ANATOMY

OF

APARTHEID

General Editor:

Peter Randall

THE STUDY PROJECT ON CHRISTIANITY
IN APARTHEID SOCIETY

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WHAT IS SPRO-CAS?

THE STUDY PROJECT on Christianity in Apartheid Society was established in the middle of 1969 and its work will be completed during 1971.

The aim of the project's sponsors, the South African Council of Churches and the Christian Institute of Southern Africa, was to call together a body of experts to examine the implications of applying Christian principles to the major areas of our national life and to make recommendations for a juster social order.

The original stimulus for Spro-cas was provided by the Message to the People of South Africa, which was issued by the South African Council of Churches in September 1968. The Message provided the basic theological foundation for the project, i.e. the Gospel as reconciliation.

Six commissions were established to study the following aspects in South African life, the 'apartheid society': economics, education, law, politics, sociology and the Church. The members of the Commissions were chosen on the basis of their intellectual and practical ability and their acceptance of the need for change in South Africa in the direction of reconciliation and love. Nearly 150 South Africans, who probably constitute the most broadly representative group ever assembled in this country to examine its national life, agreed to serve on the six commissions,

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either as members of consultants. In addition, a large number of people outside the immediate membership of the commissions have been consulted and their contributions have significantly added to the depth of the work being done by the commissions.

Spro-cas is now approaching a position where it is possible to anticipate the publication of the final reports of the six commissions. These will be published independently of each other, in English and Afrikaans, during the first half of 1971, and will be followed by a co-ordinated report drawing on the findings of all the commissions.

As a preliminary to these reports, it has been decided to issue a series of Spro-cas Occasional Publications containing some of the working documents prepared for the commissions.

Other titles which are proposed in this series are *South Africa's Minorities* (with contributions by Dr. M.G. Whisson, Mrs. Fatima Meer, Mr. C.O. Gardner and Mr. W.A. de Klerk), *Directions of Change in South African Politics*. (Mr. L. Schlemmer, Mr. Alan Paton, Dr. Denis Worrall and Dr. Rick Turner), and *Some Implications of Inequality*.

Advance orders for Spro-cas publications should be addressed to:

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Further information will be gladly given on request.

INTRODUCTION

peter randall

The papers in this publication were written as working documents for the commissions of the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society. Together with many other documents prepared for Spro-cas, they warrant wider publication in view of the valuable insights and information they contain.

The selection presented here can be roughly grouped under the title Anatomy of Apartheid, since they are essentially analytical of the present situation in South Africa, although most of the writers do go beyond mere analysis and make a number of recommendations for change in the direction of a juster society.

The papers are reprinted virtually as they originally appeared, although there has been some updating where necessary. No attempt has been made to edit them into a coherent whole, since this would be contrary to their nature as working documents for the consideration of the various commissions. It is thus apparent that the views of the writers do not necessarily reflect the findings of the commissions themselves which will appear in report form in due course.

I hope that this publication will add to the quality of public debate in our country. This is one of the prime aims of the whole Spro-cas undertaking.

NOTES ON THE PAPERS

THE PRESENT POLITICAL POSITION: this report of a sub-committee of the Political Commission was written by Mr Peter Randall, the director of Spro-cas, based on the discussions of a sub-committee and a paper on The Future of Southern Africa by Dr David Welsh. The sub-committee's report was subsequently approved by the Political Commission.

THE FACTORS UNDERLYING APARTHEID: a working paper for the Social Commission. Mr Lawrie Schlemmer is Senior Research Fellow of the Institute for Social Research, University of Natal.

SOME ASPECTS OF CULTURE AND APARTHEID: a working paper for the Social Commission. Mr Andre Brink is particularly known for his novels, poetry and plays in Afrikaans. He lectures in the Department of Afrikaans-Nederlands at Rhodes University.

ECONOMICS OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT: a background paper for the Economics Commission. Mr Robin Siedle is an economist attached to a large South African bank. The paper was written in his private capacity.

MODERNIZATION AND APARTHEID: a working paper for the Social Commission. Dr van Zyl Slabbert lectures in the Department of Sociology at the University of Stellenbosch.

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THE PRESENT POLITICAL POSITION

SOUTH AFRICA is a plural society. Its diversity is expressed in terms of race, nationalism, culture and tribalism. Group identity and legally enforced discriminatory norms determine the patterns of social and personal relationships. There is an economic cleavage on racial lines, with the White group representing the 'haves' and the other racial groups, particularly the African group, representing the 'have nots'.

For the White group, the South African political system contains the fundamentals of democracy in that free elections are held on adult suffrage with a variety of competing parties. In terms of the country's population as a whole, however, the South African policy is not a democracy but may rather be described as an oligarchic institutional structure based on race, with the White group exercising virtually complete political control and the other groups virtually non-participants in government.

The White oligarchy not only possesses exclusive political power, but has also devised a system of education which reinforces racial and linguistic divisions and perpetuates the social hierarchy. The oligarchy furthermore possesses the lion's share of economic power, which it seeks to retain by means of statutory and customary economic colour bars. In the final analysis, the White oligarchy maintains itself by control of the armed forces and the police, the security branch of which has in the last decade played an important part in destroying radical opposition.

In practical political terms, the Nationalist Party's political supremacy is a major factor in maintaining the status quo. The Nationalist Party's support is buttressed by Afrikaner sentiment, by effective control of the armed forces and the police, by the degree to which its government is accepted as legitimate by people of all groups, by the imbalance in the electoral system which favours the rural vote, and by the lack of alternative policies which are regarded as workable, and therefore acceptable, by the White electorate.

Despite the concentration of political and economic power within the oligarchy, the Whites do not form a closely-knit group, being divided on linguistic, cultural, religious and, to a lesser extent, on political grounds.

In the past, the main issue in South African politics has been the relationship between the Afrikaners and the English-speaking. Since 1950 there has been a growing tendency towards White solidarity, as both Afrikaners and English-speaking have felt themselves threatened by decolonisation in Africa, by the upsurge of non-white political militancy during the 1950's and early 1960's in South Africa, by fears of guerilla incursions, and by the pressure of international opinion, which castigates South Africa for policies based on racial discrimination.

There is now probably a high degree of consensus among the Whites of both language groups on the main political issues.

The rise of a militant African nationalism in South Africa during the 1950's, and the pressure of events elsewhere in Africa, as well as the moral indignation of much of the rest of the world, brought about a significant modification of South Africa's policies in that the right of peoples to self-determination has theoretically been conceded. In an attempt to accommodate the historical pressures already mentioned while retaining power, the Nationalist Party adopted a policy of devolving power into embryonic political institutions in the African 'homelands'. In theory, these homelands or Bantustans will at some future unspecified time become independent, sovereign states.

The South African political situation is apparently rigid, but inherently volatile. The prospect of revolution can, however, be ruled out for the foreseeable future. The White oligarchy's determination to maintain its position, the formidably efficient police and military machine, the destruction of organised non-white resistance, and the apparent submission of the Black masses render it virtually impossible for a revolutionary group to make even the slightest dent in the power structure.

There is a dearth of accurate information about the attitudes of the African masses, but it is probable that some form of 'Black

Power' movement will emerge, the implications of which can only be guessed at now. The early signs of such a movement can be seen in such things as Matanzima-ism, the steady withdrawal of Africans from multi-racial bodies, and the increasing use of apartheid forums such as Urban Bantu Councils to advance Black interests.

A Black anti-White nationalist response has probably been built into the South African situation by policies of discrimination and oppression.

ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL FORCES OF CHANGE

If the assumption is correct that internal revolution is impossible in the foreseeable future, and given the further assumption that foreign intervention will be limited to sporadic guerilla incursions, violent methods of change can be discounted as a possibility in the near future.

(a) White attitudes

A case can then be made out for believing that significant change in the near future can only come from within the White group, and more particularly from within the ruling political party.

The 'verligte' movement in the Nationalist Party and the continuing urbanization and economic prosperity of the Afrikaners particularly may result in growing dissatisfaction with the tardy implementation of 'separate development' and with 'petty apartheid' generally, leading to more vigorous attempts to develop the homelands both economically and socially as well as politically, and a movement away from racial discrimination *per se,* which is at least theoretically condemned by leading government spokesmen. Should these processes continue and receive greater momentum then significant changes will occur, but not, however, in the direction of a shared or common society.

It has been pointed out that the concept of multi-nationalism, as opposed to multi-racialism, is given increasing expression by leading Afrikaner intellectuals and political figures and it has been suggested that if this concept becomes generally accepted it will lead to the establishment of new norms in inter-personal relations in that, again in theoretical terms, discrimination will not be practised against members of other 'nations'. At the same time, of course, labelling one's fellow country-men as nationals of another country removes the embarrasing need to give them political rights within the system.

Related to the above is the desire of a considerable number

of pro-apartheid Whites for a morally justifiable policy. There is some unease in Afrikaner intellectual and religious circles about the present situation. This too, is a potential force for change, either in the direction of a shared society or, more likely, of a more radical implementation of separate development. It has been suggested that such people would be responsive to alternative policies which appear both practicable and just.

The emergence of the Herstigte Nasionale Party, with its frankly reactionary policies, has to some extent liberated the more enlightened and progressive elements within the Nationalist Party and allowed them to pursue a more determined and unequivocal course towards 'separate freedoms'.

It is possible that the Coloured people may play a catalytic role in modifying White attitudes. They do not fit neatly into the apartheid scheme, and having no potential homeland they would seem to make any thorough-going partition or federal plan impossible. Added to this is their cultural and ethnic affinity to the Afrikaners. It is possible that increasing support will come for the call that the Coloureds should be allowed to integrate politically with the Whites. Should this occur it would have a modifying effect on White attitudes and may lead to a re-thinking of the position of the other non-white groups. This is, however, unlikely to occur in the near future, since the recent trend has been in the opposite direction.

In summary, it would seem that there are three possible ways of persuading the Whites that change is necessary:- the arguments of morality; the promise of greater future rewards as a result of change; and fear of the serious consequences that will follow if significant change does not occur.

(b) Economic Factors

The possibilities of change appear to be closely bound up with the economic situation.

The economic boom of recent years has improved the standard of living of all groups, and this may have partially ameliorated Black frustration and resentment. At the same time it has made the Whites more than ever anxious to maintain the status quo. So economic prosperity may be regarded as one of the conserving factors in the political situation.

Paradoxically, however, continued economic development will further strengthen the already indissoluble economic links between White and Black in South Africa. The race groups are and will probably forever remain economically inter-dependent. The implications of this for change are considerable.

But it is necessary to guard against a too-facile optimism that continued industrialisation and economic maturity, with its concommitant increase in Black employment in skilled and responsible jobs, and with a further strengthening of racial interdependence, must necessarily propel South Africa towards a non-racial democracy.

There is a strong case for the primacy of politics, with the consequent view that economic forces tend to defer to and accommodate themselves to the racial ordering of society. This is underlined by the inability of the English-speaking Whites to affect significant political change although they are dominant in the industrial and commercial life of the country.

While it is improbable that apartheid will succumb before 'irresistable economic forces', the implications of continuing economic growth for indirect change are significant.

On the one hand, serious contradictions arise from the need for more skilled labour, and the official colour bar which limits the capacity of non-whites, especially Africans, to rise to more skilled occupations. The skilled manpower shortage appears to be reaching crisis proportions and South Africa suffers from both an over-supply of unskilled labour and a shortage of skilled labour.

The official view is that economic needs must be subordinated to political imperatives, even if this means a declining growth rate. At the same time, however, it is unlikely that the government can ignore indefinitely the serious consequences of its policies for the South African economy, since much of its support derives indirectly from the economy's strength.

The likely result is that the level of the industrial colour bar will gradually rise, allowing Africans to perform more skilled occupations in a variety of fields. This is already occurring in the 'Border areas', and as it spreads to the major urban areas it may mean in time the *de facto* recognition of a permanently urbanised African population in the white areas, enjoying an improving standard of living. If this is not accompanied by adequate political expression, a potentially revolutionary situation may develop.

The second major way in which continued economic development may indirectly help to bring about change lies in its effects on the Afrikaans-speaking Whites. The growth of a class of Afrikaner industrialists, financiers and businessmen has been an important element in promoting a rapprochment between the two White sections. It has also been one cause of the tensions within the Nationalist Party. Prosperity has not reached all Afrikaners

equally, and conflict between the 'have nots' and the 'haves' played a significant role in the verkrampte revolt.

Those Afrikaners who are participating fully in the economy are unlikely to be satisfied with politically motivated efforts to slow down economic growth.

The manpower shortage is one of the factors which may lead to economic recession. A temporary economic setback seems a possible development in the near future and one can only guess at the political consequences if this should occur.

Once again one must guard against a too-facile expectation of far-reaching political change. It is most unlikely that the country will undergo an economic slump such as occurred in the 1920's. The government will undoubtedly take effective steps to prevent a catastrophic depression, and modern governments are equipped with machinery to do this.

If a relative recession were to occur, resulting in considerable numbers of Black workers being out of work, then it is likely that sporadic violent outbreaks would take place. These would undoubtedly be easily repressed, and the disabilities of African workers, such as the restrictions on the right to strike, would hinder the development of any organised Black labour movement. Should sporadic violent outbursts occur, they may well have the effect of hardening White attitudes and hastening a movement towards a full fascist system, based on further consolidation of government power. An economic recession may have the effect thus of strengthening support for the viewpoints expressed by the Herstigte Nasionale Party, thus forcing the Nationalist Party further to the right.

If an economic recession in South Africa were to be of a local character, and if it were to be accompanied by labour unrest, then a likely consequence would be an outflow of capital. This would inhibit speedy economic recovery and further counteract the forces of radical change.

It is, of course, possible to argue that the cycle of recession - unemployment - riots - loss of confidence will have profound psychological effects on the government, causing it to realise that change is necessary.

If, however, there should be a world-wide economic depression there would probably be no marked outflow of capital from South Africa, which might in fact be regarded as one of the few countries worth investing in.

If economic depression occurs in other African states, leading to revolutionary situations developing there, the likely outcome will be a further hardening of White attitudes in South Africa.

The economic situation offers no grounds for facile optimism for early change. It might, however, be profitable to use the fear of economic recession, caused at least partly by inadequate use of non-white labour and thus indirectly non-white educational provision, as a means of persuading White people of the need for change.

An economic recession is an early possibility; its consequences will be serious, and much of the seeming security of the Whites may disintegrate.

(c) *International Action*

A possible source of change flows from South Africa's international relations - with Africa and with the rest of the world. The major consideration here is the likelihood of more concerted international action being taken against South Africa. At present action such as economic sanctions, backed up possibly by an embargo on South African ports and subsequent military invasion, seems remote. To the states whose decision to participate in such action would be crucial, Britain, the United States, and France, South Africa is a stable, anti-communist country, a profitable trading partner and a lucrative field for investment. As the major Western power the United State's role would be decisive. It is likely that the unfortunate involvement in Vietnam will have important effects on American foreign policy in the future. A retreat back to the traditional isolationism is unlikely in view of her widespread commitments, but the Vietnam experience will make any future President highly reluctant to commit America's forces to involvement in further unstable and fluid situations.

Some observers have advocated the imposition of economic sanctions on South Africa to forestall the inevitable outbreak of large-scale racial violence. A moral crusade of this kind seems inherently improbable. As a study made by the British Council of Churches argued:

> 'governments are not structured so as to be able to deal with such problems. Distracted by crisis all over the world - Cyprus, Laos, the Yemen, Borneo, Cuba, Israel - they are able only to deal with an immediate problem. Prophylactic action is foreign to their nature; allied to the intrinsic difficulty of the problem, it follows they are likely to deal with it only when obliged to by external events.'
> *(The Future of Southern Africa: A study by British Christians,* pp 77-8)

It is worth underlining the point that South Africa is not on the brink of revolution; nor does a 'revolutionary situation' look like developing in the foreseeable future. In other words the situation most likely to cause foreign intervention seems unlikely to arise. Elsewhere in the sub-continent, however, things are different. The Portuguese are in serious difficulties with guerilla movements and while they appear to be containing them at present, one doubts whether Portugal will have the resources or the will to carry on the war for more than five or so more years. Likewise, the illegal Rhodesian regime is probably experiencing more difficulties with guerilla activity than it cares to admit.

These remarks raise the question of South Africa's role in the sub-continent. At present her foreign policy encompasses two contradictory aims: on the one hand attempting to foster friendly relationships with black states, and on the other acting as the ultimate custodian of repressive regimes in Rhodesia and in the Portuguese territories. Denis Austin has explored some of the possible implications for the South African Government of this holding battle over a vastly extended area of conflict. He sketches three scenarios of the future and then asks which is the most probable.

> 'For the immediate future, the first is certainly likely: very little change at all, the existing guerilla movements being penned back in northern Angola and Mozambique, and African unrest in Rhodesia being limited to occasional incursions from across the Zambezi. But at some future date (in the **1970's?**) it is likely that events, unforeseen, unpalatable, uncontrollable, will compel Mr Vorster and his colleagues to move further than they now wish to go - towards becoming either the skilful defenders of a white managed enclave in a continent of independent African states (second scenario) or the arsenal and garrison of the white-dominated southern Africa (third scenario). My guess is that the latter is more likely than the former if only because of the common assumption in Pretoria that time is on the side now of the white south against the black north, an assumption which may tempt the Nationalist Government to underpin both white Rhodesian and Portuguese rule'. (Austin: *White Power?* pp 102-5).

Austin does not attempt to spell out the consequences of his third scenario, but he implies that the damaging consequences to White rule might be considerable.

The South African Government, however, is astute to the risks it is running and to the dangers of over-confidence. Almost certainly it is realised in Pretoria that it is to the South African

Government's longer-term advantage to come to terms with more friendly disposed African-led states than to get bogged down in a protracted war whose possibilities of escalation are considerable.

Some of the consequences of South Africa's 'outward looking' foreign policy have been key issues in the *verkrampte* revolt. The *Verkramptes* attempted to exploit the alleged danger to White South Africa of having African diplomats living in White suburbs or of admitting Sir Seretse Khama to a White hospital in Johannesburg. The decisive defeat of the *Verkramptes* should mean the elimination of a significant obstacle to the policy.

The South African government regards developments in Mocambique and Angola as crucial. There have been suggestions that South African troops are operating in the latter territory. But even if the Portuguese should be defeated and hostile Black governments emerge in Angola and Mocambique, South Africa can probably maintain her position in relation to them indefinitely because of her overwhelming economic strength. They might in fact become 'neo-colonial appendages', exporting labour to their powerful neighbour.

Militarily, hostile regimes in Angloa and Mocambique would pose little threat to the Republic, whose frontiers can be easily defended against invading guerilla bands. The Kruger National Park would also act partially as an effective 'cordon sanitaire'.

The 'moral revolution' against South Africa's racial policies may have a number of effects: it may persuade some Whites that they must modify those policies, or it may harden them in their resistance to change. It may also act as an encouragement to radical Blacks, or it may lead them to believe that outside pressure is sufficient to cause apartheid to crumble.

The moral pressure is intensifying, with, for example, disruptive action being taken against South African sports teams, walkouts at the U.N.O., refusals of technical assistance, and the exclusion of South African delegations from international agencies like the Universal Postal Union. The effects of this on South Africa's international position must be worrying to the country's rulers, whose propaganda counter-offensive has become more subtle, and effective. The suggestion by Ghana's new Prime Minister that communication be established with Pretoria is evidence that in some parts of Africa at least the methods of protest and recrimination are being rethought.

It is impossible at this stage to assess the effect of international hostility on South Africa's policies, but the fact that the Republic's government is at least sensitive to the position

indicates that it takes the matter seriously. It is possible that further minor modifications of, for example, the 'sports policy', will take place, but it is improbable that deep-rooted change will occur in the foreseeable future in the basic structure of apartheid because of propaganda and other attempts at moral suasion.

FACTORS UNDERLYING APARTHEID

l. schlemmer

ANY COMPLETE discussion of the factors which have given rise to the policy of Apartheid in South Africa would fill a substantial volume. What has been attempted falls far short of an exhaustive analysis; it is simply an attempt to isolate the salient factors and to examine how they might be interrelated. The aim has been to provide an outline as a possible guide for a more detailed consideration of separate aspects of the problem, and as such a great deal of oversimplification has been unavoidable.

It is necessary at the outset to distinguish very carefully between the term Apartheid, as used in this paper, and the concept of Separate Development. By Apartheid is meant simply the current reality of the South African political system: the policies and practices, both formal and informal, which affect the circumstances of Blacks. Separate Development, (or more latterly, 'Multi-National Development') on the other hand, is a party-political slogan of the present government which is reflected in some, but not all, aspects of policy regarding Blacks, and which has become widely accepted as a conceptual framework within which current policies can be rationalised and defended. This is not to suggest that the concept of Separate Development has not influenced the government's policies in certain important ways; the creation of separate political institutions with limited auto-

nomy for Blacks in residual areas of the country or residual
spheres of activity being the outstanding example. The concept
has also influenced the political attitudes of certain Whites,
particularly Afrikaans intellectuals, in ways which will be dis-
cussed towards the end of this paper. Nevertheless, the two con-
cepts are easily distinguishable.

   The overt theme and rationale of Separate Development draws
on one aspect of the basic structure of South African society,
this being the cultural and ethnic pluralism. Apartheid, on the
other hand, can be seen to reflect the total system, including
not only the element of cultural pluralism but also the system of
legalised material, social and political privilege enjoyed by
Whites. Apartheid is defined broadly, so as to include not only
the policies of the present government, but the system of inequal-
ity maintained by previous governments as well, which the pre-
sent government has simply made more rigid and pervasive.

   Separate Development currently relates to present policies
mainly in the sense that it is a (partly successful) means of
legitimising continued White domination, and in that it provides
what is today an innocuous avenue of political expression for
some Black leaders. It is completely utopian in that it can never
be implemented in the form of an equitable geographic, political
and economic partition of the country, the only form of implemen-
tation which would preserve the moral justification which its
adherents claim for it. Signs of the inevitable failure of Separate
Development cannot be automatically translated into predictions
of the failure of Apartheid (as is sometimes done). Other justifi-
cations and euphemistic slogans for Apartheid can be devised, as
has been done by previous governments (trusteeship, guardian-
ship, etc.).

   Apartheid, with or without the advertisement of Separate
Development, represents a policy which, for the present, is
completely successful in achieving its major aims. This dis-
tinction between the two concepts will emerge more clearly in the
ensuing examination of some of the major roots of inequality and
discrimination in South Africa.

   Historical events laid a very firm basis for racial inequality
in the society. Master-slave relations in the old Cape Colony
established colour as a badge of status-inferiority. Border wars
and the clashes between tribesmen and trekkers spawned hostil-
ity and mistrust between Black and White. The conquest of the
Blacks by the Whites is obviously crucial to any understanding
of the position today. The earlier establishment of dominance
over land and natural resources has not only given Whites the
material advantage of the spoils of conquest, but the 'ethos' of

conquest has tended to persist as well. On going through a large number of interview schedules on the topic of job reservation recently, I was struck by the occasional use by Whites wishing to justify this discrimination of phrases like: 'Well, we won the wars, didn't we?'

At the time of the political unification of South Africa, the various ethnic groups were very tenuously integrated (although relations between Whites and Coloureds in the Cape and to a certain extent in Natal as well represented somewhat of an exception). The society was rigidly stratified in terms of political power and social prestige, and the majority of Blacks were unenfranchised. Except for the fact that the majority of Whites saw South Africa as their only home, the situation was typically 'colonial' in its structure. This was the basis for future developments. The theme of cultural and ethnic pluralism has remained powerful right up to the present.

Subsequent economic development has increasingly drawn members of all groups into a single urban labour force. Partly because of initial differences in culture and technological experience, and partly because of political and social influences, the various groups have come to occupy different positions in the occupational structure. Hence an extremely important additional divisive factor has emerged to strengthen the formerly 'colonialist' pattern of power, that of typically self-reinforcing industrial class. These lines of class coincide roughly with ethnic and cultural differences, and therefore also with political rights. The term class is used here to denote distinctions in privilege, power, and authority; it is not meant to refer primarily to differences in prestige, as it is often used, although obviously power and prestige are almost always correlated.

This is not to suggest that wherever occupational roles are differentiated in terms of complexity or the level of training required, or where the necessity for task supervision exists, there must inevitably be political or social or economic inequality. South African society has become characterised by precisely the same broad type of class system as has existed in Western post-feudal society, a system which is not necessarily universal nor inevitable. Race attitudes in South Africa are in many ways strikingly similar to class attitudes in Britain in the 18th Century, as Tunmer has shown. [1] Apartheid has been powerfully influenced by the Western capitalist and pre-capitalist class tradition, to which all South African Whites are heirs.

1. Raymond Tunmer, *Race and Education*, Institute for the Study of Man in Africa, Johannesburg, (undated).

The South African political and social system is often seen
purely in terms of race, race prejudice, or a combination of race
and concomitant cultural differences, understandably enough in
view of the fact that White South Africans appear to be obsessed
with race. This view is inevitably one-sided. The system of
Apartheid, as it has been defined, is essentially the result of
the interrelationship of class and race, and a major purpose of
this paper is to attempt to dissect this complex interrelationship.

The element of class is to be seen in the fact that basically
we have to deal with a system of material and social privilege
and the monopolisation of political power which perpetuates this
privilege. Bearing in mind the historical facts already referred
to as well as the nature of our industrial system, it is more than
likely that this type of inequality would have existed *to some
degree,* even if the conquered peoples and more latterly the
industrial proletariat had been ethnically similar to our Whites
(unless, of course they had by now, like the Afrikaners, done
something about it). The different major policies of all the White
political parties are without exception aimed at maintaining this
privilege; they might differ in regard to the question of how pre-
cisely the question of race should be dealt with, but this does
not   alter   a basic concensus in regard to continued domination
by the present ruling group. Suffice to say at this stage that
race reinforces class and that race is employed as a rationalisa-
tion or justification of class. For example, when Whites (includ-
ing those opposed to the specific policies of the present govern-
ment) refer in some context or another to 'our complex racial
(or human) problems in South Africa', they are usually rationalis-
ing their conservatism in regard to class with an appeal to race
or culture, albeit unconsciously.

Let us look at the element of class in more detail. Ignoring
many specifically local characteristics for a moment, one obser-
ves that the broad patterns of class distinction seem to be roughly
comparable with the position in Northern Europe at a very early
stage of industrialisation, before the proletariat had organised to
fight for and win its present rights. For this comparison to be
meaningful it is necessary to look briefly at the broad relation-
ship between civil and economic rights, class and the economic
development of Western capitalist type societies as has appeared
from historical developments in Europe.

It has been argued [2] that in an economy of this type at the
early stages of development the level of consumption of the

2. The argument given here is primarily and broadly that of Karl de Schweinitz,
   jr., *Industrialisation and Democracy,* Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.

labouring masses is restricted. Goods are scarce, the economy produces an insufficient surplus for general distribution, and there is a need to accumulate resources for investment to ensure further growth. Marx termed it the stage of 'primitive capitalist accumulation'. At this stage the so-called 'welfare problem' arises when the labouring classes, congregated in close proximity to others in urban areas, have their expectations of a higher standard of living stimulated by contact with the more affluent bourgeoisie, capitalists or administrators. These expectations tend to rise faster than the capacity of the economy to satisfy them. The resulting discontent cannot be accommodated in the early stages of industrialisation by negotiated settlements between labour and management because very little negotiable surplus exists to bargain over. If economic growth through continuing capital investment, and naturally the profits of the owners in a capitalist society, are to be protected this discontent has to be contained by autocratic controls - political or otherwise. Once the economy is able to produce a sufficient surplus to begin to meet the material demands of the masses, and to provide widespread services like education and welfare, a fundamental concensus of values in regard to the system develops which makes possible a liberalisation of political controls and the negotiated settlement of wage disputes.

These are the economic preconditions for the gradual evolution towards the type of mass-consumption society characteristic of the West today, in which the universal franchise and a generally high standard of living for all have transformed the nature of class and class conflict compared to what existed in the previous century. (It can be argued that manipulation, domination, and the alienation of the masses has by no means been eliminated but rather made more subtle, but this issue is not relevant to our argument). In the history of Western Europe the process of democratisation and the transformation of the class situation was obviously also facilitated by a number of other factors, including the presence of a relatively enlightened middle class whose own demands had previously initiated processes of political change in a democratic direction. Furthermore, at the stage when surplus production was available for more equitable distribution, neither governments nor the owners of production had acquired modern techniques of forceful repression; and it simply seemed more profitable and less dangerous to compromise and share than to suppress demands.

This view of the general relationship between economic growth and inequality in capitalist society has been put forward

as a defence of certain aspects of our current situation in South Africa - notably the low wages of Blacks and the lack of effective political rights and bargaining privileges [3] . Granted, the stage of development of the South African economy might make it unrealistic to expect that the wages of unskilled and semi-skilled workers should approximate those paid in a more highly developed economy, especially since the South African economy is also a surplus labour economy at the present stage. It can even be accepted, given the presence of an extremely affluent elite living in the midst of poverty, that totally unrestricted political freedom for Blacks would be a surprising feature. This latter concession, however, assumes the capitalist model of society. In an *ideal* socialist economy, the discrepancy in the material rewards of workers and administrators would theoretically be miniscule compared with our current situation and the 'welfare problem' and the problem of containing popular discontent would be correspondingly smaller.

On other grounds, however, reference to this type of theoretical argument in order to justify Apartheid is far-fetched, even within the capitalist framework. The theory which has been broadly outlined is based on a dynamic model of society and assumes a process of change from an undemocratic society with a serious 'welfare problem' towards a democratic system with an increasingly equitable distribution of rewards. The central feature of the policy of Apartheid, however, is that it goes further than policies in any Western society in history to inhibit this type of change in order to ensure the perpetual privilege of a minority. The theory outlined above makes mention of the process of increasing occupational differentiation as a factor which tends to fragment the two opposing economic classes thus reducing the potential intensity of conflict. Apartheid, on the other hand, has the effect of inhibiting all but the most economically essential upward mobility of African workers in the major industrial areas. The theory also assumes a steady narrowing of the gap in incomes between the privileged minority and the proletariat. Apartheid has had the effect of maintaining the gap in incomes between Black and White [4] .

Valid insights can most definitely be gained by comparing Apartheid with the class situation in early capitalist society, but these insights have to be supplemented by a consideration of

3. See for example, Frans van den Bogaerde: *Die Taak van die Suid-Afrikaanse Ekonoom,* Communications of the University of South Africa, Pretoria, 1965.

4. For a well-founded proof of this, as well as of the fact that expenditure per head on African education has also remained static, see Frederick A. Johnstone, ''White Prosperity and White Supremacy in South Africa Today'': *African Affairs,* Vol. 69, 1970, pp. 124-140.

other factors if we wish to understand why the situation in South Africa is currently to utterly resistant to change and why the suppression of Blacks in all the major spheres of South African life is tending to worsen rather than lift. Obviously the additional factors requiring consideration are those involving the problem of race; the general factor which has imbued the class-system with its caste-like quality.

Because of the early colonial situation and the other historical features mentioned, as well as other factors which will be discussed presently, colour has a strong emotional valence for most Whites. For this reason it has been convenient and indeed natural for politicians and other leaders and spokesmen of White interest groups to articulate and rationalise basic economic and political interests in terms of race rather than in terms of the real issues; this more often than not being an unconscious process. As in so many other places in the world, differences in colour and culture are put to the service of privilege. This association of the two major elements is so firmly established that very few Whites are able to distinguish between the two. Certain supporters of the policy of a qualified franchise for Blacks seem to be the only conservative Whites who are able to disentangle the issue of colour from their conception of their own material self-interest. This is possibly because their own social and economic positions are so secure that a *gradual* extension of privileges to Blacks along the lines of historical developments in Europe could not possibly threaten their material interests. The powerful factor of colour has also seen to it that Whites in subordinate positions identify with privileged Whites rather than with Blacks who could theoretically be their class-equals; and of course for this they are rewarded by the system.

The distinction which has been drawn between the two elements is an analytic one and for this reason difficult to support with empirical examples. Here and there everyday patterns are revealing, however. In terms of the racial ethos the Black and White groups are culturally incompatible, making close contact undesirable; yet close contact seems perfectly acceptable to most Whites provided it is not on a basis of status-equality. Master-servant relations and other hierarchical relationships are perfectly tolerable to Whites, with the exception of certain astute politicians who sense certain long-term political dangers. Large numbers of de jure Whites who obviously have Coloured blood are perfectly acceptable to their White friends since their position is formally and legally established. It is only when the inconsistency between legal status and ethnic characteristics becomes so blatant and visible as to create public precedents that Whites

tend to react. Generally it is those Blacks whose education, cultural backgrounds, similarity to Whites, and potential social standing give them a visible claim to equality of status with Whites who are most overtly disliked by many typical Whites, directly contradicting the etho-cultural rationale for separation.

These varied illustrations reveal the hard issue of power which lurks behind the ethos of racialism, but it must nevertheless be accepted that racialism is generally a powerful agent reinforcing the system in its own right, and here we might profitably consider some of the factors underlying the racialism in Apartheid.

Apart from the historical factors already mentioned, the most obvious factors are the psychological components of race-prejudice. Psychological elements - attitudes and predispositions of personality - have to be treated with caution in the examination of a social system. If the attitudes are what is termed 'malleable' - that is easily shaped and altered by influences from the system of which the individual is a member; then there is no point in discussing them since they will merely reflect the system. If, however, certain attitudes are less 'malleable', then it is important to consider them since changes in the system can be facilitated or inhibited by such attitudes [5] . This is an important consideration inevitably overlooked by those wishing to work for justice in South Africa by attempting to change the attitudes of Whites. Pettigrew [6] , an American investigator who conducted research in South Africa, concluded that the race attitudes of Whites tended to be a function of conformity to social norms (i.e. tending to be 'malleable') rather than of the classical psychological determinants of race-prejudice like authoritarianism, frustration-aggression and the projection of unconscious guilt and hostility. Certainly, the degree of racial hostility among individuals is probably related to psychological factors such as these, but it is doubtful whether they could account for its existence as they often do in societies where public values do not support racial inequality.

These psychological factors are probably relevant in some ways, one being the fact that the social system allows certain 'prejudiced' personality types to achieve positions of influence because their attitudes are highly functional, thereby placing such individuals in an excellent position to reinforce the system.

5. For an excellent discussion of this see Percy S. Cohen, 'Social Attitudes and Sociological Enquiry': *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 17, 1966, pp. 341-352.

6. T.F. Pettigrew, 'Personality and Socio-cultural Factors in Intergroup Attitudes: *Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 11, March 1958.

It has been observed by numerous investigators overseas that racial hostility at the individual level tends to be aggravated by situations of rapid change, upward or downward occupational mobility, and other forms of dislocation [7] . If this holds true in South Africa then the relatively recent dislocation, urbanisation and rapid occupational mobility 'which has occurred among Afri kaners might in part explain the relatively greater degree of racial intolerance which has been observed in this group.

A very general psychological theory which can be tentatively advanced, and which might relate to attitudes of the type which are less 'malleable' and therefore fairly independent of the system is the following. It concerns the effects on race attitudes of the personality characteristics of the Northern European. It is often observed that the Spanish and Portuguese Colonisers have never created the type of colour-caste systems which the Northern Europeans have in Africa and North America. A (largely speculative) explanation for this is that Northern Europeans, with their typical modal personality characteristics of high self-discipline, the repression of natural inclinations and the internalisation of authority, find it difficult to accept individuals from other cultures who do not exhibit these traits to the same degree. The African, who appears to be relatively undisciplined, less morally restrained, more spontaneous and passionate (stereotypes which are due as much to the ignorance of African culture as anything else) threatens the typical White because the latter tends to unconsciously recognise the same inclinations in his repressed self. The White man sees in the African something which he does not understand and fears in himself. This explanation has to be very cautiously applied, since it is very loosely formulated, and, as has been said, largely speculative.

Generally speaking though, most of the highly relevant racial attitudes among Whites can, for our purposes, be more profitably explained with reference to social rather than social psychological processes. One such process of extreme importance is that of the historical development of exclusive and aggressive Afrikaner Nationalism, the proponents of which have carried the policy of Apartheid to rigid extremes. This nationalism appears to have incorporated anti-Black feeling as one of its components and raised(lowered might be a more appropriate word) this feeling to the level of an ideology held with the same degree of fervour and emotionalism as has characterised its other forms of expression. Today, possibly because White self-interest is not well-served by serious divisions among Whites, the formerly powerful

7. See B. Berelson and GA. Steiner, *Human Behaviour*, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1964. Chapter 12.

anti-English feeling among the majority of nationalists appears
to be waning. It would seem, however, that the ideological reject-
ion of outgroups is being preserved at the same high key vis-a-vis
Blacks - a situation where nationalist feeling has become focus-
sed as it were, to serve another purpose. Naturally, Afrikaner
political leaders probably find this development convenient and
encourage it since it provides an alternative platform with the
same grass-roots appeal as that which they profited from when
the major enemy was the Englishman.

A factor which is often mentioned as a psychological cause
of the ideology of Apartheid is that of White 'fears'. Most of these
fears are not independent of the system; they tend to reflect
pressures and conflicts within it. Obviously many of these fears
are utterly realistic. If Apartheid fails most Whites will be affec-
ted to some degree by the loss of privilege and material advan-
tage. Somewhat more emotional fears are those of being 'swam-
ped', 'driven into the sea', 'deprived of a country', etc. Bearing
in mind the treatment which Blacks have to endure and the nature
of all grass-roots politics, even these extreme fears have a ra-
tional basis to some extent, but not in an absolute sense. If the
Whites continue with current policies or modified versions of
these policies until violent revolution, mass labour unrest, or
something else leads to a collapse of White control then a merci-
ful and tolerant treatment of Whites by Blacks in the initial
stages could hardly be expected. These fears are of the Whites'
own making in this sense, and in another sense as well. It is
not unnatural for Whites to translate their own dimly perceived
guilt at the way they treat Blacks into fears of what Blacks will
do in revenge if given the chance. In this way, through a social
psychological process, the system tends to be continually self-
reinforcing.

By and large, though, I would reaffirm my hestitation to place
too much emphasis on the social-psychological characteristics
of Whites in attempting to explain the system. For the most part
these attitudes do not seem to vary independently of the social
order. Broadly speaking, if such attitudes could be modified the
effects would be temporary, since they would probably revert to
their former content if the social situation of the individuals
concerned remained unchanged. A class system such as South
Africa's tends not only to be reinforced by racialism, but in turn
continually breeds more racialism. Even members of the ruling
class are unwittingly manipulated by this process.

Finally it is necessary to look specifically at the Blacks in
South Africa to complete the picture of the system. Beliefs among

Whites that Blacks are inferior, backward, or 'different' are an important consideration. Now obviously no inherent differences between races exist which would either cause of justify the system. What is important, however, is that the system actually causes the rank and file Black to be inferior. The privilege and power of the White man gives him a certain morale, personal confidence and assuredness in dealing with Blacks which the latter, because their lack of privilege and low status weaken their morale, simply cannot challenge. This is quite apart from the educational disadvantages suffered by non-Whites. The White man therefore often quite realistically sees himself to be superior (and often the Black feels himself to be inferior). The system ensures enhanced personal abilities in the privileged classes, and therefore not all the attitudes of Whites are simply the result of prejudice. This is one rather important factor reinforcing the system.

One cannot escape the conclusion that, in the final analysis, Apartheid exists because Blacks allow it to continue. Many of us predict a concerted effort on the part of Blacks to end the existing system at some stage in the future. Concerted action by all Blacks, say on the labour front, could destroy the present system almost immediately by crippling the economy. Such action in the near future is highly unlikely, and this political incapacity of Blacks is one of the foundations of Apartheid. In attempting to understand this one has to look beyond obvious and important factors like the destruction of effective Black leadership, fear of official reprisals, the presence of a network of police informers and the general ability of Whites to put pressure on Blacks to conform.

In my experience large numbers of less well-educated Africans, despite envy and even hatred of Whites, still have the ethos of a conquered people. The system - the factories, towns, roads, mines, etc., are somehow perceived to belong to the White man. The system, while not liked, is not uniformly regarded as illegitimate. This obviously inhibits the development of a spirit of protest.

Another factor underlying the political incapacity of Blacks is the lack of coherence in the Black group. The attempts by the present government to divide Blacks into separate tribal and ethnic camps are obvious and need no further comment. More subtle factors are also of relevance, however. Many 'middle-class' Blacks, and probably even poorly-educated Coloureds and Indians have tended to identify with the White way of life and with White men, possibly in the generally far-fetched belief that the distance between themselves and rank and file Africans will ultimately

be recognised by the Whites and rewarded. These differences in status which certain Blacks believe to be worthy of recognition by Whites have probably done as much to 'atomise' the Black community as any government policy. The Blacks are not yet a self-conscious class; they are a series of aggregates of people who, while experiencing a common condition of suppression, do not generally perceive this basic unity. The action of White liberals in courting some Blacks (mainly those with education) and showing little other than an academic and patronising interest in others has probably helped to perpetuate this condition. More latterly the outlets for political and social aspirations which the trappings of Separate Development afford some Black leaders will also help to maintain the divisions in the Black community (although other aspects of Separate Development might have a positive effect on political awareness among Blacks).

In conclusion I would again stress my main thesis that Apartheid should be seen as resulting from the interrelationship between the effects of the earlier colonial situation and of class and race. Some Whites are less motivated by racial considerations than the majority, but very few of these liberals would be equally accommodating on the class issue if their interests were perceived to be threatened. Recently more and more Afrikaans intellectuals ('verligtes') also seem to be gradually rejecting colour as such as a basis for their political stance. They tend to rationalise their position consistently in terms of culture rather than race, and they have already succeeded in influencing the tone of official political statements. This is undoubtedly yet another 'frontstage' to the 'backstage' of power and class. This development nevertheless deserves careful study, since any change in one of the interrelated elements in a complex situation can have far-reaching unintended consequences in the future.

SOME ASPECTS OF CULTURE
AND APARTHEID

andré brink

THE OBJECT OF this paper (which can serve as a brief intro-
duction only) is to examine some aspects of the cultural situation
in South African apartheid society; the social implications of
some specific cultural phenomena; and to attempt an evaluation
of some possibilities of social change in the light of cultural
development. This can and should be an extensive study in its
own right; for practical reasons I shall be as brief as possible.
Although I shall aim at objectivity it must be made very clear at
the outset that the nature of my approach is personal.

This means that the terms of my approach must be defined.

1. In the first place, I am not a Christian and cannot, there-
fore, approach the subject as a Christian. I do, however, sub-
scribe to the basic Christian values: to justice; to compassion
which transcends justice; to individual liberty which respects
the liberty of others; to a concept of human dignity which accepts
that all man are equal; above all, to love in its widest sense.

2. I am a writer, not a politician. And so I may not always be
practical in my approach. I most emphatically deny, however,
that ethical ideals should be regarded as unpractical or impracti-
cable simply because they are ideals. Convictions, if strong
enough, can make almost any ideal a practical possibility.

3. I believe in the metaphysical concept of revolt as defined
by Camus. I believe that apartheid is a denial of everything that

is basic to human dignity and to the concept of love; therefore
I am dedicated to the ideal of changing it. Peacefully, if possible,
because it seems to me that violence denies not only the human-
ity of the person against which it is directed but also that of the
person who practices it. At the same time I accept, with Camus,
that there are some situations which can only be solved by
violence; and that to shirk from violence when it is imperative
is not only cowardice but an act which strengthens the very
system one tries to attack. South Africa, it seems to me, is fast
approaching a point of no return where violence may be the only
solution. At the same time I am deeply convinced that *at this
stage* there is still a possibility of effecting change peacefully.
But this still means change, not *compromise*. Compromise, adapt-
ation, token resistance can all be "contained" by the system
and, in fact, imply condonation of the system. And if a system is
as odious and inhuman as apartheid any condonation of it denies
one's own dignity.

    4. It might seem that the concept of "culture" should be
more precisely defined in advance, but that would demand a
paper in its own right. (An entire UNESCO conference was de-
voted to an exploration of this concept - during 1968 - without
arriving at any clear conclusion). But for the purposes of this
paper it should be adequate to content ourselves with some
accepted phenomena or symtoms of culture: arts and crafts;
language; recreation and entertainment; sport etc. (Obviously
religion forms part of it, and a nation's whole 'way of life' is
embodied in it - the way it organises its politics and its justice
and its education and its urban development programmes - but
these aspects are treated by other Spro-cas commissions and so
fall beyond the immediate scope of this paper). If one accepts
culture as the sum total of everything that is "acquired" by man,
in the process of civilization, to define and organise and shape
his position and his behaviour and his attitudes in society - then
it should be clear how wide this concept really is. The main
thing is that one should see culture as that body of habits, con-
ventions and behaviour patterns which allows an individual to
express himself in a social context and to be comprehended: i.e.
that body of patterns or structures which most clearly distin-
guishes one society, one nation, sometimes one race from another.

1.

    The first fact one has to bear in mind is that there is no one
"South African culture": this is a multicultural society. Ever
since Dr. Philip's Kat River Settlement and Sir Benjamin D'
Urban's administration of the first "Bantu Homeland" (the

Province of Queen Adelaide) the concept of separate groups, and separate group cultures, has been rooted in South Africa. This so-called "traditional South African way of life" imported by British colonialists (it is surprising how "colonial" even a philanthropist can be!) has contributed to the isolation of different local cultures. On the other hand, there have been strong forces at work against cultural isolation: political unification in 1910, the complex economic interdependence of the different groups, the comparative accessibility of two official languages, urbanization, the rapid development of national and international communications, the growth impact of the mass media etc. In other words: in spite of the existence of a variety of cultures in South Africa, by c. 1948 there had been a marked tendency towards assimilation, a definite, if slow, development in the direction of a new cultural structure. (In at least one field this had been almost totally effected by 1948: the cultural unity of Afrikaners and Coloureds).

The introduction of apartheid as prescribed structure made an end to amalgamation as a "natural impulse" (in the words of Lewis Nkosi). Culturally, the premise of apartheid was that separate development would provide equal facilities for all groups. With the preservation of their "own identities" all groups could then fully develop their cultural potential and, in the words of the old dictum, be true to their own selves. So lofty was this ideal that Dr. Verwoerd could state, without batting an eyelid, "We shall be able to prove that it is only by creating separate nations that discrimination will in fact disappear in the long run" (December 4th, 1963. Note, incidentally, the significance of the word "creating", implying the deliberate and artificial establishment of separate groups even where they may not have existed any more). Since 1948 this separation has grown more and more dogmatic and rigid: separate sports, separate concerts, separate beaches, separate libraries, separate churches, separate educational systems (with mother tongue instruction for all African sections), separate radio programmes, separate universities.

If this incredible structure of separation had in fact stimulated the growth of all - or even some - different cultures in the country, it would have been difficult to denounce it. But the reverse is all to sadly true.

In the first place, amenities and facilities made available to the different groups have not been similar. However outdated or ludicrous in many respects, the 19th Century American dictum of "separate but equal" might still have had some virtue if the demand of equality had in fact been respected. It hasn't. It is not

necessary to accumulate statistics. One look at the allocation of beaches to the different groups is enough to expose the farce of "equal cultural opportunities" for the sham it is. Another look at libraries confirms it. (In 1964 the Pietermaritzburg White Library contained 4,890 reference books; the African branch of the library had two volumes). The almost insuperable difficulties encountered by CAPAB, PACT and other Councils for the Performing Arts to present occasional performances to non-white audiences speak for themselves. The standard of work in the African and Coloured Universities is disgusting. The state of African schools is a disgrace for any responsible government. Sports facilities for non-whites are ludicrously inadequate. *Et cetera, ad nauseam.*

In other words: cultural separation has meant *cultural deprivation* to almost all non-white groups. School-children cannot attend performances of prescribed plays if these are produced by whites; it is almost impossible for a non-white to attend a symphony concert or even a folk music performance by an imported pop-singer. Hardly ten per cent of all films shown in the country are shown to non-white audiences; in spite of the population ratio the number of cinemas available to Coloureds, Indians and Africans is a meagre percentage of that available to Whites. Consequently, these local cultures, deprived of almost all stimulation from outside, are forced to exploit only the material immediately available within each group - and even for that there are hardly any facilities or funds. This means that "culture" has become a privilege for a small minority. And essentially culture is not a privilege but an elementary human right, an essential human dimension. In a scathing and justified attack on South African culture Breyten Breytenbach blamed the "tribal whites" of the country for "reducing culture to folklore". The white concept of African culture, he says, is limited to Ndebele huts, Xhosa pots or Zulu beads. Coloured "culture", to whites, means the Coon Carnival of the 2nd January - and even that has been rigidly regimented: the only authentic, spontaneous indigenous folk festival in the country has become subjected to tight control in order not to inconvenience the privileged whites through whose area the coons traditionally held their gay procession.

It would be wrong, however, to think - be it sadly or smugly - that only non-whites have suffered from cultural malnutrition: White culture, both English and Afrikaans, has been affected as deeply, if more subtly. Quite recently Guy Butler still had to admit that most English South African poets still regarded London or New York as their spiritual home: I do not think this is due to any atavistic colonial sentiment but to the fact that local South

African cultures (African, Afrikaans, Coloured or Indian) have become more and more inaccessible. This is certainly true of the Afrikaans writer.

One of the fiercest indictments history may make of apartheid, will be that the Afrikaans writer has been cut off from Africa. When, in the magazine *Kol*, Breyten Breytenbach asked - in 1968 - why Afrikaans writers never bother to visit African writers, Chris Barnard replied: "What African writer has ever looked *me* up?" One may dismiss this for the pathetic show of suprematism it is; but one should link it to another statement by Barnard in a recent London *Times:* We Afrikaans writers, he said, yearn for Africa and need her … but Africa doesn't seem to need us - or words to that effect. Once again one cannot hide one's disgust: after all, why the hell should Africa need the pretty insignificant writings of the Sestigers? But again this reveals the pathos - if not the tragedy - of cultural apartheid. At a moment when most of the world is deeply conscious of Africa, at a moment when youth all over is discovering Africa, we who live here are denied ready   access   to our continent. It is impossible to visit most African countries - because of apartheid. It is almost impossible to associate with African writers - because apartheid has either driven those writers out of the country, or imprisoned them, or made them almost impossible to reach. (In every sense of the word). Where apartheid does not make it physically impossible to associate, it creates barriers of mistrust, suspicion or forthright antagonism - *between people who would normally be drawn to each other.*

In this situation the (younger) Afrikaans writer finds himself in a peculiar position. Almost all writers of the younger generation suffer from cultural schizophrenia. Because most of them have lived in Europe for longer or shorter periods, and because of the writer's natural inclination towards the larger philosophies and ideas of his time, they write their books from a world whose common denominators have been created by Sartre and Camus, by Henry Miller and Ionesco and Beckett: an international and cosmopolitan world. On the other hand, their very language ties them to a specific cultural group - a group which, through apartheid, through geographical necessity, and through the arid rigidity of Calvinism has made a virtue of isolationism; a group almost wholly out of touch with the "world outside". And it becomes increasingly difficult to solve this duality. Especially because the majority of younger writers feel a very strong emotional and spiritual bond with the "volk" and prefer to adopt a defensive attitude towards the hostile outside world. This means that, contrary to trends almost everywhere else, young Afrikaans wri-

ters openly or tacitly support "Afrikanerdom"; and this leads
to the extreme of even, willy nilly, supporting Afrikaner Nationa-
lism - and apartheid. The fear of rejection is incredibly strong
in Afrikaans society - because that society has habitually been
isolated (also geographically) from the rest of the world. To be
ostracized from this community means to be literally "thrown
into the wilderness". Because of the writer's association with
Europe and America he does not feel quite so utterly rejected
as before when his people turn against him: hence a reasonable
measure of revolt in Afrikaans writing recently. (This is signifi-
cant in its own right: that the only valuable cultural development
within the apartheid system has been one based on revolt). But
it is a safe revolt: it knows how far it can go. It attacks religious
and moral taboos because these are not so vital to the Afrikaner
mind as political taboos which involve "voortbestaan" itself.
(Consistently logical Afrikaners - the Weiss Squad, notably -
have justly realised that an attack on moral and religious taboos
also implies a threat to political survival; the rest of Afrikaans
society, more pragmatic or more nonchalent about values, have
not reacted so hysterically - which in itself is a wry comment on
the state of Afrikaner ethics; or simply on the niveau of its in-
tellectual debate). Consequently even this mild "literature of
revolt" has so far been neatly contained by the system.

Some of the most significant writing by Africans and English-
speaking South Africans has been marred by personal bitterness
and subjective revolt: most understandably so, for they have
often suffered personal persecution; and most of them have had
their books banned. Almost all the leading African and Coloured
writers of the country are now forced to live in exile. (And who
cares about them? Nat Nakasa wrote the horrible truth: "Most
white South Africans have simply never opened their eyes to the
reality of there being other humans beside the whites in this
country. They do not 'do unto others', but unto an unidentified
mass of Natives"). How can they possibly avoid getting entang-
led in personal rancour? At the same time the loss of creativity,
the loss of scope in their writing - directly attributable to apart-
heid - is one of the main arguments against the deliberate sepa-
ration of cultures which leads, not to development, but to stagna-
tion. The narrowness in white writing is equally evident. In most
Afrikaans writing there is an irksome awareness of "them" and
"us", a denial of the humanity of the Other; in much English
writing there is a lack of true compassion or true objectivity.
  Censorship has aggravated the situation. In spite of the most
massive resistance from artists and writers the country has ever

known, the Publications and Entertainments Act came into force in 1963. This Act is not directed primarily against attacks on religious or moral values, but is a political instrument typical of all young, absolutist regimes (cf. Cuba, China, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Greece). Religious and sexual liberty have an immediate political significance; a permissive society is directed against absolutist traditions and dogmas: hence, to safeguard a "traditional way of life" these new freedoms must be curtailed. In this respect the South African Censorship Act is directly opposed to modern trends of liberalization all over the free world.

It soon became abundantly clear how effectively the Act could be used. Apart from keeping some 15,000 books out of the country (including some works by the world's greatest writers and philosophers) and banning almost 90% of all important overseas films, the Act has made it possible to ban the work of almost all the leading South African writers from the African and Coloured groups, as well as that of several English South African writers, including Nadine Gordimer and Jack Cope.

Until now, no work by an Afrikaans author has been banned. It may be - as has been facetiously suggested - that no Afrikaans work has yet merited banning. But this may be due to other reasons too (because in several instances there have been very strong pressure from influential sections of the "volk" to obtain bannings). These may include the fact of that mystical but extremely important sense of "Afrikaner unity": if an individual Afrikaner is loth to get himself driven into the wilderness, the Afrikaner establishment is itself loth to drive someone out unless it becomes an absolute necessity. (cf. the Hertzog affair). Again this probably has historical and geographical roots: one cannot weaken the laager in the wilderness. And so, if the Afrikaans writer has been allowed more scope than his English-speaking, Coloured, Indian or African compatriots, it may be because the establishment is afraid of open rifts and would rather suffer more from its own children than commit the terrible act of ostracism. Unfortunately, it appears that Afrikaans writers have not made sufficient use of this scope allowed them. They have had this liberty: why have they not used it?

Of course, censorship does not always work openly or legally. The climate of fear and suspicion created by the existence of a Censorship Act is often much more inhibiting than any action in terms of the law itself. It is obviously impossible to know whether any works (let alone works of merit) have remained unwritten as a result of fear of censorship - although we have the word of Etienne Leroux and others that some novels they would have liked to write have remained unwritten. What can be asserted,

however, is that the climate surrounding the Censorship Act has caused several works to remain unpublished. In 1964 at least four Sestiger writers were planning books dealing with sabotage, 90 days and similar subjects. Of these at least two were completed, Jan Rabie's "Die Agitator" and my "Die Saboteurs". I do not know the full history of Rabie's novel. I know, however, that mine was accepted for publication on literary grounds - and then returned after consultation with lawyers. And I know that Breytenbach's novel "Om te vlieg" was accepted on two occasions (on the recommendation of at least two professors of Afrikaans literature) and then returned - once, because political pressure was exerted on the directors of the publishing house, and the second time because printers refused to take the risk of printing the book, for fear of prosecution. Even from Breytenbach's latest volume of poetry several of the best poems had to be left out (even after acceptance by a professor of literature who is a member of the Board of Censors!) because printers feared prosecution - *and* because they feared discrimination by other influential and wealthy clients. One firm has refused to print certain books because they might lose the patronage of the N.G. Kerk; another has been intimidated by the Salvation Army. I can cite several other instances, but these should prove the point.

The advocates of apartheid insist that the hardships and injustices (cultural and other) created by the system are temporary and belong by their very nature to a period of transition: these are, of course, the same arguments that have been advanced for decades by leaders in Russia, Hungary, China or East Germany. Furthermore: if non-whites in South Africa are to remain culturally deprived until they have fully developed their own states - how in God's name can they start from scratch then? To "create" a culture artifically is as impossible as Verwoerd's dream of "creating" nations. In the meantime, the hard reality of the world, of the cultural situation is: for the whites, a narrowing of the world, inbreeding or escapism; for the non-whites, restriction and denial.

Perhaps it should be stressed, again, that our form of censorship is a terrifyingly logical consequence of the apartheid mentality: it is based on the assumption that a handful of people have the - God-given? - *right* to decide what all the others may do, or read, or write, or think, or be. In this, once again, apartheid is not merely inhuman but anti-human: it does not seem preposterous to me ascribe even our high death rate on the roads to the apartheid mentality: a mentality which must deny the humanity of another person in order to survive oneself; once another person's

humanity is denied, he can be destroyed, because he is no lon-
ger a *person.* In this connection the apartheid society - especial-
ly in its cultural implications - becomes a startling proof of the
existential schizoid state described in Robert Laing's *Divided
Self.*

(Note: *At this point the writer wished to quote Ezekiel Mphah-
lele on the way in which creative work is stifled in
South Africa by conflict, stock responses and fragmen-
tation. With most leading Black South African writers,
Ezekiel Mphahlele may not, legally, be quoted in this
country. - Editor).*

2.

I have tried to show, very sketchily, how apartheid promotes
stagnation and splintering in all the different cultures it so
idealistically set out to "develop". And I must insist that this
is happening in spite of a natural trend to interact and to unite.
I have said that culture implies that which distinguishes one
society or nation from another. But it is true that the very nature
of our world after the Second World War and in the midst of a
population explosion tends more and more towards universalism.
This need not imply a levelling of standards and it certainly
does not imply a monotous sameness of culture all over the
world: but it does suggest the common humanity of all men. Just
as some form of socialism seems to me the only logical solution
to the artificial problems of our world, a true sense of the "human
family" seems to me inevitable for our very survival. The Black
Panther leader, Eldridge Cleaver, points out that competition is
usually seen as one of the primary characteristics of man: in-
stead he suggests that competition is the law of the jungle and
that co-operation is the keyword of true civilisation. It is interes-
ting to note that Krustchev's phrase "peaceful coexistence" has
has now been taken over by the National Party: its interpretation,
however, is as much as travesty of the real meaning of the phrase
as Krustchev's has been: there is no real aim towards coexistence
in an apartheid society: in the small isolated groups created by
apartheid each eventually excludes the other, distrusts the other,
fears the other, and hates the other.
    Within a few hours one can travel from any capital in the West
to another; mass media tend to unite large portions of the world
in common experiences; the exploration of the moon was as expe-
rienced as a feat of *man* - not necessarily of Americans. The inter-

nationalisation of sport creates new bonds. International pro-
grammes to combat famine, to explore the sea, to save water, to
stop air pollution etc., create an awareness of common goals. In
the arts, the film has become the truly modern universal medium:
the experiments of the avant-garde in Italy, America, Brazil,
Poland or France reveal remarkable common denominators; the
same is true of sculpture and painting and music; thanks to modern
travel a Peter Brook production can travel to Czechoslovakia
or the U.S.A., and Grotowski can perform in London or New York;
the Yanacek trio or I Musici can travel all over the world in a
single season; and the Gonzales professional tennis team can
compete in all countries. What happens in New York, or Tokyo, or
Vladivostock or Sharpeville is of immediate relevance to any
living person. This has become startlingly clear in the course
of student protests in Europe and America since 1967: the gene-
ration gap in our time is entirely different from that in any pre-
vious age, because of the international conscience that has come
alive. A young demonstrator in Paris or Bolivia is not only in-
terested in what happens in South Africa, but immediately *con-
cerned* by it; it affects his personal future; because in our time
Donne's words are more true than ever before: No man is an
island entire of itself ... We have the same goals and the same
agonies; we are threatened by the same Bomb and enticed by
the same Space. The barriers in the way of true internationalism
are class and race; therefore it is imperative - for all men - that
they should be broken down. And that is why South Africa runs
like a sewer through the conscience of the world.

Cultural events in the rest of the world cannot but influence
South Africa. *Hair* is familiar to almost every teenager in the
country. Even though South Africa has not seen it, *Oh Calcutta!*
is present in the awareness of anyone concerned with the theatre.
Drug addiction and permissiveness are as much here as miniskirts.
Bonnie and Clyde is as much of a reality to the young cinema
goer as *Romeo and Juliet*. This general cultural awareness is
in conflict with our factual isolation and causes a growing frus-
tration which may reach a danger point. It is a climate in which
youthful revolt thrives. If the SABC bans the Beatles it is all
the more reason for the younger generation to listen to them.
Miriam Makeba is a favourite and revered figure in almost as
many white South African homes as Mimi Coertze is.

In other words in spite of censorship and the deliberately
isolationist aims of apartheid we are continually exposed to a
cultural bombardment from all over the world. And the face of
Che Guevara looks down on countless teenage beds in South
Africa.

But also inside the country, among the different cultural
groups, there are strong movements against isolation. At the
moment these movements have little to do with culture, but they
have cultural potential. In spite of all apartheid ideals the coun-
try cannot exist without the economic interdependence of all its
groups; and it is surely unnecessary to refer again to the growing
number of Africans in cities in spite of influx control and repa-
triation schemes(which exist, for the greater part, on paper only;)
the unparalleled economic boom also affects all groups, creating
more contact, and more cultural awareness - more cultural needs
- in the less privileged groups. More people have more money;
and so more people have access to some of the products of cul-
tures - or else grow more impatient in their demands. This is as
simple as a law of nature - and, I think, as irrepressible. Apart-
heid creates more and more of a paradox, where enforced isola-
tion of groups wars against natural and inevitable contact.

3.

It is always easier to evaluate a situation than to suggest a
remedy. But I think the evaluation I have tried to give also im-
plies some possibilities of specific action which may either
speed up the breakdown of apartheid, or - at the very least -
prepare a climate of ''readiness'' for full cultural growth as soon
as the system has been destroyed.

1. The recent series of incidents on the sports front is a
promising sign. However revealing it may be of the cultural and
spiritual adolescence of South Africans as a whole and the Afri-
kaner in particular, the fact remains that sport is one of apart-
heid's most vulnerable areas. It is true that opposition, protest
marches overseas and isolation locally appeals to the masochis-
tic sentiments of - especially - Afrikaners and increases their
determination to ''hold out''. At the same time it is difficult to
swallow the fact that at a moment when on so many fronts South
African sports are flourishing we should be isolated. I feel more
specific use should be made of top sportsmen to denounce the
system or to plead for a change. A few isolated cases are not
good enough. Both the American establishment and Black Power
leaders have long ago realised how necessary it is to use figures
with mass appeal in their campaigns: even presidential elections
are run with the aid of comedians, film stars or jazz singers. A
definite effort can be made to coordinate widespread dissatis-
faction in sports circles and to deliberately provoke showdowns
if necessary. It is not enough to have convictions; one should

be prepared to suffer for them. It is no use to say that one is against something: it should be proved by acts. Also, a definite programme of "education" can be put into practice to reveal, bluntly and sensibly, to the ordinary mass of readers of any magazine or newspaper *why* students and other people overseas protest against the Springboks and other South African sportsmen. It was remarkable to note the effect of a single letter from an Afrikaans student at Oxford who explained why he took part in the demonstrations: obviously many people turned violently against him, but a significant number were impressed, and at least started thinking about the "whys". If this letter had been followed up by others it could have become much more useful. Here, as in all other cultural fields, it seems to me that co-ordination is an absolute necessity. It is specifically necessary that more such "revelations" should come from Afrikaners. Because the whole situation in this country places the Afrikaner in a position where his criticism has more value than that of anyone else: after all he is a member of the Establishment, by virtue of the colour of his skin and by virtue of his language.

2. This is equally true in the arts. The best proof is the Breytenbach syndrome. For purely private reasons Breytenbach married the Vietnamese woman he loved and quite unexpectedly found himself in the midst of a furore when he was awarded a literary prize and some of his fellow Sestigers suggested, in the newspapers, that he might not be allowed to come back to South Africa because his wife, though whiter than mo st, might be non-white in the eyes of the law. This incident forced an utterly non-political person into the political arena. In a devastatingly logical way he developed his political philosophy to the point where he had to attack the country in public. And now he will refuse to return, even if he were allowed to do so, unless all his non-white co-exiles can return too: for why should an exception be made of him because he happens to be white, and Afrikaans?

The point of Breytenbach's position is this: he is one of the greatest poets Afrikaans literature has yet produced; but to an overwhelming majority of people who have never read a single line of his verse, Breyten is a symbol of resistance to oppression. Among Africans, Coloureds and Indians he has become a symbol of hope: because of his marriage and because of his stand. By virtue of this, every line of poetry he writes - even if it is the purest lyrical verse - becomes a political act. The publication of his latest volume, *Kouevuur,* is a deliberate act of defiance: not because of its contents, but because of its very

existence - in the light of what Breyten represents for the ''underdog'' in South Africa, and for a large proportion of the younger generation (who react to him as others do to Guevara). And again we find that his particular impact is due to the fact that he is an *Afrikaner*. Again, in other words, we should realise that this is an aspect of cultural leaders which can be exploited to help bring apartheid down. I have said that most Afrikaans writers uphold apartheid. But they are also dissatisfied with much of the iniquity perpetrated by the regime. This dissatisfaction can be harnessed and used. Ideally one should like to see some Afrikaans novels of considerable merit published with devastating comment on the system. But one cannot ''demand'' anything of a writer: even if he writes to order, it may be rubbish. What *can* be exploited, however, is the position of the writer in society - simply because he is a writer. Millions of people all over the world were inspired by Pasternak without reading a word of *Doctor Zhivago* (by now they may have seen the film). Thousands can be inspired by the example of dissident writers - especially Afrikaans writers - if they come out for their convictions.

3. Perhaps a writers' congress can be arranged: it should not be too difficult to find an international sponsor. Ideally this congress should be attended by writers from all groups in the country - including those in exile. For that reason it may have to be held in Swaziland or another neighbour state. If such a congress, with several leading Afrikaans writers attending, can come out with a resolution unconditionally attacking the cultural sterility caused by apartheid it may have an enormous effect: not necessarily in immediate, practical terms, but in the process of bringing the country to an awareness of what is really going on.

4. It should be clear from the above that a programme similar to that of Brazil's ''conscientizacao'' can be of great value here. This may take the form of small cultural groups established all over the country, and across all racial barriers, to work together on cultural projects. In Bloemfontein an Afrikaans actor brought together a Coloured group and embarked on theatre programme: in Grahamstown a group is now being established to work towards the production of something like Peter Brooke's *US*, but with apartheid as theme: the aim is to develop into an interracial group. This can be done in the form of debating societies, literary discussion groups, writing workshops, amateur theatre groups, music groups, ''folk'' groups - anything: all aimed at cultural integration. For practical reasons these will start on a reasonably ''high'' cultural or intellectual level: one should at all costs avoid the impression of cultural missionary work, which

becomes as odious as organised charity. These groups are not there to "dispense" anything: they want to *create* something communally. And even if they can only serve, in the beginning, to create more awareness among whites - among Afrikaners - it would serve a very valuable purpose. This can then be co-ordinated with a purely educational programme for Africans, along Brazilean lines: not only to supplement the meagre teaching of Government schools but specifically to teach people what they do NOT learn at school.

5. Censorship plays a large part in maintaining cultural backwardness: so censorship must be attacked. It is enough t o denounce it: many have done so without avail. Censorship must be attacked frontally. I should suggest that several leading authors and/or academics - including as many Afrikaners as possible - deliberately seek prosecution for possessing banned books: preferably those books by the world's leading writers and philosophers. These writers (of whom I am most willing to be one) must refuse to pay fines and choose to go to gaol. If only five are prepared to do so in conjunction, the impact will be very great. The law may not be changed. But something in the climate will change: a narrowing in a certain group, but also a widening in another. Obviously this must not be done for the sake of ridiculous martyrdom! But it can be an effective act - in the long run.

6. At one performance of Fugard's *Boesman and Lena* to a Coloured audience in the Luxurama, a teacher came to Fugard and said: "I want you to know that we laughed because we thought we ought to. If we'd started to cry, we wouldn't have been able to stop". And during the performance of *People are living there,* when one character on stage accused the other of hiding behind his white skin, the entire audience jumped to their feet and shouted: "Yes"!

In a society where this can happen, theatre is an electric medium. In Europe and England, where reflexes have become stale, the theatre is dying - unless it forcibly relives in new forms like the theatre of cruelty, living theatre etc. But in South Africa theatre has something to SAY; it is the most social of all arts. And it can be exploited. Even within the framework allowed by the Boards of Directors of the Regional Boards, much of significance can be accomplished. For the rest, amateur groups can be cultiviated to produce a truly social "theatre of revolt".

7. Much can be done with films, too, although censorship is extremely rigid. (I understand, though, that it is possible for locally made films to be screened under certain conditions without the consent of the Publications Control Board. This should be examined and exploited. And if needs be, the board should be

directly defied). There is a remarkable number of young actors and film technicians eager to experiment with this exciting medium: this can be put to a socio-cultural use to shock people in this country into awareness of what is really being done to human beings in the name of Christian apartheid. Even a film like *Katrina* had remarkable social success: in spite of its being made by an outspoken Nationalist and in spite of propagating apartheid as only solution for our "problems": the simple, stark, human tragedy struck home in many minds. And even great cultural and social revolutions begin with moral questions in the consciences of a few.

One should not be discouraged by the lack of a favourable "climate". Climates can be *created*. When Castro invaded Cuba, he had an army of twelve men. In the end they overthrew Batista.

8. In the minds of many people Afrikaans is associated with the apartheid Establishment. This could mean a literary tragedy. Consequently it becomes imperative that Afrikaans writers should be made more aware of the enormous social responsibility they have to bear in addition to their normal human conscience as writers. *They have to prove to the world that the Afrikaans language can - and must - be something different from the language of apartheid.*

9. This may seem trivial. But I have become increasingly aware of a tendency among Afrikaans "highbrows" to refer to Africans as "Kaffers". A decade or so ago it was done universally, and not always with disrespect. Then the Establishment enforced the use of "Bantu". Now it seems to become the vogue again to prove how "verlig" one can be by saying "Kaffer" again. The simple point is that any word like Kaffer, Bantoe, etc. is a denial of the human individuality of another person (as American soldiers talk of Gooks and Viets - until they have so dehumanised the "enemy" that they can massacre women and children). It should be a simple but remarkably effective remedy to consciously propagate the use of the words "man", "woman" and "child" for anybody in this country, irrespective of colour. In situations where, for some reason, it is absolutely imperative to distinguish colour (and I think one will discover that there are surprisingly few such situations), it should be easy to refer to a black man or a white woman or brown child. I have said that this seems trivial. But a word is a sympton of an entire attitude; and perhaps one can eventually change attitudes by simply startting with elementary words respecting the humanity of people.

We live in a dissatisfied country, an unhappy country, a violent and tragically splintered country. But basically we all be-

long   here   - and nowhere else. There are enormous differences
between us, but all differences can be eliminated consciously
by love and understanding. And love and understanding can
emerge from cultural maturity. This can arise from a true inter-
action of indigenous and foreign cultures. One need never assume
that   another   person is in all ways similar to oneself, blinding
oneself to differences. But it can be fatal to see another as so
completely different from oneself that one defies not only his
humanity but one's own. I believe that we are heading for a vio-
lent explosion. But I also believe that it can still be avoided -
not by evasion or illusion, but by creative preparation. The very
unrest and dissatisfaction so evident all round us can be moulded
into creativity in order to arrive finally at a truly vital South
African culture.

ECONOMICS OF SEPARATE

DEVELOPMENT

robin siedle

PART I - BANTUSTANS

A.   DEVELOPMENTS DURING 1968

On paper, separate development is now virtually complete. Ten Bantu homelands which are to make up the future Bantustans have been nominated, and 1968 saw some major strides in the tidying-up of the necessary legislation together with new enabling acts which will make it possible to steer these territories towards independence.

There was however, little evidence of progress towards the goal to halt the flow of Africans to White areas, so that the policy was dubbed by many as one of "Separate non-development".

Another notable feature of the past year was the rising chorus of critics (chiefly amongst Afrikaans supporters) who felt that separate development was proceeding too slowly.

The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M.C. Botha said to the South African Economic Society on November 1 1968 "Development of the Bantu homelands is the greatest single problem in South Africa". In similar vein the State President, Mr. J.J. Fouche said in Pretoria in November 1968 that Whites must learn to accept economic and fiscal sacrifices inherent in separate development to show that they were in earnest.

The policy of separating the races in South Africa, known as "Separate Development", rests on three cornerstones:-

1. Legal   and   residential separation in cities and other White areas.

The denial of rights in White areas can be justified only if Africans are given a valid alternative. The aim of the present policy is not to achieve complete partition, but simply to create a "focal point" for Africans, and to strive to persuade Africans to accept the reserved areas as their own. This effort leads to the second cornerstone of the policy.

2. Creation of Bantustans

Mr. M.C. Botha has now defined ten areas for Bantu homelands.

> Transkei
> Ciskei
> Tswanaland
> Ovamboland (S.W.A.)
>
> North Sotho
> Venda
> Shangaan
> Swazi
> South Sotho
>
> Zululand

Comments:-

The Transkei is already described as "independent".
The Ciskei and Tswanaland were set on the road to independence in 1968, as was Ovamboland in South West Africa.
The next group - from North Sotho to South Sotho - will be set on the road to independence shortly.

3. Border areas

The Border areas policy was first formulated by Dr. Verwoerd in the 1950's when he was Minister of Native Affairs. It seeks to overcome the political problems associated with White capital entering the homelands by encouraging Whites to invest in the border areas.

B. LEGISLATIVE BASIS OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT

The following laws or measures took shape in 1968.

a) Promotion of the Economic Development of the Bantu Home-lands Act 1968

This set up three types of corporations to develop the home-lands - Ethnic corporations for national units: investment corporations like the Bantu Investment Corporation; and cor-porations to cover all types of development. The chief pur-pose is to channel in investment, including White capital and ideas, on an agency basis.

b) Bantu Labour Regulations (Bantu Areas) 1968

These provide for tribal, district and territorial bureaux in the homelands. All workers will be registered at bureaux in their homelands and will need permission from a labour official to move outside their tribal area.

c) The Tswana Territorial Authority Regulations (promulgated June 1968)

This set up the departments of finance, community services, works, education, agriculture and justice. The first session of the Tswana territorial authority was opened by Mr. M.C. Botha on December 12, 1968.

d) The Ciskeian Territorial Authority Regulations (promulgated June 12, 1968)

Set up structure like that for Tswanaland and was opened on November 14 1968.

(Both the Tswanaland and Ciskeian authorities are forerunners of a Transkei type independent government. Both will use White officials until Bantu have been trained to take over.)

e) The Development of Self-government for Native Nations in South West Africa Act 1968

This defined different areas for different nations and govern-ing bodies, and paved the way for the establishment of an Ovamboland Council and the creation of certain powers of self-government.
The first session of the Ovamboland Legislative council open-ed October 17 1968.
Press comment:- Ovamboland is a composite unit and ''does have a faint credibility as a possible Bantustan''.
Population of Ovamboland - 271 000 people.

f) Border areas

Additional concessions were announced and new areas were
defined. Most important - all existing and new border area
concessions are to apply to the Bantu homelands.

C.   CRITICS OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT

1. *Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut in "Volkshandel",* in December
    said:-

    (i)   Africans are being integrated in increasing numbers in
           White areas.
    (ii)   Africans are entering commerce at an increasing rate
           especially office and clerical posts in wholesale, light
           industry and business houses.
    (iii) To develop Bantustans co-operative farming is needed
           to modernize methods, plus White capital and enterprise.
    (iv)   The African population in agriculture are not even pro-
           ducing sufficient food for their own use.
    (v)   The increase in agricultural production is not keeping
           pace with the increasing population of the Bantustans.

2. *Other comments*

    South Africans accept the Bantustans as a device to remove
    a few million Africans from established White areas but do
    not accept (a) the promise of full independence or (b) the
    denial of rights for Africans in White areas.

3. *Woord en Daad* - Organ of the Afrikaanse Calvinistiese Be-
    weging.

    This warned of the danger of removals and said if Africans
    were to be "cooped up in these primitive conditions ... a very
    dangerous situation will develop".

4. *Frictions over Bantustans are defined as:-*

    (a) Matanzima versus Pretoria. (Development too slow).
    (b) Right Wing Nationalists versus Government. (Bantustans
         too expensive and independence feared).

5. *Other critics*

    United Party - Bantustans should be given provincial status
    but not independence.
    Randburg - Attempts to remove Africans from this Nationalist
    area were strenuously resisted.
    Pietersburg - The attempt to make Pietersburg the first "White

by Night" town was not enthusiastically received. Prominent town people suggested that the scheme should be pursued as slowly as possible - to cover say ten years - and that the Government should wait for alternative accommodation to become available for Africans.

The chief objection to the policy was that it would be inconvenient for Whites.

D. POLICY STATEMENTS

Dr Carel de Wet, Minister of Mines, Planning and Health - Speech to Annual Chamber of Industries - December 6 1968:-

"It is not the Government's policy for the African to lay claim to skilled work in White areas".

Deputy Minister, A.H. Vosloo (Bantu Development) -

"Ten new towns and cities reached an advanced stage of planning in Bantu areas".

E. POPULATION STATISTICS

1. Total Population (mid-1967 estimates)

White	3,640,268
Coloured	1,829,521
Asian	565.151
Bantu	12,690,354

2. Growth 1960 - 1967

	WHITES			BANTU		
	1960	1967	+ %	1960	1967	+ %
Urban	2,581,731	3,133,507	+21.37	3,471,233	4,413,429	+27.14
Rural	506,761	506,761	—	7,456,689	8,276,925	+11.00
TOTAL	3,089,492	3,640,268	17.82	10,927,922	12,690,354	+16.12

Comment: In absolute terms growth of Africans in urban areas (942,196) outstripped that of Whites (551,776) from 1960 - 1967. As a percentage, the growth rate of Africans in urban areas increased 27.14% during the same period while Whites increased 21.37%. The ratio of Black to White in urban areas has increased from 13.4 : 10 in 1960 to 14 : 10 in 1967. In Johannesburg the African population has increased from 395,000 in 1946 to 774,000 in 1967, when Whites totalled only 477,000.

Capital expenditure on housing and other essential services for Africans in Johannesburg has increased from R46,000,000 in

1962 to R60,000,000 in 1967. From these figures it can be seen that the flow of Africans to urban areas has not even been slowed down.

Die Burger:- ''The trek therefore is still in the wrong direction''.

3. Population movement since the National Party came to power

Africans	1951	1960	1967
Total	8,560,083	10,927,922	12,690,354
Transkei	1,269,277	1,407,815	Not available
Zululand	· 409,343	550,195	'' ''
Urban	2,390,586	3,471,233	4,413,429
Rural	6,169,497	7,456,689	8,276,925

Notes:- Population of the Transkei is only 1.4m although there are 3.5m Xhosa in South Africa as a whole. The population given for Zululand in 1960 was 550 thousand - there are 3.2m Zulus in total.

The African population in the urban areas has almost doubled between 1951 - 1967; from 2.39m to 4.41m.

4. Press comments on statistics

The Tomlinson report in 1955 predicted that within 25 - 30 years (by 1980 - 1985) the Bantustans could support 10m Africans. In 1960 the population of the Bantustans was 5.3m. The increase in the Bantustan population has not been fast enough.

Of the 1.4m Africans in the Transkei only 32,200 find employment outside of agriculture against 278,000 Africans from the Transkei who are employed in White South Africa. Of the Africans employed inside the Transkei 1,700 are employed in industry and nearly half of these are in Government employment.

F.   WHITE CAPITAL FOR BANTUSTANS

Die Beeld:- 'The money of the White investors and the big industrialists must be inspanned in the homelands'.

The extension of border area concessions to homelands was an important step. However, conditions under which White capital will be admitted are still very stringent. They may be summarized as follows:-

(a) No freehold for White concerns is allowed.
(b) Foreign capital not admitted.

   (c) The Government owns the land and buildings.
   (d) Companies must not operate "exclusively to their own advantage".
   (e) Large concentrations of White workers and their families must be avoided.
   (f) Companies must pay a share of profits (if they ever make them) to the Government or the local African authority.
   (g) Africans must be employed and promoted rapidly.
   (h) Companies will eventually be taken over by the Africans.
   (i) Conditions on which Companies will eventually sell out are very loosely defined - the general idea is that the investors will be given enough time to establish a viable company and to redeem their original capital.

The result is that only two contracts have been signed for White capital to enter. One is a sawmill near Empangeni and the other is a dolomite quarry in the same area.

G.   EMPLOYMENT IN THE BANTUSTANS

Mr M.C. Botha announced that over six years 945 new jobs had been created. The Tomlinson report estimated that 30,000 new industrial jobs were needed *each year* over the next 25 - 30 years. This would stimulate another 20,000 jobs a year in service industries. Thus the creation of jobs needed over six years was 6 x 50 = 300,000 (compare this with the actual creation of 945).

Professor   Sadie   of Stellenbosch said that to cope with the population increase of the Bantustans and to bring about a 5% reduction in the number of Africans in urban areas every year, 1,086,000 jobs would need to be created in the Bantustans over six years - or 181,000 jobs a year.

Total Investment by the Bantu Investment Corporation to date has been R11m, thus the cost of placing each African in industrial employment has been R11,500.

The cost of financing employment for Africans in border areas has been cheaper, working out to R5,000 a head for the 44,600 new jobs created over seven years. (This includes Durban/Pinetown, Phalaborwa and Rosslyn).

Comment by Mr A.J.J. Wessels of the Afrikaanse Sakekamer - technical and trade schools are needed for Bantu homelands. For instance, Veka Textile factory, to be established in 1969, will pay monthly wages of R½m within five years.

H.   COST OF BANTUSTANS

Mrs Helen Suzman defined three hidden costs of apartheid:-

(i)   The army of civil servants. (compare employment figures with other countries).

(ii)   Prison costs.
Unproductive employment of Africans arising from job restraints on their mobility.

White farmers have complained about Africans leaving their farms to find employment in Bantustans. The Potgietersrust branch of the Nationalist Party tabled the motion on this at the Nationalist Party Congress.

I.   JOB LAWS

The Business Times barometer of November 24 1968, found that 86% of South African businessmen believe that to varying degrees, the private sector ignores the requirements of the Government's job reservation policies and laws. The percentage of Whites as a total of the manufacturing labour force fell as follows:-

1961	30%
1967	25%
1971	20% (projected)

J.   MIGRATORY SYSTEM

This was singled out by Dr Edgar Brookes as the biggest single objection to separate development.

K.   HEDGING OPERATIONS

Government spokesmen have already begun to hedge on the prediction that by 1978 the flow of Africans to the White areas will have ceased. Mr Blaar Coetzee, Minister of Community Development, said during 1968, that *the flow would be stopped by 1978* - if not, by 1979 or 1980. He said in September 1968, to the Isando Industrialists Association, that the Government was planning 200 years ahead to prevent industrial areas becoming choked as in the United Kingdom.

Spokesmen are also saying that if *industries* establish themselves in Bantustans and Border areas by 1978 they would absorb the natural increase of Africans in these areas. If not, two million Africans would drift into White areas by 1978. The Minister for Economic Affairs, Mr Haak, said to the Transvaal Chamber of Industries in November 1968 that industrialists were *not co-operating* sufficiently with the Government in diversifying industry and developing Border areas.

Finally, Mr Oppenheimer has been attacked for frustrating the separate development programme by not investing in Border areas.

L. NEW HOMELANDS:

Kwa-Mashu, Durban's biggest African township is to be declared a Bantu homeland in which Africans will be able to own freehold land.

Population 110,000.

This conveniently overcomes the problem of excess Africans in White areas by defining part of the town as a Bantustan.

M. THEMES OF GOVERNMENT POLICY STATEMENTS

1967:   Consolidation impossible.
        New definition of Bantustans, not as composite *geo*-graphical units, but as focal points for various African "Nations".

1968:   Blaming industry for their failure to decentralise. Because Physical Planning did not work.
        Criticism by Afrikaner intellectuals.

PART II

BORDER AREAS

A. SECOND PHASE

The development of border areas is entering a second phase in which the Government is attempting to shift the focus from growth points adjacent to established cities to growth points in remoter areas.

The new phase combines increased incentives with increased threats to industrialists. This has been characterised by Volkshandel (the official journal of the Handelsinstituut, November 1968) as the "thumbscrew-and-carrot policy".

B.   NEW BORDER AREAS

Ladysmith has been designated as a growth point. It is the key to the future Tugela basin and all concessions apply. The I.D.C. will develop it in co-operation with the Permanent Committee and the Town Council. This will be the first step towards the development of the entire Tugela basin. Encouragement will also be given to Colenso, Escourt and Newcastle.

Brits and Rustenburg are the other areas which have been nominated. They are to be an alternative to further development at Rosslyn.

C.   ADDITIONAL CONCESSIONS

1. A rail rebate of 15% is available for special areas. (Only the Transkei and Ciskei have been named to date).
2. Additional tax and investment allowance are available, or, as an alternative, an income tax holiday for a maximum period of five years for factories which establish themselves before October 1 1970.
3. In a radical departure, all these concessions were extended to industries which might be established *inside* the homelands.

D.   I.D.C. REPORT

The 1968 report of the I.D.C. defined the task of Border areas policy very clearly.

It stated that from 1971, 23,500 Africans will need to be absorbed annually into border industries (to date only 7,000 have been absorbed each year). The I.D.C. will participate in industries which will absorb 11,000 of this total annually. The I.D.C. participation will involve R27.5m of I.D.C. capital a year.

The I.D.C. concluded that an investment of R80m will be needed each year to provide employment for 23,500 Africans.

The I.D.C. report added only 20% of the total amount normally invested by all undertakings in metropolitan areas will need to be applied in decentralised industries .

The source of this R80m estimate is obscure. In 1967 gross domestic investment totalled R2,071m; that by private business enterprises was R1,182m; However, R80m is 20% of total private investment in manufacturing and construction, which was R404m. This is not, however, the total amount normally invested by *all undertakings*.

E.   RESULTS ACHIEVED

Results quoted in the Financial Gazette were:-

Area	New industrial undertakings	New workers	Investment
Rosslyn	44	5,300 Africans	R34 m.
Hammarsdale	13	7,000 Africans	No value given
Pietermaritzburg	19		
	(13 expanded)	2,500 Africans	R35.4 m
		1,900 Indians	
		4,900 Total	
East London	23		
Kingwilliamstown	(20 expanded)	13,000 Africans	No value given
Queenstown area			

F.   OFFICIAL ESTIMATE OF TOTAL INVESTMENT

Mr Haak, in answer to a question in Parliament, gave these figures for total investment in Border areas.

	R millions.
Government	86
I.D.C.	52
Private industry	243
Escom	45
	R426

Mr Haak also said that it was not Government policy to establish specific border areas. He insisted that it was Government policy to assist industry in *any* suitable areas. He gave a list of 24 existing growth points.

G.   DR P.S. RAUTENBACH

Dr P.S. Rautenbach, Chairman of the Permanent Committee, produced the most favourable report on border areas in his official report for 1967. He said that first one had to stop the flow of job-seeking Africans to urban areas. He said the increase in the number of economically active males in South Africa as a whole was 58,000 a year. The corresponding increase in the homelands was 35,000 a year. Assuming that only 1 in 4 need be employed in industry, the number of jobs to be created each year on border areas was $\frac{35,000}{4}$ or 9,000 a year. He concluded that the shortfall was not serious as 7,000 a year had been created up to 1967.

H.   NEAR BIG CITIES

The major result of border areas development to date has been seen in Rosslyn (near Pretoria), in Hammarsdale (near Durban), and in Pietermaritzburg. These are all near urban white cities. The Financial Gazette commented "in time to come, most of these border areas will simply merge in the metropolitan areas and towns upon the fringe of which they are situated; and consequently, the end result of a substantial part of the border areas programme will eventually boil down to a movement of factories within one enlarged industrial complex".

I.   THREATS TO INDUSTRIALISTS

Mr Haak - November 1968: told the Federated Chamber of Industries that industrialists were not co-operating sufficiently with the Government in diversifying industry and developing border areas.

The judgement by Justice Maisels in the City Deep (Johannesburg) arbitration was most significant in that one major issue was whether or not the new Physical Planning Act would indeed inhibit the proclamation of new industrial areas on the Reef. After hearing experts from every walk of life Justice Maisels concluded that the prospects of obtaining industrial rights were in fact greatly diminished.

J.   PROFESSOR HORWOOD

On November 26 1968, Professor Horwood made two significant points:-

1. *Export industries* may be hampered by the border area policy, because decentralisation could push up costs. These higher costs would not only affect goods produced for the industries, thus affecting export prices as well.

2. Decentralisation could in fact decrease *employment opportunities,* especially for unskilled labourers. At present unskilled labourers are chiefly dependent on obtaining employment in mining and agriculture, and both these sectors are showing a falling growth rate. (Therefore, industrial development is vital to create jobs, and should not be hampered by ideology).

K.   DISADVANTAGES

The disadvantages in the drive to promote border areas remain as follows:-

1. Industrialists fear the *political risk* that their border area might one day be consolidated into a Bantustan.
2. *Costs* for allied services are very much higher in a border area.
3. The *lack of facilities* for executives, such as schools for children, clubs, golf courses and so on, are a deterrent.
4. If investment is concentrated in border areas there will be little over for Bantustans - There is a *clash* here.
5. Facilities for factory maintenance are inadequate.
6. There is a lack of infrastructure (telephones, water, transport, housing and power).
7. Excess   capacity   exists in many factories in White areas - in these circumstances decentralisation is unlikely.

PART III

TOWARDS A SOLUTION

Only one   conclusion can be drawn from figures which are available to date. This is that the economic integration of Black and White in South Africa is proceeding with little diminution. The ratio of Africans to White in White cities is increasing annually - the degree of dependence on Black unskilled and semi-skilled labour in White areas is also increasing. There have been a few modest instances of reducing the number of Blacks employed in industry in certain cities, but this has invariably been outweighed by the intake of Blacks into commerce.

The first question is whether it is too early to judge results and whether the pattern will soon begin to alter dramatically. .There is little evidence to support this. In fact integration will probably gather momentum as South Africa progresses industrially.

The   debate   about Bantustans and border areas is therefore entering a barren area. Arguments about whether or not these projects are having their effect are fruitless, as the facts are self-evident. The important priority now is to shift the debate away from the barren area of juggling with figures. *Some* degree of economic integration must be expected. This does not mean that

Bantustans or border areas must be abandoned. Indeed they should be pursued more vigorously and more systematically.

The fact that some integration in White areas will remain should be recognized and accepted as a fact.

The problem then becomes one of making the facts politically acceptable. Here it is a question of placating the right wing of both the major political parties.

The solution may be to harness the power of semantics. The race separation statisticians can be satisfied by shifting blocks of Africans from the White cities (or debit side) of the balance sheet on to the Bantu areas (or credit side). All that is needed is to re-define more industrial growth points as border areas, and the African populations near to them as Bantustans. In Border areas, Rosslyn (near Pretoria) Hammarsdale (near Durban) and Pietermaritzburg are already good examples. Some more can be found. In 1968, Durban's biggest township, Kwa Mashu (population 110,000) was declared a Bantu homeland and freehold rights were extended to residents. Another step which has been suggested is to give similar status to Soweto, Johannesburg's giant 600,000 dormitory. This shift of 600,000 from one side of the balance sheet to the other in fact improves the balance by 1,200,000.

DIRECTION OF ECONOMIC FORCES

Right up to the end of the third quarter of 1970 economic forces continued to point towards an increase in the economic integration of the races, and to an undiminished need for African labour in the White cities.

At the same time the support of Nationalist Party followers for the policy of separate development tended to lose its fervour as the country's economic troubles - rising cost of living, increased deficit on current account, and reduced private investment - were increasingly identified with the labour shortage in White areas.

The basic economic fact is that jobs are still being created at a faster rate in the White areas than in Bantustans or border areas and the gap is tending to widen rather than diminish.

MODERNIZATION AND APARTHEID

f. van zyl slabbert

A. THE POLICY OF HOMELAND DEVELOPMENT

(a) Introduction

SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT is a blanket-term which in its ideological reference is aimed at the separation of black and white population groups in general and, in particular, the separation of non-white ethnic or "colour" communities. As far as possible this separation is implemented on all levels of social contact - from the use of different facilities in the daily routine to the creation of separate political and economic institutions.

The overriding emphasis of the policy is one of *separation* and more specific policies can only be understood against the background of this general ideological principle. Thus the policy of economic decentralization or "Border Industrial Development" is primarily of importance insofar as it facilitates this separation and only secondarily insofar as it accommodates industrial overcentralization. Recently Dr. P.S. Rautenbach, who is on the Economic Advisory Board of the Prime Minister, made this point clear when he stated that the motivations for border industrial development in South Africa went beyond "pure economic values" and was "part of our traditional way of life" [1].

The same applies to the policy of "Homeland Development". In terms of the ideology it would be self-defeating should the development of these areas result in institutions which are shared by the different population groups. Homeland development is primarily of importance insofar as it facilitates separation and only secondarily so insofar as it raises the level of economic development of these areas. The Commissioner General of the Northern Sotho Group, Dr W.W.M. Eiselen, for example interprets the policy as nothing else but the creation of separate opportunities for national units which are already separated from one another in a "natural way".[2]

Propagandists for the policy of separate development are thus misleading when they argue that "Border Industrial Development" and "Homeland Development" are but specific instances of the universal problems of economic decentralization and development. Both Rautenbach ("The motivations for industrial decentralization programmes are therefore basically the same in different countries where the problem of retardedness is apparent.")[3] and Eiselen ("Just as the principles of intellectual growth are universally the same, the principles of economic growth are equal for all.")[4] make this subtle shift of emphasis. The point is that on the assumption that there are "general principles" available for decentralization and economic growth, these are subordinate to the basic postulates of the policy of separate development. Confusion of this point leads to the erroneous inference that criticisms of the Border Industry and Homeland Development policies imply the rejection of economic decentralization and development in general.

(b) The Rationale for Homeland Development

The underlying question is of course: Why separation? A number of justifications have already been given: "fear of black domination", "miscegenation", "cultural diversity", "maintenance of white identity" etc. [5] These generalized beliefs are the results of major political, educational, economic and other differences that coincide with differences in colour between various population groups. The defenders of separate development ascribe a collective uniqueness or "differentness" to the white population which they regard as irreconcilable with the collective uniqueness or "differentness" which they ascribe to the various non-white population groups. To what extent conceptualizations of these different collective characteristics are rationalizations for the preservation of the politically and economically advantageous position of the white group is not so important for the ideological argument. For in terms of the latter, Se-

parate Development embodies a policy which provides for the
maintenance of the separate "uniqueness" of the different popu-
lation groups in a special way. That is why the concept of "own
identity" plays such a crucial role in motivations for the policy.
This is a very cloudy and politically emotional concept which
presumably refers to common cultural traits shared by various
groups. Spelling these traits out in terms of observable social
relationships does not appear to be politically advisable as it
could create voter dissension amongst the whites. It is highly
questionable for e.g. that a common "identity'" could be formu-
lated which would satisfy the aspiration of all the whites or the
various non-white population groups in the cultural sense of the
word. Nevertheless it is the ideology's concern with "own cultu-
ral identity" which justifies Eiselen's inference that Separate
Development is not based on race discrimination or racial aware-
ness but on group identity and awareness of the role of cultural
differences. [6] The rationale for the general policy implies there-
fore that different ethnic (cultural) communities have to be sepa-
rated from one another and should experience modernization
separately because: (a) the different communities have different
life styles, cultural traits and expectations and (b) this cultural
diversity on the part of the non-white population groups poses a
threat for the "identity" of the whites should this heterogeneous
pattern be accommodated within common institutional frameworks.

It is this 'threat' which the policy of Homeland Development
is supposed to diminish. That is why Kitshoff argues that the
very existence of the whites depends on the influx of non-whites
to the cities being stopped and redirected to their various home-
lands. [7] For there, De Wet Nel, then Minister of Bantu Adminis-
tration, argued in 1951 when introducing the Bantu Authorities
Act, "...we have a basis on which the native will henceforth be
able to give expression to his own inner self, to develop his fa-
mily life and his national life". [8]

More than 10 years later (1965) the Department of Bantu Edu-
cation conceptualized its policy with the same emphasis:

> It has been constantly borne in mind that the development of
> the Bantu and their homelands must be firmly rooted in their
> own cultural institutions and customs with due regard to their
> right to self determination. [9]

In short, separation is necessary because of cultural diver-
sity. Only against this ideological justification can the recent
Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act [10] be appreciated as well as
any major attempts at the economic development of the "home-
land" areas. [11] The Transkei is the homeland area which thus

far has experienced the implementation of this policy to the
greatest extent and will be the subsequent source of illustration.

(c) The Paradox in the Policy

    What are the traditional cultural traits of the Xhosa of the
Transkei? Strauss [12] emphasizes the following characteristics:
They are community centred with a very low level of institutional
specialization; they have an extended matrilineal kinship system
where leadership is hereditarily determined; non-Christian Xhosa
enter into polygamous marriages with a system of communal land
tenure; there is a patriarchial political structure and laws and
mores   are   a reflection of tribal traditions. In short, the typical
characteristics   of   a tradisionalistic society. Presumably if the
term "own identity" refers to anything at all as far as the Xhosa
are concerned, it should refer to these characteristics. Conse-
quently the policy of Homeland Development is to a large extent
concerned   with   making constitutional provision for the mainte-
nance of this traditional "identity" of the Xhosa. At the same
time provision is made for the economic development of the Trans-
kei and Pepler states that:

> The rate at which the development programmes in the Bantu
> Homelands can be implemented with success, depends to a very
> large extent upon the rate at which the people can be trained
> and educated to fulfil the diversity of tasks which they will have
> to shoulder. [13]

    These goals in the policy of Homeland Development are in a
paradoxical relationship to one another insofar as an attempt is
made to maintain traditionalistic cultural patterns and to modern-
ize economically. This paradox is underlined by the changes that
take place in the social structures of societies undergoing the pro-
cess of modernization. A considerable degree of consensus
exists amongst social scientists [14] that the degree of moderniza-
tion cannot only be measured in economic terms. Industrialization
is undoubtedly linked with the large scale production of goods
and services but such a process presupposes a social structure
where inter alia the factors of production can be freely appro-
priated, bureaucratic administration is possible, and extensive
technical training is provided for. Thus attempts have been made
to measure the level of modernization of a country in terms of
indicators such as the ratio between doctors and the population,
the number of cars, television sets, schools, hospitals, the size
of cities and extent of transport and communication. [15]

    The underlying assumption is, of course, that whatever the
original differences between traditionalistic societies they begin

to exhibit common structural characteristics when drawn into the process of modernization. These changes occur in the central institutional spheres of the society, for example: [16]

(a) In agriculture - the change from a subsistence economy to a market economy.

(b) In education - the change from kinship-dominated instruction to specialized educational institutions emphasizing secular goal achievement.

(c) In industry - the change from production through use of animal power for localized consumption to bureaucratic production for mass consumption through the use of inanimate sources of power.

(d) In politics - the change from traditional or ascriptive access to centres of decision making to the extension of political participation on more universalistic bases.

These changes do not imply that modernizing societies become similar in all respects but they do imply that in terms of the abovementioned spheres they become less different from one another. The basic fact is that no traditionalistic society can attempt modernization without bringing about changes in agriculture, education, production and/or political organization.

An important aspect of contemporary modernization which has a definite impact on the particular course the process takes in a society, is the role of deliberate large scale state planning. Contrary to the gradual and almost voluntary way in which modernization occurred in Western Europe and the U.S.A., [17] it is today the result of deliberate state planning with a much faster tempo and coalescence of events. Such planning implicitly uses a "theory" or model in terms of which society is reconstructed.[18] That is why foreign powers compete so strongly for the favours of, for example, African States. This is to ensure that the 'right' model is used in attempts at modernization.

Returning to the South African policy of Homeland Development it should be clear that attempts to maintain the traditionalistic characteristics of the Xhosa of the Transkei are bound to conflict with attempts at economic modernization. In addition, the modernizing elites in South Africa are whites and any advice and aid given will necessarily reflect their conceptions of how agricultural practices, educational curriculums, political processes and industrial production should be conducted in a modernizing society. Some idea of this "model" can be gained from the prerequisites for full independence stated by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development in April 1968: [19]

''(a) Considerable administrative experience in management and control of government departments;

(b) deep rooted reliability in all actions, particularly in control of financing or budgeting;

(c) integrity of purpose in public affairs - from the highest to the lowest official;

(d) a democratic way of life and a sense of complete responsibility;

(e) control and management of all fields of administration by its own citizens;

(f) economic development and provision of jobs for its own people by its own government;

(g) a firm desire for peaceful co-existence.''

The role of the whites as modernizing elites in South Africa should not be underestimated. Hasty analogies with other colonial countries are bound to ignore distinctive features of the South African situation. In most post independence phases in other colonial countries there was a sharp reaction against the continued existence of colonial structures. This necessitated a great deal of adaptation to more traditionalistic and sectional interests on the part of the new indigenous leaders, often leading to the temporary breakdown of modernizing processes. In South Africa there is a much longer and more extensive exposure to colonial influences. Secondly, the white elite groups have no ambivalence with regard to the duration of their existence in South Africa. Consequently it would be unrealistic to imagine that within the immediate future there would be a more or less complete withdrawal of ''colonial'' influence in order to allow a more autonomous play of black traditional and other sectional interests in shaping new social structures. For a long time in the past and for some time in the future white interests and aspirations have and will infringe on whatever traditionalistic characteristics continue to exist amongst the various non-white population groups and a ''white model'' will serve as a frame of reference for modernization.

Recapping, it appears that the dilemma of the policy of Homeland Development is reflected in the following points:

(a) The rationale for the policy is to maintain the cultural diversity of the various non-white population groups.

(b) The Xhosa of the Transkei have, as a distinct ethnic community, a traditionalistic social structure.

(c) Insofar as the white government modernizes the Transkei, they are bound to change the traditions of the Xhosa.

(d) These changes imply that traditional practices in agriculture, education, industry, politics, etc. are superceded by practices similar to those of the whites in these spheres.

In order to give some validity to these propositions a tentative analysis of changes that have taken place on various levels in the Transkei since the adoption of the policy of Homeland Development, is necessary.

B.   DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TRANSKEI 1963-1970

(a) Political Change

(i) Before Partial Self-Government

Instability and the tendency to sub-division have been the distinctive features of traditional Nguni political units, [20] and there was very little sign of a permanently centralized political structure in the Western European sense of the word. Authority structures that developed over and above the level of chieftainship were thus based on criteria other than the traditional ones of the Xhosa. The typical pattern that developed in this stage was on the one hand traditional administrative units linked with one another in terms of widening scope of authority, for example from household to location to chieftainship, and on the other hand, superceding this traditional structure, a bureaucratic magisterial district system administered and controlled by the whites.

Another development was finalized in 1931 with the institution of the United Transkei Territorial Council or Bunga which consisted of the chief magistrate of the Transkei who was also chairman, 26 magistrates (one from each district), and 3 members elected by the Xhosa from each District Council. The chiefs of Eastern and Western Pondoland as well as Tembu served as ex-officio members on the Bunga which brought its total membership to 108. The function of the Bunga was originally confined to discussing and expressing opinion on matters affecting the local population, but in 1932 its scope was extended to the discussion of any proposed legislation affecting Africans. Its resolutions were reviewed by a conference of official members - that is magistrates - before being submitted to the governor-general for his information. The Bunga had limited control over locally raised funds, which were allocated mainly for road building and other public works, agricultural improvements and scholarships. [21]

Up to 1951, thus, a mixture of traditional and western political structures existed in the Transkei with control ultimately

vested in white power. It is significant that already with the Bunga system a tension was felt between traditional and modern structures. Two constant topics of debate were the ultimate political representation of the Africans in the white political structure and the role and status of the chiefs.[22]

In 1955 the Bunga decided to accept the Bantu Authorities system provided by the government. This system consisted of the following tiers of authority: at the lowest level there was the tribal authority headed by a chief, above this was a district authority with a group of chiefs as governing body. On this followed a regional authority with the relevant tribal and district authorities. On the highest level was the territorial authority. [23]

The Bantu Authorities system thus laid particular emphasis on the traditional power structures of the Xhosa. Despite this, however, Strauss maintains that the smooth functioning of this system was hampered by the conflict between modern and traditional elements in the system itself.[24]

On 21 April 1961 the Transkei Territorial Authority passed a resolution asking the government of the Republic for self-government. Events followed quickly after this and a constitution for the Transkei was developed. [25] The Legislative Assembly would consist of 4 Paramount Chiefs, a maximum of 60 additional Chiefs and 45 elected members. Certain departments remain under the direct control of the central government, for example defence, police, and foreign affairs, while the white government has indirect control over the Legislative Assembly insofar as the law determines that the government has the right to acknowledge, appoint and dismiss chiefs.

Of particular importance, however, is the linking of traditional and western oriented political structures. The 45 elected members imply elections, registration of voters, creation of political parties, etc. In 1963 the first elections were held in the Transkei.

(ii) The First Elections

Of the 2,469,000 Africans in 1960 who were politically defined as citizens of the Transkei, 1,372,000 were in the area as against 1,097,000 outside. [26] Anyone over the age of 21 could vote as well as taxpayers from the age of 18. Of the 1,150,000 eligible to vote, 500,000 were outside the territory as against 650,000 inside. Total registration was 72% with 97% registering inside the territory and 50% outside. Of the total electorate 53% were women. [27]

The implications of the above figures are important. For the

first time, 72% of the adult Xhosa population were involved in
a typically western oriented political process where democratic
election and universal franchise were basic aspects of political
participation. The extension of political awareness and partici-
pation are defining features of political modernization and it is
questionable whether the idea of a qualified franchise would
ever again be an attractive one for the Xhosa.

The fact that deposits of R20 had to be paid did not prevent
180 candidates from standing in the election. Headmen and farm-
ers made up one-fifth of the candidates respectively whereas one
quarter were teachers. Only eight candidates lived outside the
Transkei. [28]

No political party played any significant role in the first
elections and loyalties around specific issues were more or less
divided in terms of support for the chiefs Poto and Matanzima.
The former wanted the Transkei to be part of a multi-racial South
Africa with common political participation whereas Matanzima
stood for independence and self-government for the Transkei.
The other candidates stood more or less as supporters for these
two.

It is difficult to make clearcut generalizations on trends in
the first elections. Carter et al. interpret the results as a clear
rejection of Separate Development, but a few factors make this
a problematical conclusion. One cannot ignore the lack of fami-
liarity of the Xhosa with this new form of political participation.
Were all the voters informed about the implications of the elect-
ion? Did they appreciate the difference between elected and ex-
officio members, the powers of the Legislative Assembly, etc.?
What is clear is that the results of the election proved to be a
personal victory for Poto. Of the 45 elected candidates, 35 could
be regarded as pro-Poto and early in the election Matanzima
switched his attention to winning the support of the ex-officio
members rather than any possible elected members. [29]

An important implication of the election was the fact that the
majority of the traditional headmen who stood for office were not
elected. [30] This meant that 'political' leaders served with tradi-
tional leaders on the Legislative Assembly - the former with
popular achieved support, the latter with ascribed traditional
support. A comparison between elected and ex-officio members
reveals that the elected members on the average were older, had
been outside the Transkei more often and for longer periods and
had a higher level of education than the ex-officio members. [31]

The percentage of "urban" votes returned is of significance.
Only one out of four of the voters in the urban areas voted, as

against 3 out of 4 in the homeland territory itself. [32] If it is kept in mind that just under half of the total Xhosa population were residents of the common area, then it appears that those who had been the most exposed to so-called Western influence were mainly indifferent to the elections of the Transkei. The fact that it was administratively more difficult to locate the urban Xhosa must, however, be kept in mind.

Shortly after the elections, on 11 December 1963 the Legislative Assembly was formally constituted. After this the Assembly split up into political parties on the principle of government and opposition with Matanzima heading the government and the Transkei National Independence Party and Poto heading the Democratic Party and the opposition.

(iii) Events until the Second Election in 1968

In 1964 the Transkei started with partial self-government endowed with political structures which differed greatly from the traditional tribal practices of the Nguni. Two aspects are of particular importance in the period 1964-69. The first concerns the relationship between traditional and "political" authority. The second, the role of Matanzima as head of the T.L.A.

With regard to the former, Strauss remarks:

> "A thorough study of the recent reports of the various state departments of the self-governing Transkei, as well as of the debates in the Legislative Assembly shows clearly that whereas the necessary acknowledgement is made to the traditional Xhosa structure, a political system is busy developing in the Transkei, that is in general, based on the modern Western democratic political system." (Translation) [33]

In contrast to the traditional ex-officio members, the elected members participate more fully in and dominate debate in the Assembly and Strauss concludes that the status of traditional members will become increasingly ambiguous in future.

As far as Matanzima is concerned, it is clear that despite beliefs to the contrary, he did not become a willing and unquestioning stooge for the white governmeht and started showing signs of independent action. On April 10, 1964, he told more than 600 cheering Tnembu tribesmen that the Transkeian government would see to it that the white towns were gradually taken over by Africans. [34] On May 15, 1964, he is reported to have said: "We want to withdraw the colonists from the Transkei and give power to the aborigines of the land." [35] These are hints at mobilizing support in terms of narrower black nationalism. That this nationalism is not necessarily limited only to the Xhosa is indicated by the

fact that according to reports, Matanzima in April 1969 indicated that if and when other homelands received independence, his government would invite them to form a federation of black areas in South Africa, with one prime minister. [36]

Another significant achievement of Matanzima's government is the fact that in June 1964 they accepted important recommendations of the Cingo commission regarding education in Transkei. This commission was created by the Department of Bantu Administration and Development in 1962 to inquire into appropriate educational methods for the Transkei. The recommendations accepted by the T.L.A. were that instruction in the tribal vernacular be substituted for either Afrikaans or English from the fifth school year onwards and that the Cape school syllabus be adopted. Thus two principles of the system of Bantu Education were rejected: instruction of African children in the tribal vernacular and separate educational systems for different ethnic units. It is important to note that vernacular instruction was rejected not because of a disregard for the traditional language, but because it was felt that the latter was not appropriate for instruction in modern technology and industrial practices. [37]

The importance of this decision by Matanzima's government should not be underestimated. In view of the almost common resistance of Xhosa and other Africans to the Bantu Education system, this decision in the face of government pressure and resistance, must have impressed the voters of the Transkei.

There are other indications of Matanzima's critical attitude towards the general policy of Separate Development. In 1964 he expressed the view that Border industrial development was an impractical attempt at creating economic development in the homeland areas and requested that "white" capital be allowed into the Transkei. [38] Afrikaans Sunday newspapers reacted sharply to this request, but today the principle is accepted. Matanzima also asked for a relaxation of influx control measures. [39]

The general expectation at the start of the second general election was that the anti-Matanzima Democratic Party would strengthen its position and possibly gain supremacy in the T.L.A. The results of a by-election held in November 1964 were a pointer in this direction, since the Democratic Party gained a big majority at that time. [40]

The result of the second general election was, however, an unqualified success for Matanzima. Three parties fought in the election and the results are reflected in Table 1. Matanzima strengthened his position in the Legislative Assembly by 26 votes and thereby had the majority also of the elected members. Considered against the background of events sketched above, the

results were not altogether surprising.

Table 1 [41]	Before the Election			Results of 2nd Election		
Parties	Chiefs	Elected	Total	Chiefs	Elected	Total
T.N.I.P.	56	15	71	56	28	84
D.P.	8	27	35	8	14	22
T.P.F.P.	-	2	2	-	-	-
Independents	-	1	1	4	3	3
Total	64	45	109	64	45	109

T.N.I.P. - Transkei National Independence Party
D.P.   - Democratic Party
T.P.F.P.- Transkei People's Freedom Party

The other parties more or less adopted the view that the present system was unsatisfactory, whereas Matanzima had the advantage of an administration in operation and any benefits accruing from it would be associated with his government. Even if Strauss is correct in maintaining that traditional loyalties were the dominant influence in patterns of political participation in the second general election, Matanzima's achievements as a political leader in the period between the two elections should not be underestimated.

(iv) Summary

The Transkei is well on the way to political modernization. This does not necessarily imply effective political control by the inhabitants of the area. It does signify that the structures of political participation have been laid down and that the principles of one-man-one-vote and political parties that function in a parliamentary system provide the bases in terms of which broader groups and strata will become increasingly involved in general problems of political decision making. With the relatively low level of differentiation of status groups, occupational strata, voluntary organizations, etc., it also means that problems will be channelled into the political arena in a generalized and undifferentiated manner. That is, problems such as educational facilities, job opportunities and housing are not limited to a certain section of the population, but are felt by most inhabitants, and to the extent that these problems become political issues broader groups will become more actively involved in the new political processes. In such circumstances it is highly unlikely that traditional authority structures will survive unchanged and more likely that demands for accountable political representation will increase.

(b) Developments in Education

Education was one of the departments placed under the control of the Transkei Legislative Assembly and mention has already been made of the recommendations of the Cingo commission. The white government still subsidizes education in the Transkei to a considerable extent and preference is given to the establishment of higher primary and primary schools in the homeland areas rather than in the common or "white" area.

By 1967 there were 1,588 schools in the Transkei with 1,517 Primary Schools, 45 Secondary Schools, 11 High Schools, 7 Trade Schools and 8 schools for the training of teachers. [42] Approximately 65-70% children of schoolgoing age attended schools in 1967. [43] According to Pepler there were 1,612 schools with 375,728 pupils in the Transkei in 1968. This means that 24 schools were built between 1967-68.

Indications are thus clear that the basis has been laid for the development of a highly differentiated educational system in the Transkei providing ordinary, advanced, commercial and technical training. It is also clear that for some time to come education in the Transkei will go through phases of considerable adjustment. The majority of pupils are still in the primary schools and in 1967 only 2,034 African pupils wrote Matriculation and Senior Certificate exams in the whole of South Africa. [44]

Table 2 gives some indication of the increase in number of pupils who wrote the Std. 6 exams in the period 1964-67 in the Transkei as well as the rate of failure. The latter remains disconcertingly high. In this regard Horrell calculates that although 85% of the children of the total African population between the ages 7-14 attended school in 1966, just over half of them would reach Std. II, one quarter Std. VI and one tenth would proceed to secondary schools. Factors that play an important role here are the general socio-economic position of the Africans, paucity of teachers and inadequate school facilities. [45]

Table 2 [46]

Std. 6 Exam	1964	1965	1966	1967
Number of candidates	10,781	11,065	11,279	12,443
Failure rate	47.6%	36.9%	49.2%	42.7%

As far as teachers are concerned, the Transkei had 6,258 African and 53 white teachers in 1964-65. [47] As is clear from Table 3, the general level of qualification of these teachers is poor; approximately 90% have an educational training lower than matric.

Table 3 [48] Level of Qualification of Teachers in Transkei

	1965	1967
University degree	2.14%	1.85%
Matric or similar qualification	7.60%	7.93%
Lower than matric	90.26%	90.22%
Total	100.00	100.00

Although the above figures underline grave educational problems in the Transkei, they also emphasize the importance of education as a medium of modernization. In the recent sitting of the Legislative Assembly (1970), Matanzima announced a seven point plan for the development of the Transkei. One of the points was that the educational system should be streamlined in order to promote economic development.

The emphasis on development is important. It indicates that in areas where traditionalistic practices of the Xhosa impede the process of modernization, they will be abandoned and that education based on "Western" curricula will prepare the inhabitants for the demands of development. However, it will take some time before any significant intellectual elite develops in the Transkei. Fort Hare is the university college that supplies the Transkei with higher education and between 1960 and 1968 the student enrolment increased from 360 to only 451. [49] Horrell points out that as far as existing students are concerned, there is general opposition to the policy of the white government and as a result of lack of contact with white students black nationalistic awareness is developing. [50] The strongest pressures for change can in future be expected from these students as well as from teachers in the Transkei.

It is generally accepted that education is an important lever to pry people loose from traditionalistic loyalties and to create new aspirations amongst them. [51] In the Transkei, education is based on the pattern of the white educational system. Curricula, methods of examination and teaching qualifications of the 'whites' serve as models to be achieved. Is it far-fetched to

conclude that to the extent that the Xhosa child progresses in education he will develop more or less the same aspirations as the average white child? If so, is it plausible to expect him to accept that the only reason why he will not enjoy the same opportunities to realize these aspirations is because of his particular cultural identity which he is asked to preserve?

The indications are petty clear that education as a medium of modernization will be high in the list of priorities in the Transkei. In fact, education was the most popular issue with virtually all the candidates of the first election. [52] In addition education is something which touches nearly every citizen of the Transkei. According to the Bantu Taxation and Development Act No. 38 every African male of 18 years and older who was domiciled in the Republic had to pay a basic tax of R3.50 p.a. from January 1959 as against R2.00 previously. From 1962 the total revenue collected in this fashion was given to Bantu Education.[53] It was also calculated that it cost an African parent ± R17.25 p.a. to send his child to a lower primary school; R28 p.a. to send the child to a higher primary school; R48 for a Junior Certificate and R65 p.a. for high school.[54]

As far as education in the Transkei is concerned, one can conclude that, given the particular importance attached to it by the local authorities, the almost universal involvement of the voters with education and the fact that it is run along Western principles of learning, it is not unrealistic to expect an intensification of modernistic aspirations amongst the Xhosa.

(d) Developments in Agriculture

It is in agriculture that the traditional practices of the Xhosa are particularly recalcitrant to change. Here a subsistence type of farming has for a long time produced only for local family consumption. Women are the traditional labourers in the lands which are communally owned by the tribe. The lobolo or bride barter system also led to the accumulation of inferior and unproductive cattle whose quantity rather than quality was stressed. [55] As a consequence, Pepler remarks:

> "The Bantu pattern of farming has been characterized by wrong use of land, inefficient methods of cultivation and animal husbandry practices, deteriorating soil fertility, soil erosion, low yields and a generally low standard of living. The fact that agriculture is so strongly bound with culture signifies in itself that, with agricultural development, complementary changes in the socio-cultural pattern must of necessity take place simultaneously." [56]

Such large scale development was recommended by the Tomlinson Commission in 1955, but at that time Dr. Verwoerd felt that if implemented it would undermine the whole tribal structure of the Africans and that any changes that were brought about had to be the responsibility of the Africans themselves. [57] The position of the Republican government has changed somewhat since and the principle is now accepted that the inhabitants of the Transkei should be divided into full-time farmers and other workers. Officials are however cautious not to bring about changes in agriculture contrary to traditionalistic pressures. To the extent that the results of modern farming practices in the planned areas have become known, a greater acceptance of the official agricultural policy has come about. [58]

This policy was succinctly restated in January 1970 and can be summarized as follows: (a) agricultural planning; (b) stabilization of land; (c) improved land utilization; (d) pr oper agro-economic surveys of land units; (e) agricultural education and training; (f) community development; (g) proper ext ension services. [59]

Given the backwardness of agriculture in the Transkei, impressive progress has been made toward the implementation of the policy. The problem of communal land still remains to a large extent. In 19 of the 26 districts the land is occupied under communal tenure, individual tenure being in force in the rest insofar as arable plots are concerned. In the latter areas plot-holders pay an annual quitrent. The principle of one man one plot applies. Subdivision is controlled, the land may not be dispossessed, and it may be forfeited if the holder is convicted of certain crimes or fails to pay his quitrent, or on account of non-beneficial occupation. It may not be mortgaged or pledged, nor may it be sold in execution of debt. It is inheritable according to a table of succession based on primo geniture. [60] One can expect that as long as property in this area is not disposable as a means of capital formation, development will be very slow.

Agricultural services and expert guidance is provided by the white government and in Tsolo an agricultural college provides training for African farmers. Training is also given for the planning of rural areas and the building of roads. [61] By 1968 approximately 37% (1,600,000 morgen) of the agricultural land in the Transkei had been fully planned. [62]

Despite the changes, the agricultural yield has remained low for example 3 bags of maize per morgen in 1968. [63] The point is, however, that up to the present most of the development has been concerned with laying the groundwork for future changes, i.e. to involve agriculture in the Transkei as fully as possible in a mar-

ket economy. In the process the most important problem has been to change traditional attitudes and practices in order to adjust to the demands of cash crop f arming.

(d) Secondary and Tertiary Development

(i) The Labour Force [64]

According to the report of the Transkei Department of the Interior for 1967 and 1968 the male population of the Transkei was approximately 700,000. Of these:

> 34.3% were under working age;
> 15.0% were aged or unfit;
> 15.0% were permanently on the land;
> 35.7% (about 250,000 men) constituted the labour potential.

Those employed within the Transkei as at 30 June 1968 (excluding certain self employed professional persons) were:

	Men	Women	Total
Urban areas	12,309	5,655	17,964
Rural areas	15,638	8,024	23,662
Total	27,947	13,679	41,626

In 1966 the distribution of labour over various sectors was as follows:

Sector	Percentage	Number
Government Depts.	46	15,000
Industry (including building)	5	1,700
Municipalities	5	1,500
Commerce (including hotels and flats)	17	5,500
Domestic services	27	9,000
Total	100	32,700

Total cash earnings of the workers in the Transkei were estimated to be R5,620,000 in 1968, an average of R135 per person. The average wages paid to unskilled workers or domestic servants were:

Government	Basis	Minimum	Maximum
Men	Daily	R0.60	R1.00
Women	Daily	R0.40	R0.60
Juveniles	Daily	R0.25	R0.25
Non-Government			
Men	Monthly	R10.00	R26.00
Women	Monthly	R 5.00	R13.00
Juveniles	Monthly	R 4.00	R 7.00

The Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration said in the Assembly on 3 June 1969 that about 233,000 migratory workers were away from the Transkei at any one time. According to the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, the Africans recruited in the Transkei during 1968 were:

> 63,878 for the gold mines;
> 19,947 for other mines;
> 5,971 for farms in the Western Cape;
> 22,788 for farms elsewhere;
> 13,096 for industries and other purposes in
>   the Western Cape;
> 9,190 for industries and other purposes elsewhere

134,870   Total

This Department estimated that about R23,300,000 is earned in cash wages annually by Transkeian workers in the Republic (an average of R150 per worker per eight-month contract), and that at least half of this finds its way into the Transkei in the form of deferred pay and money sent or brought back by the workers. The average wages paid in the Republic of unskilled migratory workers were estimated to be:

Sector	Basis	Minimum	Maximum	Free food and quarters
Agriculture	Monthly	R14.00	R20.00	Yes
Factories	Weekly	R 4.50	R 9.00	No
Construction	Daily	R 0.85	R 2.00	No
Railways	Daily	R 0.90	R 1.40	No
Gold	Shift	R 0.34	R 2.00	Yes
Other	Shift	R 0.60	Plus	Yes

During 1968, 73,824 workers registered at labour bureaux in the Transkei. The figure for 1969 is likely to be considerably higher because of the drought and the consequent enhanced need to supplement incomes from farming.

Preliminary conclusions drawn from the above figures are the following:

(a)   The extent to which the Transkei labour force is dependent on job opportunities outside the Transkei is considerable - ± 79% of the labour force was working outside the Transkei in 1968.

(b)   The Transkei civil service provides work for 46% (±15,000) of the workers inside the Transkei.

(c)   The total income of employees outside the Transkei was twice that of workers inside the area in 1968.

(ii) Secondary and Tertiary Development in the Transkei

The level of tertiary and secondary development is highly inadequate in the Transkei - only 7,000 workers found employment in these areas in 1968. It is against this background that the Republican government attempts to stimulate growth in these areas. For this purpose the Bantu Investment Incorporation Act was passed in 1959 to create a Bantu Investment Corporation (B.I.C.) as well as the Xhosa Development Corporation (X.D.C.) in terms of the Bantu Homelands Development Corporation Act of 1965.

The former body is intended to encourage existing industrial, commercial and financial undertakings and the establishment of new ones through financial aid and technical assistance. The X.D.C. has to promote the economic development of the homeland. By March 1970 the share capital of the B.I.C. was R18,250,000 and the X.D.C. R7,000,000. [65]

A further measure was adopted by the Republican Government in 1968 with the passing of the Economic Development of Homelands Act. White entrepreneurs were now allowed to establish industries in the homelands on an agency basis. Certain concessions were made in order to stimulate capital investment, for example: ground, factory buildings and services would be provided by the B.I.C. for a yearly rent of 2% and 6% for the investment therein; in certain cases the costs for water and power supply would be subsidized; subsidized transport facilities would be provided for the workers, etc. [66] However, certain conditions would also have to be met, for example: (a) the white agent could only use property, not own it, (b) no connections with foreign interests would be allowed; (c) large concentrations of white

workers and their dependents must be avoided as far as pos-
sible. [67] On 9 September 1969 the Deputy Minister of Bantu
Administration and Development announced that four industrial-
ists had applied to establish industries on an agency basis in
the Transkei. [68]

The overall picture concerning secondary industries in the
Transkei by March 1969 was as follows: [69]

Industries controlled by Africans:

A cane factory in Umtata; six brickworks - 3 in Umtata and
the others in Port St. Johns, Cofimvaba and Engcobo respectively.

Industries administered by the X.D.C.:

At Butterworth, a small maize roller mill, employing 24 Afri-
cans; a sweet factory; a sheet metal works; a mechanical work-
shop. At Umtata, a bottling undertaking; the Vulindlela furniture
factory; the Heldmond handspinning and weaving factory employ-
ing about 207 people. At Sada, Whittlesea, a brick-making con-
cern.

According to the Minister $\pm$ 945 Africans were employed in
these industries in the Transkei on 20 February, 1968.[70]

Information on the tertiary sector is not so comprehensive.
The 209 trading posts administered by the X.D.C. in 1969 were
divided as follows: 39 were still managed by whites; 12 by Col-
oureds and 158 by Africans. Five of those under white manage-
ment were used as training centres for Africans. [71]

The position concerning secondary and tertiary development
in the Transkei can be summarized by stating that for a consi-
derable time in the future employment opportunities in these
sectors for the majority of Transkei citizens will have to be
provided outside the territory. Realistically speaking, a vast
amount of capital expenditure would be needed to supply only
the natural increase of the population inside the Transkei with
adequate job opportunities in these sectors.

(iii) Border Industrial Development

Although the Tomlinson Commission suggested only half-
heartedly that industries be established on the borders of the
homeland areas in order to provide employment for Africans
living inside the territories, [72] the Republican government accep-
ted this idea with alacrity and enthusiastically started imple-
menting a policy of Border Industrial Development. The Indust-
rial Development Corporation (I.D.C.) created in 1940 to stimu-
late industrial growth would in future concentrate in establishing
industries on the border areas. In addition a new body, the Per-

manent Committee for the Location of Industry, was created in 1960, whose sole purpose was to give practical application to the policy of border industrial development. Rautenbach formulated the goals of this body as: ''... to serve the policy of general industrialization and to create a favourable climate for industrial development of the homelands.'' [73]

This Committee reported in 1968 that the total additional direct investment in secondary industries in border areas for the period 1960 to the end of 1968 amounted to about R314 million. [74] According to Cilliers [75], 5,000 employment opportunities are provided annually for Africans in the border areas and at the beginning of 1969 a minimum of 138,000 Africans were occupied there. If it is kept in mind that during the sixties 58,000 African males were annually available for employment and that of these 35,000 are in the homeland areas and furthermore, that one quarter of all economically active African males are employed in secondary industry, then an average rate of 9,000 workers from the homeland areas have to be absorbed by industry each year. The present rate of absorption in border areas of 5,000 per annum leaves approximately one half of the workers available for industry elsewhere. The I.D.C. estimated in November 1968 that in order for the border industries to provide 23,000 Africans annually with jobs from 1971, an investment cost of R80 million per year w ould have to be met. [76]

The border industries that have any significance for the Transkei are located near East London, King Williamstown and Queenstown. These areas provide employment for both the Ciskei and Transkei and the Minister of Economic Affairs reported in May 1969 that additional employment opportunities had been created for 8,000 Africans. [77]

'Grave misgivings exist as to the possibility of this policy to stimulate economic development in the homeland areas:

(a) These industries are still located in the same political sphere as in the cities and the white worker can exert pressure on his political representatives to prevent Africans from performing competitive jobs. White trade unions, for example the Mine Workers' Union, have already expressed their dissatisfaction with this possibility even in the homeland areas. [78]

(b) Cilliers argues that present developments in the border industries only serve to emphasize the degree of economic integration and the multi-racial nature of South African society. [79]

(c) Moolman finds that preliminary results indicate that urban developments in the homeland areas near Pretoria are going to create huge locations rather than African cities and that border industries draw away any possible development from the homeland itself. [80]

(iv) Summary

The problem of bringing about economic development in the homeland areas must be appreciated against the background of the general structure of the South African economy.

Kitshoff describes this structure as based in capitalism, i.e. where free reign is given to private investment and competition.[81] Lombard concurs with this analysis and doubts very much whether the state is in any position to direct the economy simply by moral coercion or threats:

> "Methods such as these, lacking any principles, are of extremely dubious quality as neither threats or moral persuasion will make any practical difference to the individual investor or decision-maker. To expect of any household or firm voluntarily to accept irretrievable costs in the face of competition is unrealistic." (Translation). [82]

Consequently Lombard argues that the only alternatives open to the Republic of South Africa as far as directing the economy is concerned, are those of either "central decision making or socialism" or the "individual responsibility of liberalism". He propagates the latter course, but remarks that:

> "The most important argument against the liberal principle in South Africa is the agnostic attitude of the business sector to the realism and probability of the present government's goals. To reach a situation where every decision-maker in the economic processes of South Africa regards it in the interests of his own firm or household to act in ways which promote the goals of government, demands a brilliant program of differential taxation and subsidizing, indirect manipulation of the flow of funds and interest rates as well as limiting private abilities."[83] (Translation).

It is questionable whether the alternatives sketched by Lombard are as rigid as he would have them. Concepts such as "capitalism" and "socialism" are found to be problematical in the comparative analysis of economic systems. [84] Nevertheless the crux of the argument remains valid, namely that to the extent that economic growth is dependent on the preference of the private investor, non-material or non-economic considerations, especially political ones, will play a secondary role in his economic acti-

vities. In this respect the whites in South Africa literally control the economic power because, given their structural position in South African society, they can compete with greater freedom and comfort in the economy.

What are the implications of all this for the Transkei? Firstly, that large-scale economic modernization in the Transkei will demand a considerable adjustment on the part of the economic structure of South Africa and is still a long way away. Secondly, that for as long as this situation endures the majority of the economically active population will perform their economic activities in the common or "white" area where they will inevitably be exposed to new patterns of consumption and life styles.

C. CONCLUSIONS AND PROJECTIONS

1. The purpose of the policy of homeland development has a two-fold formulation: (a) to make constitutional and political provision so that each African ethnic community can maintain its own particular culture patterns; (b) to modernize these areas in which this provision is made as far as possible. Such goals are in a paradoxical relation to one another and an analysis of developments in the Transkei bears this out. On every level that modernization has occurred, political, agricultural, economic and educational, the traditional cultural patterns of the Xhosa are undergoing significant changes. In politics, patriarchial authority is slowly being undermined by party political representation in a parliament; in agriculture, a subsistence type of farming is being prepared for cash crop farming and participation in a market economy; in education, a differentiated educational system is high on the list of priorities and in the economy, group centred production is being replaced on the one hand by financial, investment and development institutions to promote capital formation, thrift and entrepreneurial talent, and on the other by a growing labour force that is increasingly being drawn into a highly industrialized complex of activities.

Certain questions arise: what has become of the "cultural identity" of the Xhosa that has been politically manipulated by the Republican government for the justification of its policy of Homeland Development? Put more bluntly: who is the Xhosa today? Is the rural inhabitant in the Transkei culturally the same man as the one who is in his third or fourth season of migratory labour or the third generation urbanite in the common area? If they still see themselves as Xhosa, can this solidarity still be explained in terms of traditional and tribal practices which they hold dear? Is it not possible that the word Xhosa will increasingly have only a historical reference in the sense that it refers

to a group of people who share a common position in the economic
and political structure of South Africa and out of which new
cultural trends will develop rather than old traditional ties being
maintained?

These are extremely important questions and difficult to ans-
wer. The test question as far as the policy of Homeland Deve-
lopment is concerned, is whether the political, economic, agri-
cultural and educational practices of the Xhosa are today more
different or more similar to those of whites than before the im-
plementation of the policy. The brief analysis of developments
in the Transkei indicated that the latter is the case. The fact
that whites form the determining modernizing elite in South Africa
and that their various models serve as a framework in terms of
which modernization takes place in the Transkei, implies that
the structures that develop in the various sectors undergoing
modernization will create the same aspirations for progress that
are generated for the whites. To the extent that these aspirations
intensify under the impact of modernization, it is quite plausible
to expect that the existing differences between the Xhosa and
whites will become more sharply articulated. The most important
source of ideological difference that will lie at the source of
differential opportunities for realizing aspirations will be "black-
ness". To be "black" will increasingly mean to share a common
economic, political and social position and not a common tribal
or traditionalistic life style.

2. Unevenness is an important characteristic of development
in the Transkei. The preceding analysis indicated that the tempo
and level of political and educational modernization is somewhat
higher than economic and agricultural modernization and that this
disparity is more likely to increase than disappear in the imme-
diate future. Politics and education are important means for pro-
moting modernistic orientations and developing new expectations.
However, for the majority of people in a society aspirations are
not realized in politics and education but in available job oppor-
tunities and by the degree of upward mobility possible in them.
A discrepancy between aspirations and opportunities is an im-
portant politicizing factor and to the extent that aspirations es-
calate in the Transkei without concommitant increase in job
opportunities, pressures will increase on the available political
structure. The reaction of those in power to such pressures will
be of extreme importance for future developments. Should the
power holders react by trying to preserve the status quo or by
relying on conservative traditional elements to contain demands
popular opposition groups may develop. This is possible because

of the low level of differentiation of interest groups and strata in the Transkei and because of which most problems become common political issues. The possibility of these pressures being effective will depend on the degree to which traditionalism is still a force in the political processes of the Transkei. The results of the two first elections indicate that traditionalism did still play an important role. Should the holders of office in the Transkei on the other hand embark on a process of continual accommodation of new aspirations and demands that arise as a result of modernization especially in the political and educational sectors, strains in the relation with the Republican government are bound to develop.

3. With every generalization and projection on developments in the Transkei, this area's virtually complete economic dependence on the Republican government and the ''white'' economy should be kept in mind. This is a strategic feature which could control developments to a great extent. However, what economic dependence cannot control, is the development of modernistic aspirations amongst the Xhosa citizens. Who are these citizens? There are three broad categories: (a) the permanent resident in the Transkei for whom the idea of one man one vote is slowly being translated into a political reality and who is encouraged to participate in the process of modernization by changing his rural life style and to grasp available educational opportunities. (b) the migratory worker - approximately 75% of the active labour force of the Transkei with the same background as the permanent resident but who, for the greater part of the year, labours in an environment where the aspirations developed in his own area are given concrete expression in the common or ''white'' area. (c) the ''permanently absent citizen'' or urban Xhosa who represents approximately 40% of the total official population of the Transkei and of whom a large number have never been in the Transkei. Whether this latter citizen is going to identify with the political structures in the Transkei and to what extent he will be satisfied with its effectiveness for handling his immediate problems is not known. Quite probably diverse and contrary groups will develop, ranging from partial acceptance to acceptance for ulterior motives to strong reaction against identification. Whatever the diversity of trends in the cities, these citizens have the following in common with the permanent resident in the Transkei: they are both developing modernistic aspirations and they are both ''black''. It is not unrealistic to expect that at some stage in this development a search for new common symbols of identification will ensue which could result in a particular brand of South African black nationalism. This nationalism will not be anchored in traditional

cultural characteristics, but in common racial characteristics and all forms of race discrimination that remain in force will only strengthen it. Ironic as it may seem, the success of the policy of Homeland Development will lie in the fact that it has helped to develop a new "identity" rather than preserve an old one.

FOOTNOTES

1. Rautenbach, P.S.: "Industrial Decentralization in South Africa", Paper delivered to the Council of the S.A.I.R.R., 27-30 January, 1970, p. 2

2. Eiselen, W.W.: "Die Ontwikkeling van Bantoe Volkseenhede na Selfstandigheid" in Lombard, J.A.: *Die Ekonomiese Politiek van Suid-Afrika,* H.A.U.M., 1967, p. 103

3. Op. cit., p. 103.

4. Op. cit., p. 103.

5. Vide the work of Rhoodie, N.J.: *Apartheid,* 1959.

6. Eiselen, W.W.: Op. cit., p. 103.

7. Kitshoff, J.J.: "Nywerheidspolitiek" in Lombard, J.A.: Op. cit., p. 37

8. Carter, G., Karis T. and Stultz, N.M.: *South Africa's Transkei,* North Western University Press, 1967, p. 49.

9. Horrell, M.: *Bantu Education to 1968,* S.A.I.R.R., 1969, p. 6.

10. Horrell, M.: *The African Reserves of S.A.,* S.A.I.R.R., 1969, p. 6.

11. Pepler, L.A.: "Economic Aspects of Separate Development", Paper delivered to Council of S.A.I.R.R., 27-30 January, 1970, p. 1.

12. Strauss, J.: *Sosio-Politieke Ontwikkeling in die Transkei,* unpublished D. Phil. Thesis, University of Pretoria, 1969, pp. 234-238.

13. Op. cit., p. 2.

14. Vide for e.g.: (a) Eisenstadt, S.M.: *Modernization, Protest and Change,* Prentice Hall, 1966, (b) Moore, W.E.: *The Impact of Industry,* Prentice Hall, 1965, (c) Smelser, N.J.: *The Sociology of Economic Life,* Prentice Hall, 1963.

15. Lipsett, S.M.: *Political Man,* New York, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1963.

16. Smelser, N.J.: Op. cit., p. 101.

17. Eisenstadt, S.N.: Op. cit., Ch. IV.

18. Moore, W.E.: Op. cit., Ch. 2.

19. Horrell, M.: *The African Reserves,* p. 3. These prerequisites were relaxed somewhat when in Parliament this year (1970) the same Minister stated that economic self-sufficiency was not a pre-condition for independence and the Prime Minister followed with an invitation that the homelands should feel free to negotiate for full independence at any time.

20. Carter et al.: Op. cit., p. 82.

21. Ibid., p. 88.

22. Ibid., pp. 115-120.

23. Ibid., p. 89.
24. Strauss, J.: Op. cit., p. 250.
25. Carter et al.: Op. cit., pp. 115-120.
26. Strauss, J.: Op. cit., p. 310.
27. Carter et al.: Op. cit., p. 126.
28. Ibid., p. 128.
29. Ibid., p. 136.
30. Ibid., p. 141.
31. Ibid., p. 129.
32. Ibid., p. 146.
33. Op. cit., p. 287.
34. Carter et al.: Op. cit., p. 165.
35. Ibid., p. 166.
36. Horrell, M.: *The African Reserves, p. 6.*
37. Carter et al.: Op. cit., p. 160.
38. Ibid. p. 161.
39. Ibid., p. 162.
40. Ibid., p. 169.
41. Horrell, M.: *The African Reserves,* p. 6.
42. Horrell, M.: *Bantu Education,* p. 47.
43. Ibid., p. 54.
44. Horrell, M.: *Bantu Education,* p. 80.
45. Ibid., p. 55.
46. Ibid., p. 59.
47. Ibid., p. 86.
48. Ibid., p. 90.
49. Ibid., p. 125.
50. Ibid., p. 132.
51. Andersen, C.A.: ''The Impact of the Educational System on Technological Change and Modernization'' in Hoselitz & Moore: *Industrialization and Society,* UNESCO, 1963, pp. 259.
52. Carter et al.: Op. cit., p. 137.
53. Horrell, M.: *Bantu Education,* p. 24.
54. Ibid., p. 50.
55. Horrell, M.: *The African Reserves, p. 33.*
56. Pepler, L.A.: Op. cit., p. 4.
57. Horrell, M.: *The African Reserves,* p. 36.
58. Ibid., p. 37.
59. Pepler, L.A.: Op. cit., p. 70.
60. Horrell, M.: *The African Reserves,* p. 18.
61. Ibid., p. 40.
62. Ibid., p. 37.
63. Ibid., p. 43.
64. The following section relies completely on Horrell, M.: *The African Reserves,* pp. 117-119.
65. Ibid., p. 28.

66. Ibid., p. 66.
67. Ibid., p. 29.
68. Ibid., pp. 64-65.
69. Ibid., pp. 64-65.
70. Ibid., p. 81.
71. Ibid., p. 82.
72. Cilliers, S.P.: "Border Industries" in *Optima,* September, 1969.
73. Op. cit., p. 3.
74. Horrell, M.: Op. cit., p. 74.
75. Cilliers, S.P.: Op. cit.
76. Ibid.
77. Horrell, M.: *The African Reserves,* p. 80.
78. Ibid., p. 76.
79. Op. cit.
80. *Die Beeld,* 16.8.70.
81. Op. cit., p. 30.
82. Op. cit., p. 125.
83. Ibid., p. 126.
84. Hoselitz, B.F.: "Patterns of Economic Growth" in Smelser, N.J.: *Readings in Economic Sociology,* Prentice Hall, 1965, pp. 176.