981, first as a detainee and subsequently as an awaiting trial prisoner refused bail by the attorney-general. After a defence application for bail was made, he was released on bail of R1 000, and the trial was postponed until mid-April.

TERRORISM ACT TRIALS

Lillian Keagile (24)

The accused in this trial faced two charges under the Terrorism Act, with a further count in terms of the Internal Security Act. The state alleged that the accused was an ANC member who furthered the aims of that organisation by acting as a courier between members in Botswana and people in South Africa. In particular, it was claimed that Keagile carried messages from Roller Masinga, Joyce Diphale and Martin Sere, delivering them inter alia to Philip Dlamini, Buti Thlagale, Jabu Ngwenya, Sam Mabe, Frank Chikane, Baby Tyawa, Ernest Diphale, Joseph Mavi and Raymond Mabiletsa.

Keagile was also charged with conveying money from Botswana to the Black Municipal Workers' Union (BMWU), informing certain people to travel to Botswana to see ANC members there, and arranging transport for them. She was also alleged to have recruited Steve Thupae, Mpho Masethla and Wandile Zulu to undergo military training under the auspices of the ANC.

The state further claimed that an ANC cell was formed consisting of Ernest Diphale, Baby Tyawa, Felix Ngwenya, Joseph Mamasela, Ben Singo and Keagile.

The second charge against Keagile involved the reconnaissance of the Inhlazane power station for the purpose of sabotaging it. Keagile allegedly made a sketch of this power station, having kept it under observation to establish its exact location, size and layout.

Finally, the accused was charged with undergoing military and other training in Botswana during January and February 1981. This training included cyphering, coding and decoding of messages, communications, surveillance, the working of Tokarev and Makorov pistols, theoretical training in handgrenades and other explosives, the making of pamphlet and bucket bombs, timing devices, map drawing, practical pistol shooting, and the workings of the AK rifle. This training took place under the auspices of George Twala, and three others identified only as Thele, Pieter and Karen.

The accused was detained by police at the South African - Botswana border on 18 November 1981, and held in custody as a detainee and awaiting trial prisoner until her trial ended. Shortly after her detention, she made a statement to a magistrate, but in her trial contested the admissibility of this, claiming that she had been coerced into making it. In particular, she told the court that she had been sexually assaulted by a security policeman, and that three children in her custody when she was arrested

were used to pressurise her into making a statement. However, the presiding magistrate disbelieved Keagile, and admitted the statement as evidence.

In this statement, Keagile explained that her husband was an ex-executive member of the BMWU, and had left the country in 1980 and settled in Botswana. She subsequently learned that her husband, Martin Sere, had joined the ANC.

She visited her husband in Botswana, and as a result of this, met ANC members Roller Masinga and his wife, Joyce Diphale. Diphale was a cousin of hers.

Subsequently she agreed to carry messages from the ANC in Botswana to various people in South Africa; she also conveyed R2 000 to Philip Dlamini, at that time an official of the BMWU.

Dlamini, who was held in detention for a lengthy period, was called as a witness against Keagile, but refused to testify. He was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, and also faces charges in another trial (see the trial of Harrison Nogqekele and others, below).

It was alleged by the state that the accused had conspired with, inter alia, her cousin Ernest Diphale (a brother of Joyce Diphale). It will be recalled that Ernest Diphale died while held in security police detention. Just prior to his detention, an assassination attempt was made on Ernest Diphale. At much the same time, a similar attempt was made on the life of his sister, Joyce, in Botswana.

After 83 days in detention, the accused was seen for the first time by a doctor. She informed him that she had been assaulted while under interrogation . However, subsequent to this, and while still in detention, Keagile signed a statement saying that she had not informed the doctor involved of any assault.

The state called a number of witnesses in the case, including certain of the people named as accomplices of the accused. One witness, who testified for five days, was a member of the ANC who infiltrated on behalf of the security police. However, his evidence was heard in camera, and nothing said may be reported.

The defence called a brother of Martin Sere, Ben Sere, as a witness. He testified that when he had visited his brother in Botswana, there had been no discussions concerning the ANC. Another defence witness, Rev Graduate James Shongwe of the International Assemblies of God church, told the court that he had visited the flat of Joyce Diphale in Botswana, but had seen no ANC posters or literature there. Both defence witnesses were, however, not believed by the presiding magistrate.

Verdict: Guilty on all three counts.

Sentence: Two years for the Internal Security Act contravention, and four years on each Terrorism Act count. (The minimum sentence under the old Terrorism Act was five years. However, with the repeal of the Act, the magistrate was not obliged to impose it). Because sentence on the Terrorism Act charges is to run concurrently, effective sentence is six years.

The defence has noted its intention to appeal against conviction.

(Johannesburg Regional Court, 18.03.83).

Stanley Radebe (27), Ephraim Mthuthezde Madalane (24), Ernest Lebana Mahakalala (23), and Innocentia Nankululeko Mazibuko (20). The accused face charges relating to the South African Youth Revolutionary Council (SAYRCO). They are alleged to have joined the organisation, recruited others for it, travelled to Botswana and Lesotho on SAYRCO business, and infiltrated the Azanian Students' Movement (AZASM) with the aim of furthering SAYRCO's objectives.

The trial follows the conviction and imprisonment of SAYRCO president Khotso Seathlolo, who was arrested on a clandestine visit to South Africa. In his trial, Innocentia Mazibuko refused to testify, and was subsequently charged in this trial.

Evidence against Mazibuko was given by two witnesses who told the court that they had been recruited to SAYRCO by her. The first claimed that she had told him about SAYRCO at school and the second that he had been recruited on a bus they were travelling on. The second witness subsequently admitted to giving false evidence to avoid detention,

saying the he had lied when he testified that Mazibuko had recruited him for SAYRCO.

Madalane admitted that he was a member of the Azanian Students' Movement (AZASM), but claimed that he met two of his co-accused for the first time when they were charged.

A statement made by Radebe while in detention was rejected by the presiding magistrate as evidence. While the magistrate found that Radebe had not been tortured - as was alleged - he ruled that the confession was made in a desperate attempt to get out of solitary confinement.

In his evidence, Radebe said that he thought SAYRCO was a youth club, and admitted that he often ran errands for its members. Documents which he collected were not, in his opinion, of a political nature. He admitted being approached by two people from Lesotho with a request for nitrate and alcohol. However, he learnt for the first time from police that those who approached him were from SAYRCO, and that the chemicals were for the manufacture of explosives.

During the course of Radebe's evidence, the state attempted to make use of a tape recording of conversations between Radebe and his mother. These recordings were made while Radebe was an awaiting trial prisoner at Modder Bee prison. Defence Counsel have argued that the tapes are inadmissible because (a) the state has already closed its case; (b) they were unfairly obtained; and (c) the defence would be unable to prove whether the tapes had been tampered with.

The trial continues in the Kempton Park Regional Court.

INTERNAL SECURITY ACT TRIALS

Simon Cyprian Nomvalo, George Xoleliswe and David Sibisa.
The accused in this trial were charged under section 54 of the Internal Security Act, the state alleging that they attempted to leave the country with a view to undergoing military training. They were part of a group of ten arrested on the South Africa - Lesotho border in December 1982.

The remaining seven members of the group testified against the accused, who first appeared in court in February 1983. At the end of the state case, counsel for the accused applied for a discharge on the grounds that the state witnesses had materially contradicted each other. This was granted by the presiding magistrate, and all three accused were acquitted.
(Ladybrand Regional Court, ?.03.83).

Andrew Mokone (19), Vulindlela Mapekula (22), and Reginald Mzwandile Nkosi (21).
The accused, all from the Springs township of KwaThema, faced a charge of taking part in ANC activities. The state alleged that they conveyed messages and information from the ANC in Botswana to South Africa; formed an ANC cell; carried ANC literature from Botswana to South Africa; distributed this literature; and received money from the Botswana ANC for various projects.

A confession allegedly made by Mokone in detention and tendered by the state was rejected as evidence by the presiding magistrate after Mokone alleged that he had been tortured while in police custody.
Verdict: Guilty
Sentence: Mokone - 2 years.
Mapekula and Nkosi - 3 years.
(Springs Regional Court, 25.03.83).

Lazarus Mmoledi (27).
The accused was charged with furthering the aims of the banned African National Congress by playing and possessing a tape of a speech by its president, Oliver Tambo.

According to a state witness, the accused visited him in June 1982, and played him a tape recording of *a speech made by Oliver Tambo*. There was evidence that Mmoledi played the tape to three other people.
Verdict: Guilty.
Sentence: 4 years. The presiding magistrate dismissed a defence plea for a suspended sentence, asked for because the accused had spent 5 months in custody already. Bail of R2 000 was allowed pending an appeal.
(Johannesburg Regional Court, 11.03.83).

Peter Mokaba (23), Portia Nhlapo (24), and Jerome Joseph Maake (23).
The accused face ten counts under the Internal Security Act, all related to alleged ANC activities. Mokaba is alleged to have joined the ANC in 1980 and received military, economic and political training. He allegedly brought a Makarov pistol and several rounds of ammunition into South Africa, and collected information for the ANC while in Molepo and Lebowakgomo in May 1981. It is further claimed that he recruited Masilo Jonas Sehlapelo as a member of the ANC, possessed banned literature and used a dead letter box for smuggling ANC messages, weapons and explosives.

Maake is accused of being an ANC member and receiving military training outside of South Africa. He is said to have conveyed hand grenades to South Africa with the aim of undertaking sabotage, and to have recruited various people, including Portia Nhlapo, as members of the ANC.

The accused are all former students of Turfloop students, and on a number of occasions the court has been packed with students from that university.

According to one of those allegedly recruited by Maake - MacMillan Letsoalo - the accused taught him how to use a hand grenade. He also explained the workings of a cell system to a group of students, and talked about his experience in using guns in his period away from the university. This the witness took to mean that Maake had undergone military training.

The trial continues in the Pietersburg Regional Court.

Harrison Nogqekele, Joe Thloloe, Veli Mguni, Philip Dlamini, Sipho Ncgobo, Nhlanganiso Sibanda, Stephen Zolo, Mfana Mtshali, and Shadrack Rampete.
The accused in this trial are alleged to have participated in the activities of the banned Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). This is the first trial in some years involve substantial allegations of PAC activities within South Africa.

One of the accused initially pleaded guilty to the charges, saying that he had passed on certain weapons (a machine gun, two magazines and a hand grenade) to journalist Joe Thloloe. However, he was subsequently allowed by the presiding magistrate to change his plea to one of not guilty.

Inter alia, the accused are alleged to have set up the Azanian National Youth Union - AZANYU - as a front for PAC activities. A number of AZANYU office bearers are amongst the accused.

STATE REFORM - yes repeat no

It is a truism that the state's 'constitutional reform programme' differs from the rightwing blueprint only in being a different means to the same end - preservation of white supremacy in South Africa. And that the new polarisation of the white rightwing under Treurnicht was planned for and precipitated.

Grand apartheid remains the cornerstone of powersharing though its implementation may alter; africans in urban areas won't even be afforded symbolic representation in the mooted tricameral parliament; Group Areas remain; and influx control is being tightened up in legislation and execution.

But why is the state having such trouble legislating - if not implementing - some cosmetic reforms? Why is it so difficult for a government that has changed the structure of the state to allow for an enormous range of executive actions, to implement a little co-optation? The rightwing threat is not enough to account completely for this.

Currently parliament's playing the by-election blues, leading to a number of reassertions of good old-style apartheid - to the dismay of the Coloured Labour Party. Some examples are: Hendrik Schoeman's statement that coloured and indian MPs would, come the day of their elevation, have to do without 'pozzies' in the

parliamentarians' township and stay in their 'own' group areas; reassertion of railways apartheid; Chris Heunis's puzzling about-face on compelling sports clubs to open up, and noises about integrated paddling pools in Durban. (Theoretically, the idea is that constitutional reform gives local level bodies such as municipalities more control of such decisions, and Heunis is after all Minister of Constitutional Development).

A more long-term sign though is the way the De Lange committee report on education in South Africa has been handled. When the report came out at the end of 1981, it was hailed as a grand breakthrough for reform, recommending as it did a unified education ministry, equality of opportunity in education and equitable distribution of facilities and resources, to be watchdogged by a Council for Education representing parents, teachers and experts of all races.

The official response to it was an interim memorandum in which the government put the kibosh on a single ministry and desegregated schools. It appointed a working group, made up almost exclusively of state functionaries, to process responses and make final recommendations. Almost simultaneously with the Treurnicht split, the Bloemfontein Volkskongress rejected the recommendations wholesale. Now, one white paper of a possible series may come out of this parliamentary session, and legislation is postponed, effectively for years. But it's quite clear, from the insistence on racial quotas for universities, from apartheid in technicons, from the creation of Vista university, that the issue is on the shelf.

It could be argued that as the educational revolts of 1976 and 1980 faded, the perceived need, from the state's point of view, for reforms in this field faded as well, and the relative urgency of rightwing reaction became greater. Or that change in educational structures and policy needed to be brought into line with the overall constitutional alterations.

But the very point of co-optation is to win legitimacy with a broader range of groups, and a watered-down version of De Lange would have helped. Areas like education, sport, and the Immorality Act seem tailor-made to boost foreign, English-speaking and reformist black support.

Another issue is the Pageview/Mayfair muddle. After insisting on whiting out Pageview, a section of Mayfair is thrown to the indian community as a belated sop - a move unlikely to win support there and alienating working class whites into the bargain.

It is not enough to say with the Sunday papers that the state or the government is trapped in its ideology like a fly in amber. Perhaps the interpretation that the end remains the same while means change needs to be looked at again. Is the end Afrikaner supremacy, white supremacy, or capitalist supremacy?

The President's Council recommendations and the presentation of the industrial decentralisation plan indicate that it's the latter. But willingness to share the formulation of policy with representatives of capital seems limited, as witness big business's frustration after the Good Hope conference. Consultation there was a one-way street, indicating (shades of Hoggenheimer) that policy determination is reserved for a narrower faction even than white capital.

This may indicate unwillingness finally to give up the idea of a united and dominant Afrikanerdom - and its (ideologically) all-important 'Christian-National values' - which can hardly be shared either with the Hoggenheimers or with the heathen; or an awareness that new coalitions will mean the sacrifice of that powerbase in favour of the right. Certainly for some years now old alliances have been in their death throes, while old ideologies appear to prevent the forging of new ones - even where it is not power that is ultimately shared, but responsibility for the executors of power.

The governing faction in the state may not find its way to a new alliance, except with bodies within the state, like the military. It may finally rely on its position within the state apparatuses to hold political power and so resolve the contradiction, in execution if not in theory, between the notions of total onslaught and reform.