

ECONOMY

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CAMPAIGN FOR A DEMOCRATIC MEDIA



Progressive journalists have fought for a democratic media. As yet the media is still undemocratic — representing the views of the racist government. Media — page 24

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EDITORIAL

A CALM

BEFORE THE STORM?

At the time of the writing of this editorial, all seems to be relatively quiet in South Africa. The violent storm that shook the Transvaal province during August and September has subsided. In Natal, it has also scaled down, even though the people still feel the effect of the violence every minute of their lives.

Our supporters everywhere are wondering whether the calm we are experiencing now is the calm before a storm. They are wondering whether the calm will bring with it an even more violent storm. This goes on in their minds because, for them, the stage our struggle has reached is the fulfilment of a dream they have fought hard to realise. The violence distresses them as much as it does every South African who wants peace to dawn in our country.

What is certainly clear is that the semi-state of emergency that has been introduced by De Klerk in various townships, and the full State of Emergency in Natal, are not what has brought about this relative calm. The use of mercenary forces in Natal and the anti-negotiations elements within the South African security forces cannot bring peace to the trouble-free areas.

De Klerk must clean up his forces **first**. He must also do something about his ministers responsible for the police and the army. They are forever making belligerent statements about the ANC and other democratic forces, and therefore cannot be trusted to give any orders to their personnel other than to say that political activists must be hunted down.

At another level, De Klerk must heed the ANC's call on the role of the KwaZulu bantustan in the violence. While Inkatha has a right to exist and recruit as a party, there is incontrovertible evidence that it has used the KwaZulu bantustan to impose itself on the people.

These are some of the actions that the South African government can take to allow the negotiating process to proceed on course, and eventually allow South Africa to enjoy the peace it has never experienced.

But that there is this relative calm speaks volumes. How has it come about if the Vloks and Malans continue to blame the ANC for the violence? Does it mean that there are additional steps that have been taken by the ANC to stop its supporters from perpetrating it?

The ANC's stand has been firm from the beginning — calling for an end to the violence. It has convened a meeting with the bantustan leaders to try and resolve the conflicts that have raged between hostel and township residents. It has had meetings with the leaders of Inkatha, and continues to speak to the South African government on the issue. These are not actions of a war-bent force. They are actions of a responsible organisation that owes it to its members and supporters to facilitate the creation of a new society based on democracy and non-racialism.

From the side of the De Klerk government all we hear at present is the success that has been 'scored' on the international front. President Bush has been met; Prime Minister Thatcher will be met; there will be official visits to other capitals of Europe.

If this government claims not to be in cahoots with the anti-negotiations members of the security forces, we wonder why they did not go on to make his trip to the United States a failure. De Klerk himself was forced to admit the existence of a third force — a faceless group made of right-wing elements bent on derailing the peace process. This force, whose hand has been seen in the Inkatha vs township residents' conflict and in random shootings and bombings of blacks, would have been expected to go on the rampage against De Klerk's "irreversible peace process" speech in the United States. It did not.

Clearly, then, there are those in the government who control this group and determine its actions. They do this because they have an agenda which they have not shown to the world as yet. It may well be a plan to unleash upon the democratic forces the most horrid violence yet seen in the country.

The calm, then, can be no calm unless the government shows seriousness about taking the necessary steps to do away with the causes of the violence. And, for our supporters and activists in the country and elsewhere, the struggle must be intensified even more. The visits that De Klerk is making must be used to expose his lack of resolve about creating an irreversible move towards a democratic transformation of our country.

DEATH OF COMRADE FRANCIS MELI

At the time of our going to press, the sad news reached us of the untimely death of Francis Meli (Allan Madolwana), in Johannesburg on October 8. A historian and political writer, Comrade Meli had been a member of the National Executive Committee since 1985, and editor of Sechaba from 1977 till 1989. Hamba kahle!

LAUNCHING THE WOMEN'S LEAGUE

DURBAN, AUGUST, 1990

By a participant in the launch

The ANC Women's League launch opened with a Press conference on the morning of August 9, where the leadership of the ANC Women's League Task Force, and the ANC Women's Section from outside South Africa, spoke. They were led by Gertrude Shope and Albertina Sisulu. The conference was convened to announce, officially, the formation of the Women's League inside the country.

The next day, the women's leadership toured all the war-torn Natal Regions — the Natal Midlands, Natal South, and Northern Natal. In these areas, rallies had been planned for women to address people about the ANC position with regard to the issue of violence, as well as to inform them about the ANC Women's League and the launch. The Women's League distinguished itself by daring to visit even the most 'no-go' areas in vastly rural Zululand. As a result, rallies were held at Ongoye University, Entseleni and so on — places which had already been given up as being dangerous for ANC rallies. During these visits, the visitors were able to see for themselves the ghost townships (areas formerly inhabited by UDF supporters) as against the settled, normal communities for Inkatha supporters.

People have left their once beautiful homes, and have been turned into refugees in their own country. Further, this violence has recently assumed a different mode of operation: Inkatha has ex-

ported violence into the PWV area by bussing its heavily armed supporters, with the assistance of the South African Police, into areas that were once peaceful. During these attacks on innocent residents, the refugees told the visitors, Inkatha and the SAP had been laughing their lungs out as they remained behind, looting the people's possessions with no one to stop them.

Saturday saw the delegates locked in serious discussions on a number of issues:

- ★ The National Organiser's presentation of regional reports;
- ★ The Draft Constitution of the ANC Women's League;
- ★ The issue of violence, with regard to the Natal area in particular.

Very sober discussions took place as the women began charting their way forward to the Conference to be held on October 26-28. The discussions grappled with the realities and implications of an above-board ANC as well as the organisational problems our women are faced with on the ground.

At all times, what became clear was the need for us to share our rich and different experiences, as ANC women from both within and outside the country, especially with regard to consolidating the support our organisation enjoys and transforming it into a power base for the ANC.

For those who were delegates at the workshop,

all will agree that tension could be felt as soon as the discussion on violence began. Everybody had a suggestion to make in terms of finding a solution to this problem. Finally, the house resolved to embark on a National March on August 25, with a common memorandum to deliver to the Chief of Police in each area.

The memorandum was seen as a means of stating our abhorrence of the violence in the townships, perpetrated by Inkatha supporters with the collusion of the SAP, in areas like Natal, Kagiso, Thembisa, and many others. The memo called on the SAP to remain impartial, as expected, in the trouble-torn areas. The role of the police and the hostile Press in presenting as 'ethnic' the violence between Xhosa and Zulu, was stated.

The marches were planned so that they should take place before the pending meeting between Mandela and De Klerk.

One crucial question that continued to be asked wherever the Women's League organisers went, as well as at the workshop, was whether it was vital at this juncture to establish Women's League structures first, or to start with ANC structures, or to attend to the violence problem. The response of the Women's League Task Force remains that it is essential to have Women's League structures established and treated as a priority to ensure that our women participate fully and equally in the decision-making processes, be they political, social, economic or any other.

It was strongly expressed that the women have been marginalised for too long in our society, and therefore the emphasis should be that women form part and parcel of their communities from the initial stages of building a new, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist South Africa. This would ensure that the issue of gender relations was simultaneously being addressed.

It was felt to be important that women should bear in mind that Women's League members are first and foremost ANC members, and thus are ANC organisers first. It is therefore partly as a result of this approach that structures have mushroomed in most rural areas. The rural areas are largely populated by women, because of the migrant labour system that does not allow the men working in the urban areas to bring their wives along.

According to the report of the National Organiser of the Women's League Task Force, Nosiviwe Maphisa, the organisational drive has taken off quite well in many regions, except for problematic regions like Natal and the PWV — the most strife-torn areas. However, Task Forces in different areas exist, and a lot of enthusiasm remains to be converted into action.

The organisational drive is being matched up with campaigns in progress, to address issues specific to each area. The National March against violence is one of such campaigns to ensure mass action is kept alive. Some of the campaigns still to be taken up are the literacy and Women's Charter campaigns.

Some of the problematic areas identified through the Task Force Report, which must be understood within the context of any organisation's teething problems, are:

- ★ The working relationship between ANC and UDF structures, and co-existence of these structures;
- ★ Educating the general membership on ANC policy and how it functions;
- ★ The transport and communications problem especially affecting the rural areas.

The public launch at a rally in Durban was opened by Gertrude Shope. Terror Lekota, the Natal South Convenor, welcomed delegates to Natal. Harry Gwala gave encouraging words to the women with regard to their role in the political struggle and in political life in their different communities in general. Govan Mbeki, who spoke on behalf of the ANC National Executive Committee, also urged the people to give as much support as possible to the women in their work of organising women and championing the emancipation of women within our society.

However, the programme had to be cut short, as word was received about an impending Inkatha attack at the Thokoza Women's Hostel in town. We were informed later that the Thokoza Hostel problem had been resolved, but, the same night, Inkatha attacked residents of KwaMashu township. This is the manner in which this historic occasion was disrupted, even as it strove to address the problem of violence in Natal in particular.

PROBLEMS BEFORE US THE STEPS FORWARD

This statement was delivered by Thabo Mbeki for the African National Congress at a conference, "South Africa at a Turning Point: Negotiations and the Future," convened by the Five Freedoms Forum in Johannesburg on August 24 1990.

The Five Freedoms Forum is an organisation composed mostly of whites, which seeks to inform the white community about the purposes and aims of the Mass Democratic Movement.



Thabo Mbeki

It is just over two hundred days since the ban on the ANC and other organisations was lifted. Most probably for all of us, these two hundred days have been characterised by contradictory feelings of hope and despair. Each step forward has brought to the fore the enormity of the problems that have to be solved to sustain the advance to a new South Africa.

On occasion, the steps forward have been accompanied by one step backward, as exemplified for instance by the continued detention without trial of many members of the ANC and the democratic movement as a whole, despite the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement between the ANC and the government, affecting political prisoners and detainees, political trials and exiles.

Those who can afford the luxury have responded to the situation with cynical and disparaging comments. As though bent to spread gloom and despondency, they have sought to magnify everything negative and minimise the essential reality of the road towards a just and lasting solution of at least the political problems facing our country.

Quite clearly, those of us who have an interest in rapid and meaningful change cannot adopt a posture of pessimism. What we have to do is meet the challenge confronting all of us. We must confound our detractors by succeeding to overcome all the factors that make for despair.

We must reinforce the popular hope for change with actual and visible movement forward towards a better life for all the people of our country. The question that millions are asking — when will the nightmare of the apartheid system end? — demands an urgent and practical answer.

The urgency of the matter has been brought home especially by the totally unacceptable

murders that continue to take place in Natal. This campaign of murder has now spilled over into the Transvaal, resulting in the needless and gruesome death of hundreds of people and the displacement of thousands of others. As we all know, more people were killed in Port Elizabeth.

Only the instigators of this campaign, the shadowy angels of death, know where next disaster will descend on innocent and defenceless people. These goings-on emphasise precisely the point that we must all move with all necessary speed to achieve the democratic transformation of our country.

It is to us self-evident that South Africa is at a turning point. As a movement for national liberation, it is not our brief merely to observe contemporary events and processes and to make educated or uneducated comments about them. Rather, it is our resolve to participate fully in the making of the history of our country.

We approach this task with neither the conceit nor the arrogance which would lead us to believe that we have a monopoly of wisdom or the omnipotence of a saviour. All we are is a particular political movement, with its own history and policies, its constituency, its strengths and its weaknesses.

We believe we have a positive contribution to make to the common effort to reshape the destiny of our country. We would like to take this opportunity to mention a few of the ideas we would like to bring to the process of peaceful political change.

★ First: for the process of negotiation to succeed, it is necessary and vital that a national consensus should develop around various issues that are fundamental to the political, constitutional and economic make-up of a democratic South Africa.

★ Second: it is also necessary and vital that the masses of the people, both black and white, should participate in the process of negotiating the new constitution.

★ Third: it is also of critical importance that the institutions of the old state power, especially the army and the police, should be mobilised and educated to see themselves as the defenders of the new constitutional order, which would be

based on the national consensus to which we have referred, itself born out of a free political debate among all our people.

★ Fourth: clearly, the cutting edge in the process of transformation must be the process of constitutional change itself. In other words, the situation should not be allowed whereby matters that are ancillary to the pursuit of fundamental change take centre stage and overshadow the central objective of creating a new political order.

★ Fifth: this, of course, means that the sooner the constitutional discussion starts the better, and once it begins, it must be promoted with the greatest vigour, sustained at a brisk pace, and be seen to proceed from one visible marker to the next. This emphasises the point we have made already, that the constitution-making process should not be held back while efforts are made to solve problems that are ancillary or incidental to this process.

We do not have the time to elaborate to any great extent the five rather basic points that we have just made.

We shall move to the first point. This country has never had a constitutional system which included all citizens as equals. When we speak of a new order of justice, there are no national antecedents on which we can draw. We must, ourselves, the ordinary women, men and youth of this country, elaborate those basic principles which will bond our society together, in much the same way as the Americans, the French and other nations, regardless of their party political affiliations, feel bound by principles of government which they elaborated in the course both of an armed struggle and during political negotiations.

We believe that, within the political sphere, we should all join hands to evolve a set of constitutional principles, perhaps a future preamble to the new constitution, based on the perspective of a united, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist South Africa.

Let me hasten to add that we are not putting forward this proposal as a pre-condition to negotiations. Other political forces are of course free to put forward their own suggestions. These must enjoy equal weight in the debate aimed at

defining the national consensus, which is a critical element in the common effort to arrive at a new reality of justice and peace.

What we are arguing merely is that detailed constitutional discussions would be preceded by an agreement which sets the broad parameters within which the detailed process of drawing up a new constitution should take place.

As the ANC, we believe that no lasting political solution can be found, unless South Africa is indeed transformed into a united, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist country, and governed according to principles which derive from this perspective. If this perspective, and the very words themselves, are associated with a specific school of thought, the time has come that they should become national property, the proud possession of all political forces that are committed to change.

We also believe that the country needs to reach a national consensus about matters economic. Among us there can be no debating the fact that the economic transformation of our country is as important as the political. Indeed, the debate around fundamental economic issues bearing on the issue of this national consensus has begun. This is a positive development which we should all welcome.

At the same time, the reality is that we are all victims of a concerted campaign to convince the entire country that national consensus should be built around the notions of private property, private enterprise and a free market. An attempt is made to allege that refusal to deify these notions is clear and uncontestable proof of lack of commitment to the objective of full and unfettered democratic rights for the individual.

We reject these charges, and are convinced that the effort to reach a national consensus in the economic sphere must be focused differently. We are dealing with a country which has intolerable levels of poverty and backwardness. The situation is made much worse by the fact that this stark deprivation is in direct contrast to a display of opulence which, in some instances, is patently provocative.

We believe that our country should build a national consensus around more humane objectives than those which have become an article of faith

among some of our compatriots. We should set it as a national objective that we should build an economy which would ensure that every citizen enjoys a decent and rising standard of living. There should be no need to emphasise the importance of this objective.

In the past, those who had political power bent every effort to end what was called the "poor white problem." The time is upon us when the country as a whole has to bend every effort to end the "poor black problem." Private enterprise, the free market and other social instruments, will all have to play their due role in the common effort to address this burning question.

At the end of the day, we must be proud of being South African, because we can demonstrate that all our people, both black and white, in the towns and the countryside, live in conditions, not only of freedom and peace, but also of human dignity and prosperity, which will remove the imperative for some to hold out their hands as beggars and oblige them to demean themselves by calling another 'baas'. We believe that these values should be part of the process of the making of the South African nation.

As we have said before, all our people should be active participants in the process of constitution-making. In the first instance, these masses must involve themselves in the elaboration of the political, constitutional and economic principles which will underpin the new social order. This matter should not require any further argument.

Suffice to say that, for the ANC, the mass democratic movement and all other forces opposed to the apartheid system, the task of drawing the people into the process of constitution-making should rank as a challenge of mass mobilisation equal to no other that we have engaged in, in the past.

It must also be our task to engage all other organised formations, whether they are political or not, to contribute their views and those of their members, so that, much as it is possible, nobody should be left out of the process of developing the national consensus to which we have referred.

In this context, we would like to express our

appreciation of the stand taken by Professor Carel Boshoff and his colleagues to participate in the process of negotiations. Though we may not agree with their views about a *boerestaat*, we are convinced that they, like all other political formations, have a right and a duty to present their views in any such negotiating forum as will be agreed.

The attitude adopted by Dr Treurnicht is at best unhelpful and at worst destructive. Nothing but the whirlwind can be gained from a policy which continues to pretend that the future of our country can be decided by a coterie of white politicians who believe they should appropriate to themselves the exclusive right to determine the future of our country.

There is a clear need for the government to take very seriously the observations that the ANC, other organisations and individuals have made about the conduct of the security forces in situations of conflict. The reality of course is that these forces were trained and prepared to defend the old order. It therefore comes as no surprise that, as reported, many find their way into the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging and other armed right-wing groups.

We have made the point many times that the process of change has as a necessary corollary the objective of national reconciliation. Accordingly, the ANC has no plans and no intention to carry out acts of vengeance and retribution against anybody. There is therefore no reason for anybody within the present security forces to oppose change in the belief that such change will create a situation in which their lives and livelihood will be threatened.

Rather, they should look forward to the situation when, perhaps for the first time, they would be accepted by all our people as part of a truly national security force, voluntarily supported and accepted by the people as real defenders of law and order and the security of a democratic and independent South Africa. The process of change requires that the security forces should be reoriented to internalise the view in their thinking and their procedures that their brief is to promote the democratic process and not to block or frustrate it.

As a result of the talks between ourselves and

the government since the beginning of May, various agreements have been reached. These include the release of political prisoners and related matters, the ending of violence by all sides, the repeal of repressive legislation, ending the State of Emergency, ways and means of addressing public grievances, and so on.


We consider these to be important steps forward which are a vital part of the process leading to constitutional negotiations. Implementation of some of these agreements has started. Steps are being taken to ensure the implementation of the rest. It is obviously of critical importance that all those involved should do everything they can to ensure that the intention of the agreement is realised. This is vital in terms of the strengthening of mutual trust and demonstrating the viability of the peaceful political process which has produced the agreements.

However, the point we would like to emphasise is that the process of the implementation of the agreements should not be used as an excuse to delay the beginning of negotiations about matters related to the making of a new constitution. In the end, what the whole exercise is about is precisely the restructuring of the country in terms of a new democratic constitution.

It is for this reason that it was agreed in Pretoria on August 6 that exploratory talks would begin on the issue of the new constitution. There should therefore not arise any new obstacles to this process. Rather, if there are problems, they should be solved simultaneously as progress is being made on the constitutional front.

Finally, no argument should be required to emphasise the importance of moving with all necessary speed on this front. It should be the common resolve of everybody who is committed to change to move forward as speedily as possible to end the system of apartheid. But also it is clear that any delays create a situation of uncertainty and allow for the emergence of new factors militating against the process of change. It is therefore obvious that such questions as the determination of who shall participate in deciding who should draw up the new constitution should be resolved soon. So should such other questions as the stages through which the process of drawing up the new constitution should pass.

GOVERNMENT ADOPTS A LAISSEZ FAIRE ATTITUDE ON VIOLENCE



Inkatha members about to launch an attack in the East Rand

The National Executive Committee of the African National Congress met in extended session from Tuesday September 18 until the afternoon of today, September 20th.

The extended NEC meeting, which included

representatives of COSATU, the UDF, members of the Interim Leadership and representatives of all sixteen regions, was convened as a matter of urgency to review the ANC's strategic and tactical perspectives in view of the current wave of

violence that has visited so much death, injury and misery on the African townships of the Reef.

The meeting received an extensive report from the Joint National Working Committee on Violence, comprising representatives of the ANC, COSATU and the UDF; and discussed a Strategy Document prepared under the auspices of the Political Committee.

The meeting noted that, while the South African government is evidently committed to political change in South Africa, it is becoming clear that it would prefer that change occurs on terms most favourable to itself. In pursuance of that objective, the government has adopted a two-track policy which, on the one hand, accepts the need to negotiate a settlement of our country's problems while, on the other hand, devising stratagems to weaken the ANC and other democratic formations.

The government has, consequently, adopted a *laissez faire* attitude towards the violence in Natal and in the Transvaal with the hope that it will generate a climate of insecurity, fear and terror and thus make a decisive majority of our people more amenable to an authoritarian regime.

The ANC condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the violence that has been unleashed against the people of the townships in Natal and the Transvaal by the combined forces of elements of the security services and Inkatha vigilantes, and emphasises that the ongoing violence poses an immediate threat to the entire process of peaceful transition. Though the ANC has a profound and unwavering commitment to peace in our country, we warn the South African government that, unless the government is seen to be taking appropriate measures to apprehend and prosecute the perpetrators of this violence, it will have to assume full responsibility for the derailing of the peace process.

It was the unanimous opinion of the NEC that the measures announced by State President de Klerk on Wednesday September 19th, and those threatened by General Erasmus of the South African Police on Saturday September 15th, are designed to abridge the civil liberties of the African population on the Reef, repress legitimate political activity, reintroduce the State of Emergency by guile, and not to bring an end

to the violence or track down its organisers and instigators.

We are obliged to draw the attention of the South African people and the international community to the act of bad faith committed by State President de Klerk in his most recent actions. It is a matter of record that, pursuant to the adoption of the Pretoria Minute, a joint Government/ANC Working Group was established to devise mutually acceptable principles for the implementation of a cease-fire. Among the numerous tasks with which this Working Group was charged was the disposition of the arms and other weapons in the possession of the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe. The State President has deliberately undermined the Working Group by pre-emptively criminalising the possession of such weapons. We cannot but interpret this as a measure directed against the ANC and its underground military structures. It does nothing to build mutual confidence between the ANC and the government.

The meeting unanimously condemned the detention of members of the ANC and the democratic movement, including our colleague, Comrade Mac Maharaj, under Section 29 of the Internal Security Act. We shall hold the South African government accountable for any harm or injuries these comrades incur while in its custody. The attitude of the government with regard to these anti-apartheid fighters and leaders contrasts sharply with the concern it displays in relation to detainees of the white ultra-right. The refusal of the South African government to extend indemnity to Comrades Chris Hani and Ronnie Kasrils, both members of the NEC, was also noted.

The NEC noted the veritable avalanche of charges, emerging from every area that has been affected by this wave of violence, to the effect that the South African Police and the SADF have adopted a partial attitude in favour of the vigilante aggressors in almost all instances of violence. The Report of the Goldstone Commission on the March 22 massacre in Sebokeng confirms our belief that internal departmental enquiries conducted by the Police and the Defence Force do not deserve public confidence. The ANC therefore calls for an independent judicial

commission enquiry, with adequate terms of reference, to investigate the numerous charges levelled against the state's security organs.

The NEC also adopted a recommendation made by the Joint ANC-COSATU Working Committee on Violence to conduct a national campaign to achieve greater public accountability on the part of the Police and other Security Services. The campaign shall be centred, *inter alia*, on demands for:

- (i) The establishment of an independent review body, equipped with powers to recommend action, to investigate complaints against the police.
- (ii) The establishment of a publicly devised code of conduct for all police personnel.
- (iii) The demilitarisation of the police.
- (iv) The limitation of police arms and weaponry to those adequate for normal law enforcement and the detection of crime.

Consistent with this view, the NEC calls for the immediate and visible disbandment of the various State murder squads, such as the CCB, the Askaris, Koevoet and other mercenary formations such as Battalion 32. There should be full public disclosure of the future deployment of the personnel of these units, the distribution of their assets and their arms.

The extended NEC noted the century-old migrant labour system and the degradation and humiliations it imposes on a sizeable section of the African working class. These hostels and labour compounds were expressly designed to isolate the migrant labourers from the urban environment in which they work by segregating them in barrack-like conditions which permit neither privacy nor normal family life. This situation of stress has inevitably contributed to feelings of aggression and hostility which have on numerous occasions been cynically exploited by elements pursuing political agendas that are inimical to the best interests of the migrant workers and their fellow workers.

The speedy elimination of the migrant labour system should be regarded as one of the priority national tasks facing us as we strive towards a new South Africa. During the intermediate period, the ANC demands that all labour compounds, single-sex hostels and similar com-

pounds be converted into decent living quarters, such as flats, to accommodate those who wish to live as single persons and those who wish to live as families.

In order to get to the root causes of the violence and to secure peace among the people, the extended NEC resolved to convene a meeting with all homeland leaders, including Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, to devise a joint strategy for ending the violence and measures to prevent any possible future outbreaks.

The ANC, in co-operation with its allies, will, at the earliest possible date, also call a conference of the broadest spectrum of anti-apartheid and democratic forces, with a view to discussing a common strategy to combat the forces of destabilisation and violence.

In order that they can mount effective defence, the extended NEC encourages all our people in the areas affected by vigilante violence to organise themselves for purposes of self-defence.

The meeting instructed the NEC of the ANC to seek an early summit with the South African government to discuss the gravity of the situation and to bring to the government's attention our profound anxieties regarding the future and integrity of the peace process. In this regard, the NEC is instructed to demand that the government take the necessary measures to put an end to the activities of all irregular, pro-apartheid armed groups and forces such as the vigilantes, right-wing paramilitary formations and the covert armed wing of Inkatha.

During its final session, the meeting received news of the successful exploratory meeting, held in Durban on the evening of September 19, between members of the NEC and members of the Central Committee of Inkatha. The NEC welcomes this development, and congratulates the participants from both organisations for the excellent work they have commenced.

The meeting concluded by sending a message of greetings to Comrade President O R Tambo, and expressed its collective confidence that his continuing recovery will enable him to attend the forthcoming ANC National Conference scheduled for December 1990.

ANC NEC statement, September 20 1990

A POST-APARTHEID CONSTITUTION TOWARDS A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION

By Zola Skweyiya

The negotiations initiated by ANC Vice President Nelson Mandela from Victor Verster Prison have ushered in a new era in the struggle for national liberation in South Africa. They have led to the unbanning of the ANC and other people's organisations, and have presented all democrats in this country with a unique opportunity to contribute towards the creation of a new and just democratic order in our country.



All men and women of good will have been presented with an opportunity of participating in the constitution-making process, and to contribute in the moulding of the basic law of a post-apartheid South Africa. All peace-loving forces of this country, irrespective of their political affiliation or ideological leanings, have been presented with a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to take part in the process towards the promulga-

tion of the fundamental law of a post-apartheid South Africa. The constitution-making process presents all our people with a challenge to stand up and be counted in the new phase of struggle that has emerged. The constitution would be an instrument through which the will of the people of South Africa as a whole, irrespective of colour, gender and class, long checked and suppressed by apartheid tyranny, would be lodged in their will to power.

It has been a long way from the first actions of Umkhonto We Sizwe, in December of 1961 to the present phase of our struggle. Many a heroine and many a martyr has paid the supreme sacrifice, towards this phase. We say this because negotiations are also part of the struggle.

The ANC has never rejected negotiations. This is no new phenomenon in the long history of our struggle. Even after the adoption of the armed struggle, the ANC repeatedly expressed the hope that the first military acts would persuade the government of this country to discuss the peaceful solution of the apartheid problem. Over the years, the ANC has many a time stated categorically that, if a serious possibility presented itself, it would take part in negotiations.

With the change in the situation, especially after the uprising which engulfed South Africa from 1984-1986, the option of negotiations became central in the resolution of the crisis. It was at this time that the ANC saw the need to state its positions more clearly, especially when it came to the position of a new constitutional order and the question of negotiations. It was at this time that the ANC appointed its Constitutional Committee and instructed it to draw the broad outlines of a democratic constitution for a post-apartheid South Africa. To take advantage of the victories which the democratic forces had won internally and internationally, the ANC had to clarify its vision of a future South Africa, and elaborate more on the principles set out in the Freedom Charter.

This process resulted in the drawing up of the ANC Constitutional Guidelines. These guidelines were never meant to be a constitution, but broad outlines of what a post-apartheid constitution should contain. They are meant for discussion by all South Africans, who can amend them, elaborate on them and criticise them in whatever way they choose.

This was the ANC's contribution to the constitutional debate which has occupied South Africa since the mid-eighties.

Further, when it became clear that negotiations were becoming the order of the day in South Africa, the ANC saw the need to state its position clearly. The ANC initiated consultations and discussions within the democratic movement in

South Africa, and in the countries of the sub-continent of Southern Africa and in Africa as a whole. This led to the adoption of the Harare Declaration on Southern Africa. These positions were broadly accepted by the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth and the United Nations. They are enshrined in the United Nations Declaration on South Africa.

The central principles behind the ANC approach to the negotiations mechanism are:

- ★ Negotiations should not take place behind the backs and above the heads of our people. They should be among delegated representatives with a clear mandate from their constituencies.

- ★ There should be a specific time frame within which negotiations should take place.

- ★ The process must not be unduly protracted. The faster we reach an agreement the better.

- ★ To supervise the transitional process, there will have to be an impartial interim government. Negotiations cannot be carried out within and through the existing apartheid institutions.

There will have to be a number of phases before the new constitution is adopted. After the climate for negotiations has been created and obstacles have been removed there will have to be a suspension of hostilities between the parties involved in the armed conflict, that is the liberation movement — in this case the ANC — and the South African Government. A mutually agreed ceasefire, on the basis of terms agreed upon, will have to be acceptable to all parties involved in the armed conflict.

The whole process led to the meeting on May 2-5 1990, between the ANC and the South African Government, which adopted the Groote Schuur Minute.

The Groote Schuur Minute

The ANC's approach at the talks was in conformity with its commitment to the process set out in the Harare Declaration. Within this process, the question of suspension of hostilities is addressed to both sides, the ANC and the South African Government. Such suspension of hostilities was to be negotiated after the removal of

obstacles. The obstacles referred to were factors whose removal would help in the creation of a climate for negotiations. Included here are the need for unconditional release of all political prisoners, including those on death row, lifting the State of Emergency, and the repeal of all security legislation.

While the ANC did not, at Groote Schuur, renounce any form of struggle that may advance its cause, it looked forward to the future phases of the process, when it will be possible for both sides to suspend warfare and ultimately lay down arms entirely.

In this context, how do we interpret the Groote Schuur agreement?

The preamble refers to a common commitment towards the resolution of the existing climate of violence and intimidation from **whatever quarter**, as well as a commitment to stability and to a peaceful process of negotiations.

We interpret the reference to violence and intimidation as addressed, in the first place, to the forces of apartheid, and among the forces of the right, black and white. We recognise also that some of our own followers have been involved in acts of indiscipline. It is part of our duty, in establishing the ANC as a mass legal presence, to ensure that this does not continue, and that we spread understanding of our policies by reasoning and not by any form of violence or intimidation.

This is a commitment born out of confidence in our constituency and policies, and also a sense that it is both short-sighted and morally wrong to believe that followers can be won over by force or violence. This goal can only be achieved through establishing strong grassroots structures organised on a disciplined basis and with a strongly rooted political consciousness.

As far as the ANC is concerned, the commitment to stability and to a peaceful process of negotiations is nothing new, nor is it a compromise. The entire history of our struggle and organisations is related to attempts to find a peaceful resolution of all our problems. The path to armed struggle was not chosen by us, but was forced upon us by the intransigence of the apartheid regime, its repressive policies and the banning of the ANC.

We strongly believe that the whole spirit of the agreement and the character of the exercise was dictated by a common commitment to remove all obstacles to normal political activity and the achievement of a climate conducive to negotiations. We hoped that that would soon lead to the removal of all repressive legislation, the release of all political prisoners, and the return of the exiles. Our constituency demanded that we ensure that the agreement be speedily implemented, thus bringing us to the point where obstacles to the negotiations would be removed.

The agreement did not entail any limit on our normal peaceful political activities. That is why the ANC would not relax its struggle to liberate South Africa from apartheid, and create a non-racial, non-sexist democracy. The agreement laid the basis of trust and good faith between the negotiating parties, and was fundamental in confidence-building for the future stages of the negotiations process. It led to the adoption of the Pretoria Minute.

The Pretoria Minute

By agreeing to the Pretoria Minute, the ANC wanted to ensure that the possibility of achieving its goal through peaceful means should be fully explored. The declaration is construed in a manner that seeks to map out a fair process which would not put the democratic forces in South Africa at a disadvantage.

Perhaps, for one to gauge the amount of sacrifice the ANC made in the Pretoria Minute, one has to go back to the Harare and United Nations Declarations. In both declarations, it was envisaged that the South African Government should take steps, unilaterally, to create a climate conducive to negotiations; all the obstacles to those negotiations are identified.

It is clear that the Pretoria Minute does not strictly follow the wording, procedure and phrasing of the Harare Declaration. The ANC unilaterally suspended the armed struggle without the South African Government's removing all the obstacles. Repressive legislation still exists, the State of Emergency in Natal is still fully in place. Further, right-wing violence has gained greater

prominence among both whites and blacks.

We should ask ourselves the question whether the failure of the Pretoria Minute to adhere strictly to the provisions of the Harare Declaration means that we have made an unacceptable compromise.

While the ANC initiated the present negotiations process, we need to evaluate at every particular minute whether our actions or inactions may lead to our losing the initiative, and, in fact, endanger the achievement of our fundamental goal.

While the sequence, as foreseen in the Harare Declaration, might have been fundamental in creating the designed climate for negotiations, we need to ask ourselves whether its precise sequence needs to be religiously adhered to and followed. In particular, we need to answer this question in the context of the logjam and dwindling of confidence that was developing.

To avoid a permanent blockage of the negotiations process, we had to deviate from the precise process and phasing of the Declaration. The object of the Declaration is not to adhere religiously to its phrasing and words, but to make speedy progress towards peace in a democratic and non-racial South Africa. While we had to aim at achieving our strategic objectives, we had to move with tactical flexibility towards our goals.

Our main strength has always been political. Our principles are unquestionable. The Pretoria Minute would open new possibilities for mass struggle, and open the gateway towards the peaceful resolution of South Africa's problems.

The government sought to force the ANC to go further than the suspension of armed struggle. It wanted a demobilisation of the people, an end to consumer boycotts and industrial strikes and a wide variety of actions which are judged normal in any Western democracy. This was fully repudiated by the ANC.

Until now, we have driven hard bargains and won many a victory, some going further than foreseen in the Harare Declaration — for example, the return of the exiles, which is not listed in the declaration.

While the Pretoria Minute is aimed at speeding up the process towards negotiation, we also need to strengthen our political organisation. We need

to move quickly to ensure that our people participate in the monitoring of the unrest. We should use the new opportunities to our advantage.

Sometimes one wonders whether the present artificially created spell of well-orchestrated violence is not aimed at the very spirit of the Pretoria Minute. Is it not aimed at securing a place for some parties who, up till now, have seen both the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes as eroding their prestige? Is it not aimed at securing a place for some leaders whose political careers are on the wane? One wonders whether it is aimed at presenting South Africa with a choice in its constitutional models. Is it not aimed at increasing regional and ethnic differences, and thus forcing us to recognise them and so securing a place at the negotiating table and in a transitional cabinet?

The suspension of the armed struggle is a necessary compromise. It is not happening for the first time in the history of national liberation movements. The same case can be found in the history of the Algerian war of independence, in Vietnam and other countries. Democratic international law recognises ceasefires as agreements between belligerent forces for a temporary cessation of hostilities. It does not bring an end to the conflict between the parties. The negotiations between the ANC and the South African government aimed at a general ceasefire. It is a temporary arrangement. If the duration of the ceasefire is not fixed in an agreement, as in the Pretoria Minute, it continues in force for a reasonable period (Y Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self Defence*, 1988, Articles 36 and 51).

Despite this, the ANC looks forward to the future phases of the peace process, and the possibility for all sides to suspend war and violence, and ultimately participate in the peace process.

Despite this, it is perhaps worth while to spell out what has not been agreed on. The armed struggle has been suspended unilaterally by the ANC, with a proviso that the ANC reserves the right to revive it, should the government fall short of its obligations. The forces of Umkhonto We Sizwe have not been forced to lay down their arms or identify their armed caches. Umkhonto has been unbanned, and remains in

existence until such time as a complete cessation of hostilities is announced, consequent on a total settlement, and a unified South African army is established. Despite this, we hope there will be no need to take up arms again.

Despite this, the way towards fully-fledged constitutional negotiations has been opened. The ANC certainly hopes that it will not be necessary to resume armed activity. We want a peaceful solution. The present stage lays the basis or foundation for unfolding the process of democratising South Africa through the process of shaping a new constitution in our country.

Constitutional Principles

When deciding on the goals and priorities which must find expression in a new constitution, the ANC bases itself on the Harare Declaration. The principles are as follows:

1. South Africa shall become a united, democratic and non-racial state.
2. All its people shall enjoy common and equal citizenship and nationality, regardless of race, colour, sex or creed.
3. All its people shall have the right to participate in the government and administration of the country on the basis of **universal suffrage**, exercised through one person, one vote, under a common voters' roll.
4. All shall have the right to form and join any political party of their choice, provided that this is not in furtherance of racism.
5. All shall enjoy universally recognised human rights, freedoms and civil liberties, protected under an entrenched Bill of Rights.
6. South Africa shall have a new legal system which shall guarantee equality of all before the law.
7. South Africa shall have an independent and non-racial judiciary.
8. There shall be an economic order which shall promote the well-being of all South Africans.
9. A democratic South Africa shall respect the rights, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, and pursue a policy of peace, friendship and mutually beneficial co-operation with

all people.

These principles reflect the thinking and spirit of co-operation and peace as stated in the ANC Constitutional Guidelines.

Drawing up a Constitution

In drawing up constitutions, especially for the developing countries, where the percentage of illiteracy is great, one should ensure that the language of the constitution is clear and non-technical. The document must be as short and precise as possible. A constitution is meant to be read and understood by ordinary citizens. It should not be made a monopoly of supreme court judges and constitutional specialists.

A constitution should not be made an excuse for party political pronouncements. It should be neutral and open-ended in political and ideological terms. Otherwise, it may be too closely identified with the fortunes of a particular political party or pressure group, and rise and fall with it. A constitution is meant to endure, if not for ages, at least for a certain term of years.

The drafter should have a direct political mandate. It is for this reason that the ANC calls for a constituent assembly. A precondition for any viable exercise in a constitution-making process is the existence of a prior political consensus — on the part of that part of society for which the constitution is intended, or at least its dominant political elite — as to the main goal values of that society in the future. If such a political consensus does not exist, but a substantial comprehensive societal consensus is there, the drafters must operate modestly, and try to concentrate on those areas where a societal consensus exists.

The text of the constitution should have an in-built element of generality that facilitates its continually creative adaptation, through time (by judicial interpretation and administrative application, apart from formal amendment), to changing societal needs and expectations. The constitution should not be rigid and difficult to change by ordinary modes of constitution amendment, lest that may encourage the citizen to change

by extra-constitutional means and direct action, or else ignore it completely.

In conclusion, one may warn that no constitutional charter can save a sick society. One should always take into account the human element in constitutional decision-making and application. Drafting a new constitution can never be a substitute for wise political action — the exercise of the ordinary skills of political compromise, and respect for the constitutional "rules of the game." The constitution of any democratic country should try by all means to inculcate a culture of human rights. This culture in South Africa must take into account the actual needs of the people and the extent to which a society, like the apartheid one, is based on inequalities. It should encourage tackling the problems of poverty, lack of housing, inadequate medical care, social services and education based on racial discrimination. It must also reflect the interests of workers, gender issues and the protection of children.

The principles enunciated above set out the minimum constitutional requirements, without whose implementations we are convinced apartheid would not have been eradicated. The central theme is a united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic South Africa, based on one person one vote, under a general common voters' roll and full equality, without regard to race, gender and religion.

A Constituent Assembly

The ANC insists that an elected Constituent Assembly should draw up the constitution of post-apartheid South Africa. We insist on this because such an organ would have a direct mandate from the people. The election process leading to the constituent assembly would give all parties competing in the election an opportunity to declare their policies. Further, it would give the electorate, especially the Africans, who have never voted before, a chance, once in their lifetime, to cast a vote, which would lay the basis for the foundation stone of a democratic South Africa. Further, and most important, it will spell out clearly who is who, in South Africa's

political life.

The road to a constituent assembly is long. The ANC is at present involved in consulting all parties amongst the oppressed. We are not aiming at convincing them that they should adopt our policies. What we aim at is a broad consensus which would determine the shape of the negotiating table. We are talking to everyone, including the chiefs and leaders of the bantustans.

Perhaps some may be critical of such an approach. If so, they should take into consideration the fact that about 50% of our people live in the rural areas. Further, they should consider the influence which apartheid officials have on our people.

Last but not least, they should take into consideration the political changes that have taken place in these bantustans, and further consider the fact that if we do not have them on our side — somebody will. The results of the recent meeting between F W de Klerk and the bantustan chiefs point to the broad strategies of the regime in the rural areas and bantustans. The promise of regional government in the countryside is aimed at enticing the bantustan leaders to the side of the National Party during the negotiation process.

The ANC further insists on an interim government to oversee the transitional process. We are convinced that the present apartheid regime, with its history of violence and intolerance, is in no position to play such a role. It can't be player and at the same time be referee. We foresee an interim government being composed of all the parties that claim to have a following in South Africa. We hope that period of constitution-making would last at least a year, or 18 months at the most.

We hope that during this period a spirit of tolerance, understanding, mutual confidence and trust will be infused into the whole body politic of South Africa. It is a period during which the sincerity of all the parties towards the peaceful resolution of the problems of this country will be tested. The times we are going through are hard times, but also exciting. We will need each other and we must build mutual trust, if we are to achieve the development and peace we have so long sacrificed for.

DO WE CONTINUE THE TALKS? THE PRETORIA MINUTE AND ITS AFTERMATH

By Raymond Suttner



The decision for the ANC to suspend the armed struggle has been difficult for many of our supporters to accept. It has also been seized upon by 'radical' critics as a sign of betrayal. All the more so when it appears that the leading liberation movement has given this up unilaterally, and apparently without corresponding concessions on the side of the apartheid regime. How do we understand this? Is this a setback?

Subsequent to the signing of the Pretoria Minute, a massive onslaught has been unleashed against communities on the Reef, leaving some 800 dead. There is clear evidence of police and SADF involvement, connivance and condoning of acts of terror against our people. It does not appear to be coincidental that these attacks coincided with the launch of a large number of ANC branches in the PWV region. What this means for the future of the talks will be considered in a final section. It is necessary first to understand the reasons behind the adoption of the Pretoria Minute.

When the ANC and its allies initiated the process leading to the adoption of the Harare Declaration, it was a strategic initiative with a particular purpose. It was known that governments like that of Thatcher were preparing their own initiatives, whose purpose would have been to sideline the ANC and other democratic forces and create a favourable climate for continuing white minority rule.

The ANC did not want to have to respond to such an initiative. Instead it set its own process in motion, which, through its unanimous adoption in the OAU and the cogency of its arguments, became accepted as the authoritative road to a negotiated settlement in South Africa.

The ANC wanted to ensure that the possibility of achieving its ultimate goal, a non-racial, democratic South Africa, through peaceful means, should be fully explored. The Declaration was constructed in a manner that sought to map out a fair process which would not, as in other plans, put the democratic forces at a disadvantage.

It was envisaged, at the present stage, that the government should take steps, unilaterally, to create a climate for negotiations, identifying amongst others, some six obstacles in the way of the onset of negotiations.

While we have initiated the present process, we do not automatically retain the initiative. We need at any particular moment to evaluate whether or not our action or inaction may lead us to lose the initiative and in fact endanger the achievement of our fundamental purpose. This can only be adequately addressed if we consider the state of the process at this point in time, not only in relation to the Harare Declaration, but within the context of our overall strategic perspective, of the national democratic struggle.

It is clear that the adoption of the Pretoria Minute does not strictly follow the wording of the Harare

Declaration. The ANC has unilaterally suspended the armed struggle, without there being a climate for negotiations, without the removal of the obstacles listed in the Declaration nor that of other obstacles that have gained greater prominence in recent times, for example, the right wing violence, and the violence in Natal.

Does the failure to adhere strictly to the provisions of the Harare Declaration mean that we have made an unacceptable compromise?

It is crucial that we negotiate with a proper climate and that we eliminate all the obstacles that have been identified. But we need to ask whether the precise sequence of events laid down in the Harare Declaration must necessarily be followed, irrespective of conditions. In particular, we need to answer this within the context of the logjam that has developed in the process.

Do we want there to be a permanent blockage? Do we want a permanent stalemate? Or do we have a way of unblocking the process? If we do, and this entails deviating from the precise formulation of the Harare Declaration, we need to weigh this against the purpose of the Declaration.

The object of the Declaration was not to have precise words adhered to (though deviation from these provisions cannot be done lightly). The object was to make speedy progress towards peace in a democratic, non-racial, unitary South Africa. The means chosen to achieve this were laid down in the Declaration.

Just as the Harare Declaration has a specific and larger purpose, at every phase of this process we need to assess how we are moving towards this main goal, that is, whether what we are doing or not doing helps or retards progress towards a new, democratic constitution.

We have to ask how we are to achieve our strategic objectives while moving with tactical flexibility. We need all the time to ask whether the positions we adopt are advancing our goals or not.

The ANC's main strength is political. The opening up of the mass terrain creates possibilities that we need to utilise fully. The armed struggle had been conceived as a political weapon in a situation where open, legal, political action was virtually impossible. The reopening of the legal terrain has meant that the possibilities and need for action in this area have become much greater than ever before.

The government sought to have the ANC go further than a suspension of armed struggle, and wanted a demobilisation of the people: an end to consumer boycotts, strikes, and a wide variety of mass actions.

We rejected this because the ANC is a product of, and accountable to, the people. Its strength lies in this link. This is not a time for demobilising the people, but for heightening the struggle on the ground, as an adjunct to that at the talks or the negotiating table. (It may well be asked whether suspension of the armed struggle could not have been avoided if the level of mass struggle had been higher, of that could not have been used to break through the blockage delaying the peace process.)

The ANC has faced hard choices, and has chosen to make tactical adjustments. We need to understand what the choices were, and what considerations came into play when the choices were made.

Until now, we have driven hard bargains and have achieved many victories, some going further than the obstacles listed in the Harare Declaration (for example, the return of exiles, which is not mentioned). But at any moment we have to be flexible with regard to our response, and broad in our vision of what we are prepared to concede, if in so doing we can advance our goals.

At a particular stage we may facilitate our future gains by conceding more than the opposing forces. Up till now, as mentioned, we have mainly had unilateral concessions from the side of the government. To take this further has required a concession on our side. **That concession was judged necessary in order to facilitate the achievement of our long-term strategic goals.**

But we need to keep the momentum going, and in fact ensure that we put the democratic forces in command, dictate the pace of struggle from the streets, townships, work places, and so on.

The political terrain is where we are strong. While we have engaged the regime militarily, that is not our most powerful area. In this time we need to focus very strongly on the mass struggle and remove obstacles in the way of its becoming an irresistible force, felt very much at the negotiating table itself.

We have tried to speed up the process, but we need to ensure that we are equipped by our organisational activities to use this speed to our

advantage.

An important question that needs to be addressed is whether we have not made a unilateral suspension, while the state remains free to perpetrate aggression against the people. Realistically, we are not in a position to secure the disarming of the SADF and SAP at this stage. But serious steps must be taken to monitor and curb their repressive acts. The state has identified some 96 officers at various places, as contact people who should be informed of corresponding ANC people, to liaise with one another over situations which threaten to erupt into dangerous conflagrations leading to the shedding of further blood of our people.

We have been accused of delay in naming corresponding contact people on our side. Recent evidence indicates, however, that many of our people on the ground are very dissatisfied with the system because the contact people are very often, in their view, those members of the police who are responsible for the violence.

Clearly, as the NEC has demanded, much more thoroughgoing steps need to be taken to identify and charge the perpetrators of the current terror, and to see to a visible disbanding of the various killer squads.

Our main job now is to interpret this Minute to the people, and explain that it is essential that all our members, and the masses in general, are involved in the process of negotiations. The release of Mac Maharaj and other political prisoners, the return of indemnity to Ronnie Kasrils and Maharaj, are not matters for the leadership alone. It is for the people to open the jails and take decisive action, under the leadership of the ANC, to end the violence.

We need also to make the people focus on our political and organisational tasks, to ensure that our branches and regions can raise demands which will provide our representatives at future negotiations with clear ideas of the thinking of the people and also proper structures from which a mandate can be obtained and to whom the leaders are accountable.

The suspension of the armed struggle is a compromise. But whether or not one compromises is not an abstract, purely logical, decision. If a compromise is necessary in order to advance our struggle, we must compromise. If a compromise is

necessary to prevent a serious defeat, we compromise. If a compromise is necessary to raise the level of struggle and create new conditions which may take us further in the realisation of our ultimate goals, we must compromise.

We do not enter this process with a view to compromising. But we cannot cater for a changing situation if we allow ourselves to be frozen into one response: no compromise. To refuse to compromise is not a principle in itself. It is not an issue subject to no variation. It is, in the main, a tactical question, and how one relates to compromise is a combination of the conditions existing at a particular time and their relation to our ultimate goals.

Anything we do now must relate to the present and the future, to our present conditions and our ultimate objectives. The question of compromise is justified or unjustified by the effect of any action on the obstacles in the way of the realisation of our aims. Does such a compromise assist in the removal of such obstacles, or not? is the question we need to answer.

The Pretoria Minute is a justified compromise, ensuring the release of political prisoners, all of them, whether on death row or serving sentences; it secures the return of exiles, and, in the spirit of the Minute, serious steps ought to be taken towards the repeal of security legislation and the resolution of the Natal conflict.

If we want a negotiated settlement, if we want our brothers and sisters, mothers and fathers, in jail to be released, if we want an end to the aggression against our people, we have at this time to adopt the type of approach found in the Pretoria Minute. Ideally, only the apartheid regime should make concessions, but in real life, politics does not operate that way. Even though we initiated the process leading to the Harare Declaration, we do not control all aspects of the way it unfolds in South Africa. The suspension of armed struggle is a bold step, seeking to ensure that we retain or regain the initiative, that we have the moral high ground and that there is no legitimate reason for the government to delay the process towards a just settlement.

It is important, nevertheless, to clarify what has not been agreed on. The armed struggle has not been ended. It has been suspended, with the proviso that it would be revived if the government fails to meet its obligations. The forces of Umkhonto We Sizwe

have not handed in their weapons, or identified arms caches. Umkhonto remains in existence until such time as a cessation of hostilities, consequent on a total settlement, is reached.

We certainly hope that it will not be necessary to resume armed activity. We want a peaceful solution, and we need every democrat to demand, with us, that there be speedy movement towards the creation of a democratic South African state.

After the signing of the Minute:

The recent violence on the Reef raises new questions about the future of the talks. The controversial nature of both the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes amongst many of our supporters has been compounded by the revocation of the indemnities, and the massive war against ordinary people and the ANC on the Reef.

Many people fear that we are in a reversal of the Dingane-Retief encounter, where the enemy now takes advantage of our suspension of armed struggle, and interprets agreements as it wishes.

It is important to remember that the interpretation and implementation of agreements arising from both Minutes is not merely the examination of wording. While the Pretoria Minute, in particular, commits the government to specific time scales for releases and the return of exiles, it is not clear what is required from the security forces. We interpret the spirit, as opposed to specific wording, as supporting our view that the state has an obligation to step in and stop the carnage.

But how successful we are in achieving this is a matter of struggle. We need in particular to take more determined steps to win the propaganda battle as to the meaning and cause of the violence. We need to step up this campaign until it reaches a point where massive pressure can be exerted by all peace-loving people, to force the government to end the war.

Another thing to remember is that we need also to talk a different type of language. Mass action — such as stayaways costing R750 thousand in the case of that over the Natal violence — often have strong persuasive powers. The ANC needs, now, to take a bold lead in showing its muscle, ensuring that the government is forced to listen and act decisively to bring the killers to book.

Do we continue talking?

If we pull out of the peace process we risk the continued incarceration of comrades who have a right and a duty to play their part in the transition to a free South Africa.

The same goes for comrades who have spent up to three decades building the movement abroad, struggling on the international terrain, or in training cadres for work inside the country. We want all these people back. They are entitled, and must be allowed, to play their full part in the rebuilding of the ANC as a legal mass organisation, building the new South Africa.

This does not mean, as Comrade Deputy President Mandela has emphasised, that we will continue with this process no matter what is done to our people. Crimes are being committed against ordinary, innocent people. If this is not stopped, the government will be responsible for derailing a process that could transform this country into a place of peace and democracy.

We initiated this entire process because the ANC, since its inception, has worked for peace. Its members have hungered for peace, peace that can only be brought about with the end of apartheid and the creation of a democratic South Africa.

But we are not prepared to delude ourselves, if the government continues to meet this commitment with acts of war, or the toleration or connivance in such acts performed by others.

We are taking steps to defend our people. The scale of recent violence has, however, been so great that we cannot pretend to be able to provide a defence umbrella that can repel this. If we are forced to return to the armed struggle, the responsibility lies squarely on the government.

We are confronting a counter-revolutionary attack, an attempt to return us to the pre-February 2 situation, to renew all the obstacles in the way of negotiations. This should alert us to the need to deploy all our forces to defend our gains and ensure that our strength is felt.

We hope that we can bring the government to its senses. We will, as suggested, not only use the power of reasoning to achieve this. We will rely on our main strength, the power of the people, the power of mass action, which can often achieve more than countless debates and arguments.

LAND REFORM

RECONSTRUCTING RURAL SOUTH AFRICA

From the ANC Land Commission Secretariat

Two fundamental issues frame the problem of land reform in our country: our historical grievance resulting from the process of dispossession, and the problem of reconstructing our whole agricultural system — commercial and subsistence. Resolution of this crisis facing our agrarian sector requires an integrated approach which recognises how closely these two aspects of the problem are intertwined.



South Africa has been appropriated by the white minority. Politically this is maintained by a monopoly over political power. But socially, in the lived experience of our people, this appropriation is reflected in control of the land.

By law, whites, who own 87% of the surface area of South Africa, can expel black people from the land, demolish their homes, prevent black people from entering, crossing or remain-

ing on 'their' land. The result is that control over land is not only control over a productive resource, but is control over the lives of people. This means that only if we truly de-racialise the terms of ownership, occupation and use of the land, will the question of land focus on issues of land use and agricultural development, and no longer be a question of domination and subjugation.

Thus we argue that, if the issue of sovereign-

ty is to be addressed, and the question of how the land should be owned and workers reached, then what we need to do is to ensure that South Africa has one national body of law governing the question of land rights.

This requires that we abolish racist statutes, equalise state supports to agricultural producers, introduce principles of constitutional rights and apply the rule of law evenly to all those living in the countryside. This will de-racialise land law and open the way to a fair and acceptable method of tackling the difficult problem of competing claims to land.

Legally, this vision requires the introduction of constitutional, legislative and practical means of implementation which would:

- ★ protect the fundamental rights and liberties of all who live on the land;
- ★ extend the rule of law to prevent abuse of people's rights — with profound implications for local policing and judicial practices;
- ★ guarantee a minimum platform of social, economic and cultural rights;
- ★ provide guarantees of workers' rights, and
- ★ produce laws aimed at promoting gender rights and combating the oppression of women, as well as provisions designed to give support to the family.

Achievement of a commitment to extend these universal human rights to all of our people living in the countryside would serve as a basis for addressing the need for land redistribution. In applying these principles, we may identify three important aspects of a possible land reform programme:

- ★ First, there must be an immediate and publicised restitution or return of expropriated land to those communities who have suffered forced removals.

Facilitating the return of victims of forced removals to their land and creating conditions which will allow these communities to live and farm successfully, will both acknowledge past injustices and indicate a commitment to the adoption of just solutions.

- ★ Second, the adoption of legislation to protect occupants on the land from eviction, except on

very limited grounds. This measure would create conditions in which it would be possible to begin exercising freedom of speech and organisation in the countryside, to guarantee basic trade union rights for agricultural workers and to create conditions for eliminating existing patterns of physical abuse and the persistent violation of the basic human rights of those living on the land. ★ Finally, competing land claims may be tackled through the establishment of a process to evaluate competing claims, possibly through the establishment of a Land Court which would apply an agreed-upon list of factors in each case. Factors may include birthrights, the history of occupation, a history of productive use, inheritance and the question of title, both ancient and current. The Land Court would then be in a position to make determinations based on the evidence submitted by the parties, and, in case of irreconcilable claims to a particular area of land, it may be possible for the Court to apply standards of just compensation, involving a reallocation of land, compensation for capital improvements to the land, or other suitable basis of compensation.

The success of such a programme of land reform will however also be dependent upon the rapid allocation of large areas of land to alleviate the pressure of immediate land hunger, particularly in relation to the provision of urban land for housing, and land that can be used to alleviate the burden of overcrowding in the bantustans.

Although we may not ignore the centrality of our claim to the land, which springs from our claim of citizenship and forms the foundation of our national struggle, we must also recognise that land reform and redistribution cannot be achieved outside of a comprehensive reconstruction of South Africa's rural areas. This approach involves much more than the division and parceling out of land. Although our focus here is on rural land, we must not forget that any land reform programme must address the demands of our people for land and housing in urban areas.

Reconstruction requires the formulation of both a general goal, to create a system of sustainable agriculture and rural production, and a range of more specific aims. For us to create a

sustainable agricultural system, we need to address the failures of the present dualistic system of commercial and bantustan agriculture. Six specific aims may be identified as prerequisites for the achievement of our general goal. These are, in brief, the need to:

- ★ provide a place for rural people to live and produce their food and fuel;
- ★ provide employment for rural people;
- ★ provide food for the urban population;
- ★ provide industrial raw materials;
- ★ earn foreign exchange with the exports produced;
- ★ protect the environment in order to pass land on from generation to generation in a better condition than it was received.

The enormity of our task and the complexity of the issues we face is revealed when we juxtapose some of these aims with some existing realities. When we commit ourselves to a rural reconstruction strategy which aims to provide a place for rural people to live and produce their food and fuel, we must recognise that today:

- ★ over 15 million people, nearly one half of South Africa's population, live in the countryside;
- ★ South African agricultural production is dominated by some 60 000 white farmers with grossly disproportionate control over resources and political power. This domination is compounded by decades of heavy subsidies which did not necessarily support production;
- ★ and that this exists in a context in which the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts set aside a mere 13.6% of the total land area for black occupation and use, and gave white farm owners almost absolute control over the lives of the black people living in the remaining 86.4% of the South African countryside — whether as tenant farmers or labourers.

When we speak of reconstruction providing employment for rural people, we must also recognise that:

- ★ a total of some 5.5 million black people live in the so-called white rural areas, and of these 934 000 are farm employees;

★ and, furthermore, between 1960 and 1983, the impact of mechanisation, mono-crop production and a state policy of forced removals saw an estimated 1.1 million farm workers and their families removed from white farms.

When we speak of providing food for the urban population on the other hand, we are quickly warned that any attempt to redistribute the land or to restructure commercial agriculture will have a devastating impact on food security.

★ However, it should also be noted that by 1983 some 30% of white-owned farms supplied about 75% of South Africa's agricultural produce.

★ Conversely, the same group controlled 80% of South Africa's overall agricultural resources, an imbalance reinforced by a history of producer-controlled pricing policies and marketing and financial practices.

★ By contrast, bantustan inhabitants, who make up about one third of South Africa's population, supply less than 7% of the country's agricultural production. This portion of our population lives with severe land hunger on plots which fail to meet even the subsistence needs of their occupiers.

If we aim, in this context, to protect the environment and to make it possible to pass land on from generation to generation in a better condition than it was received, we must recognise that:

★ Present South African agricultural practice, including the commercial farmers' exploitative farming methods and the overcrowding in the bantustans, are rapidly and severely degrading our environment.

★ New forms of land abuse have emerged with the over-use of chemicals in insecticides, herbicides and chemical fertilisers.

★ Despite their banning in other countries, DDT, 24-D, 245-T and some banned organochlorides are freely available and widely used in South Africa.

In conclusion, it must be realised that to even begin to tackle these problems and to strive for these goals, we must all acknowledge that the major issue in any discussion of the land in South Africa remains the issue of sovereignty.

COMMUNICATIONS IN SOCIETIES UNDER STRESS

THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA IN SOUTH AFRICA

By Solomon Kotane



Pallo Jordan NEC member of the ANC talks on the future on the media

In this paper, presented at the International Media Conference in Dublin in September 1990, the writer explores the role of the media in South Africa. The conference was organised by the International Institute of Communications (IIC), and Solomon Kotane was representing the ANC.

The sordid history of the media in South Africa is well documented in many publications in the world, including several declarations through the United Nations system, especially UNESCO. Additionally, the Information and Publicity Department of the African National Congress has, over several decades, produced volumes of information about the repressive nature of the South African media. We believe, therefore, that no one will benefit much by listening to our continued accusations against the National Party-controlled media in our country. The sad story remains the same.

It would perhaps be interesting to note that, in spite of the much-publicised reforms in South Africa, the mainstream Press is still the monopoly of four major newspaper groups: the Argus Group and Times Media Ltd, which publish

mainly English-language newspapers, and Nasionale Pers and Perskor, publishers of mainly Afrikaans-language newspapers. These two newspaper groups account for almost 93% of all urban dailies and weeklies — that is, over ten million copies a week.

In an interview with a group of journalists in Johannesburg recently, Aziz Pahad, ANC National Executive Committee member, pointed out in broad terms that future historians, in a study of the development of the country's Press over more than a century, will detect a connivance between the state and Press owners to deliberately deny the black majority effective access to mass media.

Moegsien Willians, the editor of the South African newspaper, *South*, seems to take the argument a little further in his examination of the issues raised in the interview.



He notes that any future government in South Africa will make a serious mistake if the development of Press freedom is left in the hands of the present owners of the Press. He says the possibility exists that major newspaper corporations, in the face of majority rule, and, to them, an uncertain future, may "sell up and cut loose."

Williams correctly cites the recent Zimbabwean experience, where the Argus company sold lock, stock and printing processes when a majority government came to power in 1980. The same happened in 1964 — the year when the then Northern Rhodesia became the independent Republic of Zambia. The Argus group, together with its Southern Rhodesia-based subsidiary, the now-defunct Rhodesia Printing and Publishing Company, withdrew from the new nation-to-be as newspaper publishers. They feared that the pro-white record of their newspapers would have negative repercussions, and create an attitude in the new black government.

The withdrawal phenomenon appears to be repeating itself today in South Africa. The major money connections of the newspaper corporations are already setting up offshore companies, and divesting from South Africa.

The other key component in the South African media is the electronic landscape, led by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), which controls radio and television services. In formal legal terms, the SABC is said to be an independent state corporation, with its own statute, board of governors, and policies. Formed in the 1920s, throughout its first thirty years of existence, the SABC maintained a relative balance between the different capitalist factions and parties in its presentation of news, information and entertainment.

However, under successive National Party regimes since 1948, and in particular following the appointment of Broederbond Chairman Dr P J Meyer as Director-General in 1958, it became a highly partisan vehicle for the propagation of the apartheid line of the National Party. The basic services of the SABC today cover radio and television broadcasting. However, for many years the corporation firmly resisted the introduction of television — not because there were no financial resources to start the project,

but because the regime apparently feared the impact the electronic media would have had on the minds of the majority of the population. The late 1950s and early 1960s saw the establishment of radio broadcasts in various African languages under the so-called Radio Bantu outfit, consisting of bland musical programmes and pro-regime propaganda. The establishment of Radio Bantu coincided with the introduction of frequency modulation (FM) broadcasting in the early 1960s. This 'technical innovation' had a highly political purpose. In an era of intense anti-apartheid struggles and the independence of much of Africa from formal colonialism, the apartheid regime feared that South African blacks would be incited by foreign (and particularly African) news broadcasts.

The introduction of the aggressively publicised FM services went hand in hand with the promotion of relatively cheap, single-channelled FM receivers, incapable of receiving foreign short wave and medium wave broadcasts, thus barricading South Africa's oppressed population behind a wall of misinformation and propaganda about South Africa and the world.

The introduction of FM also saw the establishment of local musical commercial channels, aimed at white listeners, and likewise trivialising news and information.

In 1965, external broadcasting in several languages was introduced, through Radio South Africa. This Radio RSA was explicitly seen as the regime's external propaganda weapon. Directed mainly at Africa, it seeks to present an idyllic picture of life in the so-called stable South Africa. But the spiralling resistance against the regime clearly indicates that South African people have gradually come to grips with the intended propaganda effects of the electronic onslaught.

The regime's electronic onslaught does not end with its external broadcasts through Radio RSA and Radio Bantu units clustered throughout the country — it also invested millions of rands by taking the electronic war to the townships. There were times when, during upheavals in Soweto and other townships, the regime would resort to mobile radio-beaming cheap commercial music to demonstrations. It was not surprising, during those days, to see some isolated groups of peo-

ple either following the broadcast vans, or dancing to the music of their local artist being beamed from the radios. But, instead of being duped, South African people seem to have welcomed the electronic revolution by using it for their own revolutionary purposes. Accessibility to the electronic media by the masses of the people greatly improved communication, and general understanding of the issues at stake in the South African political arena.

Williams notes in this instance that, in a small and humble way, the media monopoly and sectarian interests of Afrikanerdom were first effectively challenged when a newspaper, namely *Grassroots*, and student publications such as *Work in Progress* were launched. *Grassroots* became the first regularly published newspaper rooted in the oppressed community in more than twenty years. It served as the forerunner of what has become known as the alternative Press, comprising a handful of weekly and monthly tabloids.

Williams further points out that, chronically under-resourced and formative in development, the alternative Press is outstripped in circulation four to one by the commercial newspapers. The significant common denominator among the mushrooming alternative Press copies appear to be their electronic-based production. Most of them are by-products of desk-top publishing — a component part of the electronic revolution, which to a large extent has immensely assisted South African revolutionaries to promote their cause to unprecedented levels. There has been easier mass politicisation and mobilisation through a variety of electronic gadgets, including radio cassettes, video tapes and so forth.

Although not to the same extent as in South Africa (because of varying historical reasons) the effect of the electronic media could be said to have been able to advance the struggle in almost all former Portuguese colonies.

Looked at through a continental perspective, the revolution in the electronic media has so far had a great impact. The establishment of the Pan African News Agency (PANA) on May 25 1983 was a bold attempt to restructure the African world by intervening radically in the flow and content of news and information in and about Africa.

The need for Africa to speak in its own voice and to the world at large is no longer a controversial idea. There are many who would be relieved to see this come to pass; for Africa has been the most misrepresented and misunderstood region of the world.

In the information vacuum which existed in the past (in the absence of the electronic media) many self-appointed spokespersons and false prophets rose to speak for Africa, often arrogating unto themselves responsibilities and attitudes to which they had no justifiable claim. In the process, they succeeded in enthroning new distortions, falsehoods and half-truths about the continent.

Naturally, there are plenty of problems. Until the projected Pan African Telecommunications Network (PANAFTEL) and the African Regional Satellite (AFRSAT) projects being undertaken by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and International Telecommunications Union (ITU) are completed, PANA's attempt continues to be a valuable first milestone in the process of decolonising communication and information in Africa.

The African National Congress has repeatedly called upon donor agencies to assist young South Africans in the acquisition of relevant technical know-how in various fields — including the electronic media.

I wish to seize this opportunity, provided by the IIC through this conference, once more to reiterate our call for added assistance to the people of South Africa, because we believe that the electronic media are another form of ensuring peace and freedom to the troubled Southern African states and the world in general.

Sources:

1. *South* newspaper, May 17-22 1990.
2. James Curran and Jean Seaton, *Power Without Responsibility: The Press and Broadcasting in Britain*, third edition.
3. Rob Davies et al, *The Struggle for South Africa*, Volume 2.
4. Francis P Kasoma, *The Press in Zambia*.
5. ANC Newsbriefing, Volume 14.
6. *New Nation* newspaper July 27—August 2 1990.

APARTHEID IN SPORT AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

By Eric Singh

The Fourth International Conference Against Apartheid in Sport met in Stockholm, Sweden, from September 4-6 1990. It was organised by the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid, the Swedish Sports Federation, the Swedish National Olympic Committee, the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) and the International Campaign Against Apartheid Sport (ICAAS).

The delegates were welcomed by Prince Bertil of Sweden. Keynote addresses were presented by Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, President of the UN General Assembly Major-General Joseph Garba, and the President of the International Olympic Committee, Juan Antonio Samaranch.

The main topics under discussion were the entry of South Africa into the international sport family and Olympic Movement; the formation of single governing bodies for each code of sport in South Africa, culminating in the formation of a single national sports federation and Olympic Committee; and the uplifting of, and international assistance to, sports suppressed by apartheid.

There was a strong belief that South Africa could re-enter international sports competitions if certain conditions could be met. The Association of National Olympic Committees of Africa (ANOCA) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) have committed themselves to assist South Africa in this venture, and Samba Ramsamy, Chairman of SANROC, was sent from exile to his homeland to communicate this to the various sporting codes. The result is a meeting to be hosted by ANOCA and attended by representatives of the various sports bodies of

South Africa and ANOCA, of the IOC and SANROC, together with ICAAS. It will take place in Harare, on November 3-4 1990.

Whilst all agree that South Africa must be readmitted to the international family, at the same time all are of the opinion that sanctions imposed against South Africa must continue until South Africans themselves are convinced that apartheid is a thing of the past, and inform the international community accordingly. One area in which all parties are agreed, is that urgent action must be taken to help uplift the standard of those who have suffered through apartheid — the black sportsmen and women.

Introducing this subject for discussion, Professor Bruce Kidd, from the School of Physical and Health Education of the University of Toronto, Canada, member of ICAAS, the Canadian Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Canadian Olympic Association, said:

"The inspiring breakthroughs of the last year have raised the worldwide expectation that apartheid's demise is near. While liberation leaders caution that 'grand apartheid' remains very much in place and that sanctions must continue, there is an undeniable spirit of optimism in the air. Speculation about the 'normalisation' of relations with South Africa has become commonplace. This is perhaps strongest among the sports com-

mumny, where the desire to make friends and 'build bridges' is strong, some movement is taking place towards unified, non-racial, sport, and there is enormous curiosity (as well as admiration and solidarity) about the non-racial bodies. But, as we toast the victories of the last few years and the heroic leaders of the struggle, we cannot afford to underestimate the difficulties of the tasks ahead."

He continued:

"If genuine, non-racial sport is really to be achieved in South Africa, it will not only be necessary to abolish all the hated apartheid laws and discriminatory practices and create new democratic, non-racial structures — essential as those steps may be — but there must be massive programmes of sport development undertaken in the black communities. The historic pattern of centuries of racism has left blacks terribly disadvantaged in sports. We should not forget that, because of similar circumstances, when Zimbabwe and Namibia won their independence, the white minorities still held a monopoly on the best opportunities. Strengthening the disadvantaged sector is not only a matter of equality and social fairness. Properly developed sports can play a valuable socialising role in the creation of a healthy, productive and human society..."

"The challenge of developing black sport within the broader development of a one-person-one-vote, non-racial, non-sexist society, therefore poses a number of difficult issues. For instance, how can sport development be effectively linked to the campaign for income redistribution, better housing, schooling and health care, and so on? How can we best assist the efforts of those on the ground in South Africa? What can be provided, and what is the best means? ... How can we be sure that our programmes really address local needs, and empower those most directly involved? We don't want to substitute neo-colonialism for racist paternalism. How can we ensure that new programmes of international assistance are presented so that they are not interpreted as a resumption of support for the apartheid regime? It is essential that nothing undermine the sanctions still very much in place..."

"I am struck by the democratic ambition of the African National Congress, Mass Democratic Movement and the National Olympic Sports Congress in the documents I have read about the tasks of non-racial sports — the emphasis on extending opportunities to girls and women, taking sport to the peoples of the deprived rural areas and bantustans, and bridging the gap between high performance sport and sport for all. Speaking from a Canadian perspective, I can say that, after a decade of public and private cutbacks in the name of neo-conservatism, we have virtually withdrawn the aspiration to equality from the public agenda. Those of us in the developed world have much to learn from a partnership with a movement which so courageously seeks non-racial, non-sexist democracy, with equal life chance for all."

In response to the general feeling in the meeting, and to Professor Kidd's statement, the Congress adopted the following declaration (Article 7):

"We recognise that there are special opportunities for governments and the international sporting community to assist the non-racial sports movement to redress the structural inequalities created and sustained by the apartheid state into and beyond the post-apartheid period. We appeal to all those of good will to consider ways in which assistance of appropriate kinds and at appropriate stages can be afforded to the sportsmen and women of South Africa in order to achieve the openness of competition and the equality of opportunity for which sport stands. We envisage assistance in such areas as training courses for coaches, the provision of equipment, help in developing physical sports facilities and financial assistance. Such programmes of assistance should be developed in collaboration with SANROC and ANOCA.

Pending the lifting of the boycott, there can be no question of individual or team sportspeople from South Africa participating in sport outside the country, or sportspeople from outside visiting South Africa to take part in sporting events.

We also urge the international community to assist Namibia in its efforts to overcome the legacy of apartheid in sport."

Our Letters Page has mainly had letters written by South African readers. Quite a few of these, lately, have addressed the role of the various black opposition groups in South Africa. In this issue, we publish a letter that appeared in the New York Times of September 21 1990, on this subject. We believe that it is important, also, to have a view expressed by a non-South African in this issue.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

To the Editor:

Thomas H Irwin (Op-Ed September 4) criticises the African National Congress in South Africa for its "identification of the struggle against Inkatha with the fight against apartheid."

According to Mr Irwin, Inkatha, a Zulu organisation led by Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, represents a "moderate third way" toward a democratic South Africa, while the ANC's assertion of its right to self-defence against Inkatha is a "hypocritical manipulation of the negotiation process." As someone who has just returned from a month-long visit to South Africa (involving extensive discussions with political activists) I wonder if Mr Irwin is talking about the same country and organisations I visited and encountered.

Inkatha represents little more than a vehicle for the political ambitions of Chief Buthelezi. Lacking any serious alternative to the ANC's political programme, Chief Buthelezi has never posed a real threat to Pretoria. Instead, he has built up Inkatha in the manner of a party machine boss. With his control over the KwaZulu 'homeland' government and its notoriously brutal police force, Chief Buthelezi has for years served as a conduit for hundreds of millions of dollars in patronage funds from the South African Government, and the enforcer of South Africa's brand of 'law and order' in black areas of Natal Province.

Chief Buthelezi's KwaZulu is a one-party mini-state in which opposition to Inkatha often results in death for political opponents. Independent monitoring groups, such as the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa, headed by Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, former leader of the official opposition, have documented hundreds of outright murders by Chief Buthelezi's political henchmen.

Mr Irwin's argument assumes that all blacks in South Africa must be principled opponents of apartheid. Thus he criticises the ANC's anti-Inkatha posi-

tion for blocking the chances of "agreement between the two groups." But not all blacks oppose apartheid (some, such as Chief Buthelezi, have profited well from the homeland system), and those who oppose apartheid have fundamental political differences. Chief Buthelezi, by promoting Zulu nationalism, and his attempts to portray the ANC as a "Xhosa" organisation, perpetuates the ethnic hatred on which apartheid has always thrived.

The ANC remains by far the most popular and respected mass political organisation in South Africa. It was the first South African party to admit both blacks and whites (in 1967) and has never, in actions or rhetoric, attempted to pit one ethnic group against another. This egalitarian pragmatism differentiates it from both unyielding black nationalism and the reactionary Zulu-first attitudes fostered by Inkatha.

A survey conducted by the respected Market Research Africa in July showed that 84% of blacks supported the ANC, while only 2% supported Inkatha. A more recent survey conducted by the McCann Advertising Agency found that "blacks outside of Natal, including many Zulus, seemed almost to consider Inkatha a greater danger than many radical white right-wing movements." (This comes from an August 22 Allister Sparks column in the *Daily Mail* of Johannesburg.)

It is clear who stands to gain from the horrific bloodshed gripping the Johannesburg townships. The Government gains, as it always does, when there is chaos in the black community. Inkatha gains when Chief Buthelezi can demand an image-boosting meeting with Nelson Mandela as the price for calling off his warriors. Only the ANC loses when the heartland of its support is racked by a terror that outdoes the worst of the Lebanese civil war. The ANC's call for self-defence is all that it can do in the face of violent attacks by Inkatha supporters, and a police force and army still highly hostile to its membership and the black community at large.

Larry Kolodney

Cambridge, Mass.

September 9 1990

(The writer, just back from a research trip to South Africa, was a Harvard Law School human rights fellow in Johannesburg in 1988.)

BOOK REVIEW

Education and Employment in Southern Africa: Defusing the Time Bomb? Report on a seminar on education and training for employment creation in SADCC countries, held in Zimbabwe between April 20 and 28, 1989, published by the International Foundation for Education with Production, Gaborone, 1990.



As a teacher, an educationist, I jumped at the opportunity of reviewing a book on education. Little did I realise what a mammoth task it would turn out to be. Mammoth, because I had not been aware that there was so much going on in Southern Africa on education planning, curriculum and policy-making.

In Part One, the introduction to the book, the seminar is officially opened by President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. In his address, he touches on the developments and problems of education facing SADCC countries, namely the unemployment of people whose education had little or no relevance to their countries' needs and development plans. He talks of the shortages of skilled people to do certain jobs which are crucial in the running of the country. He also poses an important question, on how much longer the SADCC countries will continue blaming colonisation for these problems.

In Section Two of Part One, the various countries — Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Tanzania — set out to outline their countries' policy on education and unemployment. Their programmes, despite the massive steps and improvement since their respective attainment of independence, show that they have not really gone far enough towards solving the unemployment and skills shortage problem. Interestingly enough, what comes up in these papers, without being expressly stressed, is that, since learners are given the option of following the education path of their choice, most of them prefer careers that will lead them away from the rural areas, which are really the main economic bases of these countries. On the other hand, forcing choices on learners would also have a detrimental effect on learner enthusiasm and moral for learning.

The very important aspect of finance, or rather

the lack of it, is implied or stated throughout the book as being one of the major drawbacks to implementation of educational programmes.

The successful experiences of Cuba and China are cited as exemplary in the way they have handled this problem of employment creation and assimilation of graduates into work places. Successful though these may be, it would be difficult, if not near-impossible, to transfer them or adapt them for the SADCC countries. Economic systems of different countries determine the types of education programmes and policies they can have. The notion of competitive industry automatically builds a ladder in the education system, and, depending on the sizes of industries, the numbers of the learners, and the strength of the currency in a country, not everybody will be catered for.

Part Two of the book looks at curriculum development in SADCC countries. There is development towards self-reliance: for example, the Botswana brigades, whose education is actually on-the-job training, so that their academic work goes hand in hand with skill acquisition. There is also the education scheme in Tanzania and some of the other countries, where subjects like Agriculture are compulsory, at least in primary education. These programmes, needless to say, play a great role in the countries' education systems, towards solving the unemployment and skills shortage problem. But in the end, are the people who have undergone them given the same status in their societies as college or university graduates will probably get? These schemes, though useful, will possibly never have a great effect, especially since the rural-urban divide is still a problem. People will still be drawn by money and prestige to be nearer the towns, as

the word 'rural' is still equated with backwardness and ignorance.

There is also mention, in one or two papers, of going back and looking into ways of copying, or taking examples from, traditional African education, where everything was more practical than theoretical, and was centred around the needs and wants of the society. Attractive though this idea may be, it would take too long and cost a lot of money to change the existing education systems, plan and implement new ones. Besides, would it be acceptable to people who have learned to compete with others, or are continuing their studies in other countries? Will the countries that have been education partners or helpers before and after the independence of SADCC countries recognise this new education system? Won't the people it is meant to protect feel trapped inside their countries because of it? This would also mean changing people's attitudes and long-standing values, expectations and ideas on education.

Finally, the book makes the point that education on its own does not hold the key to solving the problem of unemployment and lack of skilled human resources. The economy, amongst other things, plays a vital role in this. Enough incentive should be given to people to enter other fields that are traditionally ignored by learners. I noted with great satisfaction that the SADCC countries hoped that this seminar would be the first of many. Hopefully, in the next one, the ANC will not be there as a liberation movement but as a representative of the millions of people who would be grappling with the problems of readjusting the South African education system from its distortion by apartheid rule.

Monica Nhlapo

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
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Lusaka

TOWARDS A NEW

PROFILE: Ciskei's controversial strongman
It's five years in the cells for being rude about but let

He is, in his own military ruler of five-year sent VUYELWA QING in a rare int

Real Gross Domestic Product at 1985 prices
 Percentage change



go
 He is the mandatory me. their chances gozo



Brigadier Oupa Gqozo ... in all coups the police always feel left out

days. He said he used to e his own car, but now he's everywhere. The hours are "While you make peop freer and happier and ha unhappier and unhapp you've got more probl "You don't sleep at hon left here at half past tw another meeting, a very meeting at home at abou Today I was really fee thing the cat had just o you run a lot of risks miserable the may normally urban and rura stans and else entertainment and co and his salary is h although not as high "I was a brigadier I'm chairman of the President Reagan." And for the future with rhetoric about South Africa, he's definite: "One sh about it," he said. part of negotiatio Ciskei's behalf. "My country w body what to do. be there to say w There are still with and Gqozo ing up. He's ba over the issue Thomhill peop you negotiate v draw a blank "He is also w traditional ch "like you mak deposed Lem as I've taken chiefs I'll be and I'm sus package." While he the future

BUSINESS

New Post Office 'palace' rises near Joubert Park

By REG RUMNEY
 The soon-to-be completed Post Office telecommunications building near Joubert Park has raised eyebrows in the architectural community because of the ex-

restricted to the use of brick in its construction. The Post Office estimates the 13-storey building is complete.

etc, who designed the building, says it is a hi-tech building. As the nerve centre of the PC's telecommunications, it houses houses the 1-2-1-1 fittings such as and access control around the building.



ern Cape is about to start. Since their appointment the 10 members of the faced with the exhausting establishing branches in the largest ANC region in the c

Their task of recruitment and establishing branches began a months ago.

undertake - are associated with the repression of criticism and with an indifference towards the empowerment of ordinary citizens. Added to this, an extension of an already enormous state sector

heid will cost more money in the early years than it yields. The document also harks after economic self-sufficiency in a manner reminiscent of schemes for "socialism in one country", de-

of levels of d the black pop. The organiz class are not sessed. For th jobs or prop

The start was ra — which was app — invited 500 ac Peninsula Techn the process of bu way.

Although some fied with the mar tivities were start into action to beg 100 members in process of launchi

For many memb at least two ANC hours of door-to-d members.