


OCTOBER 1990



# SECHABA

official organ of the african  
national congress south africa



**ANC SAYS: DISARM THE VIGILANTES!**

Bus ambush outside Durban, 1990: innocent commuters killed and injured



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Graphic design by Hylton Alcock



# EDITORIAL

## ALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE

Recently, opponents of the ANC have questioned the centre-role the ANC is playing in the unfolding process in South Africa; why other black parties are not sitting side by side or across from the ANC in the current talks with the South African regime.

Whatever the case may be, the National Party is the ruling white party and, as such, it would be an exercise in folly to imagine it being left out of the process.

In the past, in building the opposition base in the country, the ANC has met various white organisations and parties. Under the present situation, this process continues, and has even included bantustan leaders and those to the right of the National Party who want to really grasp what the ANC is, and what the future holds for them.

There has been no deliberate attempt to sideline any organisation or party. The simple fact is that the ANC is the premier organisation of the oppressed and democratic majority in South Africa, a fact that the regime has had to reluctantly accept openly.

For decades, the ANC has been the main enemy of all the various National Party ruling cliques. Each regime pronounced the death of the ANC as the ultimate among its objectives. This was a way of working their way to the hearts and minds of their white supporters.

These regimes, and their supporters, were responding to a reality that has always existed in the country, namely, that the greatest danger to apartheid rule came from the ANC and its allies in struggle, the South African Communist Party, the South African Congress of Trade Unions and later the mass democratic movement. From other quarters, they expected no danger, while from others they saw unqualified support for their policies against blacks and their objective of destroying the ANC.

On numerous occasions, the world woke to horrific stories of massacres, in their sleep, of ANC members and refugees and nationals of neighbouring states by soldiers of the South African regime. Scores of agents were infiltrated into the ANC and instructed to poison its cadres in its military camps and educational institutions. All these actions were perpetrated because the ANC's armed and underground political work was having its effect on the apartheid system.

It is only rank opportunism or a deliberate wish to set off course the present talks that make some people blind themselves to these facts. The truth is that all in South Africa are aware that history dictates that the ANC plays the role it is playing today. Over the years, the regime has spoken to all who were prepared to speak to it on its own terms. The ANC chose not to engage in talks — not as a matter of principle, but because it did not feel that the apartheid rulers were serious about negotiations. Others took a non-negotiating stance as a principle, and some continue to do so.

As has been stated on so many platforms, the ANC believes that any organisation or party that feels that it has suggestions to make as regards the present process of creating a climate of free political activity, should do so. Only in this way can we reach a position which would satisfy everyone. This cannot be done by denying the ANC the right to engage in talks with the De Klerk regime. We set out our conditions for full negotiations to take place, and are now sitting with the regime to thrash them out.

Our aim is the establishment of a constituent assembly in which all parties and organisations would have to represent their constituencies. Towards the creation of this assembly, anyone and any party can contribute, but free political activity must be guaranteed to the ANC, in the same way that it has been enjoyed by others in the past.

# VIOLENCE AMONG THE PEOPLE ANC AND COSATU RESPOND

**The immediate response of the African National Congress and the Congress of South African Trade Unions to the escalating violence came in the form of this call to the people made on August 16 1990 in Johannesburg.**

Violence among the people has reached alarming proportions. The blood of black people is flowing like rivers. Lives are being lost in the hundreds: babies, youth, women and men. Why do we butcher one another like beasts? There is certainly no reasonable answer to this question.

There are a few misguided individuals sneaking into our ranks — in the hostels and in our communities — calling on us to fight against one another. They spread rumours that one section of the community is planning to attack another. They have taken it upon themselves to divide us along ethnic lines. They urge one language group to fight another. Within the hostels, hatred is being sown everywhere.

- ★ Yes, we might have political differences.
- ★ Yes, we might belong to different political organisations.
- ★ Yes, we do not speak one language.
- ★ Yes, we do come from various parts of the country.

But this should be the basis for our unity, not for violent conflict among the people. We can and must debate, yes. But butchering one another will not take anyone anywhere. No one can claim to gain from the shedding of blood among the people.

The African National Congress and the Congress of South African Trade Unions appeal for calm among the people: workers, students, teachers, housewives, the unemployed and others. This senseless carnage must stop.

- ★ We all desperately need freedom.
- ★ We all need jobs and a living wage.
- ★ We all need housing.
- ★ We all need better education.

Killing one another will not bring us these and other rights. Every conflict among the oppress-

ed people takes away the strength we need to achieve our freedom. Every black life lost prolongs the period of our suffering.

The ANC and COSATU appeal for peace among the people: no matter what country you come from, there is no reason for us to murder one another.

The violence among the people must stop.

- ★ Beware the wedge-driver, who comes to you demanding that you go out and attack your fellow brothers and sisters.
- ★ Beware the rumour-monger who whispers into your ear that people who speak a different language from yours are your enemies.
- ★ Look out for the cunning plotter, who seeks to breed hatred between you and those who stay in the hostels, between you and those who stay in the locations.
- ★ Refuse to be provoked.

Those who want to deepen the wounds of conflict must be isolated. If and when we are united, the rumour-mongers will stick out like a sore thumb.

The ANC and COSATU call on all our people to bring peace and unity within our communities:

- ★ Young and old;
- ★ Hostel-dwellers and township residents;
- ★ People who speak different languages;
- ★ Individuals from different areas of the country.

The role of the police is to save the community, not to fan the flames of conflict. Peace and calm must be brought to the ravaged communities. We cannot afford any more loss of life. Our country and our nation needs peace and justice.

**Let us stop slaughtering one another.**

# INTERVIEW

## THE CONFLICT IN NATAL IS NOT ACCIDENTAL

**Thembelihle Ngcobo is an organiser for the Pulp and Paper Workers' Union of South Africa (Ppawu). She is a member of a youth organisation, is involved in women's activities, and serves on the Natal Midlands Emergency Services Unit, set up to help victims of violence. Her own family has suffered from this violence; the family house was burned down in 1987, and some of the family are now squatting in a flat in central Pietermaritzburg. She spoke to Sechaba in August, during a visit to London, where she addressed audiences on the situation in Natal.**



*Grief in Natal: the funeral of Guduza Gumede, a child killed by vigilantes*

*You used to be a teacher. What can you tell us about the state of education in Natal at present?*

Education has been disrupted, totally, because of the violence. I will quote the present crisis in Pietermaritzburg, where after the attacks by Inkatha in March the kids and their families had to flee — that is, if the parents were still alive.

And now they cannot go back to the schools where they were, because they fear the attacks. As a result, Edendale has 40 000 kids out of school, from the lower sections up to the higher sections. During the holidays of the University of Natal, arrangements were made that these kids should be taught by the teachers who had been teaching them in their schools, and it went all right. But then the crisis came back when the

university had to re-open, because then they no longer had premises. From August 1 they have been roaming around, not knowing what to do.

And, worse than everything, since March the teachers themselves have been too afraid to go to the KwaZulu schools, because it is too dangerous for them. They have staged a campaign of solidarity with the kids. As a result, from August 1, the Department of Education and Culture, which is under KwaZulu, stated through a circular that any teacher who does not want to go back to schools that are in operation is not going to get paid.

*Are the teachers organised?*

I think the situation has organised them. They are now talking of organisations like the National Education Union of South Africa (NEUSA) and the National Education and Health Workers' Union. But we cannot say they were properly organised in the beginning. One other difficulty is that they cannot go and join the trade unions, because they have signed a pledge with the KwaZulu government that they cannot be members of a union, they cannot complain about the Department of Education and Culture. It has always been a difficult situation for them.

The situation is intensifying, because if you are teaching in an area where there is a chief who is acting as a warlord, it is likely that the chief and the indunas will get direct command in the schools. As a result, the teachers themselves have no authority in the schools now. If the warlords feel that they should take one child who they believe is anti-Inkatha, and kill it there, the teachers cannot say anything.

The kids are even killed at school, in front of the others. From three or four onwards, up to the age of 16, the kids witness the killings.

There's a high school under the Department of Education and Training, not under the jurisdiction of KwaZulu, but situated on the border, where the warlords and chiefs are able to move in with the backing of the police, to do what they please. A female teacher at this school says she was busy writing on the board when she heard the sound of a gun, and the next thing she heard

was a kid falling down from the desk.

The child had been shot, there in the desk, sitting in the classroom, shot through the window. They did not see the attackers approaching, but the attackers started shooting, and the shot happened to get this child in the classroom.

*Why do they go for the children? Is it to punish the parents? Or are the children very politicised?*

Not necessarily. It's just like the saying that the small snake is also dangerous.

*Will you tell us something about work in the trade unions — difficulties, the progress of union organisation in Natal?*

All organisations are being affected, directly or indirectly. We should remember that the people we refer to as workers are also part of the community. They are refugees in camps, or they have to go from work to the churches for shelter, because their homes have been burned down. And there are people in the anti-progressive unions of the United Workers' Union of South Africa (UWUSA), operated by Inkatha, and they cause problems in the factories. What happens in the community controls what is going on in the factory.

Take the example of the workers of SARM-COL, when they went on strike and the shop stewards were attacked and killed by Inkatha in 1987-88. If it is not Inkatha that attacks the people and disrupts their strike, it is the police or the soldiers who come and shoot them. There may be a boycott in support of the striking workers — then you can be sure that there will be Inkatha vigilantes to smash the solidarity, either by opposing it openly or by using the smear pamphlets that are distributed in the evening by the police. The operation of the union is affected in the same way as the whole community is affected.

*A person who is an Inkatha vigilante — what reward does he get for being an Inkatha vigilante? What's in it for him?*

As far as we can see, there are key members who are getting paid for the number of jobs — it may be the number of deaths — they have done. But then they have to set up their own network, and it won't be clear to the network members on the ground which direction they are taking. But the warlords on top — they know what they are doing. They know exactly. Take an example of ten people charged with more than 21 cases of murder, and acquitted; some have more than nine interdicts against them, protecting certain families, but still those families get killed, those witnesses get killed.

All of a sudden, these people are promoted to the KwaZulu legislative assembly, and, if they are in the township, they all become town councillors, so that they'll exercise their job properly within the framework of law.

There was a councillor who killed three children on the road, and stood in front of the corpses until the police arrived, so none of the families could touch them. After a few months he wanted to be voted into the position again. People could not vote him into the position, because he was killing their kids. So people under his command went from house to house, collecting the identity books of the people, so that in the administration department they just entered the names and ID numbers, and submitted them as people who had voted for him.

So this councillor, who is a warlord, has all the power; he kills if you do not agree with him. You do not have to give your ID book, but you know that if you do not, you'll be attacked in the evening.

*I see what the warlords get out of it, but what about the ordinary vigilante, who takes orders from the warlord?*

Of course, he gets something; you don't know how much each councillor has and how much he will get paid. But the councillor can promise him a house, and a job, and of course he will get a gun free of charge, and he won't be arrested. An unemployed person cannot refuse that, because the situation is desperate. A person will only think of his or her stomach.

It's not difficult to formulate something that will make that type of group angry. For example — they would say, "These kids have insulted your leader," and of course the people who take that person as a leader, because that person pays them, will grow angry and attack. So the people on the ground are just given information that will make them angry, so that they do the job for the top people, who know exactly what they are doing.

People who belong to that organisation get a licence for their arms. People in other organisations cannot get that type of privilege. I am an official of COSATU, but if I was in Inkatha, I could have a licence to buy arms to protect myself. The situation is biased. People are talking about it. Inkatha people should be disarmed.

When they are injured, the situation is not difficult for them. They have to be referred to hospital by a well-known person in that area, like the councillor, and they will go straight to the hospital. The councillor will arrange for security from the KwaZulu police, so that the casualty will not be attacked in the hospital.

If somebody on the other side has been injured in an attack gets to hospital, he does not get the same attention. If he is bleeding too much, he dies, without being taken into the ward.

There is an arrangement with the National Medical and Dental Association (NAMDA) that an injured person can be referred to a NAMDA doctor, who will give medical attention himself, or, if he thinks it is necessary, will write a letter to refer the patient to a hospital like Grey's Hospital in Pietermaritzburg.

*That's very good, but suppose the person is bleeding to death?*

It's the only way.

*When your house was burned down, did you think it was because of your connection with the trade union movement?*

There's no clear reason that I can state, or that the family can state, but one thing that was mentioned is that my brother is on Robben Island.

My father and mother were at home at three o'clock during the day when the attack took place. An SADF camp, which was supposed to monitor the area, was only 500 metres from the gate of the house, but there was no assistance from this camp; somebody had to run more than ten kilometres to get assistance in the Edendale main road. The Riot Squad came and later phoned for the ambulance, using the walkie-talkie, and my parents were taken to hospital.

When the relatives came, they were told to vacate the premises. The reasons were not very clear, but the usual explanation they give is that it is "illegal" to disturb the police while they are investigating a case. They vacated the premises, and the SADF camp promised to take guard, but that evening the house was burned down, totally destroyed. Everything was burned to ashes.

When people rush to help others, the police often say it's "illegal" to interfere with the situation, so people are sometimes burned alive.

*Will you tell us about the role played in the situation by the army and the police, by the authorities in general, South African and KwaZulu?*

What is happening is not accidental, or something that happens at random. If one strategy fails, they use another. In townships like Chesterville, where they cannot use Inkatha, they have released the criminals, life-serving criminals from the jails, formed them into groups, given them arms and money. In Chesterville, they formed them into a group called The Eighteen. They once lived in the area, they once knew everybody in the area, they were able to identify key people. They had the arms, they had all the resources, and they could not be prosecuted by the government. In some areas, where there are many chiefs under the KwaZulu government, they can be used. In the townships, they use the councillors.

In Umlazi they use the KwaZulu police, led by the chief of intelligence and security. The KwaZulu police can exercise their power because they are acting within the framework of the law. Complaints have got to be lodged through this commander, and if he cannot solve the problem,

he refers it to the Chief Minister of KwaZulu as the Minister of Police.

They have been able to confuse people. People will say, "One day in Umlazi we had problems and the SAP came and managed to smash the problem," and in one place they'll say, "It was better when the SADF came," and in another place, "It was better when the KwaZulu police came." Then, in March, De Klerk said — and this is what the papers were saying — "It is clear that the people of Natal do not know what they want. While their leadership are saying that they don't want the troops in the townships, the people on the ground are saying that they want the SADF, some say the SAP, in the townships."

In the end, they brought in the 32 Battalion. They said the battalion is a neutral force because they don't understand English, Afrikaans, Zulu, Xhosa, nor any of the languages spoken there, and do not know who is Inkatha, who is UDF, ANC or COSATU.

This battalion is a mixture — some are ex-FLNA, some are from Zaire. We cannot be sure UNITA is not there too. They stress that they are the Buffalo Battalion that managed to smash the SWAPO bases in 1985, and they have been used in many successful operations of the SADF.

What happened is that 32 Battalion came — they never came to the people, they came to the camps. They used helicopters; the troops were briefing them on the situation, and the troops have obviously been told which area is against the government and which area is for the government. Their actions have never been separate from the actions of whatever state force has been there.

I can take as an example the women's meeting we recently had in Greytown, a general meeting of women. It was surrounded by these battalions, mixed with the SADF, carrying arms, and when the meeting ended, they told the women to walk away in groups of not more than three. The police and the 32 Battalion were just imposing their own law. Yet we expect organisations to be operating freely.

While we talk about peace with the government, they are training Koevoet in the northern Cape, just near the border of Namibia. They call



them the 31 Battalion; they are training them to act as a "neutral force," like the 32 Battalion, in whatever region they're needed. And now, since there is violence in the Transvaal, Inkatha is now in Transvaal. In the end, because the organisations have taken a resolution that the troops should be out of the townships, and the people have started complaining that the troops are favouring one side, they will be able to bring in a "neutral force," which will be Koevoet from the west, because they won't know which side is the Xhosas and which side is the Zulus.

You can imagine what those kind of people are going to do. If, for example, the kids wear SWAPO T-shirts printed during the independence of Namibia, what would be the reaction of 31 Battalion in the situation of Natal and in the situation of South Africa, where most progressive people feel that SWAPO is like their own organisation?

The state of emergency was retained to make sure that the violence is well established, so that it won't be difficult for them to import it to other regions. If the government was truly for peace, they wouldn't be preparing for a fight. The ANC has suspended the armed struggle — why shouldn't they take the move of suspending everything? They're preparing themselves so that if their well-established strategy doesn't work in other regions, then Koevoet will be used.

*What difficulties do women experience? You were talking about the meeting in Grevtown.*

Everybody is organising under difficulties, but women are facing even more problems. You can imagine, if you are not working, your husband dies, and two of your sons, who you hoped would maybe do something to help you in the future, are also killed, on the same day, and you have to face the cost of the funeral, and maybe you still have more than three kids who are growing. Maybe even your house has been destroyed; you no longer have a home, you no longer have a breadwinner or somebody to rely on.

Most of the refugee camps are full of women and children. We talk of plus or minus 45 000 people in the refugee camps. One of the biggest

camps consists of around 11 000 people. The others are smaller, but there is not less than 2 000 people in each. In Durban and in northern Natal there are refugee camps. They have to get food every day; they have to get clothing; they have to have health facilities, and they cannot get into the KwaZulu hospitals. If you are a UDF or COSATU supporter, you are refused admission, and, because of the failure of the KwaZulu government to provide equipment, some of the clinics have been closed. So alternative means have got to be made.

The government will have nothing to do with the refugees. The organisations that sympathise with them have got to look at the day-to-day cost of food. Of course the organisations do not have money; they have to try and raise the funds. Imagine how much it costs to feed that number. Some of them do not even have clothing.

Committees are set up to raise funds, to discuss the immediate issues facing them, to discuss the way forward. It's something that has to be co-ordinated properly. In Pietermaritzburg there's an *ad hoc* crisis committee, which consists of church members, trade unionists, social workers, organisations to counsel the people, organisations like the National Medical and Dental Council. These people have their full-time jobs, and cannot look deeply into the problems of the people, so they disperse the job into smaller sub-committees.

The welfare of the people has been made the responsibility of the South African Council of Churches (SACC), so that donations go into the account of the SACC in the area. The distribution of food and everything is done by the officials of the South African Council of Churches, but monitored by this committee.

When I left there was a problem. The resources are drying up. Since March, companies and individuals have been donating on a day-to-day basis for the welfare of the refugees, but they cannot go on like this. It's not only the present number of people; the number keeps on growing. It appears as if within the next few weeks we will have the problem of not knowing what these people are going to eat from day to day.

# MANDELA SPEAKS IN OSLO THE HUMAN RACE: OUR COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY

At the end of August 1990, in Oslo, the Deputy President of the ANC, Nelson Mandela, addressed an international conference on "The Anatomy of Hate." Present at the conference were the Prime Minister of Norway, the Right Honourable Jan Syse, heads of state and government, freedom fighters and peacemakers from all over the world. The statement reproduced below clarifies various policy positions of the ANC as well as some current political issues.



*Nelson Mandela*

For thousands of years, the human race has thrown up men and women of love, vision and boundless courage. It is thanks to these towering giants that our humaneness has always remained with us and will continue to remain with us, no matter how difficult the challenges thrown at us from one historic era to another. We remain human beings precisely because little-known people, everywhere, have risen and continue to rise in defence of the human race. Some of these are named and have become saints; yet

countless others have passed unnoticed and unsung. We meet here today, and in their memory, to challenge the vanity and hatred that threatens the very survival of our planet. Like them, we who are congregated here today should reaffirm our undying love for humanity.

We have come here despite the pressing need for us to be in South Africa. Our troubled country continues to bleed because of the violence of apartheid. As a result, we come here carrying

the hopes of millions of our people, who pray that this conference should contribute in some way towards bringing a speedy end to their long suffering. Our presence here is not an abdication of our duty at home. Rather it is an affirmation of our long-standing faith in the common destiny of the human race. Our commonness challenges men and women of conscience to understand the anatomy of hate, and promote universal love, prosperity and peace.

When we talk about hatred in the world today, we should do so without fear or favour. We should have the courage and political will to be counted amongst those who stood for right in the face of overwhelming evil. In this respect, we cannot talk about human rights without addressing the sea of problems confronting our generation, especially hunger, homelessness, illiteracy, ignorance and disease. From the east to the west, the south to the north, we all share in the guilt of leaving our fellow human beings to suffer the pain of deprivation. We have a common responsibility of ensuring that the great divide between the rich and the poor, between the east and the west, between the north and the south, is ended.

We are living in times of great upheavals and great hope. The political landscape of our world is being transformed beyond recognition. The familiar landmarks are no longer there. We are pioneers of a new world. We should, and indeed must, steer humanity towards a new path, away from the pain and tribulations that have afflicted us for so long. This is a task that can no longer wait. The clouds of war gathering in the Middle East must be diffused through dialogue without delay. This is not only necessary but possible. For as long as there are men and women of conscience amongst us, we cannot and must not lose hope. We should replace anger with reasonableness, recklessness with statesmanship.

The threat to the world environment is real. We need to raise the conscience of humanity to the calamity that may befall us. We owe it to the coming generations to preserve this world. We owe it to them to make the world a more habitable place. International peace remains one of the chief concerns of our time. In this regard, we heartily welcome the current thaw between

the east and the west. We are looking forward to the day when we shall live in a world without nuclear and chemical weapons. We urge all concerned, particularly those possessed of these weapons of mass destruction, to ensure that our planet is rendered a much safer place without delay. Let us respond to the challenge with the boldness and determination that the situation requires from us all.

Regional conflicts constitute one of the major factors of destabilisation. The prevailing spirit of resolving these conflicts by peaceful means must not only be encouraged, but should be made the cornerstone of the policy of each country. If we could achieve international and regional peace, the scarce resources needed to redress the basic needs of the people the world over would be released. This we must do in the interests of humanity.

In South Africa, we stand on the threshold of a historic and fundamental democratic transformation. The new situation in our country is a direct result of our people's struggle, supported by the sterling reports of the international community. Realising that our struggle had produced conditions where it was possible to end apartheid by peaceful means, our movement, the African National Congress, lost no time in inviting the government to open negotiations with the legitimate leaders of the black majority.

In this regard, it should be mentioned that there is no single organisation or political party in South Africa which can compare with the ANC's commitment to peace. As a result, we are heartened that finally the government has responded positively to our initiative.

We have had two successful meetings between the government and the ANC. In both the Groote Schuur and the Pretoria meetings, the main subject for discussion was the creation of the necessary climate for peaceful negotiations. In a gesture of goodwill and reconciliation, the ANC announced the suspension of the armed struggle at the conclusion of the Pretoria meeting. For its part, the government undertook to address the violence which at the time was confined mainly to the province of Natal. It is deeply distressing that the current wave of

violence occurred on July 22 1990, when violence broke out at the Sebokeng hostels, following an Inkatha rally. On that day, thirty people died and approximately fifty people were injured. Since then, well over six hundred people have died and thousands more are injured.

Time does not allow for us to give a detailed account of the pattern of the current spate of violence. What is clear, however, is that forces opposed to our peace initiative are behind the latest violent eruptions. Their strategic objective is to undermine the process that we have so delicately nurtured. In this regard, the role of the South African police has been less than helpful. The ANC will not allow this violence to derail the process of negotiations. It is for this reason that the ANC shall leave no stone unturned in an effort to normalise and stabilise the situation in our country. We have already set in motion a process which we hope will usher in peace and reconciliation amongst the various political organisations and our people. The international community has an ongoing responsibility to assist and strengthen our efforts to promote peace and democracy in South Africa.

The so-called black-on-black violence has its roots in the system of apartheid, which continues to be firmly in place. It is apartheid which continues to sustain this violence. Indeed, in some instances, the right wing has carried its threat out by resorting to violence, so the threat to the peace process remains real. We are still far from the stage where we can say that a fundamental and irreversible transformation has taken place in South Africa. Until then, it is our common responsibility to challenge, without relenting, the apartheid edifice. The international community should therefore maintain all forms of pressure, including sanctions. On the apartheid system, it would be premature for anyone to begin thinking of assisting apartheid South Africa to break out of her pariah status and diplomatic isolation. Apartheid is an evil, and this evil must be ended, not merely reformed. We urge all concerned to heed the appeal of the overwhelming majority of the South African people.

For our part, we remain fully ready to continue with the struggle until our dream of a

united, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist South Africa has become a living reality. We shall continue to be partisan fighters on the side of peace and democracy. We shall relentlessly challenge the infamous seeds of hatred wherever these are found. This is the spirit in which we have come to Oslo: the spirit which has guided our people over centuries; the spirit which has sustained us during the many and lonely years of our imprisonment; the spirit which will form the basis of our new society.

We seek to build a society wherein a person's colour will matter no more a society in which all our people will be united in their diversity. In doing so we are challenging the scourge of racism which is negating the humanity of the whole world. We are opposed to white domination as much as we are opposed to black domination. The solution to our problems does not lie in the enslavement of others; rather it lies in our ability to free all, for in so doing we shall be freeing ourselves. In this regard, male domination and sex discrimination should not find any place in any truly democratic society.

We are painfully aware of the practice of religious intolerance in many parts of the world. We are deeply saddened by the revival of anti-semitism, particularly in Europe. We should not and cannot fold our arms and allow the world to recess into yet another abyss of hatred. Religion should be the basis of co-operation and not a source of conflict. In this regard, South Africa is perhaps more fortunate than others. The overwhelming majority of our people, who belong to varied religious denominations, continue to challenge apartheid as a united force. It is our intention and prayer to carry this co-operation with us, as we enter a new and democratic society. Never again should anyone be discriminated against or persecuted simply because he or she belongs to a religion different from our own.

Let us all march forward, confident that good is ultimately bound to triumph over evil. History has shown that the human race does not only have the capacity, but also the will, to rise in defence of humanity. Let us do so now, and not relegate our collective responsibility to posterity.

# LANGUAGE POLICY FOR A POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

By Monica Nhlapo

**This paper was written as a critique of a 1986 paper titled, "Points for Consideration in Regard to Language Policy and Planning for a Socialist South Africa/Azania," by Neville Alexander.**

There is no denying the fact that English as a language has a major role to play in South Africa, and is doing so already. Some South African linguists are already working from the premise that its future as the leading language is unquestionable. T Reid in 1982, for example, said, "English is not only the common language for large areas of life and business but also possibly the vehicle for a future common South Africanness." D Young in 1978 also said, "Its future as the major *lingua franca* in South Africa is beyond dispute."

Even the ANC, which is the most influential force in the future of South Africa, seems in agreement with this undisputed role English has, judging from the fact that it is the only language taught in the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College in Tanzania. It is important to note, though, that the formulation of a comprehensive language policy by the ANC, in consultation with the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) is still under way.

The importance of the English language in South Africa's future, then, is not in doubt, but the question is how much importance is attached to it and what effects this will have on the linguistic situation and society in a future South Africa.

Neville Alexander begins his paper by saying that a language policy for a future democratic, socialist, non-racial South Africa will "... bear features that accord with cultural aspirations and political programmes of the working people who are the main agents of radical change in South Africa." This is probably true, but it is also a contradiction in terms in that, if South Africa in future is a truly democratic country, then its language policy has to bear the cultural and

political inspirations of all its citizens who accept democratic rule. After all, not all working people subscribe to the idea of radical change in South Africa, just as it does not follow that, if you are South African and not working class, you oppose radical change in South Africa.

Alexander states that, "... all languages in South Africa have a right to flourish," and then he goes on to make two suggestions that he says still need to be debated upon. One suggestion is that English, "Nguni" and "Sotho" be official languages, while the other, "minority," languages enjoy official status on a regional basis. The other suggestion is that English be the official language and the others be official at regional level. He goes so far as to suggest, in the last paragraph, that after an initial phase of English dominance "... one or other of the indigenous African languages, like a consolidated "Nguni" or a consolidated "Sotho" could become a *lingua franca* of a future Azania/South Africa."

First of all, there is no mention of the other South African languages spoken by other sections of the South African community, like Urdu, Hindi, Tamil and Gujerati, which, combined, are spoken by 8% of the South African population. Gujerati alone is the home language of 3.1% of the South African population. Are these languages included, like Afrikaans and Venda, under the minority languages? If, as he says, all languages have a right to flourish and no language is inherently inferior or superior to another, why does he choose to elevate some languages above others? It is also quite true that because of the kind of world we live in, primarily for socio-economic purposes, countries have to have one or two languages as of-

official languages; but exactly how or why a certain language is chosen above others should be agreed upon democratically, and should have a strong political and social goal.

T B Gorman in 1974, writing about language policy development in Kenya, says, "Language policy is subordinate to political and social values and goals." This means that whatever choice of language made cannot just be neutral. Gorman here was concerned in particular with the Kenyatta policy on KiSwahili, which he had hoped would, as in Tanzania, help to solve Kenya's 'problem' of over 30 different languages and dialects. Kenyatta had overlooked deeply ingrained anti-Arab attitudes among the Kenyans so that KiSwahili, because it has so many Arabic words, was not palatable to them, and they preferred English instead. Which is why Kenya has such a low proficiency in standard KiSwahili, though it was set out as one of the official languages. Kenya was by no means then a parallel of the linguistic advancement South Africa has today, and so can only be used as an example of how imposing language policy on people, without taking into account values of society, cannot be a success.

Secondly, doesn't the prospect of languages being official on a regional basis carry more than a hint of regionalism with it? Doesn't it promote nationalism and segregation, which was one of the functions of the apartheid system? Is it practical even for education purposes to have tiny linguistic communities, will each linguistic sector have its own education department managing its own teachers, how will the resources for each be worked out? This also suggests very little, if any, teacher/learner mobility.

Thirdly, if there were consolidated languages like Nguni (which would be Zulu, Xhosa, Siswati and possibly Tsonga), and Sotho (Pedi, SeTswana and South Sotho put together), what is the implication for the individual languages? Will this herald their dying out slowly and the disappearance of the traditions that go with them? The dying out of languages is no myth. There is the example in Tanzania, where the use of KiSwahili as a unifying language is slowly killing off its indigenous languages, especially because not all the languages are written, and also there has been insignificant, if any, opposition to its dominant role in the country.

Alexander also said that a democratic language policy for the future must be based on "the reality of a multilingual nation ... encourage and promote ... all the languages spoken by our people." This, though a laudable statement, contrasts with the regional

language and consolidated language versions; in multilingual societies, efforts are made to bring people together and make them appreciate each other's languages, rather than to divide them into linguistic groups.

The last and very important point I will discuss which Neville Alexander cautions against, about the promotion of English, is "... the very real danger of entrenching elitist and classist divisions." This is definitely not unfounded, as the experience of most African countries, whether Anglophone or Francophone, shows. This has probably got a lot to do with the status accorded a language consciously or unconsciously. Helen Mwazi, on her research on English teaching commissioned by the Bureau of Education Research in Kenyatta University, says it is possible that, in adopting the language policy, the officials were not aware of the subtle role of language. For instance, fluency in the English language is to most Kenyans a symbol of intelligence, a symbol of high learning, and has a lot to do with character formation through emulation and imitation.

In South Africa, this is also the case, mainly because, like in all societies which success is judged by the number of academic qualifications a person has, elitism and social class divisions are inevitable. Success also means proficiency in a language. Therefore, what better way is there to be proficient in a language than speaking it like its native speakers, which means for most people the adoption of ways of living and behaviour of the target country.

This leads to the question of whether it is possible to teach a language and disregard its culture. Most linguists agree that this is an almost impossible exercise, especially if there is a more than a slight chance of the language learners' meeting the target language speakers. Knowing a language involves quite a lot: it involves knowing what to say, where, how and to whom. It also involves knowing the unspoken and unwritten language: that is, gestures and facial expressions. This makes it all the more important for policymakers to know their countries' educational, social and political aims before choosing a language. They should also know what underlying effects a language has on people.

In conclusion, therefore, I will say that Neville Alexander's paper raises a lot of points and views which may be representative of views of many other South Africans. This shows all the more the need for more discussion on this issue, so that a language policy acceptable to most South Africans can be written out.

# TOWARDS A POST-APARTHEID ECONOMY

By Slumko Sogoni

**The legalisation of the ANC and the beginning of talks on the removal of obstacles to a negotiated settlement of the South African conflict have meant that the movement and its policies, especially its perspectives on post-apartheid economy, can now be closely scrutinised. This puts pressure on the ANC to put forward a viable economic policy which would offer all, especially black, people a better life, security and comfort for generations to come.**

The ANC has, therefore, to come up with a clearly conceived and detailed programme which will ensure economic efficiency and social justice. This article focuses on nationalisation, because this undoubtedly is an economic strategy which has provoked a lot of interest from the media and analysts, and, not least, the people of South Africa, black and white. There have, quite frankly, been distortions, hysteria and scare-mongering surrounding the question of nationalisation.

Monopoly has been a dominant feature of apartheid capitalist development. Centralisation, which began in the mining industry, later spilled over to manufacturing, especially in the 1960s. This saw an unprecedented economic boom and capital intensity in this sector. The scramble for profits in a limited market — a product of intensive exploitation (of mainly black workers) — inevitably gave rise to internationalisation of capital and stretching of production beyond South Africa's borders.

Capital-intensive labour techniques and capital export existed alongside alarmingly rising unemployment, critical skilled labour shortage, balance of payments crisis and inflation. In short, there were fundamental structural contradictions within the system, and they could no longer be contained, especially when they were exacerbated by mass political struggle.

Throughout the 1980s, the regime attempted, as it had done from the close of the 1970s, to restructure the relations of political domination and economic exploitation of black people. The switch in the balance of power in favour of the liberation movement had become irreversible.

This is the reason why both sides to the conflict are now moving towards a negotiated peace formula.

For the purpose of this paper, what needs to be emphasised is that the South African economy has been and is dominated by monopoly capitalists. It has guaranteed white privilege, and extremely exploited black workers. The state has actively enforced and ensured this situation by deficit spending through parastatals such as ARMSCOR, IDC and so on. In short, it sustained crucial industries designed to make the country 'self-sufficient', undertook massive capital investment to promote economic growth through loans, research subsidies, tariff protection, import-substitution, and so on. This intervention in the economy, it must be stressed, was an attempt to grapple with fundamental contradictions within apartheid legislation.

It is, therefore, abundantly clear that a future government would inherit a depressed economy with structural contradictions. Such a government's priority would have to correct the extreme imbalances which have characterised the system. Central to the ANC economic strategy for a future non-racial democratic South Africa would then be nationalisation of the major industries. The state would also play a central role in ensuring economic growth so that equitable redistribution of the country's wealth can become a reality. As already pointed out above, nationalisation has been, and is bound to be, a contentious issue, which is why the movement has a duty to clarify it, and of course with consultation and participation of the people of South Africa.

Nationalisation as an economic strategy is nothing new. Nor is it an alien doctrine. It occurs when the state owns a whole company or a majority shareholding therein. Its objective is to shift the balance in favour of social benefit rather than profit maximisation for the all-powerful private enterprise. It must immediately be stressed that the aim of a government which embarks on a nationalisation programme is not necessarily to destroy private enterprise, but rather to control its social injustices. The British government's nationalisation after World War II did not eradicate private enterprise whatsoever. Instead, private enterprise thrived.

In the 1960s, developing countries, in an effort to improve their bargaining power vis-a-vis developed countries, and to control the power of the multinational corporations (MNCs) and improve the material welfare of the mass of their peoples, nationalised major industries. The question of whether or not the strategy brought about the desired results is not discussed here. The programme was coupled with huge state expenditure in the infrastructure to support and stimulate private enterprise (to open up domestic markets and stimulate internal demand).

It is necessary to examine the legality of this measure. Every sovereign country has an inalienable right to follow its own path of national economic development; no country has a right to impose arbitrarily upon others its view on how to pursue that goal. This must be stressed, because we have heard a lot about hawks within western administrations and the bourgeoisie within and outside South Africa being very much concerned about the ANC's 'socialist' or 'communist' blueprint for a post-apartheid economy.

In 1962, the General Assembly of the United Nations *inter alia* declared:

*"... nationalisation, expropriation or requisition shall be based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognised as overriding purely individual or private interests ..."*

Quoted in *Sechaba*, July 1987, p.13

Similarly, in 1975, the Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial Development and Co-operation, adopted by the Second General Conference of United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) stated:

*"... every State has the inalienable right to exercise freely its sovereignty and permanent control over its natural resources, both terrestrial and marine, and over all economic activity for the exploitation of these resources in the manner appropriate to its circumstance, including nationalisation in accordance with its laws as an expression of this right ..."*

Thus, the people of South Africa have a perfectly legal right to their own prescription as to what road to follow to national economic independence and prosperity. The relevance of the Freedom Charter, ever since it was drawn up in 1955, has not diminished, but is widely accepted up to this day by all progressives, the democratic mass movement and the working people in South Africa.

The "Recommendations on post-apartheid economic policy" produced at the conclusion of a consultative workshop organised by the ANC and COSATU in Harare from April 28 to May 1 1990 said:

*"The transformation of the economy will require a viable state sector. Nationalisation would be an essential part of the reconstruction programme of such a state."*

The document also specifically spells out the responsibility and roles the state would have to assume to promote efficiency and growth. Nowhere is it stated that private capital initiative would be stifled or eradicated. State corporations or parastatals would also be set up. The decision to present the proposals to all South Africans for consultation and to hold further workshops reflects the seriousness with which the organisers and participants regarded the enormously difficult tasks that lie ahead. The practical problems a post-apartheid South Africa would have in running the economy are outside the scope of this paper.

It is an inescapable fact that an economic pro-



gramme which incorporates nationalisation and guarantees a central role for the state in guiding the country towards the next century would be extremely attractive to the vast majority of South Africans. This is why effective presentation of policies is extremely important for the movement. There is no shadow of doubt that nationalisation is popular to the overwhelming majority of workers.

If the apartheid state was able to undertake such gigantic projects as it had in the past, the difference between it and the post-apartheid state would be that of priorities, and what would best serve the interest of all South Africans, especially blacks. Our struggle has both national and class aspects. It must, therefore, be seen as no surprise when we envisage economic measures which appear to be 'socialist.'

There is growing evidence that black business is divided over the question of nationalisation — what needs, and what does not need, to be nationalised. This was reported in the *Weekly Mail* of August 3 1990. The problem seems to be a theoretical one — the conceptual interpretation of the phrase. Malunga writes that some prefer the term 'government intervention' to 'nationalisation.' This may be because of the reasons already stated above — nationalisation being 'socialist.' Wholesale nationalisation, or taking into public ownership all the means of production, has been associated with eastern European countries, where communism or socialism has allegedly failed. In such countries, there were economies planned by a central agency of the government which set production targets to be achieved by state enterprise, with the state setting up prices and what amounts of raw materials and parts to use. That is not what is envisaged by the ANC. The eastern European system left almost no room for private enterprise and market forces.

The setting up of state corporations or parastatals or joint ventures may amount to one and the same thing: state intervention in the economy. For instance, the Zambian government at liberation nationalised 51% of Anglo-American-owned copper mines, and this is normally referred to as a parastatal.

Other observers may refer to the same arrangement as a joint venture. It is interesting to note that Anglo-American might be "willing to enter into mining venture partnerships with a future government," according to *Business Day* of July 12 1990.

Nationalisation can be total or partial, and the ANC has not yet decided what form is favourable or more beneficial, because "these are crucially complex issues with no easy answers ..." (*Evening Post*, May 3 1990). This is the reason why the movement argues that it would seriously consider "better alternatives (to nationalisation), to seriously address this economic restructuring" (*Cape Times* May 14 1990).

Be that as it may, the nationalisation envisaged by the ANC and its allies would definitely not be total or wholesale. The state, as in many countries which implemented the strategy, would entail that it is involved in capital accumulation in competition with private capital and sometimes in partnership with either local or foreign capital. It sees its role as central in the effort to redress economic inequalities. The economic programme for a post-apartheid South Africa and its practical implications will be an iron test of the non-racial government, for national liberation would be meaningless without social emancipation.

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# ANC REPORT BACK TO THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA



Our all-round offensive against apartheid has led South Africa to the beginning of a new and democratic era. We still have some distance to cover before apartheid is replaced by a democratic Constitution. Although we have made substantial advances, certain stumbling blocks remain in our way. Below is a report and assessment of the second meeting held between the ANC and the government in Pretoria on August 6 1990.

## The Obstacles

Before the Pretoria meeting the following obstacles stood in the way of the peaceful resolution of the problems of our country:

1. All political prisoners and detainees had not been released;
2. Political trials were still continuing;
3. Security legislation was still on the law books and was being used against our people;
4. The State of Emergency in Natal was still in place.

The ANC has also noted the steady deterioration of the situation in Natal and other parts of the country. In addition to police violence against the people, it is quite clear that the state has connived with vigilante forces in their criminal actions.

## The Gains

The Pretoria meeting achieved the following major advances for the people of our country:

**1. A timetable for the release of political prisoners and the return of exiles.** The release of political prisoners will start from September 1 1990. It is expected that most political prisoners will be released by December 1 1990. Within the same period, all political trials should cease and all political detainees be released. We also expect most exiles to return during this period — indemnified from prosecution.

However, a few disputed cases will be examined on an individual basis by a Working Group consisting of the ANC, other political organisations and the government.

**2. The government has committed itself to amending existing security legislation at the next session of parliament. In addition it will give immediate consideration to repealing all provisions of the Internal Security Act that:**

- ★ prohibit the furtherance of communism;
- ★ list or ban activists;
- ★ require newspapers to pay a deposit before registering.

## The Natal Situation

While the State of Emergency continues to exist in Natal, both parties committed themselves to search for peace and stability in the spirit of mutual trust.

The demands made by the ANC still stand. They are:

1. The arrest and prosecution of warlords and perpetrators of violence;

2. Lifting of the State of Emergency;
3. Disbanding of KwaZulu Police;
4. Dissolution of the KwaZulu bantustan.

## The Armed Struggle

In view of the priority the ANC gives to the peaceful solution of the country's problems, we have taken the initiative to suspend the armed struggle. This means that the ANC will not carry out any further armed actions and related activities such as the infiltration of armed cadres and weaponry. The ANC will participate in monitoring the activity of the SAP and the SADF.

The following points must be noted:

- ★ the armed struggle has not been abandoned;
- ★ the People's Army, Umkhonto we Sizwe, has not been dissolved;
- ★ we have not forfeited our right to self-defence.

Therefore, continued suspension is conditional on the behaviour of the South African Police and Defence Force.

## Mass Action Continues

Mass struggles have to continue in all spheres of our lives to achieve our objective of a united, non-racial democratic and non-sexist society. The government must listen to the demands of the people.

## A Democratic Constitution

Whilst the obstacles are being removed, exploratory talks on the drawing up of a democratic constitution may begin. The ANC's position is that there must be an Interim Government to supervise the transitional process. A Constituent Assembly, elected on the basis of one-person-one-vote and on a common voters' roll, must be responsible for the drawing up of the new Constitution.

**The African National Congress is committed to the achievement of a united, non-racial, democratic South Africa. We have initiated the process of talks to realise this objective. In this regard we have taken, and will continue to take, certain measures which will facilitate the success of this process.**

Issued by the ANC, PO Box 61884, Marshalltown, 2307, South Africa.



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# **POST-APARTHEID ECONOMIC POLICY**

## **RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE ANC/COSATU CONFERENCE**

A consultative workshop organised jointly by the African National Congress and the Congress of South African Trade Unions was held in Harare from April 28 to May 1, and involved economists and other representatives from both organisations. Discussion addressed the question of building a post-apartheid economy which will serve the interests of all South Africans. The resulting policy proposals are contained in a document which has been presented for consideration to the National Executive Committees of the ANC and COSATU. Below, we publish this document in full.

### **A. The Growth Path For a Democratic, Non-Racial South Africa**

The South African economy is in fundamental crisis. This arises out of the distortions of the apartheid system, problems in the sphere of domestic production and reproduction and the changing and destabilising international environment. It has not been able to meet the needs of the great mass of the country's people. Neither are current state and capital strategies likely to alleviate poverty and mass deprivation.

#### **1. The growth path**

To address these goals, a non-racial and democratic state would follow an economic strategy that aims to achieve economic growth through a process of increasing equality in the distribution of incomes, wealth and economic power.

This strategy calls for the active restructuring

of production to meet basic needs, to expand employment, to redistribute incomes and to provide social services. Furthermore, the restructuring of production would take account of the need to transform South Africa's international economic linkages. The aim would be to increase competitiveness and develop dynamic linkages with domestic industries and markets.

#### **2. The role of the state**

Within the context of a mixed economy, the democratic non-racial state would assume the leading role in the reconstruction of the economy in order to facilitate the realisation of its developmental objectives. This necessitates some form of overall macro-economic planning and co-ordination. The democratic non-racial state would involve the mass-based organisations in planning this reconstruction. The criteria for state involvement would be efficiency and effectiveness.

#### **3. Financing the reconstruction**

### **3.1. Savings and taxation**

The main emphasis in financing the reconstruction of the mixed economy would fall on domestic savings, including personal savings. Foreign capital should supplement domestic savings and not be seen as a substitute.

The new state would also undertake tax reform to make taxation more equitable and effective in many areas. Over time, the expected expansion of income and employment will widen the tax base.

At present, the tax burden is carried disproportionately by individuals through both personal direct taxation and indirect taxation. The new state would begin the process of shifting the burden of taxation, especially towards the corporations.

### **3.2. Macro-economic imbalances**

Macro-economic imbalances, including inflation and balance of payments deficits, have been an important factor contributing to South Africa's economic crisis, and their effects have been a severe problem for the living standards of our people.

We are also aware that such imbalances have presented critical obstacles to redistribution and economic development policies of governments in some other countries.

For these reasons, appropriate economic stabilisation policies, including monetary and exchange rate policies, would be used to manage macro-economic imbalances of this nature.

The issue of state expenditure and overall fiscal policy is especially important in this regard. A future non-racial democratic government would not replicate the recent practice of using borrowings to finance current state expenditure.

The overall budget and the budget deficit would be managed according to criteria determined by the democratic state. Those criteria will be in accordance with our objectives of socio-economic reconstruction and the redistribution of income and wealth, and would pay regard to macro-economic balance.

### **3.3. The capital market**

The current capital market does not sufficiently direct investment into productive activity or in-

to critical areas of infrastructure (such as housing) which a new democratic government would want to develop. The new government would seek to rationalise and restructure the financial sector and to develop new institutional arrangements for both the primary and secondary bond markets. This is needed to make them more ordered and directed to meet broader developmental objectives.

Current financial deregulation policies and monetary policy exacerbates the problems of the present financial system. To correct this requires direct state intervention, including state regulation. Consideration will be given to the extent of state ownership within the financial sector.

### **3.4. Exchange controls**

The non-racial democratic state would pursue exchange control measures in order to retain domestic savings within the country and to prevent destabilising speculative capital flows.

These exchange controls would have to be consistent with other macro-economic policies and development objectives.

The present system of exchange controls would continue, but would have to be modified in ways consistent with development objectives of the new democratic state.

## **4. Conglomerates and foreign investment**

### **4.1. Conglomerates**

The existing extreme concentration of economic power has been detrimental to the achievement of balanced economic growth in the interests of all the people of South Africa.

The government of a democratic non-racial South Africa would investigate this concentration of economic power with the objective of promoting a more efficient and effective use of resources.

In addition, consideration would be given to extending collective bargaining into investment planning. Where feasible, a policy of dismemberment of conglomerates into units would be pursued to make the operation of conglomerates more compatible with the overall development objectives of the new democratic

state.

#### **4.2. Foreign investment**

The democratic state would encourage foreign investment on terms which are consistent with its developmental goals.

Foreign investors would be encouraged to invest in activities which lead to increased employment and the development of local technological capabilities. They will also be required to follow labour practices acceptable to the trade union movement.

Such policies are required to ensure that the activities of foreign investors do not have a detrimental effect on the environment or the general development strategies of the state.

Finally, the state and the trade union movement should be legislatively empowered to ensure that foreign investors re-invest productively to promote continued growth.

### **5. Ownership and nationalisation**

The transformation of the economy will require a viable state sector. Nationalisation would be an essential part of the reconstruction programme of such a state.

The non-racial democratic state would retain existing nationalised industries and would be prepared, as a matter of fundamental policy, to renationalise privatised state assets. Furthermore, it would set up new state corporations in areas where necessary.

Nationalised industries would operate within strict budgetary controls, and they would not become vehicles for the enrichment of a large bureaucracy. Rather, they would be developed in the interests of the people.

Nationalisation would be effected through due legal and constitutional processes. In addition to these measures, the democratic state would also facilitate forms of collective ownership, including co-operatives.

### **6. Gender**

One of the legacies of apartheid and its economic system is discrimination against women. Women have been marginalised and relegated to being victims of unemployment and low wage

employment.

The democratic South African state will strive to promote the rapid integration of women into economic activity, and to promote the removal of gender inequalities in employment.

A programme of action will be mounted by the state to address the problems of gender discrimination in and outside the work-place, and to provide support for women, especially in areas such as ante- and post-natal child care.

### **7. The Southern African region**

The non-racial democratic state would actively seek to promote regional economic co-operation along new lines, in ways that would not be exploitative and will correct imbalances in current relationships.

The state must be prepared to enter into negotiations with its neighbours, to promote a dynamic and non-exploitative and mutually beneficial form of regional co-operation and development. This may involve making concessions to our neighbouring states.

### **Current legislation**

The democratic forces do not recognise, and find morally reprehensible, the present government's attempts, through privatisation, deregulation and other legislative means, to weaken the new state's ability to intervene to restructure the economy.

The majority of these laws and measures which the apartheid state has used to give effect to these policies will be reviewed and, where necessary, reversed. Privatised industries will be open to renationalisation.

### **B. Industrial Restructuring**

Despite the poor performance of manufacturing over the past two decades, emphasis should be given to the potential for manufacturing growth. The non-racial democratic state would actively seek to address problems inherent in the present industrial structure and in present industrial policy.

It will give serious consideration to the implementation of policies which are incorporated in the following proposals. These are aimed at addressing current problems, restructuring industry and developing a more dynamic path of industrial expansion. Industrial restructuring would be directed to meeting domestic needs and increasing international competitiveness.

Industrial policy and planning would be based on strategies targeted at specific sectors. This approach would be complemented by strategic planning which would set objectives across the economy as a whole and provide guidelines for sector strategy.

Sector strategy and strategic planning can only be undertaken on a selective basis with targeted objectives in each case.

## **1. Strategic planning and policy issues**

A first priority would be to meet basic needs for the population in food, housing, welfare and employment, etc. This should be done in a way that is sustainable, for example by creating new production capacity through employment linkages rather than in the form of simple income supplements.

To some extent, user charges would have to be applied depending on the services being offered.

The non-racial democratic state would develop industrial policies aimed at transforming imbalances that exist between blacks and whites, between urban and rural areas and between regions.

The failure of the regime's industrial decentralisation policy should not detract from the need for rural industrialisation with well-developed linkages within the local region.

The alternative industrial strategy would have to meet macro-economic objectives. A key constraint on manufacturing development has been the balance of payments.

South African manufacturing is import intensive and has failed to develop export growth strategies aimed at raising living standards for the mass of the population. The potential to reduce import intensity would be investigated.

Restructuring industry would require a major

set of policies with respect to technology, skills training and labour process reorganisation.

South Africa's manufacturing industry is heavily concentrated and there is some scope for the development of small-scale enterprise. The new state would consider the establishment of an agency to support and direct such developments. Other important aspects of firm size are the development of localised industrial districts and the break-up of conglomerates.

Infrastructural development can in part be based upon a radical transformation of existing potential in the mineral-energy complex.

Attention would be given to the institutional structures responsible for devising, implementing and monitoring industrial policy.

The non-racial democratic state would recognise the need for an industrial strategy for the armaments industry. Armaments production will be converted to meet civilian needs.

In formulating industrial strategy, the need to protect our environment will be given high priority.

## **2. Response to current government initiatives**

The capacity of the post-apartheid state to intervene to serve basic needs and to promote economic growth is being undermined by current and proposed legislation of the apartheid regime. Immediate steps should be taken to:

1. halt privatisation and deregulation;
2. oppose the application of the Temporary Removal of Restrictions on Economic Activities Act;
3. review the approach embodied in the General Export Incentive Scheme, in the light of the essential need for selective sectoral strategy with respect to exports.

## **C. Mining**

### **1. Planning and policies**

The non-racial democratic state acknowledges the demands of the mine workers. It would initiate measures to root out racist labour practices

and improve wage levels and living conditions. This would be done without weakening or making less efficient the mining industry. The state recognises and will seek to enhance the role of the industry as a job creator, foreign exchange earner and raw material supplier.

The democratic state would investigate the use of fiscal policy to encourage venture capital in new mines. The possibility of the state making strategic investments in mines would also be considered.

In view of the declining and volatile nature of mineral prices, a policy of stabilising mineral prices through the formation of cartels would be seriously considered. The formation of a State Minerals Marketing Authority would be investigated. Such an agency would control all minerals marketing and enter into marketing agreements with other producing countries.

Consideration would be given to using surpluses created by cartelising certain minerals to stabilise the domestic price of non-cartelised minerals. A minerals marketing authority would also be necessary to restrict transfer pricing by the mining companies.

Given the wasting nature of mining, high priority would be given to the creation of resource-based industries to further add value. In this regard research would be undertaken to identify optimal areas for mineral transformation industries, such as mining machinery. Methods of encouraging this such as tax incentives, government funding of research and development, import tariffs and cheap loans, need to be investigated.

The concentration of monopoly mining finance capital is a great impediment to alternative means of controlling mining. In order to control investment strategy and labour practices, the non-racial democratic state would encourage research into the benefits of disaggregating the monopolies, taking the efficiency of the economy as a whole into consideration.

Policy to maximise the benefits of mining to the people as a whole and to optimise the working conditions and life chances of miners could be brought about by a variety of instruments. These include fiscal instruments, inspectorates,

equity, board representation, incentives, direct funding, anti-trust legislation and union empowerment. Within the context of the state's developmental objectives for this industry, the nature and extent of state intervention and ownership will be considered.

## **2. Response to current capital/state incentives**

The recent shift of De Beers control to Switzerland is a serious development, and potential disinvestment of this type should be an urgent item in negotiations with capital.

There is also concern among miners about the implications of the new Minerals Bill currently being proposed. Its privatisation /deregulation outlook represents an abdication of state responsibility in crucial areas. Mineral rights must be retained by the State, not given away, as proposed.

It is strongly recommended that a Minerals Policy Research Commission, to consider the future of the mining industry and to address the above issues, needs to be created as soon as possible. It should be based in South Africa.

Emergency action should be taken to investigate means of preventing the passing of the new Minerals Bill and curtailing asset transfers out of South Africa.

## **D. Agriculture**

South African agriculture is facing a major crisis both in the advanced capitalist sector and in the black rural areas. Land distribution is a central national grievance and raising agricultural production is vital to the future economic prosperity of the country.

A future non-racial democratic state commits itself to:

1. the immediate return of land to those removed from black freehold farms and to the repossession of land by certain categories of labour tenants;

2. redistribution of land and relocation of people by a land claims commission with grassroots participation;



3. promoting various forms of production, including smallholder production, co-operatives and joint ventures;
4. providing a secure food supply at affordable prices and producing industrial raw materials;
5. a reallocation of support services and training provision to achieve redistribution whilst maintaining production;
6. provision of support services which will positively discriminate in favour of women to ensure access to land credit and training;
7. redistribution of land to create employment and provide secure housing;
8. enacting labour legislation to abolish backward labour employment practices;
9. promoting rapid unionisation and encouraging rural community organisation to redress historical injustices and protect jobs and worker rights;
10. state intervention on environmental issues to sustain the long term production capacity of land.

## **E. Labour and Human Resource Development**

### **1. Overall objectives**

The non-racial democratic state commits itself to the development of a high employment, high wage, high productivity economy, with economically viable, competitive enterprises. It will ensure a central role for organised labour in the formulation and implementation of all economic policy. It will seek to empower organised labour, and to promote greater industrial democracy.

### **2. Labour relations policy framework**

Current labour legislation in South Africa is based on maintaining the industrial balance of power firmly in the hands of capital. A democratic state would be committed to changing this.

The empowering of trade unions and their active involvement in economic policy is based on three propositions:

- 2.1. The need to avoid an over-centralised, commandist approach to economic policy by the state;

- 2.2. The need for a strong civic society, independent of state and political party, with real economic and other power;

- 2.3. The advantage of creating a compact, powerful state, without a massive bureaucracy to regulate and implement all policy.

### **3. Union rights**

There are a number of specific areas where the legislative programme and constitutional rights ought to empower organised workers. These are:

- 3.1. The right to enter and organise in all establishments;

- 3.2. The right to bargain, including legislation requiring centralised bargaining, disclosure of financial information, the right to strike, the right to picket and the right to protection against employers replacing strikers with scab labour;

- 3.3. The extension of workplace democratic rights to organised workers in publicly-owned corporations, privately-owned companies and provident fund management/trustee boards;

- 3.4. The right to be represented in and participate in industrial courts/tribunals and in state commissions on housing, transport, unemployment and other areas directly affecting workers.

### **4. Human resource policy**

#### **4.1. Racial employment structure**

The democratic state would correct racial inequalities in the workplace. This would be done, not only through legislation and prosecution, but by investing and redirecting resources.

A comprehensive programme of education, training and skills for workers in industry and within the state sector is needed. In addition, technical, professional and managerial skills among blacks will be promoted.

Policy towards the civil service needs to address not only racial inequality, but also the issues of the political complexion of the civil service, appropriate staffing levels to give effect to the changed emphasis of state policy and the need to avoid an excessive state bureaucracy.

All policy options which address the transformation of the civil service must involve the public sector trade unions.

#### **4.2. Gender employment structure**

Apartheid economic development has fundamentally shaped gender employment structures. Women in townships, squatter settlements and rural areas have been particularly discriminated against and constrained by the labour policies of black rural areas. Land distribution is a central national grievance, and raising agricultural pro-

The democratic state would seek to correct these gender inequalities by means of legislation to secure women's rights, a vigorous programme to provide training, and examine opportunities for women and means of support in the sphere of ante- and post-natal care.

#### **4.3 Employment creation**

The current state strategy of seeking to create employment through deregulation and privatisation is not a solution and must be opposed. The democratic state would address employment creation through public works programmes (of which housing projects hold distinct advantages), retraining and the deployment of resources from apartheid-oriented projects into employment-creating economic activities.

The democratic state would encourage the unions to play a role in employment creation through collective bargaining over resources for employment creation and by encouraging the direction of pension and provident fund investment capital towards productive investments in employment-creating activities.

### **5. Training**

A democratic state would initiate a comprehensive training programme, to remove racial inequalities and to improve the productivity of labour. In particular, the democratic state would intervene to ensure that the content of all education and training at technikons, universities, schools and other training institutions is appropriate for changing labour market needs and consistent with national industrial strategy.

It would also set up non-exploitative youth training schemes for underskilled and unskilled youth.

The state would encourage trade unions and employers at industry level, to develop and co-

manage training schemes. Linked to this, private corporations would be required to direct resources to training schemes.

### **F. Basic Goods and Services**

A massive injection of finance is going to be required to meet basic social needs (i.e. welfare, housing, health, education). Two sources of finance can be considered — public finance and the mobilisation of private capital.

Determination of priorities in meeting social requirements will have to take account of several conflicting objectives:

- (i) the immediate relief of poverty;
- (ii) the need to reduce existing social conflict over unequal distribution of material resources;
- (iii) the expressed expectations and demands of people and communities;
- (iv) promotion of economic development strategies;
- (v) the need to avoid inflationary spending policies;
- (vi) the promotion of equality to correct existing biases in resource allocation, relating to (a) race and gender, (b) socio-economic divisions within black urban communities and (c) between urban and rural communities;
- (vii) the promotion of employment and training opportunities.

The non-racial democratic state would foster active community participation in order to determine priorities, and in order to ensure the effective implementation of development strategies. This must also include training in implementation and administration of capital development projects.

#### **1. Social welfare and pensions**

The democratic non-racial state would bear ultimate responsibility for the provision of welfare and pensions. This would be exercised in the context of the negotiated provision of welfare benefits between capital and labour, and of private provision by those groups able to provide for themselves. The role of the state would

be to provide a minimum level of social services at a reasonable rate for all people.

The possibility of a national compulsory retirement scheme, underwritten by the state, would be investigated.

A system of compulsory unemployment insurance will be enacted, based on contributory obligations by employers and employees. The objective in dealing with structural and other forms of unemployment will be to create an extended network of institutions for training, retraining and placement in jobs of the unemployed.

State policy would seek to counter discrimination, whether legal or informal, in regard to gender unemployment benefits.

Existing benefit funds would be deployed in support of national development objectives. State policy would facilitate such redeployment by providing legislative regulation, and by underwriting such initiatives so as to ensure the worker's monies are not at risk.

## **2. Housing**

The provision of sufficient and affordable housing for millions of South Africans is dependent on the following areas:

**2.1.** The release of affordable urban and rural land could be achieved through the removal of land from the market by implementing a policy of 'land banking' as a matter of urgency, and by reducing of land prices through the imposition of a generalised land tax on unused land to force sale.

**2.2.** The non-racial democratic state commits itself to providing the minimum infrastructural services that are needed to ensure decent living standards. These include water reticulation, waterborne sewerage, electricity, stormwater drains and tarred public transport routes.

However, the provision of these services is very costly. The state would intervene through extensive subsidisation (both central and local) in order to provide these services at an affordable cost and of a reasonably high standard.

Construction of serviced stands would be part of a public works programme aimed at job creation.

**2.3. Provision of housing:** it is recognised that there are increasing negative effects arising out of the rapidly growing housing market in low-income black residential areas.

The non-racial democratic state would counter these effects by defending the existing public housing sector, by providing new houses and flats for rental with security of tenure and by providing state assistance to community-controlled non-profit housing development projects.

Furthermore, the provision of housing is currently taking place on a privatised basis. In the future, the democratic state would take primary responsibility for the provision of housing needs.

However, it is noted that the provision of affordable housing for all can be costly. As such, the role of the state would be based on establishing the conditions for providing low-cost housing (i.e. subsidisation of land and services) rather than direct state construction of houses.

This would not rule out the establishment of a national state housing company. The democratic state would also encourage initiatives on the part of local and community-based organisations to undertake housing projects.

## **3. Local government**

Local government is central to the provision of goods and services.

### **3.1. Administration and finance**

State policies would include integration of towns and cities into metropolitan management structures, and an end to separate black local authority structures.

The principle of financial self-sufficiency for poor communities would be replaced by the integration of divided urban areas into a single local tax base, and cross-subsidisation within metropolitan areas.

### **3.2. Representation**

The future democratic state's priority would be to foster the establishment of democratic, non-racial municipalities, while at the same time maintaining the involvement of mass-based organisations in the provision and control of certain services.

# **SEBOKENG SHOOTINGS**

**MARCH 1990**

## **ANC STATEMENT ON THE FINDINGS OF THE GOLDSTONE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY**

The African National Congress notes the issues raised by the Goldstone Commission Report regarding organisation, co-ordination and marshalling of marches and we strive constantly to improve our performance in this regard.

The African National Congress does not recognise the Internal Security Act nor the right of the South African government to proscribe and determine the rights of the people of South Africa to exercise their democratic rights to peacefully assemble and demonstrate.

- 1.** It is clear from the Goldstone Commission Report that all police officers, from Captain du Plooy down to the men in his command, acted in violation of standard police procedures and wilfully chose to disregard Colonel Mazibuko, the senior officer in the area.
- 2.** The shooting was completely unjustified. There was no need for the police to use live ammunition, let alone ammunition that was so deadly.
- 3.** We fully expect that all police personnel involved in this incident will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. Pending such legal proceedings, the policemen identified should immediately be suspended from duty.
- 4.** It is clear that had the ANC not taken the steps it did, including the postponement of the Groote Schuur talks, an internal police inquiry would have resulted in a whitewash which would have covered up the crime committed against our people.
- 5.** The findings demonstrate an indiscipline, callousness and readiness to shoot on the part of the police. This reinforces the perceptions widely held by our people that the police are not a body for the maintenance of order, but a force of repression. The routine issuance of firearms to police for purposes of crowd control during demonstrations is itself a contributing factor to the fatalities that inevitably result. This practice should end forthwith.
- 6.** It must not be forgotten that the position taken by Vereeniging's Conservative-controlled council, which withheld the right to march, forced the change of venue thereby contributing to the lack of co-ordination on the part of the organisers of the march.

**Issued by the ANC Department of Information, PO Box 61884, Marshalltown 2307  
September 1, 1990**

# INTERNATIONAL ANC AT THE NOTTING HILL CARNIVAL

The 25th Notting Hill Carnival, the largest street event in Europe, took place on August 26-27 (writes **Lawson Naidoo**). It was a joyous celebration of black culture and history. Huge crowds over one million strong descended on West London on both days, which were hot and sunny, to admire the splendour of the Costume Bands and dance to the sounds of Caribbean, African and black British music.

Carnival originated in the Caribbean from the Mardi Gras tradition. It has developed in Britain to reflect the experiences of black people since the 1950s. Although mainly a celebration, it has a definitive political dimension, articulating the struggles of black people in the Diaspora.

The ANC presence at Carnival with the theme, "ANC Lives! ANC Leads!" sought to galvanise support for the continuing struggle to end apartheid. A 30-foot-long banner proclaiming this slogan hung across All Saints' Road, the 'front line' of Notting Hill, outside the Mangrove Restaurant. The ANC was assisted by the London Committee of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, and war resisters from COSAWR. The ANC float with the Sir Coxson International Sound System drew the largest crowds around any float there. Blacker Dread, together with DJs Tenor Fly and Daddy Freddy, roused the crowds with a wide selection of reggae sounds, such as: "Gunshot for Botha" (Danny Dread), "It's a Revolution" (Dennis Brown), "Roughneck Fashion" (Tenor Fly) and "Mandela's Story" (Tony Rebel). The loudest cheer of Carnival greeted Blacker Dread's dedication of Bob Marley's "No Woman No Cry" to Nelson Mandela. It was the first time ever that a sound system had performed on a float on the Carnival procession, and the crowds certainly appreciated being able to follow one of Europe's premier sound systems on the streets of Notting Hill.

Sir Coxson articulated the political hopes and aspirations of black youth in the ghettos. The throngs of people around the float demonstrated the deep and wide understanding of the black British community about the situation in South Africa, and their unequivocal support for the ANC. The ANC float travelled from the 'front line' in Brixton to the 'front line' in Notting Hill on both days, with rapturous support all the way.

The discipline of the audience around the float was illustrated when the police sought to disperse people at the end of each day's festivities. On the main day of Carnival the ANC float was still on the road at 11 pm, long after all the others had left. The police turned to Blacker Dread for assistance. With a crowd of thousands dancing to the music being pumped out by Sound System and wanting to continue, Blacker calmed the crowd by reminding them of the respect due to the ANC and Comrade Mandela. He requested them to disperse quietly and peacefully in deference to the struggle of the people of South Africa who have shown such discipline and restraint in the face of racist provocation and brutality. The audience applauded these sentiments and heeded the request. The legitimacy and esteem of the ANC is now unquestionable in the eyes of black Britons.

The ANC, having participated in the Carnival for many years, finally took its rightful place as one of its central attractions. People came on August 27 seeking the ANC float; they are still talking about the electric atmosphere generated around it. Many wore ANC and Mandela T-shirts, and thousands were adorned with stickers marking the ANC's celebration of Carnival. A spirit of defiance and a commitment to struggle until apartheid is destroyed permeated the whole Carnival.

# LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Dear Sir

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament welcomes Denis Goldberg's suggestions for discussion on a nuclear policy for the ANC (*Sechaba*, August 1990). We agree with Mr Goldberg that "the strategic reason (for South Africa's possession of a nuclear power station) was clearly to produce the plutonium necessary for nuclear weapons." We endorse Mr Goldberg's suggestion that: "(The ANC) cannot envisage any situation in which we would consider the use of nuclear weapons." It is a sad fact that our own government, under the leadership of Mrs Thatcher, will not contemplate the adoption of a similar position. She continues to call for the adherence of other nations to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, while continuing to modernise and increase Britain's own nuclear capability.

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament welcomes the suggestion that South Africa should sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the earliest opportunity. We would further suggest that the NPT, while making a major contribution to halting the spread of nuclear weapons, has a number of weaknesses. For example, the powers of the International Atomic Energy Authority must be increased if it is to have a greater chance of preventing the development of nuclear capability by more states.

On the question of nuclear-generated electricity, CND would agree that it is more expensive than electricity generated by other means. CND also believes that nuclear power stations are inherently dangerous and that the associated

hazards of the transport and storage of nuclear waste, not to mention the association of nuclear power with the development of nuclear weapons, make nuclear power an unacceptable form of energy production.

The suggestion that South Africa would invite international supervision of the destruction of any existing nuclear weapons is particularly important. The necessity of comprehensive verification measures for all arms control and disarmament initiatives is paramount in the building of international trust and confidence.

One area omitted in Mr Goldberg's article is that of nuclear testing. CND feels that adherence by all nations to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is fundamental to the struggle against nuclear weapons. It is by far the most effective means of preventing their spread; a country that cannot test its weapons is much less likely to develop them. It is now widely accepted that a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing would be easier to verify than the existing Partial Test Ban Treaty. We would urge the ANC to support calls for a comprehensive test ban.

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has been campaigning for more than 30 years for an end to all weapons of mass destruction, be they nuclear or chemical. It supports all initiatives, be they unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, which make a genuine contribution towards attainment of this goal. We hope that the ANC will develop a firm policy against the use of nuclear energy and the development of nuclear weapons in South Africa.

Yours sincerely

John Grounds

Information Officer  
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament  
London N7

*(The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is the leading peace organisation in Britain, and its campaigns over the years have attracted powerful mass support.)*

Dear Editor

Two important issues seem linked to the spread of the violence throughout the Reef during August. One is the attempt by Inkatha to transform itself from a Natal-based organisation, to a national party that can draw its membership from all over the country.

The other is the major ANC membership drive in the Reef. Taken together it would seem that the violence stems from competition to capture as many members as possible in the Reef. Indeed, the press, in most cases, has tried to portray the matter in this way.

The reality is very different and yet plain. There is one side that seeks power and is prepared to go to any lengths. Nothing more complicated than that. Power, and nothing more, for Inkatha, the side that has wreaked the most havoc ever seen in South Africa in just one week. Lives scarred for ever in just one week of senseless killing.

There is no way in which Inkatha could significantly increase its membership in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal (PWV) area. Surveys carried out by the *Star* and Market Research Africa concluded that Inkatha enjoys only 2% support outside Natal, not just in the PWV area. On the other hand, it was found that the ANC enjoys almost 84% support in the same areas.

I was particularly worried to hear Inkatha leaders saying that as long as the "vilification and denigration" of its leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and other Zulus continues, the war will continue. What a reason for the wastage of lives that has swept South Africa!

My letter is an appeal to honest, patriotic and democratic leaders among Zulu-speaking South Africans to try and prevail on Buthelezi and his closest lieutenants to halt this violence, and bravely to accept that the majority of black South Africans do not think like them. More than any violence, which distances Inkatha further from the people, only a genuine acceptance of differ-

ing views with others can build respect for Inkatha and its leaders.

For the moment, I believe that the stage belongs to the ANC and any other parties that may want to take part in the negotiating process. Each party has a right to have its own meeting with the South African government. And if certain problems are resolved as a result of such meetings, as has happened in Pretoria-ANC meetings, we should all rejoice. We should not reject these fruits simply because we were not at the table.

Lastly, throughout the years, Inkatha has had meetings with Pretoria and should therefore not at this stage feel that the negotiating process must be derailed because it is not taking part.

And of course it would be very foolish to heap everything on Inkatha and leave out the South African fascist police. Black or white, from the anti-democratic stance, the police have not changed their ways. They continue to harbour the dream of a South Africa in which their control would be supreme. And in Inkatha they feel they have found a partner.

It is a real shame for South Africa that part of the oppressed should be found in the corner of the oppressor, as an ally, but the sad reality is that there are some in the Inkatha leadership who feel too proud to admit that the bantustan system has failed and they have to align themselves fully with the democratic opposition in the country.

It would be a blessing for us all in South Africa if those within Inkatha who have done some serious soul-searching would step forward and offer a hand of peace to opposition forces in South Africa. Up till now I may not know Oscar Dhlomo's reasons for leaving Inkatha, but I support that brave step while the violence continues. As for what Inkatha would stand for once it ceased to attack its opposition, it would be for us to see then.

Please give peace a chance!

*(It is a sad factor of our struggle that the author of the letter has asked for his name not to be published because of fear of victimisation. He comes from Natal and expresses great dismay at what he has experienced in the last few years).*

# VIDEO REVIEW

*A migrant worker in a hostel, and  
a school teacher in class.  
Pictures by Omar Badsha.*



*Images in Struggle: South African Photographers Speak*, directed by Barry Feinberg, produced by International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (IDAF), London, 1990.

Information plays a crucial role in the struggle to end apartheid, and, like journalists, photographers who produce and present evidence of the agony of apartheid are often in the front line.

*Images in Struggle* opens a new door for those interested in the South African media, as it reveals the people who record the realities and contrasts of life in South Africa. For the first time we are able to put faces to some of the well-known bylines beneath photographs, and gain some insight into the work of South African

photographers Paul Weinberg, Santu Mafokeng, Zubeida Vallie, Omar Badsha, Rashid Lombard, Cedric Nunn and Lesley Lawson. They describe how they became photographers, their work and what they hope to achieve as photographers as the face of South African politics continues to change.

Some of them stumbled into photography and soon discovered that this was what they wanted to do and that they had a responsibility to reveal South African reality to others — both inside and outside South Africa. Despite the hardships en-



countered, they are driven to present and record what is happening in our country.

The video shows examples of their work and technique, and reveals their motivations and aspirations through interviews with them. Paul Weinberg originally wanted to leave South Africa, but, after working as a photographer and recording images of peoples' lives, found himself being drawn deeper and deeper into South African society, and wanted to record what he saw. Lesley Lawson believes that her work, often focusing on the struggle of South African women, can help individuals to gain insight into South Africa and themselves, and may help them push back boundaries in their own lives. The examples of their work range from portraits to depictions of forced removals, police violence, political rallies and funerals. What they all record is suffering — the suffering of the South African people under the system of apartheid.

As with film and television, photography plays an immense role in conscientising people. The work of a documentary photographer is seldom easy — it requires commitment and often bravery. The South African photographers interviewed in this video are no exception. Some of them started their careers as newspaper photographers, and felt the brunt of the Emergency regulations and police brutality in the townships.

Like journalists, photographers covering political developments in South Africa have been harassed, attacked, detained and deported. Their equipment has been smashed and their films confiscated by police. In terms of the Emergency regulations, journalists and photographers were prohibited from photographing, filming or recording, as well as distributing within or outside South Africa, any film or recording of any public disturbance, strike or boycott, any damage to property, any assault or killing, and even any person present at any of these activities. Permanent censorship laws had already stifled the South African media, and these draconian measures made it exceedingly difficult for journalists and photographers to do their work.

A quote from a Johannesburg commercial newspaper springs to mind. To some extent it describes the dilemmas and frustration faced by

South African press photographers:

*"To most photographers and sound men in the country the state of emergency has brought with it unbearable heartache. The fact that most of us around the country witness things but can do nothing about them has created a very big gap in what the country knows. The feeling among most photographers is that the state has succeeded in convincing the outside world that it is quiet ... We will still slog on, go to events and situations and hope that one day the world will see it as it is ..."*

(From *The South African Media: Current Restrictions and Future Potentials*, by Jo-Ann Collinge, Herbert Mabuza, Glenn Moss and David Niddrie, Association of Democratic Journalists (Transvaal branch) Johannesburg, December, 1987)

The photographers interviewed in *Images in Struggle* describe the problems encountered and the measures they were forced to go to in order to record what was happening in the townships — cameras were often disguised or hidden. They learned the necessity of having to take photographs quickly and unobtrusively, often setting cameras on auto-focus. Several photographers risked their lives during police actions in the townships to record what was happening. Films were carefully hidden and smuggled out of the townships. Unfortunately due to the Emergency regulations, newspaper editors were often prevented from using the material produced by their photographers, and a lot of evidence of police brutalities never saw the light of day.

The Black Inklozi Club Choir, the Europack Workers' Choir and the Hanbad Choir provide the music for the video.

*Images in Struggle* is a polished presentation of the work of South African photographers who have a conscience. It presents not only their work, the influences that shaped the work of these photographers, but also their dedication, integrity, and determination to reveal the realities of South African life as the struggle to build a new, democratic, non-racial South Africa continues.

DMS

# BOOK REVIEW

*Africa Today: Dismantling Apartheid: Problems and Possibilities*, Vol. 37, No 2, 1990 2nd quarter. Published by Africa Today Associates in association with the Graduate School of International Studies of the University of Denver. Bookstand price, \$3.50.

*Africa Today* is a quarterly review of articles about political developments and issues in Africa. Although geared towards an American readership, who are not perhaps fully tuned to the complexities of the African continent, it is a useful publication to those interested in or studying sociological and political concerns in Africa.

In this edition, the journal, established by the American Committee on Africa in 1954, deals with various issues in current South African politics. These are law and reform in South Africa; the issue of black, coloured and Indian participation in South African politics; detention without trial, and disinvestment.

Of particular interest are the papers on *Apartheid*, *The Law and Reform in South Africa*, by David R Penna, and *Detention Without Trial in South Africa: The Abuse of Human Rights as State Strategy in the Late 1980s*, by Christopher Merrett.

The former deals with the seldom-mentioned perversion of law by the South African regime to serve the interests of the ruling class in maintaining apartheid. The laws that entrench apartheid are of particular relevance at the moment, because the African National Congress is challenging discriminatory laws as it approaches negotiations with the De Klerk government.

The article briefly outlines the legal structures erected to enforce apartheid and the implications of these structures for 'reform' within the existing South African political system. The author examines the prospects for reform in various legal areas and concludes that it is unlikely that

the judicial branch can be reformed from within or in isolation from the legislature. Therefore, the legislature must be the true agent of change, and must bring this about through repealing discriminatory laws and implementing reform programmes. He adds that the South African legislature and the power it wields are the key issues to be negotiated.

The author also examines the Nationalist government's cherished idea of 'group rights,' and correctly stresses that 'group rights' must not be taken to mean the preservation of white privilege in an economic or political sense. This, he states, would be a misconception of justice that would be tragic for all concerned.

In outlining the implications of detention without trial in South Africa, Christopher Merrett examines trends in the numbers of detentions, the purpose of detention as a tool of political control, and its results. He concludes that if the future of South Africa is to be one of democracy and equity, the damage the South African government has wrought on its own social fabric must be repaired. Just as the abuse of human rights has been central to South African state strategy, so the protection of human rights must be central to the liberation struggle.

This issue of *Africa Today* also includes a section entitled, *Africa Rights Monitor*, examining questions relating to Liberia, Francophone Africa, and the use of food as a weapon in the ongoing conflicts in Ethiopia and the Sudan. Various book reviews and sections on new publications, announcements and coming events are included, as well as a list of books on Africa that are available for review.

Although geared to a mainly academic and American readership, *Africa Today* is useful reading for all those interested in Africa.

DMS

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