

ZAMBIA, THE ANC AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID
1964 - 1990

BY

MZAMO WILSON JACOBS

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DEDICATION

DEDICATED TO MY BROTHER WHO SACRIFICED EVERY
CENT TO PUT ME THROUGH SCHOOL.

OPSOMMING

Die skripsie handel oor die steun wat Zambië aan die ANC verleen het in die stryd teen apartheid tussen die jare 1964 - 1990. Die stryd word in die historiese konteks van Zambië se verzet teen kolonialisme geplaas en die botsende standpunte van Zambië en die RSA oor sake soos dekolonisasie. Verzetbewegings en blanke minderheidsregerings word ontleed.

Vir die ANC was die steun van Zambië as gasheerland van kardinale belang. Deurdat 'n tuiste aan die ANC gegee is, het Zambië nie alleen die voorsetting van die stryd teen apartheid ver buite die grense van die RSA nie, maar ook die voortbestaan van die ANC verseker. Deur die optrede het Zambië egter ook 'n teiken vir die destabiliseringspogings van die RSA geword.

Zambië het nie slegs as toevlugsoord vir die ANC gedien nie, maar was ook betrokke in die gewapende stryd en organisasie van internasionale sanksies teen die RSA. In dié verband het Zambië militêre opleidingsgeriewe aan die ANC voorsien en gehelp om infiltrasieroetes vir MK-lede te organiseer.

Op die internasionale front het Zambië voortdurend die ANC se oproepe om sanksies teen die isolasie van die RSA gesteun. Nietenstaande sy ekonomiese afhanklikheid van Suid-Afrika het Zambië die voortou in Afrika geneem in die instelling van sanksies. Kenneth Kaunda het ook 'n reuse bydrae gelewer om sanksies teen die RSA te bevorder en het veral die Westerse Moondhede voortdurende onder

(ii)

druk geplaas om die VN-besluite in die verband te eerbiedig.

Kaunda het ook alle pogings van die RSA om hom te dwing om sy steun aan die ANC te onttrek, sterk teengestaan. Ongeag militêre en ekonomiese druk op sy land het hy die vrylating van Nelson Mandela en die ontbanning van die ANC bepleit totdat die RSA in 1990 tot die stap oorgegaan het.

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FOREWORD

This dissertation resulted from my research for a seminar course on the African States and the ANC. My seminar paper on the "Frontline States and the international struggle against apartheid", awakened my interest in Zambia's commitment to the liberation of Southern Africa from white minority rule. Consequently, I became curious to discover the extent to which Zambia's commitment to the liberation of Southern Africa from white minority rule has been translated into meaningful support for the ANC in the struggle against apartheid.

Although much has been written on various aspects of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, no serious attempt has, so far, been directed to the support of Zambia for the ANC. The present study therefore addresses itself to that task. The object is to demonstrate the extent of Zambia's support for the ANC in the struggle against apartheid.

In order to attain the objectives of this study, I had to rely on publicly available sources. Much use has consequently been made of books, published documents, journal articles, research bulletins such as Africa Research Bulletin, Africa Confidential, Keesings Contemporary Archives and a wide variety of South African newspapers (English and Afrikaans).

The ANC Department of Repatriation which granted me an interview provided vital information with regard to the role of Zambia in the development of the struggle against

apartheid. Furthermore, published interviews with Kenneth Kaunda also provided useful insights into Zambia's commitment to the struggle against apartheid.

The completion of this dissertation has been made possible by the assistance of several people and institutions. I am specially indebted to my supervisor, Professor Henning van Aswegen who patiently guided me through every stage of this study. I am equally grateful not only for his patience, but also for his encouragement, support and valuable suggestions.

My debt of gratitude also goes to Mrs E. Wessells of the Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, who provided me with much needed research material not available in the RAU library. To several members of the H. F. Verwoerd Library, RAU, Jan Smuts House, University of the Witwatersrand, the Institute for Contemporary History (INCH), the University of the Orange Free State, I wish to express my thanks for the friendly co-operation and assistance I received.

My thanks also go to Mr Mzwandile Booi of the ANC Department of Repatriation. Despite a heavy work schedule, he kindly made his time and knowledge available to me. I am also grateful to my former school principal, Mr Mahlomola Khunyeli, for his patience and understanding whenever I had to be absent from school to conduct research for this work.

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MZAMO JACOBS
JOHANNESBURG

ABBREVIATIONS

AAPC	ALL AFRICAN PEOPLE'S CONFERENCE
ALC	AFRICAN LIBERATION COMMITTEE
ANC	AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS
CIAS	CONFERENCE OF INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES
CONSAS	CONSTELLATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES
FLS	FRONTLINE STATES
FRELIMO	FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF MOZAMBIQUE
INCH	INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY HISTORY
MK	UMKHONTO WE SIZWE
MPLA	PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA
NAM	NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT
NEC	NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
NP	NATIONAL PARTY
NWC	NATIONAL WORKING COMMITTEE
DAU	ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
PAC	PAN-AFRICANIST CONGRESS
PAFMECSA	PAN AFRICAN FREEDOM MOVEMENT FOR EASTERN, CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
PMC	POLITICAL MILITARY COUNCIL
SACTU	SOUTH AFRICAN CONGRESS OF TRADE UNIONS
SADCC	SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT CO-ORDINATING CONFERENCE
SADF	SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE
SAIC	SOUTH AFRICAN INDIAN CONGRESS
SAUF	SOUTH AFRICAN UNITED FRONT
SOMAFCO	SOLOMON MAHLANGU FREEDOM COLLEGE
SWANU	SOUTH WEST AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION
SWAPO	SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION
UN	UNITED NATIONS

UNIP	UNITED NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE PARTY (ZAMBIA)
ZANU	ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION
ZAPU	ZIMBABWE AFRICAN PEOPLE'S UNION

UNIP	UNITED NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE PARTY (ZAMBIA)
ZANU	ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION
ZAPU	ZIMBABWE AFRICAN PEOPLE'S UNION

INTRODUCTION

This study directs its attention to the support that Zambia has extended to the ANC in the struggle against apartheid. It examines Zambia's support for the ANC within the context of the conflict between the liberation movements and the white minority governments in Southern Africa, and seeks to find out to what extent Zambia's commitment to the liberation of Southern Africa from white minority rule was translated into meaningful support for the ANC. While the focus of the study falls on Zambia's support for the ANC, the following issues have been taken up : the concept of a host state and liberation in Southern Africa, the organisation and growth of the ANC under the refuge of a host state, and the effects on Zambia of her support for the ANC. In this connection, I will endeavour to show how Zambia came under various forms of pressure from South Africa to abandon her support for the ANC.

Although many studies have appeared on the ANC and the liberation struggles in Southern Africa, there has been no major study on the support of Zambia for the ANC. Most previous studies on liberation in Southern Africa have concentrated on the commitment of Zambia to liberation in Southern Africa, and the efforts of the ANC to wage armed struggle against South Africa. Never the less, explanations and interpretations related to the subject of the present study have appeared in an number of books and journal articles. J. D. Nelson's Some External Aspects of the Internal Conflict within South Africa : A Study of the Place of International

Activities in the Development of the ANC (University Microfilms International, London, 1975) throws some light on the position of Zambia as a host state to the ANC. This is a richly detailed study on the ANC's international activities but has very little in the way of a serious treatment of Zambia's support for the ANC. Similarly, in his study, The Diplomacy of Liberation : The International Relations of the ANC of South Africa, 1960 - 1988 (PhD Thesis, University of London, 1989) Scott Thomas deals with the international relations of the ANC. Although this study makes no effort on the support of Zambia for the ANC, it has provided the writer with relevant information in relation to the growth of the ANC under the refuge of a host state which also falls within the scope of the present study.

S. M. Davis devotes a chapter of his work Apartheid's Rebels Inside South Africa's Hidden War (AD Donker Publishers, Johannesburg, 1989) on the development of the ANC under the refuge of a host state. While focussing on the development of the armed struggle against apartheid, he also throws some light on the ANC community within the borders of Zambia. This study also depicts the strategic position of Zambia as an important factor in the efforts of the ANC to wage armed struggle against apartheid. In terms of meaningful support for the ANC, A. T. Mugomba's The Foreign Policy of Despair Africa and the sale of arms to South Africa (East Africa Literature Bureau, Kampala, 1977) is the most valuable in so far as it places emphasis on the position of Zambia in relation to the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. It should be borne in mind that the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa came as a sequel to the

ANC's mobilisation of world opinion against South Africa. Zambia's opposition to the sale of arms to South Africa therefore signified support for sanctions against South Africa. In his article, Zambia and the Liberation of¹South Africa, K. Good also focusses on Zambia's support for the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. This study has provided useful information on the activities of Zambia on the international battlefield against apartheid.

V. B. Khapoya's work, A Comparative study of African Policies Toward Liberation Movements in Southern and Colonised Africa (University Microfilms International, London, 1975) has identified nine manifestations of support for liberation movements amongst the independent African states :

- 1 Provision of asylum to politically active exiles.
- 2 Provision of field offices for liberation movements.
- 3 Provision of facilities for military and military oriented activities of liberation movements.
- 4 Irregular payments of assessed dues to the OAU liberation Committee.
- 5 Regular payments of assessed dues to the OAU Committee.
- 6 Initiation or participation in efforts to unify liberation movements from the same country.
- 7 Opposition by African States to dialogue with South Africa.
- 8 Serving as host to non-political refugees from target areas.

- 9 Provision of additional aid to movements in terms²
of cash, medical supplies, educational facilities.

Having identified the manifestations of support, Khapoya compares the extent of support that independent African states have extended to the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. Though a superficial study in relation to Zambia's support for the ANC, the author provides valuable information on Zambia's commitment to the liberation of Southern Africa from white minority rule. But falls short of discussing Zambia's support for the ANC. For the purposes of the present study it is important to observe that Zambia is ranked highly by Khampoya's measurement of support.

In his article Zambia and Southern African Liberation
³
Movements 1964 - 1974, D. C. Anglin deals with Zambia's support for liberation in Southern Africa. He argues that Zambia is the only landlocked country in Africa that has been fully committed to the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. This study has provided valuable information on the role of a host state in relation to the armed struggle. One is therefore inclined to argue that Anglin's work constitutes important groundwork for the present study in relation to the importance of a host state for an exiled liberation movement such as the ANC. C. J. B. Le Roux's Umkhonto We Sizwe. Its Role in the ANC's Onslaught against White Domination in South Africa, 1961 - 1988 (PhD Thesis, University of Pretoria, 1991) provides useful insights on the position of Zambia in relation to the ANC's armed struggle against apartheid. Although this study focusses on Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK)

it contains valuable information on the support of Zambia for the armed struggle against apartheid.

From the preceding evaluation of sources it can be seen that no other work so far has made any serious study on the support of Zambia for the ANC. The present study therefore addresses itself to that task. The object is to demonstrate the extent of Zambia's support for the ANC in the struggle against apartheid. In this connection, attention has been focussed on questions such as ;

- 1 What motivated Zambia to become a host state to the ANC despite obvious economic and security risks?
- 2 What is the role of a host state in relation to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa? The whole concept of a host state raises further questions which fall within the scope of the present study. Questions that must therefore be asked about Zambia's political position as a host state to the ANC are as follows :
 - 2.1 What are the implications of Zambia's political position as a host state to the ANC for South Africa?
 - 2.2 Is it legal under international law for Zambia to host the ANC?
- 3 To what extent has the ANC developed under the refuge of a host state?
- 4 To what extent has Zambia translated her commitment

to the liberation of Southern Africa from white minority rule into meaningful support for the ANC.

- 5 How did South Africa react to the presence of the ANC within the borders of Zambia?
- 6 Has Zambia been consistent in her support for the ANC over the years (1964 - 1990)?

In approaching Zambia's support for the ANC it is necessary to highlight and analyse the broader political environment under which Zambia extended support for the ANC. Taking an overview of developments in Southern Africa one finds that Black-White conflict over political power has dominated the politics of the region. This can be ascribed to the transformation of Southern Africa into two hostile power camps. There is no doubt that the independence of Malawi and Zambia (1964), Botswana (1966), and finally Swaziland in 1968 transformed Southern Africa into two camps. On the one hand, the independent African states desired the establishment of democratic rule in the place of minority rule. On the other, the white minority governments of South Africa, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the former Portuguese Colonies of Angola and Mozambique committed themselves to the maintenance of the status quo. The underlying motive for this attitude was to maintain political power in the hands of a white minority.

The position of the white minority governments with regard to the political order in Southern Africa remained in conflict with the liberation movements of the region.

Amongst the movements in this category would be the ANC, SWAPO, ZANU, MPLA, and FRELIMO. It is important to note that these liberation movements had been engaged in a struggle for democratic rule. The minority governments prevented these movements from asserting their rights to participate in government. They adhered to their racial policies and were determined to perpetuate white supremacy in Southern Africa.

With the independence of the African states in the 1960's the situation in Southern Africa assumed a new dimension. In the first place, the liberation movements of Southern Africa assumed greater importance. Secondly, the independent African states were faced with three important political issues : apartheid in South Africa, liberation movements, and the elimination of white minority rule from Africa. These issues constituted political realities that independent Black Africa could not afford to ignore.

In this situation the independent African states had to decide where they stood in relation to the political issues in Southern Africa : whether they would support the remaining white minority governments on the African continent or the African liberation movements. Independent Africa found it difficult to co-exist with white minority rule on the African continent. The independent African states perceived their independence as a significant victory against White minority rule in Southern Africa. The leaders themselves grew up and

9
struggled against white minority rule. As a result, the independent African states identified themselves with the liberation movements of Southern Africa. This eventually pitted the independent African states and the liberation movements against the white minority governments.

Zambia emerged as a prominent actor on the side of the African states and the liberation movements in opposition to white minority rule. At the same time, South Africa emerged as a prominent player on the side of the white minority governments who continued to oppose democratic rule in Southern Africa. On the one hand, Zambia identified very closely with the liberation movements. She desired the establishment of a non-racial political order in Southern Africa. On the other, South Africa supported the continuation of white minority rule in Southern Africa. This was made clear by the banning of the ANC which sought to eliminate apartheid in South Africa.

It is therefore clear that South Africa and Zambia held conflicting views on the need to change the political order in Southern Africa. When the liberation movements of Southern Africa were banned in the 1960's, Zambia came forward and allowed them to operate on her territory. For Zambia there was a need for these movements to continue with their activities so that white minority rule could be eliminated from the African continent. This situation led to conflict between Zambia and South Africa. As will be shown later in this study, this conflict centred around Zambia's support for the ANC.

This briefly is the background against which we examine Zambia's support for the ANC. In terms of organisation of data, this study has been divided into six chapters. Chapter one is an overview of the development of sympathy and support for the liberation of the oppressed. This has been considered an appropriate point of departure if the support of Zambia for the ANC is to be properly understood. Here the focus is on the position of independent Black Africa in relation to the conflict between the ANC and South Africa. To this end, I have tried to show the extent of support the ANC enjoyed in Africa before Zambia attained her independence from Britain in 1964.

Chapter 2 deals with the factors underlying Zambia's willingness to host the ANC. This chapter represents an attempt to answer the following questions: what is the role of a host state in the liberation struggle; in Southern Africa? what are the implications of Zambia's political position as a host state to the ANC for South Africa? Is it legal for Zambia under international law to host the ANC. These are the kinds of questions tackled in Chapter 2.

In Chapter 3 an attempt has been made to show how the ANC, as a banned liberation movement developed under the refuge of a host state. This chapter will also focus on the role of Zambia in the development and the growth of the ANC within her borders.

Chapter 4 and 5 deal with the actual support of Zambia for the ANC. Here an attempt has been made to illustrate the extent to which Zambia's commitment to the liberation

struggles in Southern Africa was translated into meaningful support for the ANC. In this connection, attention has been focussed on the international struggle against apartheid, as well as the armed struggle.

The last chapter in this study (Chapter Six) deals with the reaction of Zambia to various forms of pressure from South Africa to abandon her support for the ANC.

ENDNOTES

- 1 K. GOOD : ZAMBIA AND THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH AFRICA (JOURNAL OF MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES VOL. 25, NO. 3, 1987)
- 2 V. B. KHAPOYA : A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AFRICAN POLICIES TOWARD LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, p. 110.
- 3 D. C. ANGLIN : ZAMBIA AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT 1964 - 1974 (IN T. M. SHAW. AND K. A. HEARD (eds) : THE POLITICS OF AFRICA : DEPENDENCE AND DEVELOPMENT, LONGMAN AND DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY PRESS, LONDON, 1977)
- 4 L. W. BOWMAN : SOUTH AFRICA'S SOUTHERN STRATEGY (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, VOL. 8, No. 4, 1975), p. 20.
- 5 M. DOXEY : ALIGNMENTS AND COALITIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, VOL. 3, NO. 30, 1975), p. 518.
- 6 B. B. BROWN : SOUTH AFRICA'S POLICY TOWARD ITS BLACK NEIGHBOURS, p. 184.
- 7 G. M. CARTER : CHALLENGES TO MINORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, VOL. 24, NO. 1, JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1975), p. 486.
- 8 B. B. BROWN : SOUTH AFRICA'S POLICY TOWARD ITS BLACK NEIGHBOURS, p. 186.

9 Ibid.

CHAPTER 1

BLACK AFRICA AND THE ANC : SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT FOR THE
ANTI-APARTHEID STRUGGLE

"Wherever I went I met sympathy
for our (ANC) cause and promises
of support. All Africa was united
against the stand of South Africa ..
1
....."

After its banning in 1960, the ANC soon gained the sympathy and support of many independent African states. When Zambia attained her independence in 1964 various countries and institutions had become concerned about the evils of apartheid. Support for the ANC is an issue that has been important not only to Zambia but in international affairs. This chapter therefore begins the discussion by focussing on the manifestations of support for the ANC in Africa. Of particular importance will be an analysis of the position of independent Black Africa in relation to the conflict between the ANC and South Africa.

1.1 THE BEGINNINGS OF SUPPORT FOR LIBERATION

Before an analysis of the position of independent Africa in relation to the conflict between the ANC and South Africa is given, it would be useful to

highlight the conditions and circumstances that gave rise to the development of sympathy and support for the liberation of the oppressed. It would be difficult to approach the support of Zambia for the ANC without seeking an explanation for the fact that support for the ANC has been an important issue in international affairs. Support for the liberation of the oppressed can be traced as far back as the Second World War years, when a world consensus against apartheid was developing. More specifically, the Atlantic Charter (1942), and the formation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 brought about an atmosphere under which the liberation of the oppressed became an important issue in international affairs.

Under the Atlantic Charter the nations of the world committed themselves to a new political order based on freedom, equality, and justice. The signatories undertook to respect the rights of all peoples to choose their own form of government² As soon as the nations of the world endorsed the Atlantic Charter it became clear that the situation in South Africa would not escape the attention of the world, as apartheid constituted a violation of the right of self-determination for the African majority.

The significance of the Atlantic Charter for the liberation struggle in South Africa can be seen in the ANC document that became known as African Claims in South Africa.³ This document represented the response of the ANC to the developing world

consensus against apartheid. It placed emphasis on the elimination of apartheid and the formation of a government based on the will of the people.⁴ Of particular importance is the interpretation given by the ANC to the Atlantic Charter article dealing with the issue of national self determination, the right of peoples to choose their own form of government. In this connection, African Claims stated :

"Africans are still very conscious of the loss of their independence, freedom, and the right of choosing the form of government under which they will live."⁵

The essence of African Claims was that the political order in South Africa constituted a violation of the Atlantic Charter which Smuts had signed for South Africa.⁶ For the purposes of the present study it must be noted that African Claims was not only directed to the people of South Africa, but also towards the international community. The ANC hoped that African Claims would direct international attention to the plight of the African majority in South Africa.⁷ One can therefore argue convincingly that the Atlantic Charter inspired the ANC to look at its conflict with the South African government in a much broader perspective.

The second significant development in relation to the issue of sympathy and support for liberation was the formation of the United Nations in 1945. It is interesting to note that the Atlantic Charter laid important ground work for the UN Charter. This is clearly reflected in the human rights provisions of the UN Charter under articles 55 and 56 :

"..... all persons were equal,
all had the same political rights,
and all enjoyed the same political
8
representation"

From the preceding articles it can be seen that the UN condemned racial discrimination and political domination and placed greater emphasis on the preservation of human rights. It therefore goes without saying that member nations assumed certain obligations under the UN Charter. These include the⁹ promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is clear that, South Africa, like all other UN members also assumed an obligation to promote human liberty and equality. But the political order in South Africa remained in conflict with the provisions of the UN Charter.

As soon as the UN came into operation it became clear that South Africa was not prepared to honour her obligations under the UN Charter. The government turned a blind eye to ANC calls for a new political dispensation based on justice and equality. Given the spirit and content of the UN

Charter, one is tempted to argue that the continued existence of apartheid in South Africa constituted a stumbling block to the attainment of UN goals in relation to the promotion of human liberty and equality. Moreover, apartheid in South Africa represented a denial of the fundamental principles embodied in the UN Charter.¹⁰ As a result, it became impossible for UN members to ignore the political conflict between the ANC and the South African government. In signing the UN Charter, member nations committed themselves to promote human liberty and equality not only within their borders but throughout the world.

It therefore became imperative on the part of the international community to take a stand in relation to the political conflict in South Africa. Eventually, the conflict in South Africa received attention at various levels. The resolutions of world bodies, the policies of individual nations, and the statements of individual statesmen focussed attention on the conflict between the ANC and South Africa.¹¹ This signified that the nations of the world were more than prepared to honour their obligations under the UN Charter in so far as the promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights was concerned.

South Africa became a target area with regard to the promotion of freedom and equality throughout the world. For the purpose of the present study the question is raised as to how could the nations of

the world promote freedom and equality in South Africa. It soon became clear that the only conceivable means for the nations of the world to promote freedom and equality in South Africa was to support the ANC in its endeavours to eliminate apartheid rule in South Africa. As a liberation movement, the ANC had been engaged in a struggle to replace apartheid with a political order based on freedom and equality. Its objectives have been consistent with the human rights provisions of the UN Charter.

In this situation the struggle against apartheid gained recognition internationally, and world sympathy and support for the ANC became an important issue in international affairs.¹² The nations of the world could not afford to ignore the ANC in its endeavours for human liberty and equality in South Africa. There is therefore no doubt that the Atlantic Charter and the formation of the UN created an international atmosphere that became hostile to apartheid and sympathetic to the ANC. Having explained the development of sympathy and support for the ANC, we can now turn to the position of Black independent Africa in relation to the political conflict in South Africa.

1.2 BLACK AFRICA AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ANC AND SOUTH AFRICA

Zambia attained her independence in 1964 under an atmosphere that was hostile to apartheid and

sympathetic to the ANC. By 1964 the ANC had gained considerable recognition in Black Africa. During Nelson Mandela's tour of Africa in 1962, several African states pledged specific sums of money and other forms of assistance to the ANC.¹³ Of his trip to Africa including his attendance of the 1962 PAFMECSA Conference, Mandela stated :

"It has become clear to us that the whole of Africa is unanimously behind the move to ensure effective economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa."¹⁴

The reponse of African states to Mandela's tour of Africa revealed their enthusiastic support for the elimination of White minority rule and racialism from the African continent. For the African states, apartheid in South Africa represented a continuation of colonialism and "is such the anti-thesis of Black rule."¹⁵ It therefore became imperative on the part of the independent African states to support the ANC in its efforts to eliminate white minority rule in South Africa. Eventually, support for liberation became an important issue amongst independent African states. This was clearly reflected in African gatherings on the continent, the OAU, and at the UN.

1.2.1 AFRICAN GATHERINGS

The support of African states for the ANC can be traced to conferences on the continent between 1954 and 1964. Wherever African states came together the conflict between the ANC and the South African government became the focus of attention. And statements issued at the end of meetings always condemned apartheid in South Africa. The leaders of independent Black Africa believed that they had a responsibility to aid liberation movements such as the ANC so that Africa could be liberated from white minority rule.¹⁶ It can thus be asserted that support for the ANC in Africa developed naturally from these conferences on the African continent.

The first conference of significance in relation to the support of the African states for the ANC was the Bandung Conference of 1955. For the African states this was the first conference outside the UN to focus attention¹⁷ on the liberation of the oppressed. As liberation in Africa constituted an important subject of discussion to the conference, African liberation movements were also accorded representation at the Conference. In this connection, it must be noted that the ANC was¹⁸ represented by Moses Kotane. From the proceedings of the conference, it became clear

that the ANC was to obtain direct support from Black Africa. Although the conference made no specific reference to apartheid, one is inclined to argue that the conference identified very closely with the position of the ANC in relation to apartheid. This is clearly reflected in principles one and three of the ten principles that the conference adopted :

"..... respect for human rights and
..... recognition of the equality
19
of all races"

There is no doubt that the position of the conference with regard to the issues of equality and human rights was in full accord with the objectives of the ANC. The resolutions of the conference can therefore be seen as an extension of sympathy and support for the courageous stand taken by liberation movements such as the ANC. William Lloyd observed: "The significance of the conference for the ANC was in the personal contacts made in association of the anti-apartheid struggle
20
with the Afro-Asian anti-colonialist movement." For the ANC this was an important breakthrough in so far as external support against apartheid was concerned.

The second conference of significance was the first Conference of Independent African States, (CIAS).

This conference was organised by Nkrumah and was intended to bring all of independent Africa together. Except for South Africa, all the independent African states attended the conference in Accra, Ghana, in 1958.²¹

Unlike the Bandung gathering, the Accra conference paid special attention to the conflict between the ANC and South Africa. Of importance to note is that the Accra gathering gave independent Africa an opportunity for the first time to speak with one voice on the subject of liberation. It therefore came as no surprise when the conference committed independent Africa to direct involvement in securing the liberation of Africa.²² The conference called on independent Africa to give "all possible assistance to the dependent peoples in their struggles for self determination."²³

From Accra, the message was clear to apartheid South Africa : The struggle in one part of Africa is interconnected with the struggles for liberation in other parts of Africa. Furthermore, independence in one part of Africa was considered meaningless unless the whole of Africa was liberated from white minority rule. This sentiment was conveyed in a special resolution which pledged support for the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. The resolution appealed to the white minority

governments to :

"..... refrain from suppressing national liberation movements, to release immediately all political prisoners, detainees and persons under restrictive orders."²⁵

The significance of Accra to the struggle against apartheid can be seen on two levels : On the one hand, the Accra gathering committed independent Africa to direct involvement in the anti-apartheid struggle. On the other, the gathering extended its warm sympathy and support for the efforts of the ANC to overthrow apartheid. In this way the gathering provided the ANC with potential allies in the struggle against apartheid. Consequently, apartheid could no longer be considered an issue between the ANC and South Africa.

The first CIAS was followed by a non-governmental conference of political parties and liberation movements. This conference was held at Accra in December 1958. It should therefore not be confused with the first CIAS. In contrast to the first CIAS, delegates attended on behalf of liberation movements²⁶ and political organisations. This gathering became known as the All African Peoples Conference (AAPC). For the purposes of this study it must be noted that the ANC was also represented at the AAPC. The ANC delegation

was led by Ezekiel Mphahlele who went into exile in 1957. When Mphahlele heard about the AAPC he obtained Mandela's permission to²⁷ represent the ANC at the conference. While the conference was in session, Alfred Hutchinson, one of the ANC leaders in the Transvaal,²⁸ arrived and became part of the ANC delegation.

Like the CIAS, the AAPC also focussed on the conflict between the ANC and South Africa. Liberation was the crucial issue that confronted delegates. The conference recognised that South Africa was an area that deserved special attention with regard to the elimination of white minority rule from the African continent. After serious debate on the subject of liberation, the AAPC took the following position in relation to liberation movements that were still engaged in active struggle for liberation :

The All African Peoples Conference in Accra declares its full support to all fighters for freedom in Africato all those who are compelled to retaliate against violence to attain national²⁹ independence and freedom for the people"

The AAPC demonstrated beyond doubt that Black Africa was fully committed to the total liberation of Africa from white minority rule.

In expressing support for the ANC's active struggle for liberation, the conference called for an economic boycott of South African goods.³⁰ The presence of the ANC at Accra might have been responsible for the AAPC's militant stand against apartheid. One can therefore safely assume that the goals of the ANC at the conference were listened to.

In 1960 the independent African states became more determined in their opposition to apartheid. In that year more than fifty percent of African states obtained their independence.³¹ Upon attaining their independence the African states made it clear that they would not forget those whose independence was still to be achieved. Liberation was considered a crucial issue that confronted independent Black Africa. This attitude was clearly reflected in the proceedings of the second CIAS at Adis Abeba. In its deliberations on the situation in South Africa, the second CIAS identified very closely with the ANC strategy against apartheid. In this connection, the second CIAS urged all African states to sever diplomatic relations with South Africa and to implement a boycott³² of South African goods. Furthermore, the gathering requested African states who were members of the commonwealth to campaign for³³ the exclusion of South Africa from the forum.

From the second CIAS independent Africa became increasingly desperate in its support for the elimination of apartheid in South Africa. It began to advocate political and economic sanctions and the expulsion of South Africa from international forums.

This position was endorsed by the third CIAS³⁴ in May 1961. As a result, independent Africa aligned itself with the ANC strategy of economic boycotts and the isolation of South Africa from the community of nations.

From these gatherings on the African continent it became clear that independent Africa was united against white minority rule in Southern Africa. The significance of these gatherings for the ANC was that Black Africa identified South Africa as a target area for liberation. As the number of independent African states increased, attention was focussed on the struggle against apartheid.

1.2.2 AFRICAN UNITY AND THE DESIRE FOR LIBERATION

From the African gatherings it is clear that Africa adopted a common position in relations to apartheid in South Africa. By 1963 the independent African states had reached consensus in their determination to support the liberation of Southern Africa from white minority rule. It was this consensus which led

to the formation of the OAU in May 1963. When the leaders of thirty-two independent African states got together at the Adis Abeba Conference of 1963 (where the OAU was founded) they agreed to support the struggle for the³⁵ elimination of white minority rule from Africa. As a result, the liberation struggles in Southern Africa became the focus of attention.

The Charter of the OAU proclaims as one of the aims of the organisation, the eradication of "all forms of colonialism" from Africa, and demands of member nations "absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African³⁶ territories which are still dependent." In expressing support for the struggle against apartheid, the conference passed a resolution³⁷ on Apartheid and Racial Discrimination which condemned the situation in South Africa. The resolution declared among others :

- support for the liberation movements within South Africa
- diplomatic pressure on non-African states, and on the United Nations, which has been repeatedly requested to impose economic sanctions on South Africa.
- breaking off of diplomatic relations with South Africa and refrain from establishing such relations.
- boycotting of all South African goods, and refraining from exporting goods, including

all arms and ammunition to South Africa.

Further support for the struggle against apartheid was expressed through the formation of the African Liberation Committee (ALC). As an integral part of the OAU, the ALC was intended to co-ordinate support to liberation movements fighting for the overthrow of white minority rule.³⁹ The mere creation of this structure signified the extent of African commitment to the liberation of Southern Africa from white minority rule. It therefore became clear that the African liberation movements were to benefit a great deal from the formation of the OAU.

For the ANC the formation of the OAU was an important turning point in the struggle against white minority rule. Oliver Tambo, who led the ANC delegation at the OAU founding conference, Adis Abeba, remarked :

"We have never doubted that singly the African independent states supported us in our struggle to be free. But at this conference we received, for the first time, an outspoken token of support from the heads of state themselves, speaking in unity, Beyond that it places at our disposal all the facilities and other forms of assistance which

the African states individually or
collectively can offer"⁴⁰

It can thus be argued that the formation of the OAU transformed Africa into an important support base for the liberation movements of Southern Africa. The message was clear to South Africa : Black independent Africa was united against apartheid.

1.2.3 AFRICA AT THE UN

Having identified with the position of the ANC against apartheid, Black independent Africa turned to the UN to campaign for support against South Africa. The opportunity to rally support for the ANC came in 1960 when as many as seventeen African states were admitted into the UN. And this raised the total number of African votes in the UN General Assembly from eight to twenty five at one go.⁴¹ This created an atmosphere in the UN under which Black Africa could direct world attention to the conflict between the ANC and the South African government.

The main objective of African states at the UN was to use the UN system and member nations to help in the termination of apartheid in South

Africa by rendering assistance to the ANC.⁴² The African states wanted the UN to recognise the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed majority in South Africa. As a result, the African states did not hesitate to take full advantage of their numerical superiority in the UN General Assembly. As the UN constituted a world forum, the African states wanted the struggle against apartheid to become a central issue in international affairs.

In an attempt to attain their objectives at the UN, the African states initiated a number of resolutions that enabled them to mobilise support for the ANC in the struggle against apartheid. Between 1960 and 1965, the African states led the UN General Assembly to adopt a number of resolutions in support of the struggle against apartheid. Beginning in 1960, the African states sponsored the adoption of⁴³ the Declaration on Decolonisation. Their desire was for the UN system to identify with the position of the ANC in relation to apartheid in South Africa. Consequently, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by an overwhelming majority.⁴⁴ This Declaration "solemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations", and to this end declares that

"all peoples have the right to
self-determination" and independence.⁴⁵ From
this resolution it became clear to independent
Black Africa that the UN supported their goals
on the liberation of South Africa from white
minority rule. The significance of this
resolution can be seen in the fact that the UN
recognised that all people have the right to
choose their own form of government. This was
therefore an important achievement in the
efforts of Black Africa to rally support for
the struggle against apartheid.

After the passage of the Resolution on
Decolonisation, the activities of the African
states were geared towards persuading the UN
to take concrete measures against South Africa.
They argued that moral pressure on South Africa
had produced no positive results.⁴⁶ As a result,
the African states pressed for more decisive
action on the apartheid issue. Their efforts
paid dividends in November 1960 when the
General Assembly called on its members to break
off or not establish diplomatic relations with
South Africa, boycott South African goods, and
prohibit the export of their own commodities
to South Africa.⁴⁷ It was such African sponsored
resolutions which laid the groundwork for the
eventual economic and political isolation of
South Africa.

Independent Africa also took the struggle against apartheid to the UN Security Council. In the Security Council they argued that the continued existence of apartheid constituted a threat to the peace and security of the world.⁴⁸ They therefore advocated the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa. Eventually, the Security Council adopted African sponsored resolutions which called for coercive measures against South Africa. These measures can be summed up as follows :

- all states were called to "cease immediately the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa."⁴⁹
- the expulsion of South Africa from the UN and the imposition of economic sanction against South Africa.

By 1964 the African states at the UN had secured a number of resolutions geared at mobilising international support for the ANC. These resolutions paved way for the eventual recognition of the ANC by the UN as an authentic representative of the African majority in South Africa.

There is therefore no doubt that the Atlantic Charter and the formation of the UN created an

international atmosphere that became sympathetic to the ANC. By 1964 when Zambia attained her independence, the anti-apartheid struggle had gained international recognition. In various resolutions since 1946 the UN pledged support for the liberation of the oppressed. Moreover, various conferences which culminated in condemnation of apartheid and praise for the ANC were sponsored by the UN. In Africa the ANC gained the sympathy and support of many independent African States. Amongst the independent African states Zambia emerged as the most important source of support for the ANC. In the next chapter we will look at the factors underlying Zambia's willingness to host the ANC.

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CHAPTER 2HOST STATES AND LIBERATION : AN ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS
UNDERLYING ZAMBIA'S WILLINGNESS TO HOST THE ANC

"We are struggling for human rights,
the inalienable rights of all men. We
are engaged in a struggle against any
form of imperialism and colonialism ..."¹

When Zambia attained her independence in 1964 the liberation struggles in South Africa, Zimbabwe and the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique assumed greater importance in the liberation of Africa from white minority rule. President Kaunda made it clear that Zambia would not forget those whose independence was still to be achieved.² Earlier in this study it has been conclusively shown that support for the ANC in Black Africa was perceived as the only avenue open to the African states for advancing the cause of liberation in Southern Africa. As Kaunda committed Zambia to the total liberation of Southern Africa from white minority rule it became clear that the ANC was to receive direct assistance from Zambia. At the beginning the assistance was very limited. But as time went on Zambia became more and more actively involved in helping the liberation movements of Southern Africa.

This chapter represents an attempt to answer the question of why Zambia came forward and hosted the ANC despite obvious security and economic risks. It will also direct attention to Zambia's political position as a host state to the ANC. There is no doubt that Zambia's status as a host state to the ANC centres around the question of advancing the cause of liberation in Southern Africa. It is therefore necessary to begin an analysis of Zambia's willingness to host the ANC by focussing on the following issues : the concept of a host state in the liberation of Southern Africa, the implications of Zambia's political position as a host state to the ANC for South Africa, and the legality of Zambia's political position as a host state to the ANC.

2.1 HOST STATES AND EXILE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

In order to appreciate the status of Zambia as a host state to the ANC, one must trace very briefly the development of the concept of a host state in the liberation of Southern Africa. This makes it imperative to provide a thorough answer to the question of what is a host state? Kenneth Grundy, in his Host Countries and the Southern African Liberation Struggle, defines host states as :

"countries that permit liberation movements to function on their
3
territory."

The concept of a host state can therefore be applied to any country that allows a liberation movement from another country to establish itself within its borders. As soon as a liberation movement establishes itself within the borders of another country, it assumes the status of an exiled liberation movement. This simply means that such a liberation movement can no longer operate freely and legally within the borders of its country of origin. What then has been the determinant of host states in Southern Africa?

The concept of a host state in Southern Africa can be traced to the failure of the white minority governments to co-exist with the African liberation movements. Amongst the movements in this category would be the ANC (South Africa), SWAPO (Namibia), FRELIMO (Mozambique),⁴ ZANU (Zimbabwe), and MPLA (Angola). The minority governments of Southern Africa turned a blind eye to the legitimate African demands as articulated by these liberation movements. Their response to the demands of the liberation movements took the form of increasing⁵ repression. As a result, between 1956 and 1961 all African liberation movements in Southern Africa were⁶ banned. It then became unlawful for the African liberation movements in Southern Africa to engage in activities directed at advancing the cause of African liberation. In spite of government repression, the African liberation movements were determined to continue with the struggle for equality and justice.

The question that confronted the liberation movements in the 1960's was not whether, but how to continue with the

struggle. For the African liberation movements there was no question of surrender. But the reality of the situation was that these movements could no longer operate within their countries of origin. In this situation the liberation movements committed themselves to a new mode of struggle, that is, the armed struggle. This was the only way in which the liberation movements could transform their determination to continue their opposition to white minority rule into reality.

It soon became clear that armed struggle required a new mode of organisation under different conditions to the repression that prevailed under white minority rule. Consequently, the liberation movements were compelled to look beyond the borders of their respective countries for the continuation of the struggle against white minority rule. It was only in exile that the liberation movements could organise effectively for the beginnings of armed operations against white minority rule. The support of Black independent Africa for the liberation cause in Southern Africa made it possible for the liberation movements of Southern Africa to reorganise themselves in preparation for armed operations in neighbouring states. As a result, President Kaunda's commitment to the liberation cause in Southern Africa quickly transformed Zambia into a land of exiled liberation movements. This simply means that President Kaunda permitted the liberation movements of Southern Africa to set up their headquarters on Zambian soil. Eventually, Zambia became a host state to the ANC. It is therefore clear that white minority rule in Southern Africa is the main factor

that generated host states in the liberation of Southern Africa.

2.2 THE IMPLICATIONS OF ZAMBIA'S POLITICAL POSITION AS A HOST STATE TO THE ANC FOR SOUTH AFRICA

A host state can be considered an important area for a liberation movement that can no longer operate in its country of origin. One can therefore argue convincingly that Zambia has been the most important area in the continuation of the ANC's struggle against apartheid. There is no doubt that Zambia's willingness to host the ANC centred around the important issue of liberation that confronted Black Africa. In granting political asylum to the ANC, Zambia desired to advance the cause of liberation in Southern Africa. An important question that must be answered about Zambia's political position as a host state to the ANC is as follows: What have been the implications of the presence of the ANC within the borders of Zambia for South Africa?

Zambia's political position as a host state to the ANC effectively rendered the ban on the ANC ineffective. The ANC retained its identity as a liberation movement and could reorganise itself in pursuance of its objectives to overthrow apartheid. In terms of organisation South Africa could no longer exercise control over the activities of the ANC to ensure that the provisions of the Unlawful Organisation Act (1960) remained in force. In this

way the ANC was freed from South Africa's control
of political space.¹¹ It should be borne in mind that
in exile, the strategy of the ANC was based on armed
struggle and the mobilisation of world opinion
against apartheid.¹² The atmosphere under the refuge
of a host state became conducive for the ANC to
prepare itself in line with its new mode of
struggle.

While within the borders of a host state the ANC was
able to get its armed struggle against apartheid off
the ground. Transit rights, training camps, transit
camps, and operational bases were placed at the
disposal of the ANC.¹³ As a result, armed struggle
became a major security problem that confronted
South Africa between 1964 and the unbanning of the
ANC in 1990. It is obvious that without the
hospitality of Zambia as a host state it would have
been impossible for the ANC to wage armed struggle
against apartheid. In addition, a liberation
movement under the refuge of a host state is also
able to influence international opinion against the
policies of its country of origin.¹⁴ And this may
have negative consequences for the country of
origin. In this connection, the ANC did not
hesitate to exploit the conditions under the refuge
of a host state to mobilise international opinion
against apartheid. As will be shown in subsequent
chapters, the ANC dealt with international
organisations and governments while South Africa
became increasingly isolated. This eventually led

to the recognition of the ANC as an authentic representative of African aspirations in South Africa. Zambia's political position as a host state to the ANC rendered the ban on the ANC an end in itself. The ANC retained its identity and through the hospitality of Zambia managed to continue with the struggle against apartheid.

The status of Zambia as a host state to the ANC did not augur well for South Africa. It effectively rendered South Africa a target area in the ANC's armed struggle. As already indicated, the preparations for armed struggle within the borders of Zambia posed the greatest threat to the security of South Africa. This state of affairs affected relations between the host state and the target

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area. As a result, throughout the history of the liberation struggles in Southern Africa, relations between host states and target areas have been characterised by accusations of subversion and

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counter accusations of aggression. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, the response of South Africa to the presence of the ANC within the borders of Zambia took the form of border violations, air

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raids, and military cross border raids. These measures were designed to force Zambia to comply with South Africa's demands that no country in Southern Africa provides assistance to the ANC. South Africa wanted to create a safe political climate for the continued existence of apartheid in Southern Africa.

2.3 APARTHEID, HOST STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Zambia is the only land-locked country in Southern Africa which has hosted national liberation movements. Zambia began to host liberation movements as early as 1960 before the attainment of her independence.¹⁸ The desire to change the status quo in Southern Africa led Zambia to grant asylum to the ANC. The provision of asylum to the ANC emanated from Kaunda's deep commitment to the liberation of Southern Africa from white minority rule. A sense of duty to support the ANC has also been reinforced by the calls of the international community for states to support the national liberation movements of South Africa. Zambia's political position as a host state to the ANC cannot be seen in isolation from the prominence of the struggle against apartheid in international affairs. It has already been argued that several resolutions of the UN and OAU have condemned apartheid and called upon member nations to contribute moral and political assistance to the ANC. Despite the condemnation of the international community South Africa continued to adhere to her apartheid policies. The question to be considered then is whether or not, given the prominent position of the struggle against apartheid in international affairs, it has been legal for Zambia to host the ANC.

The legality of Zambia's political position as a host state to the ANC can be analysed according to

the rules of general international law as provided for in the UN Charter. At the outset, it is important to note that international law is a highly complex and contentious issue. Nevertheless, through its apartheid policy, South Africa has violated her international legal obligations. For the purposes of this study these obligations can be summed up as follows :

2.3.1 THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Under the UN Charter South Africa assumed an obligation to grant the right of national self-determination. The political order in South Africa has been in conflict with the UN Charter and South Africa's legal obligation to grant self-determination to the African majority. Apartheid has effectively denied the African majority the right to participate in government. This view has been confirmed by the UN General Assembly which condemned apartheid as inconsistent with South Africa's international obligation to grant self-determination to the African majority. In 1970 the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the UN. This resolution stated :

"..... all peoples have the right freely to determine their political status and every state has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. Every state has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action, the realisation of the principles of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples
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....."

From the preceeding it is clear that the continued existence of apartheid in South Africa constituted a serious violation of South Africa's obligations under international law. Hence the political conflict in South Africa between the ANC and the government could no longer be confined within the borders of South Africa.

2.3.2 HUMAN RIGHTS

In terms of the UN Charter member nations are obliged to "promote and encourage respect for
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human rights." As already pointed out in the first chapter, articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter required South Africa to observe and respect human rights. But South Africa,

through her apartheid policies, failed to comply with her obligations under articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter.²⁴ The UN could not afford to ignore the situation in South Africa. As a result, the violation of human rights in South Africa came under the spotlight in various resolutions of the UN General Assembly and Security Council. For example, in 1963, the Security Council condemned the policy of the South African government as : " inconsistent with the principles of the Charter and contrary to South African's obligations as a member."²⁵ It therefore goes without saying that the continued existence of apartheid in South Africa prompted the nations of the world to provide the necessary assistance to the ANC. Our concern is whether Zambia's political position to the ANC has been a legal means of supporting the ANC in the struggle against apartheid.

2.3.3 ZAMBIA'S POLITICAL POSITION AS A HOST STATE TO THE ANC : THE POSITION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

We have already observed that support for the liberation of the oppressed has been an important issue in international affairs. It must be noted here that the ANC is a representative of the oppressed African

majority in South Africa. Since its inception in 1912 it has been engaged in a struggle to replace apartheid with a non-racial political dispensation.²⁶ This led to the recognition of the ANC in international affairs as a legitimate national liberation movement. The ANC has been accorded this status by the OAU²⁷ and the UN. Given the status of the ANC in international affairs, it is possible to argue that Zambia's conduct in hosting the ANC has been in compliance with her legal obligations under the charter of the UN and the OAU.

As early as 1964, the UN Security Council appealed to states to "..... exert all their influence in order to induce the South African government to comply with the provisions of the UN Charter."²⁸ Moreover, the OAU also demands of its members to support the liberation movements of South Africa. This is apparent from the provisions of OAU Resolutions CM 242 (XVII) of 1971 : The OAU has reaffirmed :

"..... its full unconditional support of the oppressed people of South Africa in their legitimate struggle to eliminate²⁹ apartheid and achieve majority rule."

Zambia's hosting of the ANC amounted to a form of support for the struggle against apartheid.

It was not designed to secure any political advantages for Zambia. Rather, Zambia hosted the ANC to put pressure on South Africa to yield to ANC demands for the dismantling of apartheid. Zambia's position as a host state cannot be construed as unlawful conduct as far as international law is concerned. As a member of the OAU and the UN, Zambia has an international obligation to allow ANC offices within her borders.³⁰ The obligation to provide offices to liberation movements like the ANC has been accepted even by Western Countries such as the UK and France and by the international community as a whole.³¹ Such support is therefore in conformity with international law.

Accepting the ANC to operate on her soil, Zambia does not violate article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, but rather furthers the purposes and principles of the Charter.³² The presence of the ANC within the borders of Zambia has been consistent with the UN Charter. It can therefore not be seen as a form of aggression against South Africa. The 1974 Definition of Aggression, for example, stipulates:

"Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any way prejudice the right of peoples particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or

other forms of alien domination, nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above mentioned

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Declaration."

The preceding declaration concedes the right of Zambia to host the ANC. Because the ANC is engaged in a struggle to challenge the denial of the right of self-determination by the government of South Africa, Zambia is entitled to render whatever form of assistance towards the realisation of the exercise of the right of self-determination. After all the UN allows or permits states to render the necessary assistance to national liberation movements. This is clear from the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States of 1970 :

"Every state has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples of their rights to self determination and freedom and independence.

In their action against, and resistance to forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right of self determination, such peoples are entitled

to seek and receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter."³⁵

Another argument in support of Zambia's legality as a host to the ANC is the important and continuing interest of the international community in the protection of human rights. The UN has on various occasions described apartheid as "a threat to international peace and security",³⁶ "a crime against humanity",³⁷ a violation of the Charter of the UN,³⁸ and " a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind."³⁹ This shows that international law concerns itself not only with relations between nations; but also with the treatment of people by governments. In view of this recognition, Zambia's position as a host state to the ANC is a legally appropriate means of rendering assistance for the recognition of human rights in South Africa. Moreover, the international community, through the UN, recognises the protection of human rights to be in the⁴⁰ interest of mankind. It can thus be argued that Zambia's support for the ANC has been in the interests of peace and security in Southern Africa. Zambia's expressed goal in hosting the ANC has been to contribute towards the attainment of a non-racial political dispensation in South Africa.

Taking the preceeding into cognisance, one is led to the conclusion that the conduct of Zambia as a host state was not contrary to international law. The intransigence of the government over its apartheid policy left Zambia no alternative but to host the ANC.

2.4 ZAMBIA IDENTIFIES WITH THE POSITION OF THE ANC AGAINST APARTHEID

In order to understand the difficult position of Zambia in her support for the ANC it seems necessary to highlight very briefly the economic realities that confronted Zambia at independence. Most of the independent African states in Southern Africa have developed historical ties and trading relationships with South Africa. These relationships are to be found in four areas of economic activity : labour,⁴¹ energy, communication, and trade. At independence in 1964 Zambia's imports from South Africa represented 20,7 percent of its total imports, and⁴² in 1966 it rose to 23,8 percent. Thus, Zambia found herself economically dependent on South Africa.

It therefore goes without saying, that South Africa has been a powerful state when compared to the rest of the neighbouring African states. Both Zambia and South Africa were aware of this economic reality. This shows that support for the ANC was not an easy decision on the part of Kaunda. The reality of the

situation was that Zambia's economic position rendered her vulnerable to possible South African retaliation for supporting the ANC. This is basically the background against which Zambia's support for the ANC between 1964 and 1990 should be seen. What then motivated Kaunda to host the ANC despite obvious economic and security risks?

A basic understanding of Zambia's willingness to host the ANC has its point of departure in Kaunda's philosophy of humanism which can be traced back as far as 1967. The policy was first propagated by President Kaunda in his opening address to the address to the Annual Conference of UNIP in 1967.⁴³ In propagating humanism, President Kaunda asserted that it is a rival ideology to the racist policies of the white minority governments in Southern Africa.⁴⁴ As a rival ideology to white minority rule, one can argue that humanism was designed to advance a new political order in Southern Africa. Human dignity and equal political representation were the ultimate objectives in relation to the ideology of humanism.⁴⁵ In essence, humanism represented a challenge to colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa. In this connection, Kaunda stated :

"..... apartheid as practised to the South of us is in direct contradiction to humanism."⁴⁶

In advocating humanism Kaunda desired to re-establish the rights of Blacks. As a result, Zambia could not reconcile herself with the evils of colonialism and apartheid. For the ideals of humanism to become a reality Kaunda was compelled to support the ANC in the struggle against apartheid. In supporting the ANC Kaunda wanted to make a meaningful contribution to the demise of apartheid in South Africa. Moreover, the philosophy of humanism was in full accord with the expressed goals of the ANC. Hence Kaunda openly expressed support for the ANC.

Another important factor in Zambia's support for the ANC is her adherence to the principles of non-racialism. In keeping with the ideology of humanism, Kaunda could not reconcile with states that stood for political domination and racial discrimination. Like the African majority in South Africa, Zambia also experienced racial prejudice and discrimination under colonial rule. In propagating non racialism Zambia adopted a hostile attitude to white minority rule. President Kaunda asserted that his government stood for human rights in Southern Africa. And was dedicated to the principles of justice and respect for the human
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person. It is therefore clear that the political order in South Africa represented a great challenge to the independence of Zambia.

On the eve of Zambia's independence, Kaunda stated that Zambia opposed the minority governments of

Southern Africa not because of their colour, but because, "they speak falsely when they declare one human being better than the other." Non-racialism as propagated by Kaunda, seeks to advocate the end of racial prejudice and discrimination in South Africa. It is interesting to note that non-racialism has been an important ideal in the ANC struggle against apartheid. After all the struggle for liberation in the whole of Southern Africa was geared towards the creation of a non-racial political order.

The significance of non-racialism in the struggle for liberation can be seen immediately after the majority of African states attained independence in the 1960's. The political order which replaced white minority rule was designed to satisfy the political aspirations of both Black and White. As a result, a non-racial political setting became an important achievement in the struggle for liberation.

Non-racialism as a factor that accounts for Zambia's support for the ANC came under the spotlight immediately after the 1962 elections which brought about majority rule. In his first policy speech in the Legislative Council on 17 January 1963, Kaunda spelt out his party's commitment to non-racialism. He stated :

"It is our intention, to treat
our fellow man like human beings

because that is what they are ...
.... we have fought and suffered
against such a racial system,
and I repeat, it is not our
intention to replace that type
of system with one of our own." 49

Zambia's commitment to non-racialism is clearly reflected in her opposition to white minority rule. Unlike other independent African states in Southern Africa, Zambia adopted a radical position in relation to the continued existence of white minority rule on the African continent. It therefore came as no surprise when Zambia took the lead amongst the states of Southern Africa in supporting liberation movements.

Zambia's support for the ANC can also be ascribed to the promotion Pan-Africanist ideals on the African Continent. In this connection, it must be noted that African unity and independence have been the most important ideals to Black independent Africa. With the formation of the OAU in 1963 independent Africa committed herself to the total liberation of the African Continent from white
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minority rule. As already indicated, the African states assumed an obligation under the OAU Charter to extend the necessary assistance to the liberation movements that were still engaged in a struggle against colonialism and apartheid. When Zambia gained membership of the OAU she also assumed an obligation to advance the cause of liberation in

Southern Africa. Like all independent African states, Zambia also perceived independence as a significant victory against the political order in South Africa.⁵¹ Given the significance of independence to Black Africa, Kaunda found it difficult to accept white minority rule over the African majority in Southern Africa. As long as white minority rule continued to exist in Southern Africa, independence to the independent African states was of no significance.

The main desire of Kaunda was the total liberation of the African continent from white minority rule. It therefore became imperative on the part of Zambia to support the ANC in its endeavours to eliminate apartheid. For the independence of Zambia to be meaningful, the whole of Southern Africa had to be liberated from white minority rule. In this connection, Kaunda remarked :

"..... independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of Africa."⁵²

Having assumed an obligation under the UN Charter Kaunda could not afford to escape the political realities that confronted Zambia at independence. This became evident when a government spokesman remarked :

"Zambia's policy since independence has consistently remained one of

rendering assistance to the liberation movements in Southern Africa within the framework of the OAU." ⁵³

Zambia's main concern with the situation in South Africa was the maintenance of freedom and prosperity, for all. Guided by his philosophy of humanism, Kaunda committed Zambia to the total liberation of Southern Africa from white minority rule. When South Africa placed a total ban on the activities of the ANC, Kaunda placed Zambia's territory at the disposal of the ANC. In this way Kaunda offered the ANC an opportunity to reorganise itself on Zambian territory and prepare for the continuation of the struggle against apartheid.

Zambia felt compelled to do something about apartheid. Kaunda refused to subordinate African political interests to South Africa's economic power. The desire for human rights and racial equality was so strong that Kaunda could not afford to be intimidated by South Africa's economic power. The decision to support the ANC can therefore be seen as a great sacrifice on the part of Kaunda.

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CHAPTER 3

THE ANC IN ZAMBIA : THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF A LIBERATION MOVEMENT UNDER THE REFUGE OF A HOST STATE

An analysis of the development of the struggle against white minority rule in Southern Africa reveals that Zambia has extended the most important form of support to the liberation movements. When the liberation movements of Southern Africa lost their domestic bases in the 1960's Zambia emerged as a sympathetic country that was ready to provide the necessary accommodation. In essence, Zambia made it possible for the liberation movements to continue with the struggle against white minority rule. Had it not been for the hospitality of Zambia, it is unlikely that the liberation movements in Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia would have succeeded in their efforts to liberate the African majority from white minority rule.

The ANC also benefited from the hospitality of Zambia. Under the refuge of Zambia the ANC got an opportunity to reorganise itself for the continuation of the struggle against apartheid. Zambia made it possible for the ANC to lay the necessary groundwork in preparing for armed struggle. It can thus be asserted that Zambia, as a base from which the ANC operated, played an important role in the efforts of the ANC to wage armed struggle against apartheid. Without the accommodation provided by Zambia it is unlikely that the ANC would have succeeded in translating its new mode of struggle (armed struggle and

economic and political isolation of South Africa) into reality especially under the political conditions created by the Unlawful Organisation Act (1960) which placed a total ban on the ANC and all its activities.¹ But from Zambia the ANC leadership could plan their strategies and supervise the day to day affairs of the ANC.

The important contributions of Zambia to the ANC struggle against apartheid can be seen in the manner in which Mandela commended Zambia for having hosted the ANC. In a speech in Lusaka, shortly after his release in February 1990, Mandela acknowledged the role of Zambia in the ANC struggle against apartheid when he stated :

"Zambia is the country which
has made it possible for us
(ANC) to continue our struggle."²

What emerges clearly from the above is a recognition of the contribution of Zambia to the eventual survival of the ANC. The importance of accommodation as a mode of support raises an important question in relation to the ANC. To what extent has the ANC grown or developed in terms of organisation and political status under the refuge of Zambia as a host state? In an attempt to answer this question this chapter will also focus on the role of Zambia in the development of the ANC. Of particular importance will be an analysis of the ANC Leadership structure and its functions, the ANC community in Zambia, and the international political status of the ANC. By way of introduction, and to place the growth of the ANC under the refuge of a host state in context, it

The reaction of the ANC to its banning was that it would continue with the struggle against apartheid. It therefore goes without saying that the ANC was not prepared to comply with the government order to disband. Instead, the ANC created a military wing, known as Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), to prepare for a new mode of struggle, initially based on sabotage.

The refusal of the ANC to comply with the provisions of the Unlawful Organisations Act No 34 of 1960 can be traced to its plans for a permanent external structure. In this connection, it must be stated immediately that the ANC started to make plans for

"The African National Congress refuses to submit to the ban imposed on it by parliament of the Union of South Africa. We shall carry on our fight of the past half century for the rights and freedoms of the African people. We shall continue our struggle for which we pledged ourselves to all the democratic demands of the Freedom Charter until the unjust and immoral ban suppressing the ANC has been repealed."

3.1 ORIGINS OF THE ANC'S EXTERNAL STRUCTURE

seems necessary to look very briefly at the origins of the ANC's external structure.

a permanent external structure before it was
declared an illegal organisation.⁵ In a National
Executive Committee (NEC) meeting in June 1959, the
ANC decided that in the event it was banned Oliver
Tambo was to go abroad and set up a permanent
external structure.⁶ The ANC's external structure
should therefore not be seen as an immediate
response to the Unlawful organisations Act of 1960.

Under the state repression of the 1950's the ANC
anticipated a clampdown on its activities. With the
banning of leaders from participating in political
activities and the prohibition of political
gatherings, the writing was on the wall that the
days of the ANC as a political organisation were
numbered. Hence Oliver Tambo was sent abroad in
March 1960 to set up a permanent structure.⁷
According to Albert Luthuli, Oliver Tambo "left with
our prior agreement, and his departure had been
intended before the crisis - we wanted a roving
ambassador."⁸ It is therefore clear that when the
ANC was banned in 1960 plans were well underway for
the formation of a permanent external structure.

The primary objectives of the ANC external structure
was to mobilise international support and to prepare
for armed struggle against apartheid. Initially
this objective was carried out in conjunction with
the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) through the South
African United Front (SAUF).⁹ Of interest to note
is that the United Front was a joint undertaking by

the ANC, PAC, South African Indian Congress (SAIC), and the South West African National Union (SWANU). The strategy of the United Front was in full accord with the ANC's new strategy. It placed emphasis on the following : the isolation of South Africa from its vital sources of support and the acquisition of support for the anti-apartheid struggle.¹¹ For the ANC the SAUF served a useful purpose. It enabled the ANC to campaign more effectively for the economic and political isolation of South Africa. Given the strategy that the SAUF adopted one can argue that it laid the necessary groundwork for the ANC's external structure.

The SAUF lasted until 1962 when it broke up because of ideological differences between the ANC and the PAC.¹² The collapse of the SAUF constituted a significant challenge to the ANC. Under the political conditions imposed by the Unlawful Organisation Act (1960) the ANC could not afford to remain without an external structure. The ANC was quick to recognise that the creation of a working external structure was indispensable for the continuation of the struggle. With the collapse of the SAUF, the ANC proceeded to set up an independent organisational structure. The initial offices were¹³ opened in London, Cairo, Algiers, and Dar-es-Salam. Oliver Tambo assumed control of the London Office and made it the ANC headquarters.

3.2 THE ANC MOVES TO ZAMBIA

There is no doubt that London became an important post in Europe from which the ANC could give effective coverage of its position in relation to apartheid. It served a useful purpose in terms of mobilising world opinion against apartheid. From London it became convenient for the ANC to make contact with governments and international organisations in the pursuit of its objectives to isolate South Africa. It therefore came as no surprise when appearances before the UN by Oliver Tambo, Duma Nokwe, Robert Resha, and Tennyson Makiwane in the 1960's became an annual event in ANC attempts to secure international support for the struggle against apartheid.¹⁴ Thus, the London office played an important role in soliciting support for the struggle against apartheid.

For the purposes of the present study the importance of permanent headquarters must be viewed against the background of the overall ANC strategy against apartheid. On the one hand, armed struggle assumed a point of central importance in the ANC's new mode of struggle. On the other, mobilisation of world opinion against apartheid served a useful purpose in terms of support for the efforts of the ANC against apartheid.

In the words of Tom Lodge, "it can secure financial and other forms of assistance in such a way as to minimise reliance on a single or narrow range of

foreign allies." ¹⁵ The central position of armed operations in the ANC strategy against apartheid became obvious as early as 1962 when the external structure assumed responsibility for all MK ¹⁶ activities outside of South Africa. While the London Office engaged in mobilising world opinion against apartheid, the first priority continued to be an army of liberation. ¹⁷ According to Oliver Tambo, after 1960 the external structure was working ¹⁸ in support of an internal military build up. As a result, in May 1962 the external structure finally assumed responsibility, for "co-ordinating and conducting all the activities associated with MK ¹⁹ outside of South Africa." This responsibility included making arrangements with Africa for training, training sites and the transportation of ²⁰ men being sent abroad for military training.

Having assumed responsibility for MK activities, the external structure could no longer afford to retain London as permanent external headquarters. London was too far for the execution of armed operations against apartheid. Moreover, the ANC could not rely on international support alone for the attainment of its objectives against apartheid. If apartheid was to be toppled, the ANC could not afford to continue with the struggle without effective African participation. To enable Africans to participate in the continuation of the struggle, the ANC had no

alternative but to position itself as close as possible to the borders of South Africa.²¹ It is clear that armed struggle was the only option in the ANC's new mode of struggle that afforded the African majority an opportunity to be directly involved in the continuation of the struggle. It was important for the armed struggle to be based among the people. It therefore became imperative on the part of the ANC to set up its permanent headquarters in Southern Africa.

3.2.1 FROM MOROGORO TO LUSAKA

Initially, the ANC looked to Ghana as the first independent African state as a base for its headquarters in Africa.²² But the question of proximity to the borders of South Africa rendered Ghana an unsuitable candidate for the ANC's permanent external headquarters. As already indicated, it was important for the ANC to position itself as close as possible to the borders of South Africa. This forced the ANC to turn its attention towards Tanzania, another independent African state in East Africa. Tanzania's commitment to the Pan-African ideal of the total liberation of Southern Africa from white minority rule made it possible for the ANC to set up its headquarters in Africa. Eventually in 1964 the ANC headquarters were

shifted from London, to Morogoro, Tanzania.²³ London was retained as an important post in Europe, but lost its status as ANC headquarters. The presence of the ANC within the borders of Tanzania considerably enhanced the chances of the ANC to move into Southern Africa and position itself much closer to the borders of South Africa.

While the ANC started to reorganise itself from Morogoro, independent Zambia emerged as the most suitable base for the permanent ANC headquarters in Southern Africa. This was clearly reflected in Zambia's strategic position in relation to the beginnings of armed struggle in Southern Africa. Since the 1960's Zambia had been the centre of operations for MPLA infiltrating Angola, FRELIMO infiltrating Mozambique, ZAPU infiltrating Rhodesia

(Zimbabwe), and SWAPO infiltrating Namibia.²⁴ This signified that Zambia occupied a key position in the military plans of the liberation movements of Southern Africa. For the ANC, permanent headquarters would facilitate the infiltration of cadres into

²⁵ South Africa. Given the central position of armed struggle in the overall ANC strategy, Zambia became an ideal base from which the ANC could set up its permanent headquarters. It did not take long for the ANC to recognise the strategic position of Zambia in relation to

armed struggle. As a result, in 1970/71, the ANC decided to move its headquarters to
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Zambia.

3.2.2 ANC HEADQUARTERS : LUSAKA BECOMES THE CENTRE OF THE ANC'S EXTERNAL ORGANISATION

After the move to Zambia, ANC headquarters were started in what became known as the Liberation Centre. This was a building complex built specifically to accommodate the liberation
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movements of Southern Africa. When the ANC moved to Lusaka it also acquired offices in the Liberation Centre where ZAPU, FRELIMO, and
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SWAPO had been operating. For the purposes of this study, it must be noted that the presence of the ANC within the borders of Zambia was not based on any formal agreement with the
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government of Kaunda. One can therefore safely assume that ANC operations in Zambia were allowed out of Kaunda's commitment to the Pan-African ideal of the total liberation of Africa from white minority rule. In this way Zambia became the most important supporter of the ANC, and Lusaka the centre of the ANC's external organisation. From Lusaka the political and military leaders could meet and plan their strategies and supervise the administration of the ANC.

3.3 ORGANISATION AND LEADERSHIP

The process of rebuilding the ANC constituted a significant challenge to the external leadership. It is worth noting that the Rivonia Trial had effectively eliminated both MK and ANC Leaders. Even the ANC's newspaper, Sechaba admitted that the arrests at Rivonia had "smashed the very heart of the organisation."³⁰ Under the political conditions imposed by the Rivonia Trial, Oliver Tambo was forced to assume control of the entire ANC. The task of organising the ANC for the continuation of the struggle was thus immediately shifted to the hands of Oliver Tambo. Following the death of Albert Luthuli in 1967, Tambo became the Acting President of the ANC, a designation he held until the Morogoro Conference in 1969 at which he was³¹ elected President. As the state repression of the 1960's forced many political activists to leave South Africa, Tambo soon obtained support from ANC veterans who subsequently constituted an integral part of the leadership in exile. Among these veterans who joined Tambo in 1963 were : Thomas Nkobi (Treasurer General), Alfred Nzo (Secretary³² General) and Thloome (Deputy - Secretary General). Under the capable leadership of Oliver Tambo, they have all been at the forefront in the process of rebuilding the ANC for the continuation of the struggle.

3.3.1 THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (NEC) AND THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE

The ANC's governing body is known as the National Executive Committee (NEC). This structure has been headed by Oliver Tambo since 1969 when he was elected President at the Morogoro Conference. The most important positions on the NEC have been those of President, Secretary-General, and Treasure-

³³General. It is interesting to note that those positions remained unchanged during the ANC's period of exile. In view of the status of the NEC as the ANC's governing body, the question is raised as to how this important body was constituted. The membership of the NEC has over the years been determined through elections at the level of the National Conference. Whenever a National Conference is convened, all the facets of the Congress (policy and leadership) come under review. This is when the rank-and-file gets directly involved in the conduct of affairs within Congress. In the words of Tom Lodge, the National Conference is : "some kind of open forum for exchange of ideas between the rank

³⁴and file and the hierarchy." In this way the National Conference has been a true reflection of the nature of the ANC in terms of support base and leadership. The National Conference has had a final say on the leadership and the

directions the ANC has followed in the pursuit of its objectives against apartheid. It is therefore clear that the National Conference has over the years remained the supreme organ of the ANC.³⁵

The National Conference has been convened only on two occasions since the ANC lost its domestic base in 1960 : at Morogoro, Tanzania, in 1969, and at Kabwe, Zambia, in 1985.³⁶ The proceedings of those gatherings will not be detailed here : they lie outside the focus of this Chapter which deals with the growth and development of the ANC under the refuge of Zambia. It is sufficient to state that these gatherings shed light on organisation and leadership aspects within the ANC over the years. For the purposes of this Chapter they have also provided useful insights into the growth and development of the ANC between 1964 and 1990.

As the supreme organ of the ANC, the National Conference has always decided on the composition of the NEC. Between the first National Conference in exile, at Monogoro in 1969 and the unbanning of the ANC in February 1990, the ANC has undergone significant changes at the level of the NEC. At Monogoro the NEC³⁷ was reduced from twenty-three to nine members. They were Oliver Tambo (President), Alfred Nzo (Secretary-General), Moses Kotane, J. B. Marks, Joe Matthews, Thomas Nkobi, W. Mokgomane, Moses

Mabhida, and Mzwandile Piliso.³⁸ Another important change was the division of the ANC into three major sections. As a result, three new departments, that is, that of the President, the Secretary-General, and Treasurer-General, were established to assume control of the struggle, to control non-military affairs, and to control the finances³⁹ of the ANC respectively. From Morogoro Tambo's NEC got a mandate to oversee the ANC in the pursuit of its objections for the elimination of apartheid rule in South Africa.

By 1985, when the second National Conference in exile was held at Kabwe, Zambia, the size of the NEC had increased from nine to twenty two. This was achieved through cooption rather than direct election at the level of the⁴⁰ National Conference. Confronted by a heavy workload, the NEC could not afford to wait until the next National Conference for a resolution to be taken on the size of the NEC. Moreover, organising a National Conference in exile was not an easy task to accomplish. This shows that conditions could force the NEC to effect the necessary changes to its mode of operation without a mandate from the National Conference.

It should be borne in mind that the Kabwe Conference took place within the borders of Zambia. Attended by about 250 delegates, it looked at strategy, organisational matters and what could be done to step up armed operations⁴¹ against apartheid. An important implication of this event was that Zambia remained firm in her determination to support the ANC. It goes without saying that Zambia provided the necessary facilities for the conference to take place. In this way Zambia enabled the ANC to strengthen itself in the pursuit of its objectives to overthrow apartheid. For its part Zambia contributed a great deal to the success of the conference.

The Kabwe Conference effected significant changes to the composition of the NEC. Concerning the character and size of the NEC two changes stand out : Firstly, the NEC was increased from twenty two to thirty members⁴² because of work load. More significantly, Whites, Coloureds, and Indians were admitted⁴³ to positions on the NEC. Of significance to note is that "non-Africans" had been able to join the ANC in exile since the Morogoro Conference of 1969, but had been excluded from positions on the NEC. This represented a significant turning point in the development of the struggle against apartheid. With the election of Joe Slovo (White), Mac Maharaj and Azziz Pahad (Indians) and Reg September and

James Stuart (Coloureds) the leadership became more representative of the communities that constituted the South African population.⁴⁴ This can be considered an important development in the growth of the ANC in that it transformed the movement into a non-racial liberation movement.

The increase in the number of positions on the NEC also had a significant impact on the composition and character of the ANC. This was clearly reflected by the number of political activists who joined the movement in exile and were elected to the NEC. These political activists included : Dr Pallo Jordan, Dr Sizakele Sigxhashe, Cassius Make, and Dr Francis Meli amongst others.⁴⁵ Their election to the NEC considerably increased the number of younger leaders on the NEC who were already represented by the likes of Thabo Mbeki, Chris Hani, Jacob Zuma and Johnny Makhathini who were co-opted onto the NEC between 1970 and 1985.⁴⁶ From 1985 the NEC thus consisted of ANC veterans of the 1950's and the younger political activists who left South Africa in the wake of the 1976 Soweto unrest. In terms of leadership this signified an important growth point in the development of the ANC. As will be shown later, the expansion of the NEC also paved way for the different sections of the ANC to be represented on the NEC.

3.3.2 THE NEC : MODE OF OPERATION

As already indicated the NEC is the body that has been governing the ANC. All the management and operational aspects of the ANC have been in the hands of the NEC.⁴⁷ If the task of the NEC as the ANC's governing body is to be properly understood it is necessary to reflect back on the ANC's new mode of struggle. It included diplomacy, making arrangements for MK and looking after the welfare of rank and file in exile.⁴⁸ All this required a specific mode of operation in relation to the task of the NEC. Whether the ANC was to succeed in overthrowing apartheid with its new mode of struggle depended entirely on how the NEC was to exert itself in the execution of its duties. Without a specific and well defined mode of operation in the execution of its duties, there was no way in which the NEC could steer the ANC towards the attainment of its objectives against apartheid. What then can be said about the system of organisation that the NEC adopted as a mode of operation in the execution of its duties?

3.3.2.1 THE NATIONAL WORKING COMMITTEE (NWC)

The NWC is responsible for the day to day

affairs of the ANC. It was based in Lusaka under the chairmanship of Oliver Tambo. In his absence, Alfred Nzo, the Secretary-General, became the chairman in all meetings of the NWC. Membership of the NWC was kept open to all members of the NEC. The situation in exile was such that a number of office bearers in the NEC⁵⁰ were based in different countries. It therefore became impossible to confine the membership of the NWC to a specific number of NEC members. In this situation the NWC always consisted of any number of NEC members who happened to be in Lusaka when a meeting was⁵² convened. The NWC has always enjoyed the status of a cabinet with the organisational set up in the ANC. It played an important role in the efforts of the ANC to work towards efficiency and good organisation in the conduct of ANC affairs.

3.3.2.2 THE POLITICAL-MILITARY COUNCIL (PMC)

As far as decision making is concerned the NEC operated by means of committees. The functions and duties of each committee were clearly defined. The PMC also came into operation under the chairmanship of Oliver Tambo. This was an important organ in the ANC's organisational structure. It occupied a key

position in the overall ANC strategy. This can
be seen in the manner in which the PMC was
constituted. It consisted of representatives
from the army (Chris Hani, Joe Modise, Steve
Tshwete, Ronnie Kasrils), the intelligence and
security (Dr Sizakele, Sigxhashe, Jacob Zuma,
and Joe Nhlanhla), the labour and political
wing (Mac Maharaj and Mlungisi Mgwayi from
SACTU). The main task of the PMC was to co-
ordinate political and military activities.
Under the chairmanship of Oliver Tambo the
political and military leaders came together
to assess and co-ordinate the progress of the
political and military phases of the struggle
in South Africa. By means of the PMC the NEC
remained abreast of developments in relation
to the continuation of the struggle against
apartheid.

3.3.2.3 THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE

This structure operated as a subcommittee of
the PMC. Its activities were confined to
political and labour related aspects in the
struggle. It came into operation under the
chairmanship of John Nkadimeng, the General
Secretary of the South African Congress of
Trade Unions (SACTU). The main task of the
Political Committee was to co-ordinate activity

between the ANC supporters inside and outside
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South Africa. Equally important, this
committee was also responsible for political
and trade union activity within South Africa.
Operating as a subcommittee of the PMC, it was
responsible to the NEC in the execution of its
duties. For the NEC the political committee
constituted a source of information on the
political scene in South Africa especially with
regard to the progress of the struggle. In
view of this committee's scope of operation one
is tempted to argue that it was an important
component in the decision making structure
within the ANC.

3.3.2.4 THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

Like the political committee, this structure
also operated as a subcommittee of the PMC.
It came into operation under the chairmanship
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of Joe Modise, the Commander-in-Chief of MK.
While the political committee operated in the
political and labour fields, the military
committee assumed responsibility in the
military field. This simply means that the
military committee was responsible for military
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activity within South Africa. The ANC's armed
insurgency attacks and the sabotage attempts
inside South Africa constituted the military

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committee's field of operation. In this way the progress in relation to the armed struggle depended on how the military committee performed in the execution of its duties.

3.4 THE NEC : EXPANSION INTO DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS

Under its new mode of struggle the ANC could no longer afford to operate like any ordinary political organisation. The preparations for MK, diplomacy, and the need to look after the welfare of rank and file in exile required different forms of organisation. This forced the ANC to change from being a purely political military organisation and expand into different areas relevant to its new mode

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of struggle. Zambia played a significant role in terms of political space that was conducive for the ANC to expand into the desired directions. It is rather difficult to establish the extent of Zambia's involvement in the development of the ANC. But indications are that the ANC has been independent from the host state as far as the conduct of its affairs was concerned. The role of Zambia can only be understood in terms of providing the necessary facilities which made it possible for the ANC to get its various departments off the ground.

The expansion into different areas included the departments of publicity and information,

international affairs, security and the treasury.⁶⁴ For the purposes of this study it must be noted that the formation of these departments directly complimented the ANC's new mode of struggle. And can therefore be considered the most important structure in the development of the ANC under the refuge of a host state. The welfare of rank and file in exile came under the control of such departments as health, religious, and education.⁶⁵ As soon as these departments came into operation, the conduct of affairs within the ANC resembled a major corporation or a government.

3.4.1 PUBLICITY AND INFORMATION

Diplomacy has been one of the most important functions of the ANC's external organisation. It should be borne in mind that the original purpose of the ANC's external mission was diplomacy. Publicity and information should therefore be considered an important department for a liberation movement that was led from exile. This department came into operation⁶⁶ under Thabo Mbeki. Its activities ranged from press releases to the smuggling of ANC⁶⁷ literature into South Africa. This signifies that the production and distribution of ANC publications constituted an important area of

operation for the department of publicity and information. This department benefited directly from the hospitality of Zambia as a host state. One can presume that Zambia provided the necessary assistance in terms of facilities that were required for the production and distribution of publications.

The department of publicity and information played a significant role in keeping South Africa and the world at large on the know about the ANC and the continuation of the struggle against apartheid. The ANC's journal, Sechaba, which has been a mirror of ANC positions was also produced by the department of publicity and information.⁶⁸ Furthermore, Radio Freedom which beamed ANC news and propaganda into South Africa from broadcasting facilities in Zambia and other Frontline States (FLS) was also administered by the department of publicity and information.⁶⁹ Through the political space provided by Zambia, the department of publicity and information enabled the ANC to provide more effective coverage for its position in relation to political developments in South Africa.

3.4.2 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT

Like publicity and information, this department also occupied a central position in the ANC's new mode of struggle. As already indicated,

the primary objective of the external mission was to mobilise international support for the anti-apartheid struggle. As soon as the external mission came into operation the ANC started to treat the international arena as a place that deserved serious attention. As a liberation movement led from exile the ANC looked at its conflict with the South African government in a much broader perspective. The ANC leadership stated that it was their belief that they must inform the international community of the character of the South African⁷⁰ government. As a result, the mobilisation of international support became an undertaking that required a specific form of organisation. Thus the department of international affairs was set up to assume responsibility for the ANC's international activities.

International affairs came into operation under Johnny Makhathini, after having represented the⁷¹ ANC at the UN. It is important to observe that this department was set up to give coverage to ANC positions in the international arena, and⁷² solicit world support for the ANC. Through the department of international affairs, the ANC dealt with governments and international⁷³ organisations. With the co-operation of Zambia the ANC was able to engage in talks with a number of government representatives in Lusaka. This shows that the department of

international affairs received the necessary support from Zambia as far as the arrival of ANC visitors in Lusaka was concerned.

The ANC's diplomatic offices and representatives came under the direct control of international affairs. Equally important, international affairs was also responsible for the cultural, educational and health facilities which the ANC provided for the rank and file in exile.⁷⁴ By means of the department of international affairs, the ANC succeeded in drawing international attention to apartheid in South Africa.

3.4.3 TREASURY DEPARTMENT

This department has been headed by Thomas Nkobi, the Treasurer-General.⁷⁵ The size of the ANC and its works in exile necessitated a separate department for the finances of the organisation. As Treasurer-General since the 1970's Nkobi became the best candidate for the position of head of ANC finances. Given the expansion of the ANC into various sections, Nkobi assumed the status of a Minister of Finance within the ANC's organisational set up. In his capacity as head of the Treasury, Nkobi took control of the funds that ran the ANC.⁷⁶ The activities of his department ranged from

transportation costs by ANC officials to the allocation of funds for the welfare of rank and file in exile.

Its worth noting that the provision of supplies to meet the basic needs of the rank and file constituted an important area of operation for the treasury department. Assets that the ANC managed to acquire in exile such as office complexes, farms, and vechiles also came under

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the control of the treasury. As regards funds and resources it must be noted that the ANC received considerable support from Scandinavian countries and anti-apartheid organisations in

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other parts of the world. Through the co-operation and the support of Zambia, the treasury department was able to receive all funds and resources intended for the ANC. It therefore goes without saying that the treasury department also received the necessary co-operation from Zambia as far as the delivery of ANC resources. The most important task of the treasury department was fundraising and income generating projects. To keep the ANC financially afloat the department started farms

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and small factories. Through the support of Zambia the ANC was able to secure the necessary land for these projects. These projects were intended to promote self-sufficiency in food, clothes and furniture. By means of its treasury department the ANC wanted to minimise its dependence on the host government as much

as possible. In addition to the donations received from the international community, the ANC also wanted to make a meaningful input to the welfare and survival of its own community in exile.

3.4.4 SECURITY DEPARTMENT

This department has been headed by Joe Nhlanha, assisted by Jacob Zuma and Dr Sizakele Sigxhashe. It represented some kind of "internal intelligence and counter intelligence ⁸¹ body within the ANC." Its main task was to prevent infiltration and enforce discipline and ⁸² control over the rank and file. According to Mzwandile Boozi, the formation of this department constituted a significant development in the development of the struggle against apartheid in that it enabled the ANC ⁸³ to close its ranks from government agents. It became important for a liberation movement led from exile to take the necessary precautions to guard against possible infiltration by the South African government's agents. The safety of leadership, rank and file, and the survival of the ANC in exile became the sole responsibility of the security department.

The department screened all new members so as

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to keep out South African agents. In this way the department strengthened the position of the ANC in relation to armed struggle. There is no doubt that infiltration could have rendered the ANC ineffective in its efforts to wage armed struggle. Hence the security department is considered an important development for a liberation movement that had committed itself to the continuation of the struggle beyond the borders of South Africa. For the safety of rank and files the security department inspected parcels for the presence of South

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African bombs. Furthermore, the department also maintained protective devices such as gates, walls, and alarms around ANC buildings

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in Lusaka. This ensured a certain amount of security against the enemies of the liberation struggle in South Africa.

The departments of research, constitutional and economic affairs complete the list in relation to structure designed to compliment the ANC's new mode of struggle. As opponents of the political and economic dispensation in South Africa, the ANC had to come up with viable alternatives to the status quo. The ANC could not afford to be found wanting when the day of liberation finally come. These departments therefore represented an attempt on the part of the ANC to prepare itself for a post-

apartheid South Africa. Constitutional affairs, under Dr Zola Skweyiya, looked into the feasibility of an alternative post-⁸⁷ apartheid constitution. To this end, this department has engaged in research, initiated seminars to stimulate debate over a post-apartheid political dispensation, and even⁸⁸ consulted academies from the West and East. The economic affairs department also engaged in research to formulate an alternative economic system for South Africa. The Research Department has also followed the same trend in its endeavour to collect information on South⁸⁹ Africa that may be useful to the ANC. These departments served a dual purpose for a liberation movement that was led from exile. On the one hand, they strengthened the ANC in its endeavours to continue with the struggle. On the other, they prepared the ANC for a post-apartheid South Africa.

3.5 THE ANC AND THE WELFARE OF ITS COMMUNITY IN ZAMBIA

The ANC community in Zambia consisted of people who have lived outside South Africa since the 1960's. The numbers increased significantly in 1977 as an effect of the exodus of refugees from South Africa⁹⁰ following the Soweto uprisings in June 1976. Estimates on the number of people under the ANC headquarters in Zambia vary. Tom Lodge, writing

in 1985, gave a figure of 300.⁹¹ Other sources have even opted for a higher figure. In this connection, Mzwandile Boozi of the ANC Department of Repatriation estimated the number of people at about 4 000.⁹² Whatever the case might be, the fact of the matter is that while the ANC was engaged in struggle against apartheid, it had to look after the welfare of its rank and file in exile. The ANC according to Thabo Mbeki has been "..... the totality of⁹³ their lives."

This was indeed a challenging and demanding task for a liberation movement that dedicated itself to the overthrow of apartheid. But with the support of Zambia and the international community it became relatively easy for the ANC to fulfill its obligations in relation to the basic needs of its community. The departments of health, education, arts and culture and the treasury became directly⁹⁴ involved with the welfare of the rank and file. Through these departments, the ANC was able to provide its community with all its basic needs. These included education, health facilities, food accommodation, clothing, transport, and spending⁹⁵ money each month. In terms of resources, not much could be expected from Zambia in relation to the necessary supplies to the ANC community. As indicated earlier, the ANC received donations from Scandinavian countries and anti-apartheid organisations throughout the world. Nevertheless, the departments of health, education,

and the treasury executed their duties through the support of Zambia. It is obvious that Zambia provided the necessary facilities for these departments to carry out their task in relation to the welfare of the ANC community. Without the necessary buildings and the availability of the Zambian currency to the ANC it would have been impossible for these departments to look after the welfare of the ANC community. Despite the limited resources at her disposal Zambia also made a significant input to the efforts of the ANC to satisfy the needs of its community.

Under the refuge of Zambia as a host state life for the ANC community became relatively comfortable, safe and secure.⁹⁶ The conditions under which the community lived compared favourably with those of an average black family in South Africa. This was clearly reflected by the type of accommodation that Zambia enabled the ANC to provide to its community. Most of the houses were four roomed houses, but⁹⁷ there were also three and two bedroomed houses. Of significance to note is that most of the houses were supplied with a television set, refrigerators,⁹⁸ electric stoves and some furniture. Under these conditions Lusaka became a second home for the South African exiles. There is therefore no reason not to believe that the rank and file in Lusaka lived in a relatively comfortable community.

In exchange for the provision of supplies the people were engaged in various categories of work within

the ANC hierarchy. Some worked on the ANC's Chongella farms where the meat and vegetables supplied to the households came from. The ANC's farm project was intended to feed the exiled ANC community in Lusaka and provide practical training
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for aspiring ANC farmers. These farms were purchased with assistance of the Norwegian
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Development Aid and the Swedish Seda Aid Agency. It is reasonable to argue that an undertaking of this nature on the part of the ANC was made possible by the co-operation that the ANC received from Kaunda's government.

By means of such projects the people got directly involved in ANC endeavours to promote self sufficiency. The fresh supply of meat, eggs and vegetables from the farms enabled the ANC to reduce reliance on the host government to the minimum. The ANC also took the opportunity to promote good relations between the host nationals and the ANC community. The ANC also employed host nationals at its self sufficiency projects. According to Davis, this exercise on the part of the ANC was
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intended to encourage local goodwill. This gave the ANC community an opportunity to exchange ideas and share their experiences with the host nationals. In addition to these encounters, friendship also developed naturally out of common experiences of
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colonial domination in Southern Africa. One can therefore argue convincingly that the Pan-African ideal of total liberation in Africa was a powerful unifying force not only with the leadership in

Africa, but also with the people. It is therefore possible to argue that the ANC community in Zambia enjoyed good relations with the host nationals. The fact that the ANC remained in Zambia until its unbanning in February 1990 attest to the fact that Lusaka has been a second home to the ANC community. One cannot help but argue that Kaunda enjoyed considerable support for having hosted the ANC.

The departments of health, education and arts and culture took the lead in ANC endeavours to support its community in and around Lusaka. The department of health operated schools of its own from which health workers were produced. It also ran a clinic for the sick in Lusaka and a hospital near the schools in Tanzania. Officially, it was responsible for the health of the ANC community. As indicated earlier, undertakings of this nature always became a reality with the co-operation of Zambia which took the form of providing the necessary facilities. The provision of education became the responsibility of the department of education. Through this department, the ANC provided free education at Zambian schools. This shows that Zambia also supported the ANC in its endeavours to satisfy the basic needs of its community. Members were also sent to a technical school in Tanzania and the famous Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College (SOMAFCO). An important function of the education department was to look for bursaries and scholarships for

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tertiary education. This enabled the ANC to provide free education to its members. Those who received education in ANC schools in Zambia and Tanzania were sent abroad to the United States, Canada and even Eastern Europe to further their studies.¹⁰⁹ This represented an attempt on the part of the ANC to equip its community in exile with the necessary academic, managerial and technical skills for a post-apartheid South Africa.

The department of Arts and Culture was also closely involved with the ANC community in exile. It contributed a great deal to the ANC fundraising efforts. In this connection, it sent performers to festivals in various parts of the world. More significantly, it assured control of the ANC's cultural boycott of South Africa. In this way it played an important role in the efforts of the ANC to isolate South Africa in the performing arts. The accommodation provided by Zambia made it possible for the ANC to meet the basic demands of its community. It is therefore clear that Zambia played a significant role in providing the necessary facilities or infrastructure of the ANC's self sufficiency projects.

3.6 THE ANC GAINS RECOGNITION AS A LEGITIMATE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT : AN ACHIEVEMENT UNDER THE REFUGE OF A HOST STATE

We have already noted that the original purpose of the ANC's external mission was diplomacy. When the ANC lost its domestic base in 1960 it adopted economic sanctions and the isolation of South Africa as a new mode of struggle. The whole international community had to be gained for support against South Africa's apartheid policy. To this end, the ANC constantly appealed to governments and organisations in other countries to boycott and apply sanctions against South Africa in all fields.

Under the refuge of Zambia as a host state the political leadership could meet and strategise in accordance with the new mode of struggle.¹¹¹ For the purposes of the present study, Zambia's political position as a host state to the ANC has been considered the most important and significant form of support. As a result, the progress that the ANC has made during the period under discussion cannot be seen in isolation from the accommodation provided by Zambia. Important as this form of support to the ANC may be, the crucial question arises: What did the ANC achieve on the international battlefield in its efforts to mobilise support for the struggle against apartheid?

From its Lusaka headquarters the ANC went ahead with its campaign to gain the support of the international community. The achievements of the ANC against South Africa during the period under discussion can be seen from the response of the international community to the ANC campaigns for the

isolation of South Africa. From governments to international organisations, the ANC received more attention than the South African government. At the UN the ANC attained recognition as an authentic and representative liberation movement. The UN resolution 3411 (XXX) of 1974 recognised the ANC as¹¹² a legitimate national liberation movement. This meant that in future the ANC could expect more support from the international community.

Following Resolution 3411 (XXX) of 1974 the ANC gained observer status in the UN General Assembly¹¹³ and Security Council. This eventually gave the ANC access to the facilities and specific funds of the UN. While South Africa was being excluded from the activities of the UN, the ANC began to participate in UN deliberations on South Africa. For the ANC, the most important political advantage of UN recognition was that it gave the ANC the platform to campaign more vigorously for the isolation of South Africa. There is no doubt that the recognition of the ANC by the UN enhanced the status of the ANC in the eyes of the international community. The ANC also gained recognition in many parts of the world. From Africa to Europe, the ANC's representatives enjoyed diplomatic status. This contributed to the rapid isolation of South Africa internationally.

The OAU also recognised the ANC as a legitimate¹¹³ national liberation movement. In 1973, the ANC was given full observer status in the OAU. This enabled

the ANC to attend and participate in all OAU meetings. With the support of the OAU, the ANC managed to build close ties with a number of African states. During the period under discussion the ANC gained representation in Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.¹¹⁴ The diplomatic status that the ANC enjoyed in Africa kept South Africa in isolation on the continent. Furthermore, the ANC also gained observer status at meetings of the Frontline States (FLS) and the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC).¹¹⁵

In addition to its presence in Africa the ANC opened offices in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the United States, Asia, Cuba and South America. From these offices the ANC took the opportunity to further the cause of the oppressed African masses against apartheid. As a result, during the period under discussion the ANC established diplomatic missions in more countries than the South African Government. And South Africa became more and more isolated. All this became possible under the refuge of Zambia as a host state.

Under the refuge of Zambia the ANC attained the status of a government in exile. It enjoyed more contact than South Africa. The reality of the situation with regard to the political conflict in South Africa became more evident than ever before: that the ANC was an indispensable political factor to the peaceful solution of South Africa's problems.

This realisation could be attributed to the recognition that the ANC enjoyed in the international community.

The status of the ANC in international affairs eventually received attention in South Africa towards the end of the 1980's. During this period Lusaka hosted a number of South African delegations¹¹⁷ that visited the ANC between 1985 and 1989. These visits to the ANC ranged from sports groups to political organisations. Through the host state, the ANC could propagate the struggle against apartheid, while at the same time establish contact with governments and leaders of political organisations.

An important message that these South African contacts with the ANC conveyed to the government was that the ANC was not part of the problem. Instead it was part and parcel of the solution to a peaceful resolution of the political conflict in South Africa. These contacts also helped to encourage the possibility of dialogue between the ANC and the government. Through the support of Zambia as a host, the ANC continued with the struggle until it gained international recognition as an important player in the political future of South Africa.

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CHAPTER 4

ZAMBIA, THE ANC AND THE INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE AGAINST
APARTHEID

"..... Zambia, has, always been, still is, and will continue to be involved directly and actively in strengthening the efforts of the people of South Africa to free themselves from their oppressors as we were involved in Mozambique and Angola When we pledge our support we always back it with practical
1
action"

This chapter concentrates on Zambia's involvement in the international struggle against apartheid. In order to keep it a manageable length it avoids the activities of the ANC in the pursuit of its objectives for the isolation of South Africa : they lie outside the focus of this chapter. The main focus of this chapter falls on the extent to which Zambia translated her commitment to the liberation of Southern Africa from white minority rule into meaningful support for the ANC. Of particular importance will be an analysis of Zambia's activities in relation to apartheid on the international battlefield.

4.1 THE ANC AND THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID

In order to comprehend the support of Zambia for the ANC it is necessary to be clear about the background to the internationalisation of the struggle against apartheid. It should be stated that the international battlefront constituted an important avenue for the outside world to render assistance to the ANC. The support of Zambia for the ANC should therefore not be seen in isolation from the internationalisation of the struggle against apartheid.

It has already been argued in the first chapter that support for the ANC is an issue that has been important not only to Zambia but also to the international community. The internationalisation of the struggle against apartheid has its basis in the ANC's analysis of the political and economic conditions in South Africa. In analysing the situation in South Africa the ANC believed that the struggle against apartheid could not be seen in isolation from the rest of the international community. Confronted by the government's unyielding position on apartheid, the ANC thus argued:

"the problem of South Africa is not only of a national nature, but equally embraces the international domain because of the involvement

of Western investments (in South Africa) which drew considerable benefits from the privilege of apartheid. It is for this reason that Western Countries supply considerable aid to all sectors of the racist regime of Pretoria and the apartheid system, the source of wealth for their countries (Thus) the massive (foreign) investments have internationalised the South African problem the question for apartheid must engross the whole progressive world, those people who are engaged in a struggle against imperialism"²

What emerges clearly from the ANC's analysis is that South Africa, like any other country, could not afford to exist without economic and political contacts that were vital to her survival. The economy and the need for the exchange of diplomats provided the necessary points of contact with the outside world. For the ANC these points of contact constituted an area of weakness that could be exploited to involve the international community in the struggle against apartheid. Having identified areas of weakness in the position of the state, the ANC did not hesitate to invoke a new element in its strategy against apartheid. This element consisted of a call on the international community to impose

political, economic, and military sanctions against apartheid South Africa. ³ This signified an important turning point in the development of the struggle against apartheid. It created an international battlefront on which the outside world could render the necessary assistance to the ANC.

The question then arises as to what was the motive behind the new tactic in the ANC strategy? The leaders of the ANC believed that the failure of the government to satisfy African political aspirations necessitated the creation of a new avenue for the continuation of the struggle against apartheid. As a result, the international battlefront became an important avenue for the ANC to engage the international community on the side of the oppressed African majority in the struggle against apartheid. The new tactic was not designed to substitute for the struggle of the African majority. The intention of the ANC with the new tactic was to weaken the capacity of the government to persist in the enforcement of apartheid, and bring about the ⁴ desired political changes. In explaining the objective of the new tactic the ANC stated :

"..... It is our view that South Africa is vulnerable to external economic pressure and her international isolation would speed up the achievement of a solution of the serious problems that beset the whole of Southern Africa

the time is long overdue for
international pressure to be exerted
on South Africa⁵"

It was hoped that South Africa would feel the pressure of other nations to modify its apartheid policies. As observed in the third chapter, when the External mission came into operation, it assumed responsibility for the mobilisation of world support for the ANC efforts against apartheid. Thus, in exile, the ANC focussed its attention on the isolation of South Africa from the rest of the international community. In this way the ANC opened up an international battlefront against apartheid.

4.2 KAUNDA'S APPROACH : SUPPORT FOR THE ELIMINATION OF APARTHEID RULE IN SOUTH AFRICA

When Zambia attained her independence in 1964 a more favourable climate had developed in which there was more sympathy for the ANC struggle against apartheid. It therefore came as no surprise when Kaunda adopted a hostile attitude towards apartheid. Guided by the philosophy of humanism, Kaunda moved himself much closer to the position of the ANC in relation to apartheid. Like the ANC, Kaunda perceived apartheid in South Africa as an unjust and evil political system. Thus Kaunda argued :

"the philosophy of apartheid denies to the Black people the right to be such a philosophy as enshrined in the laws and customs of South Africa denies to the Black people the right to be themselves - themselves not as another race sees them, but as God made them." ⁶

Of considerable significance to note is that Kaunda viewed apartheid in the broader context of Pan-⁷ Africanism and anti-coloniliation. The continued existence of apartheid in South Africa constituted the greatest threat to the peace in Southern Africa. As a result, apartheid became a cause for concern to the independent African states. Kaunda's concern about the situation in South Africa became known as early as 1964 when he stated :

"I find myself obsessed with the tremendous problem of South Africa if bloodshed really begins in South Africa, it will have a ghastly effect not only within the republic itself, but throughout the whole ⁸ continent of Africa."

As the preceding quotation indicates, apartheid could no longer be regarded as an issue between the ANC and the South African government. Kaunda also aspired for a political order in which all the people enjoyed the same political rights, and also

have the same political representation.⁹ This led Kaunda to identify South Africa as a target area in Zambia's quest for liberation. What, then, has been the strategy of Zambia for supporting the ANC on the international battlefield? It should be borne in mind that the ANC's strategy on the international battlefield has been the isolation and the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa.

4.2.1 SUPPORT FOR THE ISOLATION OF SOUTH AFRICA

Zambia's support for the isolation of South Africa can be traced as far back as 1964 when Kaunda proposed an exchange of ambassadors with South Africa. As far as Kaunda was concerned the banning of the ANC did not mean the end of the road for the liberation cause in South Africa. He argued that through contact, South Africa could be used to further the cause of¹⁰ liberation in South Africa. In Zambia he was determined to create a stable and non-racial political order. It was hoped that a non-racial political order in Zambia would help in changing the course of apartheid in South¹¹ Africa. In this way Zambia shall have created the necessary conditions for the government and the ANC to engage in dialogue for the creation of a non-racial democratic South Africa.

Kaunda's offer to exchange diplomats with South Africa should not be seen as an exercise in normal diplomacy among nations. By making the offer Kaunda had hoped to exploit relations with South Africa and convince the South African government that human equality and self-determination as advocated by the ANC were¹² the only basis for justice in South Africa. The real motives in the offer can be seen in the conditions under which Kaunda was prepared to accept an exchange of diplomats with South Africa. In proposing an exchange of diplomats with South Africa, Kaunda insisted on equality as a basis for contact between Zambia and South Africa. He argued that Zambian diplomats should be treated like their counter parts from Europe. In this connection, he stated :

"We will not have them
(Zambian diplomats) pushed
13
around as kaffirs."

From this it can be seen that Kaunda's offer constituted a direct challenge to the political order in South Africa. Zambia did not abandon her support for liberation in South Africa when Kaunda proposed an exchange of diplomats. The conditions attached to the exchange of ambassadors demonstrated Zambia's support for the position of the ANC in relation to apartheid. As a result of Zambia's status as a host state to the liberation movements of

Southern Africa, South Africa rejected the
15
exchange of ambassadors with Zambia. Equality
as a basis of contact between Zambia and South
Africa became unacceptable to South Africa. The
reaction of the government was outlined by
Prime Minister Verwoerd when he stated :

"It must be very clear to
representatives of other
countries in South Africa
that, while we shall act
in their countries in
accordance with their
customs, we
expect them to act in
South Africa in accordance
16
with South Africa's customs."

South Africa's negative reaction did not
discourage President Kaunda in his
endeavours to support liberation in South
Africa. He continued to identify with the
position of the ANC in relation to the
unjust political dispensation in South Africa.
In June 1964, following the Rivonia Trial,
Kaunda wrote to President Swart, and proposed
that Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders be
17
sent to Zambia instead of Robben Island. Once
again the proposal constituted a direct
challenge to the political order in South
Africa. As expected, South Africa ignored the
proposal and sent Nelson Mandela and other ANC

18

leaders to Robben Island. It soon became clear that South Africa was not prepared to make concessions to the liberation cause in South Africa.

Despite South Africa's uncompromising position on apartheid, Kaunda remained committed to the struggle for liberation in South Africa. Kaunda believed that Zambia was morally obliged to make a contribution to the realisation of the goals of a non-racial democratic order in South Africa.¹⁹ His view of the struggle in South Africa was that of a legitimate cause which deserved the necessary support for the overthrow of apartheid. This was clearly reflected in the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa. It is important to note that Kaunda played an important role in the formulation of the objectives and principles stated in the Manifesto. As a result, the document became more identified with Zambia than any other African state. It is possible to argue, therefore, that the Lusaka Manifesto constituted a true reflection of Zambia's position in relation to the political conflict in South Africa. The Manifesto makes the position of Zambia on the goal of liberation in South Africa unequivocally clear:

"..... on the objective of liberation as thus defined, we can neither surrender nor

compromise²¹"

This document demonstrated beyond doubt that Zambia was committed to the liberation cause in South Africa. As we noted in this chapter, Kaunda's desire to support the ANC emanated from his deep commitment to the principles and values of equality and freedom. In this connection, the Lusaka Manifesto reiterated the wellknown position of Zambia in relation to apartheid in South Africa :

"The truth is, however, that in the Union of South Africa, there is an open and continued denial of the principles of human equality, and national selfdetermination
..... and all that flows from it, is either universal or it does not exist. The dignity of all men is destroyed when the manhood of any human being
²²
is denied."

For Zambia the Lusaka Manifesto presented South Africa with yet another opportunity to reconsider her position on apartheid. But South Africa refused to identify with the spirit and content of the Lusaka Manifesto. Once again South Africa demonstrated her

unwillingness to make concessions to the liberation cause in South Africa. South Africa's intransigence over apartheid did not dampen Kaunda's commitment to the liberation struggle in South Africa. This became evident when Kaunda granted political asylum to the ANC. In this way Zambia created the necessary political conditions for the continued existence of the ANC as a liberation movement. As already noted in chapter three, this enabled the ANC to continue with the struggle against apartheid.

Having granted asylum to the ANC, Kaunda identified fully with the ANC's call on the international battlefield for the isolation of South Africa. The opportunity for Kaunda to demonstrate support for the isolation of South Africa came in 1970 when the Ivory Coast called for dialogue between South Africa and Black independent Africa. The President of the Ivory Coast, Houphouet-Boigny, suggested that the matter be discussed in the OAU. When the matter came up for discussion in the OAU, Zambia spoke against dialogue with South Africa. There is no doubt that Zambia's position on the dialogue question was intended to advance the ANC cause for the isolation of South Africa. For Zambia, the continued existence of apartheid in South Africa remained the major stumbling block to normal relations between South Africa and Africa: This was reflected in a foreign policy statement issued

by the Zambian Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry pledged Zambia to continued support of the liberation cause in South Africa. In opposition to dialogue with South Africa, the Foreign Minister Mr Mudenda stated that negotiations with South Africa "could only²⁶ be conducted on the basis of human equality." Meanwhile, the Zambian Daily Mail also condemned dialogue with South Africa. In an editorial on 29 April 1970 it was stated that establishing closer ties with South Africa²⁷ would have a corrosive effect on African unity. It is apparent from what has been said thus far that the position of Zambia on contact with South Africa remained in full accord with the ANC's demands for the dismantling of apartheid. Zambia was only prepared to establish contact with South Africa for the sole purpose of promoting the ideal of a non-racial democratic order in South Africa.

The ANC applauded Zambia's stance on dialogue with South Africa. Mr Thomas Nkobi, ANC Treasurer-General, warned countries advocating dialogue with South Africa to take careful note of Vorsters recent attack on President Kaunda. The ANC he said : "admired and totally agreed with the courageous manner in which Zambia made public the correspondence and thereby exposed him (Vorster) as the²⁸ fascist liar he is." This shows that Zambia's stance on the international battlefield was in

full accord with the ANC's new mode of struggle.

When it became clear, however, that Zambia could not be reconciled to accept apartheid, South Africa resorted to threats and²⁹ intimidation against Zambia. As will be shown in chapter six of this study, Zambia came under various forms of pressure to abandon her support for the ANC. Despite her dependence on South Africa Zambia never wavered in her support for the ANC. Throughout the 1980's Zambia continued to support the isolation of South Africa, the armed struggle against apartheid and the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa. It became abundantly clear that no amount of pressure would force Zambia to abandon her support for the ANC.

4.2.2 SUPPORT FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST APARTHEID

In discussing Zambia's support for sanctions against South Africa it is important to note that the first serious attempt to impose sanctions against South Africa came as a sequel to the ANC's mobilisation of world opinion against apartheid. We have already noted in a previous Chapter that the ANC reacted to state repression of the late fifties and early

sixties by opening up an international battlefront against apartheid. In the pursuit of its objectives for the mobilisation of world support against apartheid, the ANC "called upon the peoples of the world, independent Black Africa and the United Nations to support a programme of sanctions and to isolate South Africa." In this the ANC attempted to engage the international community on the side of the African majority in the struggle against apartheid.

With the creation of the international battlefront, the international community accepted the need for sanctions as a means of exerting pressure on South Africa to abandon its apartheid policies. As a result, a number of sanctions measures were taken by the international community in response to the ANC's calls on the international battlefront. These included the sports boycott, and oil and arms embargo. What then has been the position of Zambia in relation to the ANC's call for the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa. As the international community accepted sanctions as a form of pressure on South Africa, there was no way in which Zambia could not support sanctions against South Africa.

Zambia's support for the ANC's sanctions campaign against South Africa was signalled in

an announcement in 1964. The Minister of Commerce and Industry, Mr Mundia indicated that Zambia would no longer maintain economic ties with South Africa.³² This was an insignificant step in relation to South Africa's economic power in Southern Africa. Whether or not Zambia co-operated with South Africa in the economic sphere her dependence on South Africa was likely to continue. But for Zambia the announcement to cut economic ties with South Africa amounted to an economic measure that signified support for the sanctions campaign against South Africa.

Given Zambia's weak economic position, not much could be expected from her in terms of tangible economic measures against South Africa. Nevertheless, Zambia's economic dependence on South Africa did not discourage President Kaunda in supporting the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa. Zambia's support for sanctions against South Africa really began to get off the ground only in 1969/70 when Britain announced a resumption of arms sales to South Africa. Of interest to note is that the British decision to sell arms to South Africa amounted to a violation of the 1964 UN arms embargo against South Africa.³³ For the purposes of the present study it is worth noting that the arms embargo was a sanctions measure that was designed to put pressure on South Africa to abandon apartheid. Having

committed herself to the anti-apartheid struggle, Zambia could not afford to ignore a move that was likely to undermine the liberation efforts of the ANC in South Africa.

4.2.2.1 OPPOSITION TO ARMS SALES TO SOUTH AFRICA

The sanctions campaign constituted an important avenue for Zambia to demonstrate her support for the position of the ANC in relation to apartheid. After aligning herself with the ANC against apartheid, Zambia did not hesitate to support the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa. In outlining Zambia's policy on the sale of arms to South Africa, Kaunda reiterated his support for the elimination of apartheid in South Africa :

"The aims of building South Africa's military capacity at the present moment cannot be divorced in any way from the major objective of the Vorster regime to keep political and economic power firmly and
34
irrevocably in white hands ..."

It was at the United Nations that Kaunda stressed Zambia's support for the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa. He

told the UN on 15 October 1970 :

"To supply arms to South Africa is to cast a vote for apartheid, it also gives authority to her to establish her military presence in the rest of Southern Africa."³⁵

Kaunda made it quite clear that the sale of arms to South Africa amounted to support for apartheid. According to Kaunda this also gave additional strength to South Africa "to carry acts of repression internally"³⁶ With the support of Western powers such as Britain it was unlikely that South Africa would yield to the pressures of the ANC and its allies on the international battlefield. It therefore goes without saying that any country that co-operated with South Africa in the economic sphere constituted a stumbling block to the efforts of the ANC to overthrow apartheid. It should also be borne in mind that the ANC's calls for the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa was intended to weaken the capacity of government to persist with its apartheid policies. By opposing arms sales to South Africa Zambia fully identifies with the position of the ANC on sanctions against South Africa. It is not entirely clear whether the ANC campaigned for Zambia's support in relation to the arms sales to South Africa. What is certain, however, was that the ANC applauded

all actions designed to support its endeavours to weaken the position of the government with a view to the elimination of apartheid.

Zambia was strongly offended by Britain's decision to nullify the efforts of the international community to isolate South Africa. Kaunda felt that it was a moral obligation for the international community to support the struggle against apartheid. We have already argued in the first chapter that when the UN came into operation member nations assumed an obligation under the UN Charter to promote liberation. Hence the international community through the UN responded positively to the ANC calls for sanctions against South Africa. The British arms sales to South Africa could therefore be viewed as collaboration that was designed to perpetuate white minority rule in South Africa. Kaunda argued that the Western powers could contribute to the struggle against apartheid by denying economic and military assistance to South Africa. This would have strengthened the efforts of the ANC in weakening the capacity of the government to continue with apartheid.

In this support for sanctions against South Africa Kaunda viewed the sale of arms to South Africa as an effort to weaken the liberation struggle in South Africa. For Kaunda the attitude of Britain to the liberation cause in

South Africa was a cause for concern. Thus Kaunda stated :

"..... we will not sit idly by and watch the West arm the South Africans who have made their intention clearly known over the past few years we have watched as the Western countries and major powers in particular have increasingly adopted a negative attitude towards issues concerning South Africa at the United Nations. It therefore appears that the economic and military support which the West is giving to the Vorster regime strengthen the basis of the political and moral support for apartheid which the South African regime greatly desires."⁴⁰

To further the cause of liberation in South Africa Kaunda insisted on the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa. Through international forums such as the OAU, UN and Commonwealth, Kaunda called for the maintenance of UN sanctions against South Africa.⁴¹ In 1970, in his capacity as chairman of the OAU, Kaunda travelled to Europe and North America in his efforts to support

sanctions against South Africa. ⁴² On this occasion Kaunda appealed to Britain and the United States to co-operate in the efforts of the international community to isolate South Africa. Kaunda viewed sale of arms to South Africa as a violation of the UN Charter on human rights and self-determination.

Another factor in Kaunda's opposition to the sale of arms to South Africa related to Zambia's position as a host state to the ANC. Security has been an essential factor in the support of a host state for liberation movements. There was therefore no doubt that arms sales to South Africa posed a major threat to Zambia and other African states, which ⁴³ openly supported liberation movements. As will be shown in chapter six, South Africa consistently threatened with force and intimidated the independent African states for their support to the ANC.

This led Kaunda's government to reject the British argument that arms sales to South ⁴⁴ Africa was for strategic reasons. For Zambia this amounted to moral and political support for South Africa's apartheid policy at the expense of the liberation cause in South Africa. On this Kaunda took the following position:

"..... It is quite clear to us that South Africa will not use the Buccaneers, the Mirages, the Shackletons ... and all the missiles supplied by the West for the defence of the Western interests. She will definitely use them against Zambia and all other independent African countries determined to make African independence a reality. Aircraft supplied by the Western Countries have been used to violate our airspace We cannot, therefore, believe that what is being supplied to South Africa will not be used against our economic and political interests in this country and in the rest
45
of Africa."

The above statement demonstrated beyond doubt that Zambia was deeply committed to the struggle against apartheid. It also indicated that Zambia was prepared to sacrifice for the liberation of Southern Africa from white minority rule. Hence her dependence on South Africa did not discourage Kaunda from openly

identifying with the campaign for sanctions against South Africa.

4.2.2.2 ZAMBIA AND THE INTENSIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

The campaign for sanctions against South Africa built up to a climax in the 1980's. As a result, sanctions became an important issue that confronted the international community. Supporting or imposing sanctions against South Africa became a question of supporting the ANC in the struggle against apartheid. As P. Moorcraft, in his African Nemesis : War and Revolution in South Africa puts it : "You were either for or against apartheid." As the sanctions campaign gathered momentum Kaunda's main concern had been to avert a bloodbath in South Africa. He constantly repeated his warning that South Africa was heading for a bloodbath if apartheid was not dismantled. This led Kaunda to accept sanctions as the only possible way of avoiding a bloodbath in South Africa. As far as the imposition of sanctions against South Africa is concerned, Kaunda took the following position :

"The question we have to ask ourselves is which is better economic sanctions or a violent

change of things in South Africa.
In our opinion sanctions would
bring to the fore the problem of
apartheid within South Africa
itself more than anything else.
The only other way is violence,
which will leave hundreds of
thousands of people dead, black
and white⁴⁸"

There is therefore no doubt that Zambia fully supported the intensifications of sanctions against South Africa. Kaunda viewed sanctions as the sole peaceful option to compel South Africa to yield to ANC demands for the
⁴⁹
elimination of apartheid. He stressed that sanctions were a moral and political obligation for majority ruled countries to render assistance to the struggle against apartheid
⁵⁰
in South Africa. It can thus be argued that, Zambia, as a majority ruled country, felt obliged to support the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa.

Eventually Kaunda adopted a more militant attitude in supporting sanctions against South Africa. An important point of departure in this direction was to commit Zambia to accept the serious repercussions of sanctions against
⁵¹
South Africa. In his support for sanctions, Kaunda did not overlook Zambia's weak economic

position. He acknowledged the fact that Zambia was economically dependent on South Africa. But the reality of the situation was that whether or not Zambia supported sanctions against South Africa, her economy was bound to suffer

⁵²
economic losses. The extent of Zambia's dependence on South Africa was such that she would not escape the effects of sanctions against South Africa. In accepting Zambia's economic dependence on South Africa Kaunda

⁵³
argued that "we will fight to the bitter end." This shows that Zambia, more than any other African state, was prepared to make the necessary sacrifices for the liberation of the African majority from white minority rule in South Africa.

After accepting the effects sanctions might have on Zambia, Kaunda took the lead in the international campaign for mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa. It was through forums such as the Commonwealth, OAU, FLS, (Frontline States), NAM (Non Aligned Movement) that Kaunda called for the imposition of

⁵⁴
comprehensive sanctions against South Africa. In this connection, Kaunda stated, "we want to take action that will have an impact on

⁵⁵
apartheid." At the Commonwealth meeting in Nassau, Bahamas in October 1985, Kaunda demonstrated his support for the ANC. In advocating the imposition of sanctions against South Africa, Kaunda supported a ban on all new

Kaunda's reaction to Thatcher demonstrated an uncompromising attitude on the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. His determination in advocating sanctions within the Commonwealth eventually paid dividends. In May 1986 the Commonwealth accepted a new sanction package against South Africa. Amongst the economic measures supported by Zambia were notably the following bans : (1) on airlinks with South Africa (2) on the importation of agricultural products (3) on all government procurements in South Africa and (4) a ban on

"I cannot see myself sitting with Mrs Thatcher a fellow leader who says black life is cheaper than gold."

58

Kaunda stated :
 He accused Britain of offering re-assurance to the South African government. Having adopted a militant attitude on sanctions Kaunda threatened to withdraw from the Commonwealth if Britain continued to oppose sanctions against South Africa. In this connection, (Prime Minister of Britain) resistance to comprehensive sanctions against South Africa. Kaunda criticised Mrs Thatcher's and police amongst others. Within the

56

loans to the South African government, a ban on the import of Krugerrands and on computers likely to be used by the South African army

reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa. For Zambia such measures were likely to strengthen the position of the ANC against apartheid.

At meetings on the African continent Kaunda continued to call for sanctions against South Africa. As already indicated, Kaunda believed that the independent African states had a moral and political obligation to assist in the struggle against apartheid. From the SADCC to the FLS, Kaunda advocated sanctions against South Africa. Given the weak economies of the African states it became important for Kaunda to win the co-operation of Black Africa in the international sanctions campaign against South Africa. In this way, Kaunda argued that the vulnerability of the African states to the effects of sanctions against South Africa should not be used as an excuse for not

61

supporting sanctions. To Kaunda the African states had to accept sanctions as a peaceful approach to the political conflict in South Africa.

The majority of African states eventually supported the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. Although they did not have the capacity to impose sanctions, the African states pledged co-operation in the international sanctions programme against

apartheid. Through the FLS, NAM, and SADCC independent Black Africa undertook to support measures such as the severance of airlinks with South Africa.⁶² This also shows that African economic dependence on South Africa did not discourage Kaunda from mobilising African opinion in favour of sanctions against South Africa.

In his support for sanctions against South Africa, Kaunda always viewed the West as a stumbling block to the attainment of liberation in South Africa. The Western powers readily expressed moral condemnation of apartheid while continuing to support South Africa. For Kaunda this situation was counterproductive to the liberation struggle in South Africa. If the Western powers could co-operate in the international sanctions programme against apartheid, then the capacity of the government to continue with its apartheid policies would be weakened. Moreover, the position of the ANC in the struggle against apartheid would be strengthened.

It was against this background that Kaunda appealed for the co-operation of the Western powers in the international sanctions programme against apartheid. He argued that Zambia could not act on her own, without the support of South Africa's major trading partners, without whom he stated : "there are no sanctions at all. If Zambia and Zimbabwe tomorrow applied

sanctions on their own it would be
suicide on our part, it would be meaningless." ⁶⁴
For sanctions to have the desired impact on
South Africa the support of the Western powers
could therefore not be ignored. It then came
as no surprise when Kaunda employed
international forums such as the UN to appeal
to the Western powers to impose comprehensive
sanctions against South Africa. ⁶⁵ In this
connection, Kaunda identified the U.S.,
Britain, and Germany as the main stumbling
blocks to the effectiveness of the
international sanctions programme against
apartheid. At the beginning of 1986 Kaunda
appealed to these powers as follows :

"If you don't act now it will
be too late Please, I
beg you in the name of God and
his people, apply economic
sanctions now." ⁶⁶

Kaunda felt that it would be a positive move
if the Western powers supported comprehensive
mandatory sanctions against South Africa. As
the sanctions campaign gathered momentum,
Kaunda denounced the attitude of the Western
powers. Reaffirming support for the ANC,
Kaunda continued to appeal for international
co-operation in the sanctions programme against
apartheid. Referring to the imposition of
sanctions against South Africa, Kaunda asserted

that " the programme of action against Pretoria should start with the West, as South Africa's allies and its source of arms, material and credit."⁶⁷

The contribution of Zambia to the mobilisation of international opinion in favour of sanctions can therefore not be overemphasised. Kaunda's militant and uncompromising attitude could be seen as late as the release of Mandela in February 1990. Following the release of Mandela Kaunda still demonstrated a commitment to the total elimination of apartheid in South Africa. For Kaunda the release of Mandela did not signify a meaningful departure from apartheid, as political and economic power still remained in White hands. Kaunda argued that sanctions, as a means of putting pressure on South Africa to end apartheid remained a valid weapon in the struggle against apartheid. As a result, Kaunda stated that sanctions against South Africa should not be lifted :

"If change in South Africa was irreversible, then sanctions could be dropped. If not, we⁶⁸ will appeal for more sanctions."

From this it can be seen that the ANC enjoyed the support of Zambia up until the release of Nelson Mandela.

4.3 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

Zambia's support for the ANC cannot be discussed without some reference to the international environment in the period under discussion. It has already been argued in the first chapter that support for the ANC has been an important issue in international affairs. With the creation of the international battlefront against apartheid in the early 1960's, western official and public opinion began to express concern and condemnation of the apartheid system. It can thus be argued that Zambia hosted the ANC under an international atmosphere that has been quite sympathetic to the liberation cause in South Africa.

The support of Zambia for the ANC has over the years gained credibility from international forums such as the OAU, UN, NAM and the Commonwealth. As already noted, a cornerstone of the OAU has been its strong dedication to the eradication of White minority rule in all its forms in Africa. This is one forum that has strengthened Zambia in her determination to support the ANC. As will be shown in chapter five of this study, the OAU, through its Liberation Committee, has enabled Zambia to make a meaningful contribution to the ANC's armed struggle. Moreover, the OAU has also served as a continental forum through which Zambia could mobilise the necessary support for the struggle against apartheid. As early as 1967 the OAU

expressed full support for Zambia's position in relation to apartheid in South Africa. A statement issued by the OAU Secretariat stated :

"..... If to stand firm against the discrimination and inhuman practices of apartheid which are ruthlessly imposed on the majority Africans is to threaten the minority and racist white regime led by Prime Minister Vorster, then President Kaunda is not alone in this task."⁷⁰

The UN has also taken positions in the period under discussion which complimented Zambia's support for the ANC. Various declarations and resolutions which condemned apartheid have been passed in the UN General Assembly and Security Council.⁷¹ In 1980 the UN gave moral and a legal basis for Zambia's political position as a host state. In this connection, the UN identified with the armed struggle against apartheid and appealed to all states to render the necessary assistance to the ANC.⁷² Not only did the UN direct the attention of the world to the struggle against apartheid, but it also gave Zambia, as a member state, the opportunity to campaign for support against apartheid. As a result, this strengthened Zambia in her position as a host state to the ANC.

The Commonwealth and the NAM have also since their inception been major opponents of apartheid. These

forums have also identified with the position of the ANC in relation to apartheid. It was through the activities of these forums that Zambia campaigned for support against apartheid. These forums also served a useful purpose in Kaunda's endeavours to popularise the international sanctions programme against South Africa.

It is against this background that Zambia's consistency in supporting the ANC must be understood. Despite her vulnerability to South Africa's military and economic power, Zambia never wavered in her support for the ANC. The international atmosphere gave a certain amount of reassurance to Zambia's political position as a host state to the ANC.

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CHAPTER 5

ZAMBIA, THE ANC AND THE ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID

In the introduction to this study it was pointed out that the politics of Southern Africa have been dominated by Black-white conflict over political power. This conflict pitted the liberation movements against White minority rule in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and the former Portuguese Colonies of Angola and Mozambique. Politically, the liberation movements devoted all their efforts to a peaceful and non-violent campaign against inequality between Black and White and the exclusion of the African majority from the political system. From the 1960's the conflict in Southern Africa assumed a new dimension when the liberation movements resorted to armed struggle in their quest for a non-racial political dispensation in Southern Africa.

In South Africa the ANC formed a military wing known as ¹ Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK). Its prime function was to mobilise and organise the people for a new mode of struggle in the efforts of the ANC to bring about a non-racial democracy in South Africa. The banning of the ANC in April 1960 proved beyond doubt that the government was not prepared to abandon its apartheid policies. As a result, the political atmosphere in South Africa was no longer conducive to the ANC's non-violent and peaceful campaigns against apartheid. In his analysis of the political climate in South Africa following the banning

of the ANC, Nelson Mandela remarked :

"all Lawful modes of expressing opposition
..... had been closed by legislation
..... the government had decided to rule
by force alone²"

It can thus be argued that the decision to resort to armed struggle was taken after the non-violent and peaceful approach had been exhausted. Confronted with the governments determination to perpetuate white minority rule, the ANC had no alternative but to adopt armed struggle in its endeavours to bring about a non-racial political dispensation. Having rejected the governments order to disband, the ANC proceeded immediately with preparations for armed struggle. An important step in this direction came in 1962 when the External mission assumed responsibility for all aspects connected with MK outside of South Africa. As indicated earlier these aspects included : arrangements with Africa for training, training sites and transportation of men being sent abroad for military training. There was therefore a need for the people to be prepared both politically and militarily to participate in armed operations against South Africa. The emphasis was to be on the creation of an army of liberation. For the purposes of the present study, it should be noted that armed struggle signified a profound turning point in the development of the struggle against white minority rule in Southern Africa. A question might then be raised as to what has been the position of Zambia in relation to armed struggle as a new mode of struggle against apartheid in South Africa?

5.1 ZAMBIA VIS-A-VIS ARMED STRUGGLE

Zambia had long advocated dialogue between the liberation movements and the white minority governments of Southern Africa. As noted in the fourth chapter, the Lusaka Manifesto stressed peaceful means in seeking solutions to the political conflict in Southern Africa. When it became clear, however, that the white minority governments of Southern Africa were not prepared to abandon their racial policies, Kaunda accepted armed struggle as an alternative approach to the political conflict in South Africa.

While Kaunda continued to advocate dialogue, he also recognised the need for armed struggle against apartheid. The Lusaka Manifesto also provided that if the minority governments became unreasonable in their dealings with the liberation movements, the African states would fully support armed struggle. At the very beginnings of armed struggle in Southern Africa Zambia offered its territory to the liberation movements. This in itself signified the existence of a willingness on the part of Zambia to support armed struggle. The Lusaka Manifesto is quite unequivocal on the position of Zambia in relation to armed struggle :

"..... If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we

would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change. But while peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power in the states of Southern Africa, we have no choice but to give to the peoples of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors⁶"

The above statement indicates that the intransigence of South Africa over apartheid rule forced Zambia to embrace armed operations as a method of struggle. Although Kaunda's overwhelming concern had been to find a peaceful solution to the political conflict in South Africa, he fully identified with the efforts of the ANC to wage armed struggle against apartheid. This was clearly reflected by the granting of asylum to the ANC and other liberation movements of Southern Africa. At this point it is appropriate to turn our attention to the support of Zambia for the ANC's armed struggle against apartheid.

5.2 ZAMBIA AND THE ANC'S PREPARATIONS FOR ARMED STRUGGLE

Zambia has proved to be of strategic importance to the beginnings of armed struggle against white minority rule in Southern Africa. As pointed out

in the third chapter, Zambia has since the early 1960's been the centre of operations for the liberation movements in Southern Africa. To this end, Zambia provided a launch pad for MPLA, FRELIMO, ZAPU, and SWAPO infiltrating Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Namibia respectively. In this way Zambia provided the necessary territorial support for armed struggle to get off the ground.

Zambia also became important for the ANC in its plans to wage armed struggle against apartheid in South Africa. Having committed herself to the liberation cause in Southern Africa, Zambia did not hesitate to provide the necessary support for the beginnings of armed struggle in South Africa. It should be borne in mind that Zambia supported armed struggle against apartheid from a position of weakness. Her economic and military vulnerability has been a major problem in the fulfilment of her commitment to the liberation struggle in South Africa. The extent of Zambia's support for the armed struggle against apartheid should therefore not be seen in isolation from her economic position.

In what can only be interpreted as a bold move to demonstrate support for the armed struggle, Zambia placed her territory at the disposal of the ANC. This enabled the ANC to set up training facilities inside Zambia. Until the independence of Zambia in 1964 ANC preparation for armed struggle were conducted in various African countries such as
9
Algeria, Ethiopia and Egypt. Thus from 1964 the ANC

acquired facilities that were conveniently situated for the return of MK cadres into South Africa. According to an article that appeared in To The Point in February 1973 most of the ANC and MK bases in Zambia were situated in an area between the Kariba Dam and the town of Livingstone.¹⁰ The existence of such facilities on Zambian soil enabled the ANC to provide the necessary political and military training to its cadres. According to Gibson the cadres were taught general military skills, the use of fire arms, explosives, sabotage¹¹ and the principles of guerrilla warfare. In this situation Zambia gave impetus to the ANC's plan to wage armed struggle against apartheid. By providing military bases to the ANC Zambia assumed an important position in the plans of the ANC to build an army of liberation. According to Michael Morris, the ANC also operated a training facility with ZAPU¹² just outside Lusaka, called Nkomo Camp.

Although Zambia permitted the ANC to set up training facilities on its soil, this did not produce immediate results in terms of returning MK cadres into South Africa. The reason for this was that forward bases could not be established in South Africa's neighbouring territories from where the ANC¹³ could launch attacks on South Africa. Both Mozambique and Angola were under colonial rule until 1975 when Portugal granted them independence. Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) also remained under colonial rule until 1980. The other independent African

states by 1969 (Botswana and Swaziland) could not afford to become springboards for attacks against South Africa. Their dependence on South Africa rendered them vulnerable to possible South African retaliation. There is no doubt that South Africa possesses the strongest army in Southern Africa. Since the early 1960's South Africa has warned Zambia that it would not allow the ANC to use its territory for attacks on South Africa.¹⁴ This aspect will be more fully examined in chapter six of this study. Of interest to note is that South Africa's military might did not deter Zambia from supporting armed struggle.

In spite of economic constraints on Zambia, South Africa continued to be confronted by the ANC's armed struggle. The training facilities in Zambia contributed a great deal in keeping the armed struggle alive and a force to be reckoned with. As conditions in the late 1960's did not permit for the successful return of MK cadres into South Africa, Zambia remained an important centre for the training of MK Cadres. Given the state of affairs in Southern Africa between 1964 and 1976 not much could be expected from Zambia in relation to the infiltration of MK Cadres. During this period Zambia became the main training ground for MK Cadres in Southern Africa.

Although Zambia remained an important training ground for MK Cadres, she lacked resources to assist the ANC in meeting its basic needs for this

training.¹⁵ This means that Zambia was unable to provide the ANC and MK with arms and ammunition. Nevertheless, the importation of arms and supplies for the liberation movements enabled Zambia to make a meaningful contribution with regard to the liberation struggle. Most of the military and other supplies for the liberation movements were imported through Dar-es-Salam.¹⁶ In this situation Zambia assisted the ANC with the safe transit of arms and ammunition to its bases. Zambia readily provided escort services for the transport of arms, medical equipment and other supplies from the Tanzanian border to ANC bases.¹⁷ This was an essential service for the ANC plans to build an army of liberation.

In addition to the provision of bases, Zambia also gave ~~finanacial assistance~~ to the armed struggle. This form of support for the ANC came through the African Liberation Committee (ALC).¹⁸ As already indicated in the first chapter, the ALC was set up at the OAU founding conference. Its main task was to channel assistance from the African states to the liberation movements that were still engaged in the struggle against white minority rule. To this end, the OAU set up a Freedom Fund which was to be administered by the ALC.¹⁹ With regard to contributions to the Freedom Fund, Zambia was always to date with her payments.²⁰ This signifies the seriousness with which Zambia viewed the struggle

against white minority rule. It can therefore be presumed that Zambia also provided financial support to the armed struggle against apartheid.

It is not entirely clear how much the ANC received from the ALC Freedom Fund for its armed struggle. To what extent Zambia's contributions to the ALC in particular helped the ANC in the armed struggle is also not clear. According to Khapoya the DAU²¹ prefers to "conduct its business in secrecy." Hence it is not easy to know fairly accurately how much the liberation movements received from the ALC. What is certain, however, was that the ANC benefited in one way or the other from Zambia's contributions to the ALC Freedom Fund.

5.3 ZAMBIA AND THE INFILTRATION OF MK CADRES INTO SOUTH AFRICA

The return of cadres to South Africa only became possible with the independence of Angola and Mozambique in 1975. Until the independence of these African states the ANC was unable to infiltrate its cadres into South Africa. As a result, its preparations for armed struggle were confined to²² guerrilla training in its camps in Zambia. Although this was the situation, Zambia's support for the infiltration of MK cadres into South Africa can be traced as far back as the late 1960's. In August 1967, and again in the first half of 1968, joint

ANC/ZAPU cadres crossed into Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)²³. In this case Zambia demonstrated her willingness to play the role of a forward base for the return of MK cadres to South Africa.

Although the joint ANC/ZAPU campaign failed to move MK cadres into South Africa, it showed that Zambia was prepared to facilitate the infiltration of MK cadres into South Africa. The campaign itself should be seen as an important point of departure for Zambia in her determination to support armed struggle against apartheid. The independence of Mozambique and Angola in 1975 gave impetus to the armed struggle against apartheid. On the one hand, Mozambique provided the ANC with much needed bases²⁴ across the borders of South Africa. Consequently, Mozambique became the main MK route for moving cadres in and out of South Africa. On the other, Angola became the main training ground for MK cadres where training was given by East Germans, Soviets²⁵ and Cubans. In this new situation the ANC was able to return cadres into South Africa. As a result, the number of MK attacks in South Africa grew steadily between 1976 and the beginning of the 1980's. They included attacks on government buildings, military installations, power stations²⁶ and transport links.

It soon became clear that infiltration of MK cadres constituted a serious problem to the South African

government. The head of the South African Security, Brigadier C. Zietsman admitted that infiltration of MK cadres was a major problem. In a South African radio broadcast he said, "police have clashed several times with terrorists of the banned African National Congress and quantities of arms²⁷ and ammunition have been seized". MK attacks inside South Africa always gave credibility to Zambia as host to the ANC. What then has been the role of Zambia with regard to, the infiltration of MK cadres into South Africa between 1975 and the beginning of the 1980's? The infiltration of cadres by way of Mozambique also gave Zambia an image of an important source of support in relation to the return of MK cadres into South Africa. Zambia had by this time sufficient trained MK cadres and well established training camps to enable the ANC to utilize Mozambique effectively for infiltration²⁸ purposes. While infiltration got off the ground, Zambia continued to provide bases for the training of MK cadres.

Zambia's strategic position continued to be a key factor to the survival of the armed struggle against apartheid. It is unlikely that the independence of Mozambique and Angola would have prompted Zambia to abandon her support with regard to the training of MK cadres. As the focus shifted to Angola in the late 1970's as the main training ground for MK cadres, Zambia assumed the role of a facilitator with regard to the infiltration of MK cadres by way of Mozambique. Indications are that MK cadres from

training camps in Zambia were readily available for infiltration by way of Mozambique. In her role as facilitator, Zambia also provided transit for cadres to reach forward bases for launching attacks against South Africa.²⁹ The significance of this form of support became evident when the ANC suffered setbacks in the 1980's in its efforts to step up attacks on South Africa. The first of these setbacks came with South Africa's non-aggressive pacts, first with Swaziland in 1982, and then with Mozambique in 1984 (Nkomati Accord).³⁰ Both the Swazi and Nkomati Accords were intended to stop the ANC from operating forward bases in these countries.

The signing of these agreements seriously disrupted MK bases and routes for returning MK cadres to South Africa. This forced the ANC to turn to Botswana as an alternative route for the movement of MK cadres.³¹ In this situation Zambia emerged once more as a vital factor. Zambia effectively provided transit for MK cadres. This allowed MK cadres free passage to reach Botswana.³² Moreover, ANC bases in Zambia served as a catalyst in relation to the infiltration of MK cadres by way of Botswana. Whenever an operation has been planned MK cadres left Lusaka for bases along the Zambian border. This is where they picked up information with regard to sabotage targets in South Africa.³³

Through the support of Zambia, the Swazi and Nkomati Accords failed to stop the ANC from returning MK

cadres into South Africa. According to the Institute of Strategic Studies of the University of Pretoria an 800% increase in "revolutionary violence³⁴ has occurred since the Nkomati Accord." A total of 88 attacks were for example recorded in the second half of 1985. This represented a significant increase in MK attacks given the provisions of the Swazi and Nkomati Accords. It can therefore be asserted that Zambia contributed a great deal in keeping armed struggle alive in South Africa.

The second setback for MK came in 1988 with the signing of the New York Accord between South Africa, Angola and Cuba. Although this agreement focussed on the independence of Namibia, it also committed the signatories to refrain from using their territories for acts of aggression against other³⁶ states. This meant that the ANC had to remove its bases and other military facilities from Angola. In this situation Zambia, once again, demonstrated her concern for the armed struggle. Some of the MK cadres were transferred from Angola to camps in³⁷ Zambia. Zambia remained a pillar of support for the armed struggle throughout the ANC years in exile. Without the support of Zambia it is unlikely that the efforts of the ANC to wage armed struggle against apartheid would have succeeded.

5.4 MORAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE ARMED STRUGGLE

As pointed out above, Zambia identified with armed struggle as early as the 1960's. The presence of ZAPU, FRELIMO, MPLA and later the ANC within her borders proved beyond doubt that Kaunda was in full accord with the adoption of armed struggle as an alternative approach to the political conflict in South Africa. The Lusaka Manifesto made it quite clear that if peaceful progress towards the attainment of liberation was blocked Zambia will have no alternative but to support the armed
38
struggle carried out by the ANC.

As far as the armed struggle is concerned Zambia also adopted the position of the liberation movements with regard to the necessity of armed operations as a new mode of struggle. It should be borne in mind that the ANC attributed its decision to resort to armed struggle to the intransigence of the government over apartheid. This attitude on the part of the government became evident in 1960 when a total ban was placed on the activities of the ANC. This state of affairs prompted Kaunda to come out in full support of armed struggle. In a speech at the National Press Club, Kaunda said that armed struggle had been forced on Southern Africa, "as the
39
only option in reaction against brutal force."

Zambia's approach to armed struggle was somewhat ambivalent: Consisting on the one hand of a desire

to distance itself from armed struggle and on the other hand of a desire to openly support armed struggle. For the purposes of this study it must be noted that support for armed struggle was the most sensitive issue that confronted Kaunda's government between 1964 and the unbanning of the ANC in February 1990. Her continued economic dependence on South Africa rendered Zambia vulnerable to possible South African retaliation. It is therefore not surprising that Zambia began her support for armed struggle by not disclosing the nature and extent of her involvement with the ANC's armed struggle.

With the beginnings of armed struggle against apartheid Zambia consistently denied the presence of ANC bases within her borders. In this connection, Kaunda stated:

"We have no training camps in Zambia
..... none whatsoever Zambia
cannot, and does not tolerate the use
of its soil as a base for military or
para-military operations"⁴⁰

This position should not be construed to mean that Zambia was opposed to armed operations against apartheid. It is obvious that ANC camps within the borders of Zambia posed a direct threat to apartheid in South Africa. Zambia could therefore not afford to reveal its role in the ANC's armed struggle. With the limited resources at her disposal Zambia

would not have been able to withstand possible South African retaliation. By denying the presence of ANC bases within her borders, Zambia wanted to protect herself against South African retaliation. It was hoped that the denials would mislead South Africa into believing that Zambia was opposed to armed struggle since Kaunda had been advocating a peaceful solution to the political conflict in South Africa.

While Kaunda insisted that no military training was given to MK cadres inside Zambia, MK was allowed sanctuary and transit through Zambia.⁴¹ For Zambia there was nothing wrong in allowing MK cadres free passage through Zambia with their arms to carry on the struggle inside South Africa. Zambia acknowledged that MK cadres were allowed free passage through Zambia on their way to South Africa. Zambia, as one minister explained, "..... is doing no more than giving these people from abroad the right of way into the country they are fighting for."⁴² When Kaunda, was asked whether MK cadres passed through Zambia on their way down to South Africa, he remarked :

"Certainly going and coming back to their own country, they pass through Zambia."⁴³

The ambivalent approach to armed struggle lasted until the 1970's when Zambia began to be more open with regard to armed struggle. It soon became apparent that Kaunda was prepared to suffer the consequences of Zambia's support for armed struggle against apartheid.⁴⁴ As long as South Africa continued with her apartheid policies, armed struggle remained an acceptable form of struggle against apartheid. On several occasions between the 1970's and the end of the 1980's Kaunda admitted Zambia's support for armed struggle. In an interview with Africa, Kaunda justified the efforts of the ANC to wage armed struggle against apartheid:

"..... we have since left no stone untouched in our determined efforts to avoid bloodshed where possible, including to Mr Vorster Having exhausted the peaceful option there only remain the war option. Our duty to Africa calls us to respond to the challenge and now that we have accepted it morally we are organising ourselves to discharge our responsibilities as we must with a clear conscience From now on our only interest is to vigorously prosecute the intensified armed struggle to the very end just as we pursued with determination the peaceful option up to the end until that option was clearly exhausted"

The preceding statement reveals that the intransigence of the government over apartheid caused Zambia to remain firm in her support for armed struggle. Whenever the ANC suffered setbacks in the armed struggle Kaunda was always at hand to encourage the ANC in its endeavours to overthrow apartheid. When the ANC for example lost its forward bases through the Nkomati Accord, Kaunda did not hesitate to speak out against the Nkomati Accord. In an article that appeared in the Sunday Tribune in April 1984, Zambia, in response to the Nkomati Accord, committed herself to continued support for the armed struggle. In reaction to the implications of the Nkomati Accord for the armed struggle Kaunda stated :

"At SADCC summits we have consistently condemned apartheid how are we going to do that without
47
condemning Mozambique"

Zambia's position as a host state to the ANC contributed a great deal in sustaining the efforts of the ANC to continue with armed struggle. The greatest test to Kaunda's commitment to armed struggle came in the 1980's when South Africa resorted to a policy of destabilisation in retaliation to the escalation of armed operations against South Africa. As will be shown in chapter six of this study, destabilisation was intended to coerce Zambia into expelling the ANC from her

territory.

Confronted by South Africa's destabilisation tactics, Kaunda continued to demonstrate support for the ANC. Kaunda refused to yield to South African pressure to abandon his support for the ANC. Kaunda argued that the problem continued to be apartheid, and not the presence of the ANC within the borders of Zambia. On the presence of the ANC within the borders of Zambia. On the presence of the ANC within the borders of Zambia Kaunda endorsed a statement by Thomas Nkobi, Treasurer General of the ANC, who said :

"When the ANC moves its headquarters from Lusaka it will go South - across
48
the Limpopo to Pretoria."

An appropriate concluding comment on Zambia's support for armed struggle is to be found in Kaunda's interview with Africa when he remarked:

"..... We have always understood the challenge of liberation We accepted the consequences of our participation in assisting the oppressed masses in their armed struggle. We are
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deeply involved"

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CHAPTER 6

ZAMBIA : PRESSURE FROM SOUTH AFRICA TO ABANDON SUPPORT FOR THE ANC

The central purpose of this study has been to find out to what extent Zambia supported the ANC in the struggle against apartheid. It was seen in the second chapter that the presence of the ANC within the borders of Zambia did not augur well for South Africa. The provision of asylum meant that the ANC would continue with the struggle against apartheid. South Africa was quick to recognise the implications of Zambia's political position as a host state to the ANC. Among these was the fact that Zambia provided the means by which the struggle against apartheid could be continued and broadened. South Africa could therefore not afford to ignore the support of Zambia for the ANC. As a result, Zambia came under various forms of pressure to abandon her support for the ANC.

6.1 ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE ZAMBIA TO ACCEPT APARTHEID

After recognising the important position of Zambia in the struggle against apartheid, South Africa attempted to persuade Kaunda to accept apartheid. South Africa's main concern was to prevent Zambia from supporting the ANC. The government realised that Zambia's economic dependence on South Africa

could be exploited to weaken the position of the ANC. Zambia had to be persuaded to adopt a friendly attitude towards South Africa. In this connection, Zambia was described by Foreign Minister Muller as "the valuable conquest, and the one which would consolidate the block and make it almost impregnable." If Zambia could be reconciled to accept apartheid then the chances of the ANC receiving assistance from Zambia would be reduced. Moreover, South Africa would have cut the ANC from the rest of the world. To achieve this goal South Africa used its economic strength to entice Zambia with offers of economic co-operation. According to Kaunda himself, by April 1968 he had received a number of proposals for "extending co-operation with South Africa in the fields of technology, economic and education." The idea of economic co-operation became an important aspect in the efforts of South Africa to reconcile Zambia to accept apartheid.

Under the regime of P. W. Botha the idea of economic co-operation with Zambia assumed a new dimension. Botha proposed an economic forum known as the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), for economic co-operation in Southern Africa. Without giving details about CONSAS, let it be sufficient to say that the policy was designed specifically to prevent the overthrow of apartheid. Like his predecessor, Vorster, Botha wanted to discourage independent Black Africa from supporting the just liberation struggle of the people of South

Africa. It was hoped that through economic co-operation Zambia could be persuaded to abandon her support for the ANC.

6.2 MILITARY PRESSURE

Unable to achieve its objectives by peaceful means, South Africa decided to change tactics. As a result, between the end of the 1960's and the mid 1980's the use of force became a fundamental feature of South Africa's efforts to prevent Zambia from supporting the ANC. The use of force against Zambia started with threats and warnings of retaliation and culminated in the destabilisation of the 1980's.

As we noted in this chapter South Africa could not afford to ignore the political position of Zambia as a host state to the ANC. In response to the joint ZAPU/ANC campaign in 1967 and 1968 South Africa threatened Zambia with retaliation for giving sanctuary to the ANC. However, inspite of the threat, South Africa did not attack Zambia. It should be borne in mind that by 1967/68, South Africa was still hoping to win Zambia on the side of apartheid. But it soon became clear that Zambia was not prepared to co-operate with South Africa as long as the government continued with its apartheid policies. Confronted with Kaunda's uncompromising

attitude to apartheid, South Africa began to adopt a hostile attitude towards Zambia. In 1970 Vorster warned Kaunda that if he gave support to the liberation movements "we will hit you so hard that you will never forget it."⁶

Vorster's warning was a signal to step up military pressure against Zambia. Following Vorster's threat South Africa engaged in a number of acts of aggression against Zambia.⁷ At a meeting of the UN Security Council in October 1971 the Zambian representative accused South Africa of twenty four separate acts of aggression and stated that "the racists were virtually waging an undeclared war on Zambia."⁸ Military pressure continued against Zambia even after the UN condemned South Africa for her activities. From January to September 1979 South African armed forces crossed the Zambian border ten times, violating Zambian airspace and land. It was unlikely that South Africa would stop exerting pressure on Zambia as long as the ANC continued to operate from Zambia.

Zambia's political position as a host state to the ANC remained a threat to the continuation of white minority rule in South Africa. This became evident after 1976 when the ANC stepped up its armed operations against South Africa. In 1977 for example, the police discovered caches of arms, booby traps and explosives which suggested that the ANC had been successful in smuggling arms across the

¹⁰
border. As a result, between January 1977 and
December 1982 instances of MK armed activities
included attacks on police stations, bombs in city
centres, military targets and clashes with South
¹¹
African forces. In this situation South Africa was
not prepared to ignore the presence of the ANC
within the borders of Zambia.

South Africa responded to the presence of the ANC
within the borders of neighbouring African States
¹²
with its own "total strategy." P. W. Botha launched
a systematic policy of destabilisation against the
¹³
neighbouring African states. The aim of this policy
was to "enfeeble the ANC and strengthen South
Africa's military, political and economic hegemony
¹⁴
over the region." In implementing this policy South
Africa made use of its armed forces to attack
territories of neighbouring African states. The
government openly declared its intention to make the
neighbouring states "pay dearly for supporting
¹⁵
liberation movements." This policy was spelt out
clearly by South Africa's Defence Minister, General
Magnus Malan, when he stated :

"When the ANC commits terror against SA
from neighbouring countries, the leaders
of those countries are co-responsible. A
leader like Dr Kaunda must realise that
he cannot play host to the ANC and the
Communist Party and be known as a man
¹⁶
who seeks peace"

For the purposes of this study, it must be noted that Zambia's political position as a host state to the ANC made her a prime target in South Africa's policy of destabilisation. Some of the tragic examples of South Africa's efforts to deter Zambia from providing asylum to the ANC have been the 1980 South African invasion of the Southwestern regions of Zambia in which Zambian property was destroyed¹⁷ and Zambian civilians killed. It was hoped that military destabilisation would eventually force Kaunda to turn his back on the ANC.

The most recent incident occurred in April 1987 when the SADF launched an attack on the Southern town of Livingstone in which civilians were killed.¹⁸ According to the SADF the operation was carried out on a "terrorist infiltration route from Zambia¹⁹ through Botswana." As could be expected, the attacks invoked an angry response from Zambia, the ANC and the international community. On the one hand, the international community condemned the attacks on Zambia as a violation of international²⁰ law and the United Nations Charter. On the other, both Zambia and the ANC committed themselves to the continuation of the struggle against apartheid. Other forms of pressure on Zambia included bombings of Zambian property and ANC offices, espionage and the use of surrogate groups against Kaunda's²¹ government.

6.3 THE REACTION OF ZAMBIA

It has already been argued that Zambia supported the ANC from a position of weakness. In spite of Kaunda's uncompromising attitude towards apartheid Zambia has remained economically dependent on South Africa. But the various forms of pressure from South Africa did not dampen Kaunda's commitment to the liberation struggle in South Africa. For its part Zambia continued to support the ANC in the struggle against apartheid.

6.3.1 ZAMBIA AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA

Despite her dependence on South Africa, Kaunda was not prepared to abandon his support for liberation for immediate economic benefits. In his published correspondence with South African Prime Minister Vorster in 1968, Kaunda cited apartheid as an obstacle to co-operation²² between Zambia and South Africa. President Kaunda believed that economic co-operation as advocated by South Africa could only be maintained in the interest of apartheid. This was already demonstrated by South Africa's refusal to exchange diplomats with Zambia on the basis of equality. Consequently, Kaunda reacted as follows to South Africa's proposals

for co-operation between Zambia and South Africa :

"..... for South Africa
to court friendship with us under
prevailing conditions within that
country amounts to asserting that
we in Zambia are superior Africans²³
to the Mandela's and Sobukwe's."

These observations by Kaunda demonstrated his willingness to support the ANC's position on the isolation of South Africa. For Zambia any co-operation with South Africa amounted to a betrayal of the liberation cause in South Africa. Instead of accepting economic co-operation with South Africa, Zambia granted asylum to the ANC. In this way Zambia fully identified with the ANC led struggle against apartheid.

Under P. W. Botha new methods were sought to win Zambia and weaken the position of the ANC. With Botha's CONSAS, it was hoped that Zambia could still be reconciled to accept apartheid. But Zambia continued to oppose economic co-operation with South Africa on the basis of inequality. As indicated earlier, Kaunda was prepared to sacrifice Zambia's rapid economic development rather than abandon support for the ANC. In response to Botha's CONSAS, Kaunda stated :

"South Africa is to become king pin of us all, and all of us - Zambia, Mozambique, and Angola - are going to be satellite or puppet states of South Africa."²⁴

Kaunda correctly perceived Botha's idea of CONSAS as a ploy to weaken the liberation cause in South Africa and deprive the ANC of the much needed support base for armed struggle. Kaunda's reaction to the idea of CONSAS demonstrated beyond doubt that apartheid remained a stumbling block to normal co-operation between Zambia and South Africa. There was no way in which Zambia could co-operate with South Africa while the ANC remained an illegal organisation, and South Africa continued with her apartheid policies. It can thus be argued that Zambia remained in full accord with the ANC's position on the isolation of South Africa.

In addition to the concept of economic co-operation, Botha made a number of concessions to enhance the status of South Africa amongst the Black independent African states. These concessions included the repeal of petty apartheid laws and the admission of Coloureds²⁵ and Indians to parliament. Such measures were intended to influence the attitude of the African states to apartheid, and eventually weaken the position of the ANC in the struggle

against apartheid. Zambia, however, did not succumb to Botha's propaganda. Commenting on the reforms in South Africa, Kaunda had the following to say :

"What is taking place in South Africa now is not change. It is something that I call cosmetic, designed to hoodwink the outside world into thinking that South Africa is making some moves towards something constructive It is important to understand that the move alone will make the Black masses even more desperate"²⁶

For Kaunda Botha's reforms did not signify a real departure from apartheid. The basis of the apartheid system remained unchanged. The African majority still remained without political representation. In an interview with the Rand Daily Mail, in 1982, Kaunda reiterated Zambia's support for the ANC. He also indicated that support for the ANC extended beyond the borders of Zambia :

"..... there is tremendous support for the African National Congress in Africa and the rest of the world."²⁷

From this it can be seen that Kaunda was

committed to the end of apartheid rule in south Africa. His bottomline on South Africa was the dismantling of apartheid as advocated by the ANC. As long as the South African government persisted with its apartheid policies, there was no way in which Zambia could abandon her support for the ANC. The activities of the ANC have been geared towards the eradication of apartheid in South Africa and therefore deserved the necessary support from Zambia.

6.3.2 ZAMBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY DESTABILISATION

As already noted, military destabilisation was intended to coerce Zambia into expelling the ANC from her territory. Given her economic dependence on South Africa and the limited resources at her disposal, it was expected that Zambia would easily succumb to South Africa's military pressure. The May 1986 and April 1987 SADF raids represented a significant test on Kaunda's commitment to the struggle against apartheid. Contrary to expectations, Kaunda never wavered in his support for the ANC. He rejected the view that the presence of the ANC within the borders of Zambia amounted to a form of aggression against South Africa. The ANC has been perceived by Zambia as a legitimate

national liberation movement fighting to eradicate apartheid in South Africa. The legitimacy of the ANC cause inspired Kaunda to endure the effects of South Africa's military destabilisation.

It is against this background that the response of Zambia to South Africa's military destabilisation must be seen. Kaunda viewed military destabilisation as a "flagrant violation of all international norms of conduct and a blatant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity" of Zambia.²⁹ As a result, Kaunda continued to express support for the ANC. Zambia pledged to step up her support for the ANC in "their legitimate struggle for their birthright."³⁰ This became evident when Kaunda identified openly with the bread and butter issues which confronted the African majority in South Africa. These issues included the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC.

Instead of succumbing to South African military pressure, Kaunda advocated dialogue between the ANC and the government. While the ANC continued to operate within the borders of Zambia the South African government had to be convinced that apartheid remained the greatest threat to peace in Southern Africa. This could only be attained by promoting the idea of dialogue between the government and the ANC.

For Kaunda the independence of Namibia was an important point of departure in the direction of dialogue between the ANC and the government. In an attempt to promote a peaceful settlement in Namibia Kaunda arranged a meeting with P.³¹ W. Botha. If South Africa could be persuaded to agree to the independence of Namibia then dialogue to end apartheid in South Africa could³² be initiated. The meeting eventually took place on 30 April 1982 on the border between³³ South Africa and Botswana. During the course of the talks Kaunda demonstrated his support for the ANC cause against apartheid. He persuaded Botha to release Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and engage in dialogue with the ANC to end apartheid. By meeting Botha Kaunda did not abandon his support for the isolation of South Africa. After all the meeting was not intended to discuss bilateral relations between Zambia and South Africa.

Kaunda told the New York Times in September 1983 that his efforts to deal with South Africa were intended to "find ways and means of softening the explosion which is bound to³⁵ come." The meeting with Botha represented an honest attempt on the part of Kaunda to facilitate the creation of a climate conducive to dialogue to end apartheid. Kaunda felt that the independence of Namibia could create

fertile conditions for the beginning of dialogue between the ANC and the South African government.

In response to criticisms for his meeting with Botha Kaunda made his position on the liberation of South Africa unequivocally clear. He defended his meeting with Botha on the basis of the spirit and content of the Lusaka Manifesto. Kaunda argued that, "..... at no time have I ever discussed bilateral relations with them (South Africa). My talks with them have been confined to matters affecting the liberation struggle in the subcontinent." Through his meeting with Botha Kaunda did not turn his back on the ANC. Despite his conciliatory attitude towards Botha, Kaunda remained committed to the eradication of apartheid in South Africa. He urged the need for Botha to meet Mandela, Tambo and Sisulu. There is therefore no reason not to believe that Kaunda initiated his meeting with Botha within the parameters of the Lusaka Manifesto.

Following his meeting with Botha Kaunda continued to demonstrate support for the ANC. He called for the recognition of the ANC as a legitimate liberation movement that represented the wishes of the African majority. The government's conception of the ANC as a communist inspired terrorist organisation was

an end in itself rather than a means to an end. Kaunda argued that no solution could be found to the political conflict in South Africa without the ANC. Demonstrating the need for the recognition of the ANC, Kaunda remarked:

"..... I have been urging the South African leaders please talk to the African National Congress, please accept that the ANC is the mouthpiece of by far the greatest majority⁴⁰ of the African people"

It became imperative on the part of the government to realise that the ANC was an important element to a peaceful settlement of the political conflict in South Africa. If peace was to prevail in South Africa the government had to recognise the ANC as a mirror of African political aspirations. Kaunda felt that dialogue between the ANC and the government was the only viable option to a peaceful settlement of the problems that⁴¹ confronted the people of South Africa. The recognition of the ANC by the government could be an important breakthrough to the creation of a climate conducive for dialogue.

While Kaunda advocated dialogue, he maintained that the ball was in the court of the government to create a climate conducive for

the beginning of dialogue to end apartheid. South Africa was expected to demonstrate a commitment to end apartheid. The ANC also adopted the same attitude as far as the creation of a climate conducive for dialogue was concerned. The president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, stated that there could be no thought of the ANC meeting with P. W. Botha until it had been established that there would be serious talks, aimed at bringing an end to apartheid. Tambo further explained :

"Our conception of an effective struggle is a combination of political and armed struggle. We cannot rely solely on the gun, but it would be disastrous if we abandoned it. Non-violence has brought about more, not less, apartheid."

Like Kaunda, the ANC also expected the government to create a climate conducive for dialogue to end apartheid. If the government could demonstrate a commitment to change direction, then the ANC was likely to consider dialogue as a viable option to a peaceful settlement of the political conflict in South Africa. But as long as South Africa adhered to her apartheid policies there was no way in which the ANC could abandon its armed struggle against the continued existence of apartheid.

This encouraged Kaunda to promote dialogue between the ANC and the government. For Kaunda the release of Nelson Mandela could be an important point of departure in the direction of creating a climate conducive for dialogue. Pointing to the need for South Africa to dialogue with the ANC, Kaunda stated :

"..... I hope that a way can be found to get President Botha to release Nelson Mandela without condition, and I believe he will not regret it The earlier we can get him released, the better for all of us
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in the region."

In calling for the release of Mandela, Kaunda demonstrated his deep desire for an end to apartheid rule in South Africa. He stated that in supporting the ANC Zambia had a special
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commitment to end apartheid.

This commitment came under the spotlight when the SADF carried out raids into Zambia in April 1986 and May 1987. In view of the destabilising effect of these raid it was expected that Kaunda would expel the ANC from Zambia. These expectations eventually led to press reports
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that the ANC had been expelled from Zambia. But it did not take long for these press reports to be proved incorrect. Zambia could not afford to expel the ANC when South Africa

still adhered to her apartheid policies. As long as South Africa remained intransigent over apartheid, there was no way in which Zambia could withdraw her vital support for the ANC. Such a move on the part of Kaunda would have been counterproductive to the liberation cause in South Africa. Kaunda argued that the presence of the ANC within the borders of Zambia was in compliance with international law governing the status of refugees.⁴⁷ In response to press reports that the ANC had been expelled from Zambia, Kaunda remarked :

"..... The ANC is not the problem. The problem is apartheid, and I hold this view very strongly. And I know that the Zambians hold this view very strongly There is no way I could say to the ANC : "Leave Zambia" I would never do that"⁴⁸

Given the seriousness of the SADF raids against Zambia it became clear that Kaunda was prepared to host the ANC until South Africa committed herself to serious dialogue to end apartheid. This was the only stage at which the ANC could leave Zambia to engage the government in dialogue with a view to a new political dispensation. Botha's destabilisation tactics did not discourage Kaunda in his endeavours to promote dialogue between the government and the

ANC.

When F. W. de Klerk assumed power as the new State President, Kaunda proposed a meeting. He told a news conference in Lusaka that he had seen reports about De Klerks talks about dismantling apartheid. For Kaunda this was an opportunity to find out what De Klerk stood

⁵⁰ for. Kaunda's initiative was a further confirmation of his willingness to promote dialogue between the ANC and the South African government. It is important to note that this meeting was also initiated within the parameters of the Lusaka Manifesto. Kaunda stressed that he would report back to the ANC on his meeting with Mr de Klerk. In this way ⁵¹ Kaunda demonstrated his commitment to end apartheid rule in South Africa.

Kaunda called on South Africa to facilitate dialogue by lifting the state of emergency and the ban on the ANC. His willingness to meet ⁵² De Klerk should therefore not be seen as a sign of weakness in his support for the ANC. The Kaunda-De Klerk meeting was an important turning point in Zambia's endeavours to promote dialogue between the ANC and the government. On the one hand, it offered De Klerk a golden opportunity to win acceptance in Africa by dismantling apartheid. On the other, it offered Kaunda yet another opportunity to demonstrate his support for the ANC by

After the important meeting with Kaunda, De Klerk tried to step up the tempo of change in South Africa. He seemed to have perceived three essential factors : Kaunda's commitment to a peaceful settlement of political conflict in South Africa, the threat to security posed by the ANC's armed struggle and the widespread recognition that no solution could be found to the political conflict in South Africa without the ANC. As a result, De Klerk began to move his government in the direction of creating a climate conducive to dialogue between his government and the ANC. In October 1989 the government released six Rivonia Trialists,

"..... Dr Kaunda is a very important figure in Africa. He is not only the chairman of the Frontline States, but he is a man committed to the liberation struggle of all the people of this continent. We also hope Mr De Klerk, unlike his predecessors, will make use of this opportunity to understand the commitment of people like Dr Kaunda."

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impressing upon the South African government the need to release Mandela and dialogue with the ANC. These were political realities that De Klerk could no longer afford to ignore if he was to demonstrate any commitment on the part of his government to end apartheid in South Africa. City Press, meanwhile commented:

including Walter Sisulu, former Secretary-
54
General of the ANC. The next significant step came with the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC on 2 February 1990. These measures brought about a climate that Kaunda had been advocating as a basis for dialogue between the ANC and the government.

The NP also perceived these steps as significant in the direction of a climate for dialogue between the government and the ANC. In an address to an NP Congress, De Klerk stated :

"One of the main lessons of history is the need to grasp the opportunity for dialogue and negotiations when
55
ever the opportunity presents itself."

Thus the groundwork was laid for what was to become a joint ANC-government initiative on a new political dispensation for South Africa. There is no reason not to believe that Kaunda's endeavours in advocating for dialogue between the ANC and the government eventually paid dividends. Kaunda's meeting with De Klerk also contributed a great deal in facilitating the creation of a climate conducive for real dialogue to end apartheid. In his support for the ANC Kaunda had always called for dialogue to end apartheid.

ENDNOTES

- 1 D. G. ANGLIN, AND T. M. SHAW : ZAMBIA'S FOREIGN POLICY : STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY AND DEPENDENCE, p. 284.
- 2 THE STAR, 26.06.1968.
- 3 A. URNOV : SOUTH AFRICA AGAINST AFRICA 1968 - 1986, p. 66.
- 4 SEE BARBER AND BARRATT : SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY: THE SEARCH FOR STATUS AND SECURITY 1945 - 1988, pp. 100 - 130, AS WELL AS URNOV, SOUTH AFRICA AGAINST AFRICA 1968 - 1986, pp. 260 - 278
- 5 B. B. BROWN : SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD ITS BLACK NEIGHBOURS, p. 24.
- 6 M. MORRIS : ARMED CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, p. 247.
- 7 SEE P. JOHNSON, AND D. MARTIN (eds) : APARTHEID'S TERRORISM, pp. 77 - 100, AS WELL AS A. URNOV : SOUTH AFRICA AGAINST AFRICA 1968 - 1986, pp. 265 - 279.
- 8 A. URNOV : SOUTH AFRICA AGAINST AFRICA 1968 - 1986, pp. 283 - 5.
- 9 Ibid.

- 10 AFRICA CONTEMPORARY RECORD (1977 - 1978), pp. B 901 - 902.
- 11 H. J. SEIDMAN : WHO'S DOING THE FIGHTING (NEW INTERNATIONALIST, NO. 87, MAY 1980), p. 18.
- 12 J. DE ST. JORRE : DESTABILIZATION AND DIALOGUE. SOUTH AFRICA'S EMERGENCE AS A REGIONAL SUPERPOWER (CSIS AFRICA NOTES, NO. 26, 17 APRIL 1984), p. 2.
- 13 SEE J. HANLON : BEGGAR YOUR NEIGHBOURS, pp. 55 - 100. P. JOHNSON AND D. MARTIN (eds) : DESTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT, pp. 120 - 135. P. JOHNSON AND D. MARTIN (eds) : APARTHEID TERRORISM, pp. 77 - 100.
- 14 J. DE ST. JORRE : DESTABILIAZATION AND DIALOGUE , p. 2.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 C. LEGUM : THE BATTLEFRONTS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, p. 376.
- 17 SEE P. JOHNSON, AND D. MARTIN (eds) : APARTHEID TERRORISM, pp. 77 - 100. AS WELL AS A. URNOV : SOUTH AFRICA AGAINST AFRICA 1968 - 1986, pp. 260 - 278.
- 18 D. D. SINGH : SOUTH AFRICA AND FRONTLINE STATES: A STUDY IN DEPENDANCE AND DESTABILIZATION (AFRICA QUARTERLY, VOL. 25, NO. 1 - 2, 1985), p. 61.
- 19 SUNDAY STAR, 26.04.1987.
- 20 THE ARGUS, 27.04.1987.

- 21 SEE P. JOHNSON, AND D. MARTIN (eds) : APARTHEID
TERRORISM, pp. 77 - 100.
- 22 SOUTHERN AFRICA RECORD, NO. 11, JANUARY 1978, p. 78.
- 23 D. G. ANGLIN : ZAMBIA AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN DETENTE
(INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, VOL. 30, NO. 3, SUMMER
1975), p. 486.
- 24 RAND DAILY MAIL, 26.11.1979.
- 25 AFRICA CONTEMPORARY RECORD (1981 - 1982), p. A.11.
- 26 KENNETH KAUNDA, PRESIDENT OF ZAMBIA. INTERVIEW
(AFRICA REPORT, MAY - JUNE 1983), p. 5.
- 27 RAND DAILY MAIL, 27.06.1982.
- 28 E. KWAKWA : SOUTH AFRICA'S MAY 1986 MILITARY
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JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. 12, NO. 396, SUMMER
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- 29 Ibid, pp. 427 - 428.
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- 32 RAND DAILY MAIL, 29.04.1982.

- 33 A. AJALA : SOUTHERN AFRICA. ANY PROSPECTS FOR REVIVED DENTENTE (DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE, VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 1987), p. 223.
- 34 A. URNOV : SOUTH AFRICA AGAINST AFRICA 1968 - 1986, p. 284.
- 35 AFRICA CONTEMPORARY RECORD (1983 - 1984), p. B877.
- 36 G. MATATU : A SETBACK FOR AFRICA (AFRICA, NO. 153, MAY 1984), p. 17.
- 37 AFRICA CONTEMPORARY RECORD (1983 - 1984), p. A39.
- 38 RAND DAILY MAIL, 27.08.1982.
- 39 KENNETH KAUNDA. OUT OF AFRICA. FINANCIAL MAIL, 26.04.1985.
- 40 Ibid.
- 41 Ibid.
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- 43 Ibid.
- 44 KENNETH KAUNDA. OUT OF AFRICA. FINANCIAL MAIL, 26.04.1985.
- 45 THE CITIZEN, 29.09.1986.
- 46 THE DAILY NEWS, 18.05.1988.

- 47 WEEKLY MAIL, 29.08.1989.
- 48 LOOKING FOR A JOSHUA. LEADERSHIP, VOL. 8, NO. 8, OCTOBER 1989, p. 13.
- 49 DIE BURGER, 03.09.1989.
- 50 WEEKLY MAIL, 24.08.1989.
- 51 Ibid.
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- 54 CITY PRESS, 15.10.1989.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has attempted to show the extent of Zambia's support for the ANC in the struggle against apartheid between 1964 and 1990. The conclusion is reached that Zambia has provided the most important form of support to the ANC. Opposition to apartheid in South Africa prompted Zambia to grant political asylum to the ANC. In its effort to advance the cause of liberation in Southern Africa, Zambia placed its territory at the disposal of the ANC. With Kaunda as its president, Zambia effectively assumed the role of a host state in the efforts of the ANC to continue with the struggle from beyond the borders of South Africa.

Zambia's position as a host state to the ANC has been of great significance in the development of the struggle against apartheid. In this connection, Zambia fulfilled specific roles in the overall ANC strategy against apartheid in the period under discussion :

- as a platform from which the ANC reorganised itself for the continuation of the struggle from beyond the borders of South Africa.
- it gave impetus to the efforts of the ANC to wage armed struggle against South Africa. The provision of training facilities and transit rights enabled the ANC to engage in armed operations against apartheid.
- as a means of relaying the ANC's point of view. From its headquarters in Lusaka, the ANC hosted a

number of interest groups from South Africa and the outside world during the period under discussion. This contributed a great deal in enhancing the status of the ANC in the eyes of the international community and in countering South Africa's propaganda against the ANC.

It soon became clear that Zambia's position as a host state to the ANC constituted a serious threat to the political order in South Africa. As the ANC embarked on armed operations, South Africa felt threatened, and adopted a hostile attitude towards Zambia. South Africa recognised the need to put pressure on Zambia to abandon her role as a host state to the ANC. The response of South Africa to this situation took the form of military raids against Zambia.

Of significance to note is that Zambia remained assertive in her role as a host state to the ANC. She continued to support the ANC despite the destabilising effects of South Africa's military raids. South Africa's military power did not deter Zambia from identifying with the ANC cause against apartheid. The ANC continued to operate from its Headquarters in Lusaka until its unbanning in February 1990. This in itself signified that Kaunda was prepared to face the repercussions of Zambia's role as a host state to the ANC.

Zambia's political position as a host state to the ANC has been consistent with her obligations under the OAU and UN Charters. One can therefore argue convincingly that the presence of the ANC within the borders of Zambia did not constitute a form of aggression against South

Africa. It is therefore clear that Zambia's political position as a host state to the ANC has been in compliance with international law. Moreover, the international community, through the UN, recognised the ANC as a legitimate national liberation movement.

Zambia has been consistent in her support for the ANC during the period under discussion. She never wavered in her role as a host state to the ANC despite her vulnerability to South Africa's economic and military power. Kaunda was not prepared to weaken the position of the ANC against apartheid for immediate economic gains. As a result, Zambia rejected all offers of economic co-operation from South Africa. This was intended to maintain and strengthen Zambia's relations with the ANC. There was no way in which Zambia could abandon her role as a host state while South Africa continued with her apartheid policies. Zambia also took the lead in the international sanctions programme despite possible South African retaliation. This proved that, Zambia, more than any other African state in Southern Africa, was prepared to sacrifice so that apartheid in South Africa could be eliminated. Throughout the 1980's Kaunda consistently identified with the position of the ANC against apartheid. While the armed struggle against apartheid continued, Kaunda called for the imposition of sanctions against South Africa, the release of Nelson Mandela, and the recognition of the ANC as a mirror of African aspirations.

Finally, the following may be considered as some of Zambia's achievements in her role as a host state to the ANC.

- Zambia was able to withstand military pressure from South Africa for her position as a host state to the ANC.

- Zambia enabled the ANC to continue with the struggle against apartheid.

- Zambia contributed a great deal to the eventual survival of the ANC as a liberation movement.

- Under the refuge of Zambia as a host state the ANC attained international recognition as a legitimate national liberation movement.

- Under the refuge of Zambia as a host state the ANC developed until the conduct of its affairs assumed the character of a major corporation.

This study therefore concludes that, Zambia, as a host state to the ANC, occupied an indispensable position in the development of the struggle against apartheid during the period under discussion. Without the support of Zambia, it is unlikely that the ANC could have managed to continue with the struggle from beyond the borders of South Africa.

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