AFRICA SOUTH

Vol. 3 No. 2 Jan.-March 1959



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REVOLUTION: A DISCUSSION
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Articles and a Story on Emerging Territories

THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA 3/9
GREAT BRITAIN AND AFRICA 4/-
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 75c
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VOL. 3 No. 2 EDITOR: RONALD M. SEGAL JAN.-MARCH 1959

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AFRICA SOUTH is published quarterly by Africa South Publications (Pty.) Ltd. Editorial and Advertising Offices are at 2 Vlam Gebou, Parliament Street, Cape Town, South Africa. Price per issue 3s. 9d.; 15s. per year, post free in the Union of South Africa. In the United States, promotion offices are located at 320 W. 87th Street, New York, N.Y., and subscriptions should be sent to Mrs. S. Pauley at that address. Price per issue 75c; $3 per year, post free. Entered as second-class matter at the Post Office at New York, N.Y. Price per issue in the United Kingdom 4s.; 16s. per year, post free. Representative, Miss R. Ainslie, 31A, John Adam St., London, W.C.2. Price per issue in West Africa 4s.; 16s. per year, post free. Representative, Mr. E. Mphahlele, P.O. Box 417, Yaba, Nigeria. Price per issue in South Asia Rs. 2.50; Rs. 10 per year, post free. Representatives, Messrs. K. V. G. de Silva & Sons, 415 Galle Road, Colombo 4, Ceylon.

DR. HENDRIK FRENSCH VERWOERD, PRIME MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA

STANLEY UYS

Political Correspondent of the 'Sunday Times'.

LIKE so many racialists, Dr. Verwoerd had his early training in anti-Semitism. In the mid-1930's, when he was Professor of Applied Psychology at Stellenbosch University (Afrikanerdom's oldest seat of learning), he accompanied five fellow-professors on a deputation to the Hertzog-Smuts Government to protest against the admission into South Africa of Jewish refugees from Hitler's Germany.

A year later, in 1937, when the high priests of Nationalist Afrikanerdom selected him for the editorship of the new Nationalist daily newspaper in Johannesburg, *The Transvaler*, Dr. Verwoerd wrote his first leading article—on the Jews. "The Nationalist does not hate the Jew," he said reassuringly; but, he added, there was a clash of interests between the Jew and the Afrikaner, and the Afrikaner had found that commercial and industrial undertakings were mostly in "foreign" hands, "latterly mostly Jews".

"This population group," wrote Dr. Verwoerd, "which always separates itself within the population as a separate unit, and which is somewhat unfeeling and even hostile towards the Nationalist aspirations of Afrikanderdom, has also been seen, therefore, as a group which stands in the way of the Afrikaner's economic welfare."

The "struggle" had sharpened as a result of Jewish immigration, stated Dr. Verwoerd, and the solution was that "by legislation it must be ensured, gradually but deliberately, that each White population group, as far as possible, has a share in each of the most important occupations, in accordance with the proportion it forms of the White population as a whole." Dr. Verwoerd proposed restrictions on trading licences, and other discriminatory measures.

Dr. Verwoerd's assurance that "the Nationalist does not hate the Jew" was contradicted, in his own case at least, by the string of anti-Semitic articles which appeared in the *Transvaler*, and which continued through the war years. This resulted, soon after the launching of the newspaper, in the Jewish community of Johannesburg boycotting the advertisement columns. This

promptly evoked a complaint from the hurt editor.

Nothing of this was recalled by the *Transvaler* when it celebrated its 21st anniversary during October this year. Jewish memories were stirred, however. An Israeli newspaper, *Yedioth Archranoth*, expressed the fear that South Africa's new Prime Minister would pursue an anti-Israel policy in international affairs and an anti-Semitic policy in domestic affairs. A Jewish member of the Nationalist Party approached Dr. Verwoerd for a repudiation of these fears, and Dr. Verwoerd told him briefly that he was "continuing the policy of Dr. Malan and Mr. Strydom". There was little comfort in this curt reply.

Some Jews thought it ironical that Mr. Max Melamet, chairman of the Jewish Board of Deputies in Cape Town, should describe the report in *Yedioth Achranoth* as "stupid and without foundation," because Mr. Melamet was one of the Board's principal lobbyists when the Nationalist Party, under Dr. Malan, introduced an Opposition Bill in Parliament aimed at prohibiting Jewish immigration. If anyone should have been aware of the Nationalist Government's anti-Semitic background, it was Mr. Melamet.

In the Parliamentary debate on January 14, 1937, the Nationalist Party called for: prohibition of Jewish immigration; deletion of Yiddish as a recognized European language for immigration purposes; no further naturalization of Jewish immigrants; closing of certain professions to Jews and other "non-assimilable" races; and prohibition of changing of names, retrospective from May 1, 1930.

Since assuming office in 1948, the Nationalist Government, for reasons of expediency, has professed a desire to be friendly with the Jews; yet anti-Semitism has never been far beneath the surface of Parliamentary debates. Dr. Verwoerd, himself, has not been able to conceal his anti-Semitism: recently, he suggested that he had been denied justice in a court case during World War II because the judge (Millin) was Jewish.

From this basic training in anti-Semitism, Dr. Verwoerd moved on to much more grandiose concepts of race "purity", involving the entire South African nation of 9,600,000 Africans, 3,011,000 Whites, 1,360,000 Coloureds (of mixed descent) and 441,000 Indians. Himself Hollander-born, he brought to the Nationalist Afrikaner's crude race theories stray refinements of ideology and presentation—the product, no doubt, of his

studies in the mid-1920's when Nazism was born at the universities of Leipzig, Hamburg and Berlin.

From an early age, he had shown a preference for German institutions and a dislike of British ones. As late as his 55th birthday (1957), he had placed on record that the principal of the Milton Boys' High School in Bulawayo had "literally kicked" him down the corridor because he had expressed a desire to return to the Union, where the country's entry into World War I had provoked an armed rebellion among a section of the Boers. The headmaster was outraged at the thought of the young Verwoerd (by all accounts, a good scholar) wanting to return to "that nest of rebels".

Dr. Verwoerd's father (now 84, and running a small bookshop with the aid of his wife in the Free State village of Brandfort) had been a missionary. When they arrived in Cape Town from Amsterdam, the father established a grocery business in Wynberg, and in his spare time spread the gospel among the neighbouring Coloureds. Fifty years later, the Government, in which his son, Hendrik, was Minister of Native Affairs, took away the century-old voting rights of these Coloured people.

Perhaps the incident at the Milton Boys' High School brought a certain bitterness to the young Verwoerd's soul. Back in the Union, the family settled in Brandfort, where Hendrik matriculated. Then he went to Stellenbosch University. He obtained his M.A. degree in the young science of psychology (also sociology and logic), with distinctions, and became eligible for an Abe Bailey bursary of £400 a year. This would have meant going to Oxford, however. He turned it down. "I preferred to study psychology at a Continental university," he explained. Later, he took his doctorate in psychology, and this time he went abroad to the universities of Leipzig, Hamburg and Berlin—on a much smaller bursary than the Abe Bailey one. It was the last time Hendrik Verwoerd left South Africa.

Spurning the Abe Bailey bursary was not a casual act: Dr. Verwoerd's anti-Semitism was matched by his anti-British outlook. During the Royal visit to South Africa in 1947, he had refused to print a single word or picture of the event in the *Transvaler*. On the day the Royal family arrived in Johannesburg, he wrote a leading article on drought. (Even the *Burger*, the Cape Nationalist newspaper, recognized the news-worthiness of the occasion.)

By then, Dr. Verwoerd was well-known for his pro-Nazi

views. Mr. Justice Millin, in a judgment delivered in the Transvaal Supreme Court on July 13, 1943, had pronounced: "He (Verwoerd) did support Nazi propaganda, he did make his paper a tool of the Nazis in South Africa, and he knew it." The case arose out of an action, brought by Dr. Verwoerd (as editor of the *Transvaler*) against the Johannesburg *Star*, for publishing an article, entitled "Speaking Up for Hitler", in which the *Transvaler* was accused of falsifying news in support of Nazi propaganda and generally acting as a tool of the enemy. Dr. Verwoerd lost the case. In a lengthy judgment, extending to more than 25,000 words, the judge found that Dr. Verwoerd had in fact furthered Nazi propaganda. The defendants had proved, said the judge, that Dr. Verwoerd "caused to be published a large body of matter which was on the same general lines as matter coming to the Union in the Afrikaans transmissions from Zeesen and which was calculated to make the Germans look upon the *Transvaler* as a most useful adjunct to this propaganda service". On another point, the judge said: "This is a falsification of current news which was approved by the plaintiff. It was calculated to cause alarm and despondency, and it is not open to doubt that it was of great service to the enemy in the way of supporting his propaganda for the damaging of the war effort of the Union".

Here is a further extract from the court record:

MR. ROPER (for the defendants): "Here is a thoroughly defeatist article saying that the Germans are on the threshold of England, that it is imperative for Britain to make peace, and that these peace feelers are really inspired by her. Not a very comforting article for those not in your camp".

DR. VERWOERD: "It is not my business to comfort the English".

The judge concluded: "There have been proved two very grave cases of the publication of false news, in reckless disregard of whether these were true or false; six cases on the whole less serious, but still clear cases of falsification where news originally correctly reported was falsely restated for the purpose of editorial comment; and two cases in which news was falsified by means of misleading headlines".

"The plaintiff (Dr. Verwoerd) appeals to the principles of free speech and a free Press in a democratic country in justifying him in writing as he did in support of his policy of neutrality and a separate peace between the Union and Germany, as a means

towards a republic in South Africa. He argues that if he has to consider whether what he says would be useful to the Germans, the effect would be to silence him; and the law does not compel him to be silent. But the question in this case is not whether the plaintiff should be silenced. His legal right to publish what he did is not in question. The question is whether, when he exercises his legal right in the way he does, he is entitled to complain when it is said of him that what he writes supports Nazi propaganda and makes his paper a tool of the Nazis. On the evidence he is not entitled to complain. He did support Nazi propaganda."

An Afrikaner Nationalist by adoption, instead of birth, Dr. Verwoerd became the first South African Prime Minister with no claim to a traditional Boer upbringing. The Boer War and its bitter aftermath left no scars on him; when Strydom was bumping across the Transvaal platteland in an old red Ford, he was strolling under Stellenbosch's shady oaks; when other party stalwarts were fighting their way grimly to the top, he was plucked from his professor's chair and given control of the *Transvaler*. In his first election contest (Alberton, in the 1948 general election), he was beaten by the United Party. Subsequently, he entered Parliament as a nominated Senator. Only in the April, 1958, general election was the safe Heidelberg seat vacated for him, and he took his seat in the Assembly for the first time as an M.P. Four-and-a-half months later, he became Prime Minister.

Even then his election as Prime Minister was curiously violent. It was the first time the Nationalist Party had voted for its leader, instead of selecting him "automatically". Until the last moment, the country was kept guessing as to whether it would be the senior Cabinet Minister and Acting Prime Minister, Charles Robberts Swart, who had set his heart on this ultimate honour; or the suave Dr. Eben Dönges, Minister of the Interior and leader of the Cape Nationalists, on whom the mantle of ex-Premier Malan had fallen; or the turbulent newcomer from the north. The Nationalist Parliamentary caucus went to extraordinary lengths to ensure secrecy at the balloting for the new *hoofleier**, who would automatically become Prime Minister. The windows of the caucus room in the Parliamentary buildings were pasted up with cardboard. Ballot papers were issued, specially stamped with the letters "N.P." *(Nasionale Party)*†

* Chief leader. (Afrikaans)

† Nationalist Party

to avoid forgeries. Only the party whips knew about the secret "N.P." stamp before the balloting began. The 173 members of the caucus (excluding the three candidates) voted in groups of four at specially-erected cubicles to ensure secrecy. In this "democratic" atmosphere, the caucus chose its new leader. At the first ballot, Swart polled 41 votes, Dönges 52, and Verwoerd 80. At the second ballot, after Swart had been eliminated, Dönges polled 75 votes and Verwoerd 98, giving the latter a majority of 23 votes.

Of the 173 members of the caucus who voted, more than 70 came from the "enlarged" Senate, which in 1955 had been increased in size from 48 to 90 members to give the Nationalist Government the two-thirds majority required to remove the Coloured voters from the common roll. From 1950 to 1958, Dr. Verwoerd was leader of the Government side of the Senate, assiduously cultivating the support of the Government Senators. Therefore, when the time came to elect a successor to Strydom, the "enlarged" Senate, the epitome of the undemocratic spirit in South Africa, played a decisive role.

Although Dr. Verwoerd could not command the support either of all the senior members of the Cabinet, or of the rank and file of the Nationalist Party, nevertheless, he was the obvious choice for the post. As one commentator put it: "He is the key man in the Nationalist Government, and to have denied him the Premiership would have been both illogical and evasive".

Dr. Verwoerd was brought in to lead the Nationalist Party almost as an act of desperation. After 10 years of Nationalist rule, during which it had become increasingly urgent to find an answer to the question "What is Apartheid?", the Government had come to the crossroads: only Dr. Verwoerd stood out as the man who claimed to know the answer. He confessed once to an interviewer that he never suffered the qualms of doubt: he always *knew* he was right. It was just someone like this that the Nationalist Party wanted—someone who would face the future with absolute confidence and banish the gnawing anxiety over the fate of apartheid.

To quote again the commentator mentioned above: "Nationalist Afrikanerdom, for the first time, perhaps, is beginning to feel the pressure of history on its shoulders, and the immense implications of the apartheid task. It has discovered, too, that

apartheid cannot be checked and released at will, like water in an irrigation furrow: it has its own irresistible momentum . . . Nationalist Afrikanerdom's whole future has been entrusted to one man, Dr. Verwoerd. If Dr. Verwoerd fails, Afrikanerdom fails. Dr. Verwoerd is only 58, and apparently in excellent health. He is tireless, dedicated and determined. The circumstances are classic in their perfection. Nationalist Afrikanerdom is on the march to its final destiny. This is the last lap."

An aloof, academic man, Dr. Verwoerd has compensated for his lack of ability to rouse passions by practising the art of mass psychology. As the fledgling Professor of Applied Psychology at Stellenbosch University, he contributed a paper to the S.A. Journal of Science (1928) on the psychology of newspaper advertisements. He gave, as an example, an advertisement for a stomach medicine. It showed a dog, with a child gripped firmly in its jaws, standing sturdily in the middle of a rushing stream. The caption read "Saved!" By the same technique—the simple association of ideas—Dr. Verwoerd has persuaded Afrikanerdom, presumably, that he is its saviour.

With the crude, but effective, art of the mass propagandist, he has almost succeeded in convincing Afrikaners (and perhaps others, too) that to critize him is tantamount to heresy. Minutes after the result of the leadership ballot had been announced to the caucus, he was staking his claim to divine rule: "I believe that the will of God was revealed in the ballot." Two days later, in a national broadcast, he repeated: "In accordance with His will, it was determined who should assume the leadership of the Government in this new period of the life of the people of South Africa".

Again and again, Dr. Verwoerd has returned to this theme; and to two or three other selected themes, namely, that he is "democratic", that the "unity" of the Nationalist Party is paramount ("unity" and criticism of the new Prime Minister being mutually exclusive), and that a "new era" has begun. Skilfully, and speedily, Dr. Verwoerd has conveyed to Nationalist Afrikaners that they swim or sink with him. In these circumstances, the chances of a revolt against his leadership (the Opposition's last dream) are remote, indeed.

Even the White Opposition in South Africa, always ready to avoid the realities of life, was obliged to accept the implications of Dr. Verwoerd's election. The Johannesburg *Star* commented shrewdly: "In an important sense, Dr. Verwoerd's election

might be called the triumph of a lost cause. If there is any meaning in his selection above so stalwart a republican as Mr. Swart or so skilful a politician as Dr. Dönges it can only be that Dr. Verwoerd stands for the 'ultimate' solution of South Africa's race problem through separation. It is astonishing that there are still enough Nationalists who believe that that such a solution is possible that they have voluntarily submitted to the yoke that Dr. Verwoerd will assuredly place upon them . . . The new Prime Minister embodies the great illusion. His progress will be strewn with discarded liberties, of White men as well as Black, but it is a foregone conclusion that it will get no nearer the goal." The *Cape Times*, characteristically forthright, declared: "Dr. Verwoerd is dedicated to a fantastic and fanatical conception of apartheid, to a lunatic attempt to unscramble the South African racial omelette at any cost in human privation and dignity . . . Unless his wider powers and direct responsibility change him, Dr. Verwoerd's appointment may mark the transition in South Africa from an easy-going, elastic, more-or-less democratic parliamentarianism to a rigid regimentation backed by a tyrannical party machine on the lines of the regimes which brought some European countries to ruin. If this happens Dr. Verwoerd will wreck the Nationalist Party. The danger is that the country will be wrecked first." The *Cape Argus* observed, aptly, that "South Africa sets out on his (Dr. Verwoerd's) road with alarm bells sounding and warning signals flashing."

As for Dr. Verwoerd himself, he had endorsed these predictions in advance, in an article in the Nationalist Sunday newspaper, *Dagbreek-en-Sondagnuus*, written just before the fateful caucus meeting to elect a new leader. In the article, he stated the requirements for an Afrikaner leader: "Sincere conviction and firm action command the confidence and esteem of friends and foe, while weak leadership divides and alienates. The Afrikaner leader . . . is never a tyrant, never dishonest, self-centred, a power-greedy ruler." Tyrant, self-centred, power-greedy . . . At that precise moment, Dr. Verwoerd's extremist supporters were campaigning vigorously for a "strong man" as leader. The Nationalist Party, they said, could not afford a "weak, interim" leader like the ageing Mr. Swart.

As yet, I have said nothing about Dr. Verwoerd's most important achievements—as the architect of apartheid, or, as one of his M.P.s phrased it so picturesquely, as "the greatest

*induna** of all times''. What, in fact, are the achievements of this chubby-faced man, who summons vast *indabas*, or assemblies, of Africans, and speaks in curious, half-forgotten parables, trying to revive an age and a spirit that are passing away? Who speaks no African language, but prides himself on an understanding of the ''Native mind''? Who received (allegedly) a congratulatory message on his election as Prime Minister from the African residents of Pokwani village, reading: ''The White Bull's herd is lowing at the kraal. Even the calves are looking for him. Please throw out a mouthful of feed to quiet their hearts''?

Half of the pages of *Africa South*, since the inception of the journal, have been given over to discussion of Verwoerd's apartheid, and yet only half the story has been told. For eight years, since he became Minister of Native Affairs in 1950, Dr. Verwoerd has literally not stopped talking—

> But words, like alcohol with other men,
> Are his compulsion, theories, words, and schemes,
> Poured in dull rivers from his tongue and pen
> To sail his paper argosies of dreams . . .
> Statistics, numbers, races fill his vision,
> Ransacked from Europe, Africa and Asia
> And patched together with a schooled precision
> To form a bold, methodical fantasia,
> His Hundred Year Design, His Master Plan,
> To keep the Neths the masters—and their clan.
>
> (Anthony Delius ''Judgment Day'').

Where does one begin with this man who, after becoming Prime Minister, boasted that instead of ''mellowing'', he would remain a ''devil''? His speeches teem with remarks like this one: ''It is in no way a pleasant duty to have people, even though they are Natives, imprisoned''. He has closed the doors of more schools and opened the doors of more gaols than any other South African in history. Once, surprisingly, he bowed to public opinion: he abandoned (temporarily?) a scheme to establish a labour camp (a concentration camp, in fact) for African political offenders. It was the method, not the principle, that worried him: ''The policy of the department has always been to

* African leader

scatter rather than to concentrate the deportees."

One advantage of his verbosity is that, ultimately, he blurts out the truth. When he introduced the Bantu Authorities Act, he presented it solicitously as a plan to revive the wilting flower of tribalism. Then he let slip: "The tribal authority is the natural ally of the government against such rebellious movements (Mau-Mau). It was the chiefs with their authorities who sided with the forces of law and order and who assisted European authority. . . . We are dealing with a restoration of a natural Native democracy." With Sekhukhuneland in flames, with chiefs and headmen banned and banished, as they refuse to accept the total capitulation prescribed for them in the fake "Bantu Authorities" system—this is Verwoerd's simple view.

"Bantu Education" is another example: "I believe that racial relations will be improved when Bantu education is handled in the manner proposed by us. Racial relations cannot improve if the result of Native education is the creation of a frustrated people who, as a result of the education they receive, have expectations in life which circumstances in South Africa do not allow to be fulfilled . . . when it creates people who are trained for professions not open to them . . . good racial relations cannot exist when the education is given under the supervision of people who . . . believe in a policy of equality. Such a person will by the very nature of the education he gives, both as regards the content of that education and the spirit, create expectations in the mind of the Bantu which clash with the possibilities in this country. It is therefore necessary that Native education should be controlled in such a way that it should be in accord with the policy of the State."

When one writes about Dr. Verwoerd, one is afflicted with his verbosity. The subject of apartheid is never-ending; the misery interminable. That it will end in catastrophe, now seems certain. Dr. Verwoerd himself has prophesied the future: "It is easy to sit back. I have decided, even at the risk of becoming unpopular, or even if I made mistakes, to attempt to find a solution. It is better to have fought and lost, than never to have fought at all."

REVOLUTIONS ARE NOT ABNORMAL

MICHAEL HARMEL

Johannesburg Journalist

WHEN Julius Lewin writes that there is "No Revolution Round the Corner" one cannot exactly quarrel with him. There are so many imponderables, so many variations and possible combinations of sets of circumstances, in the near future, that it would be a rash political prophet who would set out to establish a timetable and pattern for exactly when and how changes will come about in this country. Moreover, as Dr. Simons has pointed out in his commentary on Mr. Lewin's article, our country is by no means insulated from the shocks and currents that are affecting and changing the great world beyond the Limpopo and across the seas. Here, again, is a further set of unpredictable variations and developments, economic, political and military, that must affect the course of the great struggle that is proceeding in South Africa between Nationalist autocracy and the democratic opposition.

All the same, I am sure that there must be substantial changes in our country in the fairly near future, and that when Mr. Lewin declares that "the present state of the Union" is likely to "go on almost indefinitely" he is giving grounds for quite unjustifiable complacency to the upholders of the present set-up (which is as fundamentally unstable and unviable as it is unjust) and quite unnecessary pessimism to its opponents.

What is meant by "revolution", anyway? Must it mean fighting? Despite his warning that the word "should not be lightly tossed around," Mr. Lewin does not tell us how he uses it. I think it means a fairly rapid and fundamental change in a society, involving the displacement of the ruling class: whether there is any fighting or not. Although he emphasises military factors, Mr. Lewin seems to agree with this definition when he reiterates his belief that there is not going to be any major change in the *status quo* in this country. At any rate that is just where I want to join issue with him.

Mr. Lewin leans rather heavily on a thesis by an American professor, Brinton, who has concluded from a study of four revolutions (the 1640 English revolution, the Eighteenth Century American and French revolutions and the 1917 revolution in Russia) that certain specific conditions must be present for such an event to take place. This approach has the grave

disadvantage that it treats revolution as something quite exceptional and remarkable in modern society.

Nothing could be further from the truth. During the past century practically every country in Europe has undergone a revolution—many of them through several. The same may be said of Central and South America. In the brief years since the second World War the wave of revolutionary change and upheaval has been enormously extended and accelerated, covering much the greater part of Asia, Eastern Europe and still steadily advancing in Africa. Any sort of analysis which regards revolution as something abnormal, depending on a rare combination of circumstances, therefore conflicts sharply with the realities of our world and our times, and is academic in the bad sense of the word.

Today, anybody can see what a 100 years ago it took a genius to foresee: that industrialization is incompatible with feudal despotism, with group or class monopoly of political (and ultimately of economic) power. The old absolute rulers could and did ban revolutionary movements and radical ideas, but they were powerless to ban factory production allied to new sources of energy. Invariably and inevitably, these have proved fatal to their authority and to the old order.

One by one the autocracies and absolute monarchies had to give way to republics and elected legislatures. The daring ideas of the French and American revolutions have become the universally acknowledged principles of the United Nations Charter. Today practically nowhere, outside the Union, does a privileged minority claim to govern by divine right.

The type of despotism we still endure in the Union in this age —and our country stands high in the ranks of industrial nations— is a kind of freak, an anachronism which cannot hope much longer to survive. Before the last war the upholder of White supremacy could have comforted himself with the thought that after all democratic revolutions were confined to Europe and America, but that illusion has been shattered to fragments. The Afro-Asian revolution is proving even more rapid and dynamic than the European-American; there can be few people today, outside Southern Africa, Alabama and Notting Hill, who think that democracy and self-government are "*slegs vir blankes*".*

This point is of particular significance when considered in relation to Professor Brinton's "rules", cited by Mr. Lewin,

* For whites only (Afrikaans).

regarding such matters as "subversion of the armed forces", etc. It is obvious that Brinton's facile generalizations simply do not work when applied to the Afro-Asian situation.

There was no marked civil service inefficiency, certainly not much in the way of defection from the imperial forces, in the many colonies and "possessions" which, in the past few years Britain, France, Holland and other Powers have had to quit with varying degrees of haste and indignity.

And it is quite impossible to understand the South African perspective without taking into account its pronounced similarity to the characteristic "colonial" upsurge of this decade. The point was well put by the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union, when it observed that this country "closely resembles a colonial Power, but one whose colonies . . . are scattered over the territory of the metropolitan country itself".

Of course there are significant differences as well between the position of the White South African State in relation to its African "colonies" and that of a European power and its overseas territories—one must not push an analogy too far. The obvious difference is that mentioned by the UN Commission—that the "colonies" are not overseas but right here. And it is this difference which makes the task of the national liberation movement—by which I mean essentially the Congress alliance—so extra-ordinarily complicated and difficult that, despite a leadership which in skill, wisdom and maturity can compare not unfavourably with any in the world, and certainly on this continent, it has little to show in the way of practical success.

The inevitible trend to economic integration, well brought out by Dr. Simons' statistics, are in the long run utterly destructive of Dr. Verwoerd's vision of a dominant, urban, all-White metropolis controlling separate, primitive, peasant African communities through "Lieutenant-Governors" at the head of a streamlined Native Affairs Department, refashioned in the mould of the British colonial civil services. For better or worse the Union is irretrievably embarked on the course of development into a unitary industrial society. And nowhere in the world has such a society developed without conceding immeasurably higher living standards and political rights to the people than prevail in South Africa.

One of the phenomena that has everywhere preceded and hastened such concessions has been the seething discontent of

the masses.

Mr. Lewin does not think the signs of discontent in our country are very serious. The Africans are "sharing" the economic prosperity, which compensates them for the "frustration induced by the colour bar." The defiance campaign of 1952 did not shake the government, and the election week stay-away failed this year. Anyway a general strike of Africans could not be very effective. Thus there is no prospect of any radical change; the prospect is "hopeless but not desperate"; even very fabian economic improvements will have to await the "slow and difficult emergence of effective trade unions", "under wiser leadership."

The picture is as sedative and reassuring as any that might be painted as an inducement to overseas investors—and as far removed from the facts. How, one wonders, are Africans "sharing in prosperity?" This will certainly come as news to the millions whose miserable wages (stringently pegged by the full might of the State) prove every year more inadequate to cope with soaring prices. (For demonstration, we need only turn to numerous authoritative statements by the Institute of Race Relations, to memoranda by the Congress of Trade Unions and the Trade Union Council, and even surveys made by employers' organizations. We need only recall the striking phenomenon of a year ago, when tens of thousands walked to work to save twopence a day.)

The "prosperity" of the Union, in fact has been very limited, and reflected mainly in bigger profits for producers and higher prices. And the position of the African workers and peasants has grown worse not better, on the whole, so that people are forced into a bitter struggle for what is really an almost beggarly demand for £1 a day.

For the Africans there is no prosperity, and if there were it could never compensate for what it is really a major understatement to call "frustrations of the colour bar." For in this euphemistic phrase one must comprehend all the really unendurable frightfulness of Verwoerd's apartheid. One must recall the intensification to the *n*th degree of the pass system. Its extension to women. The mass uprooting of populations. The shocking implications of Bantu Authorities and of Bantu Education. The menace of job reservation. The new taxes . . . But the list is endless. No one who knows what it means, or could put himself in the place of the people who suffer it, could

imagine that the people are contented. Indeed Mr. Lewin himself, who has fought against every one of these evil things and knows what they mean, must be perfectly well aware that they are not contented, that they hate them and the Government and systems which imposed them with a deep and abiding hatred.

Again to quote the U.N. Commission report: "As the apartheid policy develops, the situation it has made is constantly being aggravated and daily less open to settlement . . . daily more explosive and more menacing to internal peace . . ."

They wrote that in 1953. Since then we have witnessed the mounting resistance of African women to passes, the great bus boycotts, the Drill Hall demonstrations, the Rand strike of June 26, 1957, the violent disturbances in Zeerust, Sekhukhuneland and other rural areas. There has been a continuous awakening of the masses, a steady consolidation of the multiracial movement for democracy, clarification of its views, firming of its determination. The defiance campaign might not have "shaken the government", but it vastly reinforced the liberation movement in membership, influence, experience and maturity. Even the stay-at-home last April, disappointing though it was in many ways, brought home rich lessons which the movement has not been slow to learn and apply.

The Nationalist Government is far from sharing Mr. Lewin's apparent complacency regarding its stability. They are discovering, like the Red Queen in Alice, that you have to go faster and faster merely to remain in the same place. The constant stream of repressive legislation and administrative bans and restrictions on civil liberties, the Treason Trial, followed now by a series of other mass political trials, the mounting obsession with security, the very harshness of each new draconic apartheid measure—all these betray a basic jitteriness. They cannot be explained merely by referring to the well-known authoritarian tendencies of the Nationalists, or Swart's nightmares about Reds under his bed. His gigantic plots and conspiracies may be sick fancies, but there is nevertheless a very real basis for the apprehensions of the Government. That basis is the fact that the Congress movement, the national liberation movement of South Africa, has found its direction and its goal, and is steadily winning the allegiance of the vast majority of the people.

And herein lies the certainty of the defeat of the present form of Government and the victory of the South African revolution. For no minority Government can endure, however rigid its

repression or seemingly powerful its forces, once the great majority of the people have taken the path of resolute resistance and organization against it.

But revolution need not involve violence. There have been plenty of examples in history where a combination of factors have been compelling enough to make a ruling class give way for urgent and overdue changes, without dragging the people through the agony of civil war. We can only hope that this may also be the case in South Africa. We cannot tell what exact form the changes will take, how exactly or when they will come.

No doubt our road to democracy will be no easy one: the way is defended by men who will uphold privilege and injustice with tenacity and ruthlessness; the struggle will demand sacrifices and exact casualties. Insofar as Mr. Lewin was seeking to discourage facile optimism and dispel visions of easy victory, his purpose was worthy. The weakness of his article, however, was that, perhaps under the shadow of the Nationalists' last election victory, he has painted a difficult task as a hopeless one. And that is not true.

REVOLUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

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ONE can support Julius Lewin's view that revolution is not just round the corner without agreeing with him that the present state of affairs can go on almost indefinitely. A lot depends on what we mean by revolution.

Lewin makes much of Professor Brinton's study of the four classical revolutions—the English, the American, the French and the Russian—and then shows, fairly conclusively, that all the ingredients do not exist in our country. Certainly we are not in the running for a classical revolution, but there is another kind of revolution, typical of our modern post-war world, for which South Africa may be a very likely candidate. It would have been more appropriate if Lewin had compared and contrasted the situation here, not with seventeenth century England or eighteenth century France, but with post-war Indonesia, Kenya or Algeria.

The classical revolutions were all social revolutions not seriously complicated by racial factors. A "colonial" element appeared in the American and also in the Russian revolution; but in the former the colonists were rebelling against their own king, and in the latter the Russian revolutionaries, though assisted by Ukrainians, Georgians and so on, were concerned to break the power of their own ruling class and what it stood for.

Our modern colonial revolutions are essentially different. They combine social, economic, national *and racial* factors—and the racial factor, with its psychological implications, is of the greatest importance.

It is almost an axiom that any stable form of government can continue only with the consent of the majority. The organs of state power, police, army and so on, are accessory to government but the most important factor is psychological. Even in a slave state, such as our Western Cape in the eighteenth century, stability depended on the slave accepting his inferior status as something akin to a law of nature.

I wish to affirm that in South Africa the overwhelming majority of the Non-Europeans still accept their second-grade status as inevitable. They believe the white man is "baas" not merely by virtue of the law, the sjambok and the machine

gun, but because he is naturally the ruler. This is an illusion, but as long as the illusion remains in the minds of the overwhelming majority, the government's position is invulnerable. To question this belief is something very close to heresy or treason.

One of the most significant books written about Africa recently is O. Mannoni's *Prospero and Caliban*. It deals with the Madagascar revolt of 1947, an event which passed unnoticed in South Africa, but which cost 80,000 lives and made it necessary for the French to reconquer the island. The author's thesis is that the African, having accepted the white man as lord and patron, is willing, nay, anxious to be ruled by him, but that once disillusionment becomes common, the master-servant relationship is destroyed, and then anything can happen. The Malagasy were disillusioned when Paris fell to the Germans in the second world war.

It is the dependence of the South African set-up, as of all colonial regimes, on the consent of the governed that provides the clue to the present situation. It is not economic instability but psychological instability that the supporters of apartheid should fear. What evidence is there that quiescence on the part of the segregated will continue?

The static conditions of the old Cape have been replaced by the dynamic industrialism of modern South Africa. In spite of discriminatory and repressive legislation, the African's economic significance and power grow together with his sophistication. His acceptance of the status quo must suffer continued erosion. The final swing over to non-acceptance may be sudden and dramatic and may be triggered off by some event, great or even comparatively trivial, which we at present cannot foresee.

We must not place too much emphasis on the present political inertia of the African, the disunity in the A.N.C. and the almost complete disappearance of the Non-European trade union movement. Given certain conditions, organization can mushroom overnight. The spores of revolution have long since been scattered and they have germinated. There is hardly an African school child over twelve years old who does not know the "Afrika" salute or the meaning of "Mayibuye!"

The kind of revolution that involves the seizure of power by an insurgent majority (the classical type of revolution) is, for reasons that Lewin has pointed out, not at all likely to happen to us in the near future. One can, however, picture a crisis in

racial relations that would require drastic remedies for its solution. Under such circumstances a government might attempt to rule by permanent martial law, but the strain of this would prove intolerable and inevitably concessions would have to be made, as in Kenya. Once that happened, apartheid, *as a policy*, could hardly be revived. Thereafter political parties, white, black or multiracial, would be mainly concerned with the speed of advance.

SATYAGRAHA IN SOUTH AFRICA

FATIMA MEER

SATYAGRAHA, a philosophy of non-violent opposition to injustice, comes to us in an age which has seen the worst forms of human violence. As a philosophy of social change, it advances the theory that social reform is dependant wholly on the method used to bring about reform. It thus denies the possibility of instituting good through methods of evil, of realizing peace through techniques of violence, of achieving democratic rights by forms of action hostile to the spirit of democracy.

The constant use of the name of Mahatma Gandhi, of the word Satyagraha, and of such terms as civil disobedience, "hartal" and non-violence in the non-European struggle against racial injustice in South Africa seems to suggest that the Gandhian concept has had a lasting impact on our people and is in the process of emerging as a salient factor in the struggle for democracy in the Union.

Literally translated, the word "Satyagraha" means the demonstration of a heart firm in the concepts of love and truth. To Gandhi himself, the author of the word and the philosophy it expressed, it was the belief that social change, where necessary, can be effected by the impact of soul force upon the hearts of those in power.

It is doubtful whether this concept, deeply inspired by religious beliefs of a universal trend and significantly influenced by the writings of the Russian philosopher Tolstoy, was adhered to in its purity by many people other than Gandhi himself and a handful of his close disciples like Vinoba Bhave. To Nehru, Gandhi's personally chosen successor, and to the masses of India, it remained a political tactic to be utilized for the obtaining of greater political power by a voiceless people. The Indians of South Africa saw Satyagraha in this light when, under the leadership of Gandhi, they became the first people to use the weapon and develop its technique.

Numerically, the Indians constitute the smallest group in the multi-racial society of South Africa, representing only 2.9 per cent. of her total population. For the most part, they share with the rest of the non-European peoples in the country an inescapable existence of slums, endless overcrowded dwellings and a low resistance to death and disease. Three-

quarters of the Indian breadwinners earn less than £100 a year with an average family of five dependants to support. While European politicians utilize the high Indian birth rate to fan fears of insecurity in the minds of the vote-exercising public, some 65 Indian babies in every 1,000 never survive their first year.

The Indian, alone of the South African peoples, remains voteless. While some Africans have the ineffective "Native representation" and the Coloured is to be placed on a communal roll, even the Opposition United Party which in 1946 had prescribed a form of dummy representation for Asiatics, has in a recent statement expressed its complete aversion to the granting of any political rights to the Indian people. And yet, of all the non-White peoples in South Africa, it is the Indian community which has within its ranks the most articulate and powerful economic group—merchants and professionals who constitute that middle-class so vital to any suppressed people in its struggle for political rights.

It is through the unique presence of this class within the ranks of the non-European people that South African Indians have endured their peculiar oppression and earned their peculiar history in the development of the country. For basic to the emergence of the "Indian problem" is the question of European monopolization of South Africa's wealth. As early as 1880, the Indian middle-class revealed signs of entrenching itself as a non-European group of economic strength, and from that date onward, European politics commenced its bitter history of Indian antagonism.

The Indians migrated to Natal in 1860 essentially under the indenture system and on the clear understanding that complete and full participation in the citizenship rights of the country would be their ultimate reward when freed of their contracts.

It was this aspect of the British contract of indenture which allowed some compensation for the harsh and slave-like conditions of labour embodied in the agreement. At the time, the Indians held a crucial potential for increasing the numbers of a White minority which lived in perpetual fear of an African avalanche. The presence of a Black people, however, in the urban life of the colony, sharing privileges equally with the Whites, was a contradiction in a society conceived for the exclusive benefit of a White pigmentocracy. The theoretical acceptance of Indian citizenship rights was bound to lead to a

practical rejection as soon as Indians in sufficient numbers gathered sufficient sophistication to threaten the economic monopoly of the dominant group.

The breach in the agreement which followed was inevitable, and the Indian problem emerged as the problem of a White government seeking constitutional means to whittle away Indian rights and reduce their status to that of the other non-White peoples.

From 1883 onwards the Indians in Natal and in all the provinces to which they travelled became subjected to discriminatory legislation. The Transvaal treated them as pariahs who, on grounds of hygiene, were to be separated from the European community. The Orange Free State banned them completely from its territory, while in Natal, restrictions on licence applications and severe taxes crippled their freedom. The poll tax introduced in Natal to resolve the conflict between industry which depended on Indian labour and commerce which believed itself outdone by Indian competition, was exorbitantly high. Equivalent to six months' salary under indenture, it applied to all indentured Indian males over the age of 16 and all females over the age of 13, who failed to return to India or to re-indenture themselves. It set up such barriers to enterprise that some 32,000 Indians, representing 25 per cent. of the population, repatriated themselves during the years of its operation.

The situation called for counter-action, but the Indians were divided among themselves economically and ethnically, with religious and linguistic barriers preventing the organization of a common front. Whilst the business class made legal representations of a personal type or organized petitions of a small group nature, the large majority of the indentured labourers remained inarticulate and inhibited in their social and economic depression. Generally, the Indians possessed little appreciation of the efficacy of the vote, and even when entitled to it, used it to little purpose.

The dramatic awakening of Indian political conscience may be traced to 1890, when Gandhi came to Natal. A highly educated and principled young man, he was appalled by the degradations imposed on British Indian subjects. On a journey from Durban to Pretoria, he was thrown out of the coach at Pietermaritzburg for daring to travel first class with Europeans, soundly boxed about the ears at Charlestown for exerting his rights as a passenger, and rudely pushed off the sidewalks in

Johannesburg. He felt keenly the need for enlightened guidance in the Indian community and accurately diagnosed its immediate weakness as its complete inarticulateness in the language of the government.

Founding the Natal Indian Congress in 1894, he accepted the challenge of his environment, and with the theme of Satyagraha, succeeded in identifying the political purpose of the Hindu with the Muslim, the freed with the indentured, the South Indian with the North Indian.

His first reaction to the Indian problem in Natal was to inform the British government and public of the atrocities committed under their names. He was convinced of their ignorance in the matter and believed the solution to the question to lie in British enlightenment. Satyagraha itself, expressing active opposition to inflexible authority, developed as a final appeal to the British conscience when all other constitutional methods of approach had failed.

Despite the magnificence of his contribution in arousing the political consciousness of the Indian people and giving to the world a new approach to political struggle, his philosophy has not remained unchallenged, even by his followers. No great figure of theory remains without criticism, and Gandhi himself admits to having committed Himalayan blunders, which have had the effect of placing brakes upon the militancy of the people. There is little doubt that in South Africa, as later in India, his preoccupation with the impact of soul force reacted against the interest of the people's immediate and material benefits, and tended to validate the accusation that the allegiance of Satyagraha ultimately and objectively served the interests of those in power.

The practical applications of his philosophy in the South African passive resistance campaigns of 1908 and 1913 resulted in meagre gains and frustration for the Indian people. As forces of political education, their impact was unquestionable. But as techniques of liberation, they were ineffective. While both campaigns unified and strengthened the Indians in their struggle, they also halted progress during moments of supreme strategic importance, because Gandhi placed greater value on the achievement of spiritual victory over the hearts of those in power than on the acquisition of material benefits for the Satyagrahis.

In 1907 he called off the Transvaal campaign, after a 100 per

cent. boycott of the Indian pass-imposing Act had been achieved and a popular resistance movement launched, on the misguided assumption that governmental overtures to compromise were caused by a conversion of heart. In 1913, at a time when it appeared obvious to all that the government had been brought to bay, he chose to demonstrate Indian magnanimity of heart, rather than exploit the situation for the immediate rectification of Indian rights. Never before and never since have the Indians in South Africa held such a position of crucial economic importance. The mammoth Indian strike, in sympathy with the heroic march of the Newcastle mine workers who, with women and children, had set out to cross the Transvaal border on foot in violation of unjust anti-Indian laws, had disastrous effects for industry in Natal. The European mineworkers' strike on the Rand coinciding with this demonstration, placed the government in a particularly precarious position. Gandhi, however, intent on his spiritual victory, called off the Indian campaign, thus leaving the government unhampered to deal all the more effectively with the European strikers.

Gandhian concepts never quite convinced the Indians in South Africa or in India. The technique of passive resistance was invariably used with a difference in interpretation between Gandhi and his followers. Gandhi himself had visualized such a misunderstanding and, in order to obviate it, had in the first instance suggested the restriction of its use to highly trained personnel. He conceived passive resistance as a specialized weapon which only the spiritually pure could utilize.

His concept, logically followed, precluded mass utilization of the technique, and his first appeal was thus made to the middle-class trading element, who he felt would be sufficiently enlightened to appreciate and follow it. It was the unsophisticated worker, however, who gave passive resistance its strength and developed its potential as a force of mass coercion. In 1913, he followed Gandhi with unflinching faith. In 1946, he responded to the call of Satyagraha with matching valour, and, in more recent years, the non-European workers have responded to the call of non-violence with admirable discipline.

It is undoubtedly the aspect of Passive Resistance which gives forth hope for the effecting of social change without resource to violence which has upheld it in the hearts of the Indian people. It is also this aspect of the philosophy which has attracted to its orbit the co-operation of large groups of people

professing allegiance to different ideological creeds.

Satyagraha as a weapon of multi-racial usage, however, did not occur until almost half a century after its origin on South African soil. For many years after the departure of Mahatma Ghandi from the country, the creed of Satyagraha lost its continuity in the life of formal Indian political expression. The period following his departure, however, a period offset by two World Wars and the tremendous impact of industrialization, laid the basis for a vitally changed South African society, in which circumstantial forces paved the way for a future state of non-European co-operation.

Economic factors, especially in Natal, acted as great levellers of African and Indian interests. The "civilized labour policy" had retrieved and isolated the European worker from the morass of labour competition and passed economic legislation which affected all non-European workers equally.

Indians, though organized into a strong trade union movement, realized the futility of their labour strength in the absence of an equally strong African labour movement. Tragically they watched their strike actions increase their own unemployment as unsophisticated African workers replaced their labour.

The Gandhian movement had based itself on the theory of Indian exclusiveness, and had believed in the political distinctiveness of the Indian problem. To the average Indian who groped in the maze of industrial competition and who became quickly identified with the social and economic depletions of the non-European people, this was a myth which exploded all too dramatically.

Unfortunately, formal Indian political organization did not reflect the vitally changed situation in which Indians were finding themselves. The post-Gandhian era saw a leadership which remained pathetically aloof from the problems of its following. Inheriting neither the philosophy of Satyagraha nor formulating any political principles of its own, it preferred a state of precarious suspension between the two major race groups, in the false belief that acceleration of their acceptance within the ranks of the dominant class depended on Indian isolation from the general problems of racial discrimination in South Africa.

Indian political leadership approved the diplomatic interference of the British Indian government and the conclusion of the Cape Town Agreement in 1927—an Agreement which accepted the principle of repatriation for South African Indians

at a time when every Indian had become a Union national. Instead of a principled and logical opposition to all facets of racial discrimination, it endured in 1944 the conclusion of the Pretoria Agreement, which accepted the policy of segregation for the Indian people in return for certain economic concessions of a temporary nature safeguarding the vested interest of a small section of the community.

It was inevitable that a leadership at such variance with its following would soon lose its authority. In 1946, it was finally ousted by those who joined together working class interests with the intellectual guidance of Gandhian principles and Socialism. It had watched in awesome anticipation the forces of Satyagraha under the emotional impact of Mahatma Gandhi and the practical guidance of Nehru cleave the path to Indian liberation.

In 1946, this new leadership restaged Passive Resistance in South Africa and led some 2,000 enthusiasts to prison in opposition to an Act which sought their isolation from the rest of South African society. Their campaign, though in obvious form similar to the original Gandhian campaign, was appreciably different in its ultimate direction and political aspirations. It was launched in a mood which understood both the expediency and ethics of joint political action, a mood which sought non-European rather than Indian liberation.

For South Africa, this revised interpretation of the Passive Resistance weapon held crucial significance. It accelerated the growth of united militancy among the non-White peoples and heralded a new era in the development of a non-racial united democratic front in the country. There is little doubt that, despite its 'Indian' character, the campaign stressed and eloquently exhibited faith in a united struggle, ultimately directed towards the achievement of ends which would benefit equally all South Africans, not Indians alone.

Fundamental to non-European political maturity in South Africa has been the alliance of the African and Indian Congresses. Whilst 1946 saw the organization of an Indian political front which had rid itself of group restrictive sentiments, it was not until 1950 that a similar change expressed itself on the African frontier; a year after the tragic racial disturbances in Durban between the Indian and African peoples. The riots came as a serious warning to the Leadership, who realized that if the economic identification of the two peoples did not

receive progressive political guidance, the situation could be horribly misused by the government to create racial strife within the ranks of the non-White race. It expedited united action on the part of the two Congresses who, despite the Dadoo-Xuma Pact of 1946, had remained aloof from each other. In 1950, Africans and Indians jointly and equally participated in the National Day of Protest against racial discrimination, and in 1952, the two Congresses together launched the Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign, patterned on the lines of the 1946 Passive Resistance movement. The success of their unity served as a forerunner to the formation of the Coloured and European Congresses and to the setting up of an effective united barrier against anti-democratic forces.

Though many factors have combined to effect this democratic unit in South Africa, central to its theme of action has been its adherance to the form of Satyagraha. There is little doubt that, but for the profound humanitarianism and the generous tolerance of all creeds intrinsic in its philosophy, it could not have drawn together such diverse elements of political struggle. It also seems fairly clear that without its direction in the non-European movement itself, the non-White struggle for self-expression would not have drawn to itself the magnificent world support which it has done.

The racial situation in South Africa beckons a major upheaval. The Indians are aware of this and see the solution in the alliance of their political sympathy with those who wish to broaden the frontiers of democracy and who readily accept that the lead in this respect lies in united thought and action.

Satyagraha, non-violence, passive resistance, civil disobedience —one may choose any of these terms and accept either the Gandhian philosophy or the tactics of the struggle. The fact is that the Indian people are marching forward as a vital section of the democratic force of South Africa, and their philosophy of Satyagraha continues to play an invaluable role in their progress to freedom.

THE ABDICATION OF A COMMUNITY

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Of course it all depends on your point of view.

You might argue as follows: "From humble origins South African Jewry has risen to be one of the most important communities of the Jewish world, and an eminently valuable element in South African society. It has managed to clamber from a level of abject poverty to real affluence within less than a generation. In intellectual, professional, economic and political pursuits it has produced a galaxy of leaders. Hebrew and religious education is on a higher standard than almost anywhere else on the globe. Synagogues sprout up and down the country. Proportionately, the average South African Jew gives more generously towards Israel than his overseas fellow-Jews. On the whole—and especially compared to most other countries—the Jews in South Africa form a united, coherent, conscious and constructive community. As men, as Jews, as South Africans, they have every right to feel happy with their attainments."

Or else, if you suffer from indigestion or chronic malice or the plague of liberal views, you might evaluate them on these lines: "In view of their wealth, education, social prominence and certain special advantages, they could and should have made a pioneering contribution towards the just solution of the racial problem which is, essentially, the underlying reality of all facts, trends and detail questions in their country. And they have not done, and are not now doing, so."

Jews form a minority, a small minority, within the population of South Africa. Compared to the national total of fourteen million persons, the Jewish community's mere 105,000 or so souls may seem a tiny fraction—hardly one per cent. of the whole populace. Yet it would be a grievous mistake to underestimate the significance of the Jewish minority. Even purely numerically speaking, under the absurd rules of South African ethnic arithmetic, the size of the Jewish population constitutes a factor necessary to reckon with. After all, the dominant

Afrikaner group is itself but a small minority of South Africa's human millions. The proportion of Afrikanerdom to the rest of South Africa's general community which it rules is not very different from the ratio of Jew to Boer; roughly, one to ten in each instance. South Africa is the land *par excellence* where minorities can have a say—and a vast majority be deprived of it—quite without regard to what, in a democracy, their numbers would warrant. And in the two main cities, Johannesburg and Cape Town, the Jews constitute one-tenth of the citizens "that count": the Whites, including both Afrikaans and English speaking sections. But quite apart from the business of counting heads, the question of status and calibre are of prime importance. Economically, politically and culturally, their weight is far in excess of their mere sum. The clothing, furniture and leather industries, the wool and jewellery trade, the Universities, medicine, law, even agriculture and the Councils of City and State abound with leading figures who are Jews. Jewry *is* a minority in South Africa—but one of crucial importance and commanding unique possibilities of effective action.

Tautological as it may seem at first sight, it is yet a true and relevant statement to point out that the Jewish community in South Africa *is* a community. Indeed they are not walled in by a visible ghetto, they are segregated neither in residence nor in their place or type of occupation (though there are some interesting aggregations and preferences); nor are they homogeneous in habits, thinking and attitude. But they *are* markedly united and coherent. It is a well-known phenomenon the world over that Jews tend to "stick together", displaying centripetal tendencies at any rate in the social spheres. But in the context of South Africa, strong Jewish community-awareness is quite especially intense.

A number of reasons may account for this unusual degree of communal cohesion and personal orientation. As far as Jewish communities go, South Africa Jewry is a new branch. In it even second-generation Jews can count as veterans (compared, say, to Britain where descendants of nineteenth century immigrants are reckoned as green newcomers beside Anglo-Jewish families of three centuries' standing). The still living solidarity of onion-boaters, surviving memories of the old country and of being uncomfortably new in the new one, characterize much Jewish thinking, conversation, public speak-

ing and journalism. But a yet more powerful factor in maintaining Jewish separatism is the general racialistic, pigeonholing outlook of the country. Whether Jews like it or not, the typical South African White mentality classes them as a "race"—an on the whole accepted, respected and pigmentocratically privileged third shareholder in the dubiously ethical but indubitably profitable concern of White South Africa; but at the same time a distinct, unassimilated and unassimillable element. However kindly and tolerantly they might treat him, neither the Afrikaner nor the descendant of the British settlers would dream of regarding the Jew as "one of us." Willy-nilly the Jew is forced to cultivate his fellow-Jews' company. Clear evidence for, and effects of, this separateness imposed from without are the two main quasi-religious preoccupations of South African Jewry: a numinous awe surrounding the separate sports club, and an enshrinement of Zionism in its most uncritically chauvinistic form. The resentment at being rejected is often over-compensated in a peculiarly hollow pride and superiority-complex. It is instructive to ponder over the manner in which Dr. Malan's basically nasty and insulting remarks about "cultural parallellism" were taken up by the Jewish papers and transformed into an appearance of profound, philosophical philosemitism.

Significant and united as they happily are, South African Jewry has studiedly avoided any official commitment on the racial problems. This does not however mean that constituent individuals or groups of the community have always managed to steer clear of these issues. In fact to do so would be quite impossible: living in South Africa means as inevitable a contact with the colour question as with the air one breathes or the ground on which one treads. It is both theoretically and practically impossible to opt out, because the very act of refusing to be openly committed amounts to an open commitment on the side of the *status quo*. To say "I am not interested" is tantamount to saying "As far as I am concerned, things may go on as they are now. They are not as bad as to warrant my personal participation." It means tacitly appending one's own signature to the decree of race domination.

Individual Jews—or persons of Jewish extraction—have taken stands in very different and, at times, very radical ways. Cape Town's Mr. Nossel performed some pathetic antics in his desire to rally his fellow-Jews under the Nationalist Party

banner. On the other hand, Sam Kahn (no less a Jew) is known as an uncompromising opponent of racialism.

And the tens of thousand of the lesser fry. Mr. A. (an otherwise incredibly generous and simple person) between the fifth whisky and collapse voices his creed: "I'm a South African first and a Jew second. The one is my nation, the other my religion, man. I say let the *shul* (synagogue) stick to religion, and leave politics to those who know what's good for the country. I say, keep the bastards down, or else they'll slit our throats. Have another one . . ." Mr. B., the industrial shrewdie, sums up his manifesto: "Look here, we all feel sympathy towards these poor creatures. But what can we do? We are a minority; we've got to look after our own interests. We daren't offend the powers that be. Swim with the tide, make hay while the sun shines, and don't be unrealistic." Mr. C., refugee intellectual from Hitler's Germany (tired, artistic, a little queer, jocular but nervous), speaks: "Look, I've had my share of suffering. Believe me, it was enough for one person for a lifetime. Nobody worried about us when we were the victims. I am not interested in others. I am tired. All I want is to live in peace, be left alone, keep out of politics, practice my profession. Don't drag me into this odious business." Gentlemen worry about rising labour costs in the board room and on the golf course and in the synagogue entrance hall; their ladies moan about the unreliability, cheek, unchastity, clumsiness of servants; spine-tingling stories of violence, riot and danger in the location pepper up sedately luxurious dinner parties in the fashionable suburbs. Resigned acceptance or hearty approval is the prevalent attitude of individual Jews towards racialism. And the Jews who oppose it and fight against it, do so not as Jews, because they are Jews—but as humanitarians, liberals, possibly socialists. Their Jewishness as such seems to have no bearing at all on their racial alignment. That individual Jews vary immensely in their attitudes is a fact. Whether as Jews they *ought to* be thus divided, is, of course, a very different matter.

"Render unto Caesar . . " is a Jewishly unacceptable principle. What we give and how we give and why we give unto Caesar are ways of giving (or of refusing to give) unto God. Judaism cannot allow—in any interpretation of the faith—a sharp division between earthly behaviour and heavenward piety. Yet it is commonly thought that Judaism demands ritual conformity

in the first place, coupled with dogmatic rigour; a pretty-pretty, almsgiving type of sentimental charity as a secondary requirement: but specific social, economic and political attitudes not at all. And this, of course, is a fatal distortion of the essential message of Jewish tradition. Very rarely, under exceptionally strong moral provocation, an isolated Jewish preacher might allow himself, very guardedly, very moderately and obscurely, to burst into righteous indignation. Chief Rabbi Rabinowitz of Johannesburg has commented critically on the Western Areas Removal Scheme and on the University apartheid plans. Rabbi Weiler, of the Reform congregation, in his concluding benediction, often prayed for God's blessing upon all human beings, irrespective of race, colour or creed. Yet these—and similar—moral judgments were passed either on limited, self-contained issues (and thus may have given the impression that the disapproval concerned only the *manner* of procedure, not its goal, condemning unnecessary brutality of execution rather than racial discrimination and enforced human inequality as such), or else were couched in such vague and general terms that the ordinary listener would not understand its practical relevance to issues at hand and dismiss it as so much usual flabby pietistic pulpit nonsense. And however cautious and tame such statements may have been, it is noteworthy that the laity of the congregations, respected elders as well as humbler worshippers—orthodox and reform alike—were on the whole upset, afraid, at times outraged, generally icily unsympathetic towards their own spiritual leaders' pronouncements. Far too little has been said, far too rarely and far too timidly: and promptly repudiated by the flock of the supposedly faithful.

Perhaps as a lame substitute for open expressions of human fellow-feeling for, and self-identification with, the oppressed Black majority, South African Jewry has undertaken several projects in the field of welfare work. Soup kitchens, creches for the children of working mothers, hospital beds, certain educational facilities have been provided for the benefit of Africans, Coloureds and Indians under the auspices of a few Jewish organizations. The Leagues of Jewish Women and the Temple Sisterhoods are most prominent in these efforts. Often considerable sums were, and are being, spent by them for doubtlessly deserving purposes. As far as these go, they are noble and truly religious gestures. But in South Africa to-day more still than the demand of hunger and health, it is the needs

of offended human *dignity* that must be met. Condescending doles cannot improve, but may well worsen, this aspect of the moral and spiritual situation. To stand cap in hand before a patronizingly beneficent master may help to fill an empty stomach but does nothing to strengthen the human self-respect of the recipient. To ignore these welfare efforts altogether is hardly greater a falsification of the truth than to exaggerate their value.

The S.A. Jewish Board of Deputies and the Jewish papers of South Africa are at one in consistently broadcasting the creed of Jewry's non-commitment on issues of race and colour. The example of a small society known as the Jewish Democratic League is illuminating. In 1956 the League called a meeting in Johannesburg to protest against the Group Areas Act. Next week-end the colums of the Jewish press were positively saffron with pain, fury, dissociation. "No right to call themselves Jewish"—was the unanimous verdict.

But why, it might be asked, should the Jews, as distinct from other sections of the South African population, and in a special manner and degree, be expected to have something to say—and do—about the racial situation?

Four independently valid but cumulatively overwhelming considerations are relevant in answering this question.

Firstly, the bulk of South African Jewry is still personally affected by racial discrimination and intolerance. The chronologically earliest, Anglo-Jewish layer of immigrants apart, the later, numerically much more important waves of newcomers themselves came in order to escape persecution on account of their origin. Whether they came from Eastern Europe around the turn of the century, or from Central and Western Europe from the early 'thirties onward, personal memories of oppression must still be vivid in the minds of very many. There can hardly be a Jewish family in South Africa that has not lost near relations when Hitler's racialism reached its logical culmination in mass slaughter. Both through cruel oppression in the tumult of many centuries, and through recent personal experiences and involvements, the Jews of South Africa should be historically and psychologically well equipped to recognize oppression and persecution whenever they occur, stand by the victims, and fight against those who by action or connivance, through inhumanity or stupidity or both, help maintain such a system.

Secondly, common prudence and enlightened, realistic self-interest could tell the South African Jew in what direction the hope for ultimate survival and welfare lies. It can seem hardly doubtful to any thinking person within or outside South Africa, that the dominance of a small White minority over a large, deprived and growingly conscious Coloured majority is doomed. Siding with the powers of to-day is bound to mean alienating the sympathies of the makers of a very different tomorrow. Conversely, unpopularity with the bosses of the present might well be the price of becoming accepted and respected partners in the formation and running of a juster South African future.

Thirdly, racial and colour prejudice is inevitably dangerous to the Jew. Theoretically speaking, the mechanics of racial mentality work in such a way as to endanger anyone who does not belong to the innermost core of the herrenvolk. There may be an order of precedence, "Blacks" counted as worse enemies than "Jews" for the time being. But it is purely a matter of time before the edge of discrimination is turned against sections which at the moment are tolerated. And judging by the experience of the 'thirties and 'forties, it will be seen how deeply entrenched the anti-semitic traits are in White South Africa; in the xenophobiac jingoes of the United Party and especially in the pro-Nazi Nationalist leaders. Will the leopard change its spots, or lose its carnivorous appetite? Besides, however much South African Jews may wish to forget about it, an immensely significant section of world Jewry is itself non-White. A myriad literally black Jews in Abyssinia; thousands of completely Indian-looking Jews in or from India; hundreds of thousands of Cape Malay looking, dark-skinned Jews in the Arab countries—and Israel itself which is fast becoming a coloured country (present estimates put the non-European Jews in Israel at between one-third and a half of the total population). Colour discrimination both potentially and actually touches the Jew himself.

Fourthly and lastly—and most importantly of all aspects—Jewry is not primarily a nation or race or culture but a religious community. It rightly prides itself on its theological and ethical heritage. And no competent exponent of Judaism, of any branch or shade, could ever hesitate to admit that the essence of Jewish morality is wholly incompatible with any sort of racial discrimination. From the Jewish religious angle, the exegetical somersaults which some DRC trainers try to

coax or bully Scripture into performing, are both laughable in their ignorant absurdity and blasphemous distortions of God's Word and Will. Judaism insists on a down-to-earth, this wordly justice and righteousness as pre-conditions of any inward spiritual purity and worth. It repeats day after day the belief in the unity of mankind, the inherent dignity and equality of all human beings. It commands the Jew, in prophetic injunction, to seek the peace and welfare (shalom) of the land of his habitation: the good of the people as a whole, not of a ruling clique. In declaring the duty of loving one's neighbour, Judaism allows and insists that the love be not a mere emotional *schwaermerei*, but made manifest in concrete, relevant, adequate deeds and behaviour. It so happens that to oppose racialism in South Africa would suit the long-term self-interest of the Jew. But were it otherwise, should it be a dangerous and unrewarded and hopeless sacrifice for the Jew to declare the equality of man and take the practical consequences in full, ethically and religiously he would still have no alternative but do so. As a religious creature, the Jew is compelled by his faith and tradition to assert human dignity and rights for all.

Jewry in South Africa, as we have seen, has done precious little towards the betterment of the fundamental racial wrongs of its country. For the several reasons we have discussed, it ought certainly to have made a definite and unmistakable stand. But *how* could they have done so—and in what way, if any, could they do so still?

Obviously, it would be unduly optimistic to hope that all the misguided or selfishly mischievous members could be "converted" to an awareness of the dictates of Judaism and Jewish survival overnight. However regrettable this is, in view of the conservatism of human nature the sad variety of attitudes towards racial questions is bound to continue in the Jewish community. But the official forums and the leaders of South African Jewry could and should start the process. Both the Anglican and the Roman Catholic communities have a fair proportion, maybe even a majority, of prejudiced, un-Christian racialists in their midst. Yet Reeves and Huddleston and De Blank, as well as the local representatives of the Vatican, did and do speak for *Christianity* (as an ideal) and *Christendom* (as a world wide social entity). Their voice is authoritative and representative both of the religion and of the larger fellowship of its adherents. Likewise, a truly Jewish communal

policy, consistently propounded from all pulpits in definite and practically applicable terms, voiced by the Board of Deputies, in the Jewish press, even through Zionist media (isn't Israel a radically anti-racialist country, in practice and in constitution?), teaching both the ordinary Jew and his fellow South Africans—White and Black alike—what Judaism, and Jewish and human self-interest jointly demand: this is the first step in a programme worthy of, and possible to, the South African Jewish community. Genius, miracles or martyr-like saintliness are not required for it. Courage, Jewish knowledge, human decency, and a tiny grain of calm common-sense are.

Suppose it were done, suppose Jewry became convinced, and showed its sincere belief to the outside world—that racial discrimination is always an evil, that racialist South Africa is acting immorally and suicidally, that to struggle for freedom, human rights and dignity for all men is a specific Jewish and universal human duty—what would be the probable consequences of its attitude?

Theoretically, "Nothing" or "None" are legitimate possibilities. Yet even if it were so, the ethical and religious duty would clearly remain the same. That popular Jewish classic, the Ethics of the Fathers, teaches: "It is not thy task to complete the work, yet thou mayest not desist from doing it." To act aright is the main thing, not to try to calculate how likely it is to succeed. A surgeon may have to operate even if the chances of success are infinitesimally small.

But it is highly improbable that a Jewish realignment on the lines indicated should have *no* effects whatsoever. It seems that one (or maybe both) of two alternatives would follow a conscious Jewish communal policy against racialism.

A racially just and unprejudiced attitude manifested in realistic political orientation on the part of Jewry might act as leaven in White South African society. It must help swing White South African thinking towards more humane, twentieth-century, civilized and really *European* democratic ideals. The attitude of Jews might teach their fellow-Whites to think aright (or perhaps, to think at all), and bring home to them where their own moral responsibilities as well as long-term chances of survival lie. The example of the crucially placed Jewish community might set the whole of White South Africa on the way to their own physical and moral salvation.

Or else: if the vindictive fury of Nationalist reaction would drive a Jewry thus aligned onto the oppressed, non-White side of the artificial racial fence, the ultimate net result would still be favourable. At once South African Jewry would be free of the moral guilt which attaches to all who enforce, connive at or benefit from the present discriminatory, unjust arrangement. The privileges which Jewry might lose would be but a shedding of spiritual ballast: not having been entitled to unshared prerogatives in the first place, they would be much better off without them. At the same time, the presence of the Jewish community on the side of the under-privileged would give a formidable weapon into the hands of the forces struggling for the ultimate freedom and justice and democracy of South Africa. Add the trained intelligence, historical sense, ability for persistent application of the Jew as a spearhead to the mighty thrust of the rightful yearnings of the unenfranchized non-White South African multitudes, and the day of a happier and more humane South Africa will have been brought very much nearer than could happen otherwise.

Proudly Jews have called themselves, in a jeer their enemies have called them, the Chosen People. The sages of Israel never grew tired of explaining that Jews were chosen by God not for privileges, not for extra honours, but for special duties, for additional responsibilities—to be living examples of righteousness and godliness, witnesses of God before mankind.

The masters of the Midrash have taught: "When God was about to give His Law to humanity, He went from nation to nation, offering to each the sacred trust. One after the other they refused it. At last He came to Israel who accepted it implicitly as binding upon them and upon all Jewish generations." Contemporary thinkers of Judaism—Martin Buber and Leo Baeck foremost among them—have restated the spiritual essence of the ancient legend. To be a chosen people means in reality being the *choosing people*: the people which accepts the challenge of history, of God's laws and eternal values.

In South Africa, in the mid-twentieth century, the Chosen People are choosing not to be chosen. . . .

THE TRIAL BEGINS

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A DAY or two before the trial began one of the accused persons remarked to me:

"You know, I'm getting ready to go back into another world. During the preparatory examination I lived a life apart from the people outside the Courtroom. The Court itself, with the Magistrate, the lawyers, each witness in the box, all of us in the dock seemed to make up a separate world . . . And yet as time dragged on something happened to me. I became so detached from the proceedings themselves, that it needed a real effort on my part to realise I was watching *my* trial . . . I felt like a spectator."

That was the numbing effect of the preparatory examination which began in December 1956 and continued until February 1958. What of the trial which began on Friday, 1st August, with estimates of its probable duration varying from six months to two years?

The accused persons, who all remain on bail, have assembled once more, this time in Pretoria, from all over the Union. Their number has been reduced from 156 to 91 persons, the charges against the remainder having been withdrawn before indictment.

The change of venue from Johannesburg where the preparatory examination took place has placed additional burdens on the ninety-one, for mostly they established themselves there during 1957 with accommodation and part-time employment. Now they have to travel daily to Pretoria, a round trip of eighty to ninety miles, depending on residence. The journey is free, in a bus provided by the government, but the Africans have to come in miles from the location to the central starting point. A mid-day meal is provided by a volunteer committee in Pretoria.

The Treason Trials Defence Fund which receives donations from many countries has provided funds for a strong defence team led by Mr. Maisels Q.C. Without the fund most of the ninety-one would have been undefended . . . and many would be destitute due to the prolonged proceedings.

The Court, a special criminal Court created some weeks previously by a special Act rushed through the Nationalist

dominated Parliament, assembled in an old synagogue specially reconstructed. Mr. Swart, the Minister of Justice who introduced the legislation appointed the three Judges—originally Mr. Justice Rumpff (presiding), Mr. Justice Kennedy and Mr. Justice Ludorf.

What of the charges? The main charge is high treason for which the sentence may be death. Originally there were two alternative charges, alleged contraventions of the Suppression of Communism Act 1950, which imposes criminal sanctions for (generally speaking) furthering "communism" as arbitrarily defined in the Act. The indictment detailing the charges totalled 406 pages, three bound volumes of foolscap size, and was of course, served on each accused to enable him to try and understand the allegations against him.

Let me try and explain these charges. From the mass of evidence led at the preparatory examination (40 volumes, 8,000 pages, about 10,000 documentary exhibits) on which the indictment was based, the Crown details a multitude of activities commencing in 1952 and continuing into 1956, mostly directed against *apartheid* and discriminatory legislation generally, activities such as speeches at meetings, articles, lectures, pamphlets and so on, all seemingly normal and lawful methods of extra-parliamentary opposition to government policies. They were carried on not only by the accused ninety-one, but also by lawful organizations such as the African National Congress, the Indian Congress, the (white) Congress of Democrats, and by about 150 individuals named in the indictment under the heading of "co-conspirators".

The Crown alleged, however, that these activities, while individually lawful, amount if taken together to a vast conspiracy to overthrow the state—the crime of high treason, or at least, contraventions of the Communism Act. The peak of these allegedly criminal acts, the conspiracy in which all the accused persons participated at different times, was the Congress of the People in June 1955 at which thousands of delegates, mainly non-white, adopted the Freedom Charter . . . the basis for action against discrimination.

So far, there has been only a mass of technical legal argument on two defence applications. In terms of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 1955 the Court procedure and the rules of evidence are similar to those in the English courts.

To the time of writing the accused persons have not pleaded

to the charges—that stage has not been reached.

Friday, 1st August—application to recuse. At the outset, and before an audience which included international observers and press correspondents (and non-whites in their own section of the Courtroom) Mr. Maisels Q.C. launched the opening defence attack, that the presiding Judge, Mr. Justice Rumpff, and Mr. Justice Ludorf, recuse themselves.

The objections to Mr. Justice Ludorf were twofold—(i) In July 1954, the Judge, then practising at the Johannesburg Bar, appeared for the police to oppose the confirmation of a Supreme Court order excluding them from a conference into which members of the special branch had broken without warrant. Ultimately, the police withdrew their opposition, after a consultation between the Minister of Justice, *his legal advisers* and senior police officers. The senior officer who made an affidavit to this effect revealed that the decision was taken on the ground that it was not in the public interest to disclose the full extent of a current investigation into high treason. However, prior to this affidavit, other affidavits had been filed in which the police had attempted to justify their action on the ground that it was believed that high treason was being committed at the conference. In support, documents were attached, including exhibits now before the trial court, and including speeches by certain of the present accused which were material. The conference was part of the preparations for the Congress of the People.

"What has been established," said Mr. Maisels, "in the minds of the accused, at least, is that the Minister of Justice (for that was his case) has appointed as one of the Judges in this case, his advocate in that case . . ." (ii) While it was accepted that when an advocate was elevated to the Bench he shed his politics, the present instance was not normal. The alleged crime commenced in 1952, before the Judge's elevation. At that time he had close and active political associations with the political party.

"Against whom, and against whose policies, the accused are alleged to have directed strong and intemperate attacks, which attacks are alleged to form part of the acts of High Treason."

"Your Lordship, with the best will in the world, as one actively concerned with supporting this party, may not be able to take a completely dispassionate view of the accused."

The objection to Mr. Justice Rumpff was, that during the

parliamentary debate on the Special Court's Bill, the Minister of Justice had been quoted in the press as having said that he had *consulted* Mr. Justice Rumpff on the further appointments to the Court.

Other press versions used words to indicate that the Judge had *recommended* the further appointments.

"Bluntly, it would appear to the accused that your Lordship was a party to the appointment of a Judge in this case, of the Minister's advocate in (that) case . . . in matters where the the allegations were the same . . ."

Mr. Justice Rumpff immediately remarked that the press reports were inaccurate.

"I never recommended the appointment of my two colleagues. I was not asked to do so and would never have had the audacity to do so."

The Court adjourned until the following Monday to consider the application for recusal.

Monday, 4th August. Mr. Justice Ludorf recused himself at the resumed hearing on the sole ground that there was sufficient overlapping on the facts between the present and the 1954 cases for the accused to have reasonable fears that he could not be unbiassed.

Mr. Justice Rumpff denied that he had been asked to nominate or had in fact recommended the nomination of any Judges to the Court.

"Whatever was said by the Minister of Justice, it is my duty to state the facts to the accused. On these facts their fear need no longer exist, as it was based on wrong information."

The learned Judge concluded ". . . I have no choice but to follow the dictates of my conscience and refuse the application for refusal."

A further postponement for one week then followed for the appointment of a third judge, if deemed necessary.

Monday, 11th August—Friday, 15th August—application to quash. During the adjournment Mr. Justice Bekker was appointed to the Court.

The defence then made its second application—to quash the indictment. Mr. Maisels addressed the Court for over nine hours. He was followed by Mr. Fischer Q.C. whose submissions took four hours. So it is possible to give only the briefest indication of the highly technical argument.

The purpose of the application was to obtain the dismissal

of the main and the two alternative charges.

Mr. Maisels submitted that the main charge, read with the further particulars thereto, did not disclose an offence. Various other points included material variance and inconsistence between the allegations made and the facts set out in support thereof; lack of particularity, misjoinder of the accused in one indictment; the repeated use of "and/or", and so on.

The elementary rules in framing an indictment had not been observed by the Crown, the object being to inform both the Court and the accused in clear language the nature of the charges.

Mr. Maisels suggested the general attitude of the Crown appeared to be:

"Let's throw in everything the police have been able to find and let's see what comes out at the end."

The indictment as framed was an abuse of the process of the Court ". . . to throw the whole case at us . . . sort it out yourselves . . . not in the interests of the accused or of justice."

Examples of the irrelevant documents which helped to swell the mass of exhibits included—a history essay on the Vienna settlement, a poem by an Indian schoolboy and a book of Russian recipes.

The indescriminate use of the words "and/or" meant there were 498,015 counts against each accused.

Referring to the Crown suggestion that the creation of discontent at a public meeting was high treason, Mr. Maisels remarked:

"We shall have to abandon what we have learnt over hundreds of years about the principle of free speech if that is correct."

Mr. Fischer Q.C. then dealt for four hours with the alternative charges under the Communism Act. Apart from technical points relating mainly to lack of particularity, his point was that no one could "advocate" communism without publication to an audience.

When the defence argument was completed on Thursday, 14th August, Mr. Trengrove and Mr. Hoexter in turn replied on behalf of the Crown.

The defence had "thrown in everything in an attempt to find some weakness in the indictment, in a desperate attempt that some weakness may come to light."

On the main charge each accused was solely and clearly charged with having committed the crime of high treason in his individual capacity. Each accused had had hostile intentions,

had disturbed or endangered the safety of the state, and had committed overt acts.

"In committing these hostile acts the accused were acting in concert and with common purpose."

Any act, whatever its nature, even if purely preparatory (since the plans of the accused had not reached successful fruition) were punishable if calculated to injure the state. The essence of the charge was hostile intent as evidenced by overt acts.

The safety of the state was so important that even the remotest danger must be nipped in the bud. Isolated acts may appear innocent. It was only when such acts exhibited the existence of a scheme or a conspiracy that high treason could be alleged. Thus the widest latitude as to the extent of the evidence led should be given to the Crown—to show facts from which the conspiracy could be inferred.

For an accused to join an organisation, in whatever capacity, was an overt act. The crime of high treason could be compared to a polluted stream. Anyone who entered the stream at any point became polluted. So, in the present case, where the "pollution" began in 1952, anyone who entered the stream later was in the position that evidence of prior acts of other persons could be proved against him, as evidence of the grand conspiracy.

Friday, 15th August—Mr. O. Pirow Q.C. interrupted the argument of his junior counsel to obtain an adjournment of the trial to discuss with the defence the possibility of limiting the scope of the trial.

Monday, 18th August—Friday, 22nd August—The Crown approach to the defence bore no fruit.

At the resumed hearing Mr. Maisels intimated to the Court that it would be better to consider the possible limitation of the trial after the Court had given a decision on the defence application to quash the indictment.

Mr. Trengrove then continued his argument, dealing in detail with the defence criticisms, submitting that the indictment clearly intimated to each accused the charges he had to meet, with sufficient particularity, and with the necessary allegations.

In this latter regard he made a noteworthy submission. Hostile intent in the crime of high treason was not merely to achieve government or a new government, it was achieving such government by means outside the constitution, and which were therefore illegal.

In reply to a question by Mr. Justice Rumpff, Mr. Trengove submitted forceful means were not necessary. Passive resistance would be treason in such circumstances.

"There is no intermediate action between the ballot box and a treasonable action by means of force. No programme aiming at change by other than constitutional means is a lawful programme."

"If the means were legal it did not absolve the parties to the conspiracy from responsibility if the aim was to achieve a change outside the constitutional sphere."

After Mr Trengove's address which lasted nearly twelve hours, Mr. Hoexter dealt with the defence submissions on the two alternative charges. In particular he submitted that "to advocate" did not mean revelation to a defined audience or a group of people. The policy of the Communism Act was that the danger of communism must be cut out at the root before the literature was published. Possession of a document was an offence under such circumstances.

Mr. Pirow then made an application to amend the indictment to limit references to the record of the preparatory examination, and further to excise certain documents.

Mr. Maisels immediately stated that the proposed amendments did not remove the embarrassment in the indictment.

The defence replied and the Court adjourned to consider its decision.

Wednesday, 27th August. The Court made an order on the defence application—

(*a*) Granting the Crown application to amend the indictment.
(*b*) Quashing the first alternative charge.
(*c*) Directing the Crown to supply certain further particulars on the remaining charges by 15th September.
(*d*) Dismissing the contention that the main charge disclosed no offence.
(*e*) Reserving the defence right to address further on the question of misjoinder in the light of the new particulars. No order was made on the application to quash the main and the second alternative charges.

The Court adjourned until 29th September, 1958.

Monday, 29th September—Thursday, 2nd October. During the adjournment the Court had furnished written reasons for its order, the Crown had furnished certain particulars, and the defence served notice of a further application to quash

the indictment in its new form.

At the outset, and with critical comment from the Judges, Mr. Pirow Q.C. after formally withdrawing the second alternative charge, made an admission on the remaining charge of high treason.

The Crown relied entirely on proof of conspiracy, and if it failed in that respect, there was no case—whatever else might be proved. Thus the Crown no longer relied on proving common purpose between the accused, or that they acted in concert.

Defence argument then proceeded until Thursday, 2nd October, on the new application.

The material points are as follows—

(*a*) Violence is an essential element of high treason. Thus the speeches and writings alleged could never be overt acts of that crime unless such formed part of a conspiracy or an incitement to commit violent acts against the state.

The majority of overt acts alleged in the indictment were incapable of constituting violence and (it follows) high treason.

(*b*) Possession of documents (the exhibits found with the accused) is not an 'act' at all and so is not an overt act of high treason.

(*c*) The order for further particulars had not been properly complied with and the indictment was still vague and embarrassing. For instance, reliance was placed on thousands of documents and speeches in the allegation of 'conspiracy'. Some were irrelevant. In other cases it was not clear what portion of lengthy documents was relied on. Documents were excised from the indictment in one part and yet relied on in other parts of the record.

(*d*) Misjoinder. The Court had earlier upheld certain Crown allegations on the ground that certain acts were "in a common course of conduct" on Mr. Trengrove's submissions. Mr. Pirow's admission that the Crown relied only on "conspiracy" contradicted him, and further showed that the acts referred to were those of individual accused and did not relate to all.

The defence also protested against an alleged irregularity, making a statement of the proposed evidence of the Catholic priest, an alleged expert on "communism" imported by the Crown, Fr. Bochenski, available to the Judges.

The Crown applied for an adjournment to prepare a reply to the defence application. The defence objected.

An adjournment was granted until the 13th October, 1958.

13th October—When the trial resumed on the 18th day, Mr. Pirow, before replying to the defence application to quash the amended indictment, gave notice of yet another application to amend the indictment and the further particulars thereto. He wanted a decision on this application before replying so as to speed up the case. He complained that the progress of the case was impeded as there was not the normal co-operation between the Crown and the defence in criminal cases. In making his new application he did not concede any defects in the charge, but admitted that nine-tenths of the Crown case was thereby abandoned.

"If our application is not granted we will withdraw the indictment and re-indict all the accused."

"If our application is not granted, we will have to deal with the whole of the argument of the defence, and quite frankly, we are not in a position to do so and we are not prepared to do so."

Mr. Pirow dealt with the technical aspects under constant questions from the Court.

Mr. Maisels then replied on this application, objecting to the amendments which still did not meet the defence objections to the indictment on the grounds of misjoinder of the accused in a single trial. Specific acts, not a course of conduct were alleged.

Mr. Justice Rumpff remarked:

". . . the Attorney General appeared not to have fully considered treason in peacetime without the use of violence or rebellion."

After Mr. Trengrove had begun to reply to the defence argument, Mr. Pirow rose at five minutes to one.

"I am afraid that my hopes that my application for certain amendments to the charge would shorten the proceedings have not been realized. In the name of the Attorney-General I withdraw the indictment."

Mr. Justice Rumpff immediately adjourned the Court, no date of resumed hearing being mentioned.

The Attorney General is entitled to proceed on a new indictment. Until he decides the accused can only wait.

THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH MILITANT

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No one, during the outcry that followed a recent sermon delivered in New York by the Archbishop of Cape Town, questioned the truth of his remark that the Dutch Reformed Church (D.R.C.) gives "tacit approval" to the apartheid policies of the South African Government. And certainly one of the favourite principles of the apartheid-mongers in this country is that non-Europeans should at all times be encouraged to minister to the needs of their own people in their own territories.

Yet here is the story of a Coloured minister who has not only been refused entry into a Coloured territory, but has also been prohibited from ministering to his congregation there: while members of the congregation have been prosecuted and convicted for conducting their own prayer meetings in his absence. Moreover, the two bodies who have been directly and indirectly responsible for these prohibitions are the Government and the Dutch Reformed Church.

The series of events which led up to this anomalous situation began nearly ten years ago. The Reverend I. D. Morkel was then a minister in the Dutch Reformed Mission Church. He was the manager of the Dutch Reformed Mission School at Crawford, Cape Town, and chairman of the Wynberg Ring. Before he became a minister he had been a successful business man and so he was well able to support himself while he studied theology; and the energy and intelligence which had brought him financial success now enabled him to come first in his class at the D.R. Seminary where he was trained. He was obviously making a great success of his religious career too, although for some time before his final break with the D.R.C. he had become known as an opponent of apartheid and thus an embarrassment to his church. He had, for instance, declared that Coloured people were coming to Cape Town or going overseas to escape persecution in the rural areas. Eventually in October, 1950, he announced that he could no longer "preach love and practise apartheid" and that he was leaving the D.R.C. to become the founder and leader of the South African Calvinist Protestant

Church (C.P.C.) which, although it naturally has a large majority of Coloured members, does not in any way practise discrimination on the grounds of colour.

We should point out here just how the D.R.C. does practise segregation. It was only during the latter half of the nineteenth century that this church began to carry out mission work amongst the Coloured people to any appreciable extent. Once this work was established, however, it became evident that Europeans might have to be joined by large numbers of non-Europeans come to worship under the same roof and even to sit on the same benches as they did. It was not long before a minority group began agitating for a separation, and the Synod of 1857, as a sop to the "weakness of some members", made provision for the congregation "assembled or to be assembled from among the Heathen to enjoy its religious privileges in a separate building". In 1881, the Dutch Reformed Mission Church was established, and today all non-European members belong to this branch. The Mission Church has separate ministers, both European and non-European, who are all distinguished by the title *Eerwaarde* and who receive a much lower salary than their colleagues, the *Dominees*, of the main church. It also has, of course, separate congregations, buildings and church organizations. It has the right to form its own synods, but owing to the poverty of its congregations it is financially dependent to a considerable degree on *die Moeder Kerk*. (the Mother Church).

Mr Morkel's new church flourished, and five years after its inception, had grown to six branches with four ministers and over 2,000 members. Today there are about 13,000 members, not confined to Cape Town and the Peninsula. In that part of the North-Western Cape known as Little Namaqualand there are several Coloured Reserves, and in one of these, Komaggas, the Calvinist Protestant Church was welcomed with particular enthusiasm, although it was not until 1956 that they asked Mr Morkel to visit them. On December 8 he held a service in the open, and nearly a third of the entire population of the Reserve attended, while only 26 people were at the service in the D.R.C.

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Mission work was begun around Komaggas by the London Missionary Society in 1810, but in 1840 they handed over their work to the Rhenish Missionaries.

From 1843 to 1912 the community enjoyed a considerable degree of independence. It was administered by a *Raad* (council) elected by the men and presided over by the missionary, without whose concurrence no decision was valid. Two or three elders of the Church also held positions on the *Raad*.

This alliance between the Church and the community always operated extremely efficiently since the missionary was an integrated member of the society. In fact, one of the early missionaries, the Rev. J. H. Schmelen, married a "pious Hottentot woman".

This alliance, however, came to an end in 1912 when the Mission Stations and Communal Reserves Act of 1909 was first applied—one section of the Act abolished the secular authority of the missionaries.

In terms of the Act also the Raad was superseded by a Board of Management consisting of nine members and a Chairman. Six of the members are elected by the male registered occupiers. The other three are appointed by the Commissioner for Coloured affairs, one of them on the recommendation of the missionary. The Chairman, who has a deliberative as well as a casting vote, is an official of the Division of Coloured Affairs and is appointed and paid by the Government.

In the light of subsequent events it is necessary to emphasize here that at least four votes are inevitably cast in favour of government policy. If an issue frowned upon by the Government should arise, only one of the elected members would have to be in favour of it for it to fail, for the Chairman would undoubtedly use his casting vote against it.

The Rhenish Mission Society continued its work in Komaggas until 1936; for its last few years it experienced great difficulty in getting funds from its headquarters in Germany, and it was not easy either, under the Nazi regime, to find young men willing or able to go as missionaries to Africa. Thus it was forced to give up its work in Namaqualand, and its place was taken by the Dutch Reformed Mission Church.

This church had been assisting the Rhenish missionaries for nearly twenty-five years, but it had never been popular at Komaggas, and only a section of the community were in favour of its taking over the religious jurisdiction of the Reserve. Some of the inhabitants would perhaps have preferred at that time an Anglican missionary—a deputation of ten elders from Komaggas was once sent to an English Rector in Namaqualand There is

also a small Roman Catholic group in the Reserve, and they, like the Anglicans, have in the past always been ministered to by their own priests

# # #

The Calvinist Protestant Church can be said to have taken the community by storm. During the first fourteen months after Mr Morkel was invited to Komaggas, 256 children were baptised and 90 young people confirmed. There are now about 600 confirmed members and a large number of baptised members who have not yet been confirmed. On May 5, 1957, a petition containing more than 700 signatures was presented to Dr I. D. du Plessis (Commissioner for Coloured Affairs) asking for permission to aquire land on which to erect a church.

The request was refused.

Mr Morkel and his congregation at Komaggas continued in their pleas and were always assured by Dr du Plessis that he was prepared to treat their case sympathetically and that after the passing of new regulations in October everything would be settled to their satisfaction.

And on October 25, 1957, the Minister of the Interior did issue these regulations. Regulation 88, sub-regulation (i) lays down that:

"Any person who, without the approval of the Commissioner or the magistrate of the area concerned,

(*a*) Holds, presides at or addresses any meeting, gathering or assembly at which more than five persons in the area under the control of the Board of Management are present at any one time; or (*b*) Permits any such meeting, gathering or assembly to be held in his house or on other premises or land under his control, shall be guilty of an offence."

Sub-regulation (ii), however, does make it possible for more than five persons to gather, without permission, for events such as funerals, weddings, political meetings presided over by M.P.'s and religious services held by the established church or churches in the area, etc.

The Anglican, the Roman Catholic and the Calvinist Protestant Churches now had to obtain permission before they could minister to more than five of their congregation at one time—here in fact was a virtual ban on all religious services or meetings held by any denomination other than the Dutch Reformed, for, of course, no such permission has been forthcoming.

So much for Dr du Plessis' assurances!

What followed the passing of these regulations? The first prosecution took place on March 7, 1958. Three members of the Calvinist Protestant Church were found guilty of holding a meeting of more than five persons in the Komaggas Reserve. At the meeting a prayer was said, a hymn sung and a short sermon was delivered. The three men were fined £3 each, suspended for three years.

Mr Morkel then applied for permission just to send four ministers to spend eight days in the Reserves of Komaggas and Concordia (which also has a small C.P.C. congregation) from April 16 to 23. On April 17 he was finally told that permission would be granted to only one minister to work for only one day in each Reserve. This was a pitifully inadequate concession, but it was accepted. The minister and an elder who accompanied him arrived the night before at Komaggas and were welcomed by 700 people. Before dawn the next day about 600 people were waiting for the first service. They had walked miles to be there; many had children on their backs. The minister had to attend 40 baptisms, officiate at confirmations and confirmation classes, a Church Council meeting, a woman's auxiliary meeting, hold two full services, one with communion, and travel many miles visiting the sick and the aged. His day began at 4.30 a.m. and ended late at night.

On July 2, 1958, two more persons were convicted of contravening the regulations. Johannes Damon lent some land to Martha Regons and she, with a prayer book in her hand, conducted a short service attended by about twenty-five people. They were cautioned and discharged by the magistrate, but they intend to appeal against their conviction.

In a neighbouring Reserve also under the religious jurisdiction of the D.R. Church, the Roman Catholic and Anglican congregations were threatened with prosecution if they continued to hold services without permission. Although their priests have applied for permission, it has not yet been granted. It is significant that prosecutions and threats have been made only in Mission Stations and Reserves under the religious jurisdiction of the D.R.C.

A good deal of publicity was given to these incidents in the press, and Dr du Plessis made a statement explaining his refusal of permission. He declared that he had followed the "essentially democratic course of letting the people choose for them-

selves''. He did not in fact feel called upon to make any decision in the matter since the Board of Management which ''represents the people'' had refused permission for the establishment of Mr Morkel's church in the area.

It is perhaps important to point out that, whatever followed their promulgation, the regulations are in themselves a serious threat to the religious and political freedom of these Coloured communities. Not only should Regulation 88 never have been applied, but it should never have been issued in a country claiming the title of a democracy.

In conclusion we might consider who is finally responsible for the denial of a fundamental right to this particular group of people.

The Government? As we have mentioned already, the withholding of permission from the C.P.C. to establish itself in the Coloured Reserves is a negation of true apartheid. But if apartheid should interfere with the greater cause of White domination, it is presumably a matter of indifference to the Nationalists that it should be temporarily cast aside.

The Dutch Reformed Church? We should not underestimate the part it has played in this affair. In January 1957, shortly after Mr Morkel had been first invited to the Reserves, a party of D.R.C. officials visited the various congregations expressly to warn them against what they termed the ''Morkel danger''. The tried to show that he was an unreliable and irresponsible character himself, and that his church was a new sect which was completely alien to the D.R.C. In fact, of course, the C.P.C. differs from it in no respect as regards belief, doctrine or ritual. Mr Morkel's is in no sense a separatist, sectarian movement—he is simply an opponent of the political ideals of the D.R.C. and a threat to its power amongst the Coloured people. But this church is so unremittingly wedded to these ideals and clings so tenaciously to its temporal power that it has willingly connived at the application of an unjust law which condemns a thousand people to a life without the proper comforts of their religion. Perhaps, however, it has done more than connive, for in terms of one of the sections of Regulation 88, the Commissioner for Coloured Affairs had first to consult with the established church in the area concerned before granting or refusing the Calvinist Protestant Church permission to continue its work.

A TAX ON POVERTY

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WARNINGS that the expansion of educational services for Africans would have to be financed by the Africans themselves preceded the Native Tax and Development Amendment Act. The Act itself therefore embodies the principle that the poorest people in the community should pay for their own essential development, for development which, while beneficial to the people most directly affected, is also vital for the material progress and prosperity of the whole population. "To raise one's self by one's bootstraps" is an old fashioned phrase, but this is the maxim the Act applies and commends to the African community.

While the development of "under-developed" territories occupies the attention of states with economic and political interests in the African continent, the South African government rejects the obligation to use public funds for furthering the education—even on the most primary level—of part of its own population.

It has passed on the financial responsibility of extending education to the very poor, while through the Bantu Education Act it exercises rigorous control over the kind of schooling that is to be offered, and while it forbids bodies other than the State—particularly the Churches—either by means of outright compulsion or by refusing subsidies, from playing a part in expanding educational opportunity.

From January 1 1959 the poll tax paid by all African men between the ages of 18 and 65 (not from 21 the age from which members of other social groups pay personal tax) will be increased by 75 per cent that is from £1.0.0 to £1.15.0. From January 1 1960 this tax will increase on a sliding scale for men with an income of over £180 a year and women married or single, earning over £180 a year will be subject to a tax of £1, this too to increase as income rises.

Comparing rates of taxation a Fact Paper published by the S.A. Institute of Race Relations states:

"All African men earning under £140 a year (or £11.13.4 a month), *whether they are married or single*, are to pay the same in general tax as unmarried persons in Natal pay in personal tax; but higher amounts than are payable by any Whites, Coloured People or Asiatics anywhere else. In the Transvaal, in fact no

Whites, Coloured People or Asiatics are required to pay personal tax until their incomes reach £150 a year if they are single, or £250 a year in the case of married men. Married women are everywhere completely exempt.

In all the income ranges up to £450 a year, African men, whether married or single, will pay more than do married men of other racial groups in all provinces except the Orange Free State.

Africans earning up to £240 a year in taxable income will from 1960 be the highest-taxed members of the community. For the great majority of the African population therefore the tax is not related to ability to pay. It is regressive. It falls on those least able to afford it. Any poll tax necessarily departs from the principle of progressive or even proportionate taxation, but this Act underlines that departure at a time when not a higher tax on low incomes, but measures to combat poverty and large scale subsidization are urgently needed.

There has been no serious attempt to justify the tax increase on economic grounds. Some members from the government benches disparaged rather than tried to disprove the facts now available about the extent and the severity of African poverty. They maintained that the standard of living of Africans is better than the evidence shows, better than critics of the government think it is, and highly attractive to the Africans in neighbouring States. On the last point it ought to be apparent that the draw of a cash wage (but not necessarily of a standard of living) has always been one of the factors responsible for the flow of labour from farms to towns. In any case the answer to these assertions is surely a large-scale factual survey undertaken by the government so that a full picture of the condition of the people can be achieved.

Government speakers maintained that since the general tax has remained at the level of £1 since 1925, and since money wages have risen the African population is now capable of bearing a 75 per cent tax increase without undue hardship. The purpose to which the proceeds of the tax are to be devoted, 4/5 to African education and 1/5 to the South African Native Trust for the improvement of land in the Reserves, were held to justify the imposition of the tax itself. Indeed the Minister of Finance, Mr. J. F. Naude, stated that taxable "capacity must be determined with reference to *the eventual benefits* that community will derive from such development". To which one

might add the corollary that "if wishes were horses beggars would ride".

The main argument for the Act is an ideological one. During the second-reading debate the Minister of Finance stated that, "we do not have one homogeneous community in which the prosperous people can be taxed to provide services for the less prosperous, but we have various communities which must be economically sound individually . . . If the State is simply continually to give money it will undoubtedly undermine the sound development of the Bantu community, and the White guardian community would be failing in its duty". (Hansard 10.3878).

So too Mr. Mentz, "I have said that the time has come—and we must face this fact squarely—for us to regard the Bantu as a separate group and not as an integral part of our population". (Hansard 10.3894-5.) In other words this measure is designed to further "financial apartheid".

"Financial apartheid" as expressed in this Act is remarkable for its complete disregard of the facts of economic life. The idea of separate communities which must be "economically sound individually" is based on a fundamental misconception of the requirements of any modern economy. Measures designed to further such ends by making the poor pay for their own development can only reduce the material well being of the whole population. The fact of economic interdependence in a world of specialization is obvious to most people. The recognition of it is apparent in the domestic and foreign policies of most modern states. The fact that the income of one man creates employment and therefore income for another is a commonplace of modern economic thought. But, in South Africa, the supposition that it is possible to seal up poverty, inefficiency, malnutrition, disease and crime, and the effects of these evils, behind the gates of African townships or within the boundaries of African Reserves has not yet been exploded.

What are the striking facts of the present situation? From all over the Union come reports of dire poverty. Failing a comprehensive survey the only guides to the present condition of the African people are surveys carried out for different purposes by various bodies; municipalities, the National Building Research Institute, the South African Institute of Race Relations and others.

Some of the surveys make use of the "Poverty Datum Line" standard which is "an estimate of the income needed by any

individual household if it is to attain a defined minimum of health and decency". But this standard, as Professor Batson points out, "is more remarkable for what it omits than for what it includes . . . It is not a 'human' standard of living". In 1956 about 87 per cent of African families living in Johannesburg had incomes below this level.

All the available evidence shows that there is a gap between legally-earned income and necessary expenditure for, at a conservative estimate, well over half of African families living in towns. Although Africans have found semi-skilled employment at higher wages because of the lack of White manpower there are not enough Africans in these posts to relieve the picture of mass poverty. Information about conditions in the Reserves show that families there are no longer self-supporting but rely on subsidies from migrant workers to make ends meet.

What is clear is that the economic relationship between workers in the towns and families in the Reserves has been reversed in the last 25 years. Town workers no longer have self-supporting families in the Reserves. Either they have town families whom they must support out of a cash wage, or they have Reserve families who rely on support. So cash wages have had to be stretched to cover subsistence farming deficiencies on the one hand, or the new costs inherent in town living conditions on the other.

Prices have risen faster than wages. According to the Retail Price Index the cost of living has doubled since 1938. It is startling to find therefore that Wage Board enquiries have been allowed to take place at such long intervals of time. The Wage Board recently met in Johannesburg to investigate the position of unskilled labourers on the Witwatersrand and in Pretoria. The previous enquiry was 16 years ago.

All these facts have contributed to the present gap between income and expenditure. A wage of £5.7.0 a week is one estimate of the amount required for the bare support of a family of five in Johannesburg. The municipal rates for adult unskilled African labour fall far below this. On the Reef the rates vary from £1.13.10 per week in Westonaria, to £2.14.9 per week in Johannesburg. A recent investigation undertaken by Benoni throws up the discrepancy between actual earnings, what is required for 'bare subsistence', and the amount that would enable a man, his wife, one standard II child, and two pre-school children "to live and not merely exist". An unskilled

worker earns £2.3.9 per week. For bare subsistence he ought to earn £31.5.4 per week, or £16.14.9 per month. A "living wage" would be not less than £24.0.0 per month.

What is known suggests that wages for African unskilled workers, and these form the majority of the wage earners, are now completely out of step with present day requirements, and that these wages are not based on essential family needs at all, but on the needs of single men. Unskilled wage rates assume away the existence of families, or assume the family to be self supporting, in the sense that all the wage rate paid to a married man has to do is to add to an already available basic real income.

These are the conditions in which a 75 per cent increase in tax is to be imposed. Government speakers who claim that the rise in money wages makes the tax supportable have neglected to observe the facts, and neglected to recognize a situation in which low-paid workers, confronted by inflexible bills for rent and transport must necessarily cut down the already too-slender balance left for food and clothes to meet tax demands.

The question is not only whether Africans themselves can afford to pay a higher tax but whether the community—the whole community—can afford to let them pay. There are grave consequences of poverty already obvious. Crime has become a recognized profession in African townships. One of the most important contributory causes is the income-expenditure gap—not a luxury gap but a bread gap—which must somehow be filled. Malnutrition and disease are costly for the whole society; not only hospital bills but the cost of lethargic and inefficient workers are borne by South Africans of all colours and of whatever political affiliations.

It is surely unnecessary to labour the point that poverty is not a commodity which can be vacuum-sealed.

An expanding economy is dependent on an expanding market for the sale of its products. In spite of the low wage earned by the majority of African workers the market for the products of secondary industry has expanded. This fact can be explained by the substantial increase in the number of wage earners. About 500,000 Africans are now employed in private manufacturing industry alone, over six times as many as in 1925. The employment of both men and women has increased in all sectors of the economy, including the Public Service. But will the African market continue to grow? Low wages and low productivity set limits to the possibilities of expansion.

The poverty of workers and their low productivity have become a vicious circle. Lethargy and incompetance are related to malnourishment and fatigue. And the low value of workers' output keeps wages low. Poverty combined with restrictions on opportunity and mobility depress wages.

But what extra costs are incurred by industry through the employment of low-paid and uninterested workers whose view is that one unskilled job is much like another? It is possible that high rates of labour turnover, which entail more office records, more staff and more time, is one of the more important costs. More ought to be known about this.

It is said that one of the unseen contributions of the low-paid African worker to the State is in the form of the high industrial profits which are subject to tax. This appears to contradict the commonsense assertion that so called "cheap labour" is in fact costly to employ and imposes burdens upon industry. It is probable, however, that both assertions are correct, though they apply to different periods. A cheap and plentiful supply of labour has, in the past, made high profits possible, whether it will continue to do so, however, is doubtful. For the techniques of industry are changing and more industries are finding that numbers of workers are not substitutes for alertness and skills at least basic. As production becomes more mechanized different kinds of competence are required, and labour of necessity becomes more specialized. The continued reliance upon untrained labour therefore becomes inappropriate and such labour becomes increasingly costly to employ despite its low wages. This is surely an argument for the systematic training of labour—perhaps in the factory itself.

What emerges from a view of the economy is above all the inter-dependence of the various racial groups. The manner in which town and country population proportions have altered demonstrates this. In 1951, 27 per cent of the African population lived in towns, as against 10 per cent at the turn of the century.

In Durban and Johannesburg Africans outnumber Whites, in Port Elizabeth Whites only just outnumber Africans. Not only has employement of Africans increased, but in a more diversifled economy the role in which they are employed have multiplied. As industry has become progressively more dependent on African labour, African labour has become more dependent on cash wages and the products of industry.

Integration need no longer be followed by a question mark. It is an accomplished fact. It has been achieved not by formal policy decisions but by the pressures of the market economy, by the need to earn wages and the need to employ labour. Talk of "separate communities" with self-balancing budgets, and of the "economic soundness" of each separate group is a language quite inappropriate to the facts of the situation. Decisions on economic policy based on these outmoded concepts must have tragic consequences. Not only do such decisions outrage any sense of social justice but they run completely counter to the economic advantage of the *whole* community.

It is apparent that social and economic reforms are badly needed. Where should they begin? The long-term end should be to increase the productivity of African labour. This would necessitate measures to arrest declining standards of health as well as direct measures to increase efficiency. And if incentive is to play a part in this process, opportunities must be opened.

Or do the apologists of "separate communities" and "financial apartheid" propose to ignore the facts of interdependence and the fundamental basis of economic prosperity—the productivity of the worker?

RHODESIAN LIBERALS IN DILEMMA
THE ROADS TO UNION

FRANK BARTON

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In the last issue of *Africa South*, Mr. Dennis McWilliam reached a gloomy conclusion in writing about the Central African liberals. From the depths of his despondency he made a last paragraph effort to point out the two things he thought might save the day in the Federation; the emergence of the multi-racial Constitution Party and the crucial role which the British Government has still to play in the affairs of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Such is the speed of the disintegration of hope in Central Africa that even before *Africa South* was on the bookstalls the Constitution Party had fallen to pieces, with the northern and southern sections careering off in different directions—both bound for oblivion—and there was the beginnings of a backdown on the part of the British Government in its plan for a new constitution for Northern Rhodesia in which African influence would be substantially increased.

The unmistakable conclusion is that reaction has set in, that there is no sign even on the most distant horizon that anything will stop it gathering force, and that the first hairline crack in the Federal state which began with the defeat of Sir Edgar Whitehead at the Hillside by-election and led to the anilihation of Mr. Garfield Todd and his United Rhodesia Party, has now become a visible rent.

An increasing number of people, Black and White, right and left, are now beginning to discuss not "if" the Federation will break up and "whether" Southern Rhodesia will become a fifth province of South Africa, but "when" the break will be and "how long" before the Limpopo ceases to be a border to the South.

A curiously paradoxical situation is developing. An increasing number of European reactionaries and the gathering electoral driftwood, are working towards the same ends as the combined forces of African nationalism, in the shape of the three African Congresses of the Federation. Mr. Garfield Todd was the first European of any stature to comment upon this trend. In an address to Asians in Bulawayo at the beginning of August—with

the bitter sting of his election defeat still smarting—he declared: "Let us not delude ourselves. It is not only Northern Africans who are calling for a breaking up of the Federation, but also Southern Europeans, and there are amongst us today many who would like to see the southern half of the Federation seperated from the north and eventually amalgamated with the Union of South Africa."

There was always a hard core of white nationalists—mainly Afrikaaner migrants to farming and mining—who advocated union with South Africa. But to-day they have been immeasurably strengthened by more and more "ordinary" poeple who, not particularly illiberal in themselves, argue that there will never be sufficient Europeans in the Federation to make a "stand" against the African (present figures: 8,000,000 Black doubling themselves every 20 years and 260,000 White, with immigration down to 15,000 this year) and that "sooner or later it's going to be Black against White so we may as well join the Union and reduce the odds."

In this expanding philosophy we have the most tragic thing in Africa to-day: a thinking in numbers, a resignation to the irreconcilibility of Black and White and a drawing off by the Europeans into a camp of insularism to await the showdown.

At the time Mr. McWilliam wrote his article there was real hope of the Constitution Party being able to gather sufficient of both races, plus the Asians and the handful of Coloureds, who believe that partnership can become more than an 11 letter word in a dictionary. The party got off to a modest, but auspicious start beneath the tall blue gums on the lawn of the Federal Assembly's greatest elected liberal, Dr. Alexander Scott, uncle of the African nominated representative for Northern Rhodesia, Sir John Moffat.

But hardly had the party been formed than things began to go wrong. This has been the continuing pattern. The association of David Stirling, founder of the Capricorn Africa Society, immediately became an embarrassment in the North, where Capricorn is still associated in the minds of Africans with the act of Federation. Then an untimely attack was made by one of the party's executive upon the African Congress at the very moment other members of the executive were working to persuade the Congress leaders that in the Constitution Party could lay the greatest hope of the Africans to some form of realistic political representation.

The more realistic leaders of the party saw that if it hoped to attract thinking Africans—or, indeed, any Africans—then it was bound to draw upon Congress members, and that meant at least the tacit approval of the Congress leaders. Congress was naturally wary of endorsing anything involving European organization and it was only the stature of Dr. Alexander Scott—"the only White politician in Central Africa we would trust further than we could throw"—that stopped Harry Nkumbula condemning the Constitution Party from the outset. As it was, Mr. Nkumbula turned cool when the spokesman attacked Congress and thus the negotiations broke down.

In such unpublicized incidents is history made.

As it was, Congress let it be known that any African who joined the party would be ostracised, or worse. The Africans who applied for membership after that could literally be counted on one hand.

The only African of any calibre who joined the party was Safeli Chileshe, one of the four African M.L.Cs in Northern Rhodesia. But in a matter of a few months he was back in the Congress camp and out of the Constitution Party.

At this stage of the party's history it was struggling to keep alive in Northern Rhodesia, barely more than an off-shoot of Capricorn in Southern Rhodesia and non-existent in Nyasaland.

Less than six months after it s formation, the party in the North split into right and left wings and this resulted in the Rev. Colin Morris, the young "political parson" who had incurred Federal Cabinet wrath by describing partnership as the biggest confidence trick in history, resigning from the party's executive.

And here the paradox developing in Central Africa becomes grimly humourous, for Morris, one of the most articulate champions of the African since Father Trevor Huddleston left the Union, found himself lining up with the right-wing reactionaries who wanted the Federation broken up. Morris said breaking the Federation was the only thing to safeguard African interests; the reactionaries said breaking the Federation was the only thing to safeguard European interests.

Meanwhile, the Southern Rhodesia branch of the party offered allegiance to Garfield Todd, just beginning to stir after his three-month sojourn on his farm after the general election. Such an offer was a considerable compromise with the Constitution Party's earlier avowed principles.

Something similar was happening in Nyasaland where a new

party, the Commonwealth Party, had come together, comprised of a number of leading liberals of all races. But within a month of its emergence it was making overtures to the United Federal Party, and then finally fell apart on the eve of the general election campaign opening.

The new constitution which had been announced by Mr. Lennox Boyd for Northern Rhodesia after the inevitable failure of all sides to find anything like common ground during their London talks, was generally greeted by liberals as a considerable advance, doubling, as it did, African representation in the Legislative Council and creating the first two African cabinet ministers south of Dar es Salaam.

But there were such petulant outbursts from United Federal Party spokesmen from Sir Roy Welensky downwards that Mr. Lennox Boyd appeared to be wavering and announced that his mind was "not closed" on the matter.

What part the British Home Secretary, M. R. A. B. Butler, may have had in this change of heart can only be imagined, but there was something decidedly unsavoury about the way the Federal Prime Minister beat a path to the British Minister's holiday retreat in the Eastern districts of Southern Rhodesia with his protestations. And there was general relief at the reception he appeared to be greeted with by Mr. Butler who might, perhaps, have been expected to tell him that the matter had nothing to do with him and that anyway, he was on holiday. Instead, Mr. Butler made statements which, although cautious, lit hope in the breasts of the United Federal Party, and for that matter the Dominion Party too, that he would bring pressure to bear upon Mr. Lennox Boyd when he returned from London.

In the face of developments such as these, it is hardly surprizing that the African National Congress in Southern Rhodesia —until now almost a benevolent institution by comparison with the congresses in the two northern territories—announced their intention of waging "social war" in the Colony, and among the resolutions passed at the annual meeting of the southern congress in September was a call to the two African M.Ps. from Southern Rhodesia to resign their seats in the Federal Assembly.

So we are coming full circle in Central Africa, with Black nationalism spurring on White nationalism which in turn provides yet more fuel for more Black nationalism. And into this tragic whirlpool are drawn many people of all races who are normally outside race arena politics.

KEEP BRITAIN WHITE

H. A. NAIDOO

Former Central Executive member of the now-banned Communist Party of South Africa, trade unionist and journalist, now living in London.

ONLY a few weeks before the outbreak of last summer's race clashes in Britain I was sitting on the platform of a meeting addressed by Bishop Reeves of Johannesburg. The meeting was held at Central Hall, Westminister, London, within a few paces from the House of Commons. There must have been nearly 1,000 people at the meeting. Bishop Reeves had hardly begun to speak when my eyes were attracted towards the gallery. And there, truculently spread out was a large white banner with the heavy sign in black: "KEEP BRITAIN WHITE".

Although I had come up against colour prejudice on several occasions previously, this was the first time I had witnessed it in so blatant a form. I could hardly believe that what I saw was real. Yes, it was real enough. But it was incongruous. Incongruous, because it seemed out of place among an audience of serious-minded men and women, both young and old, who had come to show their appreciation of the good work being done by Bishop Reeves to fight racialism.

Those responsible for displaying the banner were quickly led out of the hall and the meeting went on as if nothing had happened. But I must confess that even though I did not see that banner again, a white flash with the inscription "KEEP BRITAIN WHITE" remained as an image in my mind in the same way that the slogan "FOR EUROPEANS ONLY" has stuck since my childhood in South Africa.

After the meeting we found that at most about a dozen youths, of both sexes, were responsible for this display. A mere dozen out of an audience of about a thousand. It was a comforting thought that, after all, the great majority of those present did not believe in colour prejudice. Yet it was the mischievous behaviour of a handful of teenagers which caught the headlines of the following day's newspapers and not the calm and dignified disapproval of the vast audience.

This is not to suggest that colour prejudice, as distinct from violence which characterized the disturbances in Nottingham and Notting Hill, should be dismissed as not being serious. Indeed, as subsequent events and newspaper reports and correspondence have shown, colour or race prejudice is more wide-

spread than many would like to admit. The Rev. Donald Soper once put it something like this in a newspaper article: "Most people would unhesitatingly deny that they had colour prejudice. But ask them whether they would have a Coloured family as neighbours and the answer would be an equally unhesitating 'no' ".

Colour prejudice festers under the surface of a somewhat benign and disciplined code of good and correct behaviour. Give this code of good behaviour even the slightest jolt and the true passions come to the surface. Then we get Nottingham and Notting Hill and everybody is surprised.

During the two weeks when the race disturbances were at their worst I was drawn into numerous discussions with Asians, Africans and West Indians. Nearly every one of them had a grievance. On occasions I found myself in the difficult situation of trying to convince them that not every Englishman had colour prejudice, that they must distinguish between those who had and those who had not. My arguments had little impact. Many of them had come to this country as students. Their difficulties and problems, mainly because of colour prejudice, have left them with bitterness and frustration. That there was ample justification for this feeling is shown, for instance, in a recent survey which indicated that only about 15 per cent of London landladies would accept a Negro student. It is shown by the extreme reluctance of employers to take on Coloured workers except in the lowest-paid jobs, and certainly not in a supervisory capacity. It is shown by the increasing number of clubs which bar Coloureds from membership. It is shown by many other instances too numerous to detail.

Many of those who accuse the British of colour prejudice point to other countries in Europe where, they say, there is far less prejudice. And they are right. During the disturbance an English woman resident in Paris wrote indignantly to one of the papers here: "In spite of the fact that it is quite impossible to determine whether the Arab in the street does or does not belong to this minority (North African), is or is not armed and ready for murder, no French man, woman, or child of whatever educational level has ever cried out 'dirty Arab' or entertained for a moment the idea of personal violent retaliation, which in the circumstances would be, if not justifiable, at least understandable. Arabs drink in cafes side by side with French people. It is in Notting Hill Gate, where I used to live, that a little child

pointed her finger at a respectable Black lawyer and shouted 'dirty Nigger'. She is in no way responsible for her action. The onus rests upon her parents who brought her up on un-British ideas of totalitarian racial hatred."

Whatever the origins of prejudice, there is no doubt that it exists to an alarming extent. Those who uphold it may point their fingers at Coloured people and accuse them of living on prostitution, of being a burden on national insurance welfare, of being untidy and lazy, of being bad-mannered and noisy.

But these evils, if they can be so described, are not the monopoly of Coloured people. They are to be found in equal proportion among the British people themselves.

Another fallacy is the mistaken belief among left-wing politicians that Coloured prejudice arises from unemployment, lack of housing and low living standards. This is an over-simplification. There are many parts of the world where conditions are much worse and yet retaliation does not take the form of race or colour prejudice.

The root of colour prejudice can only be found in historical terms. It is to be found in the British colonial system which, over the centuries, had conquered and subjugated many peoples in many parts of the world. And so has grown the myth that military defeat is equivalent to an "inferior" status. Despite the vast changes, specially since World War II and the emergence of independent nations in Asia and Africa there has been little change in the educational system. History books are still permeated with ideas that to be "Coloured" is to be "inferior". As a well-known educationalist has pointed out: "Relatively few British persons start with a strong prejudice against the Coloured man, but they assimilate the idea of his 'inferiority' because it is part of the cultural atmosphere. Children's books, for instance, are still riddled with grotesque representations of Coloured people; many texts used in schools are anthropologically out of date; and it is only a few years ago that the cinema gave up depicting the Negro as a ludicrous and degraded coon."

While people differ widely in the interpretation of the causes behind the recent disturbances, a surprisingly large number of them, including several Labour M.Ps. are calling for the control of immigration.

There are about 200,000 Coloured people in Britain today. Of these it is estimated that about 110,000 are West Indians and about 50,000 Indians and Pakistanis. Of the remaining 40,000

about 50 per cent are West Africans. Considering that Britain's population is 51,000,000 the proportion of Coloured people is about 4 out of every 1,000. And contrary to popular belief, the number of people coming in from the West Indies and elsewhere is falling and not rising.

The race clashes have come and gone and many people are only too glad to forget them. But the virus of colour prejudice is still there. It is being fed and nourished by racial propaganda of various kinds, the most dangerous and potentially harmful being that which is seeking to use the ballot box. Already a candidate has appeared in a London borough by-election and collected almost 500 votes by openly propagating racialism. True, the winning candidate, a Conservative, won by a very large majority. But significantly, the Communist candidate representing a party which has been active in the area for many years and has unreservedly opposed colour prejudice, came at the bottom of the poll.

In Britain, where many people with colour prejudice are ashamed to admit it openly, the ballot box seems to offer a way out. It would not be surprising, therefore, if the colour issue becomes increasingly prominent in election battles unless firm and immediate action is taken to outlaw race and colour prejudice.

Up to now race and colour issues have not figured in British politics and governments have not found it necessary to take any action. Indeed, because of the absence of legislation outlawing racialism, it is even possible for dance halls and other public places to exclude Coloured people. In a recent case in Wolverhampton the magistrates granted licence to a dance hall with colour bar, even though strong objections were raised by the Labour Party, the International Friendship League, the Musicians' Union and local churches.

It is incomprehensible that Britain, being a member of the United Nations, should not take action to implement the principles of the United Nations Charter which forbids race and colour discrimination. It is a welcome sign, therefore, that the Labour Party has adopted a policy statement commiting itself to introduce legislation. Legislation alone, however, cannot rid people of race prejudice. It is a problem which requires a new approach to race relations and the positive inculcation of ideas towards human brotherhood.

BROWN TOWN BLUES

W. H. van der EYKEN

A South African journalist who covered the Notting Hill race riots for the London 'Evening Standard'.

NOTTING Hill is an eight-penny bus-ride away from the neon culture of London's West End. Not many people bother to make the journey. For between the glitter of Piccadilly and the phosphorescent gloom of Notting Hill there lies a gulf so deep that to those living on "the right side of the tracks" the race riots at the beginning of September proved an inexplicable eruption. But to the people of Notting Hill it was just a bald presentation of the obvious.

This is London's Tobacco Road, lying in a shallow saucer between the square mile of the city's centre and the more westerly suburbs. The inhabitants call it "Brown Town"—to distinguish it from its northerly neighbour, White City. It would be laughable to describe the tall, gloomy houses as Regency, but the bones are there. Cats and children and peeling paint mark the streets. Spiked black railings fence the pavements. Old women with crumpled faces and empty gums lean against the lintels of doorways. Inside, faceless corridors are black as the night. Walls stand shored-up with planks. Faded strips of cotton curtains hang lifelessly from the windows.

There is violence in the very stones of Notting Hill. The bomb sites lie littered with bricks, broken beer bottles, rubbish. The goods yards hurl black smoke and soot into the air to settle on the rooftops. Junk shops and scrap yards are only separated by dimly-lit cafes selling greasy ham and eggs and overbrewed tea. Decay grows everywhere.

Two hundred seamstresses sit bent double over their sewing machines in the rag factories, churning out the cheap cotton "fashion modes" for the bazaars, while outside the babies howl in their broken-down prams. Children chase each other, and skinny dogs chase the children. The old women watch and talk among themselves. The church poster down the road says, "Fear ye not, neither be afraid." Fifteen yards further on, written in livid chalk, the wall proclaims: "Kick Out Niggers".

It is not an idle demand. About a fifth of the population of Notting Hill are West Indians and Africans. It is easy to see where they live. Look for the cracked windows. Look for the boarded-up doors, with corrugated iron or desperately

piled-up furniture shutting out the paltry light of a so-called summer's day. That is where they live. And if the Whites have their way, they won't be living there very much longer.

The softening up process begins at dusk. The hooligans are home from their soul-numbing jobs as office boys, messengers, carriers, fetchers, lifters, movers. Dinner over, they go out. Out to meet the boys. Out on the pavement. The last blade of grass that grew in Notting Hill was killed years ago in the rush. By eight o'clock the main arteries that feed this constricted heart of London are filled with a sluggish mass of teenagers, looking for fun. Excitement. Something to do. Something to look at. And all they see are the dull faces of each other, dead behind the eyes. Teddy boys in tight trousers. Toughs in leather jackets. Dolls covered in paint and tight skirts, selling their chain-store sex as the cheap papers decree. Oh, for some excitement. Oh, for some fun. Anything. Anything at all.

A girl sits on the pavement and tells the world: "I'm a Teddy girl." She lifts her head, as if to say "I'm Al Capone. I'm big." Behind her on the wall an ugly scrawl shouts "Teddy" and "Kill Niggers". An idiot, a genuine dervish—capers about for the amusement of his pals on the street corner and shrieks "Let's carve up a Wog."

"Come on, fellers, come on. Let's get a nigger." The others laugh at him. They wouldn't mind. Why doesn't somebody do something. Nothing happening to-night. But there are no Black men to be seen.

Suddenly the police arrive. "Here comes the Law, boys." The police are their natural enemy. From the Black Marias they spring, twelve at a time, with growling Alsatian dogs. "All right, now move on there. Come on, move. There's nothing happening to-night. Go home."

But nobody goes home. They stand and sulkily move foot before foot, to the next corner. More police. "Move on." To the next street. Same process. "What can you do?" says the sergeant. "These guys don't go to bed until two o'clock in the morning."

Suddenly five thugs spot a Negro, moving quickly down the street. "There's one!" They congregate together. "Run, you black bastard!" shouts the leather-coated boy. He's about eighteen. Weighs one hundred and thirty, probably. Still, there are five of them. The West Indian disappears around the

corner. The thugs go and pick up some girls. Too many police around.

From the corner pub comes a party of Unionists. Mosley's men, carrying pamphlets and copies of *Action*, their party paper. The Union Movement, Fascism made respectable and brought up to date, is fighting two council seats in the area, with high hopes of winning at least one, possibly both. Pamphlets explaining the "black invasion" and demanding that the Black man go are handed to every bystander.

The Unionists walk up the street, while on the other side a group of West Indians sit on their doorstep and watch.

"There they are!" says the leader of the White troup. "It won't be long now."

"We're ready for you" comes back the cry in thick, angry Jamaicanese.

"Don't worry, it won't be long now." One of the men stops to spit in the gutter. Another hurls obscenities. "Filthy black bastards." The hatred on his face is frightening to see.

On the next corner, the police are at their rounds, moving on the crowds. Half a dozen are searched, shoved into the van for carrying razors, coshes, or insulting the Force. Their friends cheer them away. You can see the whole story in their eyes.

"When you're poor, mate, you can't afford no morals and that, see. It's like every one for himself, sort of. Take these niggers. I got nothing 'gainst Blacks, except they're a bit too flashy with their White girls. Prostitutes. They keep 'em. In those houses, mate, I'm telling you. Don't work, not one of 'em. And there's another thing. These 'ouses. They buys 'em up, see, and before yar knows what, there's niggers livin' right through the road. Packed with 'em. Drivin' cars. I tell you. Where you reckon they gets the cash, eh? I tell ya, mate. Off the streets. Isn't that right, Harry? I seen 'em."

By midnight the fun and the trouble and the sight-seeing and the moving on and the arrests are all over, and Notting Hill has gone off to a troubled sleep.

Outside their home, the group of West Indians still sit, smoking and talking. They are not just taking a breath of air. They're watching. Two nights ago three milk bottles flew through their window. Up the road somebody threw a petrol lamp into a house and sent half of it up in flames. Nobody is

going to do that again without getting his throat cut.

"Will you tell your goddamn paper the truth?" pleads the Jamaican. He's not swearing. He is just running out of patience. "You know, the Germans come over here, and live real easy. Real good, man. We come over—we, you know, who helped fight the Germans—and we get this, boy. It's impossible, man, I truly do think it's impossible."

"You know, these people here, they think we all swing in trees at home and live in hovels." He points to the dilapidated house behind. "Honestly, I lived better. Much better."

"Here, I can't get work. I'm a skilled craftsman. Carpenter. I go to the Labour Exchange, the man does not even look at my card, he says 'sorry, there's nothing for you' and then gives the White man next to me a job. As carpenter. What can you do?"

"I apply for a job. The man says 'how much experience have you had in this country.' I say I have seven years' experience in Jamaica. He says that's no good. Must have five years work in Britain. I say how do I get started. He says he does not know. What can you do, man?"

"And you've seen the notices? 'West Indians Need Not Apply'. And then they say we don't do any work!"

"Same thing with accommodation. Black men not wanted. Lowers the tone of the area. People say we live crowded in rooms. Why you think that is? Do they really think we don't want big rooms with carpet and soft lighting and stuff like that . . . ah, man, it makes you tired."

"The police are no help at all, boy. These riots . . . well, they've been going on a long time. They attack our women. They shove you in the street. They spit. Yeah, man, spit on your shoes as you walk down the road. Don't tell me. What can we do? We sit and wait for them to burn down the house . . . and the police just tell them to move on a bit, move on a bit. But they don't protect us, boy."

"They say we take their women. If a White girl wants to go out with a Black feller, what are we supposed to do? That's nature."

"They say we don't work. You know why we don't work. Eighty per cent of us West Indians and Africans are out of work at Notting Hill. Easily. And these riots will bring the others out, too. The employers say we are trouble-makers. I ask

you! We sit at home protecting our stuff and they say we cause trouble."

"Flashy cars? You know how the Blacks get flashy cars? They save the money they get when there's work, they buy second-hand models, they fix them up, and they get out, boy. They drive away."

"But we don't work. We sit and wait, boy, for something to happen. What's going to happen? I tell you. There's only one thing. That's to fight it out. We're outnumbered, sure, but what else can we do? Make an end to it, that's better than nothing, what you say?"

A police car crammed with men pulls up at the kerb. A sergeant springs out. "Now if you want to do us a favour please get inside your door and stay there" he says, waving his arms.

"Sure, sure, we're just going. Sure . . ." Slowly they move inside taking a last look at the deserted, paper-littered, sodium-lighted street.

TOWARDS AN AFRICAN LITERATURE VII: POETRY AND THE NEW ORDER

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THE pagan tribal bard sees life mainly through the social institutions of his own tribe: the Christian literary poet sees it partly through the tribal institutions, and partly through the institutions introduced by the White missionary and by the White administrator. To understand the early literary poet amongst the Xhosa, we must put him side by side with the traditional tribal bard of the same period.

The tribal bard and the new order.

It must be repeated that the African traditional praise-poem is not, as most White people think, just a song of praise in which the tribal bard showers flattering epithets on his chief (see *Africa South* Vol. 2 No. 1, Oct.-Dec. 1957). The "praises of the chiefs" deal primarily with the happenings in and around the tribe during the reign of a given chief, praising what is worthy and decrying what is unworthy, and even forecasting what is going to happen: rivalries for the chieftainship within the tribe: the ordinary social life: alliances and conflicts with neighbouring tribes: military and political triumphs and reverses etc. Thus the tribal bard is a chronicler as well as being a poet. The chief is only the centre of the praise-poem because he is the symbol of the tribe as a whole.

This period being that of "treaties", annexations and "resettlements", we are able to see, through the eyes of the tribal bard, the encroachment of the Whiteman on the land of the Africans, the breaking of alliances between one tribe and another, boundary disputes, the undermining of the power of the chief by missionary and magistrate, the relations between pagan and Christian etc., etc.

As the Xhosa people were the first to be subjugated, it is in the "praises" of their chiefs that the vast social changes brought about by conquest are first reflected. Most of our illustrations refer to this group.

The "praises" composed in the middle of the nineteenth century and after, begin to make allusions to governors, missionaries and magistrates. In the "Praises of Sandile" (son of Ngika or "Gaika"), reference is made to *Smiti* (Sir Harry Smith)

who was governor when Sandile was arrested and sent to *Rhini* (Grahamstown) via *Monti* (East London). Reference is also made to *Kondile* (Rev. Henry Calderwood) and to *Tshalisi* (the Hon. Charles Brownlee) who became magistrates over the Ngqika section of the Xhosa after their conquest. John Henderson Soga (son of Tiyo Soga), regards Brownlee as "A Friend of the Bantu" (see *The South-Eastern Bantu*, Chapter XV), but the Ngqika tribal bard of the days of Brownlee thinks otherwise. He complains that "the land has been spoilt by the Calderwood" and that "we trust not Tshalisi who seems to be friends with the Germans". He also refers sarcastically to the "guardianship" of Charles Brownlee over Sandile, so choosing his words that the "guardianship" looks like the herding of a domestic animal by its master.

In the "Praises of Sarhili", reference is made to the exile of this chief, and his finding sanctuary among the Bomvana is recorded. The relations between his people and the Fingo buffer state are also evident. But Sarhili himself is not spared. The war that led to his exile started as a mere drunken brawl between some Xhosa men and their Fingo neighbours. Handled properly, the quarrel could have been settled in a local headman's court. But Sarhili was led to treat the "breaking of Mbune's pots" which led to the fight as a *casus belli*. The bard refers sarcastically to this:

"Alas! that the land should die for Mbune's pots!"

In this and many other poems, constant reference is made to the rôle of the fugitive Fingos who, having been "taken under his wing" by the Xhosa chief, deserted him and made friends with "their fathers the Whitemen". Always the Fingos are reminded that their place is with the other Blacks, and their attention is drawn to the kind things that have been done to them. Thus, in the "Praises of Ngangelizwe" (a Thembu chief), the Bhele clan are asked:

". . . what cause have ye to complain?
We gave you the Mthentu rich in corn."

There does not seem to be any direct bitterness towards the missionaries. But the African Christians are often subjected to sarcasm. Their divided loyalty, even as individuals, often provoked whippings, if not contemptuous amusement. It was the summary manner in which he used to deal with defiant Christians that earned the Mpondomise chief Mhlontlo, the epithet of "Wader-with-the-sjambok among the Christians".

The "Praises of Dalindyebo", Ngangelizwe's son and successor, refer to the Christians' love for "the song":

Which they sing in praise of the King,
Proclaiming Jehovah and Christ:
How strange to us that they turn to Him their buttocks,
Albeit proclaiming Him King!

The Xhosa bards are painfully aware of the havoc wrought by the Whiteman's liquor amongst the displaced and perplexed chiefs. Ndimba, grandson of Ndlambe, was ejected by *Makeleni* (Col. Mclean) from his rightful home, and came to live in Charles Brownlee's magisterial district where he apparently received an allowance of some kind. This he spent on liquor in a canteen owned by one Kelly at Draaibosch:

"*He helplessly lives in the House of Tshalisi*
Whom he leaves for paying a wage;
This child may be found in Keli's canteen,
Bearing patiently the kicks of the German."

But most tragic of all in this respect is the reference to Maqoma. A great orator, a regent with a very keen sense of justice, the hero of the Battle of Mthontsi (War of Mlanjeni, 1852), Maqoma after his defeat bore himself with such dignity at the rough *physical* handling of Sir Harry Smith as to shame this arrogant soldier-governor. But before he was banished to Robben Island where he met his death, he has so succumbed to liquor that the anonymous bard, while giving him genuine praise for his exploits, also refers to him as one "whose ways are strewn with broken bottles".

The early literary poets

The Christian African found a new meaning in life. He fully accepted the new culture with its promise of a fullness of life. The way to this promised life went by way of the baptismal font, the church and the school. These were incompatible with the tribal institutions, and so at this period the African Christian is at the crossroads. To the semi-literate one, the new road, though preferable, is misty. He is not so far removed from the old ways as not to be attracted by them. The intellectual has a clearer understanding of both roads. He prefers the new, but is keenly aware of the changing attitudes of the conqueror. The fullness of life that was promised him is not to be realised in the foreseeable future.

On the other hand, he regards the tribal institutions as backward and only serving to delay this fullness of life for himself and

his people. His aspirations and his feeling of frustration are to be seen through the eyes of the poet of this period. The influence of Christian teaching is evident everywhere.

William W. Gqoba

In the field of verse, Gqoba is famous for his two "Great Discussions", one between the *Christian and the Pagan*, and the other *On Education*. The names of the participants in these 'Discussions" show the influence of Tiyo Soga's translation of the *Pilgrim's Progress* in that they are symbolic. In the *Discussion between the Christian and the Pagan* there are two participants, namely, *Present-World* (Pagan) and *World-to-come* (Christian). They discuss "matters related to The World, matters related to education, to social life and to government".

Present-World praises the earth and its pleasures and richness of life—so rich that even the Christians look this way and that, and finally join the ranks of the pagans who openly and joyfully welcome everything that life can give.

He enumerates the pastimes of the pagans. He alleges that if the Christians were truthful, they would admit that in fact they had lost their faith. Their youth were drunkards. Meanwhile, the Whiteman in whose favour the Christians abandoned their chiefs made no difference between the Christian and the pagan. He subjected them all to the same laws. All things considered, the life of the pagan was much fuller and richer because, while in addition to present-world self-denial and sufferings, the Christian still feared to go to hell after death, the pagan looked forward to a peaceful and becoming life with his fathers in the land of the shades.

> "*Deserting your chiefs, you came to the Whiteman;*
> *Destroying our rule, you side with the enemy;*
> *But now your faith is lean and shrivell'd*
> *Even like a chameleon whose mouth is smear'd*
> *With nicotine on a sultry summer's day.*"

World-to-come replies. He reminds his interlocutor that Ntsikana did prophesy that from the East there would come the claypot of corn beer (brought by the Fingos), and from the West the "little barrel" (brought by the Whiteman): that these two would bring misfortune. But how could Present-World talk of "the pleasures of this life"? What did they amount to? What was the end of those who aimed at riches? In life were they any happier than their poorer brethren? Did they not suffer from disease? Did they not lose their loved ones by death? At

death were they any happier?

"Why boast thou of sin
That stalks man to the grave?
Wilt thou stay a sinner,
Like a locust that dies
On a dry stalk of grass?

This discussion covers 900 lines. In it Gqoba shows his knowledge of history and folklore. The participants refer to numerous incidents in history and now and again a folktale is told to illustrate a point. Present-World has a very strong case throughout, but somehow at the end he gives in.

The participants in the *Great Discussion on Education* are youthful people of both sexes. They include such characters as Sharp-eyed, Crooked-eyed, One-sided, Miss Vagrant, Miss Gossip, Miss Truthful and Miss Upright. Here the aspirations of the young intellectuals are revealed. They are critical of the educational practices of their days. They are denied access to certain fields of knowledge: they are poorly paid. There is a conspiracy amongst the rulers, and it is this: "If they cry for Greek and Latin and Hebrew, give them a little. But make no mistake about the wages. Keep the wages low. If they are employed in respectable jobs, flatter them by addressing them as 'Mr. So-and-so', but as ordinary labourers, they are to be addressed as plain 'Jack' or just 'Boy'!"

But the inevitable "moderates" are to be found even in this small group. Accusing the first group of being "ungrateful" and of "finding fault with everything", they warn them not to expect to get everything at once. They must expect to take just as long to acquire civilization as the White people. After all, hadn't the White people brought them happiness?

"While the lion of darkness still roaved and roared,
They gave up their homeland for love of us blacks."

A participant by the name of Tactless confesses to disillusionment. We thought, he says, that this way of life was going to be a refuge for those who had been smelt out as sorcerers, for suffering womanhood, for young children who had none to protect them. For these and may other blessings we gave up our independence. But now the main thing is *taxes*—a tax on firewood, a tax on water, a tax on grass even. We are deprived of our pastureland. In good faith, we allowed White traders to come and live among us, sharing our pastures with us. To-day

the land belongs to them, If our cattle go anywhere near, they are impounded.

Nevertheless, says Tactless, we must admit that the White-man's things are good. We must get them, no matter how much pain this costs us. If you want the honey, you thrust in your hand and grab it no matter how vicious the bees: no matter how painful the stings.

There is an interesting variety of participants and therefore a variety of opinions, left centre and right shading into each other. In this long, long discussion, no one says that the Blacks are getting a square deal from the Whites. The best defence that the extreme right can put up is that things are not so bad. and that if the ingrates will only exercise patience, the best is yet to be. The last speaker is Ungrateful, who "admits" that his eyes "have been opened" to "the good things" that the White people have brought them, and brings the Great Discussion that covers 1,800 lines to a close by telling the participants to "go seek learning" and "love the White people".

Smaller in quantity but decidedly greater in quality is H. M. Mthakathi's *Song of the Cross*. A poem of 200 lines, it calls upon the "Bringer-together of hostile homes . . . whose blood didst flow whilst Thou didst hunt for our souls" to "proclaim the news of heaven in the rough places of the earth". He thinks of the great upheavals in his homeland, of the thousands whose bones lie scattered at Mthombe and Sandlwana, and prays that these may dance at the gates of Zion. He prays that the Lord reveal himself to the youth:

> "*Reveal Thyself to the youth of our land,*
> *That they give up the song and the dance,*
> *And go arm in arm to the places of learning,*
> *And go arm in arm to the praise of the highest.*"

Such is Mthakathi's prayer to the Christ,

> "*Whose shoulders bore the cross of shame*
> *That the pagan might wear a crown.*"

Mthakathi speaks from the heart: Gqoba, on the other hand, is forced by the very manner in which he handles his subject matter to speak from the head. In the latter's two great poems there is more wit than emotion. But both these, the greatest poets of this period, preserve the imagery that characterizes the traditional praise-poems as well as showing the influence of the new learning not only in subject-matter but also in technique.

ANGLICAN BISHOPS AND RACIAL CONFLICTS

THE RIGHT REV. RICHARD ROSEVEARE
Lord Bishop of Accra

AMONGST the five Committees into which the Lambeth Conference was divided for two out of the five weeks of its private Session was one set to deal with *the reconciling* of conflicts between and within nations. The Chairman of this Committee was the Archbishop of Cape Town (The Most Rev. Joost de Blank D.D.). The Committee divided itself into three Sections and the author of the following article was Chairman of the one which concerned itself with *conflicts* within nations, giving special attention to racial, industrial, and political conflicts.

The Committee of Bishops which presented the Report on *the Reconciling of Conflicts between and within Nations* was composed of 42 Bishops drawn from England, U.S.A., Canada, India, Ceylon, New Zealand, South Africa, West Indies, Japan, Hong Kong, West, Central and East Africa, Madagascar, Korea, and Argentina. The secretary of the section which dealt with racial conflicts was the Bishop of Arkansas (The Rt. Rev. R. R. Brown, D.D.) in whose Diocese Little Rock is situated. This is but one example of the fact that the Report represents the views of Bishops who have considerable first-hand knowledge of the subjects under discussion. The writer spent three years in South Africa before going to Accra early in 1956.

This Committee's Report deals at some length with the causes of conflict and includes a fine statement on the work of reconciliation which is of the very essence of the Church's life and witness in the world. It continues, in a section on *conflicts between nations*, to remind its readers of the essential unity of mankind and that 'irrespective of race or colour, all men are equally the object of God's love . . . though born into a particular family, and through it into a larger community of the nation'. Nations, it says, like individuals, are members one of another, increasingly inter-dependent.

Then follows a sober yet challenging section on *thermo-nuclear warfare* in which the familiar points are forcefully made. It is interesting that, like so many other assemblies, the full Conference could not agree upon any form of unilateral abolition of, or even refusal to test or use, thermo-nuclear weapons.

The section on *conflicts within nations* opens with a reminder

that the seeds of racial tensions are bound to be present where members of different races meet, 'not least in those territories into which the white man has penetrated'. Yet, it says, tensions can be fruitful for good, especially if man lives by the at-one-ment wrought by Christ.

A section on *Areas of Unrest* includes some vivid comments upon situations in the U.S.A., Israel and the Arab World, India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, the Far East, Australia, Great Britain, and Africa. We must limit ourselves here to comment and quotation concerning the first and last of these.

It is noted that, in the U.S.A., the Protestant Episcopal Church, through its General Convention, has declared that it would

> "consistently oppose and combat discrimination based upon colour or race of every form, both within the Church and without, in this country and internationally, while its National Council has passed a separate Resolution regarding the Supreme Court's decision as 'just, right, and necessary".

It was significant that all three U.S.A. Bishops who chose to serve on this sectional committee came from Southern America (Arkansas, S.W. Virginia, and Georgia).

Every word of the section headed *the Awakening of Africa* was carefully weighed. Opening with a brief description of the present situation in West Africa, where Ghana's newly-won independence has set the pace for her neighbours and for many other African communities, the Report notes that:

> "the white man is welcomed if he comes as a cooperator to help the African through trade, through technical assistance of every kind, and through other channels, on terms now being fixed by the African." (Note those final words.)

Of East Africa the Report only mentions Kenya and, in a very concise statement, summarises the common features of the 'movements of regression' of the past few years. It adds

> "The Church must demonstrate beyond all doubt that it is the Family of God into the fullness of whose membership all may come without distinction or difference. There, in Christ, they will find strength and grace both to face the baffling bewilderment of rapid social change unafraid, and also to contribute actively towards the solution in society of the problems which society has itself created."

The brief paragraph on Central Africa pulls no punches and says:

"The Committee believes that, if true partnership is to be achieved, there must quickly be an end to many of the old ideas associated with patronage or even paternalism, and that the African should be allowed and encouraged to take a fair and just share in the government of the Federation and its constituent parts—not only a just share but one seen to be just. Here, as elsewhere, the African can only become a responsible person by having responsibility. It is clear that considerable sacrifices will have to be made by both partners, and we would urge that nothing should be done by the British Government which would have the effect of enhancing the already powerful advantages of the White settlers over the Africans."

But, as might be expected, the largest section is devoted to the Union of South Africa. A brief objective summary of the present situation, in which it is noted that "the White South African is as much an African as a Black or Coloured South African", recognizes without comment the fact that the White man seeks to maintain his supremacy and the means he has devised to do so, adding pertinently, "yet his whole economy depends upon the presence of a contented non-White population".

The Report, however, shows no sympathy whatever with the present policy of *apartheid*, and notes that 'the Church of the Province . . . fights bravely to keep open the lines of communication between the races, and protests vigorously against injustice'. Later it shows that the Committee is unanimously behind the Bishops in the Union in their condemnation of 'the injustices perpetrated against non-White men and women in South Africa under the policy of *apartheid*'. Then follow some strong words:

"It holds that every citizen of South Africa of whatever race should have equal rights before the law; and that the non-White should be given a fair and just share in the government of the nation of his birth and citizenship. It believes that, if the present pattern of multi-racial community is to continue, any form of *apartheid* is less just and righteous than a gradual and mutually enriching growth into responsible interdependence of all the races which now share this fertile and beautiful land."

These sentiments were confirmed by a resolution adopted by the full Conference quoted later. But before the text of that Resolution is given it is worth while to quote parts of a section

headed *Freedom of Opportunity*, an impressive footnote to the Africa section.

"Year by year the desire of the African (Christian and non-Christian alike) is deepened, and his determination strengthened, to manage his own affairs and to call Africa his own—one African people throughout the whole continent. His White fellow-African must become wise and humble enough to come to terms with him while there is yet time to do so peaceably and justly . . ."

Opinions expressed in the Report only carry the *imprimatur* of the Committee from which they come. But it will be seen that everything of importance which came from this Committee was confirmed by the full Conference in a Resolution adopted in the following terms:

"The Conference affirms its belief in the natural dignity and value of every man, of whatever colour or race, as created in the image of God. In the light of this belief the Conference affirms that neither race nor colour is in itself a barrier to any aspect of that life in family and community for which God created all men. It therefore condemns discrimination of any kind on the grounds of race or colour alone.

The Conference would urge that in multi-racial societies members of all races shall be allowed:

a. a fair and just share in the government of their country;

b. a fair and just share in the control, development and rewards of the natural resources of their country, including advancement to the highest level of attainment;

c. the right to associate freely in worship, in education, in industry, in recreation, and in all other departments of the common life."

In this connection it is worth while to quote from the section of the Report headed *Political Conflicts* which asks very pertinently

"Do the existing democratic governments truly represent the clear convictions of the majority of their citizens?"

and further

"Are there countries where governments, though acknowledging democratic forms, have in fact come to power, and perhaps remained in power, by undemocratic means? And when, if ever, is such procedure morally justified?"

or again

"If a government stays in power against the wishes of the majority of its citizens, what are the resisting citizens to do?"

The same section includes this statement which may not be without interest to readers of *Africa South*:

"It is laid down as a principle of the United Nations that no member nation shall interfere in the internal affairs of another; but how can a nation which has accepted the Declaration on Human Rights stand idly by while that Declaration is being openly defied by one or more of its neighbours?"

The Report ends with these words and they may fittingly conclude this article:

"Its urgent prayer is that, throughout the world, men of goodwill may continue to work unceasingly in the cause of peace as the fruit of reconciliation—peace between nations, and peace within nations. This peace remains the will of God, and the hope and inspiration of all men everywhere."

BRITISH WEST AFRICA, PAST AND PRESENT

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I

THE culture of British West African territories, as of most of the territories of French Africa, is more or less homogeneous. All these territories belong to the Sudanese group of African languages, in contradistinction to the other great group commonly called the Bantu group to which belong the rest of non-Arab and non-European Africa.

The similarity in the social and political structures of these West African territories derives from the fact of their common origin in the ancient and medieval empires and civilizations which at different periods embraced them all. According to the writings of certain European and Arab scholars who visited these parts at various times, Ghana appears to be the earliest and greatest of these empires and was at the height of its power in 300 A.D.

It was succeeded by Songhai which was itself later overshadowed by Mali, Mali by Sosso, Sosso by Walata, Walata by Mossi which, according to Delafosse, was found intact when the French incorporated it in the seventeenth century in French West Africa, of which it still forms a recognizable part. Ghana itself was not finally over-run and razed until 1076 A.D. when the Almoravides and the Tuaregs came for the last time for plunder of its gold and agricultural resources. Thus was destroyed the empire of Ghana which in the fourth century of the present era consisted of sixteen principalities with a paraphernalia of imperial officials, courts of justice, mosques and ancestral shrines (because one section had become Moslem while the other remained traditional), well-organized armies, large agricultural farms and a flourishing commerce in gold, damask, and other products either manufactured locally or imported from abroad.

The political organization of ancient Ghana, which enabled it successfully to withstand successive hordes of Almoravides and Tuaregs for nearly eight centuries, must have been based on an art of government and administration now lost to its dismembered remains under British and French rule today. Ghana at one time embraced the whole of the territory from Senegal to

Northern Nigeria, but largely excluding the coastal areas.

The successor empires to Ghana, though never as long-lived or better organized, managed to achieve varying degrees of material and spiritual greatness. There was, for instance, the great irrigation works which Askia the Great caused to be built, during his reign, across the upper reaches of the River Niger as a means of promoting the fortunes of his subjects' large-scale agricultural farms which were at that time being threatened by the advancing Sahara desert.

On the cultural and spiritual side we may recall the significant contribution to learning and enlightenment which the university of Sankore made at Timbuktu from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries. It has been said that subjects studied there included astronomy, algebra, geography, philosophy, government and, of course, Islamic and Comparative Theology.

For the slave-raiding Arabs of the fifteenth and following centuries had been preceded by the all-conquering Arabized North African invaders of the West African Coast. In the later stages of their adventures they had combined plunder with token settlements, and had no doubt served to introduce Islam and its culture into the territories subject to their sway. But they intermarried with and were largely absorbed by the indigenous African majorities. All this serves to account for the fact that the language of instruction and of the records later found at Timbuktu is Arabic; and there is a certain family resemblance between certain of the extant Timbuktu chronicles and the various Kano and Sokoto chronicles of more recent times.

We must be grateful to later travellers like Mungo Park who in the eighteenth century recorded for us a graphic account of the manner of life of the various peoples of West Africa through whose territories he journeyed in his search for the source of the Niger. Park described, often in detail, the systems of government he found in each place, the types of agriculture practised, the smelting of iron and its manufacture into hoes and cutlasses and knives, the weaving of cloth by various kinds of looms and the dyeing processes used to obtain the colourful patterns so familiar to us on our modern robes and wrappers. He was impressed with the essential fairness of the indigenous judicial process, and emphasized several times the impartiality and hospitality of the vast majority of his African hosts in numerous places along his route.

Almost all these features of life in West Africa, French as well as British, may be said to characterize our societies at the advent of the European early in the nineteenth century. The presence of large-scale political groupings of the peoples, the settled practice of large-scale agriculture, the proliferation of large towns and villages (e.g. the Yoruba town of Ibadan in Nigeria had an indigenous population of just under half a million), the widespread indigenous industries of cloth weaving and dyeing and sewing, the carrying on of trade and commerce from the Ghana days of "silent trading" to those of later times for which the currencies of exchange were cowries, gold weights, small iron rods, etc.—in addition, of course, the simple barter. And there were well-established guilds of smiths, weavers, dyers, and the rest, with rules and regulations for the Practice of their craft—very reminiscent of medieval England and parts of Western Europe.

The result has been an unmistakable similarity in the modes of dress and social attitudes of, say, the Bambara of Senegambia, the Woloffs of Gambia, the Ghana (Gold Coast) Northern territories peoples, the Mende of Sierra Leone, and the Hausa and Yoruba of Nigeria. Even today, it would be difficult to tell a Mende in his traditional dress from a Yoruba. And the Hausa language is almost a *lingua franca* for many of the indigenous peoples of West Africa today, particularly in the hinterland.

Of these West African peoples, two are known to have invented indigenous alphabets and the remnants of one of these are still extant. The Vai of the interior of Liberia, patterns of whose writings have been preserved, and a Cameroonian people have each managed to produce autouchthonous scripts. Arabic has, of course, been the language of instruction and of educated speech since the days of the University of Sankore, and has for that reason survived to this day as probably the only vehicle of our medieval literature. It is certainly the language of most contemporary writing among the majority of Northern Nigerians, Northern territories of modern Ghana, the Joloffs of Gambia, and of the Senegalese; it is of no less importance in French West Africa.

But the lack of an indigenous alphabet and, therefore, of a wholly indigenous literature in the vernacular is in part made up for by our works of art. The famous Ife and Benin bronzes, ivory and wood carvings, the justly renowned Ashanti figurines and gold weights, the Ivory Coast sculptures and paintings, the

Dahomey artistic achievements—all presuppose an efflorescence in art that must have taken place some eight or nine centuries ago. The recent discoveries in Northern Nigeria, popularly referred to as forming the Nok Culture have been scientifically dated back to about 1000 B.C., while the recent French excavations of town and city sites have largely confirmed the early historians' accounts of the old empires and kingdoms in West Africa.

II

Now, despite the wars of plunder and attrition which the invaders from the North waged against successive African empires and kingdoms in the Western Sudan, there was little contact with the outside world. True, some of the medieval rulers made religious pilgrimages to Mecca, after the manner of their Islamic mentors. But, apart from bringing back or inviting occasional scholars and savants from Arabia, there was hardly any other form of commerce with Europe or Asia.

It would seem that five main factors had been responsible for the almost complete inclusiveness of the character of West African culture. The first was, of course, the hegemony of the Islamic impact which resulted from the ceaseless raids and wars of the Almoravides and Tuaregs from North-North-West Africa, who had themselves been long Islamized through Arab conquest of the Mediterranean littoral of the continent. The second was the great physical barrier of the Sahara Desert which effectively shut in the inhabitants of ancient Ghana as it did those of seventeenth-century Mossi. The third was the existence of vast and frequently impenetrable forests which discouraged adventures beyond as well as into their borders. The fourth was the inhibiting effect of the climate on the efficacy of most worthwhile human effort. The fifth factor was that the main rivers like the Niger, the Volta and the Gambia—that should have formed alternative outlets to the Atlantic Ocean—were full of cataracts and rapids that defied all alien attempts to penetrate into the interior of the continent from the sea. Of the same order are other big African rivers like the Congo, the Zambezi, the Limpopo, and the Nile. The whole of the continent of Africa is like an up-turned plate

The wonder, then, is not that so little progress was made in terms of contemporary European advance in the art of letters and in industry, but that, thrown as they were almost upon their own resoureces, they had managed to evolve such works of art,

such economic and political systems, such self-sufficient industries as soap-making, weaving and dyeing, iron-smelting and coal and gold mining, the tanning of leather and shoe-making. The conclusion seems irresistible that peoples who could have done so much for themselves might have achieved greater horizons had the main stream of medieval European culture not passed them by for the reasons we have just stated in the preceding paragraph.

III

That this is not a mere pious assumption may become clear from a brief survey of developments in West Africa since the European advent. Although certain European adventurers first came there as early as the fifteenth century, and although trading and token settlements took place along parts of the coastal fringe in later centuries (respectively by the Portuguese, the Danes, the Dutch, the French and the British), effective contacts with the indigenous proples did not begin until towards the close of the eighteenth and the early years of the nineteenth century.

The needs of the American and West Indian plantations led to slavery and slave-dealing on a large scale, and both caused no end of depopulation and destruction of the surrounding countryside. The eventual abolition of slavery in 1807 and of slave-dealing in 1833 led to the development of legitimate commerce between Europe and West Africa before and since the latter date.

Gambia became British in 1783; Sierra Leone (Freetown only) was settled in 1787 with the first batch of repatriates from Britain who were the descendants of the African slaves who had fought on Britain's side in North America; the coastal parts of the Gold Coast were first annexed and put under Sierra Leone in 1821; Nigeria, which had begun to welcome British and other European traders and travellers since the first three decades of the nineteenth century, only became British as to the coastal area of Lagos in 1861. It was at the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 that better delimitations of spheres of influence between Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Portugal, took place. But the final boundaries of the British and French territories were not fixed until after the proclamation of the protectorates of Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast and Nigeria between 1890 and 1902.

What later came to be known as the Crown Colony system of government was first set up in Sierra Leone in 1808, although

the first Legislative Council was established only in 1863. The Gold Coast was given its first Legislative Council in 1850. although Ashanti and the Northern Territories had none until nearly a century later. Nigeria has its first Legislative Council in Lagos in 1862. Gambia and the other three were all governed centrally from Sierra Leone between 1866 and 1874, when the Gold Coast and Lagos were separated and established under one administration till 1886, when Lagos Colony was in turn separated into an independent territory. From the late 1870's onwards Africans were nominated, one or two at a time, to serve on the Legislative Councils; but their numbers slowly swelled after the First World War.

The Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone, which is affiliated to Durham and which awards Durham University degrees, had been established in 1826 under missionary auspices. By 1832 the first two African barristers had returned from England and, when the great grammar schools were established in Sierra Leone in 1842 and in Lagos in 1859, there were African members of the staff. The various christian missions and the colonial governments in West Africa were the first beneficiaries; the commercial and trading firms soon began to have their first batch of clerks and middlemen. In short, the foundations of an ever-widening middle-class, as we all too imperfectly understand the terms today, were laid in this formative era of West African re-awakening between 1830 and 1880.

Though there had been several local instances of agitation against alien rule in the British West African territories, organized political action was undertaken on a joint territorial basis only in 1919, when the leaders of the then Gold Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone demanded internal self-government based on fifty per cent of the total number of seats in their respective Legislative Councils. And, although their delegation in London failed to achieve their immediate request, the British government proceeded to allow in the Legislative Councils the first *elected* members in Nigeria in 1922, in Ghana in 1925, and in Sierra Leone in 1926. But all the other African members of these Councils were merely *nominated* by the Governor of each territory.

IV

On the eve of World War II, there would appear to be five major grievances of the British West African politicians. The first was, of course, the system of *nominated* African members of

the Legislative Council. The second was the Crown Colony principle of a permanent official majority in the legislatures. The third was the total absence of any African from the Governors' Executive Council, which was the policy-making body in each territory. The fourth was the introduction and operation of the system of indirect rule which centred all local administration on the chief and his council, from which educated Africans were normally excluded. And the fifth, a corollary of Lugard's system of indirect rule, was the exclusion of the protectorate areas—often the much larger part of each British territory in West Africa—from the work of the Legislative Council.

By 1946, all but the first of these five grievances had been met by the British administration. The politicians were, however, in no mood to accept half-measures, and movements for greater reforms were instantly promoted. In particular, they much resented their not having been consulted by the various Governors when the new constitutional provisions were being prepared. By 1951, a Ministerial system of parliamentary government had been established in Ghana and Nigeria. Sierra Leone and Gambia soon followed suit with what was until 1953 called the Member System—a half-way house between the old Executive Council and the new quasi-Cabinet in the two larger territories.

Nigeria, which had been a unitary state since Lugard amalgamated the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914, became a Federation of five territorial units in 1954, in consequence of the demand by its political leaders at a Constitutional Conference held in London in 1953. Ghana attained full Dominion Status within the Commonwealth on March 6, 1957. Sierra Leone and Gambia have recently taken further great strides towards the same goal.

V

A number of tentative as well as crucial questions remain. One broad feature of all these feverish, post-war constitutional experiments and changes has been the emergence in all four British territories of the protectorate peoples to the forefront of the political leadership. The present Federal Prime Minister of Nigeria is a Protectorate man from the North, while the Prime Minister of Sierra Leone is a Protectorate man from the interior. Dr. Nkrumah, though not a Protectorate man, is nonetheless a person from humble origins in the little-known,

village of Nzima, south-west corner of Ghana. It is not yet certain on whom the mantle of Prime Minister may fall in Gambia, but the common people seem now to be stirring there too.

Industries, mostly small-scale but sometimes of larger scope, have sprung up in the last fifty years, and these have been of an order hitherto unknown in West Africa. Trade unionism has largely displaced the former indigenous guilds of craftsmen, tractors have replaced the hoe and the cutlass, machines have lightened manual labour, the railways and the aeroplanes have annihilated distance. New ways of thought and action are abroad.

The old territorial organization of society has been greatly modified, sometimes by realignments, often by mergers of formerly semi-independent units. Men's physical and mental boundaries have been widening, and new horizons are looming.

Whither will all these tend for the family or the individual? The new morality that will be adequate to the new needs has yet to be born, while the old that once served so well has in places ceased to have validity. Aspects of the old system in West Africa can still help us to evolve, if we would, a *via media* for example, in our trying to find the answer to the contemporary problem of political stability, one can learn from patient study of the mechanism of government which sustained ancient Ghana for seven and three-quarters centuries from 300-1076 A.D., and which embraced African peoples of diverse ethnic and religious communities in a tolerant and human fellowship.

How to reconcile individual liberty with political independence of the State is probably one of the most live issues in British West Africa today. The best solution will not be quick or easy, but we must persevere.

NIGERIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE

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WHEN Lord Durham, more than a century ago, recommended "responsible government" for Canada, he did not envisage the range of territories to which this concept would eventually apply. Nor did he anticipate that the communal problem there would not be solved by his prescription. Newer colonial dependencies, inhabited not by Europeans but predominantly by Asians and Africans, came also to demand representative government. This has, not surprisingly, involved a series of constitution-making experiments, because the British are said to be neither philosophical nor theoretical but empirical.

Since India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma achieved the status of independent nations shortly after World War II, the empirical approach could be said to have paid off handsomely. Other countries have begun to travel in the same direction. The Gold Coast has been reborn as an independent Ghana. Malaya has attained independent nationhood. The same fundamental process is taking place in Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Carribean Federation. Yet there is at least one important difference between the experience of constitutional development in the Asian countries and in West Africa. British policy regarding the process of the transfer of power, particularly in the Gold Coast and in Nigeria, has been officially described as one of "creative abdication of power"; whereas the policy in the Asian countries was one of fighting a rear-guard battle and grudgingly handing over power. The West African approach would, therefore, imply a far more positive and energetically pursued policy designed to bring independence more quickly than was the case in Asia.

The purpose of this article is to present a brief survey of Nigeria's constitutional development up to the present time—pointing out, where necessary, the stresses and strains which this development has involved, and finally hazarding prospects for the country's future.

Socially and ethnically, Nigeria is a heterogeneous society. It is made up of a large number of groups commonly referred to as "tribes", with different cultures, traditions, languages and ways of life. There are three major tribal groups in the country,

namely, the monarchical Moslem Hausas predominantly inhabiting the north, the equally monarchical and shrewd Yorubas inhabiting the south-west, and the pushful and republican-oriented Ibos inhabiting the south-eastern part of the country. These three major tribes are each roughly located in each of the present three main administrative divisions of the country. But, besides these three, there are several other linguistic or tribal groupings, such as, the Fulanis, the Edos, the Ibibios, etc. The population of the country, according to the 1952 census, is roughly 32 million, distributed in the three administrative regions as follows:

North—17 million; East—8 million; and West—7 million.

Politically, the geographical entity called Nigeria today is an artificial British imperial creation. Its existence was not made possible until just about half a century ago when Sir Frederick (later Lord) Lugard conquered the Moslem Emirates of what is today Northern Nigeria. British administration has since been concerned with the effort to create a single and united state out of this welter of tribes and peoples. It was not, however, until 1914, that Nigeria as a political unit came into existence with the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria. During the period, the dominant principle of government was the concept of "Indirect Rule"[1]—the system whereby peoples are governed through their own chiefs or traditional heads—introduced by Lord Lugard.

For nearly a quarter of a century, Nigeria was ruled under the instrument of the Clifford Constitution of 1922. The only novel and democratic aspect of this Constitution was its elective principle, provided only for Lagos, the capital city, and Calabar, a town in the south-eastern corner of the country.

World War II had a tremendous impact on the acceleration of constitutional change in Nigeria. Other external influences, such as the Atlantic Charter and the growth of the Labour Party, helped in making for a changed outlook in British colonial policy. Internally, the social and economic ferment brought about by the war had created a radically different climate of opinion. Young men developed new visions and horizons and consequently looked for new and vigorous leadership. The emergence of dynamic nationalism under the leadership of the late Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwe, popularly known as

[1] For details on the working of the Indirect Rule system, see Perham, Margery, *Native Administration in Nigeria*, Oxford, 1937; see also Hailey, Lord Malcolm, *African Survey*, London, 1945.

Zik, (now Premier of the Eastern Region), the impact of the Nigerian Press, and the growth of trade unionism, all played a part in accelerating constitutional reforms through the stimulus which they gave to the demands for self government.

In 1946 Sir Arthur Richards (now Lord Milverton), then Governor of Nigeria, without consulting the people or their leaders, arbitrarily introduced his constitutional reforms. The Richards' Constitution introduced the concept of "Regionalism" by dividing Nigeria into three Regions—Northern, Eastern and Western. But, partly on account of the arbitrary manner in which these reforms were launched by the Governor and partly on account of their unpalatable taste, the Richards' Constitution was denounced and decried by all the nationalist elements of the country whose co-operation was essential for its successful working. Consequently, it did not live its full life.

During this period, two new factors affected the course of constitutional change. First, there was the Nigerian Government's initiative in the political and economic fields, coinciding approximately with the arrival of Sir John Macpherson as Governor in 1948. Secondly, there was the emergence of tribal nationalism which tended to slow down, if not to stagnate, the pace of constitutional change. Nigerian politics, as a result of the current bitter antagonism and hatred between Yoruba and Ibo leaders, immediately became an admixture of tribalism and nationalism—an unstable mixture in which, at their first encounter, the forces of tribalism appeared to prevail. It was during this period that Sir John Macpherson took the initiative to introduce his own consitutional reform.

The Macpherson Constitution of 1951 was the outcome of a complicated series of lengthy conferences, from the village and district meetings through the Provincial and Regional Conferences to the General Conference at Ibadan. One point of particular importance about these conferences is that their membership consisted almost entirely of Nigerians. The Constitution so evolved as a quasi-federal one and reproduced, to a large extent, the three regional structure of its immediate predecessor. Its most novel characteristics were the general application of the elective principle (using for the most part the method of indirect elections) throughout the country, and the introduction of the ministerial system of government which brought about the evolution of the party system of government at least in the Regions. Faced with the stresses and strains of

inter-regional jealousy and partisan hostility, the Constitution showed signs of instability and immediately broke down when in 1953 a major crisis split the Council of Ministers—a federal body charged with the task of formulating general policy for the whole country.

As a result of this breakdown of the Macpherson Constitution, a delegation of Nigerian political parties went to London in 1953 to review it. Here, one must mention the party set-up in the country. The N.C.N.C. (National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons), under the leadership of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, was the party in power in the Eastern Region; the Action Group, under the leadership of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, was the party in power in the Western Region; while the N.P.C. (Northern Peoples' Congress), under the leadership of the Sardauna of Sokoto, was the party in power in the Northern Region. Each of these three leaders comes from each of the three major tribal groups of the country. Dr. Azikiwe is an Ibo, Chief Awolowo is a Yoruba, while the Sardauna of Sokoto belongs to the Fulani ruling class over the Hausas. The outcome of the London and the Lagos Constitutional Conference was the Lyttelton Constitution. This Constitution further strengthened the power of the Regional Governments and the legislatures in relation to the Central Government.

The great disparity in the size, population (in the Northern Region is very much larger than the Eastern and Western Regions combined), and resources of the three Regions not only created suspicion and resentment but awakened deep-seated animosities and local prejudices, inter-regional and inter-party controversies, which appeared likely to undermine the federal structure and the unity of the State. These dangers would have been of less significance had the N.C.N.C., which alone preached the gospel of "one country, one God and one destiny", succeeded in winning country-wide support. Its failure left the task of holding Nigeria together as a single state to the British administration.

Ghana's independence on March 6, 1957, clearly spurred Nigerian leaders to take a fresh and bolder look at the future of their own country. Accordingly, on March 26, 1957 Nigeria's central legislature, the House of Representatives, unanimously agreed to instruct federal delegates to the Resumed Constitutional Conference in London "to demand independence or Nigeria within the Commonwealth in 1959". When, however,

the Conference resumed in London in May 1957, it was overshadowed not by the issue of independence, though all delegates had put up an appearance of unanimity on it, but by the problem of the fears of minorities, which rent it asunder. Prior to the Conference, there were strong demands for the creation of separate states notably from the advocates of a "Mid-West State" in the Western Region, of a "Middle-Belt State" in the Northern Region, and of a "Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers State" in the Eastern Region. These demands had arisen out of the fears, real or imaginary, of minority groups that they would become perpetual victims to the tyranny of the majority groups as soon as independence was attained and the protecting hand of British justice finally withdrawn.

When, therefore, the leaders of the three major delegations and that of Southern Cameroons demanded that the United Kingdom Government should undertake to grant independence to Nigeria in 1959, the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd, blandly refused, saying that he was unwilling to commit Her Majesty's Government "to draw a blank cheque" in favour of Nigerian independence in 1959, when several fundamental issues, such as, regional self-government, minority issues, etc. were yet to be settled. Disappointed and rendered impotent by the Colonial Secretary's firm, if chilly statement, Nigerian leaders quickly relented and extended the target date from 1959 to a date not later than April 2, 1960. But this was a mere affirmation of hope and faith to which the Colonial Secretary, not surprizingly, replied that he had taken careful note of it.

In the meantime, the Conference decided to appoint a Commission of Inquiry to ascertain the facts about these fears of minorities in all parts of Nigeria and to propose means of allaying them. Another decision of importance at the Conference was the grant of regional self-government to both the Western and the Eastern Regions. Both Regions are now self-governing since August 8, 1957. The Northern Region, whose leaders had not hitherto demanded regional self-rule because they considered their region relatively backward *vis-a-vis* the other regions, asked to be granted regional self-government in March 1959. This was granted.

On November 23, 1957, a four-man Commission of Inquiry under the chairmanship of Sir Henry Willink, a former Minister of the British Cabinet, arrived in Nigeria to probe into the position and fears of minorities. As a result of this inquiry, hopes

were raised and inter-tribal feelings and animosities exacerbated. The demand for separate states filled the air. Yet in its recommendations,[2] published three months after, the Commission did not recommend the creation of a single new state. Instead it recommended that constitutional safeguards be written into the Constitution.

Reactions to the Minorities Report varied considerably. The Government took stringent precautionary measures. Yet, generally, the public, even in areas like the Mid-West where the disappointment was most felt, reacted calmly. One other inference from the Report of the Minorities Commission is that it clearly emphasized the assumption which underlay the successive Richards', Macpherson and Lyttelton Constitutions, namely, that the unity of Nigeria could most effectively be secured by building it on the three regional structures of North, East and West. Yet as the Commissioners rightly noted none of these existing Regions is by itself a homogeneous entity.

Another Nigerian Constitutional Conference began in London on the 29th September this year. One-hundred and fourteen delegates and advisers, drawn from the various parties, came to attend it. But there are very sharp differences of opinion among them. The N.C.N.C. and the N.P.C. are, barring minor reservations, satisfied with the Report of the Minorities Commission. But the Action Group has called it "a bad document" and has declared that it would not accept independence until minorities are safeguarded by allowing them separate states. It was decided to grant independence in 1960.

Behind any beyond the problems of unity and independence lies the more remote but just as important question of the prospects of democracy in an independent Nigeria. Much as it is hazardous to speculate on such an issue, it is heartening to note that there is general agreement in the declaration of Nigeria's chief political leaders that after independence the country should not only remain within the Commonwealth but should also preserve the essentials or parliamentary democracy.

There is no doubt about the sincerity of these declarations. Yet one must point out that intelligent opinion in the country, expecially among the youths, seems to be inclining towards favouring the sort of "guided democracy" advocated by Indonesia's President Sukarno. This school of thought argues that

[2] See *Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into Fears of Minorities and the Means of allaying them*, H.M. Stationery Office, London, 1958.

the existing democracies themselves have passed through a prolonged stage of dictatorial government in which their country was forcibly welded into a coherent whole and that the task of nation-building is more a product of coercion than of consent. At the moment this school constitutes an insignificant minority of responsible leaders of opinion but they are growing and are likely to grow faster after independence.

To conclude, it is only fair to say that within the span of a lifetime of half a century, Nigeria has travelled a long way from the dark days of die-hard, if benevolent, colonialism to the bright days when she largely manages her own affairs. The journey has been short though the road has not been unthorny. It is indeed a proud reflection of Nigeria's political advance that her leaders have succeeded in carrying her through constitutional means to this height of her politico-economic advance.

Ghana has set the pace. Nigeria is racing hard to take over the leadership of Black Africa from her. But clearly the whole historical future of Black Africa will be determined by the way these two countries go. Without doubt, the issue of colour bar will help to influence their foreign policies, one way or the other. A call for the liberation of African peoples and racial equality has gone out from them—the most passionate and yet one of the most constitutionally couched appeals ever made in the history of modern nationalism. It is in the interests of the West to respond with sympathy and understanding to that call.

FOREIGN AID AND SELF-HELP IN WEST AFRICA

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"And then came the time for peaceful work, to furnish our house in a way that suited our people. And we all worked, oblivious of self, relying on no-one, asking help from nobody—doing everything ourselves. It was hard, for we were creating a society never known in history."

Mr. Kruschev in a letter to Lord Russell, March 1958.

We now live in an age of economic, cultural and political interdependence on a world scale. Indeed, the Secretary General of O.E.E.C. in "Ten years of American Aid to Europe," has stated that there is hardly a "free" nation in Europe which does not owe its recovery and development in the post-war years to ten years of American aid.

Modern Nigeria has evolved within the capitalist world, and Nigerians are involved in capitalist thoughts and problems—whether or not to encourage immigration of capital from abroad, be it in the form of private investment or what has become known as "foreign aid."

Race movements and migrations form one important aspect of the history of the world. The migrations of peoples, as individuals or in groups, has, for one reason or another, been influenced by the belief and hope that another land offers some particular kind of attraction. The main forces influencing the movement of capital from one part of the world to another have been, more or less, the same as those which induce the migration of peoples. Indeed a Special Committee to study the Foreign Aid Program of the United States asserts that the choice between home and foreign investment rests largely on the relative profitability of investment abroad and in the United States. It concludes that in all industries except public utilities the rate of return on foreign investment has been higher than that for the comparable domestic industry. (American Private Enterprise, Foreign Aid, Economic Development and the Aid Programs, Washington 1957.)

In the past, human migrants generally carried with them the movable part of their capital. Today, however, migration of liquid capital has become more and more separated from the

migration of persons. Foreign investments now consist of that liquid part of the property of a country corporate (governmental) and of its inhabitants (private) situated abroad from which its owners derive, or expect to derive, some income.

For instance, the annual income of the British people in 1914 was about eleven billion dollars; of this amount approximately two billions were saved. These savings were mainly in the hands of those whose field activity and personal interests extended far beyond the British Isles. Such investments found employment abroad and were invited especially by lands to which the people were spreading "solicited and directed by able young Englishmen who, in large numbers, sought their fortunes in the development of the resources of young countries". (H. Feis, in "Europe, the World's Banker," 1931.) It is no wonder, then, that, though the substantial changes in the economic importance of Britain since the two World Wars, her investments abroad outweigh, even in 1958, those of all the other Commonwealth countries combined.

Europeans and North Americans may not be able to migrate to West Africa to "settle," but some of their capital has migrated and they naturally want it to continue to migrate, even to self-governing countries in the tropics. Foreign investment has even been shown to be *necessary* to the continued prosperity of highly developed countries. American experts who have seriously studied Foreign Aid in relation to the American economy reach the main conclusions that a substantial foreign aid programme is a necessary condition "for a continued high level of employment in the United States;" that a vigorous development programme for underdeveloped areas will yield markets both in the United States and Western Europe; and that such aid in not only of economic but of political importance for the "free world".

Against this background, we can look at the request for, and the offers of, foreign aid to the underdeveloped countries, to which group Nigeria belongs.

In 1950, the United Nations invited a group of experts to report on "Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries". In their report, published in 1951, they recommended:

> "We urge most strongly that some mechanism be created for transferring from the developed to the underdeveloped countries, by way of grants in aid, a sum of money which

would increase rapidly, reaching the eventual level of about three billion dollars a year. This would be equivalent to rather less than one per cent of the national incomes of Western Europe, Australasia, the United States and Canada."

Ten years after the idea was mooted the governments of the developed countries continue to edge and dodge, to propose and counter-propose, under pressure of their under-developed sisters. The Western powers feel that until they are able to make substantial reductions in their expenditure on military programmes, they will be unable to contribute to a new international venture of this kind.

The United States favoured technical aid rather than financial assistance—"private rather than government enterprise," as Mr. Nixon, the Vice-President, announced to the International Industrial Development Conference at San Francisco in October 1957. In the White Paper of 1957 on the United Kingdom's Role in Commonwealth Development, Britain echoed America's voice in these words;

"H.M. Government considers that it is through the investment of privately-owned funds in the Commonwealth that the United Kingdom has made in the past and should continue to make its most valuable contribution to Commonwealth development . . . The responsibility which H.M. Government has for colonial dependencies ceases when they achieve independence. The Government, therefore, does not envisage government to government loans as a normal means of assisting such countries. Their interests can better be served if they build up their own credit."

It is against this background that West Africans must react to the much-publicized and over-moralized British "Labour's Colonial Policy: Economic Aid." (May 1957). The Labour Party pledged 1 per cent aid to Britain's underdeveloped world, and the policy statement came up for discussion at the Party's annual conference at Brighton in 1957. The policy as adopted is in effect a plan, which had been proposed by U.N. experts in 1953, for the creation of a "Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development", (S.U.N.F.E.D.). It should be noted, however, that Labour's policy statement as adopted was not a full pledge, but mainly a promise to "announce plans" to aid; for it says the next Labour Government would

"begin at once to announce plans to extend Britain's aid by allocating an average of one per cent of our national income

over a period of years as Britain's contribution to the development of backward and colonial territories through existing government, United Nations and other appropriate agencies."

Of course, this proposal, or any similar gesture, is quite good on moral as well as political grounds: the rich ought to aid the poor; the well-fed to offer crumbs to the hungry. The developed countries used their superior technology to extract the wealth of many underdeveloped countries without fair return, and it would now be humanitarian to plough back, even if only one per cent, of the wealth drained away to the mother country.

This would be conscience money, which the under-developed should be glad to accept. But there are many difficulties in the way.

(*a*) The Tories of Britain sing one song (private investment) and the Socialists another (public assistance); and it would be a fine game for an underdeveloped country to speculate which British Party will come next to power.

(*b*) Labour's pledge was made while in opposition, and as such it contains some element of propaganda, especially to gain favour among the under-developed.

(*c*) Any government in Westminister would have to face certain relevant problems. S.U.N.F.E.D., from which the Socialists received their inspiration, has now been shelved. Britain herself is increasingly faced with economic difficulties. London has been the banking centre of the sterling area, of which West Africa is part. Thus Britain, as a banker, has had other people's funds to use for her own trade, and the balances as a security for sterling. However, many underdeveloped customers are now trying to draw their own sterling balances to finance their own development programmes. Furthermore, they reserve the right to deposit their foreign exchange earnings elsewhere. The mother country would be that much less wealthy by consequence.

(*d*) British economists have been saying that Britain is already biting more than she can chew, as a provider of long-term capital. One such is Mr. R. R. Nield, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and one-time Director of Research to the U.N. Commission for Europe, who writes

". . . the conclusion seems inescapable that steps will have to be taken to check the capital outflow . . . so that a larger part of whatever surpluses are earned on current account is

devoted to the reduction of sterling balances and to raise the reserves . . . *We have been investing abroad far in excess of the rate that could be regarded as prudent.*'' (the District Bank Review.)

(*e*) In any case, for a dependent Nigeria, to rely much on ''foreign aid'' might develop a kind of defeatism—a capacity to ask for help and an incapacity to do things for herself.

(*f*) With the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. in the first rank, Britain has been reduced to a second-class world power; and she needs all energy and much economy for technological (''Zeta''), social and strategic (nuclear power) developments to maintain even her present position.

(*g*) The progress of the developed powers has depended largely on the relative weakness of the underdeveloped. To actively aid the underdeveloped to real equality would be against the British instinct for balancing powers; and conservatives might regard the road to equality as a kind of slow suicide.

(*h*) In the motives for the scheme, the Cold War is involved. As Mrs. Barbara Castle, a chief exponent of the scheme, put it, the fund must be established at once to forestall the Russians, who might make similar offers. But such help should be undertaken only in the certainty that it would give Britain expanding markets for manufactured goods.

In a sense, therefore, this economic aid means ''subsidizing imperialism''. Also, just as nationalized industries do not seem freer from ugly class distinction than private firms, government to government investments might not be freer from the problems of exploitation posed by private investments. It is naive to expect aid without any form of strings attached.

(*i*) In any case, one per cent of Britain's national income—about £160,000,000 a year—would be a mere drop in the ocean if and when divided up amongst the 640,000,000 peoples in Britain's Commonwealth and dependencies. It would appear, therefore, that the one per cent pledge and similar forms of economic aid are aimed at Britain's ''smaller territories'' (such as British Somaliland, Gambia, Singapore, Fiji, Aden etc.), whose prospects of becoming effectively self-governing units are considered dim, on account of their inadequate resources. Even if it were possible to invest abroad annually this one per cent of the British national income, the question of territorial needs and priorities would have to be settled; and I would not venture to suggest how Nigeria might fare in the distribution.

(*j*) From about 1952 to 1958, British net annual foreign investment—both in the developed and underdeveloped countries—has been about £150m to £175m: or one per cent of the national income. This would have been hard for Britain to achieve if defence aid from the United States, at an annual average of £79m, had not been available. (Brinley Thomas in the International Labour Review, Sept. 1956.)

It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the one per cent pledge, well-intentioned though it is, may have raised hopes which cannot in the end be fulfilled. And Nigeria must rely more on self-help than on foreign aid, if she seriously aspires to real growth and stature in the world.

What, therefore, are Nigeria's chances for self-help? It is generally argued, specially in Britain, that Nigeria is so poor that she has to depend largely on financial aid from abroad—from Britain in particular. Foreign investments can, of course, be an important supplement to the capital formation of any underdeveloped country, and Nigeria is certainly no exception. But British emphasis on Nigeria's need for outside help may have been exaggerated. Britain's attitude is coloured by psychological and political considerations as well as by pressure of ideological competition. Psychologically, such emphasis aims to increase doubts about Nigeria's ability to get on without help from her mother (Britain) and her aunts (the Western powers). Politically, aid provides means of interfering in, or influencing, Nigeria's domestic affairs: for where a man's economic interests lie, his political spirit hovers. Ideologically, it is an attempt to keep Nigeria within the capitalist bloc against the communist one. As for the Nigerian politicians who issued multifarious public statements and joint communiques expressing Nigeria's need for foreign capital and welcoming such aid—they were genuine. But these statements also stemmed from an effort to allay the fears of the capitalist world, whose goodwill was and still is essential during Nigeria's transition to self-government and soon after.

The truth may lie somewhere between the two extremes expressed by those who put too much emphasis on the need for monetary aid from abroad, and those on the other hand who deny such need, or denounce the desire to give or accept it.

It is not generally appreciated that foreign money has not played any considerable part in Nigeria's economy. During the early centuries, Nigeria's commerical history was dominated

mainly by the dark pages of the slave trade. At the beginning of the twentieth century she interested Europe mainly as a supplier of palm oil and spices. Up to 1953 foreign capital had financed only between 12 and 25 per cent of the total fixed investments in Nigeria. ("The amount of money brought into the country by new (foreign) firms is believed to be small," according to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.)

Nigeria's own internal financial resources have been such as to encourage the United Nations Mission which studied the problems of the country in 1953 to state categorically:

"The mission is staisfied that the public expenditure it recommends is well within the limits of Nigeria's financial resources."

It is also not generally known that Nigerian capital has been sunk abroad by the British administration, specially in the development of such Commonwealth countries as Canada. Money migrates from Nigeria by various other means:

(*a*) Partly because there was in the past little short-term capital market in Nigeria, surplus funds were transferred from Nigeria for investment in London.

(*b*) Expatriate officials and residents in Nigeria transfer sums, for various purposes, out of their earnings in Nigeria to Britain and other countries. Similarly, the profits made by foreign establishments in Nigeria leave the country. Thus the considerable outward transfers on capital account by the government, and the heavy outward remittances by expatriates in Nigeria, make Nigeria a capital-exporting country.

(*c*) To the above considerations we must add the fact that Nigeria's sterling assets totalled £206.7m in 1953. This reserve was certainly more than that of any of the twenty Latin American republics: South Africa's total gold and foreign exchange reserves were less than two-thirds as large; within the sterling area, only the continent of Australia and the sub-continent of India had greater assets than Nigeria.

(Thus, it is reasonable to be hopeful about Nigeria's ability to help herself from internal sources. The very small role played by foreign money has been stressed by the World Bank.)

A substantial increase in income is a definite possibility. One obvious example is the emergence of production for sale, that is an exchange economy, both in Nigeria and abroad, instead of subsistence production, which has brought about an increase in national income without heavy capital investment.

The future will see a substantial expansion in this sector. The establishment of a reasonably settled government, the suppression of fissiperous tendencies and tribalism; an improvement in communication; the spread of knowledge and improved techniques, and similar efforts which are already in progress in Nigeria, would increase national income and savings.

Like many other underdeveloped countries, Nigeria has resources, but she has not learnt to use them in the most effective ways. She could improve her real income simply by rearranging the allocation of resources. Although the population is enjoying a steady growth in real income, domestic saving and investment is relatively small, simply because people are induced to spend their earnings extravagantly on expensive foreign goods, rather than in local investment

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No country in the present stage of human development is genuinely and purely altruistic. No imperial country is disinterested towards another. Even the United States, with all the abundance of rich natuarl resources within her national boundaries, and whose national revenue tops that of all the Western European countries put together, is pursuing a policy of "enlightened self-interest" abroad. On May 1st 1957 President Eisenhower told members of the National Council of the League of Women Voters, that

"Foreign aid, my friends, is something that is being conducted to keep the United States secure and strong."

Indeed, the United States Department of Commerce has produced "primarily to meet the needs of potential investors," a study of Nigeria, which they see a rich in resources, vast in area, dense in population and ranking "among the important African areas". It is therefore understandable that Britain, whose resources, compared with those of the U.S., are meagre, should be much interested in Nigeria as a field of income from investment. In the present nature of imperial powers—and all powers for that matter—generous impulses are rare and reversible. (This is often admitted by the British themselves.) "Let it be admitted at the outset," says Lord Lugard, "that European brains, capital and energy have not been and never will be expended in developing the resources of Africa from motives of pure philanthropy."

Thus foreign capital—American, Eastern or Western Euro-

pean—is not a gift. It is a commodity for which the donor expects substantial returns and for which the receiver pays, in one form or another. Foreign aid and capital often go to underdeveloped countries mainly on the terms of the donor.

Nevertheless, it is also true that some of the interests of capital investors often coincide with the interests and needs of underdeveloped countries. Both the giver and the receiver of "aid" can benefit mutually. They can lead to co-operation on a world scale, and prepare the way for that day ahead when the resources, the capital and the technology of the world will be used more for the mutual benefit of mankind than for sectional interests and conflicts. (In fact, some of the economic aid programmes are symbols of human aspirations for a better world.)

In the immediate future Nigeria will therefore have to work hard, mainly on her own. Nigerians must find a new faith in themselves, and a fresh sense of direction. Of course, no man is an island unto himself, and the world is becoming more and more inter-dependant. But if Nigeria must take "aids"—whether from Washington or Moscow, from London or Delhi—she should do so with caution (Africans brought up on the farm or in the open country-side must have watched a bee or fly hovering over honey and subsequently alighting on it. First the legs get stuck, and then the wings. Soon the whole insect is completely stuck, body and all. The developed countries are comparable to the honey, and the underdeveloped to the insect.) The subjugation of Egypt began with offers of financial help to Ismail. Foreign auxiliaries and other forms of aid (whether in the form of the Anglo-Egyptian military combine of 1898 against the Sudan, the Egyptian arms deal with the Soviet bloc in 1954, the Anglo-American undertaking to finance Egypt's Aswan High Dam or the Anglo-French collusion with Israel against Egypt in 1956) are given "with strings attached,"—declared, or intended, immediately or in the future. Therefore, as Machiavelli discovered as far back as 1513, only those defences are good, certain and durable, which depend on oneself alone and on one's own ability. Nations, like ordinary men and women everywhere, must earn their own keep and their own rights by their own ability. Nigeria is no exception.

THE ART OF AFRICA (III)
WEST AFRICAN BRONZES

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THE best known bronzes of West Africa originate from Ife and Benin in southern Nigeria. The art of casting bronze, however, is known by other West African peoples, from Liberia to the Cameroons. In this context the term bronze is used to cover casting made with copper as a base but combined with varying amounts of other metals. Imported metals were generally used and for several centuries these took the form of manillas, rings of a standard size, which were exchanged for slaves.

The technique of casting employed is the well known *cire perdue*, or lost wax. In West Africa, in almost all cases, beeswax is used, though the Tiv of Nigeria sometimes use latex. The modelling of the object to be cast is in wax and, if small, is without a clay core; larger objects are usually based on a clay core. Among the Bamum of the French Cameroons the wax is not poured off before the metal is poured but is absorbed by the outer encasement, which is a mixture of clay and cow-dung. Surface decoration is generally produced in the wax, but in Dahomey and in the work of the Bron of Ghana it is obtained by metal punches.

Work in bronze is found among a number of tribes in Liberia, the Ivory Coast and Haute Volta but it is not a major art form. In Liberia, the Dan-Ngere tribes make armlets, bracelets, anklets and figures. The Dan and Kran tribes cast figures holding dance wands.

The Senufo, who inhabit the northern parts of the Ivory Coast, produce bronze masks, figures, bracelets, and pendants and pipe bowls with small human figures but their principal art is carving. The art of the more southerly Senufo is related to that of the Baoulé among whom bronze casting is likewise not a major art form. The Baoulé inhabit the central and eastern central regions of the Ivory Coast and, like the Senufo, cast masks, figures, pendant plaques and personal ornaments. They also make small brass weights, an art form which derives from their connections with the Ashanti. These weights are often more finished than those of the Ashanti.

In Haute Volta, bronze work is found among the Lobi, Bobo and Mossi. The Lobi live to the west and south of the Volta

river, the Bobo to the north and the Mossi to the east of the Bobo. The objects produced are much the same in each tribe: personal ornaments and small figures reproducing scenes of daily life. To the south of the Mossi, in central Ghana, a few bronze lamps and masks have been found which are attributed to the Bron. The surface decoration of the Bron pieces shows a relationship with the art of the Ashanti, who also inhabit central Ghana.

The best known art form of the Ashanti are the small bronze weights, *mrammuo*, used for measuring gold dust and referred to as gold weights. There used to be a plentiful supply of gold dust and nuggets in Ghana which was used as a form of currency in various transactions. The art of making *mrammuo* was restricted to certain families organized as a guild. Weights were graduated in a range from about $\frac{1}{16}$ ounce to more than one pound. The average height of an *abrammuo* was about 2 in. to $2\frac{1}{4}$ in., though some are as large as $4\frac{1}{2}$ in. Each *abrammuo* was named and although the same weights were supposed to be of the same standard there were often differences; those of a chief were expected to weigh more than those of a commoner.

Virtually every phase of daily life is depicted by these small gold weights: people, scenes, objects of daily use, animals, plants, proverbs, rituals, etc. In appearance the Ashanti *abrammuo* often seem a bit rough and impressionistic; human figures have a rather elongated look; but the artist's expression of forms is always vigorous. The bronze weights are undoubtedly a vital form of genre art. It is thought that the representational forms may have been introduced from the north within the past 200 years and that the earliest weights were geometric. The geometric weights, which include a wide variety of shapes, constitute the other category of *abrammuo*.

The other main type of bronze work produced by the Ashanti is the *kuduo*, a small bronze urn formerly used in purification rites and which was buried with the head of a family. These vessels either have three legs or are legless. The body of a *kuduo* has chased designs on it together with a few forms, generally animals, in relief. It has a hinged lid on top of which are animals or human figures in the round.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century the Fon people of Dahomey established a powerful kingdom with its capital at Abomey. Bronze casting, which is still carried on at Abomey, is traditionally a court art and the work of a family guild. The

principal forms made are much like those of the Ashanti weights but larger in scale: scenes of daily life and animals, fantastic as well as naturalistic. A similar but more accentuated elongatedness than the Ashanti *mrammuo* characterizes the Dahomean bronzes and there is more attention to finish.

In Western Nigeria bronze working is found among a number of the Yoruba peoples, such as the Egba, Ekiti, Oyo, Ijebu, Owo. Human figures, masks, staff heads, rattles, bells, figures, ceremonial staffs and armlets are used in cult houses and chiefs use bronze work as personal ornamentation of symbolic significance on various ceremonial occasions. But the fame of the Yoruba region derives from the remarkable bronzes which have been excavated at Ile-Ife.

In 1910, Frobenius discovered at Ife a bronze head, the Olokun head, together with a number of terra cotta ones, which bore witness to a remarkable naturalistic form of art. In 1938, eighteen further bronze heads and a figure were found. These bronzes are large pieces and very thinly cast, manifesting perfect technical control. Their realistic appearance suggests that they were portraits. In November 1957, a further seven bronzes were discovered, bringing the total to 27. These last seven consisted of a human figure, a human couple, a bowl on a stool with a figure encircling the bowl, two egg-shaped objects with human heads and two short staffs each ending in a human head.

The tendency has been to think of the Ife bronze art as unique and apart from other African Negro styles and, in consequence, to seek its origins in a non-African art tradition. It is undoubtedly unique as a style and in its perfection of modelling and technique but it does not follow that such a style could not develop in the locale where examples of it have been found. The hair of the bronze heads is not cast; there are holes left on the head, lip and chin which are presumably for the addition of hair. This characteristic is African. The most recent finds would seem to confirm that the Ife bronze tradition is African, for they manifest a disproportionate emphasis given to the size of the head compared with the rest of the figure.

The art of Benin, as that of Ife, is world-famous. The story of the discovery of hundreds of bronze castings at Benin in 1897 by a British expedition sent to punish the king for murdering the British Vice Consul and his trading party is well known. The technical excellence of these works of art was quickly appreciated.

Appreciation was further enhanced for the European observer by the representational quality of the objects; most of them quickly found their way into the leading European museums and the hands of a few prominent private collectors. Members of the expedition retained important small collections, which, for the most part, later became dispersed.

Benin art was almost entirely a court art and, until recently, bronze casting was done solely for the king. There were few objects that the Bini brass workers did not at one time or another cast: large bronze heads to hold carved ivory tusks, bells, groups of figures on stands and other objects for the shrine of the Oba's (king) ancestors; staffs for the Oba's messengers; bronze cocks; vessels in various forms for offerings and for use in rituals; swords for execution and for use in war, and various trappings; ornamental masks; many kinds of personal ornaments, such as wristlets, armlets, anklets, bells, rings, and hair ornaments; figures in the round in ceremonial regalia; horseman on stands; items of furniture and many other objects. But perhaps the most outstanding objects found at Benin were a series of bronze plaques, which at some distant time had decorated the Oba's palace. These plaques show Obas in ceremonial attire with their attendants, chiefs and their retinues, warriors and their soldiers and sword bearers, musicians, drummers, hornblowers, and many other functionaries. There are plaques depicting Portuguese with their weapons, plaques of animals and inanimate objects. The bronze plaques form a unique series of historical documents about past kings, their retainers, court activities and events.

Bronze casting still continues at Benin but is a poor reflection of the work of former times. Virtually nothing is known today about the identity of the earlier people portrayed in bronze or the symbolism of the elaborately chased designs which decorate the surfaces of many different forms. The modern bronze caster has lost all connection with the earlier great tradition in terms of its meaning and technical virtuosity.

Various theories as to the origins of Benin bronze art have been advanced, but the Bini tradition that they learned the art of casting bronze from Ife is generally accepted and, further, that this occurred before the advent of the Portuguese. Attempts to chronicle the development of Benin art have either been at a very general and impressionistic level or rested on an examination of only certain types of objects and of certain of their formal

An Ashanti kuduo or cast bronze vessel, traditionally used to contain gold dust or grease for anointing the body, or placed in graves with food and valuables. It is about 14 in. high, with a hinged lid.

Acknowledgments to the British Museum

A woman with baby, pounding corn, illustrating the Haute Volta preoccupation with scenes of daily life.

A pair of royal figures, probably depicting the ritual struggle of a king with another chief at his installation, found in 1957 at Ita Yemoy, near Ife. The 'African' proportion of the heads distinguishes them from the earlier naturalistic heads from Ife.

Photograph: the British Museum.

Bronze wall plaque, typical of those which form a unique series about historical events.

characteristics. The cultural context of the art has hardly been given any attention as no study of any depth of Bini culture has been made till very recently. Current research into the history of Benin art and culture should provide data for a detailed study of the development of Benin art.*

The work of von Luschan and Struck in the first quarter of this century led to the advancement of a chronological sequence of development which has found wide acceptance as fact. This is unfortunate for the sequence is very largely hypothetical and would appear often to be erroneous. Attempts to date Benin bronzes have generally carried the under-lying assumption that the more naturalistic, less stylized and most finely cast ones. This assumption arises from the fact that because Benin bronze casting was learned from Ife, where, as has been mentioned, a tradition of casting bronzes showing outstanding naturalism and skill was present, the earliest Bini forms would approximate to those found at Ife. It is, of course, not known when the Ife bronzes were made. They may have been made after the Bini learned the art from Ife, in which case it is necessary to assume that they represent a point in a style sequence which changed little at Ife from the time at which the Bini acquired the technique, if the underlying assumption as to the course of development of Benin art is to be tenable.

Tradition credits Oguola, the sixth Oba of the second period, with the introduction of bronze casting to Benin. Egharevba, the Bini historian, considers that Oguola ruled at the end of the 13th century. At that time he is said to have sent to the king of Ile-Ife to send someone to teach his people how to cast in bronze. An artist called Igue-ighae came to Benin. When Igue-ighae died he was deified and is worshipped today by the smiths at Idunmwu Igun Eromwo, the quarter of the royal brass founders. Assuming that, of the Bini bronzes which survive to us, the earliest examples made after the introduction of the art are those which are most naturalistic in appearance and are particularly finely cast, then it would seem that the Bini artist was unable to solve the formal problems involved in individual portraiture, as did the artist of the Ife heads. Early Benin bronze heads show that the Bini artist was able to model a type where attention to form and plasticity, though often mani-

* I am grateful to my colleague, Dr. R. E. Bradbury, for certain items of information included here. A five-year programme of research into the history of Benin art and culture is being conducted by the Department of History, University College, Ibadan.

festing a high degree of sensibility, is in terms of a set formula applicable to all formal problems of the same king. The Bini artist certainly learned well from Igue-ighae the technical processes of bronze casting but, it would seem, failed to grasp the conceptual approach of the Ife artist. This is perhaps understandable if bronze casting was introduced into a culture which already had an art tradition in another medium.

The carving of wooden heads has been credited to the time of Ere, the second king of the first period, who was the eighteenth ruler before Oguola. The wood and ivory carvings which have survived to us show a high degree of conceptual representation; formal details are expressed according to formulae: mouths, noses, eyes, and other features are not individualistic but follow generalized concepts for such features.

In designing, the same formulae are applied to the solution of similar problems. If the carver's traditional approach was much the same in very early times as represented on objects surviving today then it would seem that the later bronze stye has approached closer to the traditional style of the carver. The mastery of the technique of casting in bronze learned from Igue-ighae would be insufficient in itself to maintain a style approximating that of the Ife artist. Without a similar mastery of the Ife approach to form, the Bini artist would tend to veer towards his own traditional style. There is a heaviness, a stumpiness about Bini human heads and figures in wood and ivory and the same feeling occurs in the more recent and very stylized bronzes. A number of ivories belie the generalization made about the carver's art, but these may well have been the result of the influence of early bronze work on the traditional carving style.

There is a simplicity about those forms closest in appearance to the Ife bronzes and which are assumed to be examples of early Bini bronze casting. Later forms become more elaborate; there is a fussiness in the attention given to detail, a horror of empty spaces and a compulsion to fill them, usually by some chased decoration. This is evident if a series of plaques are examined: some are almost three dimensional in their approach to form, as though the figures were conceived in the round and pressed on a flat surface; the same approach is evident in the simple treatment of decorative details. Other plaques fall half way between the three dimensional approach to form and low relief proper; the approach to decoration is partly three dimensional and partly engraved. Still other plaques suggest that forms

were conceived as growing out of a flat surface; decoration is profuse and entirely engraved.

In the time of Eresonye, the 13th king of the second period, who was reputed to have reigned in the first half of the 18th century, it is said that there was a great deal of brass available. To this period are assigned elaborate brass stools and bronze masks, known as Odudua. It seems probable that a wide range of objects were cast at this time and subsequently, such as heavy dishes with covers, large heavy figures in the round with big loops coming out of their heads, and ornamental masks. Large bronze heads with flanged bases, used as tusk holders, may originate from this period; those with winged headdresses are said to have been introduced at the beginning of the 19th century at the time of Oba Ogbebo. Decoration of these objects is elaborate. Compared with earlier bronzes they have a heaviness in execution and are much more stylized. The general impression of Benin art is one of strong stylization with, in human figures, an emphasis on the head, which is disproportionately large. Benin art is elaborately descriptive of reality and is strongly pictorial within its particular stylized manner of expression.

A number of bronze castings known to originate from sites in central southern Nigeria other than Benin and Ife clearly derive from the Benin of Ife styles. The sites are Udo, a town about 20 miles east north-east of Benin, Owo, a town about 60 miles due north of Benin, Idah, a town on the east bank of the Niger, just north of 7°N., and Jebba-Tada, on the southern bank of the Niger, just north of 9°N., and just west of 5°E. The distinguishing feature of what W. Fagg has called the Udo style is a longish rectangular cavity found at the back of the object. The style is represented by a number of heads and figures. The relationship of Benin art and that of Owo awaits further clarification. Owo is a Yoruba town and wood and ivory carving appears to be Yoruba in general style. However, a number of Owo features are found in Benin art and bronze work is often very close in appearnace to Bini work. A very fine and apparently old bronze mask, belonging to the Atah of Idah, which is worn suspended from the waist, though more elongated than similar Benin pieces, is clearly Benin work. At Tada and Jebba are seven almost life size bronzes of some antiquity. One large seated figure is in the Ife style; the other figures would seem to derive from Benin.

Also emanating from central southern Nigeria are a number of bronzes which, though sometimes having characteristics of Yoruba or Bini art, appear to be local styles of local development. Some of these bronzes were found at Benin but are clearly not Bini work. One group of bronzes was found on the Forcados river; bells with the upper part in the form of a human face are particularly characteristic of the style. A hoard found at Apapa, Lagos, appears to be related to the Forcados style. Another hoard, found in the Andoni creeks—in the eastern part of the Niger delta—which includes a fine small bronze figure, has features common to the Forcados style and to what has been called by W. Fagg the Huntsman style, after a magnificent bronze of a huntsman with a deer on his shoulders, found at Benin and now in the possession of the British Museum. The Huntsman style is characterized by a narrow band with bars across it, like a ladder, which is used sparingly to decorate parts of an object, such as the eyelids. A head, bell and one or two other objects of this style have been identified. The treatment of the huntsman piece is outstanding for its plasticity and recalls the work of Rodin. The Andoni Creeks bronzes have certain features in common with the Huntsman style and with the Forcados river bells. Yet another style is represented by a collection of bells the distinguishing feature of which is a head with horns forming the top part of a bell.

Bronze casting is also found among the Tiv, who live along the southern bank of the Benue river. In the Cameroon grasslands, the Bamum, with their capital at Fumban in French territory, cast a variety of bronze objects, such as anklets and bracelets, tobacco pipes, bells, masks, bowls, finials for horns, sword handles and small figures. From Fumban, the centre, bronze casting has spread to peoples of the British Cameroons, such as the Bali.

From this brief survey of bronze casting in West Africa it can be seen that the major bronze styles seem to lie at the centre of the area. The achievement of naturalism of Ife is outstanding. Next to this one is struck by the dynamic expression of nature of the Ashanti artist in the small scale gold weights. A similar expression of interest in natural forms is to be seen among the larger scale Dahomean work but in a more stylized manner. In the still larger scale art of Benin, representation is static and stylized; these two qualities appear further to the east and in the western part of the area of bronze casting in West Africa.

DING DONG BELL

KWABENA ANNAN

Not having much development in our village, we all agreed when the Government Agent told us that we should do something about it. I remember the occasion very well. It was towards the end of March when the cocoa was all in, packed and sent to the coast, and Kwesi Manu had started his house again. Every year he would buy the cement, engage a couple of Northern Territories' labourers, lay out the blocks, and then run out of money. The walls had been built two years back; last year, he had managed to get the roof on, only to have it flung off again by the great Easter storm which did so much damage. The iron sheets were flung like a handful of pebbles across the street, knocking down Ama Serwah's stall. The old lady put Kwesi before the Native Authority Court for failing to pay for the loss, and this caused a first-class row which lasted us all through the rains.

The village certainly needed to be improved. The roads were laterite tracks from which the dust rose like thunder clouds whenever a lorry went through the place. Goats, chickens and sheep wandered about its alleys and slept in the doorways. We were always complaining of the difficulty of getting supplies from the nearby town, and to hear the women grumble you would think that it was unusual to walk a mile or so to fetch water from the pool. Still, we accepted the life; it had been lived a long time, as we all knew, and if there had been nothing to complain of we might have quarrelled much more often among ourselves than we do now.

We hadn't any local council either. The chief was well liked, and we saw no reason to change. There had been talk of joining us up with the next village to form a "local authority area". The Government Agent was always on about it. But our neighbours were a grasping lot, always farming our land and trying to claim that it belonged to them, and we preferred our separate existence. I suppose it was this that made the Government down in Accra take up the idea of development. If we wouldn't join in a local council, it was because we were too set in our ways, and "development" would get us out of them. We understood all that. But when the Government Agent asked us whether we agreed to anything, we always said yes. It was easier in the long

run to agree and never did any harm. And as a matter of fact, on this occasion, we forgot all about the idea until one Wednesday morning when the chief beat "gong gong" to call us together. When we reached the palace there was *Nana* and an educated clerk sitting in the compound. I call him "educated" because he was obviously a town man, in neat city clothes, with a black book under his arm and pencils sticking in his hair. It turned out that he was a new clerk in the Government Agent's office and had been sent to talk to us.

We listened to what he had to say, although we had heard most of it before: how we should think again about forming a local council, how we should pay the levy on time, why didn't we help the local teacher and send our children to the mission school, did we not know that the Government had forbidden the making of *akpeteshie* because it was dangerous to drink, why had we not cleared the bush right down to the river. It was much like the regular routine visit, which kept the Government satisfied and left us alone, with the local Native Authority policeman standing there ready to walk round the village looking for *akpeteshie*, and having a quiet drink of it with the clerk behind the court house—until the clerk suddenly told us that the Government Agent had been so pleased when we had asked for his help that he was sending a Development Officer the following week to make a start.

We didn't quite know what to make of this, and it soon slipped our memory—the next day being Thursday when we don't farm, and a good week's supply of liquor ready for use. I had business to do in Kumasi following week-end—I usually stock up with a few cases of corned beef and sardines for the store—and did not get back until late on Wednesday morning. The first thing I saw in the village was a large black car outside the chief's house, with a Land Rover behind it stacked with pick-axes. The whole village had turned out to see what it was all about, and as I came up a tall thin European in blue shorts and shirt was standing in front of the crowd lecturing them. He couldn't speak *twi* of course, but you could have told just by the way he waved his arms that he meant business. The chief looked as pleased as he could, but I could see that he was worried, and the elders sat in stony disapproval.

"Great changes are taking place in the country," the European was saying through a rat-faced interpreter. "Last week I was in Accra and everywhere I could see great buildings going up,

good roads, good water, good schools. And what can be done in Accra can be done too in the villages.'' Well, I could have told him straight away that he was making a mistake. The one thing we detest hearing about is Accra and what the city crooks are doing with our money. Then before any one could stop him, he was off about our neighbours: how co-operative they were, how ready they had been for his help, how they said they were going to extend the lorry park and the market. (''So that they can put their prices up,'' shouted a voice, but this was hushed down.) Then he got on to us. He was worried about the water and the roads. Of course we agreed. If you ask anybody in our town whether this or that is good, you will always be told that everything is as bad as it can be. We don't boast and we like to grumble. So by the time the European had asked us about the latrines and the roads and the rains, and whether the harvest was good, and how we liked the new mission school, he must have thought we were ready for all the development there was in the country.

The only time he got stuck was when he suggested that we lined the streets with deep concrete gutters, and Tetteh Quarshie stood up and said, ''No, that wouldnt do, he must have somewhere for his ducks to get food and drink.'' The European didn't quite know whether to take this seriously or not—and Tetteh stood there, bent with age and drink, clutching his cloth to his bony ribs and muttering like some one from the Kumasi asylum—so he left it and came to the point (which all of us could see he had fixed on long before he set foot in the town).

There was nothing wrong with the idea in theory. We were to dig out two or three wells by the forest path leading to the main road with the help of some ''well-diggers'', and a mason who knew how to case the sides with special concrete rings. We might have to dig twenty or thirty feet down, but there were plenty of rings and, when we were finished, the water in each well would stay sweet throughout the year. It took a long time to explain, but most of us soon grasped the idea. Only, we don't care to do things in a hurry. So the chief spoke for us all when, after politely thanking the officer for his trouble, he told him that we would discuss it and let the Government Agent know our decision. Up came little Francis Kofi with a basin of eggs which Opanin Kuntor handed to the clerk with a second round of thanks. And before the European knew what he was happening, the meeting had broken up and he was

being led to his car. Off it went in a cloud of dust, followed by the Land Rover, and we settled down again.

After this, of course, the letters began to arrive—"Your good friend this," "Your good friend that"; "His Honour was anxious to hear what we had decided"; "Could we agree to Monday week for the diggers to make a start?"; and so forth. We sat quiet and said nothing. There is no Post Office in our town, and the effort of getting stamps and paper is usually enough to deter the Chief from correspondence.

Monday came and went, so did Tuesday and Wednesday; and on Thursday we collected as usual at Kofi's bar. By three in the afternoon, we had started on the *akpeteshie*, and at half-past four no one noticed the arrival of the Government Agent and his car until he sent his clerk stumbling and sweating down the road to ask for Itals and the elders.

"He is not well," said Kofi Tandoh.

"He has travelled."

"He is mourning for his sister."

"He has the measles." This came from a young idiot of a schoolboy who had edged his way into the group.

The clerk stood first on one leg, then on the other, and scratched his head. He knew as well as we did that after half a bottle of *akpeteshie* the Chief might as well have travelled for all the help he could give. I believe the clerk said as much to the Government Agent, a fattish European with a red face and pale eyes, who immediately flew into a rage, cursed the Chief and the village, and then ordered the constable with him to go and seize the still and what was left of the liquor. But he was unlucky. We usually have two or three kerosene tins cooling off in Opanin Kuntor's yard, but this time, with the cocoa season over and a good number of funerals under way, we were down to a few bottles only. By the time he had collected these, and we sat there without raising a finger in apology or protest, *Nana* himself appeared. He was far from normal and came roaring out of the palace apparently thinking that he was celebrating the yearly *adae* festival. "Abrofo nyinaa akwaso," he was shouting, "afei oman yi nyinaa nkwaso, me Kweku Dua a me de 'Kuro yi nkwaso, mma me kote nwu mma m'ani mfura, mma m'ase nsi, mma me nya Aban amane."—"Long life to the white man and the people, myself Kweku Dua and the town; don't let my penis fail me, nor my eyes and ears close, don't let me quarrel with the Government."

The Government Agent gave him one look and drove off without a word. We all went back to sleep. But the next morning we were worried. We had a hurried meeting at the palace, brought in the schoolmaster to advise, and agreed that something must be done to turn away the wrath to come. The only way seemed to be "development". So we sent Francis Kofi on a bicycle with a letter drawn up by the teacher, with *Nana* and the elders making their mark.

It seemed to meet the case, for two days later the Land Rover came back, with the European. The site was cleared and we took it in turns to dig. It was easy work and unmarred by any mishap, except on the second night the European was with us when old Nyantechie went out before the moon rose to obey the call of nature, stumbled over one of the concrete rings and pitched into three feet of well. This brought out the European, twice as brave as Lugard, from the schoolroom where he had settled himself. He found Nyantechie on the ground nursing his ankle, crept back to the school and was shot at by the local escort constable who hand't seen him go out and who fancied himself as something of a hunter.

Still, by the end of the week, the three wells were finished, with a concrete parapet and a rough awning of palm branches to keep out the dirt. There was a shallow depth of water in each, and as a parting gesture we all queued up, with the European and his clerk, to try it. It tasted terrible. But then, it was rare in our village for anyone to drink water except the children, and they complained that the water from the wells had no taste. The women like it all right, although I suspect that, being women, what they liked most was the opportunity it gave them of arguing who should have the first use of the buckets.

One might have thought that that was the end of it, with no great harm done and everyone turning back again to a normal life. But the village was uneasy. We didn't like it and wondered what might come next. Then Opanin Kuntor fell sick, and swore beyond reason that it was the well water which had brought him down. He told his maidservant to fetch his water from the pool again, recovered quickly and went round the village triumphant, warning everyone of what they might expect. Gradually, however, matters righted themselves. And we had something to take our minds off the Government in the "outdooring" of Kwami Tweneboa's child. This was a high occasion.

Kwame was well over fifty, and although he had taken a second wife, neither had brought forth until now—and the woman herself was nearing forty. It called for a special celebration. We set to work, and Opanin Kuntor had the still going night and day in his yard. We had learned a lesson, too, from the previous occasion and decided to post sentries at the far edge of the village who would give the alarm should danger threaten: one shot for the local police, two for the Government Agent.

We slept well the night before the "outdooring". There wasn't a great deal to do on the farm so we ate and drank the day away, drank and gossiped into the night until the moon went down, when we went to bed and slept late. The next day, nearly the whole village went to pay their respects to the mother. The child, a boy, was named Osei Bonso after a famous ancestor of Kwame Tweneboa, and there was a good deal of friendly drinking, with the result that by mid-afternoon most of us were asleep again. The forenoon had been cloudy, with a leaden sky; but by midday a hot sun blazed from the pale blue shield of the sky, driving us into the shelter of the neem trees which straddled the road, or to the shade of the compounds. Goats and sheep browsed in the bush, and a stray hen scratched lazily in the scrubby ditch by the school where you could see the children sprawled across their desks or asleep on the verandah.

Suddenly, there was the sound of a double shot; then, to our astonishment, two more. There was immediate confusion. The Chief was still asleep; so were most of the elders. They were shaken into some kind of order while Opanin Kuntor hurried off to hide what was left of the *akpeteshie*. The rest of us collected round the chief's compound and held ourselves in reserve. There was the sound of a car, then another; the Government Agent's Vanguard pulled up outside the palace, with the driver signalling to a large touring car which followed to do the same. The Union Jack fluttered from the bonnet of the second car, and the driver—a uniformed constable—carefully chaperoned from the back seat an elderly European. Some one recognized him as the Regional Officer whom most of us knew to be next in power and glory to the Governor, if not to God Himself.

After the customary greetings had been made, with the Government Agent trotting up and down in attendance on the big man, we were told that the Regional Officer was interested in our town, that he had heard of our efforts to "improve the

amenities of the district through self-help," and had been good enough to interrupt a tour of inspection to visit us. This was said by the Government Agent in such solemn, satisfied tones that it was clear that, by digging the wells, we had helped more than ourselves.

Nana and the elders received this with perhaps less enthusiasm than they should have shown; they were alarmed at the second visit of the Government Agent, distrusted his intentions, and were concerned—as we all were—by the possible fate of the still and the rest of the drink. So it was with relief that we heard the Regional Officer saying that he would like to see the wells, and we led the way down the narrow path. Of course, when we got there, the Government Agent, with great satisfaction, thought he would like a drink. One of the women lowered the bucket into the nearest well and hauled it up on the rope. The Government Agent dipped a calabash into the half-bucket of water and handed it with delight to the Regional Officer who took a good mouthful, swallowed, then tried to spit it out, choking and spluttering with an agonized grimace. The Government Agent stared in amazement, and we looked uneasily at each other.

"Try it," said the Regional Officer, and spat into the bush; "Try it yourself," and he wiped his mouth with a folded handkerchief, still coughing and spitting, his eyes watering.

The Government Agent took a cautious sip, and a look of absolute disbelief came over his face. He turned, spat and shouted: "Salifu, come here. Taste this." The constable driver came forward and took a long draught. "Fine," he said.

"What is it?"

"Gin, sir, Native gin."

"How the devil did it get in there?" said the Regional Officer.

We all tried it then, including *Nana* who stood between the two Europeans with the *Gyasehene*. If possible, we looked even more astonished than they. None of us said anything, however, for the few who guessed what had happened didn't care to tell. Eventually *Nana* spoke; and it says much for his presence of mind that he kept a serene countenance and a solemn note to his voice.

"Owura," he said, addressing the Regional Officer, "what has been done was necessary and right. The spirits are angry that we have left our forefathers' ways and the pool from which

my father and his father's father drew their water. For this reason we have purified the well and placated the spirits with a little gin." "A little!" exclaimed the Regional Officer. "What would it have tasted like if you had put in a lot?"

"*Akpeteshie?*" asked the Government Agent sharply.

"No, no," said the Chief, with a dignified air. "That is not allowed, although it would have been better and cheaper." The Government Agent looked at the Regional Officer who said nothing. Then they turned and walked back to the village. I could see that the Regional Officer was amused; and slowly his good humour spread. By the time we reached the village there was a pleasant, unspoken accord between the two sides. Beer was fetched, and a bottle of whisky; the health of the Regional Officer, the Government Agent, the Chief and Elders, the village, and Kwame Tweneboa, were drunk. Finally, the two cars moved off, and we went back to the palace.

"How much did you put in there?" asked the Chief.

"Itals, it was three kerosene tins full," said Opanin Kuntor. "I was afraid. But I put the tins in complete. They must have leaked."

"Ah," said the Chief. "I'm sure they did."

EXCUSE FOR DUST

I trusted clay and hid in dust.
Like you. I breathed—and breath was just
  Another name for treachery
That turned and bit the hand of me
  Who fed it well, I swear,
  A life-time, year by year.
But now I need not blessing nor
Yet breath. I have a settled score:
Dust I paid for dust, keeping nought
Against a rainy day, needing nought.
An oh to balance life-long strife
Full-circle is the sum of life.
  I am dead and know
  Oh, times, oh, is oh.
Thus have I come into my own, the sod,
  The last arithmetic
  That knows nor chance nor trick.
I cannot now be more, or less, than God,
  Being nought.

JOHN HOWLAND BEAUMONT

BOOK REVIEWS

Church and Race in South Africa—*Edited by David Paton.* S.C.M. Press. 1958.

It is doubtful if any professedly Christian Government in this generation has defied the condemnation of all reputable Christian bodies within their own country as long and as consistently as the present Government in South Africa. The documentation of this is impressive. The most vociferous has been the Anglican Church and its record can be studied in a pamphlet published in 1953, "*Racialism in South Africa*", a collection of pronouncements by Provincial and Diocesan Synods and from the Charges of the Bishops of the Church of the Province, going back to 1930.

Other Churches have enunciated the same principles, including the Dutch Reformed Church. Indeed the twelve-point statement put out in August this year by the Reformed Ecumenical Synod at Potchefstroom would find general support among all denominations. But there is this significant difference, that the Anglican pronouncements always apply their principles to specific Acts passed by the Legistature, condemning by name the Group Areas Act, the Separate Representation of Voters Act, the Native Urban Areas Amendment Act, the Supressing of Communism Act, etc., as transgressing certain fundamental Christian principles.

The time has now passed when even the Dutch Reformed Church could maintain that the Church must not "interfere" in politics. To quote Dr. Ben Marais in the *Voorlighter*: "If a church is certain that a law, for instance, is in conflict with the principles of the Word or the doctrine and practice of the church as based on the Word, the church must speak."

This publication therefore is most timely. It is a collection of Papers from South Africa, 1952-1957, illustrating the churches' search for the will of God. The longest section is

devoted to selections from the Bishop of Johannesburg's Charges and brings the Anglican position up to date. This is followed by a fully documented account, in narrative form of the liquidation of Adams College, written by its late Principal, the Reverend G. C. Grant. One cannot see how any Christian body can fail to be moved by this tragic story.

The rest of the book is devoted to statements from the Roman Catholic, the Methodist, the Dutch Reformed Churches, and the Christian Council of South Africa. It makes an invaluable record, but it would have been enhanced had it rescued from oblivion the statement put out by the Society of the Sacred Mission when their Training College at Modderpoort was faced with the implications of Dr. Verwoerd's Bantu Education Act: "If the Minister cannot entrust the training of African teachers to Christian Missions, we, as a Christian Mission, cannot and will not entrust our land or our buildings to him or to his Department for educational purposes; for we are convinced that the true welfare of the African people is being denied by virtue of a political theory and educational principles which we affirm to be contrary to the Will of God."

This rings with the authentic note of Christian defiance down the Ages. C.T.W.

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"AFRICA SOUTH" published: Quarterly
at: New York 1, N.Y. for: October 1, 1958

(Name of post office and State where publication has second-class entry)

1. The names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are:

Publisher: Ronald Michael Segal. Address: P.O. Box 1039, Cape Town, South Africa.

Editor: Ronald Michael Segal. Address: P.O. Box 1039, Cape Town, South Africa.

Managing editor: Ronald Michael Segal. Address: P.O. Box 1039, Cape Town, South Africa.

Business manager: Mrs. Sylvia Pauley. Address: 320 West 87th Street, New York City.

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Name: Ronald M. Segal. Address: P.O. Box 1039, Cape Town.

3. The known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 per cent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: **(If there are none, so state.)**

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PRINTED IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA BY PIONEER PRESS (PTY.) LTD., CAPE TOWN, AND PUBLISHED BY THE PROPRIETORS, AFRICA SOUTH PUBLICATIONS (PTY.) LTD., NEW BRIDGE COURT, KOEBERG ROAD, MAITLAND, CAPE.