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EDITORIAL.

The political development of South Africa has reached a stage, where the historical decision regarding the road to be followed in the near future, has been placed on the order of the day. This momentous decision requires not only our careful study, but also a re-assessment of many an emotional and biased view held by the majority of politicians in the past few decades. There can be no doubt that it was the meteoric albeit disorderly rise of the P.A.S. alias Poqo, that has led to this situation. While it is obviously impossible to give an exhaustive analysis of the national situation within the scope of the editorial, it behoves us to fix our sights on Poqo and to deduce from this the immediate problems and tasks facing the N.L.F.

Poqo is the live embodiment of virulent black nationalism which thrives on the poverty, degradation, rightlessness and political immaturity of the black masses. Its primitive appeal to anti-white racialism finds a ready response in the locations and townships of South Africa. Because of the historical realities of the South African situation (cf. Pamphlet no. II) it has discarded Non-Violence as a method of struggle and elevated Terrorism to a position of supremacy. Since its internal organization is the most haphazard and undisciplined imaginable, it will be clear that the terrorism of Poqo, while it can very well upset the ruling class, is not able to unseat it. And yet it is clear also that the Herrenvolk State considers this Poqo to be the most immediate and a very danger to its security and its continued existence. The ferocity and unscrupulousness with which Poqo people and cells are dealt with show this very clearly. What, therefore, is the real danger of Poqo to Afrikaner Nationalism? What is its real danger to organizations like the N.L.F.? We find the answers to this question not in the many thousands of willing, nor in the few hundred unwilling Poqo members, but rather in the class orientation of the organization and in the class composition and alignment of the leadership. Let us look at this question more carefully.

The leadership of the P.A.C. is composed of petty bourgeois intellectuals whose main aim is the destruction of Colour Bar. This, of course, is a principle which no progressive politician will or can reject. In this matter also, the racialistic appeal of South Africa for the Africans need not be taken too seriously. Its main danger in any case lies in the fact that it is calculated to destroy the unity of the working class. These intellectuals show absolutely no understanding of the mechanics and dynamics of our society. How else could they believe (and they seriously believe) that storming a few police stations, killing off a few despicable government agents and perhaps even blowing up this or that power-station etc., how else could they believe that these adventuristic acts will bring the Capitalist State to its knees? And yet, a Robert Sobukwe has become a national hero overnight, a Leballo can threaten to free the Non-Whites in 1963 etc. What makes them so confident? Let us see who is behind them.

If we look at the continent of Africa (as an important part of the colonial and semi-colonial oppressed masses), we find that it has become the arena for the global struggle between Socialism and Capitalism Imperialism. At the moment, for historical reasons, American and European Imperialism have full control. We need not bother here to consider the conflicts and contradictions between various Imperialisms in Africa e.g. that between the Common Market and the Commonwealth, between America and Belgium in the Congo and between France and America. What it is clear in all cases, however, is that Imperialism has decided, indeed has been forced to decide, to hand over political power to the African nationalists while it continues to hold the decisive economic reins. This is their general strategy to guarantee the continued capitalists base on the continent of Africa. Their profits are today relatively smaller than in the past. Thanks to the Nkrumahs, Kaundas and Kenyattas and Bandas. (This is an aspect of the struggle which we hope to deal with in pamphlet form in the near future).

Now, in South Africa Imperialism has followed this policy ever since 1910, i.e. when it handed over political power to the Afrikaner Nationalists. However, the rapid industrialization of South Africa has given rise to a semi-modern proletariat or working class, which is militant in the extreme as a result of the racial barriers which bar their progress as a working class. (These matters are dealt with fully in Pamphlet no. I)

Because of the Colour Bar policy of the ruling class, a policy instituted by British Imperialism, a virulent African nationalist movement going under the name of various organizations e.g. A.N.C., N.E.U.M., P.A.C. etc, has arisen, demanding full equality in every sphere. Because of its policy in the rest of Africa and because of the economic difficulties it has to face, Imperialism is forced to accede to the democratic demands of the nationalists. This has become very clear in the watered-down versions of the democratic programme, which are today propagated by the Liberal and Progressive parties in South Africa. Only the more nationalistic and hide-bound sections of the ruling class, as e.g. Verwoerd's National Party, have turned themselves against these concessions of Imperialism. But they have the support of the white electorate (White working class included) and are still the only group at this stage who are able to run this State efficiently.

Imperialism knows that the policy of Verwoerd and Co. will lead to a working class explosion which will reverberate throughout Africa, fan the flames of working-class revolution in Europe and end in a Third World War, which will be the burial ground of World Capitalism. Consequently it has given its support to the P.A.C., the most audacious movement of the masses in South Africa, although it is obviously worried by their primitivity and haphazardness. Thus Patrick Duncan and Co. led the march in Cape Town in 1960 and planned everything else behind the scenes. Thus Duncan fled to Basutoland, where the headquarters of P.A.C. were put up shortly afterwards; Thus "Contact" gives prominence to all P.A.C. moves and utterances; Thus Nkrumah supports P.A.C. openly as do many other independent African Imperialists.

Against this background, it should become absolutely clear why the P.A.C. is so strong, why it is so dangerous, why it is so feared and why the ruling class fear it so much. It enjoys the open support of Imperialism. Against this background it should become absolutely clear why the N.L.F. opposes the politics of P.A.C.

We do not oppose democracy and equality. We do not oppose revolution. But we do oppose a democracy and equality which will bind the people of South Africa, its workers and peasants even firmer to the Imperialist war-chariot than they are bound now. And we do oppose uprisings which will drown the struggle of South Africa's working class in blood and misery. We firmly believe that only the working-class, united with the other revolutionary classes of South African society under the banner of the National Liberation Front, can achieve complete social, political and economic emancipation of all people in our country.

Lest members think that all this is long-winded theory, we wish to assure them that the N.L.F. executive will soon issue a comprehensive study of P.O.Q. & P.A.C. together with practical suggestions and directives as to how we can get the membership of P.A.C. into the N.L.F. and how, when and where it is possible for us to work with P.A.C.

This brief article is intended only to acquaint members with some of the basic principles of fighting the police and preventing detection. It should be remembered that in spite of its primitivity, the police force is wide awake and ever on the look-out for new methods of detection, always using new methods to trap the revolutionaries. If members should come across particularly vicious or ingenious forms of police activity against the revolutionary movement, they should forward such information to the Interim National Committee at once.

1. The Telephone:

Ministers of the Cabinet, amongst others, have not exerted themselves to hide the fact that telephones of known politicians or of suspected revolutionaries are tapped. Since it is such an efficient means of communication, we are sometimes tempted to do suicidal things over the 'phone. It has been exposed that, even if the 'phone is not tapped, the police have gadgets (either in the 'phone or in the plug) which make it possible for them to record conversations in the room with a telephone, even if the 'phone is supposedly "dead".

The obvious principles to be followed here are:

- (a) Use the telephone as little as possible.
- (b) Never mention real names over the 'phone.
- (c) If the 'phone is used to arrange a meeting or any such secret event, a pre-arranged code, as innocent as possible, must be used.
- (d) If a conversation over the 'phone becomes unintelligible, it is better to arrange a personal meeting.

2. The Post and Letters:

This too, is one of the most dangerous methods of communication in a country, where censorship has become a method of "thinking" of the authorities. In this connection the basic principles are:

- (a) Letters containing incriminating evidence, which might lead to the detection of the N.L.F., must NEVER be sent by post, unless the matter is really urgent.
- (b) It is quite safe to send letters or cards which intend only to inform the recipient about the whereabouts or health of the author.
- (c) If letters containing important information are sent by post, the correspondents should, if possible, decide on a prearranged metaphor or image (eg. farming teaching etc.). Once such a metaphor is used, the author must adhere strictly to the chosen metaphor and remain within its possibilities. It is, for example, very suspicious to write about "meeting" or "Dr Verwoerd" when discussing, say, pig-farming. Such slips of the pen can lead to immediate detection.
- (d) If correspondents are well-known to the Secret Service, they should use cover addresses. This entails a number of apparently unimportant technicalities. Firstly, the letter to the member in the area should be placed in another envelope. On the inner envelope must be written the CODE NAME of the recipient. This envelope should be wrapped in a piece of paper on which a cordial message, of any kind, to the addressee should be written. The whole thing should then be put in brown or any other non-transparent envelope in such a way that it does not appear unduly bulky or obviously "doctored". The address of the cover-recipient should then be written on this envelope, if necessary, together with some stupid remark about kisses or anything similar (eg. lipstick impression at the back of envelope, or a very brief P.S. which would lead any would-be censor astray).
- (e) Members are advised to use envelopes of bona-fide institutions like universities, hospitals etc.
- (f) Cover-addresses should be changed as often as possible, and it is advisable to have a list of such addresses. People who serve as covers must be reliable friends or political comrades.
- (g) If there is any suspicion that members' mail is being tampered with, they should immediately make other arrangements.
- (h) All members should try to get contacts in the postal service. Such contacts have the advantage of knowing certain things before they are applied. Any rearrangement in the normal postal services can then be interpreted by members themselves.
- (i) Correspondents MUST acknowledge receipt of letters in some way or other. Only in this way is it possible to know immediately whether and whose or what mail is being tampered with.

3. Literature:

(a) Literature of the organization must never be sent by post unless the correspondents have worked out a fool-proof scheme, or are quite sure that they can handle irregularities, that might crop up, competently.

(b) When transporting literature (or any other incriminating material) by car or in trains, members must always try to conceal such in as inconspicuous a way as possible. If there is any danger of being searched and if members know about such activity on the part of the police, they must ensure that there are no fingerprints/

fingerprints etc. on any parcels of literature they might be forced to transport. If caught, alibis must be at hand and there must be no hesitation.

(c) Literature should not be left lying around negligently. Situations often arise where, even innocent, well-meaning people and friends, can expose members to the police.

(d) While we do not encourage the burning of literature, it should be clear that this method of "hiding" it is best if members cannot find a suitable hiding place.

(e) Hiding-places must be 100% safe. It is preferable that members do not handle literature at the hiding-place themselves. If trustworthy friends or relatives are available, members should ask them to administer the arsenal of literature. Visits to hiding-places must be above all suspicion and absolutely normal. The best hiding-places are obviously police-stations and other such buildings, but unless members are absolutely sure of what they are doing, they should not attempt such boldness.

4. Spies:

Our point of departure must be that these elements are to be found everywhere and that we should, therefore, be on the lookout for them everywhere.

(a) Once there is suspicion that a person is in the pay of the government for spying on the revolutionary movement, we must confirm this by watching his/her movements and private associates.

(b) If there is definite proof that someone in the political organization is a spy, the organization concerned must be informed immediately so that action can be taken.

(c) If ever a spy should be found in the N.L.F., there must be no doubt as to what must happen to him/her. If blackmail will work, we will apply this, otherwise the person concerned must be subjected to the supreme punishment.

(d) Known spies and collaborators should be avoided on principle. However, it is good to have contact with them through second and third persons, so as to facilitate our espionage activity. Also it is necessary to study the movements, associates and weaknesses of these types so that any action, which might become necessary against them in future, can be taken swiftly and without fail.

(e) Members are advised to draw up lists of known spies and collaborators in their areas in order of importance. These lists should then be sent to the Interim National Committee for appraisal and duplication. If possible, photos and "character" sketches of the individuals concerned should also be forwarded.

(f) Any person who refuses to carry out or avoids carrying out positive, legitimate actions demanded by the N.L.F. or by political organizations to which members belong, should immediately be suspected and their movements studied.

(g) Members should never take any physical action against spies and collaborators (unless unavoidable) without first referring to the Interim National Committee. Revolutionary political murder, or similar action, it must be remembered, can only be justified if it has the function of serving the revolution directly. If the N.L.F. has decided to do so, it executes people; it never murders them.

(h) Known members of the Criminal Investigation Department and the political police must be treated as spies. No member of the N.L.F. is to have direct, friendly associations with these people. Boldness in this regard can lead to serious trouble.

(5) The South African Police

These are state employees in a detestable job. Nowadays they are expected to assist the political police directly. This fact determines our attitude towards them. They can at times give valuable and genuine information, and we must not hesitate to tap these sources. However, in this regard also we must exercise the utmost caution. Usually, not always, members of the S.A.P. are weak-willed, characterless people, who will at the slightest hint of a bribe, do what is required of them. Judicious use of this method (to be used only when necessary) can help to ease certain activities of the N.L.F.

(6) Psychological Aspects:

Members should remember that at this time in the history of the country many organizations are springing up all over the place, all of which pretend to have some sort of revolutionary action programme. Some of these are loose groupings around some cranky individuals who bask in the dubious glory of their own shadows. In such organizations, the last thing one will find is a strict revolutionary discipline, adhering to the principles of conspiracy.

We should, therefore, not be surprised to hear the most fantastic claims about "secret" organizations etc. being made by the most fantastic people. Much of what these people might "reveal" to us may sound familiar, because of the similarity in the structure of the conspiratorial organizations of any colour. However, we must never forget, that such "revelations" cannot and will not be made

by members/

by members of the NLF who adhere to a strict and high code of discipline. Hence we must never be tempted to reveal to any person of whom we know that he is not in our cell anything that could incriminate us or the organisation.

If and when it should happen that a member of one NLF cell finds occasion to want to recruit a person who (naturally, without the knowledge of the former) already belongs to the NLF, it is quite clear that, after one or two discussions, the individuals will recognise each other for what they are. Such instances will occur more frequently, the more widespread the organisation becomes. When necessary the clumsiness of the situation will be abolished by some kind of symbol or emblem.

For the immediate future members must remember that the NLF is a secret organisation, the existence of which is known only to its membership. Hence any exposure of details to people outside is an act of gross betrayal and must of necessity have serious consequences.

UMKONTO - WE - SIZWE

(SPEAR of the NATION ORGANISATION)

A Note on its Military Strategy and Training Programme

UWS was formed in 1961 and carried out its first acts of sabotage on December 16th, 1961. Since then it has sabotaged a few non-military installations, with poor results.

It is under the leadership of the Communist Party of S.A., and draws its members from the Congress Movement. (We know of members of the C.O.D., A.N.C. and C.P.C. who belong to it.)

UWS regards itself as the military arm of the national liberatory movement and its actions are presumably subservient to the policy pursued by this.

Military Strategy :

There are insufficient facts to assess this profoundly. From what we know two principles emerge.

The first is that UWS has instigated the acts of sabotage to publicise its existence and to give it prestige in the eyes of the oppressed. (This will facilitate both the raising of funds and the recruitment of soldiers.)

The second principle is that UWS is planned to develop as a pressure group with effective striking power and/or is building a large underground army. It seems most likely that UWS has the ultimate aim of wringing concessions from the Herronvolk (of Cyprus). There is no evidence to show that it interprets guerilla warfare in the same way as the NLF (of Cuba; China). From the history of the C.P. and the Congress Movement in S.A. it is most likely that they are planning for internationalisation of the revolution and foreign (even UNO) intervention. Unlike the NLF, which is fighting for a socialist democracy, that, logically, would press for a more liberal régime (against the interests of the workers and peasants).

Our sources of information reveal that there are elements within the Congress Movement (and even in the UWS) who are receptive to NLF propaganda. We must keep a watch for such persons -- eventually we may be able to enroll them into the NLF.

Training Programme :

A large number of men has been sent outside S.A. for training as saboteurs. It is said that even six aspirant-pilots have been despatched. Possibly certain saboteurs have returned already.

Apparently training of saboteurs inside S.A. has also commenced. Various sources agree on this:

The course lasts three months. During this period the trainee is separated from his home and receives R1 per day.

Suitable men are screened by a panel of five and have to pass a medical fitness test.

The course includes lectures on political subjects, as well as lessons on the repair of a motor-car, use of a duplicating

machine, typewriter, and field-telephone; also, lessons on the use of rifles, revolvers, the Bren gun, FN rifle; the construction and use of explosives; finally, practical exercises in judo and mountain climbing are given.

There is no indication that trainees have to pass examinations before being discharged.

BASHEE - RIVER INCIDENT

The recent murder at the Bashee River was mainly due to the ill-treatment of the people in the area by the same man who was killed. He meddled too much in the local affairs of the people -- even in those of only passers-by. The result was that they became fed-up with him, and the matter was passed on to a group of people who call themselves "Makuluspan" and who dealt with him.

"Makuluspan" is spread throughout certain areas of the Transkei. It does not operate in the area of Matanzima. It is an organisation which was formed to protect the people from cattle thieves, and to see to it that lost or stolen cattle were returned to their owners. Later it took it upon itself to deal with chiefs or headmen who made unfair dealings with the people or who robbed the people by means of taxes. Recently its activities were extended to include political questions. Hence the doing-away with the Whites who interfered with the people on the road. (Incidentally, those who were killed were overseers or people engaged in road construction.)

Police Terror. The police have not yet been able to trace any one of the killers, despite widespread terrorisation and intimidation. They went so far as to beat up any male African they came across. To protect themselves, the men dressed as women. This the police discovered. Afterwards they stopped any person wearing a dress and lifted the skirt with a bayonet or rifle in order to ascertain the sex of the wearer. This was done in public and made the temper of the people rise even more. The people's response to this was to refuse to answer questions concerning the movements of others put to them by the police.

Qamata. As for Qamata, the people there are as militant as ever. Here Poqo definitely has a great influence. It is understood that something big is about to take place in this area, under the direction of Poqo.

St Marks. In connection with the killing of a headman in St Marks (about 30 miles from Queenstown), nothing definite is yet known, but it is believed that, because Matanzima sent many of his men to aid his headman, the people retaliated by doing away with the quisling. No arrests have so far been made, and the police thugs are having great difficulty in getting information from the people.

TRANSKEI REPORT

Activities of Organisations in Transkei-Ciskei.

Concrete evidence of the presence and actual activity of underground military organisations in the Transkei is not abundant.

In East London itself there is much sympathy with PAC from some conscious politicians, but almost in each case this is so because of the absence of, or in ignorance of the existence of any organisation that is taking a militant attitude. Except in Alice, there seems to be no knowledge of "Umkonto". Certainly, with none of these organisations has a solid 'network' been established in the Transkei.

PAC people have infiltrated the Transkei in numbers greatly exaggerated by the press. But the publicity itself seems to have created more PAC support than there actually is. Of the people contacted in East London, only one has had contact with PAC.

One thing is clear, however: the known underground organisations have also realised the importance of forming groups in the Transkei. Thus, in the case of "Umkonto", an individual has been sent out to investigate a certain area in the Transkei. Again, this organisation has been enter-

prising enough to win over some of the Pondoland Resistance leaders.

Mention must also be made of an indigenous organisation -- the "Makuluspan". This organisation was formed in the Qumbu-Tsolo districts about five years ago to deal with stock-thieves. It later spread to other adjoining areas such as Engcobo. It has been reported in the press as having taken a political form.

Recommendations.

Because the Transkei is going to be our "primary field of operation", and because of its suitability and potential, the work done thus far must be regarded as grossly inadequate, although it must be added that as much work was done as was possible under present circumstances. Success in achieving better results must therefore be sought in the manner of approach we intend using in organising the Transkei. It is not enough for us to rely on individual workers if we mean to make it one of our strongest bases. Because of the conditions prevailing in the Transkei all groups must be prepared to share financially and politically in initiating a vigorous campaign. Because of repressive laws and comparative political and technical inadequacy the Transkei will for a long time be dependent on the cells in the towns. Only after a wide and effective network of contacts has been established will our people there be in a position to extend the work independently.

The people are ready and wide awake, but the conditions are such that not even the best of them will be inclined to work for an organisation with no apparent evidence that it is there to stay. The lessons of Pondoland and, recently, those of PAC are taken with all seriousness. From time to time our contacts in the Transkei must be made to see and feel our machinery at work along the lines we have put before them. They must see contacts from various areas. They must themselves travel from time to time from one centre to another of our network. For some time, therefore, the degree of progress in the country will be directly related to and dependent on the degree of development in the towns as far as establishing our own machinery is concerned.

Finally, the Transkei is technically underdeveloped, and physical conditions are as much a barrier to rapid organisation as state suppression. Living conditions are harsh and it requires much tact and patience to persuade people to look beyond their daily struggle of earning a living. But once the confidence of a peasant has been won he will be loyal to the last.

A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN S.W.A.

Recent Activity and Present Position of Political Organisations

After Dondolswartz (1922) and the Rehoboth Uprising (1925), the struggle of the people in SWA against the SA regime went into a long period of somnolence.

In 1959, as a reaction to many decades of relentless oppression, a resurgence of political activity took place. OPO (later SWAPO) was formed; the Beukes incident captured the imagination of thousands and brought Rehoboth back into the limelight; SWANU was formed; a total boycott of municipal services was effected in Windhoek. The Windhoek Massacre of December, 1959, an unsophisticated Herrenvolk response to the people's naive political adventuring, rung down the curtain on this year. The people of SWA had at last taken their place in the ranks of the revolutionary army of all Africa; they had taken the first step on the long road to independence!

However, a mass movement deserted by its leadership, cannot fail to lose its way. The leadership thrown up by the awakening of '59 was, at best, mediocre and untrained. This leadership promptly deserted en masse to the lobbies of UNO -- and has left the organisations at home wandering around in circles ever since.

The period 1960 to 1963 has been a quiet one, marked only by scattered, unconnected minor incidents. A strike at the Tsumeb Mines, a demonstration in Windhoek against further removal to Katutura (practically the sole incidents in the latter half of '62) are fairly typical of the period. On the other hand, the battle-cry of the political movement has been re-echoed by the oppressed, and the lack of purposive activity is inversely proportional to the rising militant mood of the people.

SWAPO is the major political body. It has a large membership and a wide following, especially in Ovamboland, although it is not as well known as, for example, the PAC in SA. Its influence among the Coloured and Rehoboth people is virtually nil. The Acting National Executive is not measuring up to its tasks, and at best is maintaining a liaison between branches. There is no decided strategy for 1963, and absolutely no understanding of the goals or methods of the revolution. Consequently, SWAPO is merely in a state of "suspended animation".

SWANU is in an even more useless position. Unlike the SWAPO leadership, which is at least making an effort, the SWANU leadership exists from one depressing discussion to the next. At most, it represents small and scattered groups of dissatisfied Herero people.

The Volks Organisasie van Suid-Wes Afrika represents a large percentage of Coloured people. It is essentially reformist; seeks the improvement of the living conditions of Coloured people; and has a very narrow political platform. While not consciously pro-government, it nevertheless functions closely within the bounds of the status quo. At present it is very active in the field of better housing for Coloureds.

The Coloured Council is a government-appointed (nominated) body. It is openly collaborationist. It functions as such, and also spreads its influence through the SAW Coloured Organisation, and a section of the SWA Coloured Teachers' Association. The CC and its hangers-on have very little roots among the people of SWA, but it is pursuing a very lively (well-subsidised) course to win over the Coloured people to its side.

The SWA United National Independence Organisation is mentioned here because the name still crops up in the literature (and even at UNO). It does not exist, although it has one accredited representative.

The Rehoboth Raad has solid support from the Rehobothers and the Rehoboth Burgers Vereeniging (equivalent to a ratepayers' organisation). It seeks an illusory "independence" and "self-rule" as a "state within a state", via an honourable agreement with the S.A. government. As all Rehobothers are also farm owners, the petit bourgeois nature of Rehoboth politics is intense, and the Rehobothers are far removed from the general political stream in which the whole of SWA outside the Rehoboth Gebiet is moving. For the past three years and up to the very present its only strategy has been to send petitions to UNO.

In general, therefore, the situation is such that, owing to the stiffening of resistance to callous S.A. domination, the political bodies are easily able to enroll members -- even on the basis of vague promises. But this vast mass of eager raw material is not being forged into an instrument of revolution. The whole national leadership (through no fault of its own) is to blame for this.

Attitude of the Masses to UNO

A deep and sincere hope that UNO will intervene in SWA, and release the country from the stranglehold of South Africa's mandate, is the foundation on which all political groups stand. This is no accident, but the inevitable result of the backwardness of the masses, the social basis of the leadership, and the deliberate inculcation of this policy by the liberal Rev. Michael Scott and his squad of opportunist-petitioners.

Since the petition for help from UNO (27.9.47), nothing of any significance has improved; and thus a widespread disillusionment in the efficacy of UNO is setting in. This is a new phenomenon, but is developing rapidly. Note, however, that this is mainly an infertile loss of hope, and not a turning against UNO because of an awareness of its pro-imperialist nature. Insofar as this anti-UNO trend exists it does pave the way for progressive propaganda.

Should any crisis occur in the near future, vast sections of the people (if not the enlightened top section of the leadership) would still turn to UNO for help.

Appreciation of the Necessity of the Armed Insurrection

9

While the masses are still standing with nine toes in the camp of UNO intervention, they can give little thought to any other form of struggle.

Insofar as there are some who have thought of taking to arms, this is more of a hangover from the wars of conquest than a modern solution to the problem of liberation.

However, the impact of the revolutions in Cuba, Algeria and Angola, plus the turbulence in SA (Transkei, Poqo), is making itself felt. Nothing approaching a guerilla group has been formed. Not even a PAC-type band has been recruited. PAC (Poqo) has no cells in SWA.

Recommendations

(1) Political Work

While it is policy to have our members active in political organisations, the major part of their time is still taken up with NLF activity. In view of the backwardness of the movement in SWA, more (much more) emphasis should be placed on political than military work -- for the next year at least. The education of the masses of SWA should be our first aim. Any and every available means must be used -- via platforms provided by existing bodies; an underground newspaper; pamphlets.

Clearly, all the existing organisations (with the exception of SWACO and the CC) should be infiltrated. The SWACTA provides an opportunity for supporting the more progressive against the collaborationist section.

More time should be devoted to the actual running of the organisations infiltrated (of SA). This will mean that in the foreseeable future the greater percentage of executive positions could be occupied by NLF guerillas. This will make it easier for us to bring about unity of the oppressed; to develop a progressive programme for the revolution; and to have this programme accepted.

A relentless struggle should be waged against pro-UNO (pro-imperialist) tendencies; and a concerted effort must be made to strip the petitioners of all support.

(2) Military Work

While this should not be set aside because of the necessary emphasis on "purely" political work, we should expect a certain slower rate of progress. To recruit guerillas who are still politically raw would be in opposition to our policy of training leaders.

We are fortunate, in SWA, not to have opposition from other military groups. This advantage should be thoroughly exploited NOW, and the NLF so well consolidated that we will maintain our leadership. By the time (if ever) other groups (Poqo, Umkonto we Sizwe, AFDUSA) start to recruit guerillas in SWA, the NLF should be in a position to stifle any such activity.

Report on Poqo (continued from page 13)

organisation.

More importantly, we must note the steps taken by the enemy to tighten its security measures. Mr Vorster has already indicated that special courts will be set up to deal swiftly and viciously with saboteurs and Poqo members who are arrested, and with anyone arrested for subversive activity. A general round-up of suspected persons has already begun, and stringent laws are to be passed to supplement the General Laws Amendment Act (Sabotage Law). With all this at their disposal, the enemy is in a better position to prepare itself for the struggle. We must prepare ourselves to outflank the state machine, bearing in mind always that the guerilla's best weapon is surprise.

APDUSA + armed struggle

THE NEW LINE OF THE NON-EUROPEAN UNITY MOVEMENT.

Those of us who have been concerned about the inactivity in and the ineffectiveness of the African People's Democratic Union of Southern Africa (A.P.D.U.S.A.) and the whole of the N.E.U.M., had seriously considered starting a new, more virile organization to take the place of, and, what is more important, to do the work that A.P.D.U.S.A. was intended to perform for the movement. To most of us APDUSA was dead. We felt that drastic measures such as breaking from the N.E.U.M. were necessary if we were to politicize the people effectively. However, the dramatic announcement of the decision taken by the N.E.U.M. Extended Executive in January of this year, has made us stop to take stock of APDUSA once more. I refer here to the "NEW LINE" which accepts that the military struggle is the next phase in the struggle of the people against the Herrenvolk State. This acceptance by the N.E.U.M. of an armed insurrection might even have made the more optimistic among us think that APDUSA could at last take a real part in the struggle of the people.

Jan 1963
NEUM
new line -
pro-
military

The optimists must by now feel terribly disillusioned and disgusted at the way APDUSA has handled the whole issue. To say that many young Apdusans took the new line seriously would be an understatement. They were so keen, so eager to start organizing for the military struggle that, in their enthusiasm they forgot that they needed to plan their work - their line of action. In fact many of the January enthusiasts have had their fervour dimmed by being told that their approach to the new line was dangerous to the welfare of APDUSA - as indeed it was. They had hardly been in the field a week when everyone knew that APDUSA was joining up members to train in Algeria etc.

NEUM
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In meetings held since the announcement of the new line, one thing has become glaringly clear: the promoters of the new line have absolutely no idea of how the decision is to be put into operation. This lack of a lead on a matter so demanding of clarity of action, is frustrating the few genuine workers in APDUSA. The cynics are, of course, not at all surprised.

new line
explained

The "clearest" idea of what the line of approach is to be in future, is this: The people must be made to realize that the military phase of the struggle has been reached. They must know that no army of the people fight a war - that only an organized state can fight a war against another state. The state will organize the army, industry, agriculture etc. to bring the whole nation on a military footing. Once the various arms of State have been geared for war - then the state declares war and fights the war. From this they must be made to realize that APDUSA must become the state - the central command of the people's army. Once they are organized into APDUSA then the people will be able to go into battle as a nation under an organized state, against the herrenvolk state. In essence then, if the people realize that they have to fight, they will see the need for organizing the oppressed under one central body (APDUSA). For this it is not necessary, according to APDUSA, completely to convince a person of NEUM politics. If a person is 40% convinced then that is enough to entitle him to membership of APDUSA. The rest of his political training will be gained in the course of the struggle. As we see it, this attitude must inevitably lead to mass organization of people who are interested in violence only. If this is allowed to happen then APDUSA will run the risk of landing in the same mess that PAC has. Members will become tired of waiting on action and will resort to terrorism, because they lack political foresight and principles. Such a move would set the liberatory struggle back by years.

Three months have passed since APDUSA adopted the new line. In those three months many things have taken place - much of it haphazardly. Members in Cape Town have been engaged in a frenzy of activity. Regular house meetings and group meetings have been held and, at the beginning many new members were signed up, but the effect of the January injection is gradually wearing off. Those who have taken the new line seriously are disappointed that the leadership has not yet come up with a plan of action. They realize that they have to organize and prepare the people for military phase of the liberatory struggle but they have not been told HOW to set about effecting this. The question now arises: will these members who are in APDUSA now - who have been lured by the bait of military training - stay in APDUSA or will they become tired of waiting on the leadership to work out a plan of action?

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It is quite evident that APDUSA will be banned before, if ever, the leadership of APDUSA will come up with a plan of action. It is also clear that the idea of an armed insurrection was merely used as a shot in the

the arm - a stimulant to a dying movement. They have never considered seriously what the new line could mean to the peoples' liberatory struggle. What is alarming to us is the open manner in which Apdusans are spreading this new line abroad. By now the authorities probably know as much about APDUSA as it does about Poqo. In the light of Vorster's proposed new legislation with regard to political organizations, it is quite likely that APDUSA will be banned. Will APDUSA be able to carry on underground? Is it prepared to go underground at this stage? If it does go under - what mass organization will we use for our work? Obviously it is a waste of time for our members to be active in APDUSA. Their energies could be more profitably employed gathering recruits from outside APDUSA. Those who can, should, however, remain in APDUSA but merely as observers. Under no circumstances should they involve themselves deeply in the running of Apdusa.

THE "LAW-LESS" AND THE LAW

PART I

As we have dedicated ourselves to the task of destroying the present state machinery by armed insurrection, it must be clear to all of us that we have divested ourselves of any real protection under the law of that state. We are in no better position than the "out-laws" of previous ages. The law is not for us and we are not for the law.

It has been said, however, that the law is an ass, and these articles --- giving some information as to what our "rights" are in unpleasant situations we are likely to encounter --- are printed with the aim of riding that ass for as long as we can before it drops dead under us.

At the outset, we wish to warn members that there are hardly any "loop-holes" for people involved in our kind of struggle. All that is left are a few legal stunts which revolutionaries might resort to in playing for time in emergency situations. At the moment of writing, there are six major statutes, with amendments, which make it impossible for any of us ever to be acquitted in a court of law even if merely found in possession of the "National Liberation Front". These are the following :

- i Suppression of Communism Act (1950)
- ii Public Safety Act (1953)
- iii Criminal Procedure Act (1955)
- iv Riotous Assemblies Act (1956)
- v Unlawful Organisations Act (1960)
- vi General Laws Amendment Act (1962).

Vorster has indicated that this is not going to be the end. We are still to have laws that will make all these listed here unnecessary. That will be when he introduces secret courts. In subsequent issues of the "National Liberation Front" we shall point out some provisions of the above-listed stop-gaps that are significant and relevant to the work and workers of the NLF.

As a start, let us see what is likely to happen when one of us is confronted by a policeman at home or even in the street. In theory, a policeman cannot even touch a civilian without indicating a reason for his action. But, of course, it is easy for him to find a reason or even to invent one. Once he has given a reason --- any reason --- for stopping you he is likely to ask for your name and address. This a person is obliged to give -- and nothing more. Thereafter, if he does not have a warrant to arrest you, he must let you proceed on your way. This, then, is where the Public Safety Act of 1953 comes in. It provides 15 "exceptions" to the rule that no-one may be arrested without a warrant. The first of these is applied during a state of emergency. In an area where a state of emergency has been declared any person is subject to summary arrest and detention. Then, again, a police officer has authority to arrest (without a warrant) any person suspected of committing or having committed an offence under the law governing the "possession or disposal of arms or ammunition." And, of course, if a policeman suspects a person of having committed an offence and, on his demand for full name and address, finds that the person refuses to give it or suspects that the person has given a false name and address, he may arrest that person without a warrant.

What does all this mean to us? It means :-

(1) If you think the policeman knows you, give him your correct name -- but never give any policeman your correct address, if a search of your premises would be disastrous to yourself -- and, especially, to other people whom the police probably did not know. The point about this is that, whereas it is a simple matter for the police to check on your real name, it is not so easy for them to check on your address. You could have moved into or out of your premises the previous day.

(2) You can be difficult and ask the policeman to produce an order or a warrant of arrest -- just in case you are dealing with an inexperienced policeman who may be bewildered by your knowledge of the law and not prepared to risk making trouble for himself should he be in the wrong. With a more experienced man, however, this line is not safe, for he will know that he does not always have to produce a warrant of arrest.

(3) In general, always sum up the situation and then decide on the attitude to adopt -- whether to be "hostile", "indignant", or "co-operative". It is amazing how often the right attitude can help you out of a nasty situation. In effect, my advice is that one's psychological approach is more often than not a better weapon than one's legal approach.

(4) If you have chosen to be difficult, remember that you are not obliged to give more than your name and address. But then you must also be prepared to be as difficult -- in fact, impossible -- to crack under interrogation and torture.

(To be continued.)

REPORT ON POQO

In the last edition of "Liberation" a fairly detailed report was given on Poqo. Further reports on this organisation are necessary and will be necessary in the immediate future, as there is no doubt about the effect it is having on the liberatory struggle in general.

Methods of Struggle

Basically, Poqo is a terrorist organisation. Members are trained in terrorist methods and arm themselves with primitive, home-made weapons and, if possible, with guns. These weapons are used whenever certain tasks have to be performed, e.g.; the killing of headmen, chiefs, and local traitors and quislings, or to force people to join the organisation when they are unwilling to do so. This practice, i.e., forcing people into the organisation, is very unhealthy, since they never really understand, or feel the necessity of understanding, the aims and policy of the organisation. The organisation can never depend on their loyalty and sincerity, as can be seen from the many Poqo members who are prepared to give evidence against Poqo in the trials proceeding throughout the country.

The first requirement of any revolutionary and guerilla is that he be sure of the necessity of the armed insurrection, and his joining the organisation must be voluntary. This assures the organisation of the individual's loyalty and sincerity. It is, therefore, essential to be selective at first when approaching individuals with the aim of joining them up. The time will come when almost every oppressed person will be approached at random.

In a press interview in Maseru, Basutoland, Potlako Leballo, deputy leader of PAC, stated that the organisation plans to attack with its full force of 150,000 during this year, and that he would give the signal from Maseru. These utterances are irresponsible and, coming from the top-most ranks of Poqo, show a lack of discipline, understanding, and the basic requirements for the armed insurrection, i.e., the manner in which it should be planned and carried out. It is generally known that local groups are told to arm themselves and to be prepared to attack at any moment. When utterances such as Mr Leballo's are made and cannot be carried into practice, the local groups become frustrated and take matters into their own hands, as they did at Paarl.

This also shows a lack of understanding of how freedom is to be attained. They know it is to be by armed insurrection, but armed insurrection is an art which must go hand in hand with political policy and strategy. Every cell must know what its function is in the whole network. And we never inform the

enemy of our strategy, as Mr Leballo did with regard to Poqo's.

Very little political training of members is done by Poqo. This short-coming has already shown itself in many forms --- local uprisings, unconnected and undirected; different interpretations of the aims and policy from members of the organisation, especially on the question of UNO intervention, which some feel is necessary while others feel that it should not be allowed, because of the rôle it played in the Congo; the formation of special committees by local Poqo cells which then carry out tasks on their own, e.g., the Bashee River murders.

There seems to be no systematic gathering of information as regards the military strength of the enemy, and no note seems to be taken of the efficiency, preparedness and general alertness of the enemy, or of the steps taken by the enemy to eradicate Poqo and any revolutionary movement in S.A. This attitude of Poqo flows from their attitude that the whites must be driven out of the country or killed off. The local riots, terrorism and killing of whites are but a waste of valuable energy in that they are not directed against the very pillars of the fascist state --- the police force, defence force, navy and air force. If we are ever to gain freedom, these pillars will have to be fought and smashed.

Racialism

As stated in the last "Liberation", despite the interpretations given by PAC intellectuals to Poqo's slogans of "Africa for Africans" and "We stand alone", these slogans are taken at face value by the rank and file members, and they act upon their own interpretations. When new members are recruited, the mere basic requirements of the organisation are explained only, with the result that there is a strong feeling of racialism, and antagonism towards the other sections of the non-whites in S.A., especially towards the Indians. The method of recruiting members -- appealing to their sectional outlook -- encourages racialism. When recruiting is done, witchcraft plays no small part, especially among the illiterate masses in the Transkei.

Centres of Organisation and Membership

The membership of the organisation seems very big, but very unevenly spread throughout the country. In the Cape Peninsula locations, especially Langa, it is very strong. Paarl and Stellenbosch also have large followings, particularly among the young men. In the Cape, claims Mr Leballo, there are 64,000 members, the largest membership of the four provinces, with 12,000 in the O.F.S., the smallest.

In the Transkei the membership is particularly small, and the activities of the organisation are mainly carried out by people sent there for that purpose. There the cooperation of the local population is obtained on the basis of their grievances against the local chiefs and headmen. Those who refuse to join are threatened with murder and witchcraft.

The local leadership comes mainly from Langa. The national leadership comes from other regions: the headquarters is at Johannesburg. At Maseru, Basutoland, an agency has been set up by members who have fled the country to direct the activities of the organisation from outside. Some members of the national leadership have fled to countries in Europe, most probably to seek financial aid, while representation is being made at UNO. From Ghana R50,000 was received some time ago. How the money was used is not known.

The Present Situation

At the moment, especially after the Paarl Riots and the consequences thereof, there is chaos in Poqo. Indiscipline is rife: the police know too much because of looseness on the part of the organisation in letting out its strategy; Poqo members are bribed to give information about the organisation; the police forcibly extract information from Poqo members who are arrested; the police find it easy to "persuade" members to turn state witnesses because of the forceful methods used by Poqo to make people join the organisation; this state of affairs has resulted in mass arrests throughout the country -- Pretoria, 42, Cape Town, 37, Paarl, 21, Johannesburg, 5, and many others we do not know of. Almost the whole network of the organisation has been unearthed in this way.

Many lessons are to be learned from the mistakes Poqo is making, especially as regards the necessary precautions that have to be taken to safeguard the

(Please turn to page 9 for continuation.)