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EXERPTS FROM DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN A SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION
LED BY MINISTER R F BOTHA AND A UNITED STATES DELEGATION
LED BY DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FRANK WISNER ON QUESTIONS
AFFECTING SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND ANGOLA :

CAPE TOWN : 13 MARCH 1986

United States delegation: Mr Frank Wisner
Ambassador Hermann Nickel
Mr Robert Cabelly
Mr Dick Barkley
Mr Edward Lanpher
Mr Ashley Wills
Mr Tim Carney

South African delegation: Minister R F Botha
Minister M A de M Malan
Mr R Killen
Dr J P Roux
Mr N van Heerden
Mr A L Manley
Mr D W Auret
Mr P Vermeulen

MR WISNER said that, as South Africa was aware, the US attached great importance to the statement made by the State President on 4 March 1986 as offering an opportunity to re-energize the negotiating process. It would help the US to influence its domestic constituency positively. That gesture, coupled with our combined determination and growing pressures inside Angola had stirred the pot. The SP's statement had given people something to think about.

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However, it was not easy to move the parties back to the negotiating process. MR WISNER said that he had been around the circuit. He had stressed that the US will continue to play the role as mediator, that committing itself to a specific date had not been easy for South Africa and that it presented an opportunity to Angola and the region at large to resolve its problems. If the countries concerned did not use the five months they now had, it would result in even bigger problems and the escalation of violence and conflict. The Africans had reacted predictably and regarded Savimbi's visit to the US as a complicating factor. He had indicated to them that the ball was now in Luanda's court and that their reaction was awaited. He thought the Africans wanted to see a settlement which would get the big powers out of the region. MR WISNER said that although the immediate response of the MPLA Government had been negative, it was to be expected and that the US was not discouraged by it. In fact, it could be a cover by the Angolans while they were making hard decisions. He said that it was a great idea which was now on the table. It had caught the attention of Europe and domestic US opinion. South Africa had captured the high ground. It should now stand back and let the soup cook on its own, let things play themselves out.

MINISTER BOTHA agreed. South Africa would keep quiet. As he had predicted to the US in Geneva, South Africa had encountered severe problems in Windhoek. The Transitional Government had wanted to reject the statement out of hand. Dr Willie van Niekerk had telephoned to Windhoek personally with a message from the State President advising the Transitional Government not to say too much. However, South Africa's main concern over the short term was that there was going to be an offensive to take Jamba. South Africa

did not believe that that would be the end of UNITA but it would be a severe psychological blow. Jamba provided a base for UNITA's armies and a home for their people. Apart from that South Africa feared that it would open up the whole southern and eastern front for SWAPO to penetrate into SWA. It was a route which SWAPO sometimes used. Two SWAPO's had recently been arrested using the route through Botswana. This will upset the whole programme at a time when SWAPO was at its lowest point perhaps ever both politically and militarily. If a new route was opened up through Zambia it would put South Africa in a bad position. It would bring things tumbling down. South Africa believed that everything possible had to be done to make this attempt on Jamba fail or to stop it. Over the long term FAPLA cannot win. If Savimbi had another Jamba after one month, how would FAPLA explain that to the Angolan people. Unless the Soviets had decided to do this come hell or high water, this offensive could be stopped or halted. In the meantime Savimbi was mounting attacks all over. MINISTER BOTHA continued that South Africa by and large believed that what was going to happen over the following two to four months could be of decisive importance for the whole of southern Africa. The dilemma being faced was a massive Soviet inspired action against a Black leader. The US would find that other African leaders such as Boigny, Mobuto and Bongo would agree.

MR WISNER said that there was no reason to believe that the offensive would not proceed. Savimbi was following the right tactics by attacking FAPLA all over. In any event, it was not US policy to see Savimbi weakened. The US would make certain that he received things to see to it that UNITA had the capacity to defend itself. The US had made clear to the Soviets that any escalation in Angola would

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have serious consequences. The US had no indication whether the Soviets would de-escalate. They had played their cards close to the chest in Geneva. MR WISNER said that he had made the point (to the Africans) that if they were prepared to see greater Soviet involvement they should now stand by idly. The US had confidence in Savimbi's ability to keep the pot boiling. The Africans were jittery. There were going to be meetings in Stockholm and the Lusophone countries have also called for a meeting. These should be watched. The whole issue of Savimbi and national reconciliation have become front page news with the Africans. The Africans knew that hard decisions would have to be taken. Except this military threat the US and South Africa were sitting pretty.

MINISTER BOTHA said that his advice to the US was that the propaganda campaign had to be stepped up to put the situation of the massive Soviet backed military build-up in Angola across.

MR WISNER asked what the position was concerning the people taken by Savimbi at the diamond mine.

MINISTER BOTHA said that Savimbi was in a difficult position. The Roman Catholic Church and radicals were accusing him of killing missionaries. Savimbi had denied that. He said that if he did not take those people prisoner the other side would kill them and then put the blame on UNITA.

MR WISNER asked what the position concerning the Transitional Government was. What were the following moves from Windhoek going to be.

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MINISTER BOTHA said that the Transitional Government was not strong on Cuban troop withdrawal (CTW). They viewed it as a South African situation. If the Lusaka Conference were successful - and it almost was - they would have dropped CTW. They might still opt for their own solution. They might make further attempts to involve SWAPO and present their own solution as a fait accompli.

MR WISNER asked if the Minister had heard of any new moves or pressures from Windhoek to talk to SWAPO.

MINISTER BOTHA thought that if Kalangula could be brought into the system, they would be closer to talking to SWAPO. There was severe suspicion in their minds about South Africa's intentions. They did not know what 1 August 1986 meant, but they probably thought that whatever they wanted to do they had better hurry up. They had complained that the AG was interfering in internal politics. However, he was not. They were perhaps upset that the AG had seen Kalangula. Kalangula was not far removed from some SWAPO leaders. Therefore, if Kalangula was brought into the system, there would be a bridge. MINISTER BOTHA asked if it would be that bad for the US and South Africa and southern Africa if the Southwesterners could, with SWAPO, come to an agreement.

MR WISNER said that Res 435 remained the only internationally acceptable plan. To achieve the program in Angola that was important. SWAPO was in disarray. It was not thinking forward. It was not likely to take chances.

MINISTER BOTHA said that that was so, unless Kaunda put pressure on SWAPO. He had much influence over them if not more than Dos Santos himself. If he thought that a quick

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solution for Namibia could be found under his chairmanship, he would go for it.

MR WISNER said that Kaunda was difficult. He had his eyes on the FLS and on his Chairmanship of the OAU. He would probably like to slip the move on CTW and Angola.

MR WISNER said that he did not see Kaunda moving fast.

MINISTER BOTHA said that his question was if, would it be as bad. That was why South Africa had taken care to state that, irrespective of the Namibian issue, it did not want the Cubans in Angola.

MR WISNER said that Kaunda and SWAPO were not particularly fond of each other. SWAPO had in his opinion at present a classic state of mentality of a victim.