A STUDY OF THE THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF ANC MOBILISATIONAL METHODS IN THE EASTERN CAPE TOWNSHIPS OF CRADOCK AND PORT ALFRED, 1980 - 1988.

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SUMMARY

This dissertation investigates theoretical aspects of the mobilisational strategies of the African National Congress and its surrogate organisations within the context of the development of their strategic doctrine and utilises the townships of Port Alfred and Cradock as examples. The study focuses on the mechanisms utilised by the African National Congress to mobilise support for its programme during the period 1980-1988.

This thesis argues that the activities and actions of the ANC which took place in certain select areas in the Eastern Cape Region of the Republic of South Africa can be correctly described as a People's War insurgency. It examines the concept of People's War within the context of revolutionary warfare or insurgency and identifies the essential characteristics of this doctrine. It then examines the development of the military doctrine of the African National Congress and traces the various strategic influences which have shaped ANC military thinking. It counterpoises the development of ANC People's War doctrines against the model of People's War as formulated by Mao and the Vietnamese theorists. The ANC's People's War doctrine is examined within the context of the various mobilisational, military and organisational mechanisms employed in the townships. These are in turn examined within the framework of the specific township examples selected in the Eastern Cape region. The military dimension of ANC People's War strategy is explained and the reasons for its failure examined. The counter-strategy of the RSA Government is also briefly examined. Conclusions about the changing face of ANC strategy are drawn in the final chapter and the various hypothesis propounded in this dissertation are concluded.

CHAPTER ONE.

The phenomenon of "People's War" is a widely discussed but seemingly little understood strategic concept, which has assumed particular importance within the South African context since the end of the 1970's. The adoption of this theory of revolutionary warfare by the Africa National Congress (ANC) led to a tangible change of strategic direction by the organisation and had profound implications for the overall political climate in the Republic during the early 1980's.

THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY:

The objective of this examination of the People's War concept and its application in a particular region of South Africa utilising two townships as examples, is to establish whether the events in the Eastern Cape Region during the period 1980 - 1988 can accurately be described as People's War. The concept, its origins and wider implications will be examined with the intention of establishing a clear understanding of what constitutes a People's War. After establishing a functional definition of what People's War is, the events in the Eastern Cape and more specifically Port Alfred and Cradock will be examined and counter-posed against the theoretical concept or model of Peoples War.

THE HYPOTHESIS:

The hypothesis will be advanced that the unrest and revolutionary mobilisation which took place in the Eastern Cape during this period can accurately be described as "People's War" in the classical sense and that the events in the region provide a unique insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the ANC as a whole. The study was motivated by a desire to evaluate the true extent of ANC influence during this period as it became evident that the events in the Eastern Cape provided the most advanced example of ANC mobilisational success during its period in exile. The study examines the practical implementation of ANC ideology which took place in certain selected areas which the ANC described as "liberated zones" and it is contended that an in-depth analysis of these areas enables the researcher to evaluate and project what a possible ANC government would do if it assumed power under similar conditions. An evaluation

of the events in the townships of the Eastern Cape during the 1980 - 1988 period therefore provides an insight into many central aspects of African National Congress strategy and tactics. This research was also conducted to discover whether the rhetoric widely employed by the African National Congress during this period was based on tangible evidence of successful application of the concept and whether the Eastern Cape manifestation of this strategy, fell within the theoretical framework of People's War as applied by amongst others the Vietnamese insurgents. The thesis also examines the arguments put forward by commentators who argued that the unrest in the townships during this period was primarily a grievance related phenomenon and not an engineered one. In this thesis the parameters of the "ungovernability" factor will be evaluated and a conclusion reached as to the extent of its impact.

RESEARCH METHODS AND SOURCES:

The research for this thesis was undertaken after consultation of the Human Science Research Council register of post-graduate research. It became evident that further research into this area would contribute to understanding the events which took place in this region. The research was undertaken in the Eastern Cape region and a historical/ descriptive analysis was made of the material. The research material utilised was largely drawn from primary sources such as speeches, notes, transcripts of statements made to the South African Police, pamphlets, booklets and publications of the organisations concerned and news reports of statements and interviews. This was supplemented by the use of secondary sources such as journal articles by academics involved in the events, analysis of events and extracts from books dealing with the international application of People's War.

STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS:

The research work is accordingly divided into the following parts. The first section contains the table of contents and the introduction. The second deals with the theoretical aspects of People's War and examines selected descriptions of the phenomenon. It attempts to establish a "control" against which the activities of the ANC can be measured. It also traces the development of ANC military strategy and the origins of its revolutionary doctrines as well as the causes of the reorientation which took place in the

late 1970's. The third component examines the broader theoretical elements of the ANC strategy and argues that this resulted primarily from a Vietnamese input into the organisation. The section provides an analysis of the strategic component which make up the ANC's People's War strategy and discusses them in broad terms.

The fourth section deals with the practical results of the adoption of these ideas and the structures created to implement the theoretical imperatives. This component makes up the bulk of the study and examines the structures created and their relative success. The study examines the practical implementation of ANC ideology which took place in certain selected areas which the ANC described as "liberated zones" and it is contended that an in-depth analysis of these areas enables the researcher to evaluate and project what a possible ANC government would do if it assumed power. The next component examines the military aspects of the ANC's strategy of People's War and the practical nature of Umkhonto we Sizwe's actions. A further section briefly examines specific aspects of the State's counter strategies with specific regard to the South African Police. This section only deals with this topic in a less penetrative fashion as it is only intended to explain certain selected topics relevant to the general theme of the thesis and to demonstrate contributing factors to the collapse of People's Power in these areas. The final component is an examination of the most recent developments in the ANC's People's War strategy and examines the future of the phenomenon. The thesis also contains various appendixes of central relevance to the investigation of People's War in these regions of the Eastern Cape.

CHAPTER TWO.

INTRODUCTION : HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Eastern Cape region can justifiably be described as the 'crucible of conflict' between the black and white sectors of the South African population and has been the scene of an ongoing historical clash between two assertive ethnic and economic groupings which have come into conflict frequently over the past 200 years[1]. The conflict has continued with various interludes since the first clashes between the white settlers seeking land on the fringes of the Cape Colony and the migrant Xhosa people moving down the coastline in search of grazing. The region has become the home of the Xhosa people whose nationalist aspirations have often been manifested in political activity and occasionally, military action. It was also the home of the first black political organisations such as Imbumba Yama Afrika established in 1882 by teachers and clergymen[2] as well as South Africa's first black newspaper, the Imvo Zabantsundu which was launched in 1884[3] . The area is regarded as the cradle of black resistance to white rule[4]. The emergence of militant black political consciousness has often found its strongest expression in a region which has produced two generations of African National Congress (ANC) leaders[5], Black Consciousness leaders such as Steve Biko and saw the birth of many of South Africa's strongest trade union movements. The strong nationalism and economic discrepancies so prevalent in the region, have combined with a radical political awareness to form an explosive combination of elements. It is against this historical background of conflict and confrontation that the events which took place between 1979 and 1988 assume a greater importance[6].

The Eastern Cape region erupted in insurrection and mob violence in the early 1980's and became a focal point of mobilisational effort by the ANC who recognised the advantages of attempting to mobilise a region in which the inhabitants had strong historical links and sympathies with the organisation[7]. This was compounded by the socio-economic grievances which existed in a region hard hit by various negative economic factors. The overwhelming dominance which the Xhosa members of the ANC such as Mandela, Mbeki and Tambo, managed to consolidate following the death of

Albert Luthuli, has meant that despite its public statements, the hierarchy of the ANC has become increasingly Xhosa in its composition[8]. The region has provided the ANC with a support base since the 1920's and became the ANC's stronghold during the 1950's. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to fully examine these historical factors, however it is important to view the events of the 1980's against this turbulent back-drop.

The African National Congress has played a formative part in organising and mobilising insurrection in the Eastern Cape and it is useful to examine in some detail the historical development of the ANC's strategy and its role in the events of this decade. Few people would have predicted that the 1912 Bloemfontein conference at which Dr. Pixely Seme and leading members of the black community formed the South African Native National Conference [9], would come to have such a major impact on the future of South Africa. Initially a middle class organisation, the ANC was to undergo a name change in 1923 [10] and numerous doctrinal and other changes during the course of its troubled and turbulent history. It has subsequently abandoned its more conservative policies and commitment to non-violence and embraced a socialist socio-economic policy[11] and a theory of violent mass based insurrection or what it terms the 'armed struggle'. Yet the organisations roots are to be found in the nationalism and resistance to white authority which has played such an important part in the conflict in the Eastern Cape. The ANC found ready support amongst the regions urban black population who form one of Africa's few true industrial working classes or 'proletariat's'[12], as the area moved through periods of rapid industrial growth followed by unemployment and depression[13].

The African National Congress has the dubious distinction of being the world's oldest liberation movement, and although this has imparted a degree of legitimacy amongst its sympathizers, it reflects the process of[14] marginalisation which has took place following the organisation's formal alliance with the South African Communist Party[15], itself one of the world's oldest Communist Parties and the formation of its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in 1961. The organisation faced increasing isolation from its grass roots support during its period in exile and saw the events in the Eastern Cape as a means of re-establishing the foothold it lost following its banning and the arrest and imprisonment of many of its most able leaders. This dissertation attempts to examine the

events in the region and to place them within the context of events on a national scale. ANC statements on the phenomenon of People's War and particularly the Eastern Cape, with a particular focus on selected townships are examined in some detail and some analysis of their content made.

CHAPTER THREE.

AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SELECTED CONCEPTS IN REVOLUTIONARY WAR AND INSURGENCY IN SOUTH AFRICA.

" In most cases, the revolutionaries will have start from nothing, Starting with nothing initially requires organisation. Secretly, the revolutionaries have to organise, first cells and then, extensive networks of conspiracy. Around the cells they must build political, propaganda groups to win support and teams of terrorists where propaganda fails. They will organise fronts, parties, and pressure groups to mobilise popular support. Agents will be infiltrated into the administration, the armed forces, police, labour unions and power centres. Intelligence networks will be established. The revolutionaries will foment demonstrations, strikes, sabotage and riots. They will increase the pitch and volume of their propaganda attacks against all the governing authorities. All cracks in the social and administrative structures will be magnified and exploited. Faced with counteraction by the police, the revolutionary organisations will become hardened, solidified and experienced."[16]

INSURGENT THEORY IN ITS BROADER CONTEXT:

Revolutionary wars and insurgencies in various forms have played an important role in the arena of international conflict since the end of hostilities in the Second World War and South Africa has not escaped the impact of this phenomenon. During this period insurgent forces have utilised a variety of strategic models or doctrines as a basis for their revolutionary campaigns[17]. The strategies employed by the insurgent groups differ significantly due to context, objective and subjective conditions, population dynamics, international support and geographical factors[18]. The wars of national liberation or anti-colonialism were largely fought within the framework of imported ideological and strategic principles. The revolutionary challenge to the South African state which under-pinned the events in the Eastern Cape mirrors many of these strategic variables and during the first half of the 1980's took on an advanced and complex nature.

The adoption of the doctrine of People's War by the African National Congress and its revolutionary ally, the South African Communist Party visibly changed the face of South African politics during the 1980's and had an impact on the nature of the opposition to the state in this often volatile region of South Africa. It is important to take these

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changing dynamics into account when attempting to understand both the actions of the ANC and the responses of the South African state during this period[19]. The era of "People's War" forms a clearly delineated phase in the development of the ANC insurgency and although it will be argued that its thrust in this particular form inevitably failed, it provides a valuable insight into the nature of the ANC's capabilities.

It is essential to identify the central elements of the People's War strategy of Mao and place them in their theoretical context, before establishing the characteristics of the ANC's insurgent theories. The ANC's Strategy and Tactics states that, "guerrilla warfare, the special and in our case only form in which the armed liberation struggle can be launched, in neither static nor does it take place in a vacuum. The tempo, the overall strategy to be employed, the opening of new fronts, the progression from lower to higher forms and thence to mobile warfare."[20] Mao's philosophy of guerrilla warfare is a multi-dimensional topic which goes far beyond the scope of this dissertation and only elements of key relevance will be dealt with. It is no coincidence that adaptations of the strategic doctrine of Mao Tse Tung have found the most successful universal application to date[21] in revolutionary warfare and insurgency and that the ANC and its internal structures attempted to adapt the general principles to the South African, and particularly the Eastern Cape situation.

Mao's doctrine's directly or indirectly shaped the battle philosophy of many of the prolonged guerrilla wars in the twentieth century and his writings on the subject remain extremely relevant today. It is significant therefore, that the ANC chose to re-orientate it's revolutionary strategy around the Maoist principles of liberated zones, alternative structures, popular front organisations and mass based insurrection given the historical development of an embryonic Xhosa nationalism and what appears to have been a long term rejection of white values and domination in this region[22]. This significance is largely due to the intricate ideological relationship between the South African Communist Party and the ANC's military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe and that party's close reliance on the revolutionary doctrines of Marxist Leninism as opposed to Maoism. It is also significant due to the fact that the ANC, which has largely restricted its insurgent activities to the urban regions adopted military doctrines more readily associated with

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rural insurgency and adapted them to the urban context. The ANC's experiment in People's War demonstrated both the scope and depth of insurgent capabilities and also its inherent weaknesses.

KEY THEORETICAL ELEMENTS OF PEOPLE'S WAR THEORY AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO THE RSA:

The origins of the historical success of these strategies lie in the fact that Mao in his writings on revolutionary warfare, moved beyond the realm of tactics and ideology and entered the realm of strategic doctrine[23]. This effectively transcends the narrow distinctions between urban and rural insurgencies and is concerned with the underlying factors in any insurgency of this nature. Insurgent movements utilising People's War doctrines aim at the total mobilisation of all sectors of the target population in support of their actions and ideology. The total mobilisation process assumes the proportions of a 'total war' effort, in which all aspects of public and private life are regulated in support of the revolutionary cause[24]. The centrality of Marxist ideology to this process has meant that fundamental structural changes in the targeted society take place during the insurgent phase, a development reflected in the creation of parallel hierarchies or alternative structures which take the form of envisaged post-revolutionary institutions[25]. The parallel hierarchies or alternative structures created by insurgent organisations often clearly reflect a desire to reorder society and ensure absolute control over the population during the insurgent and revolutionary phases. Pike identified this aspect of coercive mobilisation during People's War in his analysis of the Vietcong, "Revolutionary guerrilla warfare as practised in Vietnam was a way of life. Its aim was to establish a totally new social order, thus differing from insurgencies whose objective is either statehood or change of government[26]."

It is often possible to evaluate the projected nature of a potential post-revolutionary society under the insurgents control by analyzing the so called 'Organs of Peoples Power' or parallel hierarchies which they develop[27]. In a discussion article entitled Embryos of the Future State, Joe Slovo highlights the fact that the ANC sees the alternative structures as fulfilling a similar role in the future, "The establishment of 'people's education,

people's courts, people's militia, people's army and other organs of people's power in the various districts of our country is a product of political struggle and a decisive pre-condition of the development of the presently scattered, decentralised and autonomous communes to a fully fledged people's government. These organs of people's power should be regarded as historically inevitable, as they are clearly destined to be the embryo's of our future democratic state."[28] The significance of this statement lies in the fact that the structures and forms of alternative structures which were created in South Africa's townships are a preview of what a future ANC ruled state could look like. It is therefore imperative that the structures be analyzed in order to attempt a projection of future developments. Thus in the South African context, the priority target of the ANC has ceased to be defined in terms of narrow parameters such as attacks on physical installations, and became a sophisticated and multi dimensional assault on all the sectors of South African society[29] in the period preceding its unbanning and the partial cessation of hostilities. The events in the Eastern Cape indicated the broad mobilisational mechanisms which the ANC and its sympathizers were able to utilise to mobilise broad sectors of the urban black population in support of their insurrection and the level of their commitment to re-ordering society.

Mao identifies the primary objective of insurgent warfare as being "to strive to the utmost to preserve one's own strength and to destroy that of the enemy"[30]; derived from this guiding principle are three basic requirements for a successful People's War scenario which Mao identifies in his writings on the subject, firstly the establishment of a "People's Army", secondly ensuring that this army coordinates its activities with the traditions and expectations of the general population and thirdly, the establishment of sympathetic organisations and alternative structures and the arming of the people (those who support the insurgents) to undertake actions against the government forces[31]. Mao said that "In the course of the struggle we must form mass organisations, we must organise the workers, peasants, youth, women, children, merchants and professional people according to the degree of their political consciousness and fighting enthusiasm - into the various mass organisations necessary for the struggle....and we must gradually expand them. Without organisation, the people cannot give effect to the anti-Japanese struggle. In the course of this struggle we must weed out the open and the hidden

traitors, a task which can be accomplished only by relying on the strength of the people. In this struggle it is particularly important to arouse the people to establish, or to consolidate their organs of anti-Japanese political power. Where the original Chinese organs of political power have not been destroyed by the enemy, we must reorganise and strengthen them with the support of the broad masses. They are organs of political power for carrying out the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and should unite all the forces of the people to fight against our sole enemy."[32] Mao stresses the fact that revolutionary warfare is by its very nature protracted, and that while the strategy is simple, the practical translation of strategy into a concrete military capability is far more complex[33].

The concept of People's War revolutionised modern military thinking in the field of guerrilla warfare in that it moved away from the tangible and the finite and advanced a doctrine of war-fighting which dealt with the intangible aspects of conflict[34]. It stressed the development of a total strategy which addressed every aspect of human existence and the total mobilisation of the entire human resources of the target population in much the same way that economic resources are mobilised in a conventional war effort[35]. The successful adaption of Mao's teachings by the Viet Cong during the Indo-Chinese and Vietnamese conflicts appears to have served as a basic model for ANC and other Charterist activities during the 1980's and although the organisation appears to be moving away from its initial formulation of the strategy, it would seem that it will continue to play some role in their activities. The relationship between the Maoist model and the later Vietcong application of the principles is explained by Pike, "Mao did not conceive of guerrilla operations as an independent form of warfare but simply as one aspect of the revolutionary struggle. There were, he said, three types of political activities: those towards the enemy, those towards the people (agit-prop work) and those towards the guerrilla forces and supporters (organisational and indoctrinational). Within this frame work came his three stages of revolutionary warfare."[36]

Pike then goes on to counterpoise this against Vietnamese theory, "It can be argued that Giap outlined four rather than three, or that he used the three stages but proceeded them with two preliminary ones. In the first, which might be called the psychological warfare

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stage, a base is established among the people, using propaganda and political warfare, discontent among the people is converted into channelled activity, cells are formed. most activity is on the individual level and of course is clandestine. In the second preparatory phase, which might be called the small unit phase, comes the basic organisational work: the formation of vertical and horizontal associations and the creation of armed propaganda guerrilla companies, agit-prop teams with guns who fight only to defend themselves and whose chief tasks are organisation and agit-prop work, Giap said those companies prepared the ground and only when their work was well done could the three stages actually begin. Basically developmental, the three stages are categories expressed mainly in offense-defense, static dynamic, military-political terms with respect to both the revolutionary and his enemy." [37]

PARALLEL HIERARCHIES AND THE ORGANISATIONAL FACTOR:

The most significant single element in any People's War scenario and the one which has direct applicability to South Africa is undoubtedly that of organisation or what is referred to as organisational warfare. Pike refers to it as the 'god of revolution' and it is this aspect of revolutionary warfare which forms the focus of this dissertation[38]. O'Neill describes this concept in the following manner in his discussion on the major facets of an insurgency. " If an insurgent organisation perceives a need to augment its membership, it will normally increase its level of differentiation or complexity, and through the efforts of its political cadres, penetrate hamlets, villages, and cities, especially in contested areas (i.e., areas in which neither the government nor the insurgents have firm control). Insurgents often create what Bernard Fall called parallel hierarchies to compete with government institutions. The parallel hierarchy can take two forms: penetration of existing official administrative structures by subversive agents, or creation of autonomous insurgent structures designed to take over full administrative responsibility when military-political conditions are deemed appropriate[39]."

It is possible to isolate some of the elements contained in this definition within the South African context where the ANC have identified the need to 'augment its membership' and has therefore attempted to increase the complexity of its structures by playing an

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active role in the creation of internal support structures to facilitate its revolutionary programme. These structures will be dealt with in greater detail in the relevant chapter.

O'Neill identifies the other vital element in a People's War scenario, namely the creation of a vast network of auxiliary organisations which supplement the activities of the insurgent organisation. " In order to order to broaden its support base, the insurgent organisation may go beyond the government structures it seeks to imitate by creating functional auxiliaries, such as youth groups, peasant organisations, workers groups, and women's organisations, and by arranging tactical alliances with other independent groups that oppose the government. When this is done the new entity is frequently referred to as a front. The effectiveness of winning adherents by increasing the differentiation of the organisation is exemplified by the Huk movement in the Philippines, where many joined front organisations, often without even knowing party aims."[40]

The ANC activities which fall within the ambit of organisational warfare include the creation or involvement in a Charterist movement which included a broad workers front, a people's front and a youth front. This process brought together hundreds of Charterist organisations whose general political motivation could be reconciled with that of the ANC and which is referred to as the Mass Democratic Movement[41]. This was particularly effective in overcoming the restrictions and bannings which hampered ANC mobilisation during its period of banning and neutralised many of the state's efforts to restrict its influence within the RSA[42].

THE MILITARY THEORY OF PEOPLE'S WAR

People's War makes use of military action by the insurgent military structures, their military auxiliaries and subversion using political warfare teams supplemented by auxiliary political organisations, to create a state of instability and lawlessness within a particular region which is in turn consolidated into a base area or liberated zone. This area theoretically provides the insurgent organisation with the freedom of movement within both the military and political context which it requires to implement its objectives. This region can be seen to move through an insurgent and revolutionary phase

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and Mao stressed that a key factor determining the nature of a base area was the ability of the insurgent organisation to defend it against attempts by the authorities to re-establish control. Mao traced the development of insurgency through three distinct phases. The first, or strategic defensive phase is characterised by organisational warfare in which the insurgent forces seek to consolidate their structures in areas which are generally inaccessible to the forces of the regime. The recruitment and training of the insurgent forces underlies this phase which requires inter-action at a meaningful level with the population. Pandya, in his examination of rural People's War in the Rhodesian conflict describes this phase as "conspiratorial, secretive, methical and progressive."[43]

Mao viewed the base area as a revolutionary sanctuary and attributed the failure of many insurgent actions to the inability to develop meaningful control over safe areas. The envisaged zone would ideally provide the insurgents with all their material and physical needs and remove the necessity for intricate supply lines. Mao went as far as to specify that an insurgent movement was doomed to failure if it did not establish and consolidate base areas. The relative inaccessibility of the selected areas were regarded as of central importance with Mao stressing that the geographical factor would determine the relative security of an area. In the South African context this principle had a different application due to the Apartheid system and the isolation of the townships from the areas over which the state exercised its most extensive control.

Mao identified three types of zone during the insurgent phase, the first is the liberated zone in which the insurgent movement is free to move without interference from the state. This area is by definition a secure area in which mobilisation can take place freely. The second is the "guerrilla area" or contested zone in which the insurgent movement is able to mobilise but is faced with opposition from the state. This places restrictions on the movement and alters considerably the nature of the insurgent actions and the zone can be said to be undergoing a development process which will determine whether it becomes a fully fledged liberated zone or a government zone. Two central characteristics of this phase are the desire by the insurgent forces to eliminate as many enemy personnel as possible and to coercively mobilise the bulk of the population behind their programme.

The third type of zone is the state zone where the authorities are effectively able to control the population and the resources. The degree of control which the government exercises in real terms over this region determines the nature of the methods used by the insurgent. The insurgent is not restricted by the considerations of mobilisation and will often make use of ruthless terror tactics in these areas where it does not rely on support but rather fear to achieve its objectives. These zones must also come under attack from the stronger forces of the guerrilla army who can challenge the armed forces of the regime in a direct manner.

This phase is characterised by an intricate relationship between the three factors which influence the insurgency namely the formation of an effective insurgent force, the defeat of the state and the mobilisation of the people using organisational warfare techniques. Clearly the factors are inter-dependant and cannot take place in isolation, a factor which appears to have been over-looked by the ANC. It is not possible to achieve one or more of the factors in isolation from the others and it is the unique blend of military and political action which gives People's War its character. Within the South African context insufficient attention seemed to have been paid to the requirements for consolidation before further expansion, to the detriment of the insurgent forces. Mao specifies that "the correct principle is expansion through consolidation, a good method to attain a position where we can be on the offensive or the defensive as we choose[44]." The ANC's failure to transform its mass combat units into structures capable of defending the gains they had made proved a costly mistake and would inevitably force the organisation to explore non-violent mass mobilisation. This is reflected in its post-unbanning strategy.

The second phase is that of the strategic offensive and sees the systematic expansion of influence and authority of the insurgent movement under conditions which are increasingly dictated by the insurgent movement. During this phase emphasis is placed on the destruction of the enemies human resources using sabotage and assassination. These attacks are directed at both the personnel of the government as well as high profile figures who are in some way publicly associated with the status quo. This phase is primarily concerned with demonstrating insurgent potency and creating the impression that the government forces are weak[45]. Mao stated that the "principle object of the

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action of the guerrilla unit lies in dealing the enemy the strongest possible blow to his morale and in creating disorder and agitation in his rear, in stopping or slowing down his operations, and ultimately in dissipating his fighting strength so that the enemy's units are crushed one by one and he is precipitated into a situation where even by rapid and deceptive actions he can neither advance or retreat[46]." Mao's understanding of the key linkage between terror and insurgency are evident in this extract. In No Place to Hide the following observation is made about this terror factor, "the killing or torture of the very people who supposedly are being liberated is an important feature of all Marxist Leninist revolutions. It is through this tactic that terrorists are able to frighten segments of the population into supporting them. With a sufficiently bloody campaign, a small band of terrorists can establish the equivalent of a second government over the people. They actually collect taxes. They issue laws and administer punishment to anyone who disobeys those laws. But most of all they demand loyalty."[47]

Mao recognised that the use of force in a random and undirected fashion was counter-productive and called for selective violence which would make maximum use of fear to achieve its objectives. Mao also stressed the importance of striking economic targets as a means of destabilising the regime and raised the vital issue of "self-defence" units. These units are essentially recruited from the people and are responsible for defending the liberated zones and contested areas. The ANC's failure to pay sufficient attention to this aspect was to cost them dearly. Mao stated that "the correct principle is expansion with consolidation which is a good method which allows us to take the offensive or defensive as we choose. Given a protracted war the problems of consolidating and expanding base areas constantly arises for every guerrilla unit[48]. Mao also instructed the insurgents to pay special attention to the assassination of government officials to break up the regimes support base and its informer network.

The final phase outlined by Mao was that of mobile warfare in which the insurgent forces force a decisive engagement with the regime which is complemented by negotiation. Ideally negotiation follows inexorable pressure on the regime from insurgent units and increasingly powerful semi-conventional forces conducting "mobile warfare". Mao specifies that the transition to this phase of People's War can only take place when

the insurgent forces have sufficient numbers of trained insurgents to pose a real threat to the regime. The development of the insurgent forces to this final stage has seldom taken place although the embryonic stages of mobile warfare generally make the position of the regime so tenuous that psychological and political forces lead to negotiations. In this respect the ANC was successful in bringing an unwilling opponent to a negotiating position.

This exposition of Mao's military doctrine of People's War provides a brief look at the key elements of the strategy. These basic concepts of insurgency were adopted by the Vietnamese who developed them further and transformed them into an effective revolutionary doctrine with a wider relevance. The Maoist model with its dualistic military doctrine has had a considerable impact on various African insurgent movements who in turn have adapted it to indigenous conditions. The actions of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe and its then "internal front organisations" will be counter-posed against this model of People's War. It is, however, important to first examine the origins of ANC insurgent theory and locate the reasons for the reassessment which took place at the end of the 1970's.

ANC REVOLUTIONARY DOCTRINE: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.

THE FORMATION OF UMKHONTO WE SIZWE (MK)

The military wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was established in 1961 by amongst others ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela and SACP Secretary General Joe Slovo. Mandela left South Africa to receive training and pledges of support from the Soviet Union, various Eastern Bloc countries and Algeria[49]. Early ANC military strategy was premised on a belief that the South African government would collapse in the face of a concerted attack on its most visible institutions and priority was given to symbolic attacks on government installations and terror attacks against civilians in the then largely white urban areas[50].

The reliance on the military instrument of guerrilla warfare, was largely due to the

success achieved by the South African state in restricting the activities of the ANC and its revolutionary ally, the South African Communist Party internally during the 1950's when a series of state clamp downs destroyed much of the ANC's internal political infrastructure[51]. The ANC developed revolutionary structures in an attempt to escape the full effect of the state clamp downs. One of these structures was the M Plan, an organisational strategy which bear more than a superficial resemblance of the People's War strategies introduced in the 1980's.

THE M PLAN.

ANC strategy during the 1950's placed emphasis on mass mobilisation and popular resistance and a strategy was formulated to marshall support for the ANC in areas where the organisation felt it had sufficient influence. Nelson Mandela and Govan Mbeki formulated this insurgent strategy in consultation with the National Action Committee of the ANC during the 1950's. Mandela claimed that it had been drawn up with the assistance of South African Indian Congress, (a fellow member of the Congress Alliance which included the ANC and the Natal Indian Congress), the plan became known as the Mandela or 'M Plan' and the ANC experimented with it in the Eastern Cape Region of South Africa as well as on a less successful scale in other regions. Mandela cited the regional conferences of the ANC held in Sophiatown, Germiston, Kliptown and Benoni during 1953 as examples of the successful application of the M Plan[52]. The M Plan involved the creation of a network of structures in the townships which would enable the ANC to survive a major clamp down by the security forces and was to serve as a consultative mechanism in the mobilisation of popular support for the ANC. Davis notes that Mandela's "M Plan represented the first practical effort from within the Congress to prepare for the days of underground activity ahead. The M Plan's intention was to wean the ANC away from dependence on characteristics of organisation most vulnerable to government pressure. Mandela envisioned the construction of a discreet but firm cellular network at grassroots level in constant communication through a hierarchy of middle-level leaders with the national executive. But it achieved only sporadic success in implementing the M Plan, the ANC remained largely an undisciplined movement[53]."

Mandela unveiled the plan in a policy statement to the Transvaal Congress of the ANC. In the address he identified the following objectives directed at overcoming the problems faced by the ANC, namely "to consolidate the Congress machinery; to enable the transmission of important decisions taken on a national level to every member of the organisation without calling public meetings, issuing press statements and printing circulars; to build up in the local branches themselves local Congresses which will effectively represent the strength and will of the people; to extend and strengthen the ties between Congress and the people and to consolidate Congress leadership[54]".

THE STRUCTURE OF THE M PLAN:

The M Plan was planned to centre around a house-to-house recruitment drive which Benson describes in the following manner, " The people were to hold meetings in factories, on trains and busses, in their homes[55]". and the entire structure of the M Plan was based on a geographically based cell unit and drew from the residents on a particular street. This cell was represented by a cell steward on a Zone Committee which comprised of seven cells. A Chief Steward was elected to represent the zone on a Ward committee made up of five zones and he would represent the ANC members in his area[56]. This organisational strategy was never effectively implemented but appears to have had some success in the Eastern Cape during the 1950's in areas such as Port Elizabeth were ANC structures were advanced.

The M Plan served primarily as a structural basis for ANC campaigns and was not strictly speaking an example of parallel hierarchies. It attempted to replace some of the traditional tribal structures which initially formed the basis of the social order amongst urbanised blacks and observers have noted the M Plan's similarity to the tribal structures of pre colonial society, particularly to traditional Xhosa structures[57]. It becomes clear that the similarities between the M Plan and later ANC strategies employed in the Eastern Cape are limited due to the fact that the M Plan was never intended to replace government structures in the townships and lacked the ideological basis of 'People's Power' structures. The M Plan is relevant to the topic of this examination of ANC strategy only in so much that the idea of organising the township population in support

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of the ANC is not a new phenomenon and that the success enjoyed by the ANC in the Eastern Cape is therefore not surprising. The M Plan appears to have inspired the so-called "G Plan"[58], even though it differs from ANC actions in the 1980's being primarily a political strategy with no military dimensions. The G Plan is a descriptive name used in this dissertation to distinguish structures created in the 1980's from those of the 1950's.

A link between the two mobilisational/organisational strategies has emerged in a statement made by Edgar Ngoyi to the South African Police in 1987 in which he stated that "during 1956 I was elected secretary of the ANC Youth League, it was during this stage when the public meetings convened by the ANC were banned that the M-Plan in its embryo stage were introduced and implemented. The M-Plan depicts the following to ensure that this plan politicises, mobilises and organises the masses at grassroots level, that they play the leading role in the liberation of our society and its transformation into an economic, social and political system that will serve the needs of those who are oppressed and exploited, to achieve the liberation struggle, to remove the white regime with violence, and to develop a "people's power" as depicted in the Freedom Charter."[59] Ngoyi stated that "we decided to intensify PEBCO by introducing a structure based on the aims and objectives of the M-Plan with the diversity of difference in naming the structure, area committees and street committees although the aims and objects are the same as the M Plan."[60] Ngoyi's statement demonstrates the formative role which veteran ANC or MK leaders were to play following their release from Robben Island and the continuity they gave the internal insurgent forces despite the ANC's exile. Analysis of the debate about strategy and tactics within the ranks of the ANC indicates that the organisation has a strong awareness of its own history and draws heavily on the experiences of the past. This helps to shape strategy and tactics along familiar lines and assists the analyst in establishing certain patterns of behaviour.

ANC MILITARY DOCTRINE IN THE 1960/70's.
THE IMPACT OF THE MOROGORO DOCUMENT : MK MILITARY DOCTRINE:

The adoption of a military programme and the Umkhonto we Sizwe Manifesto by the

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ANC led to the formulation of what can be best termed a 'conventional'[61] guerrilla warfare strategy which the ANC believed would enable it to make the transition from the political to the military phase of revolutionary warfare[62]. The ANC regarded the 1960s as a preparatory phase in which the infrastructural requirements of the insurgency would be consolidated and the necessary internal under-ground structure would come into being to support a full blown insurgency[63].

At its 1968 Morogoro Conference[64] the ANC formulated a document entitled Strategy, Tactics and Programme of the ANC. This document described an initial stage of urban insurgency which was to serve as a basis for an expanded rural insurgency. It stated that its insurgency was to be waged to" develop conditions for the future all out war which will eventually lead to the conquest of power"[65]. In Strategy and Tactics the strategists of the ANC argued that the vast areas of unprotected land in South Africa and the extended nature of the infrastructure, made the South African Government particularly vulnerable to a rural based insurgency. The general optimism of the document extended to plans to transform the insurgency to the mobile phase which would be achieved by implementing a three phase programme: the initial guerrilla phase would compromise of acts of 'armed propaganda' ie, sabotage, landmines and car bombs, the second phase would be the 'equilibrium' phase in which stronger MK units would engage the South African Security Forces in 'mobile warfare' and the third phase would culminate in a 'general offensive' which would coincide with the collapse of the SA economy, the demoralisation of the Security Forces and the isolation of the government[66].

This approach to revolution dominated ANC thinking throughout the 1960's and much of the 70's, and resulted in a situation in which the ANC was constantly attempting to move from the first to the second phase of its revolutionary programme. The formation and development of MK led to an increase in the authority of the military leadership within the management structures of the ANC and SACP which in turn led to what appears to have been an over-reliance on MK to provide the impetus for a revolution. This is reflected in the steadily increasing percentage of the ANC budget spent on MK in the 1970's. By the 1980's about 50% of the overall budget of the ANC was spent on MK[67]. The infiltration of entire ANC Special Operations groups failed to achieve the

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desired effect during the late 70's and early 80's and therefore compounded the failure of the ANC in transforming the political tension which gripped the townships during the Soweto uprising of 1976 into coordinated military activity[68].

ANC RE-EVALUATION OF ITS REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY.

INDICATIONS OF STRATEGIC CHANGES:

The adoption of People's War doctrine by the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) High Command in the late seventies appears to have resulted from various conditions over which the ANC had little or no control. The impetus for a strategic re-evaluation of ANC strategy resulted firstly from a realisation within the ANC that in the post-Soweto era the ANC faced the prospect of marginalisation by militants inside the Republic who had grown weary of waiting for ANC liberation and were now making their own revolution. This revolutionary consciousness took the form of a radical Black Consciousness ideology with strong support in the Eastern Cape region and resulted in the formation of internal organisations which demonstrated the vulnerability of the South African government to challenges of this sort[69].

The awareness of ANC shortcomings was arguably compounded by the arrival of the so called Soweto Generation[70] of activists, whose practical experiences in the townships made them impatient for tangible successes and placed pressure on the old-guard to alter the emphasis of ANC activity. The ANC's strategic re evaluation followed indications that the Soviet Union was reviewing its support[71] for the ANC in the light of that organisations failure to exploit the opportunity which the Soweto Riots presented.

Secondly, in the late 1970's the African National Congress was faced with a massive attrition rate resulting from increasingly effective security force counter-insurgency operations and this appears to have led to the increasing realisation that the traditional emphasis on Umkhonto we Sizwe was to costly[72]. Commentator Michael Morris identified a further problem which faced the ANC High Command, "By the early 1980s only a trickle of recruits - on average about twenty monthly, not all of whom were

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trainable for armed operation, anyway, were joining ANC externally, the total number of militarily trained men, hovering at about the 1600 mark. Many of these were being sent back into South Africa on sorties in a somewhat unskilled condition. One noticed a sharp rise in the number of premature explosions and self inflicted casualties and extraordinary attrition suffered by ANC's elite attacker team, the Special Operations Group."[73] Morris also examines ANC casualties and observed that the SOG is made up of 48 men divided nominally into sixteen, three man units and that a significant percentage of the available cadres had either been killed or captured. Between October 1976 and December 1984 , 185 SOG personnel were captured and 64 killed, this effectively meant that the ANC had lost 249 cadres on 262 missions, a massive attrition rate for an organisation able to draw on such a small core of trained personnel. It would appear that this extremely high casualty rate led to a strict cost benefit evaluation of the MK strategies and the realisation that alternatives must be sought.

Thirdly the ANC began to feel the pressure of a systematic and successful South African diplomatic effort to deny it safe areas in neighbouring states, first Swaziland, then Lesotho and finally Mozambique reached agreements with the South African government[74] which led to a growing crisis for the ANC[75]. The origins of the ANC's attempts to create liberated zones can be traced to these developments and the ANC's claim following the Nkomati Accord that "We are going to reveal a secret that is no secret at all, we are going to reveal where our military bases really are. Our bases are in a country not far from here... Our bases are in South Africa itself, our bases are amongst the people them selves..." was an unconvincing explanation as to the state of the MK base structure. This no doubt contributed to the overall pressure bought on the ANC to reconsider its revolutionary options. The explanation given by Tambo appears to be a post-event rationalisation on the part of the ANC for a situation which limited the opportunities for traditional infiltration and subversion tactics.

It would appear that these three factors contributed to the re-orientation which took place within MK and accelerated the adoption of People's War. The emphasis was to move rapidly away from traditional statements as the ANC gained an unprecedented momentum in its revolutionary effort and made a conscious effort to re establish its presence inside

the Republic with a particular emphasis on those areas where it had traditionally enjoyed support such as the Eastern Cape.

The ANC admitted by the 1980's that its preoccupation with the military instrument in its narrower sense was incorrect. " These successes, however, began to carry with them certain strategic mistakes, which we realised later than we should have. Armed propaganda was supposed to be a phase, but not the permanent characteristic of our armed activity. And these special operations were meant to be only an aspect of, but not a substitute for, the main ground work of military organisation and building of combat forces from among the people. And therefore when the overall pattern of our armed activity became these hit and run tactics, the main task began to suffer somewhat, and this began to show. How? Like in any war, mistakes often show themselves by the rate of casualties."[76]

The problem is discussed further, " The problem was not in the adopted strategy, and neither was it in the interpretation nor in the understanding of that strategy, It was in the tactical level of practice. Trained guerrillas went inside the country successfully, fully equipped to survive, and then relied on the assumption that all our people were clear about the need to fight the regime, particularly after the experience of the Soweto uprising. However on numerous occasions, we discovered that some people did not understand who the guerrillas were, we discovered that the political consciousness and people's readiness to support guerrilla fighters was not to be assessed from headlines of a newspaper report about mass attendances at political funerals. When our guerrilla units found difficulty in hiding among the very people they had come to fight for, they resorted to living in the terrain - in dug outs far from the eyes of the people. The terrain is not however where the guerrilla should ultimately be based, because this negates the whole essence of the theory of guerrilla warfare. To engage in revolutionary guerrilla warfare means by definition, engaging in war conducted by the people themselves, not on their behalf. Revolutionary armed struggle develops from the grass-roots of the masses, it develops when the overwhelming majority of the people are presented with no alternative but to fight."[77] The ANC correctly identified that they were taking the revolution down a dead end path and this contributed to the strategic reorientation which

took place.

In the South African and more specifically the Eastern Cape context, the adoption of People's War resulted in the mobilisation of a wide range of support organisations by the ANC, which are grouped together in what it terms the National Democratic Movement or Mass Democratic Movement (MDM)[78]. People's War placed a unique emphasis on the duality of revolutionary war in that it married the concept of political warfare to that of military warfare to produce a new combination of elements[79]. These revolutionary concepts took traditional Western military concepts in a full circle by relating military strategy back to its political basis and by placing political objectives above military ones in a war situation[80]. This effectively means that the ANC has blurred all the traditional divisions which exist in both the legal and moral sense between political activity and revolutionary warfare. In doing so it posed unique political and constitutional problems for the South African government which was attempting to undertake reform within a controlled environment were basic law and order are upheld and these problems have produced new and interesting solutions[81].

The ANC has formulated an official definition of People's War within the South African context which pinpoints the basic intentions of the organisation. "By People's War we mean a war in which a liberation army becomes rooted amongst the people who progressively participate actively in the armed struggle both politically and militarily, including the possibility of engaging in partial or general insurrections. The present disparity in the enemy's forces and our own determines the protracted nature of the struggle in which we need to reduce the enemy's resources, reserves and endurance whilst gathering our own strength to the point were we are capable of seizing power."[82] It is clear that the ANC had reached a watershed position in its revolutionary development and that a change of emphasis was essential for the continued survival of the organisation. This change was to come as a result of increased contact with the People's Army of Vietnam and the Vietnamese government through the Afro-Asia Solidarity Organisation.

The development of revolutionary strategy within Umkhonto we Sizwe was directly

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influenced by external factors and the revolutionary doctrines utilised in other insurgencies. To fully understand the development of ANC strategy it is therefore necessary to examine the impact of these factors on the development of Umkhonto we Sizwe.

CHAPTER FOUR
PEOPLE"S WAR AND THE ANC.

> " The mainspring of the Viet Cong effort to obtain psychological control of the population of South Vietnam has consisted of a vast machine engaged in spinning a country-wide web of committees, fronts and cells of almost every conceivable description. Its aim is to enmesh all categories of the population in active support of the revolutionary cause in areas under the control of the Communist forces; and in areas outside their control or still disputed, to destroy support for the Government's forces amongst the civilian population, and to bring about a collapse of military morale."[83]

PEOPLE'S WAR FOR SOUTH AFRICA: THE VIETNAMESE INPUT.

The adoption of a new theory of insurrection has profound implications for any revolutionary organisation and more so for an organisation which is bound in a "revolutionary alliance" with a communist party such as the SACP. In a movement heavily dominated by Marxist theoreticians of the calibre of Slovo, Kasrils, "Denga", "Mzala" and others, the adoption of a new theoretical basis for revolutionary actions has complex ideological implications [84] and in the case of the ANC has led to a wide ranging discussion within the organisation which is in turn reflected in their publications and statements[85]. Hugh Trevor described the role of the people in People's War in one of these discussion articles in the SACP journal; The African Communist as follows, " It is in relation to the emergence of such organs of peoples power that we can understand that conquest of state power is not carried out by a politically conscious minority - nor by an army, but by the people themselves."[86]

To achieve this the ANC realised that it must secure areas in which it could coercively mobilise the population utilising parallel hierarchies or ' no go areas', to fill the vacuum created by the destruction of the established infrastructure. This perception came to form the basis for a new look township strategy for the ANC and became particularly evident in the Eastern Cape where sections of the black townships temporarily fell under the authority of the Comrades and other pro-ANC groupings. The African National Congress and the South African Communist Party have engaged in an ongoing process of revolutionary destabilisation over a period of about three decades[87], but this has

escalated since the adoption of the People's War strategy. The ANC transformed what was ostensibly a low key insurgency in the 1960's and 70's, into a People's War situation in which internal mobilisation of the township population became the organisations priority during the early 1980's.

In 1979, Oliver Tambo, leader of the African National Congress, led a delegation or "study group" to the People's Republic of Vietnam to conduct a study into the possible applications of People's War strategy to the South African situation[88]. The subsequent Vietnamese input led to a radical re-orientation of the strategy of the ANC and the adoption of People's War doctrine as a basis for the ANC's insurgent actions[89]. This important departure from the traditional obsession with the mere military facets of Umkhonto We Sizwe and the supposed detonator effect which it would provide came after a resolution adopted by the National Executive Committee of the ANC in August 1979[90].

The influence of the Vietnamese doctrines of military strategist Giap, on thinking in MK are explained in the African Communist[91] in which an important MK statement from Dawn[92], the publication of MK is discussed. The adoption of the Vietnamese model of People's War is attributed to the role of the 'practical organisers and theoreticians ' of the armed struggle of the 'heroic Vietnamese people who resisted the narrow and defensive Maoist conception of protracted People's War based in the country side' and accepted a structured and coordinated mass uprising combined with insurgent action[93]. The Vietnamese, in line with the basic tenants of Marxism Leninism, attempted to elevate the theory to the level of "scientific socialism" and establish a universal applicability for the strategy. Pike identified this characteristic in his in depth look at the Vietcong structures "

The communists attempted to raise the techniques in the Chinese revolution and in the Viet Minh war against the French to a science, so as to be able to prescribe a formula that, if applied accordingly to directions would yield inevitable victory. It is precisely its foolproof, do-it yourself label that makes the package so attractive to dissidents every-where and at the same time makes destroying the fiction of the formula's infallibility a

prime task for those nations interested in peace and in helping nations develop along orderly constructive lines"[94]. The Vietcong development of People's War was based on two closely related elements which served as a dogma for all insurgent. In essence this doctrine involves two elements, referred to by the Viet Cong as **political dau tranh** and **military dau tranh.**

These elements of insurgent theory were utilised by the Vietcong in the following manner " The two elements of the strategy are the jaws of the pincer used to attack the enemy, PAVN recruits are told at their initial indoctrination sessions. The two kinds of dau tranh are pictured as hammer and anvil. Always, it is stressed, the two operate together, must operate together. The dualism of dau tranh is bedrock dogma. Neither can be successful alone, only when combined - the marriage of violence to politics - can victory be achieved. Armed dau tranh is the revolutionary violence program, that is military actions and other forms of bloodletting. Political dau tranh's programs or activities are threefold, what are called the van (action) programs, and are not, it is stressed, mere politics as that term is used elsewhere, not even politics with guns. Rather, political dau tranh means **systematic coercive** activity that involves motivation, social organisation, communication of ideas, and the mobilisation of manpower and support. The pincers of the dau tranh close on the enemy. They represent the complete strategy, All actions taken in war - military attack or guerrilla ambush, propaganda broadcast or official statement at the conference table, every mission abroad, every decision taken from the Party cell in the village to the Politburo in Hanoi - all come from within the scope of the two dau tranh's. There is nothing else."[95] The Vietnamese succeeded in creating a insurgent movement which addressed all the aspects of rural Vietnamese village life as well as mobilisation of the urban areas.

The Vietcong where masters of organisational warfare creating a vast and intricate network of front organisations which were resurrected according to need by the central and regional command structures. The Vietcong succeeded in marshalling large sections of the population utilising these simple but effective mechanisms. What distinguished them from other insurgent movements was their ability to marshall social and other forces against their enemy. The ANC demonstrated a similar understanding of the

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relationship between political and military factors when it said " the history of all hitherto guerilla struggles indicates that their successes or failures depended very much on the relationship that is created between the political and military. It would not be correct to mechanically say that only those who have maintained the primacy of the political to the military have necessarily succeeded, in as much as on the other hand, history yet knows not of successes of guerilla war in those situations where the political was ignored. Striking the necessary balance, depending on the concrete situation of a given country, constitutes the art of guerilla warfare, and art cannot be reduced to a scientific formula. Success has been guaranteed by the artful combination of the two, with the proportions dictated by the concrete historical reality of the country concerned and at times by the level of the development of the struggle towards armed insurrection. What however, has been irrefutably proved, is that in those conditions where the primacy of politics was maintained both in principal and actuality, victory was guaranteed. The contrary has never bore fruit."[96] The ANC had a clear grasp of the inter-relationship between these vital factors.

The Vietcong achieved an unprecedented degree of success in this field. Pike describes the Vietnamese definition of dau tranh as "the people as the instrument of war"[97] and identifies three elements in this process, organisation, motivation and mobilisation of all the people, the sequence of this process is described as follows, control the people, forge them into a weapon, throw the weapon at the enemy. "The strategy of dau tranh is political in a way that revolution is political. Violence is necessary to it but is not its essence. The goal is to seize power by disabling the society, using special means, chiefly organisational. In fact, organisation is the great god of dau tranh strategy and counts **more than ideology and military tactics**. The basic instrument is a **united front**, an organisation of organisations, a vast web over the people, enmeshing them. These organisations become channels of communication, which is there primary use, and they make rational appeals to self interest which are shored up by other organisational instruments of coercion. Through organisation, mobilisation becomes possible. The trinity is forged. The people, now organised mobilised and motivated are set against their own society to drain it of its coherent strength."[98]

Pike identifies the key elements of People's War in this extract which refers to the vital role of organisational warfare and the importance of creating an intricate web of organisations which serve as a mechanism for mass mobilisation. This approach is based on a perception that insurgent actions of a military nature are only relevant within their broader political context. Giap stressed this when he said, " The most appropriate guiding principle for our early activities was armed propaganda. Political activities were more important than military activities. Fighting was less important than agit-prop work. Armed activities were used to safeguard, consolidate and develop the political bases." Pike clearly establishes the degree to which the Viet Cong moved away from traditional formulations of warfare when they formulated this strategic doctrine, " ...the military activity conducted in the name of the NLF was not military in the usual or von Clausewitz, sense of the word but was a series of psychologically inspired acts of violence that in addition to military assaults by guerrilla forces, included assassinations, harassing fire without the infliction of casualties, terror incidents such as bombings and grenade throwing and public executions. **The decision to employ an act of violence in a specific case was a political decision based essentially on non-military factors."**[99]

This multi-dimensional approach to insurgency was aspired to by the planners and strategists of the ANC who never approached this level of operational strategic integration or sophistication. The general sentiments are however borne out in ANC statements although the actions of the organisation were seldom in line with this purist approach. The ANC stated that "the primacy of politics is fundamental because all he revolutionary tactics, and this includes military tactics as well, are aimed basically at "conquering" the hearts and minds of the people and at the same time destroying the spiritual fibre of the ruling class. This is the political power that causes the trigger-finger of the enemy troops to hesitate to shoot, this is the force that produced, for example in Mozambique, "a general crisis and a situation of neuropsychological exhaustion" and the possibility of the transfer of political power to the people while the enemy soldiers still retain their weapons and ammunition in abundance."[100]

THE DOCTRINE OF ANC PEOPLE'S WAR :

The People's War strategy outlined in the ANC document Planning for People's War rests on various dimensions of revolutionary warfare. These dimensions of insurgent activity are linked to the ANC's targeting process and its selection of mobilisational mechanisms. The ANC appeared to identify certain sectors of South African society as its priority target. The revolutionary strategy of the ANC was directed at the destruction of important government institutions (the so-called "power bases") and the other elements of state power[101]. In order to achieve this revolutionary aim the ANC/SACP Alliance has set about gaining the support of the masses and systematically destroying the cohesion of the ruling bloc. It planned to achieve this by alienating the public from the security forces and fragmenting any unity in the middle ground of South African politics[102].

The **Strategy and Tactics** document of the ANC stresses that, "guerrilla warfare almost by definition presents a situation in which there is a vast imbalance of material and military resources between the opposing sides. It is designed to cope with the situation in which the enemy is infinitely superior in relation to every conventional factor of warfare. It is par excellence the weapon of the materially weak against the materially strong. During this stage the guerilla forces, small in number and armed with relatively inferior weapons have to contend with an enemy who has at his disposal a relatively stable economy and enormous manpower resources to draw on. It is this disparity in strength which makes guerilla warfare an imperative for the materially weak."[103] This position echoes the writings of Mao who stressed the fact that the protracted nature of an insurgency favours the insurgent whose objective it is to reverse the power relationship by systematic attrition of the enemy's physical and psychological resources. Taber highlights Katzenbach's observations about Mao's teachings when he says, "Mao's approach to the theory of was as applied to his own particular situation.....was simply to reverse the emphasis customarily given to the fundamental components of previous military doctrine. Where the industrial nations stressed such tangible military factors as arms, logistics and manpower, Mao looked to the intangibles; time space and will. Lacking arms with which to confront well equipped armies in the field, Mao avoided

battle by surrendering territory. In so doing he traded space for time, and used the time to produce will, the psychological capacity of the Chinese people to resist defeat."[104] The people's war doctrine proposes the substitution of human mass mobilisation for industrial and economic mobilisation in a wartime situation and argues that Third World countries can match industrialised nations on the battlefield by observing these ground rules.

The ANC has believed since the 1960's that it could achieve this objective an urged MK to remember that" this mode of operation compensates the guerilla's initial weaknesses in strength since the enemy has to attenuate his resources and lines of communications over vast areas. By exposing the vulnerability of the enemy they demonstrate the ability of the revolutionary forces to successfully engage and defeat the enemy in combat and in this way reinforce their belief in the certainty of victory."[105] This doctrine has proved successful in ways in which MK could not have predicted. The resolve of the white government to resist has been eroded over decades of psychological attrition and the enormous resources available neutralised by inaction and lack of resolve. The ANC have long realised that "militarily speaking guerilla warfare cannot topple a government. The enemy can sustain such small scale hit-and run operations for a very long if not indefinite period."[106] They have therefore developed an integrated strategy of subversion and insurgency which address many vital sectors of South African society. The ANC observed that "practical experience has demonstrated that given certain political factors, guerilla warfare can of itself, without developing into higher stages of military deployment, bring down an oppressive state. It is this political dimension, that is popular will as the key to military strategy, which renders it possible to overthrow even the most economically and militarily powerful government by means of guerilla tactics alone."[107]

The following interrelated and complimentary dimensions may be identified in this revolutionary strategy. They provide a useful overview of ANC/SACP strategy and a basis for analyzing the internal dynamics of the South African situation. They are a political; military; socio-economic; cultural-ideological; psychological-ideological and an international dimension[108]. In the document Planning For Peoples War the ANC

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committed itself to a three year programme centred around the following areas which were designated priority: the stimulation of Charterist[109] political activity in the townships, and the initiation of mass revolutionary violence against the South African state with the ultimate objective being the seizure of power through insurrection. These dimensions were to serve as the theoretical basis for this effort.

THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF ANC PEOPLE'S WAR:

The political dimension of ANC strategy is characterised by a drive to make what the ANC refers to as the 'masses' aware of the necessity for revolutionary change in the country[110]. The creation of awareness is cultivated by strong criticism of the government through all available channels of communication and through confrontation with the institutions of state on a wide front[111]. This process is consolidated immediately by the active disruption of government services and structures and the subsequent building of alternative structures or parallel hierarchies to replace those destroyed by the Mass Democratic Movement[112]. This societal restructuring process was supplemented by the creation of a broad range of 'democratic' or 'progressive' forces whose task it was to mobilise support for the movement and maintain and expand the parallel hierarchies brought into existence[113].

The primary task of these organisations is according to the ANC to lend legitimacy to the outlawed revolutionary organisations and to promote their ideologies and their political programme inside South Africa. These organisations fall into two broad categories, one issue campaigns which deal with issues such as the Tri-cameral Parliament[114], Local Authorities Elections, the deployment of the Defence Force in the Townships and other controversial events as well as the broader political movements formed to marshall specifically targeted groups in the population. These organisations form an integral part of the revolutionary movements efforts to challenge and undermine security related legislation and other counter insurgency measures by exploiting the legal protection afforded to legitimate political activity. The process has taken place in numerous other insurgencies including Vietnam, Algeria, Malaya and in other African examples.

THE MILITARY DIMENSION OF ANC PEOPLE'S WAR:

The vital military dimension of Maoist People's War revolutionary theory is based on the belief that violence and the armed struggle form an integral and essential facet of revolutionary warfare[115]. Insurrection is to be accomplished by the creation and deployment of a guerilla force which can be infiltrated and utilised during the insurgency as a propaganda weapon to assist in the political mobilisation of the masses and the acquisition of control over the township population. A military victory in South Africa is not considered to be a viable condition or prerequisite for a political victory but is seen as the basis for people's war leading to negotiations[116].

The military dimension includes the perpetration of acts of sabotage and terrorism in the form of "armed propaganda"[117]. Where acts of sabotage and terrorist attacks were previously directed at the so-called "power bases" of the State, such attacks where increasingly directed on a wider front, i.e. including so-called soft targets[118]. Callinicos identifies the fact that the bulk of the insurgent activity is directed at the urban environment and attributes this to the degree of urbanisation which has taken place in South Africa. He also argues that although urban insurgencies have traditionally proved unsuccessful, South Africa enjoys favourable conditions for this form of guerrilla warfare. Callinicos describes the People's War effort of MK as consisting of three dimensions, the first being the call to "make S.A. ungovernable" the second being the efforts to create liberated zones and thirdly the attempts to transform MK into a People's Army[119].

THE SOCIO ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF ANC PEOPLE'S WAR:

The socio economic dimension of the revolutionary onslaught involves the systematic exaggeration of any inherent weaknesses of the Government administration, social and community problems and economic shortcomings. These are used to the advantage of the revolutionary cause which exploits the propaganda value of the factors in full[120]. The insurgents seek to publicise problem areas in order to aggravate and increase what is often legitimate resentment and resistance to government policy[121]. These include the mobilisation of the people around labour issues, educational, community, religious,

cultural, ethnic, linguistic and other political issues[122]. This strategy was employed with considerable effect due to the economic crisis in the Eastern Cape resulting from a downturn in the economy, the increasing impact of sanctions on the many heavy industrial corporations in the region and the associated high unemployment[123]. These provided the local organisations with an excellent opportunity to mobilise popular support in a region which already had a tradition of conflict[124].

THE CULTURAL-IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSION:

The cultural-ideological dimension of People's War doctrines is aimed at destroying existing values, tradition, culture and the established norms of the community and the replacement of these values with revolutionary values and ideals[125]. The Freedom Charter forms the basis of the ANC's ideological dimension and underpins People's War and the plans to create a 'People's Power' situation[126]. The Freedom Charter has a substantial influence due to its importance too the ANC and the broad National Democratic Movement[127] who promote it as a blueprint for a post revolutionary South Africa[128]. The importance attached to the subversion of culture is evident on various levels, firstly the resources which the ANC's cultural section have made available for this process, secondly the important part which "guerrilla theatre" and other forms of protest culture came to play at rallies and mass meetings of the ANC's internal front organisations.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL-IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSION:

The psychological-ideological dimension is aimed at breaking down resistance to the ideas and activities of the National Democratic Movement and attempting to portray a "losing syndrome" on the part of the Government in general and the Defence Force and the South African Police, in particular. Extensive propaganda mileage is gained from this[129]. The ANC has attempted to convince the township inhabitants through an intense propaganda drive them that Government institutions have given up the contest for control and that victory for the revolution is inevitable[130]. Through this type of propaganda the supporters and uncommitted elements of the population are inspired to believe in the

inevitable victory of the revolutionaries.

The ANC has attempted to convince the black urban population that the revolutionary cause is the solution to all the problems within the country, and the exploitation of "bread and butter" issues such as the availability of housing, payment of rentals, unemployment insurance benefits and taxation on income are used in an attempt to convert the 'masses' to the revolutionary cause of the ANC[131]. The ANC made use of a wide range of alternative media in the Eastern Cape drawing heavily from a network of sympathetic journalists[132]. This proved highly effective in the mobilisation process and secured at least some tacit support amongst the white population.

PROPAGANDA AND THE INFORMATION DIMENSION:

The ANC has also attempted to disrupt the execution of government policy initiatives and counter insurgency campaigns through intense counter propaganda aimed at creating an unfavourable image of the South African Government both within the country and abroad. Key campaigns which have taken place include the world wide media exposure such as the "free the children from detention" campaign, the 'save the patriots' campaigns, the cultivation of revolutionary role models or 'Heroes of the People' and commemoration of revolutionary anniversaries.

The ANC has also made active use of funerals and other religious gatherings to achieve the necessary politicisation of the people within the country in order to circumvent the legal restrictions placed on mass meetings by the South African Government[133]. This process was particularly evident in the Eastern Cape where the use of religious gatherings, particularly funerals, to promote a revolutionary consciousness reached an advanced stage. The result was often a highly politicised township inhabitant who was often indirectly affected by the events due spiral effect such confrontations had on the level of violence in a particular township. A COSAS activist described the role which funerals played in the mobilisation process, " funerals were used for political purposes and to create an impression of the popularity of those killed and support for the struggle. We commandeer buses and trucks. If for example, a taxi owner does not want to give

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us his vehicle, we threaten to burn him. At the funerals we only allow one member of the deceased's family to make a speech. All the other speeches must be made by COSAS people."[134]

Another vital element of this broad revolutionary strategy is the establishment of a media and information network whereby propaganda and the revolutionary ideology can be disseminated. This includes the dissemination of misinformation and publication of media hostile to the state which is broadly referred to as 'alternative media' or 'grass roots media', with the view to gain popular support. This involved publicity campaigns run by organisations sympathetic to the ANC. The emergence of a vast number of these organisations in the Eastern Cape meant that the ANC was often able to direct events inside the country on an unprecedented scale despite its banning. These organisations consisted primarily of people who supported the broad objectives of the ANC and whose leadership cadre were often members or committed supporters. These organisations made various unsubstantiated attacks on the state and the business community in the Eastern Cape which culminated in the consumer boycotts which were so successfully used in the Eastern Cape and these closely mirror the media and publicity campaigns of the external mission of the ANC and often supplemented them [135].

The ANC effectively exploited the counter measures imposed by the state which were aimed at restricting access to the mass media and this has followed the lines set out by Carlos Marighella in his Mini Manual of the Urban Guerrilla. "The war of nerves or psychological war is an aggressive technique, based on the direct or indirect use of mass means of communication and news transmitted orally in order to demoralize the government. In psychological warfare, the government is always at a disadvantage since it imposes censorship on the mass media and winds up in a defensive position by not allowing anything against it to filter through. At a point it becomes desperate, is involved in greater contradictions and loss of prestige and loses time and energy in an exhausting effort at control which is subject to being broken at any moment. The object of the war of words is to misinform, spreading lies among the authorities, thus creating an air of nervousness, discredit, insecurity, uncertainty and concern on the part of the government."[136] The ANC has used this strategy both internally and abroad, targeting

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the media as an access point through which it can communicate its message. The Eastern Cape region has provided the ANC with a useful stage for its propaganda efforts and it has made full use of the support which it enjoys in the region.

VIOLENCE AND ANC PEOPLE'S WAR:

The revolutionary strategy of the ANC involved the use and justification of selective violence and at times murder[137]. This has taken the form of bombings, mob violence, the assassination of opposition figures and the so called necklace murders. The ANC has developed an elaborate historical justification for its adoption of violence in the 1960's and actively promotes this revolutionary 'people's history' in its media and that of its various support mechanisms[138]. While the moral validity of the rationale offered will not be debated within this context it is important to note that the rationale is widely accepted amongst ANC followers.

The ANC/SACP alliance has also made very effective use of the international political arena to advance its revolutionary strategy against the South African government. The ANC has effectively exploited the perceived reluctance of the South African government to undertake political reforms in the past to undermine support in the West for the state and its policies. The ANC has camouflaged the extensive inter-relationship between itself and the SACP and gained a disproportionate degree of legitimacy as a result[139]. The ANC undertook a massive diplomatic effort which has involved the skilful use of sympathetic forums such as the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity and the Commonwealth to promote its interests. This aspect of ANC strategy has arguably been the most successful and has resulted in the imposition of an extensive arms embargo and comprehensive punitive sanctions against South Africa[140]. The particularly effective exposure of the conflict in the Eastern Cape resulted in a considerable amount of financial and other aid being poured into the region from foreign sources[141]. This has meant that much of the organisational development amongst the pro-ANC organisations has taken place due to international funding and assistance. (see chapter on Port Alfred Civic Organisation and International funding)

PEOPLE'S WAR THEMES IN ANC STRATEGY:

The three-year programme launched by the ANC in 1979 aimed at mobilising and politicising the Black population along classic People's War lines. The developmental stage of ANC strategy was a programme of insurgency building up to a mass insurrection against the state in the form of "People's War"[142]. This began to take shape in the Eastern Cape during 1979 with the launch of the prototype Civic organisations such as Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO)[143]. The ANC utilised various channels to achieve this initial stage, these included sympathetic organisations which organised around issues such as the governments constitutional proposals and the ideological tenants of the Freedom Charter, the distribution of pamphlets, sponsored publications (especially through the "alternative media") and radio announcements, and the establishment of revolutionary themes for the ensuing years. The themes included :

1979: *The Year of the Spear*

1980: *The Year of the Freedom Charter*

1981: *The Year of the Youth*

1982: *The Year of Unity in Action*

1983: *The Year of United Action*

1984: *The Year of the Women*

1985: *The Year of the Cadre*

1986: *The Year of Umkhonto we Sizwe - The Peoples' Army*

1987: *The Year of Advance to Peoples' Power*

1988: *The Year of United Action for Peoples' Power.*[144]

Themes adopted by the ANC have been strongly represented in all their public statements and reflect similar sloganeering in the Vietnamese and Rhodesian insurgencies[145]. The slogans provide a central theme which was drawn out during the various activities of the ANC during the year and are a useful propaganda aid in the mobilisation process attempted by organisations following the People's War strategy. Themes adopted by the ANC where commonly repeated in the publications of the UDF and its affiliates imparting some degree of continuity in the rhetoric of the insurgent

forces[146].

The strategic change in direction was reflected in the emergence of a coherent and comprehensive doctrinal departure from traditional statements and the adoption of an entirely new vocabulary of revolutionary terminology. An official ANC statement described this strategic doctrine in the following manner, "The liberation movement has adopted the strategy of a People's War. It is a war in which our entire nation is engaged - Umkhonto we Sizwe, the people's army, workers, the rural masses, women, students, intellectuals, the religious community and so on- collectively in groups and as organised individuals. They use all forms of revolutionary warfare, armed and non-combat, legal and illegal, to attack and destroy all symbols, structures and organs of apartheid power, including all those who man them. The underlying principle here is that all these forms of revolutionary warfare, even those aimed at achieving short term goals, should have as their long term and fundamental objective the total destruction of the South African state".[147] This extract demonstrates the scope of activity planned by the ANC in its attempts to re-orientate its strategy. The dual emphasis on political and military work as well as legal and illegal actions closely mirror the writings of Mao and Giap and reflected changing perceptions within the ANC leadership. The rhetoric employed was soon standardised throughout Charterist publications and reflected a similar uniformity of intentions.

The ANC and the SACP appear to have reached the conclusion that future operations must be orientated towards the securing of base areas or liberated zones in the black townships to ensure their survival. In a reply given by the ANC at a press conference held on the 9th January 1986 it was stated that: "The struggle is taking place in some areas in South Africa - we call them townships. It has been confined in these townships, but these townships are not all of South Africa. The people who died in those townships are dying for a happy, peaceful South Africa. Their blood is being shed for this. It is happening in the circumstances of conflict and we are saying that if South Africans must bleed and die for the salvation of their country, let all of them do it. Let the whole country experience this conflict. Let's take it beyond the townships. Anywhere beyond the townships, because there are areas which are defined as townships. There are others

which are not, and that is all that we mean. It must spread across the country, and we think it makes sense because South Africans must participate, must all be involved in our attempts to solve the problems of our country." The ANC also recognised that it must create certain conditions and build organisations and structures to make this possible. Priority areas for ANC attention include labour, education, local government, media, church affairs, financial institutions, economy, health, law and defence.

UNGOVERNABILITY AND PEOPLE'S WAR.

Tambo gave the first practical example of the actions envisaged by the ANC in his 1983 Address in which he called on the 'masses' to unite against the Koornhof Bills and to form mass organisations to participate in mass action against the regime. The ANC followed this up with calls through underground publications and through the Ethiopian based Radio Freedom for the people to seize control over the following aspects of community life:labour, education, local government, media, church affairs, financial institutions, the economy, health , law and defence [148]. These calls were linked to calls by the ANC to launch a national campaign to 'make South Africa Ungovernable' and to destroy all existing 'organs of apartheid' in the townships. Tambo declared 1983 'The Year of United Action' and called for united mass action against the South African Government[149].

Observers such as Mark Swilling have questioned what they refer to as the "ungovernability thesis", stating that "the ungovernability thesis has been repeated frequently by the state to justify the permanent State of Emergency. This thesis argues that, because the state is to strong to be overthrown by violence, the revolutionaries have developed sophisticated legal means of achieving their objectives. By mounting multiple subversive offensives at every level, the revolutionaries have attempted to undermine the constitutional, political, economic, social, educational and psychological foundations of society. Township protest, the argument continues, was organised by exploiting local grievances to mobilise the masses against the state. The aim was to create a condition of ungovernability by destroying the local authorities and then filling this vacuum with alternative structures. The 'revolution' would then come about as more and more

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communities came under the control of these structures."[150] In his President's message for 1984 Oliver Tambo however stated that "we must begin to use our accumulated strength to destroy the organs of government of the apartheid regime. We have to undermine and weaken its control over us, exactly by frustrating its attempts to control us. We should direct our collective might to rendering the enemy's instruments of authority unworkable. To march forward must mean that we advance against the regime's organs of state-power, creating conditions in which the country become increasingly ungovernable."[151] Clearly the ANC's stated intentions and statements coincide with the position which Swilling attributes to the state.

The ANC and SACP as well as various internal groupings have gone to great lengths to describe the process by which township mobilisation and the creation of a situation of ungovernability are directly linked to the activities of MK and the ANC in general. It is therefore questionable whether the structures and organisations which came into existence in the townships were spontaneous expressions of anger and frustrations. Swilling argues that "township protest was a general response to structural oppression, and that specific local urban grievances triggered the development of social movements. These social movements emerged, initially to mobilise community power against local grievances. When this was met with a coercive response from the security forces, local movements united into organised national fronts that defined popular interests as lying in the total dismantling of apartheid."[152] The assertion that popular response to "structural oppression" can be truly spontaneous is one dimensional and ignores the role which the ANC played in the process.

Clearly it was the ANC and not the government which initially claimed that it was attempting a process of destruction of the existing structures and the building of "people's power". The ANC explained this in the following manner, " The people's combat activities must have the aim to take from the enemy, little by little, the enemies ruling power; in this way it becomes possible to talk of certain areas as liberated areas, that is, at first from the political point of view. A situation is created where the enemy's administrative organs are completely destroyed, his administrative stooges sent scurrying away like scared reptiles, leaving the township, location or village a people's territory.

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When the enemy's administration and other repression offices have been destroyed, and troops who come to patrol are constantly gunned down by armed units at night; when the people stop paying rent and other taxes in the township (partly because the rent offices are no longer there), we can get the people to elect, democratically, leaders who represent their aspirations."[153]

The UDF has also stated that the creation of a "power vacuum" in which the organs of "people's power" can be built is the objective of the National Democratic Struggle. "this has created a power vacuum in many cases. In many communities the old oppressive administrative structures have been destroyed. Owing to mass resistance, many townships have become no-go areas for the police and the army. The police fear to move around freely. When they do move into the townships they often cannot enforce law and order."[154] These claims will be evaluated in some depth in the relevant chapters but it is important to note the clear conflict between the ANC/UDF statements and those of Swilling. The Institute for Black Research noted that "at a popular level, resistance has acted as the main agent in conscientising the masses and mobilising them against the social, economic and political disadvantages. This has resulted in the formation of grassroots organisations that do not only challenge the existing social order, but also endeavour to reconstruct a future society."[155]

The creation of a climate of "ungovernability" was a vital prerequisite for the creation of secure base areas in which the ANC could operate. The immediate target for these insurgent actions was the newly formed black local government structures which formed part of the governments reform package and attempts to extend the franchise at a grass roots level. The ANC rightly identified these newly created appendages to the state as threatening to their control and credibility and decided to destroy them while they were still weak[156]. American commentator Holger Jensen identified the similarities between this approach and that of the Vietcong in the Washington Times, " The techniques should be familiar to veterans of the Vietnam war, were the systematic assassination of village leaders was used by the Vietcong to collapse the administration or the Saigon government. Terror succeeds where minor officials go unprotected."[157] The ANC stated in Sechaba; "Life in the townships is no longer like it was before. It is interesting to

imagine how it feels to live and move around there, in liberated townships in which maintaining order means turning them into undeclared operational areas. Here collaborators and informers live in fear of petrol, either as petrol bombs being hurled at their homes and reducing them to rack and ruin, or as petrol dousing their treacherous bodies which are set alight and burned to a charred and despicable mess."[158]

The strategic initiative shown by the ANC and SACP in this regard proved successful and resulted in disproportionately high returns for the organisations. By July 1985 it was reported that only five of the thirty eight black government structures survived indicating the degree of success enjoyed by the ANC[159]. By destroying these structures the ANC was creating the necessary prerequisites for liberated zones. A report at the time described the situation as follows, " With the vast majority of community councillors having either resigned, been killed or gone into hiding, and most residents refusing to pay rent or service levies, the councils were now unable to provide even essential services like refuse and night-soil removal. Thus, from the vacuum created by the collapse of state control, a new phenomenon has emerged known in the townships as people's power."[160] The ANC and its internal front organisations, embarked on a campaign of murder and intimidation which left a vacuum in the townships, this took the form of the systematic murder of the opinion leaders in the black townships who differed with the ANC[161]. This campaign was particularly intense in the Eastern Cape and the destruction of the black local government structures took place by 1985. The high incidence of necklacing in the region and the brutality of the UDF's suppression of their major rivals in the area, the Azanian People's Organisation, (AZAPO) led to the increasingly effective coercive mobilisation of the township inhabitants around 'bread and butter' issues[162].

The People's War strategy of the ANC was dependant on the creation of structures enabling it to achieve a new level of activity inside the Republic. The ANC stated that: " we must unite in struggle and together advance towards victory. We also formed mass combat and self-defence units which have played an outstanding role in destroying the enemy's organs of government and acting in defence of the people. But as serious revolutionaries, we must carefully analyze our strength and weaknesses, discover our

mistakes and correct them. We must move forward towards victory. Therefore we have to take the war to the enemy. We must attack the forces of apartheid in areas where their power is concentrated, striking powerful blows at the enemy's military, economic and administrative structures and resources. All the revolutionary work we do should be directed to ensure that we utilise the strength we have accumulated to carry out this strategic offensive in a determined manner, on a nationwide basis. We must create the situation when the enemy will no longer have the possibility to withstand our assault. The nature of the tasks we have to carry out imposes special obligations on the underground structures of the ANC and on Umkhonto we Sizwe. In the new situation, with the new tasks ahead of us, we are certain that our movement, the ANC, will live up to its responsibility. And so will our army, Umkhonto we Sizwe, whose 25th anniversary we have just observed. The objective to transform our armed offensive into a Peoples' War remains one that we must pursue with the greatest vigour. This is especially important in the light of the strategic tasks that we have just been discussing. Our mass military offensive must aim to increase the number of casualties among the enemy's armed forces, to disperse and reduce these forces, make it increasingly impossible for them to defend themselves and undermine the material, economic base which enables the apartheid regime to maintain itself in power."[163]

The ANC saw the cadres of Umkhonto as a means to achieve two complimentary objectives, firstly military actions aimed at destroying the cohesion of the security forces and secondly the undermining of the "material, economic base". This marxist term refers to the entire underlying capitalist structure of a society and has far reaching implications demonstrating the ANC's desire to fundamentally restructure South African society. The other element is the supportive role of the "masses" or the people in this process. The creation of a situation of ungovernability came about as a result of the constant ambush of police patrols by MCU's and snipers, the murder of black policemen, attacks on police posts and the burning of policemen's homes. This led to periodic collapses in the policing of several townships and necessitated the use of the South African Defence Force[164]. The short term result of this collapse was the creation of a vacuum which allowed the ANC considerable freedom of movement in the affected areas.

This disregard for the normal military distinction between civilian and military targets is an important facet of People's War. Pike describes this within the Vietnamese conflict in the following manner: "The Vietnamese communists erased entirely the line between military and civilian by ruling out the notion of the noncombatant. Their strategy precluded by very definition the disinterested onlooker. Not even children were excluded - particularly not children one might say. All people became weapons of war - that is the meaning of the strategy -and all are expendable as any weapon is expendable in war."[165] This attitude is discernable in both ANC actions and public statements and is reflected in the necklacing of opposition and the use of children as cannon fodder for the revolution.

The African National Congress and its revolutionary allies developed a complex and multi faceted insurgent strategy based on People's War principles which have been adapted and restructured in response to the various counter measures adopted by the state. Their adoption reflected a new consolidation of the ANC's position and reflected the growing sophistication of the organisation. The various elements of ANC strategy began to take shape early in the 1980's during a vulnerable phase in the South African Government's reform programme[166] The reforms and associated structures changed the internal conditions in both the socio-economic and political spheres and made the so-called "base" of state power vulnerable to insurrection. This was reflected in the economic crisis which struck the region in the early 1980's[167]. The ANC capitalised on this situation and embarked on its efforts to make "South Africa ungovernable and apartheid unworkable". To achieve this, Oliver Tambo outlined a strategy involving 'four pillars of the revolution' which were to form the basis of ANC actions during the first half of this decade.

THE FOUR PILLARS OF THE REVOLUTION : THE ADOPTION OF THE FOUR PILLARS CONCEPT:

Following the adoption of a major plan formulated by the Political and Military Committee in 1983, (Planning for People's War)[168], the ANC accelerated its activation of 'the masses' and proceeded from peaceful, non-violent political demonstrations to

demonstrations with an emphasis on violence and insurrection in the Eastern Cape. The concept of a 'revolutionary', 'popular' or 'peoples' war was introduced in all statements and broadcasts and in 1984 the ANC announced that the 'revolutionary war would in future rest on four pillars which would be " interlinked and mutually reinforcing elements"[169] : These pillars would be: the armed struggle; mobilisation of the masses; ungovernability and alternative structures; and the isolation of the South African government[170]. These "pillars" of the revolutionary effort will be briefly evaluated and their relationship to People's War in its broader concept examined.

The four pillars were first referred to by the ANC in a Presidential message in which it outlined the nature of People's War and the fundamental role which the 'four pillars' would play. The "pillars" where explained in the following terms; the ANC would undertake to make South Africa ungovernable; it would build its forces into a formidable and united mass army; its aims were the destruction of the apartheid regime and the transfer of "power to the people"; and it would continue with its political march on all fronts and would extend the "military offensive" It also stated that it would encourage the political mobilisation and organisation of the working classes and would spread its offensive to every corner of South Africa including all cities, towns and the rural areas[171]. The metaphor of the pillars appeared widely throughout ANC and SACP literature and remains a cornerstone of ANC strategy. The ANC has varied its emphasis on various elements depending on the particular environment it finds itself in.

ANC DEFINITIONS OF THE FOUR PILLARS:

The ANC made the following statement about People's War and the central role of the 'armed struggle', " The principal conclusion we should draw from this situation is that through our sacrifices, we have prepared the conditions for us further to transform the situation to that position when it will be possible for us to seize power from the enemy. Thus the central task facing the entire democratic movement is that we retain the initiative until we have emancipated our country. We must achieve this by going on the offensive on all fronts, continuously and boldly. We have to fight with a clear purpose in mind, with a definite perspective of our strategic and tactical goals so that we can

deploy and utilise our forces to the best advantage. Victory demands that we also continue to work for the maximum <u>unity of all our fighting contingents</u> and the democratic movement as well as a coordinated approach towards the <u>four pillars of our struggle.</u>"[172] This extract highlights the integrated nature of the four pillars of the revolution which supplement one another and contribute towards forming a unified base for an effective insurgency. The ANC realised the importance of maintaining an intense level of pressure on the government.

ARMED STRUGGLE : THE SPEAR OF THE NATION : PLANNING FOR PEOPLE'S WAR:

The objectives of the 'four pillars of the revolution' strategy are clearly to create a climate of ungovernability leading to the establishment of 'people's power'. The role of the armed struggle (the first pillar) centres around the two concepts of 'the people armed' and 'armed propaganda'. In 1983 a detailed ANC analysis of People's War and more specifically armed struggle was prepared entitled **Planning for People's War**. This document addressed the question of arming the masses and debate centred around the exact nature this process should take with concern being expressed about the logistical problems involved. The document stated , "The policy of 'arming the people' has completely different meanings in different phases of the revolution. In other words, if the concept of 'arming the people is to become anything more than a cliche, it must become part of a policy to involve more and more armed people as organised contingents in support of our struggle and acting under our leadership."[173]

Clearly the ANC encouraged the development of large scale unrest and violence in the townships and actively engaged in a programme to cultivate and harness this phenomena. This formed the basis for the armed struggle in its new expanded form which transcended the limitations of mere 'armed propaganda'. The role of Umkhonto we Sizwe in the ANC's People's War efforts was a central one[174]. The ANC has attached a great deal of importance to MK and has attempted to expand the structures of MK through 'cascade recruitment inside the Republic and by diversifying its recruitment base amongst whites and people of the so called coloured group[175]. The mass combat units referred to in

this extract from Tambo's policy statement were the rioting crowds who have confronted the security forces in the townships and whom the ANC hoped to mobilise into coordinated units using a nucleus of trained MK cadres[176]. The UDF and the ANC played a role in the formation and management of the "amabutho" or comrades who provided the cutting edge to the insurgent forces in the townships. In an interview with the UDF publication, an Eastern Cape activist explained who and what the amabutho were, "they call themselves the police or army of the people. For instance, amabutho are the ones to avail themselves to patrol, when to check that the shebeeners are closed at 9 o'clock." and 'the amabutho are people who volunteer, as soldiers of the people, and you find that they have pride in that."[177] The amabutho earned a reputation of savagery during their reign of terror in the townships which led Swilling to talk of the "militarism of the violent youth squads"[178] and commentators to warn of the development of a Pol Pot phenomenon.

The ANC saw its combatants in the following idealised terms " a guerrilla is an irregular soldier who is supported by the masses. Guerrilla warfare is a special type of war waged by a materially weak guerrilla army against a materially strong regular army supported by a powerful state."[179] This clear reference to the Maoist concept of disproportionate power scales gives a strong indication of the underlying People's War doctrine adopted by the ANC. The ANC states that "because of this imbalance in terms of material supplies and personnel (at the initial stages of guerilla warfare), guerillas avoid direct confrontation with the enemy forces and use hit and run tactics."[180]

The ANC characterised its approach to insurgency along the following lines, "guerilla warfare is characterised by high mobility on the part of the army, element of surprise in all attacks and short duration of combat action. In this way the enemy's strength is gradually sapped while the guerilla army constantly develops in strength."[181] The ANC's Maoist concept of warfare is further developed in this definition which points to distinctions between insurgent actions and those of conventional adversaries, " the absence of a distinction between the operational zone and the rear supply centre. Guerilla warfare takes place throughout the country and no particular areas can be pinpointed as operational area, the guerillas replenish themselves by supplies received from the masses

and swell their armories by securing arms from the enemy and other sources."[182] The ANC document states further that "the most important task of a guerrilla force is to win over the masses to their side. Without fulfilment of this task victory is only an illusion. Since guerillas have no rich powerful state to turn to for refreshment of their supplies, the have to make use of the masses. It is also from the masses that the guerillas get the recruits to swell their numbers into formidable forces."[183] The ANC followed these basic strategic concepts in its formulation of the military "pillar" of its revolutionary offensive.

MOBILISATION OF THE MASSES AND PEOPLE'S WAR:

The ANC identified the need to offset the advantages held by the security forces and the power bloc and used the second pillar of its revolutionary strategy to achieve this. " The South African people, moreover, have at their advantage the overwhelming numerical superiority over the enemy. Because of his numerical weakness, the enemy cannot go beyond certain limits in mobilising the army of repression, whereas on the other hand the masses of the people can mobilize and army thrice the size of the enemy's limits and still have numerous men and women engaged in other non-combatant forms of struggle."[184] In a true reflection of Maoist People's War doctrines, the ANC believed that it can offset the technological superiority of the security forces by harnessing the power of the people. "At all times we must focus our attention on the decisive question of further altering the balance of strength in our favour - to weaken the apartheid regime through struggle and to strengthen our forces in struggle. As part of that process, we must ensure that we attack the enemy in all areas so that we disperse its forces so that it is unable to concentrate these in a few areas at a time, to its advantage."[185] The basis for the ANC's preoccupation with mass mobilisation was the desire to stretch the security forces beyond their limit, which in turn would theoretically make the task of MK easier and allow the ANC's township structures to develop their organisational base.

UNGOVERNABILITY AND ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES.

The role of front organisations formed in the Republic centred around an ANC directive

to transform the townships into liberated zones or mass base areas which was communicated through pamphlets, Radio Freedom and various pro-ANC organisations within the country. The priority attached to creating a situation of ungovernability and consolidating support is highlighted in the following statement in which the ANC articulated its objective of establishing zones in which the ANC would be free to expand its influence. "In many parts of our country we have already made important advances towards the creation of these mass revolutionary bases. We have destroyed many of the enemy's organs of apartheid rule. The masses of the people have played a central role in this process as active participants in the struggle for their own liberation. We have also succeeded to create mass democratic organisations representative of these conscious and active masses, ranging from street committees to COSATU[186], the UDF, the NECC[187] and their affiliates and other democratic formations." The ANC's claims concerning the internal organisations and the inter-relationship between them and the creation of liberated zones provides a valuable insight into the general objectives of the ANC. The third element of the ANC's revolutionary strategy involved the creation of 'mass revolutionary bases and the maintenance of these bases by organisations sympathetic to the ANC[188], as outlined in the above quotation.

The importance of the popular structures to the People's War strategies of the ANC was explained in the following manner; " This means that we must continue to build the broadest possible united front against apartheid, for a democratic South Africa. All organisations to which the people belong, whether cultural, sporting, professional, religious or of other types, should understand that they too have an obligation to engage in struggle in pursuit of the common cause. Let the fact of the united opposition of millions of our people to the apartheid system find expression both in united action and action within a united front. Of central importance to the success of this process is the need to ensure that the masses of the people are organised into their own mass formations as well as into underground units of our movement. It is again with pride that we can say that in the strategic sense, the enemy has been defeated in its intentions. Whatever the reverses we have suffered, we have, in the main, successfully defended our organisational formations. In certain instances, as we have said, we have actually expanded the organised formations of the mass democratic movement."[189] The role of

the internal elements of the Mass Democratic Movement in the People's War strategy was clear, organisational warfare was to be utilised to mobilise the people to secure base areas through the creation of front organisations which stabilised the liberated zones and created parallel hierarchies.

THE ISOLATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE: PEOPLE'S SANCTIONS.

SANCTIONS AND ANC STRATEGY:

The isolation of the South African state forms a vital part of ANC strategy and extends to the isolation of South Africa in the spheres of diplomacy, economics and sport. Although this effort has its origins in the 1940's when India first proposed economic sanctions against South Africa, it has only really consolidated in the 1980's[190]. Economic sanctions are seen as crucial in weakening the South African economy and consequently causing resentment among the peoples of South Africa thereby improving the revolutionary climate[191]. The attack on the economy of South Africa involves the use of the following tactics: An international campaign for sanctions, boycotts, which include economic, sport, cultural, academic and other boycotts and industrial actions against foreign investors in South Africa. The ANC described the importance of sanctions in the following manner: "An important part of the crisis afflicting the racist system is the gathering collapse of the apartheid economy. We also need to mount a continuous assault on the economy to deny the enemy the material base which gives it the means to conduct its campaign of terror, both inside and outside our country. The conditions therefore exist that, in the current period, this community (the international community) should impose both unilateral and universal comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against racist South Africa. Where governments refuse to act, the public at large should respond with peoples' sanctions."[192]

The ANC saw the destruction of the economic and material base of South African society as vitally important to securing the type of environment in which it could force the regime into compromise. Sanctions of the type proposed by the ANC are a means to achieve this objective. The concept of People's sanctions marked the introduction of a

new tactic by the ANC and its various support mechanism's in which they attempted to bypass the Western governments who resisted the imposition of sanctions by mobilising trade unions and other pressure groups to enforce sanctions. This phenomenon was related to the consumer boycotts which came to play an important role in the internal unrest of the Eastern Cape and other regions and was referred to as People's Sanctions or popular sanctions.

The ANC was able to state by 1988 that, "similarly, the hopes of the racists that they could defuse the campaign for sanctions have come to nought. Despite the efforts of the major Western powers to shield the apartheid regime from effective international action, the peoples of the world have taken the struggle for the international isolation of apartheid South Africa yet another step forward."[193] The Eastern Cape region was particularly hard hit by the sanctions campaign and efforts to force international corporations to leave South Africa. This has directly contributed towards lowering the standard of living and therefore played a part in stimulating conflict and unrest.

THE FOUR PILLARS AND THE EASTERN CAPE:

The ANC applied this theory of the four revolutionary pillars in the Eastern Cape and elements of this strategy appeared to be consolidating in late 1985 when conditions in the townships reached an all time low[194]. The ANC was claiming a major victory and it appeared that the creation of base areas in the Eastern Cape was becoming a reality. This state of affairs seems to have given the ANC a false sense of achievement as the successes of the Eastern Cape were not reflected in other regions. It was the imposition of the Second State of Emergency which appears to have led to serious set backs for the ANC's internal programme. The external programme has however accelerated and considerable damage done to the economy and this has escalated the level of unemployment[195]. The strategy also involved increasing pressure on the established institutions of state to increase spending on security related functions, to the detriment of state spending in the socii-economic sphere. This aggravates the socio-economic situation in South Africa and facilitates subversion. This process was particularly evident within the South African context were the ANC expressed its commitment to the

destruction of all established functions of the state thus ensuring that governmental attempts to address socio/economic grievances were compromised[196].

The extent of the damage to property and infrastructure in the Republic during the stage of ungovernability was highlighted by[197] the Minister of Law and Order who was gleefully quoted in an article in Sechaba, " Buildings Damaged 7th October 1984: 50 Schools, 2 Churches, 7 Clinics, 85 Shops, 4 Service Stations, 17 Administration Board Buildings, 26 Beerhalls, 16 bottle Stores,98 Homes, 4 Banks, 6 Post Offices, 3 Hostels and 12 other unspecified buildings."[198] The destruction of the established institutions of the state serve various functions for the insurgent movement: Firstly it enables the insurgent organisation to demonstrate its strength against what are essentially soft targets in demonstrations of potency[199]. This process is highly effective in the South African context as the primary targets are often the traditional authority figures in society and their murder provides the population with a vivid demonstration of what the possible consequences of resistance will be. Thus in the Eastern Cape traditional community figures such as councillors, policemen, mayors, traditional chiefs and other figures where intimidated or murdered[200]. Secondly, the process of physical destruction enables the insurgents to lower the standard of living of the lower strata of society to the point were they have no vested interest in maintaining the status quo, and are thus open to recruitment attempts into the insurgent movement.

The process of physical destruction in the Eastern Cape extended into all spheres. Schools and other state owned property were specifically targeted for destruction as were all installations and other structures related to the communications network. This destruction is not unique to the South African experience and has been extensively utilised in other insurgencies. Elliot Cross describes the process in the following manner, "Insurgent attacks on modern transportation facilities, like so many other moves in unconventional warfare, have political consequences for both the rebels and the authorities. Their destruction is often deeply felt and since the injury is clearly a result of rebel action, the insurgents risk alienating popular sympathy if the damage is excessive. The Viet Cong technique of damaging roads, shows they were aware of this danger. The trenches dug prevent the passage of military vehicles, while the narrow path

that is normally left allows bicycles and foot traffic to continue unhampered."[201]

In the South African context the ANC and its supporters made considerable use of trenches and other obstacles aimed at making the passage of army and police vehicles more difficult. Due to the overwhelming reliance on foot transport and the bus boycotts which were simultaneously being enforced, it is difficult to evaluate the possible negative impact which these measures had amongst the township dwellers. The structures were occasionally effective in areas were specialised vehicles such as "Caspirs" or "Buffels" were not available but according to police personnel generally had only a limited impact. Giving evidence to a commission of inquiry into the unrest a police spokesman said that " Petrol bombs were used to burn a Land Rover with policemen on board, entrances to the township were sealed off with burning road blocks. It had been planned to dig traps for police vehicles concealed under layers of gravel. Trapped vehicles were to be petrol bombed to kill the occupants"[202]. In another interview a COSAS executive member described plans to attack police vehicles, " One method involved stretching rope between two telephone poles across the township streets at the same height as the heads of men travelling on the back of police Caspir vehicles. Another involved the digging of large holes in the township streets. These would be filled with plastic bags of petrol and are covered with a sheet of corrugated iron and gravel. A COSAS 'soldier' would then wait for a police vehicle to crash into the hole before igniting the petrol."[203]

FRONT ORGANISATIONS, THE UNDERGROUND AND PEOPLE'S WAR:

The result of this programme to achieve ungovernability was a temporary vacuum sufficiently comprehensive to result in a breakdown in public services and in law and order, creating a favourable environment for insurgent actions[204]. In the Eastern Cape the UDF felt sufficiently confident to begin taking journalists into areas which it claimed were liberated[205]. This proved extremely negative for the security forces who were seen as being unable to control the unrest and violence. An insurgent organisation such as the ANC achieves this situation by creating a wide range of auxiliary organisations which extend the activities of the illegal insurgent body into the legal and semi-legal spheres overcoming many of the legal parameters designed to maintain law and order. Taber

describes this process in the following manner: "The revolutionary political organisation will have two branches: one subterranean and illegal, the other visible and quasi-legitimate."[206] This is true of the ANC which created a vast internal network of supportive organisations whose task is the "strengthening and brightening of the rebel image and the discrediting of the regime."[207] These organisations have played a major role in the establishment of parallel hierarchies in the townships which the ANC claims to control. The achievement of ungovernability therefore stems from two distinct yet co-ordinated elements, the rioting and violence of the Mass Combat Units supported by MK and secondly by the psychological onslaught on the legitimacy of the governmental structures and local authorities in the townships. The Charterist organisations involved in this process with the ANC thus form a vital basis for achieving a power vacuum which is tailor made for the projection of ANC power in the townships.

The organisational strategies of People's War employed by the ANC appear to have been directly adopted from the Vietnamese experience. In Pike's book, Viet Cong, he describes the similar structures created by the NLF: " In the NLF controlled areas it threw a net of associations over the rural Vietnamese that could seduce him into voluntarily supporting the NLF or, failing that, bring the full weight of social pressure to bear on him, or if both of these failed, could compel his support. It would subject him effectively to surveillance, indoctrination and exploitation. It could order his life. It could artificially create grievances and develop support where logically such support ought not to have been forthcoming. The purpose of this vast organisational effort was not simply population control but to restructure the village and train the villagers to control themselves."[208] Clearly this process reached a fairly advance stage in the urban areas of the Eastern Cape and many of the categories of organisation listed by Pike are clearly recognisable.

LIBERATED ZONES IN THE EASTERN CAPE AND ANC POLICY : THE FORMATION OF LIBERATED ZONES OR BASE AREAS.

The major challenge facing any insurgent movement planning to escalate its insurgency from the preparatory stage to full confrontation with the state, is the creation of

operational areas in which insurrection can be planned, carried out and the insurgent forces trained and based. The preparation phase must therefore be in an advanced stage before this process of securing base areas or liberated zones can be accomplished. This area is distinct from a contested area in that the insurgent must be able to maintain a semi or permanent level of control over the population in this region. This is dependent on the elimination of governmental control and influence and the development of a situation of 'ungovernability'. This gives the insurgent an area in which he can move freely, rely on regular and reliable intelligence and recruit cadres while carrying out the political mobilisation of the people. Mao described these liberated zones in the following manner. " They are strategic bases on which the guerrilla forces can rely in preforming there strategic tasks and achieving the objective of preserving and expanding themselves and destroying and driving out the enemy. Without such strategic bases, there will be nothing to depend on in carrying out any of our strategic tasks or achieving the aim of the war. It is characteristic of guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines that it is fought without a rear, for the guerrilla forces are severed from the country's general rear. But guerrilla warfare could not last long or grow without base areas. The base areas are its rear."[209] The ANC's attempts to create liberated zones are related to the difficulty the organisation faced in organising itself amongst the people.

Widespread complaints from returning cadres about the reluctance of the population to accept and assist them[210], also led to a realisation that true support from the people could only be created in an environment created and maintained by the ANC. "The creation of people's organs of self-government in the South African revolution will not take place at a single stroke of armed insurrection; they will be called into being not by proclamation but by the requirements of the combination of mass actions (partial insurrections) and armed guerrilla struggle; they will be the organs of that struggle."[211]

BASE AREAS AND CONTESTED ZONES:

Mao differentiates between true base areas and zones in which the insurgent can challenge the state's authority. " In guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, there is a difference between guerrilla zones and base areas. Areas which are surrounded by the

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enemy but whose central parts are not occupied or have been recovered, are ready made bases for the convenient use of guerrilla units in developing guerrilla warfare. But elsewhere in these areas the situation is different. When guerrilla warfare began, the guerrilla could not completely occupy these places but could only make frequent raids; they are areas which are held by the guerrillas when they are there but by the puppet regime when they are gone, and are therefore not yet guerrilla bases but what may be called guerrilla zones. Such guerrilla zones will be transformed into base areas when they have gone through the processes of guerrilla warfare, that is when large numbers of enemy troops have been annihilated or defeated , the puppet regime has been destroyed, the masses have been roused to activity and mass organisations formed."[212] The insurgent organisation must undertake a process of coercive mobilisation to achieve the creation of suitable conditions for fighting a people's war. This process was evident in certain of the Eastern Cape townships during the height of the unrest however it is debateable whether they ever became liberated zones. They did however become contested zones in which the state's control was extremely tenuous to say the least. It would therefore be safe to say that while townships such as Port Alfred and Cradock reached a level of ungovernability which approached that of a liberated zone[213], this was not true of most of the Eastern Cape region. This means that the ANC partially achieved its objectives in destabilising selected townships.

DESTRUCTION OF EXISTING STRUCTURES:

The "third pillar" of the revolutionary strategy of the ANC's Peoples War doctrine is essentially concerned with the destruction of existing structures and their replacement with the organs of people's government. It is aimed at destroying government institutions and replacing them with alternative structures under the control of its cadres[214]. In order to establish alternative structures under the control of the revolutionaries, the strategy employed was to eliminate or drive out, members of councils, administrative personnel, police and so-called "sell-outs" from the Black townships as happened in many of the townships in the vicinity of Port Elizabeth and East London as well as in the Albany area[215].

At a press conference, held in Lusaka on the 9th January 1986 the ANC was faced with questions about the **New Year's message** delivered on the 8th January 1986. In reply to a question the President of the ANC stated that, "The people started by calling on councillors to resign. The majority resigned. Those who refused to resign were, of course, attacked. This is the element of black versus black, and it was unavoidable. In the result many councils have been destroyed and the regime has not been able to proceed with its plans. We have succeeded." In their Annual message on the 8th January 1987 the ANC declared that, "The Year of Advance to Peoples' Power" and referred to "successes" of the past three years in rendering government structures unworkable and inoperative and in establishing alternative structures for "peoples' power". He stated that the ANC and its allies, the UDF, COSATU, and NECC, were the true representatives of the masses in South Africa. He stated that the working class under the leadership of COSATU, had to be involved politically and militarily in the peoples' war.

The ANC remarked in their **1986 New Year's message that**: "At the same time, we have seen how the apartheid regime, intent on maintaining itself in power at all costs, has sent into our townships white soldiers and police, as well as black mercenaries, with orders to murder, rape and destroy at will - shooting infants, raping young girls and going on a crazed orgy of blood-letting. This is precisely the reason why the fascist Botha - Malan - Coetzee regime must be swept off the surface of the earth and our country transformed into a democratic, non-racial and peaceful entity. Therefore we must fight. We must organise and arm ourselves to fight harder and better for the overthrow of the apartheid regime. This year we must take up the campaign with greater vigour than before - for the immediate and unconditional ..... withdrawal of all troops and police from the townships." The campaign to have the troops withdrawn from the townships was conducted by all the UDF affiliates as well as sympathetic element in opposition parties. The impetus for this campaign appears to have been a recognition on the part of the ANC that the introduction of the SADF in reinforcement of the SAP, countered much of its success in creating a situation of ungovernability. The effect of increased security presence in the townships was dramatic and had a profound effect on the activities of the Mass Combat Units and MK. The ANC realised the vital link between control of an area and the military capabilities of its units and remarked optimistically that, " this means

that the masses have created some form of free zones in which underground activity by the liberation movement can be carried out minus some of the stubborn problems which normally dog it. They have helped solve to a significant degree the question of guerrilla survival."[216]

PARALLEL HIERARCHIES AND PEOPLE'S WAR:

"If an insurgent organisation perceives a need to augment its membership, it will normally increase its level of differentiation or complexity, and through the efforts of its political cadres, penetrate hamlets, villages, and cities, especially in contested areas (i.e., areas in which neither the government nor the insurgents have firm control). Insurgents often create what Bernard Fall called parallel hierarchies to compete with government institutions. The parallel hierarchy can take two forms: penetration of existing official administrative structures by subversive agents, or creation of autonomous insurgent structures designed to take over full administrative responsibility when military-political conditions are deemed appropriate."[217]

The strategy of replacing Government structures with alternative revolutionary structures firstly revolves around the creation of a "dual power" situation. It is the perceived duty of Umkhonto we Sizwe to shift the "balance of forces" to the side of the masses through revolutionary means. For this purpose "revolutionary bases" had to be created in Black townships throughout the country. In this regard the ANC's 1986 "New Year's message is important in that he makes reference to "insurrectionary zones": "This past year we made significant strides towards the transformation of our armed confrontation with the apartheid regime into a peoples' war. Of crucial importance in this regard has been the creation of mass insurrectionary zones in many parts of our country, areas where the masses of the people are not only active, but are also ready in their hundreds of thousands to assault the enemy for the seizure of power."[218] The reference to "ungovernability", "alternative structures", "alternative power", "dual power", "peoples' power", "revolutionary structures", "democratic structures", "government by the people", "popular structures" and the like, must be viewed in the context of overall ANC strategy. In the 1986 presidential message this trend was developed further, "During the momentous Year of the Cadre that has just passed we have also produced new organisational formations and adopted new forms of struggle in keeping with the

heightened pace of our revolution. We refer here to the mass combat units that we have formed to carry out various tasks, including those related to the destruction of the organs of government of the apartheid regime and to making the country ungovernable. We refer also to the measures we have taken, among other things, to protect our leaders and to maintain revolutionary law and order in various localities throughout the country."[219]

The process which the ANC hoped to implement in the townships of the Eastern Cape follows closely the classic requirements of the Vietnamese model of guerrilla warfare. In a book about the French Army's experiences in Indo-China, Kelly describes this process in the following manner, " In the fifth and final phase, a regular army emerges. A unity of command over the entire rebellion will have been achieved through the ruthless elimination of all but the most reliable elements. An independent territory, snatched from the jurisdiction of the 'forces of order' is created ..... Parallel hierarchies now envelop the entire territory and permit indoctrination to proceed under the most favourable conditions. The legal authorities, as well, are progressively duplicated by the organs of rebel government in all communities, so that from the point of view of the population the distinctions of administrative command are thoroughly nebulous. **In practice, legality and force have both changed camps.**"[220] This vital distinction addresses the core of the people's war offensive, namely that the authority and monopoly of force changes hands or becomes blurred in the process of insurrection allowing the insurgent to effectively challenge a powerful state machine with some effect.

ANC STATEMENTS AND PARALLEL HIERARCHIES:

In its 1987 New Year's message the ANC stated that, "In many parts of our country we have given concrete form to that emerging alternative power by destroying the enemy's structures of government and setting up organs of peoples' power. The gains we have made in this regard have meant that the apartheid regime has lost its administrative control over us in many areas of South Africa. This is a development of immeasurable historical importance for the success of our revolutionary struggle. It has laid the basis for us to make a decisive advance towards our common goal. We have, in previous years

spoken of mass bases as a very important and central element in our strategic outlook. Our success in destroying the enemy's administrative control over large areas of our country constitutes a high point in the struggle for the emergence of these bases. One of the principal tasks we face in this regard is that we should continue to escalate our offensive to smash the organs of apartheid state power and construct organs of peoples' power in their place. Our objectives must be to create mass revolutionary bases in all Black areas throughout the country and to mount an strategic offensive against the enemy in its stronghold in the towns and the cities. The campaign to make the country ungovernable and apartheid unworkable must result in the emergence of these bases which must be characterised by a number of features. One of these is that the masses of the people should not only have a high level of political consciousness but should also be active in the struggle to liberate themselves. In some areas, both in the towns and the countryside, including the Bantustans, we are still faced with the task of destroying the fascist government apparatus and making the advances we have achieved elsewhere. We urge the revolutionary forces to use the resources at our disposal to engage the enemy in these areas as well."[221] While these claims are unrealistic on a national level, the ANC could justifiably claim some success in specific regions of the Eastern Cape, and it therefore made considerable use of the activities of its cadres and support organisations in this area for propaganda purposes.

ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES IN THE LIBERATED ZONES.

African National Congress realised that uncoordinated attempts at bringing about a revolutionary situation and increasing the potential for revolution in South Africa, were insufficient to rally the masses behind them. It became necessary for the ANC and the UDF to unite their supporters in organisations with regional, provincial and local affiliates to carry out their objectives. These organisations were frequently initiated on a loosely structured local level but the organisations soon affiliated with each other on a regional basis. The mobilisation of the Eastern Cape took place on this basis. Some of the larger organisations consisted of a central national organisation with large numbers of affiliates spread throughout the country. At the lowest level, organisations were supported and their objectives carried out by "area-", "block-" and "street committees".

The so-called "area-", "block-" and "street committees" link and provide a network between national level of the organisation in question and the ordinary man in the street. The "area-", "block-" and "street committees" implemented the aims and objectives of the ANC and the UDF often relying on coercion rather that conversion to achieve their objectives[222].

The organisational structures were intended to draw in as many of the 'progressive masses' as possible into the structures of revolution. In some instances the organisations had broadly commendable public aims and objectives but were directed at the establishment of alternative revolutionary structures, the promotion of discontent and the promotion of a political climate in which the ANC can maximize its impact[223]. This took place through the promotion of civil disobedience, strikes, stay-aways, boycotts and violence. In an article entitled Building people's Power this concept is developed further, "The emergence of these organs of people's power has been called forth and motivated not only by the subjective momentary conditions but also by the objective level of development of our revolution towards the seizure of power by the people. It is this objective status of the people's communes that determines their historical task, which is to ensure that on the ruins of apartheid structures, revolutionary power is created in all spheres of life."[224] There is clear and reliable evidence that, while organisations operated under the pretext of legality, the core activities of the organisations involve the revolutionary mobilisation of supporters around programmes which closely coincide with those of the ANC and the SACP[225]. These organisations skilfully used the umbrella protection of the organisational structures to promote boycotts (education, consumer, and rent boycotts as well as stay-aways) and campaigns which had a high revolutionary content and a high degree of acceptability among the people in the townships[226]. It is significant that in the post un-banning stage of ANC development these organisations have either ceased to exist, voluntarily incorporated into the ANC or are in a close alliance with the ANC. The key leadership figures in the many front organisations have now taken their places within the ranks of the ANC and SACP despite their repeated denials before the unbanning of the ANC and SACP.

VIET CONG PEOPLE'S WAR STRUCTURES:

This strategy appears to have been adopted from the Vietnamese who undertook a similar program of coercive mobilisation. Greig describes the methods used by the National Liberation Front of Vietnam in its programme and outlines the extent to which the Viet Cong were able to control the political aspects of the day to day life of the population: " The mainspring of the Viet Cong effort to obtain psychological control of the population of South Vietnam has consisted of a vast machine engaged in spinning a country-wide web of committees, fronts and cells of almost every conceivable description. Its aim is to enmesh all categories of the population in active support of the revolutionary cause in areas under the control of the Communist forces; and in areas outside their control or still disputed, to destroy support for the Government's forces amongst the civilian population, and to bring about a collapse of military morale. Directed by a Central Committee, the NLF operates through a series of provincial and district committees; at village level it is usually most actively represented in Communist controlled areas by specialised bodies, such as Farmers' Liberation Associations, Youth Liberation Associations, Cultural Liberation Associations, Women's Liberation Associations, Student Liberation Associations, or the Workers Liberation Associations ......"227

Greig goes on to list another twenty organisations which fell under the control of the NLF and he also discusses the programme instituted to form 'People's Liberation Committees' whose task it was to govern the people in the liberated zones. In much the same way as the street committees in the RSA, the committees had permanent representatives on them from the Women's, Youth and Farmers Organisations. The creation of front organisations was clearly linked to specific campaigns undertaken by the Viet Cong, Greig mentions the build up support organisations for the NLF before the Tet offensive: "In the months immediately before the opening of the Tet Offensive in February 1968, a whole host of new Communist controlled organisations made their appearance, whose role was to conduct propaganda campaigns and incite unrest in Government areas, so as to prepare the ground for the 'general uprising' to which it was hoped the offensive would lead. These organisations took many forms: 'peace loving

Buddhist soldiers, revolutionary council, uprising committees, etc. After the offensive a number of these new organisations that survived were banded together into a new federation, known as the Alliance of National and Democratic Peace Forces of South Vietnam."[228]

The Viet Cong also activated a network of cells which supplemented the activities of the street committees. The network consisted of clandestine and semi-legal structures. The structure of the networks differed in complexity between the cities and the rural areas but effectively employed the same organisational principles. The activities of the cells included tax collection, propaganda and political education, party committee cells responsible for civil affairs and youth activities as well as co-ordination and intelligence cells[229]. The objectives of this network include the total mobilisation of all the people in a specific area and the discipline of the population. Clearly striking parallels exist between the strategies employed by the Vietcong and the ANC and many of the methods used in Vietnam are readily recognisable in the South African context. The organisational strategies described in these extracts served very similar purposes and functions during that revolutionary situation. In the following chapter the role of organisational warfare in the ANC's strategy will be examined and the role which organisational warfare plays in mobilisation will be explored. The impact of the structures created by the ANC will be evaluated in terms of their scope and effectiveness and their ability to generate mass based support for the ANC in selected areas will be evaluated.

CHAPTER FIVE:

ORGANISATIONAL WARFARE AND PEOPLE'S WAR.

" In order to order to broaden its support base, the insurgent organisation may go beyond the government structures it seeks to imitate by creating functional auxiliaries, such as youth groups, peasant organisations, workers groups, and women's organisations, and by arranging tactical alliances with other independent groups that oppose the government. When this is done the new entity is frequently referred to as a front. The effectiveness of winning adherents by increasing the differentiation of the organisation is exemplified by the Huk movement in the Philippines, where many joined front organisations, often without even knowing party aims."[230]

THE ROLE OF MASS FRONT ORGANISATIONS IN THE FACILITATION OF MOBILISATION:

The organisational process in the townships coincided with the mobilisation of the township population in selected areas through the United Democratic Front, a broad Popular Front structure referred to as a " referodox conglomerate of civic, community, professional, youth and labour organisations."[231] The UDF was intended to bring together a range of anti-Government organisations and to assist in the activation of the youth through pro-ANC organisations such as the Congress of South African Students. This enabled the ANC to actively re-enter the political arena inside the South Africa and to expand its support base in the Eastern Cape despite its banning. The adoption of the Popular Front strategy by the ANC as referred to in the term "National Democratic Revolution" is instructive in itself. " The UDF was conceived of as a front, a federation to which different groups could affiliate and a body in which could link different social interest with common short term objectives."[232] The front was purposely defined in broad enough terms to include organisations which did not share the same overall objectives. The ANC and SACP subscribe to the 'two stage theory'[233] which enabled them to justify the participation of groups or individuals who only support the first stage of the revolutionary process. Traditionally the Popular Front strategy has been employed by Stalinist's when they see little chance of seizing power by direct military confrontation and clearly this was true of the Eastern Cape where a strong military

presence and an institutionalised state structure made this impossible.

THE POPULAR FRONT IN LENINIST THEORY:

The role of the Popular Front in revolutionary strategy, is explained in the following definition offered in the Soviet work entitled What is Revolution, " A major specific feature of people's democracy is that the Communist and Workers parties exercise their leadership in the state not only through organs of people's power, trade unions, youth organisations, co-operatives and so on, but also through organisations like the Popular Front, which is a form of alliance of the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the intelligentsia. The Popular Fronts were formed because the social basis of the revolutionary movement was broad and it is necessary to unite the motive forces of the revolution and establish an alliance of the working class with the peasants and other social classes and social groups coming out for a progressive society."[234] Clearly the involvement of organisations which do not share the overall goals of the ANC and the SACP did not present a problem for the organisations. The popular front is a strategic device not to be confused with populism and does not compromise the basic Leninist values of the SACP. The Chairman of the South African Communist Party explained this in an interview with the Observer, "The ANC, SACP Alliance is part of an emerging coalition of forces which have different objectives but are agreed on the immediate one of overthrowing apartheid and replacing it with a non-racial democracy based on black majority rule. The alliance must be broadened and true socialism would flow naturally in time."[235]

THE LAUNCH OF THE UDF:

The official UDF explanation for its creation centre around the call made by Allan Boesak[236] at the annual congress of the Transvaal Indian Congress in January 1983 at the end of the Anti-South African Indian Council Campaign although the idea was initially a proposal of the forces who later launched the National Forum Committee and was hijacked by the Charterists[237]. The UDF was launched in Cape Town on the 21 August 1983 at Rocklands[238] and soon after this in the Eastern Cape. The launch of the

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UDF was welcomed by the SACP in its publication The African Communist, " The development of a broad front of popular resistance has taken a significant step forward with the launching of the United Democratic Front."[239]

The UDF immediately took a lead in the programme to make South African ungovernable, Thami Mali Chairman of the UDF Soweto Branch stated that, "No amount of intimidation can stop us on our way to liberation ....our duty as the oppressed people is to step up our resistance and create an ungovernable situation."[240] The launch of the UDF in the Eastern Cape took place after various regional conferences to work out the " organisational basis and ideological position" of the UDF[241]. The launch took place under the leadership of Steve Tshwete, a graduate of Robben Island and a committed member of the ANC. Tshwete was assisted in this process by other old-guard ANC supporters who saw the UDF as a means to overcome the banning of the ANC. Tshwete was later to leave the country and was rapidly promoted to coordinator of the ANC 75th Anniversary Celebrations and then to the prestigious position of Commissar of the Army. This was followed by an appointment to the NEC of the ANC. This meteoric rise has been attributed to ANC recognition of the valuable work done in the Eastern Cape.

UDF PRIORITIES AND ANC STRATEGY:

The UDF pledged its support for 'mass action' and embarked on a revolutionary path of action which complemented the external programme adopted by the ANC. The affiliated organisations and their obscure sub-affiliates took the lead in the formation of People's Courts, the trial of opposition figures for treason and their execution using the so called 'necklace' murder involving the victim being burnt under a pile of tyres doused with gasoline. This form of execution provided the ANC with an extremely graphic and effective means of execution which effectively deterred or intimidated opposition to the ANC in the target black communities. "In most of the areas torn by upsurge, government-instituted community councils have been destroyed, and those who man them have either been killed or forced to resign. Black police and informers have been forced, through mass revolutionary violence to quit most of the townships. Thus, in several areas of the country, we have what the press has come to term 'no-go areas'.

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These are areas in which the police have maintained a conspicuous absence, except when patrolling in large military convoys." [242] The ANC used the events and success in the Eastern Cape to promote its credibility and made an all out effort to ensure that it was able to exercise some control over all the organisations which fell within the umbrella of the UDF. The Comrades[243] who imposed a reign of terror over the townships of the Eastern Cape, were recruited from the ranks of these organisations and formed the sharp end of the ANC's campaign to make the townships ungovernable. This mirrored the Viet Cong terror campaign in which 10 000 village chiefs of the 16 000 hamlets were murdered by 1960[244].

The demonstration of political potency forms an important basis for any serious challenge to an established state infrastructure. This involves the organisational as well as the coercive element in what O'Neill describes in the following manner, " The effective functioning of both parallel hierarchies and military units may itself convert people by simply demonstrating the insurgents ability to control an area in defiance of the government (a linkage of demonstration of potency and organisation). Such differentiation is particularly important in situations were the regime is reasonable strong."[245]

Behind the revolutionary rhetoric of this period there appears to have been a genuine attempt to create liberated zones in which the ANC could act freely and mobilise its envisaged People's Army[246]. The creation of mass fronts such as the UDF enabled the ANC to undertake a political programme on a level which had not been seen since before the banning of the ANC. The UDF and its affiliates have heatedly denied that they have any links with the ANC. Subsequent events and the statements of the ANC however suggest otherwise. In its 1987 New years message the ANC had the following to say about revolutionary mass organisations inside the Republic," In many parts of our country we have already made important advances towards the creation of these mass revolutionary bases. We have destroyed many of the enemy's organs of apartheid rule. the masses of the people have played a central role in this process as active participants in the struggle for their own liberation. We have also succeeded to create mass democratic organisations representative of these active and conscious masses, ranging

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from street committees to COSATU, the UDF, the NECC and their affiliates and other democratic formations."[247] The repeated denials by the leadership of the UDF and its affiliates that they were independent of the ANC turned out to be a strategic deception. It succeeded in convincing individuals and organisations inside the country at a time when the ANC itself was unacceptable. Following the unbanning of the ANC a different picture emerged as activists and organisations revealed their true affiliations.

The UDF formulated a concrete policy on the subject of alternative structures or parallel hierarchies which was articulated by Murphy Morobe in a paper delivered to the Institute for a Democratic Alternative. " The rudimentary organs of people's power that have begun to emerge in South Africa (street committees, defence committees, shop-steward structures, student representative councils, parent/teacher/student associations) represent in many ways the beginnings of the kind of democracy that we are striving for. These structures did not originate out of abstract ideas but out of the real political battles being fought against the existing undemocratic institutions that have traditionally sought to control people's lives. Originally, the slogan of 'ungovernability' was popularised as a political weapon in the hands of people with no access to political power. As a speaker said at one of the rallies in the Transvaal during 1984: "we must be difficult to control. We must render the instruments of oppression difficult to work. We must escalate all forms of resistance. We must make ourselves ungovernable." Zwelake Sisulu argued that in a situation of ungovernability, neither the government nor do the people have control. While the direct government rule has been broken, the people have not yet managed to control and direct the situation. There is a therefore a power vacuum and no matter how ungovernable a township is, unless the people are organised, the gains made by ungovernability can be rolled back by state repression. Because there is no organised centre of people's power, the people are relatively defenceless and vulnerable..." It was out of the battles to wrest control of the townships from the state that the slogan "Forward to Peoples Power" was taken up. In many townships, this was actually transferred from a slogan to a reality before the second state of emergency took its toll.[248] The similarity between the rhetoric employed by the UDF and that of the ANC is clear in this line of argument. The UDF's revolutionary aims were also clearly spelled out the role of the State of Emergency in ending the people's power structures in areas

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such as these became evident.

ANC AND SACP STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE UDF:

The SACP and the ANC went one step further in the <u>African Communist,</u> " The years of painstaking work by the party, (SACP) and the ANC are showing results. There is the continued tremendous growth of internal organised opposition, exemplified by among other events, the momentous gathering in Cape Town during last month which launched the UDF."[249] The UDF appears to fall within the same genre as the National Liberation Front of Vietnam indeed its leadership have alluded to the similarities between the fronts. Steve Tshwete, then Border President of the UDF, alluded to this organisational similarity in an address to the National Union of South African Students, (a UDF affiliate) in 1984. In a comparison between the UDF and the Congress Alliance of the 1950's he made the following reference to the similarities: "Lets take the National Liberation Front in Vietnam. It was a tremendously huge alliance of all political, cultural and religious persuasions. Normally it would be difficult to bring these groupings together for any sustained period of time in the absence of any common enemy- French and later American Imperialism. But the Lao Dong Party not only bought them together, but also served as a spearhead."[250]

SWILLING'S ANALYSIS OF THE UDF'S DEVELOPMENT:

In a comprehensive overview of UDF activities Mark Swilling[251] identified the following broad groupings of UDF affiliates, community organisations, ad-hoc and constituency based committees (ie. consumer boycott committees and burial committees), squatter anti-removals committees, transport committees, traders, detainee's, unemployed groups, youth, student, professional and crisis committees[252]. Examples of all these organisations flourished in the strife torn communities in the Eastern Cape. Swilling argues that the UDF has gone through four stages of development and these apply particularly in this region. These are,the phase of 'reactive politics', that of 'community struggle', of ungovernability, and the final phase involves 'organs of people's power'.

The first stage involved reactive measures which commenced with the opposition to the Koornhof Bills and the new Constitution and led to the mass boycotts and the destruction of the local government structures. Swilling argues that the 'reactive phase' of the UDF's strategy ended with the Million Signature Campaign which marked the transition to the phase of 'community struggle'. The second phase began after the tri-cameral elections of August 1984 and centred around the issues created by the various community organisations. These included transport, rent boycotts, squatter revolts, strike action, school boycotts and township stay away's. He claims that the community affiliates were able to "exploit the contradiction between state attempts to improve urban living conditions and the fiscal bankruptcy and political illegitimacy of black local government."[253] The assertion that the UDF utilised the vulnerability of the state during its attempted reforms is instructive and confirms Tambo's claim that this period provided the ANC with an ideal opportunity to attack the power base while at its weakest. The key elements during this period were the 'Vaal Uprising', the national schools boycott, the 1984 workers stay away and a later stay away in the Eastern Cape in 1985. The UDF Transvaal Education forum drew up a review of UDF activities in May 1985 in which the organisation reviewed its position, the organisation stated that it had 'been unable to respond effectively to the spontaneous waves of militancy around the country' and it responded by exploring 'ways to transform mass mobilisation into coherent mass organisation'[254].

Swilling also argues that the states 'coercive response' during this period forced the UDF to go beyond mere organisational activities and resulted in the violence of the townships in which 'groups of youths engaged the security forces in running street battles'. This version of events in the townships fails to mention the active involvement of the ANC and MK in the preparation for and initiation of mass action. The argument that the UDF was forced to move beyond organisation of the people, ignores the fact that the structures created by the UDF often played a leading role in the confrontations between the security forces and the township cadres. In his analysis of the third phase, that of 'ungovernability' Swilling describes the events at the beginning of 1985 as 'urban civil war' and claims that the state was 'forced to admit that it had lost control of the townships'. This was followed by the declaration of a State of Emergency in July 1985

and the collapse of civil authority. Swilling's claim that the 'permanent presence of security forces in the townships fuelled rather than quelled resistance' is open to question as the ANC had committed the mass combat units and the MK squads to do battle with the security forces. Swilling also claims that the 'quasi-military actions squads' were organised by elements outside the UDF. This assertion perhaps contains more than an element of truth, the squads were organised by MK cadres within the UDF structures. This emerges from an examination of ANC discussion documents which highlight the methods employed in this process[255].

Phase four of the process involved the 'organs of people's power' and this centred around the creation of 'new durable decentralised organisational structures' towards the end of 1985. Swilling describes this phase as the most important element of the UDF's four stage development. He describes them as 'sophisticated forms of organisation based on street and area committees', with each street electing street committees which in turn represents area committees. Swilling claims that these structures brought the militant township youths or comrades into discipline by 'dividing youth squads into smaller more disciplined units attached to a 'street or area committee'. This claim is questionable in the light of the discussions on Military Combat Work contained in the Commission on Strategy and Tactics report. The squads were 'disciplined' but rather into effective cadres who acted on central directives in a more sophisticated approach which mirrors MK policy decisions. Swilling identifies the consumer boycotts as the most visible aspect of this phase of UDF development and states that the 'UDF is likely to generate an increasingly radical conception of a liberated society a trend which became increasingly evident in the mobilisational success enjoyed by the ANC and its auxiliaries[256].

TOWNSHIP MOBILISATION.

MOBILISATION OF THE URBAN BLACK POPULATION:

The ANC/SACP set about its strategy of coercive mobilisation utilising any aspect of township life as a vehicle for politicising the population and enhancing their revolutionary potential. The ANC was forced to improvise to insure that it was not left

behind in the process of conflict which spread through the region. An ANC statement by Ronnie Kasrils described the process of ungovernability and the transition to People's War as taking place in the following manner, " We have seen the development among our people of <u>forms of warfare</u>, and our people are showing tremendous creativity. We've seen the growth of <u>barricade tactics</u>, we've seen the <u>digging of ditches and traps</u> for the Hippos and Caspirs, we've seen barbed wire being strung across the roads to catch the enemy forces, we've seen the <u>development of street fighting</u> in the tactical sense, with the people using the labyrinth of township lanes and streets to lure the enemy into ambushes. We've seen the stone been transformed into the petrol bomb and hand grenade; we've seen the people using knives to kill police and soldiers; we've seen the people seizing the enemy's own weapons to use against them."[257] The destruction of the infrastructure and the intimidation also served the purpose of reducing the standard of living in the townships to the point were life became increasingly unbearable. The destruction of community halls, beerhalls, clinics, the disruption of sewage disposal, refuse collection and postal services contributed to the general poverty of the townships making the position of the inhabitants such that mass protest and violence seemed a viable solution to the problems. This campaign to disrupt the infrastructure was actively encouraged by the ANC who rightly identified the threat which government attempts to upgrade the townships posed to its efforts to mobilise support. It is significant that the ANC attack on the township structures came at a time when the state had engaged in a major programme of urban upgrademen!. These projects seem to have come under attack first .

PEOPLE'S WAR IN THE EASTERN CAPE:

The People's War offensive in the Eastern Cape was centred around two core elements, firstly the organisational warfare aspect which involved the launch of a wide variety of front organisations[258] and secondly well co-ordinated boycott/strike actions[259]. Mobilisation took place around contentious issues such as education, transport, rentals and other community issues which were successful politicised through skilful tactical manoeuvring on the part of the organisers. The organisers combined offensive/hostile negotiations techniques with confrontational actions and channelled discontent and

frustration into organisational dynamics[260]. The core of resistance to the state was found in the townships of Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage and Cradock which soon set the tone for the entire region[261]. It was into this environment of tension and economic hardship[262] that Matthew Goniwe's so-called G Plan was activated.

The testimony of former ANC members and the statements of leading UDF activists indicate that the People's War offensive in the Eastern Cape was planned and directed from Lesotho. The ANC during this phase was under the able leadership of Chris Hani who masterminded the structures and identified the priorities for insurgency. Hani's men in the Eastern Cape consisted of veteran MK members such as Henry Fazzie, Edgar Ngoyi, Earnest Malgas and Charles Hashe[263] as well as younger ANC activists who had proven their worth such as Thozamile Botha, Matthew Goniwe and Steve Tshwete. These cadres formed the leadership core in the Eastern Cape and both Botha and Tshwete were to eventually flee the RSA to Lesotho. In June 1982 an ANC Political Department strategy planning meeting took place in Lesotho at Upper Thamae chaired by MK Nompumelelo[264], Commander of the Unit. At the meeting "it was decided to revive and to intensify the activities of PEBCO due to that fact that the organisation was politically dormant as a result of their president, Thozamile Botha, who had obtained political asylum in Lesotho. We then unanimously decided to create a structure based on the aims and objects of the M-Plan of the early 1960's depicting the following, to make the RSA regime ungovernable, to politicise and mobilise and organise the masses at grassroots level, to play a leading role in the liberation of the RSA society and its transformation into an economic, social and political system that will serve the needs of those who are oppressed and exploited."[265] The statement continued, "the Political Department in Lesotho was responsible for the implementation of the above mentioned structure in the Border and Eastern Cape regions. The relevant pamphlets and literature were complied under the auspices of the Propaganda Department for distribution in the Eastern Cape and Border Regions. I wish to state that apart from the distribution of pamphlets and literature, trained cadres were commissioned to infiltrate the Eastern Cape and Border region, to inform the relevant progressive organisations to implement the structure, the M Plan adopted by the Political Department in Lesotho. The area and street committee's present structure in operation in the Eastern Cape, as implemented by the executive of

PEBCO and the UDF during 1985, is the structure which was formulated during 1982 by the Political Department of the ANC in Lesotho."[266] This suggests that the ANC played a direct "hands on" role in events in the Eastern Cape in a manner which makes a mockery of claims that the violence and unrest were totally spontaneous.

The intense conflict which raged across the townships of the Eastern Cape had its origins in specific regions but rapidly spread from town to town as co-ordination structures improved and intricate management mechanisms evolved in certain areas. Callinicos observed that "in the Eastern Cape, a traditional ANC stronghold, the UDF undoubtedly has a formidable mass base. For example, the Cradock Residents' Association, formed in October 1983 as a result of struggles against rent rises, built youth and student wings and organised a network of elected street committees."[267] This organisation was to serve as a virtual prototype for township mobilisation in the region.

The formation of the township organisations and the campaign in the townships coincided with the release of many older ANC and SACP activists who had completed jail sentences[268], these activists played a leading role in the organisation of structures and provided visible community leaders to replace those murdered or intimidated into abandoning the townships[269]. The ANC also activated or infiltrated numbers of Agit-prop officers into the country, agitators who were trained in the skills of urban guerrilla warfare as well as the psychological warfare techniques of People's War[270]. These cadres played a leading role in the planning for the variety of organisations formed to fill the vacuum[271]. These included 'peoples education, peoples courts, peoples medicine and other functions of "alternative" local government[272]. The ANC allocated the following tasks to these alternative structures, firstly organising the masses and transforming the 'no go areas' into 'strong mass revolutionary bases' to provide the 'ground for the growth and development of our people's army and the escalation of people's war'. Secondly, transforming these areas into 'strong mass revolutionary bases to serve as organs of insurrection and self government'. The third aspect involved ensuring that the 'expelled and rejected organs of apartheid' remained expelled and fourthly spreading this to other areas[273]. These organisations and the structures of 'people's power played a central role in the planned establishment of base areas and

ANC strategy indicates the importance attached to this. The degree to which the ANC was able to create the conditions for "people's power" in certain circumstances is evident in the observation by a sympathetic journalist that " the township power structures; responsible for checking reporters credentials, escorting the families of the bereaved, and generally keeping order, is like the experience of crossing into another country. One minute we were being searched by blue-uniformed police of the old order, and the next minute, only steps away, we were under guardianship of the new South Africa."[274]

THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE "G PLAN".

THE ORIGINS OF THE G PLAN

The basis for the functioning of the so-called "G Plan", was the formation of the UDF in August 1983 following a build up by the ANC and SACP promoting the launch of a mass democratic people's front which would serve as the legal voice of the 'liberation movement' inside South Africa[275]. The UDF bought together a comprehensive range of 'progressive' organisations into its United Front structures around what was initially a one issue campaign[276]. Callinicos observed that "the ANC's hold on the masses has been greatly strengthened as a result of the emergence of the United Democratic Front."[277] The most important component of the UDF strategy was the launch of various 'civic associations' or Civics which represented the interests of street and area committees at a regional and national level. Callinicos states that the state's attempts to establish Black Local Authorities has stimulated the "formation of a dense network of civic organisations. These civics, as they are called, have played an active role in a variety of struggles around rents, rates, transport and education, helping to create a high level of popular mobilisation."[278] This process was begun in the Eastern Cape were the launch of a range of civic organisations was a portent of things to come. The UDF therefore played a crucial role in the creation of parallel hierarchies in the townships. The following extract from a Zimbabwean publication accurately places the UDF within context. " The resurgence of extra-parliamentary legal opposition in the form of the UDF should not be understood to be a rejection of armed struggle. Rather than seeing itself in opposition to the armed struggle, the UDF through its public statements has indicated

that it sees itself as supplementing the thrust of the national liberation movement. This would seem to indicate that the UDF has a similar understanding to the ANC as to how to destroy the apartheid regime."[279]

MATTHEW GONIWE AND CRADOCK:

The G Plan, as it described in this thesis for convenience, was named after Matthew Goniwe, a UDF regional organiser in the isolated rural town of Cradock in the Eastern Cape, a listed communist sentenced to four years imprisonment under the Transkei Suppression of Communism Act in 1977 who was released in 1981[280]. Goniwe, the acting principal at the Sam Xhalli Junior Secondary School in Cradock, played a leading role in the formation of the Cradock Youth Association (CRADOYA) and became a central figure in the Cradock Residents Organisation (CRADORA)[281]. Goniwe was elected rural organiser of the Eastern Cape region of the UDF and played a central role in mobilising the township under the UDF banner[282]. Goniwe had obtained his Higher Education Diploma at Fort Hare and studied for a B.A while serving his sentence under the Suppression of Communism Act in the 1970's[283]. He masterminded a systematic programme of coercive mobilisation of the small black township around structures which were replicated throughout the Eastern Cape and in many other black townships[284]. Goniwe worked in close contact with other ANC activists in the neighbouring towns of Grahamstown, Port Alfred, Alexandria and also with the Port Elizabeth and East London Civic Associations[285]. Indications are that Goniwe drew heavily from the M Plan and consulted some of the older activists in the Eastern Cape who had been involved in the ANC during the 1950s[286]. An informal coordinating committee comprising largely of ex-Robben Island inmates who were schooled in the ideology and strategies of the ANC and who appear to have planned many of their activities during their incarceration in this political prison played a central role in the process of mobilisation and were heavily involved[287].

The township of Lingelihle outside Cradock was described in the New York Times Magazine during 1985 as " a place which has come to symbolise something new in the amorphous battle of South Africa's black majority of 23 million people for a say in the

running of their lives. It is a place of defiance, where the days events might include burning the home of a local official regarded as a stooge, or running from the teargas of the police. "The people have come to realise that they can defy the government", said Matthew Goniwe, a school headmaster closely involved in the conflict. Cradock is 120 miles north of Port Elizabeth, in the heart of the troubled Eastern Cape, which regards itself as the cradle of resistance and is cited by black activists as a symbol of dogged struggle and commitment."[288] This perception was encouraged in the South African media which went to great lengths to demonstrate the extent to which the "people" had seized control over the township.

THE LAUNCH OF CRADORA:

The Cradock Civic organisation was unofficially launched in March 1983 ostensibly to bring the complaints of the residents of the Lingelihle Black township to the attention of the government and local authorities[289]. The complaints related to housing services, rents and other community issues in a community faced with extreme economic depression[290]. CRADORA's stated intention was to act as guardian of the community's interests, to unite the community; assume leadership in community affairs and to co-operate with similar organisations[291]. The committee of four nominated to select the executive committee consisted of Goniwe, James Nqikashe, Gladwell Makaula, Wesley Balley and Fort Calata who in turn selected an Executive committee made up of Matthew Goniwe, Fort Calata, Clifford Nkutu and Bully Msinekelwa[292] all of whom were to become heavily involved in the UDF and its regional structures. Goniwe gave his version of the reasons for the formation of CRADORA in an interview with a foreign magazine: " I came here in 1983" said Mr. Goniwe, a trim, bespectacled man of 38 who once was jailed for five years (sic) for purportedly spreading Marxist propaganda. Things were pretty bad then, he said. The schools and churches had descended into a moral morass, renting their premises for discotheques that provided a front for drugs and liquor and "even the rape of girls". Mr Goniwe and Mr Calata, began the cleanup, replacing the discos with school concerts and choir practice. Mr Calata started the Cradock Youth Association. Inevitably politics became part of it, and such words as "mobilisation" and "raising political consciousness" were heard, confirming the authorities suspicions that

agitators and agents were at work in the township, subversive elements using marxist words. Then co-incidentally, the local authorities tried to raise rents in the government owned housing, so CRADORA was formed by Mr Goniwe, assisted by white liberal activists from Port Elizabeth to fight the rises."[293]

Linghelihle's population of 17 000 were to become extensively mobilised over a period of three years around Cradora's structures as the organisation was one of the first to implement the ANC's call to create 'organs of people's power' in the townships[294]. The impetus to form the organisation, came at a meeting held in Grahamstown at which Philani Nkayi, an ANC activist who had completed a sentence on Robben Island, discussed the M Plan with Goniwe[295]. This was followed up by a planning session in which Roland White allegedly assisted in the planning of the structures for the mobilisation of Lingelihle's population[296]. At a meeting chaired by Goniwe on 8 December 1983, it was decided to establish a branch of the UDF in Cradock and CRADORA was the result of this initiative. CRADORA moved towards political radicalism shortly after its establishment and went far beyond its initial mandate to advance community issues[297].

BASIS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GONIWE'S STRATEGY:

Goniwe's transfer to the staff of a school in nearby Graaff-Reinet became the pretext for threats to initiate a schools boycott and as early as January 1984, the assault of school inspectors, the destruction of the homes of policemen and of the school buildings, and the burning of school books was discussed and approved at a CRADORA meeting[298]. A decision was taken at a meeting held on the 1st of June 1984 under the chairmanship of James Nqikashe[299] to hold a schools boycott if the transfer came through, this decision was endorsed and a programme of action formulated at a meeting held in the Ascension Church Hall attended by the leadership of PEBCO, the Grahamstown Civic Association (GRACA), the Uitenhage Black Civic Organisation (UBCO), the UDF, Port Elizabeth Youth Congress (PEYCO) and other Charterist organisations in the region.

This paved the way for the boycott which followed which Gladwell Makhawula,

PHYSICAL STRUCTURES OF THE G PLAN:

The township was divided up into four zones known as Mooiplaas, Bongweni, Langamore and Vergenoeg which were administered by alternative structures[306]. These structures were comprehensive and resulted in CRADORA establishing control over the township[307]. Following the arrest of Gladwell Makaula on charges of arson an *ad-hoc* committee was announced which included Tamsanqa Hani, Stephen Maqegu and Nojaja Puta[308]. By late 1984, CRADORA was in close contact with and coordinating with other groups such as PEBCO, PEYCO and other UDF affiliates in the Eastern Cape. In the months that followed representatives from CRADORA and CRADOYA attended meetings of the UDF and other UDF-affiliated organisations in other centres as speakers and observers.

In line with the policies and actions of these organisations, CRADORA began to encourage rent boycotts, business boycotts and attacks on town councillors[309]. The township residents were mobilised and threats made against collaborators with promises that the political order would be swept away at any time. At a meeting held at Makaula residence the possible burning of the beerhall was discussed and plans made to kill Constables Gumenge and Siteto of the SAP[310]. In November 1984 a new Executive Committee was elected, it consisted of Gladwell Makaula, Elizabeth Sibanda, Sparo Mkhonto, Bhabhise Skeyi, Matthew Goniwe, Victor Puwani, Fort Calata and Mbulelo Goniwe[311]. Pensioners were encouraged to abandon the state run pension scheme and make use of the CRADORA help programme. At a meeting with the town council held on the 17th of December 1984 the town councillors were told to resign from their posts[312]. The activities of 1984 climaxed with a "Black Christmas" church service on Christmas day. After this service, it became clear that a rift had sprung up in the leadership. Goniwe and his lieutenant Gladwell Makuala were challenged by Fort Calata grandson of the first Secretary General of the ANC, Canon Calata[313] and a founder member of CRADORA over the issue of the school boycotts. The potential conflict appears to have never reached its full potential due to Goniwe and Calata's death.

CRADORA IN ACTION:

1985 saw a major escalation in the activities of the organisation and a determined shift towards violence and open identification with the ANC and the South African Communist Party. CRADORA attempted to officially launch itself at the beginning of February 1985 but the launch was banned in terms of the emergency regulations, a decision upheld by Supreme Court judge Schoon in Grahamstown[314]. Funerals were held at which the crowds were encouraged to attack the Police and vehicles and houses were stoned. There was increasing evidence of a determined drive against authority. Instructions were given by the leadership of CRADORA to burn collaborators, attack police personnel carriers, attack, burn and stone police houses, to destroy municipal vehicles, to start a business boycott and to collect money for legal costs. CRADORA attempted to enhance its credibility by engaging in a prolonged series of exchanges with government representatives with the assistance of Molly Blackburn of the PFP[315]. When it appeared that the minister concerned was willing to visit the township and discuss certain issues with CRADORA it was decided that the negotiations would be broken off. The Minister's concerned visited the township on the 22 of April 1985 and held talks with all the other parties with the exception of CRADORA. Goniwe informed a closed meeting at his house in July, that hit squads from Soweto were coming to Cradock to murder white members of the Security Branch of the South African Police. At subsequent public meetings and funerals, ANC slogans were frequently used and ANC and SACP flags displayed at numerous occasions.

The situation in the township degenerated into a level of ungovernability. " In the township numerous roadblocks set up on all roads were noticed. These comprised large stones, paint tins, rusty wire and in one case, the shell of a burnt out car. Throughout the township large groups of children of school-going age were gathered around street corners."[316] On one occasion a message from Oliver Tambo was relayed by them to a funeral gathering of thousands. Other well known leaders of the National Democratic Movement were brought in to address funeral gatherings. The degree to which CRADORA was able to defy the state is evident in the following observation made by an American journalist who stated that "the authorities seem to acknowledge their

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impotence to redeem the township, for they come here only in armoured trucks or in the person of security men with pistols tucked into their waistbands."[317] At a mass meeting of COSAS "comrades" a decision was taken to intensify the schools boycott and the rescheduling of exams was called for[318].

The death of Goniwe, Mkhonto and Calata while returning from a meeting in Port Elizabeth focused world attention on Cradock[319]. The funeral, attended by thousands of ANC supporters from the Eastern Cape and other areas of the RSA was addressed by top level UDF leadership who made it clear where their sympathies lay. The SACP and ANC flags as well as MK banners were prominently displayed and speakers stressed that the only difference between the ANC and CRADORA was the fact that the ANC had weapons[320]. A message of support from Oliver Tambo was read out by UDF leader and alleged MK member Rev. Stofile who said that the ANC viewed the men as "hero comrades" and Stone Sizane emphasised that Umkhonto and the UDF would stand together against the government[321]. The death of the UDF activists remains unsolved and occurred only months before a similar fate met PEBCO leadership figures[322]. CRADORA and its various affiliates continued to operate under the leadership of Gladwell Makaula.

COSAS suspended the school boycott in October 1985 and re-entered negotiations with the Department of Education and Training assisted by CRADORA. After these talks broke down the comrades went on the rampage burning eight schools, the homes of three councillors and a police vehicle[323]. Only 10% of the High School pupils in the townships wrote their exams amongst intimidation and the use of People's Courts to punish pupils who attended school[324]. The entire Eastern Cape was by now experiencing consumer boycotts and school stay-aways and Black teachers joined the boycott after a meeting held in March 1985. The Eastern Cape Traders Association (a UDF affiliate) decided to endorse the consumer boycott further strengthening the efforts of the ANC in the region[325]. Life in this ANC liberated zone changed considerably, US journalist Alan Cowell described it as follows: "But though the young people of Cradock's township have won a kind of organised anarchy, beyond government control, they have done so only by losing their education, by abandoning creativity in favour of

the clenched fist salute and the rhetoric of liberation. Their days are fittered away in endless games of dice between occasional bouts of conflict with the police. Cradock has become a crucible of violence that, in the manner of Northern Ireland or Beirut, burns away the frivolities of youth and spawns a lost generation."[326] During 1985 and 1986, CRADORA began to make efforts to extend its influence to neighbouring towns and villages by forming local affiliates. Thus a Noupoort Youth Organisation and a George Youth Organisation came into being. Efforts were also made in Cookhouse to involve school children in boycotts and unrest. By late 1985 the situation in the township had deteriorated to the point where "the members of the community council in Cradock have all resigned rather than face the wrath of young militants. In effect, a government-conceived body has abdicated in favour of CRADORA, which has become the popular voice that defies the authorities."[327]

It became clear that CRADORA had become an important part of a national network with close links with the exiled ANC. CRADORA restructured its management structures in late 1985 and adopted a clandestine management system which involved the use of "front" people who would protect the identities of the real activists[328]. The first indications of a formalised "G Plan" emerged during April 1986 when the activists began to refer to the alternative structures as the "G Plan". At a "Civic Workshop' held in Cradock the similarities between the G Plan and the M Plan were spelled out and plans made to escalate the mass mobilisation process. CRADORA also reactivated the consumer boycott and organised stay-aways on key occasions and expanded its control over the township. Although CRADORA became more sophisticated during this period it would appear that following Goniwe's death very little happened in the way of progress. The organisational structures developed but increasing police action including the detention and prosecution of activists curbed CRADORA activity[329]. The growing suspicion around the leadership of Makaula also appears to have paralysed the organisation and led to some tension between two rival factions in the leadership[330].

The organisation ceased to operate effectively following the imposition of the Second State of Emergency. The reasons identified for this development include the timely detention of the key activists in the organisation, the strict enforcement of the provisions

of the Emergency including the prevention of all potential mass mobilisation events, normalisation of the township could take place due to the rapid decline in incidents of unrest and growing conflict between leadership figures[331]. This is reinforced by the assessment of the Institute for Black Research which found that, "the system resorted to other means to contain the resistance. Armed as it was with a network of spies, it identified weaknesses in the community and weaknesses were not difficult to find. While popular and strongly organised, the officials of civic bodies such as PEBCO and CRADORA were often driven into taking decisions without proper consultation. The state of emergency in which the region found itself prevented the holding of public meetings. The focus was on action, and the onslaught from the government came at such a pace, that there was little time for thought. Decisions were reactive and if spontaneous, also impulsive, taken in good faith, but without sufficient consideration of the price people had to pay and when people demurred from falling into line, there was coercion and incidents of internalised violence. This created breaches in the solidarity and the system exploited the breaches"[332]. The New York times carried the following statement about conditions in Cradock, "Informers are a principal weapon of the security police, part of a police force of 47 000 people, half of them white, who must control a population of 10 million blacks near the urban areas. 'We reckon there's one informer active in every three streets' said one activist and the web of informers is widely believed to include some African National Congress exiles and many members of activist groups inside the country."[333]

G PLAN STRUCTURES AND PEOPLE'S WAR:

The G Plan functioned through a dual structure in which the street committee formed the basic unit and was responsible for the mobilisation of the residents of a particular street. These street committees were charged with the collection of taxes and the basic levels of Peoples Government, including the raising of 'self defence units and the collective production of basic foodstuffs. The street committees fell under the authority of the area committees which liaised with the regional committee which in turn received orders from the National Executive. The 'progressive organisations' launched with UDF guidance formed the other element of the G Plan and worked together with the 'organs of peoples

power' to implement the projected 'ungovernability'. The G Plan was designed to enable the UDF to control and direct black political awareness and frustration against selected targets to achieve similar basic aims to those set out by the ANC for the creation of liberated zones.

In the 1988 "New Year's message" the ANC stated: "The answer is that we must remain on the attack, maintain our offensive posture and, in struggle, win new grounds in our advance towards peoples' power. To achieve a further advance to peoples' power, these must be our watchwords - plan, organise, attack! The reasons which compelled us to take up arms have not changed .... The armed struggle constitutes the spearhead of our general offensive, a crucial element in our response to the violence of the racist regime. We must raise the level of this struggle in a decisive manner, draw the masses of our people into actual combat and realise our objective of transforming our armed actions into a peoples' war. The call we made in the past - every patriot a combatant, every combatant a patriot - continues to be of central relevance in all our work."[334] From these "revolutionary bases" or liberated zones the "combat units" had to be trained for attacks on strategic installations and targets. By extending such attacks throughout the Republic, it was intended to weaken the effectiveness of the South African Security Forces and demoralise the people.

ANC AND UDF POLICY AND THE G PLAN:

The ANC and the UDF believed that the extension and development of these structures and organisational strategies would enable them to consolidate and hold these areas for extended periods of time. The G Plan was therefore essentially an application of the parallel hierarchies principle within the South African context. It was directed at giving the ANC a serious insurgent capability in the townships and provided a visible profile for the organisation. The means used were multi dimensional and utilised powerful social forces in the communities to achieve support. These included religion, sport, culture, resistance art and guerrilla theatre, education and women's emancipation. Paulus Zulu observed in Resistance in The Townships that " resistance has acted as the main agent in conscientising the masses and mobilising them against social, economic and

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political disadvantages."[335] The ANC believed that these areas could provide MK with much vital support in the form of intelligence, logistical supply, recruits, transport, safe-houses and other basic military requirements for an effective urban insurgency[336]. In 1987 the ANC stated: " Our objectives must be to create mass revolutionary bases in all Black areas throughout the country and to mount a strategic offensive against the enemy in its stronghold in the towns and the cities. It is also vital that each mass revolutionary base must have its combat forces which will act both to defend the people and to mount armed attacks against the enemy beyond the given area and throughout the country"[337].

The political campaigns run by the UDF and its affiliates also supplemented this strategy. A good example of this was the so-called "Troops Out Of The Townships" campaign spearheaded by South Africa's own Peace Movement, the End Conscription Campaign (ECC). This campaign sought to pressurise the government to withdraw the South African Defence Force from the townships thus leaving the under staffed and badly equipped South African Police to control the unrest. The UDF also used strategies such as the consumer boycotts to place pressure on the business communities in such small towns as Cradock and Port Alfred which in turn resulted in the temporary withdrawal of the security forces to facilitate negotiations[338]. These negotiations turned out to nothing more than a ruse to enable the UDF to reorganise its structures after a particularly successful clamp down on its activities[339]. The G Plan was most successfully implemented in the Eastern Cape region of South Africa. The process which Goniwe implemented consisted of three distinct stages, firstly the break down of the existing power structures through 'ungovernability', this served as a transitionary stage until such time as the second stage in which the establishment of alternative structures took place. This in turn was to lead to the creation of People's Power[340].

PORT ALFRED: REVOLUTIONARY 'SHOWPIECE' OF THE EASTERN CAPE.

" We are involved in politics and politics is bargaining for power. Power resides with the numerical support that one can mobilise for one's cause or purpose. That support has to be consolidated into a tangible mass - the organisation. That is why we formed organisations. That is why the Port Alfred Civic Organisation is a conglomeration of interests, PAPA for pensioners interests, NOSGA for

educational interests and PAYCO for the interest of the youth. The federal nature of the organisation is to ensure equal representation of all interests. Hence there is a central committee with an executive. But this is not sufficient for information dissemination and communication, hence enabling structures like area committees and street committees to ensure this."[341]

PARCO AND THE PORT ALFRED STRUCTURES:

Another successful application of the principles of the G Plan strategy was in the township of Inkwekwezi at Port Alfred where the elected black community council collapsed in May 1985 following a series of necklacing's acts of terror and arson attacks against the councillors[342]. The Eastern Cape Development Board administered the township until they too were driven out by UDF affiliated organisations. The area effectively entered the ungovernability stage and ANC cadres were able to work freely amongst the people in what was effectively a liberated zone. The Port Alfred Residents Civic Organisation (PARCO)[343], led by one of Goniwe close fiends and fellow organisers, Gugile Nkwinti, filled this vacuum.

Nkwinti, a male nurse from a psychiatric hospital and founding chairman of the Nomzama Secondary High School Student Guardian Association, was to play a central role in the events which followed[344]. Aided by his wife and co-organiser Koleka, and UDF supporters in the township, Nkwinti created a structure which enabled him to exercise a surprising degree of control over the township[345]. At the height of the unrest he held the following positions in Alternative structures in the township, Chairman of NOSGA, Committee member of GRACA, General Secretary and Chairman of PARCO and Chairman of the Albany District of the Eastern Cape. He was later to be elected UDF organiser in the Albany region which included Alexandria, Alicedale, Bathurst, Grahamstown, Kenton-on-Sea, Port Alfred and Patterson[346]. Nkwinti had a personal bodyguard of 30 COSAS scholars who guarded his house against retaliatory attacks by Azanian Student Movement Members and served as his cadres. This led to the murder of two AZASM members in an incident in which Nkwinti was allegedly involved. The functions of these squads of COSAS members was to search for AZASM members, to enforce the consumer and beer-hall boycotts. PARCO mobilised the township around the slogan of "Unite, Organise and Resist" with the assistance of the Congress of South

African Students.

MOBILISATION IN PORT ALFRED:

Nkwinti described the process of mobilisation and its objectives as follows, " We are involved in politics and politics is bargaining for power. Power resides with the numerical support that one can mobilise for one's cause or purpose. That support has to be consolidated into a tangible mass - the organisation. That is why we formed organisations. That is why the Port Alfred Civic Organisation is a conglomeration of interests, PAPA for pensioners interests, NOSGA for educational interests and PAYCO for the interest of the youth. The federal nature of the organisation is to ensure equal representation of all interests. Hence there is a central committee with an executive. But this is not sufficient for information dissemination and communication, hence enabling structures like area committees and street committees to ensure this."[347] Nkwinti's vision of a unified township serving under the structures he created is obvious. This organisational basis would serve as the practical core of the People's War effort in the township. Gordan Jawuka, Vice Chairman of NOSGA described this organisations formative role in the following manner, " The complete political organisational structure and involvements in the Port Alfred township, originated from the establishment of NOSGA."[348]

NOSGA was launched in December 1983[349] with its launch committee consisting of the following members:
Chairman: Gugile Nkwinti.
Vice Chairman: Gordon Jawuka.
Publicity Secretary: Stanley Mntundini.
General Secretary: Nosipho Mdlalo.
Eight Additional members[350].

Jawuka states that Nkwinti immediately assigned NOSGA to pressurise the Department of Education and Training to eject Mr Mzizi from his post as Headmaster of the Nonzama School in Port Alfred. This resulted in the first school boycott which began in

October 1984. The politicisation of the township took place during these initial stages under the auspices of the Port Alfred Black Civic Organisation (PABCO) described by Swilling as "an organisation tied to elements within local government structures"[351] and mass mobilisation accelerated due to an intense NOSGA campaign around the UDF Million Signature Campaign. They received considerable publicity for these early activities in the alternative media, especially Rhodes students publications. Nkwinti's plans to form PARCO were revealed at a meeting of the Eastern Cape Civic Bodies in Grahamstown at the Livingston Church, he claimed at Rhodes University on the 22nd April 1985 that he had used his cousin Nkululeko Mntundini to infiltrate the community council. The activities of NOSGA led to the disbandment of PABCO in 1984 "paving the way for activists to address wider civic matters."[352] These included the burning down of the beer-hall on 30th October 1984 and of the premises of the Eastern Cape Development Board on the 5th of November 1984. Nkwinti was appointed Eastern Cape organiser for the Regional Committee for Crisis in Education.

NELSON MANDELA TOWNSHIP:

The township was renamed after ANC leader Nelson Mandela, becoming a model for People's Government and was hailed by the printed media as a triumph for 'peaceful co-existence'. Nkwinti sent a letter to Nelson Mandela inviting him to Port Alfred after his release and stated that " the residents have given up hope that the authorities will ever upgrade this area. They are now pinning all their hopes on Mandela."[353] Jawuka described a meeting addressed by Nkwinti in 1985 in which the overall plans for the township were explained, "At this meeting Nkwinti discussed the street and area committees as part and parcel of the People's Structures, to implement People's Power in the township. He said that these street and area committees are essential to impose people's power and to organise and mobilise the people at grassroots or street level."[354] In an article entitled 'Blacks Share Power, South African Style', The Wall Street Journal described it as follows: "One branch of the townships network of area and street committees calls itself a 'soviet'. The 'central committee' of Nelson Mandela Township, occupies a building that was formerly home of the white run administration board of the black township. Blacks run the township health care clinic and day care centre, the

primary school and the 'peoples courts."[355]

Behind this lay a much harsher reality, the people's government regulated every facet of the inhabitants existence imposing rigid moral codes and undermining the authority of the traditional community leaders. The establishment of a People's Militia responsible for the maintenance of the liberated zone involved the selection and training of eight Street Patrols who marshalled the township around the UDF's programme. The establishment of People's Courts followed with the division of the township into six 'magisterial districts' each of which had its own court, 'magistrate', 'deputy-magistrate' and peoples prosecutor. Charges were laid by the commanders of the Street Patrols who then allowed the prosecutor to charge the accused, fines levied were allegedly paid into the "people's chest".

PARCO AFFILIATES AND PEOPLE'S WAR:

The Central Committee 'nationalised' all private land or small plots in the township and appointed workers to grow food on the land which was collectively produced and distributed. This socialist measure was described in an interview in the State Of The Nation, "Our first project was to grow food. It was agreed that each family in the community would render their yard to agriculture, and in each street committee an agriculturalist was elected. These agricultural representatives have a council and they elect an executive and meet with other organisations. They decide what to plough, onions, cabbages, mielies, and so on. The family has the duty to look after the plants and the street committee also looks into this. Some yards were in a bad way and had never been cultivated before. The youth were deployed there to cultivate. But most of the people involved in the agricultural council are pensioners. Each family gets 10% of the crop from their yard free."[356]

Nkwinti and his advisors also established a range of organisations which ran parallel to the street committees, these included the Port Alfred Youth Congress[357], the Nonzomo Student's Guardians Association[358], the Port Alfred Workers Union[359], described the function of this organisation in the following manner, "This organisation was established

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to mobilise the workers in the community and the executive was chosen to represent the workers[360]. The Port Alfred Pensioners Association was also formed in 1985 to, "mobilise the pensioners to contribute towards the democratic struggle." Nkwinti also assisted in the launch of the Port Alfred Progressive Teachers Organisation and the Port Alfred Women's organisation[361]. Jawuka attributed this to the following realisation, "This organisation materialised when it was established that the women, who could contribute a lot to the freedom struggle, had no basis to operate from"[362]. Following the banning of COSAS in 1985 the Port Alfred Student Congress was formed.

This range of organisations effectively mobilised the township into well regulated UDF affiliated organisations which were represented on the Central Committee along with the representatives of the Street and Area Committees[363]. The Central Committee was made up of representatives of all the different organisations in the township with the proviso that all these members also be members of an area committee. Two representatives of each area committee represented their area on the Central Committee with two members of every street committee serving on the Area Committee. The Civic served as the overall coordinating structure and served as a management structure for the national democratic movement and represented the movement in the negotiations with the Employers Federation[364].

Nkwinti described the role of and purpose for the Civic as follows, " The civic is the people, and the people are the civic. The people fight for what is theirs and what is theirs is themselves. This is a contextual description of the Civic. The Black people's of South Africa have found themselves the problem of the white government of the Republic of South Africa..... Because "town councils" were planned without blacks, they are viewed with suspicion, and at times hatred. The Civic is therefore a collective response to the abject socio-economic conditions in which they find themselves. The people identify themselves as the White man's problem. When the people make a cry about lack of proper housing, unbearable rentals, inadequate water supply etc, that is a Civic cry."[365]

PARCO CAMPAIGNS AND THE CONSUMER BOYCOTTS: NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTACT WITH THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY.

The consumer boycott called by NOSGA, COSAS, PAYCO and PAWU began on the 30th May 1985 and centred around the release of twenty three UDF activists arrested for public violence during the previous months. This was followed by a four day consumer boycott which was to serve as a prototype for later actions[366]. Nkwinti appeared in court on the 5th June 1985 on charges of intimidation resulting from events in the township[367]. The consumer boycott resulted in negotiations between the UDF organisations and various local government officials and local businessmen. These included Louis Kok, the Chief Director of the Eastern Cape Development Board, George Reynolds of the Department of Community Development, Nationalist MP Jannie van der Vyver, Various representatives of the Department of Education and Training, representatives of the Urban Foundation and Charles de Bruin of the Port Alfred Chamber of Commerce. As a result of the negotiations and concessions made by the local government authorities the consumer boycott was lifted on the 19th July 1985 after Nkwinti handed over the list of twenty demands to the Port Alfred Employers Federation. These included the rejection of the black local authorities, the withdrawal of the SADF and SAP from the township and lower rentals for pensioners.

The negotiations with the Employers Federation formed an important facet of the process of legitimization for PARCO. The first round of negotiations took place between the local government officials and the PARCO representatives[368] but the basis for the negotiations are questionable. Du Bruin described the negotiations as a success and stated that all had seen results emerging[369]. In an article by Michael Valpy of the Toronto Globe and Mail, reprinted in the Daily Dispatch Du Bruins basic attitude towards the negotiations emerges in greater detail. " I told them that I admitted with shame that we knew what conditions were like in the township. One of the leading businessmen from Queenstown phoned me this morning and asked me what it is that we are doing right and they are not. I said, look, you've got to eat humble pie at this stage. Because if you tell me as a businessman in Queenstown that you were unaware of what was going on in your black township where you get most of your income from your bottle shop, then I'll

tell you that you're a bloody liar. That is the first thing you say: that you're bloody ashamed. And unfortunately that is it. We admitted that at our first meeting."[370]

The negotiations followed an introduction made by a local white trader, Delys Sparg who was described as having 'links to the black township'. Sparg, gave the names of various UDF activists in the township who were then approached[371]. Nkwinti's real agenda seems to have escaped some of the white negotiating team who could not see the wider implications of his demands. He told the E.P Herald that " the township was under the control of the Eastern Cape Development Board although paralysed and defunct. We are faced with a situation where we are attempting to push for the boards formal handing over of the control of the township to the white municipality. Our goal for Port Alfred is one town, one council."[372] Pressure from the Chamber of Commerce and the Nationalist MP resulted in the release of detainees and PARCO responded by temporarily lifting the boycott. This led to sharp criticism from the UDF who instructed that the boycott be reimposed. During September a new boycott was called which achieved little real success[373].

PARCO CONTROL OF PORT ALFRED TOWNSHIP:

The Civic had consolidated its control over the township by the end of 1985 when People's Power was a daily reality to the people of Port Alfred's township. Control over the education system was a priority for Nkwinti who described the situation as follows, " We're the first community to introduce People's Education, we've already started a creche and a pre-primary school with more than 228 Children. Attendance is compulsory and the syllabus will be drawn up in consultation with the students organisation and the parents of prospective children."[374] Kholeka Nkwinti began the creche in the township as a function of the Port Alfred Women's Organisation. A BBC documentary compiled by Nick Worral about the township described the creche in the following manner, "The children in this creche are aged from 2 to 4, but it is no ordinary creche for innocent children. This is a freedom song which says: "We will success in our struggle" and asks "Where is Oliver Tambo?", it is an ANC song."[375]

In the documentary Kholeka Nkwinti stresses the importance of the creche as a preparation of the children for their role in the struggle "They understand, they see teargas all the time because the police move up and down the township doing this. They see them shooting people. A child will take a gun and will say I will shoot that policeman."[376] Worral describes the curriculum as follows, " The toi-toi is an aggressive war like chant which mocks the South African Police and their weapons. These tiny children are taught not to fear them. One day they may be called upon to fight for a non-racial South Africa. Some people say the revolution is only around the corner and it is already in those children. Isn't it? 14000 people live here in small neat houses along dirt roads with no drainage or sewerage. The grass is cut neatly but the refuse is collected irregularly."[377]

The Civic is described as follows, This has replaced the community council which resigned last year under pressure from the residents who said it had been set up as an arm of white control. These sell out councils as they are known, have come under growing popular pressure, sometimes violent pressure to step aside for peoples democracy. Here in Port Alfred, Nkwinti's organisation has been remarkably successful in persuading the white town below to accept change."[378]

The creche and its political role in the education of the youth around the revolutionary cause is spelled out in the following extract from an interview with Nkwinti, " Part of the reason was to free the mothers to work and involve themselves, but a more important reason was that we can ensure that our children grow up being aware of history, and can be groomed from toddlerhood. They learn to compare leaders like P.W. Botha, Mandela, Treurnicht and Molly Blackburn. It is compulsory for the kids to go to the pre-school and creche. Nothing has to be paid, except 20c from each and every resident, whether they have six children attending or none. The creche also builds unity in the community. A place where there are kids is convergence zone. It draws many people in, and popularises organisation. For PT, the kids learn the toi-toi. Kids are just toi-toi-ing in the street for fun, without understanding the origin of it, and that is a serious matter. Now they learn to toi-toi properly, as a form of physical training, and to understand the words. For these reasons, the teachers for the pre-school and the creche must be from the organisation.

They must teach the kids correct things. Even the Bible should be interpreted to reinforce democratic ideas."[379] This addresses the core of people's education and the emphasis which was placed on control of the education system and provides an insight into the type of attitude the ANC would have to education in a post revolutionary South Africa.

The street committee's powers included the running of the 'people's courts' in the township with Nkwinti providing much of the training to the so called officials[380]. Cases which proved beyond the power of the street committees were referred to the Area and Central Committee for a verdict. The success of the People's Courts in this area is evident when the drastic fall off in reported crime is taken into account and the influence appears to have been somewhat proportionate[381]. The operation of the People's Courts is best described by examining a particle example reported in the Albany press. " Terror and violence has returned to Port Alfred's township after six months of peace. This man has more than a dozen lashes and wounds from a sjambok attack. His wrists are cut and scarred and numb, and his shirt was stuck to his back with blood when he was recently seen by the police. He has told the press how he was taken from his home and charged in a public hall (set with benches and filled with people) accused of stealing. He was hung by his wrists with metal handcuffs and beaten by several comrades until he "spoke the truth". Whether or not he was guilty, he would be beaten he was told. The man is now terrified for his own safety and that of his family."[382]

Actions such as these gave the ANC effective control over all aspects of community life in this effectively liberated zone[383]. Gordan Jawuka described the process as follows, " During 1985, when the whole township was under Nkwinti's control and the unrest situation at its worst, Nkwinti ordered the comrades to dig trenches across the streets in the township and especially around his house, the streets leading to his house. This was done to trap police vehicles and then attack them. Also then the township could not be entered and patrolled by the police. This was considered to be a no-go area for police vehicles. Nkwinti also ordered them to cut the telephone lines. These actions were undertaken firstly to make the township ungovernable and secondly because he feared retaliation and police action or detention. These actions were implemented successfully because for some time the police vehicles could not patrol the township."[384] The

military implications of this strategy are clear and reflect similar patterns all over the RSA. The role which these actions played in fomenting a revolutionary climate in the township and making South Africa ungovernable is a fundamental one. The organisation of Port Alfred had implications for the neighbouring towns of the Albany Region, in Grahamstown the Grahamstown Burial Action Committee, the Grahamstown Civic Organisation, Youth Congress, Women's Organisation as well as COSAS and the South African Allied Workers Union were all involved in the mobilisation of the township population. This process was duplicated in the smaller towns such as Alicedale, Alexandria and Kenton-on-Sea which soon launched their own Civics, youth and women's organisations. These organisations were responsible for enforcing the consumer boycott in the region.

The experiment in People's Government carried out in Port Alfred is a unique example which has been lauded by the ANC as a remarkable success. Swilling stated that "in Port Alfred street and area committees were much more tightly controlled than in other areas. The most important community body in Port Alfred was the Federal Council for Port Alfred Residents Civic Organisation. PARCO was only formed in April 1985 as an umbrella organisation for existing worker, women's student and youth organisations. The Federal Council composed 12 members, and had representatives from each constituency based organisation: NOSGA, PAPA, PAYCO and the PAWU. The more recently established PAWO did not get representation on the federal council. (Although the street committees were elected by the street members, the Federal Council appointed the members of the area committees. This apparently undemocratic procedure was justified on the grounds that it was necessary to appoint area committee members to make sure that experienced and responsible people ran the area committees."[385] The structures did not withstand the return of the security forces following a break down in negotiations and the detention of the leading figures in the Central Committee following the imposition of the State of Emergency. This experiment in socialist people's government was a short lived success for the ANC but demonstrated in practical terms what the potential nature of any future ANC run state would look like.

Nkwinti had a clear view of the national perspective and in a paper entitled Guidelines

and Principles, " Port Alfred does not see itself as an island. On the contrary, we view ourselves as part of the broader National Democratic Movement. The national character of our struggle is clearly appreciated by us and, as such, we welcome our dear comrades, from every where, to our town to appraise our strategies and approaches. However, we think that on doing so, the existing objective conditions should be taken cognisance of. The principle of Non-Racialism is a national ideal which Port Alfred endears. We have demanded a Non Racial Democratic Local Authority for Port Alfred. But we are well aware of the fact that a blue print for such an ideal will be drawn up by the people of South Africa as a whole. The demand is therefore, long term and reflective, and meat to sustain until Freedom Day. Every undertaking with us serves as an organisational thing. It must have a gain for the struggle. We involve everyone in the community, hence the difficulty in just deciding on a matter which would effect everyone without thorough consultations."[386]

INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN PARCO:

The involvement of the Consulates' and other diplomatic staff in financing the 'people's power' projects in the Port Alfred townships is of particular interest. The American Consul General John Burroughs paid a visit to the PARCO Advice centre and a cheque was handed over[387]. "During February\March 1986, Mr. Burroughs of the American Embassy visited Port Alfred township. He promised Gugile Nkwinti that the American Embassy would contribute $20 000 dollars for the establishment and development of the information centre. Nkwinti told me that he wanted to use this money to develop the information centre and pay the teachers. This would contribute to the implementation of peoples power, the politicisation of the masses and making the township self governing by the blacks themselves and independent from all government institutions."[388] The Information and Advice Centre was staffed by Gordon Jawuka, Koleke Nkwinti and Voyelwa Kolele.

The Ford Foundation also made a large contribution towards the projects run by Nkwinti in the township[389]. The United States Government Human Rights Funds Fiscal Report for Southern Africa for 1986 details the following donation of $10 000 dollars, "IAA 6-

674-517; Project: Port Alfred Residents Civic Association; US DOLS 10 000. Located in the troubled Eastern Cape Community of Port Alfred, the association, headed by Gugile Newinti (sic) is planning an ambitious program which will include start- up costs for an advice office and community centre to include salaries, administrative costs and office equipment."[390] One wonders whether the governments responsible would have approved of their local representatives funding a rigid system of democratic centralism practised by the Central Committee with its dual power structure which so closely resembles the 'people's democracies in Cuba, the erstwhile East Germany and the Soviet Union.

The collapse of PARCO's control over the township resulted from various factors relating to the imposition of the second State of Emergency. On the 13 May 1986 the South African Police and the SADF threw a cordon around the township and moved in to arrest key activists[391]. On the 14th of May the E.P. Herald carried reports of the detention of the Nkwinti's after a pre-dawn raid. Nkwinti was released on the 24th of May after questioning but incidents of necklacing continued to take place in Port Alfred[392]. Nkwinti's rearrest and prolonged detention as well as high profile policing broke PARCO's grip on the township and drove the structures under-ground. Organisation was channelled into other aspects of mobilisation and the alternative structures ceased to function. The imposition of the Second State of Emergency broke the back of the attempt to render the township ungovernable but underground structures continue to function in the area. The impact of Nkwinti's release during early 1989 after a prolonged period of detention is till to be seen but preliminary information indicates that he is involving himself in the "people's anti-crime structures emerging in the Eastern Cape. Nkwinti has once again played a leading role in the in the process of mass mobilisation which has taken place in the area since late 1989.

Port Alfred will remain an almost unique experiment in South Africa's history. The rigid control over all aspects of socio-economic existence could arguably only have occurred in a small township with a controllable population but certain questions about the success remain unanswered. Firstly it is difficult to ascertain what the role of the ANC's underground structures played in the area and the degree to which their actions dictated

the growth of structures and the emergence of leaders. Secondly the long term impact of this socio-economic experiment in People's Government are hard to measure. The unbanning of the ANC has revealed that the ANC does enjoy large scale support in the Eastern Cape but it is not possible to link this mobilisational success with the overall failure of the attempts in other areas.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 'CIVICS'.

THE CIVIC ORGANISATIONS AND PEOPLE'S WAR:

As is evident in the cases of PARCO and CRADORA, the Civic's played a central role in coordinating UDF activity. The Civic organisations were formed as a vital part of the ANC's People's War strategy in order to coordinate and streamline the activities of the major internal Charterist organisation, the UDF. By early 1984 eighty seven Civics had affiliated to the UDF, these included 30 from the Transvaal, 28 from Natal, 27 from the Western Cape and two from the Eastern Cape[393]. The Civics served as the basis for the structures in which the supporters of the UDF and the ANC could be marshalled into a viable support mechanism for the ANC and an opposition to existing local government and other institutions, " The road to peoples power requires not only regional responses to unpopular measures but also a united national offensive involving the mass of the people in town and countryside and mobilising the support of all classes and strata who reject the rule of the racist autocracy"[394]. The formation of alternative structures such as the Civics formed an important part of the ANC's overall "peoples war" strategy and aim to make South Africa ungovernable. In it analysis of the situation in South Africa during 1983, the ANC concluded that new impetus should be given to the "struggle of the people". In a document entitled "Planning for Peoples's War" (published in 1983 by the Political and Military Council of the ANC), a strategy was proposed in which a long-term guerilla war and insurrection by the National Democratic Movement was planned. To this end the arming of the people and creation of alternative structures and "military bases" was to play an important role[395]. The Civic's came to play an important role in the mobilisational and co-ordination aspects of Charterist activity.

The ANC perceived the function of the Civics along the following lines: "People have now turned towards themselves, the people in the liberated districts have been politicised and made to participate actively and independently in political life and in organisational affairs of the various civic organisations. It is through these civic organisations that people have at last discovered direct participation in democratic life and are developing political self responsibility, completely independent from government created institutions. In some areas political power no longer flows from the apartheid regime and the administrative bureaucracy down to the people. Political power is flowing from the bottom upward, from the masses organised as a commune to their democratically elected committees."[396] According to a document Protest to Challenge distributed by the UDF, its ultimate aims were to be achieved in three distinct operational phases which were to be integrated at all levels.

i.   The "protest" phase : "Some Comrades expressed surprise at the idea that the UDF has never been a 'protest' movement. But it must be remembered that the UDF was launched as a front to protest against and oppose the new Constitution and the Koornhof Bills."[397]

ii.   The "challenge" phase : After the protest, and especially during the latter half of 1984, the UDF entered the next phase which was aimed at challenging governmental institutions on as wide a front as possible. In "Protest to Challenge" this phase is described as follows: "Challenging the State means far more than responding to the measures of the State in a sporadic way. It means engaging the State on as many fronts as possible, fragmenting and dispersing its forces at the same time as strengthening and broadening our forces. It means frustrating the State's efforts, preventing its advances, forcing it to retreat and, if possible, cutting off its lines of retreat. In challenging the State we have to combine two objectives, making State programmes and institutions unworkable and isolating the State from all support."[398]

iii   The "creation of alternative structures" phase : Once this challenge has proved successful, the UDF proposed to move into the third phase of its campaign which

involves the creation and institution of alternative structures in the place of those vacated by institutionalised governmental structures in the Black structures. In "Protest to Challenge" this phase is dealt with as follows: "The masses in the African townships on the other hand have rendered the Black local authorities inoperative in large areas of the country. Since August last year 150 councillors have resigned and only 5 out of the 34 councils set up nationwide are still functioning. This is not necessarily an irreversible process and the State will attempt to reimpose these unpopular bodies on the people. Struggles of popular organisations must develop to the point where the State can no longer impose its undemocratic structures on oppressed communities in any area. Conversely, democratic organs of the people must start to replace those structures as embryos of a future democratic people's South Africa. Having established the illegitimacy of the South African regime, it is necessary to project a popular alternative based on both the present and the future. The present in the sense that our organisations have to become living and viable alternative organs of People's Power. Therefore, for example in institutions where the apartheid puppets are no longer able to effectively function in the townships, a stage should be reached where the people's organisations assume responsibility for organising the community to govern itself in a variety of ways from setting up health clinics to crime prevention."[399] In the publication "Isizwe the Nation" (a publication of the UDF) this third phase is referred to as follows: "Nevertheless, the building of People's Power is something that is already beginning to happen in the course of our struggle. We must start the process of liberating South Africa. We must begin to place power in the hands of the people. In all spheres, the economy, education, culture, crime control, health, in fact, wherever it is possible."[400]

In a document entitled **National Working Committee Conference** of 29 - 30 May 1987 the UDF, that organisations perception about the role of the alternative structures is expressed as follows: "Plans are also afoot to launch a national coordinating structure of civics. It is hoped that the above process will assist in overcoming the following areas of weakness:

a   a lack of direction of the rent boycott and the establishment of People's Power;

b   centralisation of resources;

c   inadequate response to vigilantes and other forms of repression;

d   contact between street level structures and national structures;

e   the failure to generalise the experiences of places like Soweto to other areas."[401]

And also in the same document: "The rent boycott which took a national character around May and June 1986 was one of the most successful campaigns conducted by the Civic Centre. It was in this campaign that many civic associations strengthened their organisation at the street level."[402]

The development of civic organisations into a fundamental mobilisational mechanism had its origins in the development of the Black Consciousness orientated structures in Soweto and Port Elizabeth. These origins are reflected in the name of the Port Elizabeth Black Civic, the prototype Eastern Cape civic organisation. PEBCO's development provided the basis for the formation of the civic organisations in the Albany region. It is therefore important to examine the development of the civics against the background of PEBCO.

PEBCO- THE EASTERN CAPE'S LEADING CIVIC.

The Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation was established on 10 October 1979, along the same lines as the Soweto Civic Association. PEBCO was one of the oldest civics and appears to have been one of the first of a new generation of organisations launched to promote the 'national democratic movement' inside South Africa. The organisation was formed around the issue of separate municipalities but the organisation became the centre of controversy after allegations originating from an internal document which reputedly outlined the relationship between the ANC and PEBCO. Thozamile Botha, the first President of PEBCO, played a central role in a series of large strikes in the Port Elizabeth area following his dismissal from his job following the launch of PEBCO[403]. PEBCO undertook a wide range of campaigns including highly effective Consumer boycotts, an area where PEBCO played a formative role. The most successful consumer boycott commenced on 15 July 1985 and at its height was estimated to be about 85% effective. Demands made by PEBCO included the release of Mandela, the return of

political exiles and the lifting of restrictions on banned organisations. PEBCO also successfully used the rent boycotts as a mobilisational means, they were aimed at depriving the community councils of income. Use was also made of mass public funerals and at many of these events many thousands of mourners were present. PEBCO used leading figures in the national democratic movement to mobilise support for the civic organisation and its campaigns at the funerals. The civic organised frequent public meetings which periodically led to violence in the townships. This trend increased following the return of ANC activists Henry Fazzie, Edgar Ngoyi and Sipho Hashe from imprisonment on Robben Island[404]. MK cadres and ANC leaders played an important role in the growth and success of PEBCO. Many of the activists involved in its launch and development now hold senior leadership positions in the ANC.

An ANC battle plan for revolutionary activities in the Port Elizabeth area was discovered in the PEBCO offices on the 16 June 1986 by the South African Police. The document was entitled People's Power and the Question of Liberated Zones[405]. The document, the identity of whose author is still unknown, dealt in some detail with UDF strategy for the Eastern Cape and highlighted the overlap between the strategic doctrines of the ANC and those of the UDF with regard to People's War. The document deals with the unique nature of the revolution in South Africa and states that the struggle will take place in a far more concentrated manner in the urban areas and the 'platteland towns'. "The process of building people's power in SA is already taking on a somewhat different character. If we speak of liberated zones in our country then we are thinking mainly, although not only, of these places. For us the factories, schools, colleges and townships have to become the main trenches of our struggle. In order to have a secure base we must be organised, factory floor by factory floor, school classroom by school classroom, township street by street. For our part we need to learn to develop strategies and tactics that exploit to the maximum the situation in which we are struggling. Our liberated zones may not be like those of certain mother struggles, but we are already proving in practice that it is possible to force back the enemy, and to open the space in which we can build the organs of our new society."[406] This extract indicates the degree to which the strategists of the UDF and ANC viewed the events in the Eastern Cape within their historical and strategic context. The differences between the liberated zones of the Eastern Cape and

those of other revolutionary examples are identified and the characteristics of the local zones listed.

The document also examines the basic assumption of people's power and its incompatibility with the present order. " When we speak of people's power we are not thinking of putting our leaders into the very same structures. We do not want Nelson Mandela to be state president in the same parliament as Botha. We do not want Walter Sisulu to be chairperson of a capitalist Anglo American Corporation. We are struggling for a different system where power is no longer in the hands of the rich and powerful. We are struggling for a government which we vote for. The year 1985 has marked a turning point in our struggle. Like never before in a whole series of sectors we have begun not just to demand a people's government , but we have begun to build in that direction."[407]

Speakers at PEBCO meetings reportedly took a militant pro-ANC/SACP line and made clear the organisations support for the National Democratic Movement led by the ANC. PEBCO played a leading role in the creation of parallel hierarchies in the area.

In an interview with City Press Mkhuseli Jack spelled out the relationship which existed, " this type of organisation is intended to lay the basis for a new South Africa, one where the future is decided by all and its also become clear were the support lies, the town council in Port Elizabeth as well as in Uitenhage has collapsed. Only ten out of the 21 members are still councillors. And because their is no quorum, the council in Port Elizabeth has virtually come to a standstill. The new move is gaining ground especially in the embattled Eastern cape cities and towns where intensified repression following the state of emergency has taken its toll"[408]. In the same article mention is made of an address delivered by Jack to the Southern African Bishops Conference in which he stated that the street committees were the first step towards creating structures to replace the black town councils. PEBCO played a leading role in the resurrection of alternative structures in many of the areas were Mandela had implemented the M Plan in the 1950's. Jack described these structures as follows, "the street committees are very effective in Port Elizabeth and are addressing specific problems arising from our situation. The

consumer boycott was conceived at such a meeting and lasted for four months."[409] Attacks on community councils and community councillors were also widespread in the Port Elizabeth townships. Throughout its existence PEBCO singled out community councillors for campaigns of vilification and councillors were repeatedly represented as agents of the government and profiteers, a serious allegation in the light of the necklacings associated with these accusations and subsequent mock trials. Given the high level of unemployment in the area during recent years, these attacks have had an appeal to many audiences with often disastrous and lethal consequences. PEBCO also played a leading role in the school boycotts campaign. PEBCO spokesmen have openly declared their support for the ANC on numerous occasions and the organisation proclaims itself a Charterist organisation.

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES IN THE EASTERN CAPE.

The "area-", "block-" and "street committees" which fell under the authority of the Civics formed the basis of the alternative People's government strategy at a "grassroots" level, and formed the base of the pyramid of the UDF structure. Civics and the "area-", "block-" and "street committees" form inseparable elements in the creation of the alternative structures. In this context so-called "people's committees" under control of the revolutionary "civics" organised the residents of an area at block-, street- and even house level in order to give impetus to the objectives of initiating a "people's war". The aims and objectives of these "people's committees" are outlined in ANC and SACP literature and included the following core elements:

- The dissemination of propaganda and information.
- The administration of community services where the Government structures have been paralysed or withdrawn, which includes the maintenance of law and order and settlement of petty disputes amongst the people.
- The institution of "self-defence", "disciplinary" and "intelligence" tasks and the growth of "combat units" from these "self-defence units" - The establishment of "revolutionary bases" in the Black townships from which the "people's army",

needed for the "people's war", can grow and operate.

- The establishment of structures through which "revolutionary justice" can be implemented, namely the so-called "people's courts".

- Action to prevent the re-establishment of governmental institutions in areas where these institutions have been neutralized. The ultimate aim is to apply such pressure on the individual that he cannot remain in the community unless he joins one of these radical organisations.

The ANC has outlined various conditions which are necessary for the effective creation of "organs of people's power" or "people's committees". Significantly, these stress the fact that the long term objective of the formation of the structures is the seizure of power. The ANC has specified that the structures should provide visible evidence of a new revolutionary way of life to the inhabitants of the townships. The people's committees are described as "islands in the sea of apartheid" which must inspire resistance and ungovernability[410]. The ANC has stressed that " the basic aim is not merely to survive, but to attack and to implement a people's government for the whole of South Africa."[411] The guidelines offered by the ANC stress that a programme of action based on the Freedom Charter must underlie all structures and this adds the ideological dimension which overrides the pretences about civic service orientation.

The ANC stressed that street committees should undertake propaganda campaigns aimed at the mobilisation of the people. The commissars who work in these structures are instructed to ensure that the "people" clearly understand the functions of the structures. "Street committees should establish the necessary infrastructure for the production, reproduction and distribution of pamphlets and newsletters: for the purpose of spreading information, education, organisation and mobilisation. Through such means we are able to reach all households and turn them into hives of political activity"[412]. The ANC also advised the committees to " know the individuals in its area, their profile and activity and identify the enemy network of informers and deal with it effectively."[413]

WHITE'S DEFINITION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES:
Roland White, a UDF regional executive member and leading left-wing theoretician,

reviews the building of 'Organs of People's Power' in the Eastern Cape in a discussion article on Consumer Boycotts. He describes the primary objective of the street and area committees as follows: " the essential objective has been to involve every adult township resident in a structure which organises at the most grassroots of levels."[414] White outlines the structure of these structures in the Eastern Cape, "The residents of a particular street attend a regular meeting at which various issues are discussed. They then elect one representative who, together with the representatives of other street committees form an area committee (normally an area covers about 16 to 20 streets). The area committee then links up with the leadership of the civic and youth organisations (PEBCO, PEYCO) at the highest level.This tiered system is appropriate to the role that the street and area committees play. They form forums at which ordinary people bring their everyday problems to be discussed, considered and acted on by the people who form their immediate community."[415] White's analysis of the role of these structures is essentially a sympathetic non-critical one and fails to examine them in their broader context.

Although the discussion focuses on their role in the consumer boycotts in the Eastern Cape it fails to mention their vital role in the overall ANC strategy. White does however examine the projected role of the structures in some detail and discusses the other functions of the organs of people's power and the role which they can play in a revolutionary assault on the state. White argues that the structures fulfill a broader role in that they can take up national political issues within the context of their activities. He states that they can become a "form through which direct political action against the state and the ruling bloc can be decided on and implemented. Understanding this latter dimension is of crucial importance both in understanding People's Power correctly and .... in guiding the organisational dynamics unleashed recently to the greatest possible effect in welding the oppressed classes in South Africa into a mass force capable of effectively confronting the central state and its apparatuses, and of governing after power has been seized (through the precise organisational forms will clearly alter dramatically between these different phases."[416] White's analysis is instructive in that he pinpoints the vital role which these structures can play in a revolutionary strategies of the National Democratic Movement. His evaluation closely reflects thinking within the UDF that the

power base of the state can be effectively challenged using the structures of the internal movement. The role which similar structures have played in other insurgencies has been a significant one with the emphasise moving away from state structures to revolutionary committees which are not really accountable to anyone other than the higher strata in the revolutionary movement. White does however express concern about the potential weakness of the structures due to organisational problems. The solution to these problems, he argues, lie in the creation of more 'resilient ' structures which will withstand the counter measures of the state.

UDF POLICY AND THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES:

This is demonstrated by the following extract from "UDF Update", "If attempts to 'rehabilitate' offenders through politicisation and recruitment to organisations does not 'succeed' offenders are ostracised. For people who want to live and be happy amongst their neighbours, it becomes difficult not to co-operate."[417] In the publication "UDF-Update", the following is said: " The street- and area committees which have been established, raised the level of struggle not only in the sense of alternative ideas but also through establishing organs from popular power."[418] The importance of street committees to the radicals is further demonstrated by this extract from "The New Nation", Murphy Marobe, Publicity Secretary of the UDF, expresses himself as follows: "New grassroots structures set up by UDF affiliates in many townships, allowing for popular participation........ Examples of such structures are committees at section, block and street and even yard level....... We see our grassroots structures as the embryonic stages of People's Power."[419]

In a document entitled United Democratic Front - Three Years of United Action, the importance of street committees is further underwritten by Marobe where he says: "In many areas, apartheid functionaries like bantustan chiefs and town councillors had been forced to resign. In their place civic, youth and student organisations have formed a rudimentary organ from peoples' power to take control of local administration. In rural areas tribal authorities are being replaced by democratically elected village councils while the collapse of-the Black local authorities has been accompanied by new forms of mass

organisations such as street and area committees. Unprecedented community unity has been achieved through these structures since by definition they involve the entire community in collective decision making. In places like Atteridgeville and Alexandra stay-aways could be called overnight as a result of strong street committees. The formation of such structures has also led to undisciplined elements being brought under control of the people and their organisations. And it is only through such structures that people have been able to defend each other against vigilante attacks or evictions. Campaigns such as the consumer boycott necessitated the full participation of the people at street level. This led to street committees being formed in the course of these campaigns and enabled the people to wage these campaigns with a minimum of coercion. This was demonstrated in the second Port Elizabeth consumer boycott where the boycott was 100% successful.......... "[420] The ANC stressed the "defence" role of the structures often due to the collapse of the structures in the face of counter-measures. More recent statements have admitted that structures where over exposed with insufficient back-up by secret structures.

Marobe goes on to say: "To defend our gains and take forward our fight for freedom we need to deepen organisations where they already exist, establish organisations where they do not and build greater unity between all forces opposed to apartheid and minority rule. Our organisations are our shields and our spears. They stand as a shield between a regime and our people. Yet they are also our spears to take forward our struggles against apartheid. Without our organisations we are defenceless. Let us ensure that in every factory, school, village and street throughout the country there are democratic committees elected and accountable to the people. These committees will make our trade unions, student/parent/ teachers associations, youth, women and civic organisations solid and powerful. And when these organisations act together at the local regional and national levels through national organisations such as the UDF, COSATU and the NECC, we will be building a mighty and impregnable national movement. All democratic forces must close rank to prevent the regime which governs by divide and rule, from exploiting and divisions amongst the people."[421] Once again the portrayal of the "organs of people's power" as the shield and spear of the "mass democratic movement" is clear, as is the attempts to co-ordinate this activity on a national scale. It appears from extracts such as

these that the ANC was desperately trying to maintain control of or harness the potential of the many organisations which it had little or no direct influence over. The UDF therefore assumed an important function as a co-ordinating body for the ANC.

In documents of the UDF's National Working Committee Conference, that organisation's perception about the role of the alternative structures is expressed as follows: " Over the past two years the struggle has indeed moved from protest to challenge. Apartheid rule has been challenged on every front: the masses have rejected the dummy institutions which are designed to perpetrate the repressions. These institutions, after being imposed on the people, were often led by corrupt individuals. Residents of the townships throughout the country began to creatively develop democratic alternatives to these apartheid structures. The network of street committees that emerged based itself on a mass participation. For the first time real democracy was practised at a street and township level and people were electing structures that were accountable to them. Street committees were readily accepted by people as their true representatives. Hand-in-hand with street committees was the emergence of township based peoples' power. They played the role of controlling crime and resolving petty disputes. They also played the role of creating an atmosphere which would leave residents insecure from a tax by anti-social elements. Above all, they allowed for democratic decision making and made it difficult for small groups to impose their decisions on the majority."[422] This line of argument about the role of the "organs of people's power" emerged as an important factor during this period. The UDF went to great lengths to portray the organisations and structures as a spontaneous result of the frustration of the "masses" which fulfilled a primarily social function. Subsequent evidence indicates that they were nothing of the sort. This debate is discussed in some length in the conclusion of this thesis. Further on in the same document the following is stated: "In those areas where zone or area committees do exist, they have been found to play a very important role especially as regards coordination at a local level; building and strengthening of organisations at local level and initiating campaigns."

In a paper entitled Building People's Democracy, Mamelodi 1985, Andrew Boraine, a member of the National Executive of the UDF outlined the following tasks of the street

committees which apply equally to the Eastern Cape region, " direct political representation , two-way communication of ideas, from mass base to leadership and vice-versa, education and information for the residents of Mamelodi as to what was happening in the rest of South Africa, forums for debate over the tactics and strategies of stay aways, and rent and consumer boycotts, solving social disputes through people's courts as well as actively prohibiting any forms of 'kangaroo' justice that the state claims forms the basis of political practice in the townships, the running of the townships-building parks, collecting rubbish, fighting crime, fixing roads, even collecting rent to build new houses and facilities for township residents. The street committees also began to work closely with the SRC's in the schools in implementing people's education programmes, the trade union movement and various shop-stewards councils in Pretoria factories, and similar democratic structures in other townships such as Atteridgeville and Soshunguve."[423] Once again, Boraine's description of the functions carried out emphasise the aspect of civic service and an orientation towards civic assistance to the people of the townships. This ignores the overwhelming ideological dimension in which all structures were run along the rigid lines of Democratic Centralism.

THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE'S COURTS.

PEOPLE'S COURTS IN THE EASTERN CAPE:

The most visible and controversial element of the ANC's People's War campaign in the townships of South Africa were the Peoples Courts which attempted to replace the established legal system with a system of popular law or people's law. These courts usurped the functions of the magistrates courts or traditional courts but in many instances dealt with allegedly serious crime for which the death penalty or harsh and instant corporal punishment was meted out. The emergence of the people's courts went hand in hand with the campaign of terror carried out by the 'comrades' as the revolutionary youth wings of the UDF choose to call themselves. The ANC and UDF attempted to create the impression that these "People's Courts" were traditional social structures created to maintain order in the community. Initially these "People's Courts" did generally hear cases such as theft and quarrels between township residents and some disputes were

solved to the satisfaction of local residents. However as soon as these courts established some credibility they were increasingly used to act against people who laid formal charges with the South African Police. The ANC encouraged this trend in an article by ex-PEBCO head Thozamile Botha, "People are generally discouraged from reporting petty offenses to the police stations, instead they were encouraged to make the people's courts function properly and to subject offenders to community discipline."[424] They were also used to punish residents who disregarded the consumer and other boycotts and stay-aways[425]. Especially harsh action was taken against so-called "sell-outs" and persons who refused to participate in the activities of the local and street committees.

Evidence given in a Port Elizabeth court during a trial included the following description of the normal course of events. " The court operates like an ordinary court. It appoints a magistrate and a prosecutor. I pleaded not guilty, but I was found guilty and sentenced to 200 lashes with a sjambok. The court sat in my grandfather's house, where I was tied with ropes to a table. the sentence was carried out by about 20 men. I had weals all over my body. The court operates in the black areas to punish people for criminal and political contravention. People appear daily before the court and the sentence is usually lashes with a sjambok or fanbelt."[426] This descriptions provides a rare glimpse at the workings of People's Courts and their impact in the townships.

From statistics available it appears that, since 1985, a total of 398 so-called "People's Courts" operated in the various townships of South Africa. During this time 556 persons were prosecuted in the normal Magistrates, Regional and Supreme Court for crimes which arose out of the functioning of these "People's Courts". The most gruesome and repugnant of these are those "sentences" related to the so-called "necklace" executions which received considerable publicity both locally and abroad. Between January of 1986 and April 1987 310 people were necklaced giving some idea of the total number of people executed in this gruesome manner[427]. Official statistics are obviously only based on cases investigated by the South African Police and it can be assumed that the incidence of these "People's Courts" is much higher than stated. The clandestine nature of their operations, the fear which they induce and the intimidation and violence which accompany their functioning, make it almost impossible to obtain accurate information

in this regard. Apologists for the emergence of people's courts described their origins as follows, "several people's courts originated out of concern with the general disorder that often accompanies township protests. In many townships across the PWV, activists in radical civic organisations grew increasingly concerned from mid 1985 with the problem of indiscipline within their organisations or related to their campaigns. Consumer boycotts in particular, were often accompanied by an unacceptable degree of coercive enforcement, and this impaired their popularity. In response to this problem, often attributed to comtsotsis, civic activists initiated anti-crime campaigns in several townships."[428]

ANC POLICY AND THE PEOPLE'S COURTS:

The ANC and SACP viewed the people's courts as a valuable means to achieve discipline in the liberated zones and imposed their control over them. The ANC took a dim view of any 'undisciplined' actions but in the following extract clearly endorses the harsher actions of these self appointed vigilante courts."Let the racist magistrates and lawyers shout their lungs out in scorn of the necklace method of punishing collaborators, let them call the people's courts kangaroo courts if they want to, but we will always reply to them by saying: when we say power to the people, we also mean the right to suppress the enemies of the people, we also mean the country's administration and control by the ordinary people. We shall not sudden be anarchists simply because we refuse to abide by the conventional legal norms generally associated with courts of law in South Africa."[429]

This view of 'people's courts' is borne out in another set of guidelines in which the ANC states that "courts are not an end in themselves" and therefore the "people's courts must be their very definition be set up to implement the objectives of peoples power and to "ensure healthy, revolutionary and democratic interrelationships within society."[430] It stresses that their function is primarily political and that their structure should reflect the local conditions in which they operate.Left wing observers have denied that the courts formed part of a wider campaign to usurp state authority and contemptuously dismissed claims that they were linked to the ANC[431], ANC statements suggest otherwise.

In the publication UDF-Update, (Volume 2, No. 1, April 1986), the function and aims of people's courts in the context of UDF and ANC strategy and the type of alternative structure which are envisaged, are explained as follows: "The Police or the Courts have proved that they do not help the people. Instead they are seen as the enforcers of apartheid and the enemies of the people. So, particularly in the Eastern Cape and the Transvaal, people's organisations are finding their own ways of dealing with crime and quarrels. Now, when people have problems with crime, or family quarrels, they do not go to lay a charge at the police station. They go to the people's organisation - civics, or street committees or the UDF. In some areas people's courts, or people's advisory centres have been set up. However these courts do not work like government courts. They are different. They are created by the people's organisations and are responsible to the people. They cannot do anything that the people would not approve of."[432] The sinister nature of these courts is evident in the guidelines for People's Courts circulated by the ANC. In these guidelines it is stated that, "where the death sentence is decided upon, ways should not endangering the court. To carry it out, appropriate structures should be used . In this regard it is necessary that we conduct proper investigations and not merely skim the surface of the enemy network."[433] People's courts have largely ceased to exist throughout the state of emergency, the general return to normality has seen the black urban population return to the civil courts and a return to law and order.

In the following chapter the role of Umkhonto we Sizwe and the ANC military structures such as Self Defence Units will be evaluated from the perspective of their role in mobilisation of the target population. It will be argued that the organisational structures created by the ANC were reinforced by the military structures in certain areas but that the failure of the organisational structures to survive the state's massive clampdown resulted from the inability of Umkhonto we Sizwe to generate genuine self defence capabilities. The relative lack of success by Umkhonto we Sizwe in this vital area led to organisational vulnerability to security force action. The development of Umkhonto we Sizwe during this period was hampered by various external and internal conflicts and tensions which involved doctrinal differences and conflict over the nature of the projected People's War offensive.

CHAPTER FIVE :

MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE LIBERATED ZONES.

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE FORMATION OF LIBERATED ZONES:

Clearly the ANC succeeded in some instances in its attempts to create liberated zones in the Eastern Cape, albeit only for a limited period of time. The creation of parallel hierarchies in these areas only collapsed due to extensive security force psychological warfare campaigns and the detention of the leadership core. At the Kabwe conference in 1985 the failure to consolidate these areas was attributed to military factors and the inability of the 'people to defend the revolution'. People's War was closely examined and possible problem areas explored in depth. In its review of its People's War strategies at its Kabwe Conference in 1985 the following definition of People's War was formulated "By People's War we mean a war in which a liberation army becomes rooted amongst the people who progressively participate actively in the armed struggle both politically and militarily, including the possibility of engaging in partial or general insurrections. The present disparity in the enemy's forces and our own determines the protracted nature of the struggle in which we need to reduce the enemy's resources, reserves and endurance whilst gathering our own strength to the point were we are capable of seizing power."[434]

GENERAL INSURRECTION AND PEOPLE'S WAR:

Discussion in this vital document cantered around the means of transforming the situation to one which favoured the ANC, general insurrection is identified as the vehicle for the seizure of power and the vital role of expansion of the military capability of the ANC is stressed. The document also stresses that it is not possible to 'mechanically' predict the timetable for the revolution but that it would result from a 'chain of events which trigger off widespread initiative from the people themselves or as a result of a call from the revolutionary movement at a special moment in the development of our revolutionary situation'. The ANC perceives the role of its military wing, MK as being that of an

'officer cadre which can lead 'peoples revolutionary violence' of the 'mass combat units' (MCV's, the ANC's euphemism for the rioting mobs which filled the worlds television screens during this period). The document differentiates between organised,spontaneous or semi-spontaneous violence and stresses the need to harness the combat potential of the people in the form of small units or in large 'people's self defence units',in land occupation (squatting), factory occupations (strikes and sit ins) and people's control of the townships. The element of MK's centrality in the revolutionary programme of the ANC is evident in the following extract from a discussion article in the African Communist: "An armed uprisings of the people cannot be successful in the absence of decisive action by a professional people's army (professional in the sense that its cadres are full time and trained in the use of modern weapons and in military technique). As Lenin pointed out, for an insurrection three streams of insurrection are necessary - workers', and military - and these must be merged into a single victorious insurrection. The important advances made by Umkhonto we Sizwe since Soweto are, therefore, of great significance. At the same time, intensified political organisation specifically of the workers and peasants will be needed to aid the development of Umkhonto as a genuine people's army."[435] Clearly the ANC and SACP attach considerable attention to the central role of MK in the revolution and this closely follows the orthodox Leninist teachings on the subject.

POLITICAL DIMENSION OF MK OPERATIONS: SELF DEFENCE UNITS.

The ANC clearly attached considerable significance to the linkage of political actions to MK operations. The training given to MK operatives contained a significant percentage of political education. This emerged in the evidence given at the trial of various MK cadres. Political training for MK Cadres was given by East German instructors and in this specific instance by Pallo Jordan and Aziz Pahad, members of the ANC's NEC as well as Sechaba editor the late Francis Meli[436]. The ANC stated in a training document that "a guerilla is not merely a military man but is also a political organiser. To be able to meet the demands of political mobilisation, the guerilla fighter himself needs to constantly develop his level of political consciousness. A politically conscious cadre is also capable of easily overcoming all strains and stress that guerilla forces are subjected

to."[437] The duties of the commissar are spelled out as follows, "the political commissar is responsible for the political life of the unit. It is his duty to is to ensure that the morale and political sophistication of all the cadres is high."[438] The ANC displays an awareness of the importance of maintaining political awareness and motivation at a high level but rumours emanating from its training camps during this period and later confirmed by returning exiles indicate that mutinies took place in protest against conditions which existed in training facilities.

The ANC has also placed priority on building self defence capabilities for the structures and areas which it secures, this closely mirrors the actions of the Viet Cong who developed similar structures in an attempt to consolidate and secure inroads made into the state's power base. The failure of these structures has been responsible for the failure of People's War and it has therefore received urgent priority in the organisation[439]. This failure has been identified by leading strategists in the field of guerrilla warfare as a central contributing factor in the collapse of an insurgent offensive. The success of these efforts in Vietnam enabled the Viet Cong to consolidate their victories and to maintain control over large areas," Self defence as practised in South Vietnam has been supremely successful and the resistance struggle could never have been pushed to its present stage of an assault on the cities, without the formation of self-defence units in the liberated villages and the integration of whole groups of fortified villages into self defence zones. The establishment of self-defence units and zones is an inevitable and logical phase of the armed struggle and plays a vital supporting role of overall politico-military activities. Among other things, it mobilises the creative initiatives of the people in developing new techniques and even new weapons, initiatives which reach full fruition only when an entire nation is engaged in the struggle."[440] The ANC's failure to achieve any long term success against the South African government appears to stem from ignoring this vital aspect of revolutionary warfare. Recent ANC strategy documents place considerable priority on the creation of these structures within the Republic and the this has direct implications for future ANC attempts[441]. MK Chief of Staff, Chris Hani stated in 1988 that " I do not agree with those who say that we failed to launch a people's army to fight a people's war. The Kabwe conference was held in 1985. Of course, this is the third year after Kabwe, and I am sure, concerned members of our movement are rightly asking the

question: What progress has been made to launch a people's army to fight a people's war? Of course, the transition from armed propaganda, a phase which we started with especially towards the end of the 70's in order to popularise the movement to the stage of the people's war is a difficult one. The road is not straight. It meanders because we are faced with a lot of difficulties both subjective and objective."[442]

MILITARY COMBAT WORK AND PEOPLE'S WAR:

The internal discussion which had taken place about what the ANC describes as Military Combat Work (MCW), provides a valuable insight into the military doctrines of the organisation and a definitive description of the official view which the organisation holds on People's War. It describes this as the 'preparation of combat forces of the revolution according to specific principles, methods and structures' and attributes it to the experience of the Bolshevik's in three revolutions and the revolutionary movements throughout the world'.The Commission On Strategy and Tactics identified three components of the 'combat forces of the revolution; the mass combat units' (MK) which are the nucleus of the People's Army and include the following: Urban Combat Units, Sabotage Units and Workers and People's Self Defence Militia's. The second component is described as 'the People in Arms ie. the advanced, active elements of the masses, prepared and trained by the vanguard formations ready to swell the ranks of the Peoples Army and thirdly those elements of the enemy forces willing to change sides and these are described as the elements which constitute the 'forces and means of People's War'.The ANC regarded MCW as its most vital priority and stated in this 1985 document that unless urgent priority was paid to MCW the organisation would remain distanced from the internal situation.

KABWE STRATEGY AND TACTICS DOCUMENT:

The Kabwe document provides an insight into the theoretical approach which the ANC adopted in its insurgency. The mobilisation of the black township population around nuclei of highly trained MK squads was translated into reality in some areas were MK was able run internal training programmes and to use its cadres as revolutionary

instructors. The major function of these units was to assist in the creation of a 'climate of ungovernability' and to this end various actions were undertaken which supported political activities of the ANC front organisations and attempted to consolidate the liberated zones.The increased role of MK in the townships was evident in the number of politically motivated attacks. These consisted mainly of hand grenade attacks and the shooting of high profile targets. During 1985 136 incidents took place while in 1986 this figure almost doubled to 229. During this period 48 insurgents were killed and 149 arrested and a sharp increase in the number of grenade attacks on black councillors and policeman was evident[443].

The role of MK in the liberated zones and the perceived responsibilities of the people was encapsulated in the following extract from an ANC analysis of Peoples War; "First it is necessary to achieve the maximum support of the surrounding populace. The people must act as couriers, intelligence data collectors and provide recruits to the guerrilla unit. If members of the population are part of the guerrilla, this gives more credibility and confidence among the people in the guerrilla unit. Without this support and participation of the people, we shall be regarded as terrorists, who lack confidence in the might of the people as the makers of history. Secondly, we cannot open one guerrilla base, bleed the enemy white, and only after that start to open other guerrilla bases. From the beginning we must open as many guerrilla bases as possible to stretch and disperse the enemy forces. But we must not violate the principle of expansion with consolidation. Thirdly, we cannot have a fixed permanent base for a long time. We will be forced to move from one position to another. Mass political struggles throughout the country will play a decisive role"[444]. Evidence in the trial of Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim gives some indication of the role which members of the internal auxiliary organisations played in MK operations. In the evidence of a high ranking ANC defector it was alleged that during the course of a meeting of the Regional Military Political Committee of MK in Swaziland during April 1984, a detailed discussion on the MK operations took place. Operations included a unit based in Soweto under the command of 'Wally', a political unit headed by an Eastern Transvaal attorney named 'Poswa', 'Dr. Harvey's' political unit run by a member of the Soweto Civic Association and 'Muriel's' unit headed by a member of the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee (SPCC) and the Federation of Transvaal

Women (FedTraW), "both of which aimed to influence legal and above ground political organisations." The RMPC was allegedly headed by Ronnie Kassrils, MK Intelligence Chief with Ebrahim serving as treasurer and secretary[445]. This provides an interesting and rare glimpse into the interrelationship between MK activities and the political programme of the ANC inside South Africa during this period. This evidence would suggest that similar cells existed in the other provinces of South Africa and that the close working relationship, which in this case was supervised by the Swaziland RMPC, was evident in other 'machineries' of the ANC.

ARMED PROPAGANDA AND PEOPLE'S WAR IN THE EASTERN CAPE.

The development of an urban insurgency along the lines of the People's War model as conducted by the African National Congress (ANC) was dependent on violence and terrorism. The history of insurgency in Africa has shown that insurgents such as the ANC rely on violence and terror to win either the active or passive support of the people to destroy the military and socio-economic infrastructure of the target state and it is only through an effective programme of what the ANC called armed propaganda that the revolutionaries can control sectors of the population and that some degree of success on their part will become possible[446]. 'Armed propaganda has taken many forms in South Africa but the favoured weapons of the ANC are Soviet made limpet mines and bombs made of Soviet supplied explosives. These bombs have provided very little material military gain for the ANC as the targets and victims have invariably been civilians. However armed propaganda does have larger psychological ramifications, although on the surface the strategy of murder to win support may seem counter productive, the objective is the creation of fear and the collapse of morale in the target country. It is therefore a recognised insurgent strategy which has led to the intimidation and psychological destabilisation of entire societies. Kitson in his seminal book on insurgency, Bunches of Fives, stresses the importance of this means of extracting support by terror importance of the psychological dimension while emphasising that the objective in insurgency cannot be measured in physical terms:

"There has never been much doubt that the main characteristic which distinguishes

campaigns of insurgency from other forms of war is that they are primarily concerned with the struggle for men's minds since only succeeding in such a struggle with a large enough number of people, can the rule of law be undermined and constitutional institutions overthrown. Violence may play a greater or lesser part in the campaign, but it should be used largely in support of ideas. Although the ultimate aim of an insurgent organisation is to overthrow a government, or force it to do something it does not want to do, it will first have to get the backing of a proportion of the population if it is to stay in being and to fight. Insurgents are bound to rely on a considerable extent on the enemy for money, shelter, food and information. Insurgents therefore need to build up a programme in which violence is carefully balanced by political, psychological and economic measures, if it is to be effective and the population as a whole, rather than the government, is likely to be the target, especially in the early stages of the struggle. Often insurgents do things which seem pointless or even damaging to their own cause when viewed in the context of harming the government but in fact the actions in question may solely be concerned with gaining support from the population by coercion and persuasion. In this connection there is little doubt that terrorism is a potent form of persuasion, it is sometimes described as armed propaganda."[447] Kitson makes the observation that in an insurgency, the insurgent is dependent on the population for material support, intelligence and other forms of support and important facet when examining the role of the ANC and its military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe.

The function of MK as perceived by the ANC leadership had clearly changed since the formulation of the Morogoro Document in the sixties. "Our strategic goal must be to shift the balance of strength decisively in favour of our struggle, through the further ripening of the revolutionary situation beyond the point where the regime is not able to rule in the old way to the stage where it is in fact unable to govern. Thus we must continue to make South Africa ungovernable and apartheid unworkable. In the attack we must aim further to weaken the Botha regime drastically, to sap its strength, to take away from it even the capacity to launch a limited counter-offensive. During the momentous Year of the Cadre that has just past we have also produced new organisational formations and adopted new forms of struggle in keeping with the heightened pace of our revolution. We refer here to the mass combat units that we have formed to carry out various tasks,

including those related to the destruction of the organs of government of the apartheid regime and to making the country ungovernable. We refer also to the measures we have taken, among other things, to protect our leaders and to maintain revolutionary law and order in various localities throughout the country. Our struggle has gained enormously by the emergence of these collectives of revolutionary Cadres, which are organised, rooted among the masses, ready to pay the supreme sacrifice if necessary, committed to the perspectives of our movement as a whole and loyal to the leadership of that movement. While it is true that we have lost many Cadres in the confrontation with the forces of repression, qualitatively, victory on the military front belong's not to the enemy but to the people. This is so exactly because in the face of the harshest enemy repression, we have succeeded both to intensify our military offensive and to enlarge the popular forces inside our country, organised to wage the struggle arms in hand. Accordingly an urgent task we face this year is the rapid expansion and extensive activation of Umkhonto we Sizwe within the country, drawing in the millions of our people into combat. Building from what we achieved last year, we must prepare for and conduct peoples' war with the peoples' army, Umkhonto we Sizwe, heading our mass military offensive. We have to increase greatly the number of guerilla units of MK, as well as the mass combat units. We must further strengthen the links between the guerilla and combat units in order to build a vast army that can carry out both offensive and defensive tasks. To retain the strategic initiative, apart from confronting the army of occupation in our areas, it is essential that we carry and extend our offensive beyond our township borders into other areas with even greater determination. The charge we give to Umkhonto we Sizwe and to the masses of our people is: attack, advance, give the enemy no quarter - an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth!"[448]

Armed Propaganda is concerned with linking political objectives to military actions, it never reflected a belief by the ANC that it could seize power by military force. Rather, armed propaganda was seen as an instrument for undermining white morale and demonstrating potency to the black community. In No Place to Hide this strategy is clearly spelled out, "to the professional revolutionary, terrorism is but one tactic out of many in a larger strategy of total war. Its primary value lies not in the killing or destruction, but in the psychological impact on the population. In fact, it can be stated

as a general law of terrorism, that its objective is to weaken a target government, not by confronting its military force, but by causing its civilian population to react in ways that will undermine the nation. In other words the action is in the reaction."[449] The role of MK in the waging of People's War has adapted and a more sophisticated approach to insurgency has become evident. The changes in training and deployment appear to have been aimed at producing more cost effective results. MK losses between 1977 and 1987 included over 130 cadres killed and a further 400 arrested a awesome attrition rate when seen against the limited man power resources of the organisation. This attrition was compounded by the loss of large amounts of equipment and immeasurable damage done to cell structures inside the Republic[450]. The ANC movement from ostensibly hard targets to soft targets has been the source of considerable debate. Statistics indicate that the trend has been towards attacking so called soft targets, between 1975 and 1984 265 terror attacks took place and in the next two years this intensified to 366. During the first period 21% of the attacks had been against railway lines, 17% on public buildings, 16% against policemen, 14% against power installations and 7,5% against civilians. By 1986 attacks on civilians had risen to 42% and the use of limpet mines and hand grenades had risen to 67%. These figures indicate increased infiltration and a greater reliance on internally trained cadres. During the first nine months of 1987, 77 of the 132 cadres captured had received their training inside South Africa. This reflects the decisions taken as a result of the Strategy and Tactics Report on MK in 1985. The recruitment of these MK operatives normally took place from within the ranks of the mass combat units and the revolutionary squads[451].

A further feature of MK operations during the People's War phase has been attacks on businesses involved in industrial disputes. The increasing emphasise which the ANC has placed on the labour front during 1987 and 1988 is reflected in MK targeting policy. Bombings were increasingly timed to boost morale during a strike action or to demonstrate solidarity. Attacks on business premises during 1985 and 1987 escalated steadily with attacks on supermarket chains, corporate headquarters and other commercial institutions. In a Radio Freedom transmission during 1986 the ANC made the following call to workers. " There are those that have got to generate a political consciousness of patriotism, of hatred of the system of oppression. Even our workers for instance, what

are your main tasks in a people's war? Your main task is to belong to democratic trade unions, to fight for the basic rights of the worker...... that is not enough- it is your duty to form the cell of the ANC in that factory - underground cell of the ANC. It is your duty to monitor what the ANC is saying to the oppressed people of our country and to be ready to carry out those instructions of the ANC. It is also your duty to begin in a small way to set units of Umkhonto we Sizwe by involving the most conscious of the workers. The enemy comrade, should not just be fought because you have got a gun or a pistol to throw - you must be very creative and inventive, you must devise ways, effective ways of making the machinery of oppression difficult to operate."[452] Clearly the ANC has attached considerable importance to the mobilisation of the working class to serve in M.K. cells and the co-ordination of ostensibly political activities with military ones.

The structure of Umkhonto we Sizwe was based on Regional Military Political Committees (RMPC's) which are the practical coordinators of MK activity in a given area. The formation of the RMPC's in their present form seems to coincide with the People's War experiment of the ANC and may have resulted from the urgent need to harness the potential of the unrest and to try and assume control of the activities of the many Charterist groups inside the country. These RMPC's coordinated the activities of the various demarcated 'machineries' ie the Transvaal Rural Military Machinery. Each machinery had a complex structure which included a commander, a commissar, various chief's of staff and logistics and security officers. According to evidence given by a state witness in a trial the command structure was responsible for the planning of operations which were assigned to specific Special Operations Groups and following the successful infiltration of the group various support structures were organised to facilitate the activities of the MK squad. These are alleged to have included 'safe houses', transport, food and supplies. The practical functioning of the MK hierarchy is therefore based on a control system whereby the military commands are given by the Central MK Head-quarters and are then channelled down through the regional command structure to the operational teams. In the evidence Joe Slovo, then commander of the Urban Command of MK is named as the originator of many of these structures[453]. These structures enable the ANC to maintain a insurgent capability inside the Republic and form an

important part of the overall revolutionary capability of the organisation.

The confrontation between the State and the ANC was most evident in the counter-insurgency efforts during this period directed at limiting the ANC's insurgent activity and denying it a base inside the country. The following chapter attempts to identify key elements of the response to mass mobilisation and examines the statements made by the agencies responsible for containing the protest actions generated by the ANC in the Eastern Cape .

CHAPTER SIX:

STATE COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN CAPE.

STATE STRATEGY: A SYNOPSIS.

The South African government found itself faced with a major problem in the Eastern Cape by mid 1986, as the unrest and violence threatened the stability and economic growth of the entire region. State response seems to have gone through two distinct phases, firstly the limited response following the declaration of the first State of Emergency and secondly the comprehensive reaction following the Second State of Emergency. The stated intention of the SA Government in dealing with situations such as these, has been to contain and suppress the unrest to ensure certain objectives. These objectives are contained in the three goals of the State of Emergency which were identified by the government as the restoration of law and order, the return to normality and the continuation of the reform process[454]. The state hoped to achieve these objectives by employing a multi-dimensional strategy including the following elements:

1.   Counter-insurgency actions.
2.   Selective strikes against external ANC facilities.
3.   Riot-control and crime prevention.
4.   Detention of suspected organisers and leaders.
5.   The restriction and or banning of individuals and organisations responsible for stimulating unrest.
6.   The maintenance of an extensive informer network.
7.   An advanced intelligence capability.
8.   The prosecution of offenders.
9.   High profile policing.
10.   'Shows of strength' by the SADF.
11.   Extensive economic and social reform.
12.   'hearts and minds' operations in the form of Communications Operations.
13.   The creation of Auxiliary forces such as the township police units and other units to supplement the forces of law and order in the townships.
14.   Upgradement of the townships, particularly communications and electrification.
15.   The erection of new or temporary police stations.
16.   Counter-mobilisation of the population

17.   Covert measures to sow disunity and dissention amongst the revolutionaries.

18.   Strengthening of the South African Police.

The state response in the form of counter-insurgency, to the unrest in the Eastern Cape stemmed primarily from the South African Police with the South African Defence Force being deployed after the introduction of the Second State of Emergency. It is instructive to examine the official SAP perceptions of the insurgency problem and the broad parameters within which their counter-insurgency actions fell. Overt police actions to halt the unrest originated chiefly from the Riot Unit of the SAP, whose commander Major General A.J. Wandrag, offered the following perceptions on insurgency in a paper delivered at Pretoria University. " Politically inspired unrest has developed into one of the most serious problems currently being faced by the S.A. Police. There are many reasons why this is so, the most important reason being that South Africa has entered upon the road of accelerated social, political and economic reform and change."[455] Wandrag states that the counter-insurgency mandate of the SAP originates broadly from the signing of Policy Declaration No. 6 by the Chief of the SADF, the Commissioner of the SAP and the then Commissioner of the SA Railway Police. He describes the role of the SADF as a supportive one until armed conflict commences. He states that a clear distinction between the functions of the two services are in practice impossible, and that Joint Planning Centres are therefore of extreme importance. The SAP counter-insurgency efforts are primarily carried out by the Counter Insurgency units or COIN, the Security Police and the Uniform Branch of the SAP in normal crime prevention.

THE STATE RESPONSE :

The riots, unrest and mass mobilisation in the Eastern Cape were characterised by constant conflict between the "comrades", other militant elements and the police. The revolutionary activity took the form of rioting, arson, stone throwing, the use of petrol bombs and ambushes of police patrols. Tambo stated that "we will confront the armed police and the soldiers and anyone else identified with the police or soldiers."[456] Confrontations of this nature took place on a daily basis in 1985 and the police could only enter certain areas in strength[457]. Hough observes that the unrest was

"exacerbated by restrictions on the holding of funerals, the presence of soldiers in the townships and incidents resulting from various boycott campaigns."[458]

These challenges to law and order seriously stretched the abilities of the state which was faced with a spiral of violence and destruction which it found extremely difficult to contain. Its response was to " combine the continuation of limited reforms and measures to suppress unrest, and the South African Police and the South African Defence Force carried out combined operations in the townships."[459] The state's initial response was the declaration of a partial state of emergency on July 21st, 1985 which appears to have had a limited impact on the level of unrest in the affected areas. The first State of Emergency was restricted to 36 magisterial districts and extended to a further six later that year[460]. This state of emergency was lifted on the 7th of March 1986 after a lull in the unrest and international pressure led the government to reassess the situation. General Steenkamp articulated the state's view of counter-revolutionary actions in the following statement, "The key to effective counter-revolutionary action is fast and effective measures by the forces of law and order. Law and order must be maintained and the revolutionary leadership and their political support apparatus must be isolated."[461] The government was forced by a rapidly deteriorating security situation to impose a nation-wide State of Emergency on the 12th of June 1986 which gave the security forces wide powers of search, arrest and other powers facilitating counter-insurgency measures. Hough described them as "provisions for arrest without warrant, detention for periods not exceeding fourteen days, restrictions on movement of people and goods."[462]

In this environment police resources became overextended. It would appear that years of neglect and a failure to secure a reasonable slice of the security budget in the Angolan Bush war era of high military related spending began to show and led to the deployment of the SADF in the townships. The basis for this co-operation was spelled out by Lt. General Dutton in 1977 following the Soweto Riots, " The traditional dividing line between national security and national defence would appear to have become obliterated. According to the classical concept, the military aspect of national security comprised of two distinct and separate functions, namely national defence to ensure that the integrity

of the state will be defended against foreign aggression, and support to the civil authority in the maintenance of law and order internally. In the new perspective, however, civil riots, strikes accompanied by violence and urban terrorism are seen as guerrilla actions aimed at military, political, economic or psychological objectives as part of the overall assault. Moreover, such ostensibly civil manifestations carry with them the ingredients for escalations to levels of force beyond the capabilities of the civil forces of law and order[463].

Major-General Coetzee, then head of the Security Branch of the South African Police, identified the collection and effective utilisation of intelligence as the 'cornerstone' of any counter-insurgency effort. He identified four principle elements of the intelligence process with regard to counter-insurgency, firstly an evaluation of your enemies capabilities, secondly his shortcomings, thirdly his goals and objectives and fourthly his targets, profiles of his leaders and his organisational structures[464]. Coetzee also identified the importance of an effective intelligence structure and a well established informer network in the process of counter-insurgency. Davis however argues that the informer network all but collapsed in the face of necklacing and people's war, "on the domestic front, which was thought to be primarily the province of the estimated thousand man security branch, the once large pool of informers available to the police had almost dried up on the account of penalties now exacted by black militants" and "in reality the security branch seemed to be losing track of the growing numbers of ANC orientated activists. It often found itself not only failing to learn of attacks in advance, but having to offer cash rewards for information about them. The security branch appeared to be particularly strained to identify the thousands of new, mostly young, activists entering resistance activities each year."[465] While Davis is exaggerating the problems experienced by the security forces there is no doubt that they were faced with new and unique challenges in the intelligence collection techniques.

This emphasis on the intelligence capability in counter-insurgency is borne out by Eliot Cross who identified the following priority, " Probably the most effective instrument that a government can bring to bear against a campaign of urban violence is an efficient police intelligence service or, to use the less palatable term for it, a good secret police.

If the leaders, the plans, and the methods of the rebellious movement are known to the authorities, the likelihood of its being able to mount major demonstrations or to strike serious blows is sharply reduced and, like a guerrilla force cut of from its bases, the movement has to fall back on the defensive."[466] Davis observed that "Information was vital to counter-insurgency. At home, advance warnings of attacks could lead to the capture of Umkhonto units, accurate lists of resistance activists could enable police to paralyse campaigns with mass detentions, tips from township informants could result in the arrest of whole ANC cells. Abroad, inside data on the Congress's headquarters operations could give Pretoria early notice of rebel tactics, details concerning ANC personnel and offices could aid in planning precision military incursions, assassinations, or sabotage attacks."[467]

McCuen also stresses the importance of a sound intelligence capability and the role of the police in dealing with a threat of this nature. " A primary objective in the strategy of counter-terrorism must be the use of police action to destroy or neutralise the revolutionary politico- administrative network. As long as this politico-administrative network remains implanted in the population, destruction of the terrorists will do little permanent good."[468] This important qualification appears to have often been ignored in the South African context where success in countering insurgency is still often measured in 'body counts' or in terms of the number of arms caches recovered.

MK Chief of Staff, Chris Hani, conceded in 1988 that the measures adopted by the security forces had effectively retarded MK activity. According to Hani, "the enemy has formulated and is implementing its own counter-strategy, that is winning the hearts and minds of our people. This strategy is to try and deprive us as much as possible of support from our people because the enemy correctly recognises the fact that once we root ourselves amongst our people, it is going to be very difficult for them to dislodge us. So, in our advance towards launching a people's war we have got to contend with an enemy which has got vast resources at its disposal. We ought to bear in mind that between Kabwe and now we had to contend with the massive onslaught on the part of the enemy. We had to contend with a vicious state of emergency, occupation of our townships by the SADF and a new phenomenon of the formation of the vigilante groups and murder

squads. We have had to contend with Botha transforming the government into a sort of security type of government where the generals both in the police and the army became the main formulators of policy. We have had to contend with the imprisonment, in thousands, of activists and with draconian measures to clampdown on activities of the mass democratic movement."[469] A more pessimistic view emerged in an article entitled People's War and Insurrection: The Subjective Factor. According to the article, "it is clear we were not able to meet that challenge of the 84-86 uprisings due to the inadequate scale of arming the people, our inability to co-ordinate mass activity through a national underground network."[470] Clearly everything did not go the ANC's way during this period.

PROBLEMS OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY.

This conceptual problem originates from problems experienced by the structure traditionally responsible for the defence of a society under attack, namely the armed forces. The 'natural response' of a state under attack, is the deployment of the institutions (its armed forces) which have traditionally used selective force backed by the parliamentary process and the judiciary to defend the state. The traditional means are not however, sufficient when dealing with a People's War scenario which was specifically formulated to exploit certain inherent shortcomings in traditional military thinking. The origin of this problem lies in the nature of the enemy, the insurgent is not a soldier or military combatant in the normal accepted sense of the word, in reality the composition of the insurgents make-up is far more complex. It includes a subtle combination of both military and political factors. " Because of the interplay of political and military factors in an insurgency, efforts to make a sharp distinction between the two are usually not very helpful. A distinction cannot be made on the basis of personnel because an insurgent is often both military and political. The nature of the target of the action does not provide a clear basis for distinction, nor does the nature of the objective, nor does the nature of the consequences that result from the action."[471] This distinction or the problem of definition, is by no means merely an academic one, the counter-insurgent forces deployed in the post war era have demonstrated that this distinction is not readily understood by

the military mind and the political dimensions of People's War appears to confound military strategists who are schooled that the military is and must at all costs remain as detached as possible from any political activity. This view of the state is not shared by Marxist-Leninists who translate the dictum about ' war being a continuation of politics' into a pragmatic blend of military and political action. The ANC appears to have learnt much from the Viet Cong in this regard and applied this principle of dual action effectively in the Eastern Cape. This is reflected in the ratio of political actions to military ones which has altered radically since the onset of People's War.

THE SECURITY DILEMMA:

This duality has posed many problems for the South African Government in controlling the unrest and related People's War activities of the ANC and its internal organisations. The South African Government also found itself faced with what could be described as the " internal security dilemma". This dillema manifested itself when the actions of organisations which appeared to the international community and indeed many South Africans to be legitimate confronted the security forces in a conflict which inevitably resulted in the use of force and the death of 'civilians'. This conflict assumed moral dimensions which made it increasingly difficult for the security forces to act effectively. This lead to a credibility crisis and political insecurity which was exploited by the ANC's international propaganda network.

The element of provocation of the security forces into over-reaction has also played a leading role in the South African situation. Taber identified this element in his work on guerrilla warfare The War of the Flea; "The survival of the guerrilla force over a period of time, demonstrating the importance of the army continues the process. As the guerrilla's support widens, and this will come automatically as the weakness is revealed, political trouble is sure to follow in the form of petitions, demonstrations and strikes. These in their turn will be followed by more serious developments. In such circumstances it will be a remarkable government that will not be driven to stern repressive measures, curfews, the suspension of liberty, and a ban on popular assembly. These illegal acts can only deepen the popular opposition, creating a vicious circle of rebellion and repression

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until the economy is undermined, the social fabrication beyond redemption and the regime tottering on the verge of collapse."[472] There is no doubt that insurgent organisations provoke response from the state to undermine credibility and highlight the contradictions between democratic values and the requirements of an effective counter-insurgency programme.

Marighella expounds this principle in his Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla, " The government has no alternative except to intensify repression. The police networks, house searches, arrests of innocent people and of suspects, closing of streets, making life in the city unbearable. The regime embarks on a massive political persecution. Political assassinations and police terror become routine. In spite of all this, the police systematically fail. The armed forces, the navy and the air force are mobilised and take routine police functions. Even so they find no way to halt guerrilla operations, nor wipe out the revolutionary organisation with its fragmented groups that move around and operate throughout the national territory persistently and contagiously."[473]

There is little doubt that the ANC has applied this time tested principle within the South African context. This approach has posed various problems for the security forces who have relied on young conscripts to carry out counter-insurgency operations. It would appear that in certain instances provocation led to a break down in discipline and subsequent negative publicity for the security forces and the country. The 'security dilemma' is a problem which will continue to plague any large scale urban counter-insurgency effort as demonstrated by the experiences of Northern Ireland and more recently the West Bank in Israel.

The media, and particularly the international visual media played a major part in certain incidents of unrest in the Eastern Cape. Nkwinti's statements have demonstrated the degree to which incidents of both a political and violent nature where staged to achieve maximum propaganda impact. This complicates the task of the security forces who are drawn into predetermined situations which are represented or misrepresented by the visual media. This resulted in a situation where the security forces where portrayed internationally in an extremely negative manner and political capital gained by the ANC.

The success of security force actions in dealing with the people's war offensive must at all times be counter-posed against the long term politicisation which took place during this period[474].

THE ROLE OF THE SAP IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY EFFORTS:

The South African Police played a considerable role in the state's effort to turn back the ANC's inroads made in the Eastern Cape Region. The work of the SAP included the following aspects: firstly the collection of intelligence and the maintenance of the informer network, the selective detention of key individuals within the ranks of the ANC and its support organisations, the interrogation of suspects to secure accurate and up to date information, liaison with members of the business community, the press and the leadership of the revolutionary organisations and selective action to prevent demonstrations and unrest. The role of the intelligence section of the police is spelled out by McCuen, " An almost equally important part of the counter-organisation of the population is the establishment of an effective, internal intelligence system. In this case internal intelligence includes much of the effort normally known as counter-intelligence.The governing body must be able to recognise the difference between revolutionary and non-revolutionary movements. They must know what the revolutionaries are doing. They must ensure that the security forces have time to react. They must know where, when, and how to attack. They must know where, when and how to defend."[475] The SAP Security Branch appears to have used a wide range of tactics in the Eastern Cape to control the subversion process. In the Albany area a flexible approach seems to have evolved after the Second State of Emergency, the SAP took action against the private armies of 'comrades' and other thugs in the townships, arresting the key activists and disarming them. This coincided with the arrest of key political activists and their detention under the provisions of the Emergency Regulations. " Mr Gugile Nkwinti and more than a dozen others were reported taken into custody in a pre-dawn and subsequent raids in the seaside resort yesterday. Colonel Gerry van Rooyen, police liaison officer in the Eastern Cape, confirmed police activity in the township. 'The operation is still on to pick up certain people' he said."[476] The state of affairs in the Eastern Cape had deteriorated to a very serious level of anarchy by this

time and the general opinion amongst the police officers consulted in the area was that they lacked the powers to effectively counter the unrest under the limited powers of the First State of Emergency. Although the Security Branch suffered under the conditions mentioned by Davis in an earlier extract, the detention of activists presented new potential for recruitment and these were exploited to the full resulting in various intelligence successes.

Gugile Nkwinti, UDF leader in the Albany region described the situation in Port Alfred township as follows, " Police and Army presence in the township has been scarce. I have never seen a hippo in our streets. Occasional incidents of harassment by the state has occurred, but says Nkwinti: "They just embarrass themselves. They always sabotage good relations between groups of people, they seem to have a penchant for unrest"[477] Nkwinti's subjective analysis of the situation does point to the lack of real or effective policing of the township. This was to change dramatically as police action following the Second State of Emergency led to the opening up of areas which had effectively been sealed of to anything but a strong police convoy and appears to have played a significant role in the process of curbing the unrest in the Eastern Cape[478]. The process whereby the security situation was allowed to deteriorate to a situation where the police found it difficult to contain the unrest within the framework of criminal law is a complicated one and it would appear that a commitment to reform and a desire to improve the standing of South Africa in the international community, over-ruled the security requirements for containing the unrest. This was complicated by the insufficient strength of the SAP who despite repeated calls for its expansion, had not been upgraded commensurate with the task which faced it.

This problem was discussed in some depth in Major General Steenkamp's investigation into alternative structures. In this work he questions the priorities of the state allocation of resources and identifies various problems which were to have long term implications for the unrest situation. Steenkamp attributes much of the success in the creation of alternative structures in the 1980's to a breakdown in the confidence of the black urban population in the police force and the subsequent damage done to the reputation of the force. This originated from the severe shortage of policemen, the lack of adequate

facilities and funding, the lack of equipment and the failure of the state to increase the Force in proportion to the massive urban population explosion[479]. Davis noted that "as a result, the SAP experienced chronic difficulty in maintaining the quality and quantity of its authorised manpower."[480] Davis details the shortages and the resignations which have constantly drained police manpower and correctly identifies the use of SADF draftees in the SAP as a stop gap solution with little long term impact.

Another perspective on this subject was offered by then head of the Intelligence Unit of the Security Branch, Major Williamson, in which he identified the vulnerability of a society undergoing reform to widespread politically related crime and an associated collapse of public confidence in the police. He identifies the following requirements for an effective police capability, firstly specialised training, manpower, equipment, coordination and a closer understanding between the community and the police force. These all have direct relevance to the Eastern Cape were the shortage of police stations, vehicles and manpower left the police in a position were they were unable to effectively contain the unrest.

The unrest in the area posed new and unique problems for the SAP as high profile religious gatherings such as funerals became the basis for meetings at which political mass mobilisation took place. The emotive context of the funerals contributed towards the militancy of the general population who were mobilised with the active participation of priests and other clergymen positively disposed to the ANC and its internal bodies. The controversy surrounding these political funerals had profound political implications. The foreign news-media made extensive capital out of the incidents which were relatively easy to film in a negative light. The following description of a funeral in Port Alfred is a typical example of the pitfalls surrounding the control of these funerals. " An 18-year old youth died, several people were injured and property was damaged during incidents of violence in Port Alfred. Between October 8 and November 16 there were several altercations between police and stone throwing youths in the township. The unrest claimed the life of an 18-year old youth, Madodane Tyuka, who was fatally wounded on November 6. According to the police, the youth died during an incident in which twenty youths stoned a police patrol vehicle in the township. The disturbance in the township

culminated in violence at Mr Tyuka's funeral during which twenty people were injured. There was a large stay-away from work on the day of the funeral. According to the police 2000 mourners marched on the police and stoned them. They were dispersed with rubber bullets, birdshot and teargas. The 211 injured included two 15-year old youths who sustained serious eye injuries."[481] This report highlights the problem of escalation attached to riot control situations were the police actions in defending themselves against a stone throwing attack escalates into a major incident in which 2000 people are involved in a confrontation leading to more incidents and fatalities. This problem contributed to the complex and difficult problem of unrest in the Eastern Cape and was compounded by negative press reporting and graphic footage for screening on television stations abroad. This in turn stimulated international sympathy for the UDF and ANC in the area and was responsible for the large amounts of funds poured into the region by Western Countries.

The counter-revolutionary strategy of the state rested on a three-pronged counter-revolutionary plan, the three components being, action against revolutionaries, upgrading of living standards and the introduction of constitutional amendments[482]. State strategy in the Eastern Cape hinged on the view that the maintenance of law and order only constitutes one quarter of the counter-insurgency effort[483]. Observers noted that the balance "lies in the urgent treatment of socio-economic grievances in an attempt to cut the ground from under the revolutionaries."[484] This task was undertaken by the National Management System which comprised of two legs, the security and the welfare element which were described as "a complex network of structures which co-ordinate the work of government, provincial and municipal departments to give priority to the stabilisation of society and the elimination and upgrading of social, economic and constitutional backlogs. The structures are organised on a basis which coincides with military command regions, sub-divided into police divisions and further split into magisterial districts. They are known as Joint Management Centres (JMCs) at the top, sub-JMC's in the middle and mini-JMCs at the bottom. At each level, the JMCs are divided into specialist committees, dealing respectively with security (including intelligence and law and order functions), communications (propaganda) and SEC (social, economic and constitutional matters). The work of the SEC formations are crucial for the achieving of four of the objectives

General Malan has determined as prerequisites for the lifting of the state of emergency. The fifth objective, restoration of stability through law and order forms the umbrella for the work in the SEC field."[485] SEC reports have dealt with the practical results of their actions, a SECSTAT revealed that "at the start of the state of emergency in June 1986, 53 of the total 235 black local authorities (23 percent) were no longer functioning at all. Their functions had largely been taken over by street committees."[486] The report indicates that 36 of the 53 were reinstated by SEC actions and that by June 1988, 244 of the total 261 local authorities were functioning. Areas which also received attention were privatisation of state owned township housing, black education and unemployment. The role of SEC has increased substantially and recently it would appear that all security related functions were subordinated to SEC in the management system.

Discussions with SAP officers in the area revealed the existence of a document drawn up by the South African Police dealing with the issue of alternative structures and formulating suggestions for counter action which recommended the banning of the key organisations responsible for mass mobilisation under the Charterist banner and the prosecution of individuals in the leadership of these organisations[487]. The document was reportedly premised on a view that the ANC and its various support organisations were "enemies of the state" and that actions such as these form a viable alternative when formulating a counter-insurgency strategy. The document warned that sufficient evidence must be available to justify the actions and identified hostile media response as a major problem. Although these steps were taken and resulted in the restriction of seventeen key revolutionary organisations, the detention of many key leadership figures and the Delmas Treason Trial it can be argued that their long term impact was merely to delay the process of mass mobilisation.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION: *PEOPLE'S WAR: WHAT FUTURE?*

An era of underground People's War ended abruptly with the unbanning of the ANC, PAC and SACP on February 2nd 1990. The analytical examination in this dissertation of the ANC's development during the decade preceding this event reveals that the nature of the revolutionary campaign of the African National Congress and its auxiliary organisations underwent various doctrinal and other changes. The evidence contained in this thesis suggests that the organisation will continue to adapt in the face of changing conditions. If it is accepted that the ANC altered its strategy to meet various challenges to its existence then the factors which determined the nature of these changes become significant.

The failure of the ANC to maintain the climate of ungovernability and to consolidate the 'organs of people's government' during its banning was undoubtedly a setback to an organisation which is faced with the reality of being the worlds 'oldest liberation movement' and having very little in the way of concrete success to show for this. Retrospectively it would appear that the central factors leading to the ANC's strategic reorientation included the imposition of two national State's of Emergency, the banning of many of the ANC leadership cadre and the restrictions placed on sympathetic organisations. It would appear as if these developments had a profound impact on the People's War campaign and forced the ANC to make important strategic reassessments. Research would suggest that the People's War reached its apogee in the mid 1980's and that the ANC was forced to seek new revolutionary channels in the late 1980's given the changing dynamics of the South African situation. Two important factors point to this change in direction, firstly the unbanning of the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party and the release of its leadership from prison. This has been followed by the return from exile of the majority of its exiled leadership and many of its cadres. Secondly the decision by the ANC to suspend its armed struggle and to enter into negotiations with the State changed the conditions within which the ANC functioned. Understandably these factors influenced the prospects for People's War in the future.

Research would also suggest that the ANC had undertaken a comprehensive reformulation of its overall objectives in the constitutional, legal and socio-economic fields and further emphasis has been placed on mobilisational activities in the townships. The ANC has demonstrated its eagerness to transform itself from an exiled organisation into a mass based political movement. The emphasis on mass mobilisation and the building of political organs inside the country has been facilitated by the RSA governments recognition of the legality of non-violent protest and the release of its internal leadership. The reorientations in ANC strategy which are examined in this dissertation reflect a recognition by the ANC of the various factors which have influenced its development since 1985.

The failure of the People's War offensive of the African National Congress following the declaration of the Second State of Emergency and the serious blows dealt to its internal leadership cadre, which appear to have had a profound impact on the strategists of the ANC and the SACP and which led to a partial reassessment of their position is evident in such important departures from the key elements of this era such as People's Education and the armed struggle. The reversal of the ANC's campaign to destroy the existing education system mobilising around the slogan "Liberation before Education" was a landmark failure for People's War. By tacitly admitting that it had committed a strategic blunder the ANC came to terms with the failure of one of the key elements of its social engineering experiment. Its suspension of armed struggle can likewise be seen as an admission that it was unable to force the state into accommodation of its aspirations through violence.

When evaluating the nature of the ANC's strategic reorientation it is important to identify those areas in which the ANC achieved success with its People's War strategy. The success achieved by the ANC and the UDF in reducing state efforts to extend franchise on a local level to urban blacks to a shambles was an unqualified success. Chief of Staff of MK, Chris Hani stated before the 1988 Municipal Elections that "The ANC was committed to aborting the municipal elections. We shall not allow puppet organisations to put up candidates. We shall mobilise our people against them. But we shall also use revolutionary violence or forcefully persuasion to stop blacks from

collaborating. Those who are about to collaborate, or who have intentions of collaborating, we want to warn them that they do so at their own risk."[488] The ANC succeeded in its objective in this regard. To date the Government has been unable to restore confidence in its black local government structures and has conceded that a governmental restructuring must follow negotiations. This element of the People's War campaign can therefore be said to have been successful.

The ANC succeeded during this period in focusing world attention on its efforts to remove the South African government and through sanctions, strikes, mass action and other strategies reduced the economic potential of the South African state to ward off the effects of economic sanctions. This element of the People's War efforts can therefore be regarded as a unqualified success for the ANC. The long term impact of this strategy on the country is however difficult to determine but it will create problems which the ANC could potentially inherit. The ANC has therefore showed a marked reluctance to abandon the sanctions weapon which it rightly sees as a powerful instrument to maintain a degree of leverage over the South African government.

Counterpoised against this success is the ANC's apparent inability to stabilise its support base and institutionalise its alternative structures. A possible explanation to the ANC's instability during this period and its spasmodic operational intensification before its unbanning, lies in the various state clamp-downs which hampered many of the key revolutionary structures and forced the ANC to reconsider its optimistic claims of the mid 1980's. Mayibuye stated in 1989 that "it is clear we were not able to meet the challenge of the 84-86 uprisings due to inadequate scale of arming the people, our inability to co-ordinate mass activity through a national underground network, MK was unable to effectively root itself amongst the masses so that the grassroots combat groups could reinforce mass struggles with strategically directed armed activity. Consequently the revolutionary movement was not able to defend the spectacular revolutionary advances of the period against the regime's multi-faceted counter-revolutionary strategy."[489] It is therefore possible to state that on this level mass mobilisation was unsustainable given the existing strategy of the state.

The restriction of leading Charterist organisations which played a leading role in the state's strategy during the 1980's, further hampered efforts to re-activate People's War. This restriction on the ANC's ability to mobilise support has largely been removed during the post unbanning period. The ANC was able to exploit the relative stability and political accommodation inherent in the negotiating process to reorganise structures which were destroyed in the past. This contrasts with the pre-unbanning period when the restrictions which were placed on the UDF after the imposition of the second State of Emergency forced the ANC to explore new avenues for its activities. In the wake of the restriction the ANC made considerable movement towards the realisation of the launching of national organisations mobilising people in key sectors of society. This process of creating front organisations led to the emergence of a national youth and student organisation, the beginnings of a national civic organisation, a national Charterist trade union movement and many other national structures within the Charterist camp. The ANC went through a lean period internally following the clampdowns and has recognised the role which these measures by the state played in restricting its ability to mobilise the people. It is therefore ironic that given the current conditions of relative mobilisational freedom that the ANC is currently grappling with the problems of organisational restructuring which were necessitated by its unbanning. These severe problems evident in disappointing recruitment figures are despite the removal of many of the obstacles which hampered its development previously. It is therefore possible to argue in the light of the facts contained in this thesis that certain inherent weaknesses existed within the ANC which restricted its growth apart from the constraints of state action.

There were various clearly identifiable reasons why the ANC found its mobilisational objectives difficult to achieve before its unbanning. The National Security Management System introduced by the South African Government during this period, was specifically structured to carry out counter-insurgency campaigns against People's War strategies. The strategic approach which lay behind this structure grew from an understanding of the works of strategists such as J.J McCuen and F. Kitson. Strategists who had been intimately involved in fighting previous People's War type insurgencies. Their role in shaping the state's response to People's War is examined earlier. The second factor was interlinked to this counter-strategy. The other arm of the NSMS which concerned itself

with "welfare" was responsible for the upgradement of the townships from a security point of view. Access was improved, lighting was installed and other measures including the building of strong points taken to improve control of the townships. Thirdly, emergency regulations resulted in the disruption and dislocation of many of the structures and alternative hierarchies during this period and the detention of key cadres, a factor recognised by ANC strategist themselves all contributed to the failure of these efforts. The fourth factor which hampered ANC efforts was the creation of a large township based police force in the form of local township police units, the so-called 'kitskonstabels' or police auxiliaries and a strong black Municipal Police[490]. This took place at a time when the South African Police were receiving a larger part of the budget and the upgrading of South African Police facilities and equipment began to change the face of township policing. These factors enabled the state to blunt the thrust of ANC mass mobilisation. It is therefore hardly surprising that these elements of state policy were specifically targeted by its critics for removal. An objective in which they have been largely successful.

The ANC current preoccupation with violence in the townships is cited by its spokesmen as a major contributing factor in its failure to transform itself into a true "political organisation. The massive death toll in the townships over the past three decades, many of the deaths resulting from attacks on individuals or organisations who challenged the ANC's drive to establish hegemony in black politics as well as the victims of security force actions, created a climate of violence in South African society. The results of the People's War experiment in social engineering are evident in South Africa's current dilemma and the level of violence. A substantial proportion of the blame for this "culture of violence" must therefore rest with the ANC which attempted to mobilise the township inhabitants into a "people's army". The systematic mobilisation of large sectors of the society using coercive mobilisational mechanisms produced a large strata of society who depended on conflict and violence to retain their newly found status as the soldiers of the "people's army". The sub-culture of violence which is so evident in the current situation is arguably therefore a direct consequence of the ANC's Peoples' War experiment. The numerous quotations reproduced in this dissertation are sufficient evidence of the intention of the ANC to militarise the masses. It is therefore ironic that

the consequences of the ANC's success in this field are currently making themselves evident in a manner in which the ANC claims is detrimental to its development. The evidence contained in this thesis would therefore suggest that despite the inability of the ANC to sustain mass mobilisation within the parameters of its own control, that a certain degree of self-perpetuating momentum was gained in the mobilisational process. This is reflected in the undisciplined actions of the ANC youth and the "comtsostis" which have resisted ANC discipline and continue to generate tension in the townships. It is therefore possible to speculate that the ANC could fall victim of its own efforts to militarise South African society. Its apparent failure to realise the long term consequences of social engineering have a bitter irony when seen against the backdrop of apartheid's failure as a social system.

Another element of ANC strategic development which emerges throughout this dissertation is the role of criticism from within the ranks of the ANC during the period preceding its unbanning which manifested itself on the National Executive Committee with Ronnie Kasrils amongst others, delivering a scathing attack on the strategies of the past. This particular attack reinforced the analysis by "Mazala" in a 1988 Sechaba that the tactical errors of the pre-People's War led to failure. It would seem from these internal statements that the position taken that the ANC was forced by circumstances largely beyond its control to re-evaluate its position and reformulate its strategy is a correct one.

This re-evaluation did not indicate an abandonment of the philosophy of People's War adopted at the Kabwe Consultative Conference but must rather be seen as an expansion to a more sophisticated and multi-dimensional approach in which the ANC appears to compromise some of its long term goals to achieve a broadly based alliance of anti-apartheid organisations[491] and the adoption of a more insurrectionist approach. ANC strategists are careful to blame their misfortunes on tactical errors rather than strategic miscalculations. The manifestations of this development are evident in both the internal developments within ANC and the SACP and in the external image which the organisation is projecting in its dealings with Western countries and in its relationship with the SA government[492].

Chief of MK Intelligence Ronnie Kasril's document entitled <u>Politics and the Armed Struggle: The Revolutionary Army</u>, was submitted to the NEC in February 1988 in Lusaka and contained some interesting admissions which enable the analyst to speculate about the reasons for the ANC's doctrinal changes identified in the thesis. Kasrils conceded that, "Despite the tremendous upsurge of mass resistance over the past three years we were not able to take full advantage of the favourable conditions that materialised. We were unable to deploy sufficient forces at home; our cadres still found big problems in basing themselves amongst our people; our underground failed to grow sufficiently and our people were left to face the enemy and his vigilantes with sticks and stones, the incredible mass resistance and strikes were consequently not sufficiently reinforced by armed struggle. It is therefore clear that although we have long formulated theoretical positions such as "the armed struggle must complement the mass struggle" and "the guerrilla must be rooted in the people" etc, etc, it is one thing to state the theory and another to put it into practice."[493] This important statement indicated the extent to which elements in the ANC are dissatisfied with the development of the internal support structures and the ability of MK to support them.

It is therefore possible to state that the creation of 'alternative structures', 'revolutionary base areas' and 'people's power' failed to survive the state of emergency because the ANC was unable to protect them from the states' counter-measures. This suggests that the ANC moved before it had consolidated its position and miscalculated its ability to face the security forces in a frontal position. Mao's writings on the subject of guerrilla warfare emphasise the dangers inherent in movement from one phase of struggle to another without sufficient preparation. The ANC appears to have ignored this element of Mao's revolutionary teachings. The demise of its Eastern Bloc support mechanism, the changing dynamics of sub-Saharan geo-politics and the political renewal process within the ruling bloc all were reflected in the changes which took place in the ANC's strategy and tactics.

The apparent uncertainty which existed within the leadership of the ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe is reflected in the internal debate within the organisation. Kasrils identified a failure by the leadership to realise a coherent and consistent strategic doctrinal position

during this period: "The fact that nearly three years since the Kabwe Conference of the ANC we still await a fresh strategy and tactics document does not help our military strategy."[494] This hard hitting observation supports other indications that the ANC were unsure how to take their onslaught or struggle further. The failure to mobilise the cadres, both externally and internally around a strategy which was popular and easily understandable reportedly led to dissatisfaction and demoralisation. Kasrils also identified a controversial topic of internal debate within the ANC when he asked the question, "Highlighting these defects (above) one asks: is it not possible that we are incorrect in believing that the armed struggle is the way forward?" and stated that the events of the past three years have demonstrated that the one aspect of insurgency without the other will be doomed to failure. The degree to which the ANC lacked an easily understandable doctrine of war fighting, is highlighted in a statement in which he says that "What is demanded is a vision of how power is to be seized and a plan for the building of the forces and means to carry out this task. This vision and this plan must be clearly understood by all activists, at home and abroad, within the terms of their tasks and responsibilities so that all have a clear and common understanding of their role within the machinery of the struggle."[495] The ANC appears to have realised that it must translate its revolutionary theories into readily accessible concepts which are both practical and easily translated into reality. These statements made after the failure of the major internal mobilisational thrust enable the analyst to look at the ANC's growth during this underground stage in a degree of perspective. The current emphasis on mass resistance within a quasi-political framework in ANC strategy appears to result from the lessons learned during the late 1980's.

An important article by "Denga" written in the African Communist during the evaluation phase of People's War concerning the broad coalition of anti-apartheid forces gave a further important insight into future ANC strategy. The discussion article highlighted the ANC's commitment to the building of a mass front against the government, this front by definition was to be sufficiently wide to encompass the largest spectrum of anti-government forces possible to overcome the marginalisation process which formed a key element of the States strategy in the pre-unbanning phase. The marginalisation process, (ie. emphasis of the ANC terrorist nature and its communist links) threatened the ANC

both internally and externally during this period. To overcome this threat to its image the ANC drew into its ranks a broad spectrum of organisations which were non-revolutionary but who could be persuaded through negotiation and discussion to either remain neutral or to side with a broad alliance of forces which shared common short term objectives but who could be abandoned once they had fulfilled their limited function. This led to a process in which the ANC attempted to abandon unpleasant elements of its image and develop an image which is more acceptable in the West following the demise of the Eastern Bloc as a source of support.

The article expands on this analysis. It states that, "various tactics have to be employed to win the multitude of the unorganised into the struggle. One of the most important is to find common bound with formations which are broadly speaking or potentially anti apartheid to which these forces may belong and act jointly with them: the fundamental aim being to raise the consciousness of the masses and activate them to become staunch participants in the struggle for national democracy." [496] An ANC planning document circulated in 1987 stated that the "consolidation of the unity of these forces will defeat plans to treat the ANC as one of a number of legitimate forces in our country and to divide our people into different political entities, each with its own set of political demands .... The issue of negotiations is pressing on us with increasing insistence. It seems clear that the imperialist powers have, in fact, gone a good way forward in considering this whole question. We must, at all times, work to ensure that we are in the strongest possible political, military and diplomatic position whenever such negotiations may be forced on us. In this regard, we have to defeat enemy manoeuvres to divide our movement on ideological and other grounds, to reduce us to one of a number of legitimate forces and to determine the subject of a negotiated process."[497] The ANC clearly can be said to have been aware of the dangers inherent in its new found freedom to mobilise which makes its relative failure to achieve hegemony in black politics more significant.

Swilling foresaw a problem which would dog the ANC throughout its late People's War phase and continue following its unbanning when he said, "A critical problem faced by political activists since the uprising began in 1984 was how to hold back political

mobilisation while organisations were built to guide and direct oppositional movements. Repression and inadequate organisational resources prevented them from resolving this problem. Communities, and particularly the youth, moved too quickly to take on the full might of the state without the protection, despite the street committee system of strong national organisation."[498] The end of repression did little to alleviate this problem. The ANC continued to find it difficult to consolidate the inroads made by coercive mass mobilisation. This suggests that throughout the era of People's War that the initial gains made by the ANC in mobilisation reflected a short term process with little chance of long term success. While it is true that the ANC maintained a steady level of support in given areas, such as Port Alfred, Cradock and Port Elizabeth, it was not able to translate these successes into revolutionary institutions or true parallel hierarchies. Its inability to generate permanent structures arguably highlights its political immaturity within the given situation. It was essentially an exiled movement during this period and did not posses the grass-roots awareness of the changing dynamics on the ground which it required to consolidate its mobilisational successes.

It is therefore possible that strategists within the ANC viewed the People's War experiment of the 1980's as a partial failure and moved rapidly in a new direction. Despite this realisation it would appear that the ANC leadership viewed the failure of the greater People's War effort as a consequence of tactical errors and continued to maintain that the strategy itself was appropriate to South African conditions. It is therefore possible for the analyst to speculate that while the strategic principles of People's War will remain part of the ANC's strategy and tactics and although the form may change substantially, the content of their strategies will remain largely unaltered.

A recent internal ANC training document stated that "whatever scenario we paint of the possible outcome of our struggle, our present priorities remain unaltered. We must prepare for the seizure of power. A negotiated settlement favourable to the masses for example, can only take place when the enemy is forced to concede that the organised forces of revolution have seized the initiative. Our programme sees no conflict between the insurrectionary perspective and the possibility of a negotiated transfer of power. The exact form of the ultimate breakthrough should not be confused with the strategy needed

to help create conditions for the winning of power."[499] The ANC are therefore actively reserving the insurrection option as part of a dualistic strategy with strong People's War influence in their current strategy.

The ANC has stated in a recent strategy document that, "as a mode of combat the objective of defence action is to oblige the adversary to abandon his attack by inflicting maximum losses on him. The question of defence hinges on the whole question of the survival ability and capability of our organisation to move and to take our people to victory in the shortest possible time and terms largely dictated by us."[500] The ANC has chosen to channel its military energies into a sophisticated structure of Defence Units. These it plans to model into a National Township Defence Force directed at defending its structures against attack from its increasing range of adversaries in the townships. Whereas its organisational focus during its period of banning was against the regime, it is found itself locked in a deathly battle with its chief rivals in the black political arena. These include the Pan Africanist Congress, the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Azanian People's Organisation. This has also necessitated changes of strategy as Umkhonto we Sizwe struggles to come to grips with the new environment in which it must function.

It is therefore possible to argue that the emphasis in ANC circles will continue to move away from People's War in its narrower, more military sense and that the ANC will increasingly look to diplomatic and other "political" strategies to continue with its revolutionary programme. The era of old style People's War appears to be over and a new dimension to ANC activity is evident in the post unbanning phase. Despite this movement it is also evident in the townships of Natal and the Transvaal that the forces of Umkhonto we Sizwe are still actively deployed, often within the framework of self-defence units against political opponents. The proposed publication of a handbook for the training and deployment of self-defence units indicates that the ANC has not abandoned its use of violence[501].

The People's War era saw substantial changes in the ANC. A conflict of this scale and nature inevitably generates a new cadre of leaders schooled in the practical art of revolution. It also produced a revitalised group of leadership with current experience in dealing with the conditions inside the country which faced the ANC following its unbanning. The ANC's development during this period points to various important

military lessons. Firstly the failure to consolidate structures cost the ANC dearly. It invested enormous human and physical resources into selected areas only to see them taken back into the system after the state of emergency. It demonstrated the inability of insurgent organisations to survive without developed internal and external base areas and validated Mao's insistence of the importance of these areas. It demonstrated the ability of draconian action to suppress revolutionary activity on certain level but it demonstrated the psychological power held by an insurgent force fighting an authoritarian as apposed to dictatorial regime[502]. More importantly the events examined in this thesis demonstrate that an insurgent effort of this nature is primarily concerned with intangible aspects such as morale and will to resist. The major realignment of the state in its position with regard to the ANC was largely a product of the enormous publicity generated by the ANC's People's War effort. This demonstrated the validity of Mao's assertion that vastly inferior forces with limited resources at their disposal can force a technologically superior force into acknowledging partial defeat.

A crucial issue addressed in this thesis is the debate about ungovernability and the causality of the ANC's involvement in events in the townships during the 1980's. In examining the mechanics of revolution as opposed to its causes, this examination of ANC strategy does not address the issue of grievances within the groupings of the South African population targeted by the ANC. These underlying factors do however have relevance to a debate which is central to this dissertation. This is the debate concerning the causational relationship between the ANC and black revolt. Jeremy Seekings, in an analysis of mobilisation in the Tumahole township near Parys described the two major positions in this debate as follows, "the South African Government, the mainstream media, and liberal observers all referred to political mobilisation as 'unrest' and interpreted in terms of violence. For them, "unrest" was a deviation from the "normal", and its was in violence (suggesting violation and illegitimacy) that this was most accurately embodied. Their explanations, of course differed. The Government blamed "unrest" on manipulative agitators."[503]

Seekings describes the liberal viewpoint as follows, "liberal observers dismissed such agitator theories. But without locating violent confrontations in an understanding of either political economy or the dynamics of township politics, their analysis lapsed into indeterminacy. Lawrence Schlemmer, for example, identified sixteen variants that formed

"a matrix of interlocking factors" (including the "irritants" of rent increases, and the inadequately deterrent"counter-reaction by police units"!) which gave townships "a propensity for unrest and dissidence".[504] Seekings dismisses the unrest theory with contempt arguing that, "the concept of "unrest" does not provide a useful approach to township politics. Whilst on the one hand it is nebulous and seems all-embracing, on the other it suggests a homogeneity that bears little resemblance to the diversity of political mobilisation and protest, and an incoherence that denies the playing out of concrete class interests. It also belittles the importance of contemporary resistance through suggesting, as one liberal observer has himself pointed out, "that these cycles of violence and counter-violence form part of the larger age-old political dilemma that plagues South Africa."[505]

Seekings rejects these two approaches out of hand and argues that rather than reflecting a "unidirectional" struggle for national political rights, that "it seems that, in many townships at least, the genesis and development of popular protest is rooted in township-specific factors." While Seeking's class based analysis of society may lead him to perceive the origins of township conflict in socio-economic conditions he fails to satisfactorily explain the process of mobilisation. Mobilisation is in itself a process which occurs as an independent consequence of the given conditions and is distinct as a process from the prevailing conditions themselves. A class based or Marxian analysis seems to inevitably over-estimate the revolutionary potential of the people to rise up in a co-ordinated fashion as a result of conditions on the ground. This thesis has attempted to explore the dynamics of mobilisation which made the difference between those communities in which people suffering deprivation and hardship either stayed in a state of relative inactivity or in which isolated examples of spontaneous protest took place and those in which organised coercive mobilisation sparked of organised protest. Seekings does not explore the important element of revolutionary conflict management, the process undertaken by the ANC's under-ground structures during this period and dismisses the role of "agitators" as conspiratorial. In the two townships examined in this dissertation the evidence is overwhelmingly in support of a planned and co-ordinated process which was not township specific but rather formed part of a conscious strategy of revolution. In evaluating the rule of the ungovernability thesis it is important to recognise the importance of intentions. The ANC actively planned for and carried out a People's War offensive. Evidence of this abounds in this dissertation. The argument that the protest was

a spontaneous result of frustration has certain benefits for opponents of the state and ironically, within certain quarters, proponents of state policy. Opponents of the state use these arguments to emphasise the nature of oppression and the extent of exploitation under apartheid. Proponents of the state's position have used the argument to demonstrate that the ANC was impotent and unable to take control of the revolutionary process. This argument attempts to minimalise the role of the ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe in the process. Both arguments are one dimensional and lack any sound empirical basis. The reality of the situation was far more complex.

An ANC document entitled Guidelines on Underground Construction is more specific that Seekings in identifying the core of the mobilisational process which took place in these selected areas, "in building the underground we should identify the most important tasks of the moment and pay the necessary attention to them. If we are dealing with a large region eg the Eastern Cape, we need to identify the most strategic industries and the most decisive social sectors, and strive to secure a decisive presence in them. At the same time there may be areas with a high level of mass activity eg Cradock or Cookhouse which would need immediate attention and resources of the underground so as to give the mass revolt there the necessary guidance. The underground would then have to respond accordingly. It could well be that the particular moment enemy activities are such that the hamper mass mobilisation and organisation."[506]

Clearly the ANC was acutely aware of the need to manage the situation and to channel anger and frustration into a revolutionary direction. The evidence accumulated in this dissertation would suggest that the ANC played a direct agitational role in those townships in which it was able to establish a viable under-ground mechanism. It would also suggest that Seekings dismissal of the role of "manipulative agitators" ignores the role which the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe and the under-ground structures played in the mobilisational process.

The activities of the ANC during this period suggest that they were able to stimulate grass-roots discontent using activists trained by the UDF and other bodies in mobilisational techniques to generate resistance to the state. They were also able to intensify the process by altering the environment in which mobilisation took place in such a manner that the township inhabitants found themselves caught in a cycle of violence and isolation from the world beyond the parameters of their township. This

process was reinforced by coercive mobilisational techniques which included fear and terror. These mobilisational techniques and their identification do not detract from the reality of apartheid, the economic hardships of the township inhabitants or the aggravating factors such as rent increases or bus-fare hikes but are a reality of ANC township activity during this period. This dissertation does not attempt to explore the dynamics of the conditions which existed in the areas in which People's War took place but rather to explore the dynamics of mobilisation and the ANC's unique role in this process. A process which will continue to have important consequences for South Africa's future.

ENDNOTES:

1. Davenport, T.R.H; <u>South Africa: A Modern History</u>; 1978; p.176.

2. Lerumo, A; <u>Fifty Fighting Years</u>, 1971; p.26.

3. Mokethi Mothabi; <u>Black Resistance to Apartheid</u>, 1985; p.6.

4. Cowell, A; <u>Defiance in South Africa</u>; undated; p.2.

5. Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki, Thabo Mbeki, Thozamile Botha and Steve Tshwete.

6. Meer, F; (ed.) <u>Resistance in the Townships</u>; 1985; p.50.

7. Callinicos, A; <u>S.A: Between Reform and Revolution</u>; 1988; p.75.

8. <u>Africa Confidential</u>; ANC; 1987; p.2.

9. Meli, F; <u>South Africa Belongs to us</u>; 1988; p. 37.

10. To the African National Congress.

11. The transition which took place in the ANC was largely due to the "Black Republic" thesis formulated by the Comintern and foisted onto the then CPSA. The CPSA then embarked on a process of "entryism" which led to the adoption of the socialist Freedom Charter in 1955 and the eventual domination of the ANC's leadership after the Morogoro Consultative Conference in 1969.

12. The Marxist term for the working class or members of the working class.

13. Meli, F; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1988; p. 184.

14. The process of marginalisation involves the involuntary movement of an organisation or individual to the fringes or extremes of the political perspective.

15. The ANC and the SACP are currently linked together in a Revolutionary Alliance which both organisations publicly proclaim in their respective publications.

16. McCuen, J.J, <u>The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War</u>, 1965; p.124.

17. Scott, A.M ; <u>Insurgency</u>; date unkown; p.4-5.

18. O'Niel, B.E; <u>Insurgency in the Modern World</u>; date unkown; p. 5-8

19. Meer, F; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1989; p.50.

20. Strategy and Tactics Document of the ANC.

21. Elliot-Bateman, M; <u>The Nature of People's War</u>, date unkown; p.127.

22. Davenport, T.R.H; <u>op.cit.</u>, p.126.

23. Taber, R; <u>The War of the Flea</u>; 1977; p.47.

24. <u>Ibid</u>., p.47

25. Pike, D; <u>People's Army of Vietnam</u>; 1986; p.87.

26. Pike, D; <u>Vietcong</u>; 1966; p.32.

27. <u>Ibid</u>, p.227-229.

28. <u>Building People's Power</u>, Sechaba, September 1986, p. 6.

29. <u>Sechaba</u>, April 1986; p.6.

30. Mao Tse tung; <u>Selected Military Works</u>; 1955; p.155.

31. <u>Ibid</u>, p.97.

32. <u>Ibid</u>., p.173.

33. Taber, R; <u>op.cit.</u>, p.49

34. <u>Ibid</u>., p.49.

35. <u>Ibid</u>., p.49.

36. Pike, D; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1966; p.36.

37. <u>Ibid</u>; p.36. <u>op,cit.</u>

38. Pike, D; <u>P.A.V.N</u>; p. 361

39. O'Neill, B.E; <u>op.cit.</u>, date unkown; p.11.

40. <u>Ibid</u>, p.12.

41. This emerged in detail during the protracted "Delmas Treason Trial", in which Judge van Dykhorst pinpointed the role which the ANC had played in this process.

42. Meli, F; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1988, p.32.

43. Pandya, P; <u>An Investigation into the Application of Mao Tse-tung's Theory of Insurgent Warfare by ZANU During the Campaign in Rhodesia</u>; 1986; p.15.

44. Mao Tse-tung, op.cit., 1955; p.143.

45. Mao Tse-tung, Basic Tactics, 1967; p.108.

46. Ibid.; p.81.

47. No Place to Hide; The Strategy and Tactics of Terrorism, Western Goals; 1982, p.12.

48. Mao Tse tung; op.cit., 1955; p.175.

49. The War in South Africa, The Washington Post, 14/12/1986.

50. Hough, M; Revolutionary War in South Africa, undated; p.2

51. Meli,F; op.cit., 1988, p.23.

52. Mandela, N; The Struggle is my Life, undated, p.40.

53. Davis, S.M; Apartheid's Rebels, 1987; p.7.

54. Benson, M; Nelson Mandela; 1986; p.60.

55. Ibid., p.60.

56. Mandela M; No Easy Walk to Freedom, undated; p. 13.

57. Bevryde Gebiede en Alternatiewe Structure; undated; p.147.

58. The Goniwe Plan of the UDF in the Eastern Cape during the 1980's.

59. Ngoyi, Edgar Dumile; South African Police C.R. 70/01/87; A.7.

60. Ibid., p.A.7.

61. The term conventional is used in the non-military sense to convey the fact that the methods and rationale were of a conventional nature.

62. Hough, M; op.cit., undated, p.2.

63. Sechaba, November 1986, p.3.

64. The conference was aimed at restructuring the organisation after its leadership were forced into exile by the banning of the organisation and the trial of its leading members after the Rivonia Conspiracy was uncovered and the ANC High Command dispersed.

65. Strategy and Tactics of the ANC, Kabwe, June 1985.

66. Hough, M, op.cit., undated, p.4.

67. Prior, A; <u>ANC and the Stalled Revolution</u>, 1985; p.13.

68. The large scale unrest sparked off by school boycotts and resulting clashes with the Security forces focused in Soweto.

69. Callinicos, A; <u>Marxism and Revolution in South Africa</u>; 1986, p.5.

70. The scholars and students who fled the RSA following the Soweto Riots of 1976 and who were subsequently recruited into the ANC and PAC.

71. This emerged after the capture and interrogation of KGB Major Alex Koslov by South African Counter-Intelligence in 1979. He revealed that the ANC was concerned with the ANC's failure to exploit the Soweto Riots.

72. SAP Statistics issued by COMPOL (SAP).

73. Morris, M, <u>Soapy Water and Cabinda</u>, 1985; p. 37-38.

74. <u>Sunday Express</u>; June 5 1983; p.1.

75. <u>A Peoples Army Fighting a People's War</u>, Sechaba, November 1984.

76. <u>Sechaba</u>, January 1987; p.6.

77. <u>Ibid</u>, p.6.

78. <u>Sechaba</u>, Sept. 1986; p.9.

79. Taber, R; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1977; p.23

80. Pike, D; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1986; p.136.

81. Schlemmer, L; <u>South Africa's Urban Situation: Avoiding the Crisis</u>, 1989; p.1

82. <u>Commission on Strategy and Tactics</u>, ANC National Consultative Conference documentation, June 1985.

83. Grieg, I; <u>Subversion, Agitation and the spread of People's War</u>, 1973; p. 398

84. For instance the conflict between Populism, Workerism and the proponents of the Two Stage Theory as well as the "spontaneous revolution" school versus the "vanguard party" school and the resistance from orthodox Marxist Leninist's to arming the masses.

85. Various debates carried out through Sechaba or the African Communists indicate the level of Marxist analysis applied to the South African situation and in particular the question of armed struggle.

86. <u>African Communist</u>, No.92, p.70.

111. <u>A United People Will Defeat the Enemy</u>: Statement by Politburo of the SACP; Sept 1983; p.36.

112. <u>ANC Pamphlets Herald Change in Tactics</u>, Weekly Mail, 14/6/1985.

113. <u>Planning for People's War</u>, ANC NEC document, undated.

114. The Three Chambered South African parliamentary system which provides for three separate houses for the white, Indian and coloured sectors of the South African Parliament.

115. Pike, D; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1966; p.215.

116. Slovo, J; <u>No Middle Road</u>; undated.

117. Hough, M; <u>Armed Propaganda</u>; undated; p.9.

118. <u>MK, Let us Move to an All-out War</u>, Sechaba, November, 1986; p.5.

119. Callinicos; A; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1986; p. 15;

120. Citizen; <u>Viet Cong Methods used by ANC</u>; 11/9/1986.

121. Mao Tse-Tung, <u>op.cit.</u>, 1955; p.124

122. O'Niell, B; <u>op.cit.</u>, undated; p.12.

123. <u>Eastern Province Herald</u>, 1.11.1986

124. Meer, F; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1985; p.60.

125. O'Niell, B; <u>op.cit.</u>, p.12.

126. Rabkin, D; <u>Mayibuye</u>, No.2; 1984, p.4.

127. The National Democratic Movement is not to be confused with the political party of the same name, it is the term used by the ANC to describe the broad grouping of organisations which are involved in the National Democratic Struggle.

128. Styles; D; <u>Understanding the Freedom Charter</u>; 1989; p.5.

129. Steenkamp, F.M.A; <u>Alternatiewe Structure</u>, undated; p.35.

130. <u>Umsebenzi</u>, Volume 4, No.1; 1988, p.2.

131. Isizwe: The Nation; <u>The Community is the Main Source of Power</u>; p.36.

132. Personal discussions with UDF activists in the area in 1987/88.

133. <u>Eastern Province Herald</u>; 2/6/86.

134. <u>Sunday Times</u>; 21/7/85.

135. See detailed section on Eastern Cape for examples.

136. Marighella, C; <u>Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla</u>, 1985, p.22.

137. <u>The Citizen</u>; 11.06.1985.

138. <u>Umkhonto we Sizwe, 25 Years of Political Struggle</u>, ANC occasional publication, 1986; p.2.

139. Karis, T.G; <u>South African Liberation: The Communist Factor</u>; 1987; p. 267-287.

140. Morris, M; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1985; p.26.

141. Discussions with activists and organisers in the region, amongst others Gordan Jawuka and Dora Moses of PARCO.

142. <u>People's Army, People's War</u>, ANC occasional publication, undated; p.2.

143. See PEBCO section.

144. Themes compiled in SAP Manual, Undated, p.43.

145. Cilliers, J.K; <u>Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia</u>, 1985; p. 39.

146. For example Isizwe The Nation; Phambili etc.

147. People's Army People's War, ANC occasional publication.

148. ANC Radio Freedom Broadcast, Addis Abba.

149. Tambo's New Years Address reprinted in February Sechaba.

150. Swilling, M; <u>Beyond Ungovernability: Township politics and local level-negotiations</u>, 1988; pp.1-2.

151. <u>Sechaba</u>, March 1984; pp.5-6

152. Swilling, M; <u>op.cit.</u>; 1988; p.2.

153. <u>The African Communist</u>; No. 89; Second Quarter; 1982; p.85.

154. <u>Building People's Power</u>, Isizwe the Nation, Vol.1 No.1; 1986; p.4.

155. Meer, F; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1985; p.20.

156. <u>Sechaba</u>, March 1986; p.2.

157. <u>Sowetan</u>; 27/2/1986.

158. <u>Sechaba</u>; November 1985; p. 30.

159. <u>Townships in Chaos as their Black Councils Collapse</u>, Sunday Star, 21/5/1985.

160. Fredrikse,J; <u>SA: Ungovernability to People's Power</u>, 1986; p.63.

161. The Washington Post; <u>The War in South Africa</u>, 14/12/1986.

162. <u>Wall Street Journal</u>, 5.05.1986.

163. <u>Sechaba</u>, March 1987; p.9.

164. Steenkamp, F.M.A; <u>op.cit.</u>, undated; p.54.

165. Pike, D; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1986; p.126.

166. Hough, M; <u>op.cit.</u>, undated; p.2.

167. Black, P.A; <u>Boycott Strategies in the Eastern Cape</u>, 1986; p.3.

168. <u>Strategy and Tactics Commission of the ANC</u>, Kabwe Documents; 1985.

169. <u>Mayibuye</u>, No.1; 1985, p.3.

170. <u>Sechaba</u>, February 1984, p.4.

171. <u>Ibid</u>, p.7.

172. <u>Sechaba</u>, January, 1987; p.12.

173. <u>Planning for People's War</u>, 1983.

174. <u>Umkhonto we Sizwe, 25 Years of Struggle</u>, ANC occasional publication.

175. <u>The Star</u>, 19 May 1988.

176. <u>ANC: Advance to People's Power</u>, ANC Publication.

177. Isizwe The Nation; Vol.1; No.2; March 1986, p.8.

178. Swilling, M; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1988; p.7.

179. ANC Military training document on tactics of revolution, undated, p. 1.

180. <u>Ibid.</u>, p.1.

181. <u>Ibid.</u>, p.1

182. <u>Ibid.</u>, p.2.

183. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 2.

184. <u>The African Communist</u>; No.89, 1982, p.85.

185. <u>Sechaba</u>, February 1986, p.11.

186. Congress of South African Trade Unions.

187. National Education Crisis Committee.

188. Sechaba, March 1987; p.9

189. Sechaba, March 1988; p.9.

190. Hoile, D; op.cit.; 1988; p.4.

191. Mbeki, T; Peaceful Struggle is Futile, New York Times; undated.

192. Sechaba, March 1986; p.2.

193. Sechaba, March 1988; p.3.

194. White, R; Towards a Strategic Assessment......, 1986; p. 17.

195. Lodge, T; Astute Diplomacy Leads to ANC Gains, June 1986, p.1.

196. Preparing the Fire Before Cooking the Rice in the Pot, Sechaba, April 1985, p.12.

197. Secretary General of the South African Communist Party and up until recently leading member of MK's High Command.

198. Sechaba, January 1985, p.26.

199. O'Niell, B; op.cit., undated; p.9.

200. Sunday Star, 21.05.1985

201. Cross, J; The Conflict in the Shadows: The Nature and Politics of Guerrilla War, 1964; p.167.

202. London Daily Telegraph; Terror Campaign for Black Townships; 10/4/1985.

203. Sunday Times; Black Student reveals amazing story of township war strategy; 21/7/1985.

204. Ibid.

205. Fredrikse,J; SA: op.cit., 1986; p.63.

206. Taber, R; op.cit., 1977; p.32.

207. Ibid., p.32.

208. Pike, D; op.cit., 1966; p.92.

209. Mao Tse Tung, op.cit., 1955; p.167.

210. Kasrils, R, <u>Politics and the Armed Struggle and the Revolutionary Army</u>, Lusaka, February, 1988.

211. <u>The African Communist</u>; No. 89; 1982; p.85.

212. Mao Tse Tung; <u>op.cit.</u> 1955; p. 167.

213. <u>Isizwe the Nation</u>; Vol.1 ; No.2; March 1986; p.5.

214. <u>Mayibuye</u>; Special Edition; p.5.

215. <u>Sunday Times</u>, 14/6/1985.

216. <u>Mayibuye</u>; Special Edition; p.5.

217. O'Niel, B.E; <u>op.cit.</u>, undated; p.35

218. <u>Sechaba</u>, March 1987; p.9.

219. <u>Sechaba</u>, March 1986; p.2.

220. Kelly, G.A; <u>Lost Soldiers, The French Army and Empire in Crisis</u>, 1965; p.215.

221. <u>Sechaba</u>, March 1987; p.9.

222. <u>Sunday Times</u>, 14/6/1985.

223. Callinicos, A; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1988; pp.63-66.

224. <u>Building People's Power</u>, Sechaba September, 1986, p.14.

225. A wide range of SAP reports.

226. Meer, F,ed. <u>op.cit.</u>, 1985; pp.20-21.

227. Greig, I; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1973; p. 92.

228. <u>Ibid.</u>, p.92.

229. <u>Ibid.</u>, p.92.

230. O'Niel, B.E; <u>op.cit.</u>, undated; p. 67.

231. Meer, F; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1985; p.14.

232. Swilling, M, <u>The UDF and Township Revolt</u>, Work in Progress, 1987, p.18.

233. The Two Stage Theory of the SACP involves a first stage which will culminate in the implementation of the Freedom Charter and the election of a National Assembly in a 'one man one vote' election. The SACP believes that this National Democratic Revolution will create the conditions suitable for a socialist or communist People's Government in which the SACP as the

vanguard party will seize control of the government and institute a People's Democracy along the lines of Cuba or the Soviet Union.

234. <u>What is Revolution</u>, Progress, Moscow, 1986, p.68.

235. <u>The Observer</u>, 1 March 1987.

236. Then leader of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and leading political activist in the UDF.

237. Callinicos, A; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1988; p.62.

238. <u>Ibid.</u>, p.62.

239. <u>African Communist</u>, No. 96; p.19.

240. <u>African Communist</u>, no. 101; p.30.

241. Swilling, M; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1988; p.92.

242. <u>Sechaba</u>, April 1986; p.6.

243. The Comrades were the bands of students and youths who formed the spearhead of the progressive movement in the townships and were largely drawn from COSAS.

244. Laqueur, W. <u>Guerrilla</u>, 1971; p. 217.

245. O'Neill, B.E; <u>op.cit.</u>, undated; p.13.

246. Moss, G, <u>MK and the Armed Struggle</u>, W.I.P, p.16.

247. <u>Sechaba</u>, April 1987; p.9.

248. Review of African Political Economy, Speech by Murphy Morobe, Acting Publicity Secretary UDF, May 1987.

249. <u>African Communist</u>, No. 96; p.19.

250. Speech by Steve Tshwete, July 1984.

251. Mark Swilling is a Wits based academic who has written numerous articles on the conditions in the townships during the unrest.

252. <u>The UDF and the Township Revolt</u>, Swilling, M, Work in Progress, No.49.

253. <u>Ibid</u>, p.18, <u>loc.cit.</u>

254. <u>Ibid</u>, p.19, <u>loc.cit.</u>

255. <u>Ibid</u>, p.19, <u>loc.cit.</u>

256. <u>Ibid</u>, p.22, <u>loc.cit.</u>

257. <u>Sechaba</u>, May 1986; p.2.

258. Fredrikse, J; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1986; p.63.

259. Black, P.A; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1986; pp.1-3.

260. Callinicos, A; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1988; p.98.

261. Cowell, A; <u>Defiance in South Africa</u>; New York Times Magazine; p.2.

262. Breier, D; <u>Exploding Eastern Cape: A Classic Pattern for Civil War</u>, Sunday Star, undated.

263. Ngoyi, Edgar Dumile; South African Police, Algoa Park C.R 70/01/87, A.7.

264. The MK designation indicates a clandestine name used by members of Umkhonto we Sizwe to protect their true identity.

265. Sakati, Xolila; South African Police Algoa park C.R. 70/01/87, A.1.

266. <u>Ibid.</u>, p.27.

267. Callinicos, A; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1988; p.64.

268. Swilling, M; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1988; p.4.

269. South African Police reports.

270. SAP reports.

271. Fredrikse, J; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1986, p.64.

272. <u>Ibid.</u>, p.64.

273. <u>Sechaba</u>, September 1986; p.16.

274. Fredrikse, J; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1986; p.63.

275. <u>A United People will Defeat the Enemy</u>; Statement by the Central Committee of the SACP; 1983.

276. <u>Mayibuye</u>, No.7; 1984; p.2.

277. Callinicos, A; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1988; p.62.

278. <u>Ibid.</u>, p.62.

279. <u>Social Change and Development</u>, No.8, 1984, p.11.

280. Evening Post, 4/7/1985.

281. <u>Goniwe did not seek Confrontation</u>, Eastern Province Herald, 4/6/1985.

282. <u>Evening Post</u>; 4/7/89.

283. <u>The Evening Post; 1/7/1985</u>.

284. Meer, F; ed. <u>op.cit.</u>, 1989. pp. 50-52.

285. SAP reports.

286. SAP reports.

287. Swilling, M; <u>op.cit.</u>, 1988; p.4.

288. Cowell, A; <u>op.cit</u>; undated; p.2.

289. The Evening Post, 4/7/1985.

290. Cowell; A; <u>op.cit.</u> undated; pp.30-48.

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