THE COMMONWEALTH AND INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY
Joint Chairmen of the Honorary Editorial Advisory Board
SIR ROBERT ROBINSON, O.M., F.R.S., LONDON
DEAN ATHELSTAN SPILHAUS, MINNESOTA
Publisher: ROBERT MAXWELL, M.C., M.P.

COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS DIVISION
General Editors: SIR KENNETH BRADLEY AND D. TAYLOR

The Anglo-African Commonwealth

POLITICAL FRICTION AND CULTURAL FUSION

The Anglo-African Commonwealth

POLITICAL FRICTION AND CULTURAL FUSION

by

ALI A. MAZRUI

Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science
Makerere University College, University of East Africa

PERGAMON PRESS

OXFORD · LONDON · EDINBURGH · NEW YORK
TORONTO · SYDNEY · PARIS · BRAUNSCHWEIG

Pergamon Press Ltd., Headington Hill Hall, Oxford
4 & 5 Fitzroy Square, London, W.1

Pergamon Press (Scotland) Ltd., 2 & 3 Teviot Place, Edinburgh 1

Pergamon Press Inc., 44–01 21st Street, Long Island City, New York 11101

Pergamon of Canada Ltd., 6 Adelaide Street East, Toronto, Ontario

Pergamon Press (Aust.) Pty. Ltd., 20–22 Margaret Street,
Sydney, New South Wales

Pergamon Press S.A.R.L., 24 rue des Écoles, Paris 5e

Vieweg & Sohn GmbH, Burgplatz 1, Braunschweig

First edition 1967

Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 66–29595

Printed in Great Britain by The Carrick Press Ltd

(3162/67)

To Jamal

Acknowledgments

FOR stimulation on some of the points I have discussed, I am grateful to a number of colleagues. I am particularly grateful to Mr. Ahmed Mohiddin and Dr. Dharam Ghai of the University of East Africa, and to Professor Donald S. Rothchild of the University of California, Davis.

Most of the book was written when I was under a Rockefeller Foundation research grant and was enjoying the stimulating hospitality of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, as a Research Associate. I am greatly indebted to both institutions.

The patient yet speedy typing of Mrs. Ailene Benson and Mrs. Jane Tatlock greatly facilitated the endeavour. My warmest thanks to them both.

My wife was invaluable. Every chapter was discussed with her. And her comments on the literary and linguistic matters discussed in the book helped to shape the analysis. She also read the whole typescript.

For the appendices I am, of course, indebted to all the sources. President Nyerere's article (Appendix II) is being reprinted in the collection of Nyerere's works entitled *Freedom and Unity* and published by Oxford University Press. I am grateful to the President's office and to the Oxford University Press for permission to use the article as an appendix in this book. I am also grateful to Mr. Tom Mboya personally for giving me permission to use Appendix V. To the Journal *Transition* I am indebted for some of the excerpts on the English Language. I am also grateful to the publishers of the books quoted.

To *Conspectus* and *International Affairs* I am very thankful for permission to re-use in Chapters 4 and 5 material which first appeared in articles written for them.

Responsibility for any faults in the book must, of course, remain exclusively mine.

Britain's Third Commonwealth: An Introduction

GEORGE PADMORE, the West Indian founding father of pan-Africanism, regarded the British colonies in Africa as " Britain's third Empire ". However, it would be less than helpful if, by extension, we now proceeded to describe the independent African states today as " Britain's third Commonwealth ". The sequence we propose to use here rests on a different basis from Padmore's—the crucial element in Commonwealth evolution for us in this book has been the shifting balance of racial composition.

For our purposes the first British Commonwealth consisted exclusively of white governments—Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. It is a measure of the dominance of *governments* in Commonwealth relations that South Africa was for so long included among the " white Dominions " in spite of the fact that the bulk of her population was non-white.

The second British Commonwealth came with the accession of India and Pakistan. This gave the Commonwealth its first non-white Prime Ministers. But the non-white member governments were still in a minority. We might therefore define the second British Commonwealth as that period when the Commonwealth was already multi-racial but with the white governments still maintaining either a majority or a numerical parity with the rest of the Commonwealth.

It will therefore be seen that this second Commonwealth did *not* come to an end with the independence of Ghana. The significance of Ghana was in being the first black African member of the Commonwealth. But Ghana on her own did not tilt the balance of

membership in favour of the coloured sector of the Commonwealth. It was Malaya a few months after Ghana which gave the Commonwealth *parity* as between coloured and white members. There were now five each—the five white governments we mentioned above and the governments of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya and Ghana.

Strictly speaking, then, the third British Commonwealth did not come into being until Nigeria became independent in 1960. Nigeria shifted the balance of racial composition in the Commonwealth in favour of the coloured members. This was a momentous development in terms of strengthening the principle of multi-racialism in the Commonwealth. Almost in response to this new era of coloured preponderance in the Commonwealth, South Africa was forced to withdraw from the Commonwealth following the 1961 conference —the first Commonwealth conference to have a majority of coloured participants. The trend of coloured preponderance has continued upward ever since.

The accession of Cyprus did indeed have a significance of its own. This was the first white country to become a member of the Commonwealth since the old Dominions were given their autonomy two generations previously. Yet, in a sense, Cyprus was a reluctant member of the Commonwealth—the only reluctant one in the present company. Commonwealth membership was for Cypriot a consolation prize—what the Turkish Cypriots had wanted was either a continued colonial status or partition, whereas the first choice of the Greek Cypriots was union with Greece.

A characteristic feature of the third Commonwealth is a decline of Britain's own control over Commonwealth affairs. Britain is still the most influential single member in the association but, as we shall indicate in a later chapter, influence in Commonwealth affairs is now significantly shared by the African group of members. African states already constitute nearly half the Commonwealth. They exert their influence partly through solidarity with the Asian members on colonial issues, but also substantially through Britain herself. In some matters the most effective way of exerting influence on the Commonwealth as a whole is to exert influence on its most influential member. And pressure on Britain has often been the

most direct way by which Africans could make an impact on Commonwealth affairs.

One form of African pressure has been the threat to leave the Commonwealth. When this threat was used by Ghana and Tanganyika on the issue of South Africa, it was effective enough to force South Africa's withdrawal in 1961. But the trouble with this kind of threat is that it loses its impact if used too often. Since then both Tanganyika and Ghana under Nkrumah have had occasion to use the threat again. In November 1963, for example, Tanganyika's Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Oscar Kambona, warned that if Britain did not grant majority rule in Southern Rhodesia "the entire African states' membership of the Commonwealth will have to be considered ".*

By October 1963 the threat to leave the Commonwealth on the issue of Rhodesia had become so closely identified with Tanzania that conservative opinion in Britain was beginning to question the wisdom of trying to keep a country like Tanzania within the Commonwealth, or the utility of giving British aid to her. As one conservative commentator put it,

> Mr. Nyerere's recognition of Britain's generosity is a threat to leave the Commonwealth if he disapproves of the manner in which Britain exercises her own sovereignty.†

Yet, when in December 1965 Tanzania's break with Britain finally came, it came as a severance of diplomatic relations with Britain and not a withdrawal from the Commonwealth. As President Nyerere put it in an article he wrote for a British newspaper on the eve of his break with Britain :

> We shall not leave the Commonwealth—that is a multi-national organisation, not a British one, and is therefore, for the moment, at any rate, unaffected by our decision.‡

Ghana broke with Britain at the same time. But Nkrumah went further than Nyerere. He mentioned the possibility of withdrawing

* See *Uganda Argus*, Nov. 8, 1963.

† Harold Soref in the *Daily Telegraph* (London). This criticism of Nyerere is reproduced with approval in *East Africa and Rhodesia*, Oct. 14, 1965, p. 108.

‡ See Julius Nyerere, " Why I am threatening to break with Britain ", *The Observer* (London), Dec. 12, 1965.

from the Commonwealth, and declared that Ghana would call upon members of the Organization of African Unity to sever all outside links which might stand in the way of African unity, including links with Britain. Yet Nkrumah did not pull Ghana out of the Commonwealth after all. Along with Tanzania he had introduced and now maintained a new anomaly in Commonwealth relations. As the weekly *West Africa* put it at the time:

> Can a country break with Britain and still stay in the Commonwealth? . . . it is difficult to see how, even if the new [Commonwealth] Secretariat is nominally responsible for arranging the meetings, a country which has broken with Britain could attend a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference in London. And though the Queen is Head of the Commonwealth, and Commonwealth Heads of State can and should communicate directly with Buckingham Palace, she is also Queen of England, and some embarrassment might arise if she was communicating with a country which had broken with Britain.*

Yet once again the threat to leave the Commonwealth was made but not fulfilled. On the whole it was a wise decision not to fulfil it. There are certain threats which lose in effectiveness when they are implemented. In terms of diplomatic influence, the Commonwealth—at least until December 1965—had been of greater utility to the new African states than to Britain. Far from being an association by which Britain influenced Africa, the Commonwealth had become a device by which the new African states sought to influence Britain. The most dramatic way of using this device had become the threat to leave the association if Britain did not respond to some demand. The device was subtly but effectively used by the old régime of Nigeria to get Britain to extradite Chief Antony Enahoro in 1963. Enahoro, a leading member of the Action Group opposition party, was wanted by the Nigerian Government to face charges of treason. Britain sacrificed the principle of political asylum for the sake of maintaining good relations with a new African member of the Commonwealth.

A year and half before that event Britain had risked the life of the Queen for the sake of Commonwealth relations. In spite of explosions in the streets of Accra on the eve of her visit, and in spite of the general fear that the visit would strengthen Nkrumah's hand

* "Whose Club?" *West Africa*, No. 2534, Dec. 25, 1965.

against his political opponents at home, the Conservative Government in Britain allowed the Queen's visit to Ghana in 1961 to go through. There is no doubt that Britain's decision was strongly influenced by fear of alienating Commonwealth African states if the visit was cancelled. This was to be the first visit by a reigning British monarch to an independent African state. Britain's relations with the new Africa were considered to be at stake. And the Queen was, after all, Head of the Commonwealth.

On the issue of Rhodesia, however, those relations were put to a clearer test. And it was on that issue four years after the Queen's visit that Nkrumah broke off relations with Britain while remaining in the Commonwealth.

On February 24, 1966, Nkrumah himself was overthown by a military coup in Ghana. The coup was to lead to yet another diplomatic novelty. The new régime asked for British recognition—and Britain granted it that recognition. Yet diplomatic relations between the two countries remained temporarily broken for the time being.*

We have already suggested that there are certain threats that become less effective when implemented. One could go further and argue that there are certain dangers which become less effective as deterrents if they are converted into specific threats. There is little doubt that the possibility of African states embarking on a precipitate action on the issue of Rhodesia, and perhaps collectively breaking off relations with Britain, was one important consideration which determined the shape of Harold Wilson's response to Rhodesia's declaration of independence. Yet this consideration was at its most effective when it was a relatively vague fear. The element of *uncertainty* as to what the Africans might do probably contributed towards Wilson's toughness. But when the Organization of African Unity removed the uncertainty by proceeding to spell out a specific ultimatum to Britain, the cause of African influence on British policy suffered a set-back. The vague fear of what Africans might do had been a stronger pressure on British policy than the new outright ultimatum. The British Government assumed a new

* On the new régime's request for British recognition see the *New York Times*, Mar. 4, 1966.

defiance towards African opinion—" We shall not be bullied into reckless policies " British spokesmen asserted.

The ultimatum was to the effect that African states would break off diplomatic relations with Britain if the Smith régime had not fallen by December 15, 1965. As the deadline approached, Tanzania very sensibly toned down the minimum demand. As President Nyerere put it:

> In announcing Tanzania's intention to honour this O.A.U. decision I made it clear that I was not demanding that Smith shall have fallen by December 15. It would be absurd to break off diplomatic relations after there was evidence that Britain was at last willing to live up to her responsibilities. We shall wait until the very last moment—and beyond —for this evidence.*

If Britain's oil embargo on Rhodesia had been announced before Tanzania broke off relations, that might well have been the kind of evidence that would have given hope to Nyerere that Britain was at last getting tough. But the embargo was announced soon after the expiry of the ultimatum, instead of just before. It is virtually certain that Britain decided on the oil embargo before December 15—but waited deliberately until the ultimatum expired before announcing it. Nine countries had broken off diplomatic relations with Britain by then. If the embargo had been announced a few days earlier it might have dissuaded some of these nine countries from carrying out the O.A.U. ultimatum. It would certainly have given those African states which did *not* carry out the ultimatum a more honourable line of retreat.

But is African influence on British policy now a thing of the past? The answer is, fortunately for Africa, " No." Africa's diplomatic stature generally suffered a severe embarrassment both by the very fact that the O.A.U. ultimatum was made and by the fact that the threat was not, in any case, unanimously carried out once it was made. The spate of army mutinies has also contributed to Africa's diplomatic decline. Yet, ironically enough, it might well be the new régimes themselves that would restore diplomatic respectability to the continent. And for as long as the Commonwealth continues to exist, and African states remain such a sizable proportion of its

* *The Observer*, Dec. 12, 1965, *op. cit.*

membership, a strong African influence in Commonwealth affairs will persist. The most distinctive thing about Britain's third Commonwealth will remain a preponderance of Africans within the coloured majority of the association.

In the following pages we shall first trace the influence of Britain and of nationalism in Asia on the development of African resistance to colonial rule. We shall then examine in greater detail the growth of African influence in the Commonwealth. In the third chapter we shall come to grips with some of the issues involved in the Rhodesian problem—and look at Kenya's background of powerful white settlers for whatever comparative insights it might yield.

But the Commonwealth, though created by an island people, is not an island unto itself. It is affected by its own relations with the rest of the world. In Chapter 4 we shall therefore turn our attention to the development of the European Economic Community and its implications for Commonwealth Africa.

These four chapters will constitute the first section of the book—the section on " History and Politics ". We shall then move on to examining the second section on " Culture and Thought ". Yet there is an element of artificiality in the divisions. " Culture and Thought " are not absent in the first section, and " History and Politics " are certainly intimately involved in the second.

Nevertheless, there is a difference in emphasis as between the two sections. And the emphasis changes slowly from chapter to chapter. Chapter 5 on " Romantic Self-Images ", though part of the second section of the book, is more like a link between the two sections. In discussing " Culture and Thought " within the Anglo-African Commonwealth, we start with Anglo-African self-conceptions. What is the pre-eminent characteristic which the Africans and the British attribute to themselves ?

In the chapter which follows we proceed to examine one particular characteristic which, in different forms, Africans share with the British—a common attachment to some monarchical values.

We then move on in the penultimate chapter to an examination of the impact of the English language and English literature on African nationalism. We shall conclude with an analysis of Julius Nyerere's

translation of Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* into Swahili and its significance both for Swahili literature and for African politics at large.

Perhaps it is fitting that the final chapter should be on that. This is a book which aspires to probe into both the major areas of political discord in the Commonwealth and into the points of cultural reconciliation. *Julius Caesar* is a play of " political friction " at its most dramatic. Its translation by Julius Nyerere into Swahili is in turn a dramatisation of " cultural fusion " in Africa.

The essence of Britain's third Commonwealth is perhaps captured in that combination.

CHAPTER 1

John Locke and Mahatma Gandhi in African Resistance

INDIA was the first non-white British dependency to emerge from colonial rule. This fact alone was bound to influence anti-colonial movements elsewhere in the Empire. And so, way back in 1928, young Obafemi Awolowo of Nigeria was going through the *Lagos Daily News* for information about the activities of the Indian National Congress. He had developed an intense interest in Indian politics and Indian public figures. As Awolowo put it in his autobiography,

> My mental acquaintance with Gandhi, Nehru and Bose had grown into hero worship.*

Awolowo was typical of politically conscious Africans of his generation. Two forces were helping to give greater coherence to African nationalism. One was the force of British liberal ideas ; the other was the example of the Indian nationalist movement. At the centre of the Indian resistance was the personality of Mahatma Gandhi and his influence on strategy and tactics. At the back of those Anglo-Saxon liberal ideas which had an impact on African political thought were principles of government associated with the philosophy of John Locke. In this chapter we hope to demonstrate the inter-relationship between these two influences on African national consciousness. The central point of contact between them is the concept of *resistance* itself. Gandhi is associated with the

* *Awo : The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1960). Awolowo, the founder of the Action Group of Western Nigeria, later became the federal Leader of the Opposition in independent Nigeria. In 1962 he was convicted of treason and sent to prison. He became a hero of his native Western Region.

doctrine of non-violent resistance. Locke is associated with the related doctrine that one need not obey a government which is not based on consent. Our analysis here will start with Gandhism and its impact on African nationalism. We shall then link this up with some of the Lockean precepts of Anglo-Saxon liberalism and their influence in colonial Africa.

I

Just by being the first to achieve independence India had proved that it was possible for a non-white dependency to eliminate the British Raj. This fact was immediately grasped by nationalists in other coloured countries.

The next question which arose was *how* had India done it. As soon as this question was asked, *Satyagraha* loomed into relevance. *Satyagraha* is the name which Gandhi used for his method. Literally, it meant " soul-force ", but the term was used more specifically to denote " civil disobedience " or " non-violent resistance ".

Quite early in his life Gandhi saw non-violence as a method which could be well suited for the Negro as well as the Indian. The word " Negro " here is used with deliberation, for the method of non-violence was considered promising for the black people of the United States as well as of the African continent. In 1924 Gandhi said that if the black people " caught the spirit of the Indian movement, their progress must be rapid ".*

By 1936 Gandhi was wondering whether the black people, as the most oppressed of all peoples, might not be the best bearers of the message of passive resistance. To use his own words,

> It may be through the Negroes that the unadulterated message of non-violence will be delivered to the world.†

In the United States, the Gandhian torch came to be passed to Martin Luther King—who kept on affirming Gandhian principles as reciprocal race-violence caught up with the slow pace of his

* See *Young India*, Aug. 21, 1924.
† *Harijan*, Mar. 14, 1936.

country's liberalism. King, a devout Christian, tells us how he once despaired of love as a solution to social problems. He had read Nietzsche and his idea of the will to power—and this shook Martin Luther King's faith in mere love. Then one Sunday afternoon he travelled to Philadelphia to hear a sermon by Dr. Mordecai Johnson, President of Howard University. Dr. Johnson had just returned from a trip to India. In his address at Philadelphia he spoke on the life and teachings of Mahatma Gandhi. Martin Luther King was so moved that he left the meeting and bought half a dozen books on Gandhi's life and works.

Prior to reading Gandhi, King had been driven to the view that the Christian ethic could only cope with a crisis of relations between *individuals*. The " turn the other cheek " philosophy and the " love your enemies " precept were only valid when individuals were in conflict with other individuals.

> Gandhi was probably the first person in history to lift the love ethic of Jesus above mere interaction between individuals to a powerful and effective social force on a large scale .... I came to feel that this was the only morally and practically sound method open to oppressed people in their struggle for freedom.*

In Africa the Gandhian torch came to be passed to Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of Gold Coast nationalism. In June 1949 Nkrumah launched the strategy of " Positive Action " as a form of harassing British authorities to grant one concession after another to the nationalist movement. Some of his fellow Africans in the country were apprehensive about the implications of the strategy. In his autobiography Nkrumah tells us how he explained the strategy to a critical traditional local council:

> I described Positive Action as the adoption of all legitimate and constitutional means by which we could attack the forces of imperialism in the country. The weapons were legitimate political agitation, newspaper and educational campaigns and, as a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts and non-cooperation based on the principle of absolute non-violence, as used by Gandhi in India.†

With the launching of " Positive Action " Nkrumah earned the

* Martin Luther King, *Stride Toward Freedom* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1958), pp. 76–77.

† *Ghana, the Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1959), p. 92.

name not only of " Apostle of Freedom " but also of " Gandhi of Ghana."*

Years later Nkrumah said :

> We salute Mahatma Gandhi and we remember, in tribute to him, that it was in South Africa that his method of non-violence and non-co-operation was first practised.†

But was it really a tribute to Gandhism to refer to a country where non-violence had still *not* paid ? Would it not have been more polite to be silent about South Africa as the first testing ground of Gandhian methods ? Yet Nkrumah was not being sarcastic. He was genuinely saluting the Mahatma as the intellectual influence behind his own method of Positive Action. The truth of the matter is that it took African nationalism quite a while to be fully convinced that Gandhism was not always successful. At the 1958 All-African Peoples' conference in Accra one of the major debating points became the issue of whether violence was, or could be, a legitimate instrument of the African nationalist. The Algerians—then at war against the French—put up a spirited case in defence of armed insurrection. But black Africa was yet to be fully convinced.

Two years later Kenneth Kaunda in Central Africa was still almost a fanatic in his attachment to Gandhism. In a discussion with Colin Morris published in 1960 Kaunda conceded that where people were denied access to a democratic system of government, there was a great temptation to resort to what he called " non-democratic means ". He cited for illustration the experience of Cyprus and Malaya. But Kaunda then went on to emphasise :

> I could not lend myself to take part in such campaigns. *I reject absolutely violence in any of its forms as a solution to our problems.*‡

Three years later Kaunda had retreated a little from the absolutism of this stand. He placed his attachment to non-violence in the context of a broad philosophical view of human nature. Curiously

* *The Spectator Daily*, June 23, 1949 and *The Morning Telegraph*, June 27, 1949. The name " Ghana " was beginning to be used, though it did not become the official name of the country until independence.

† Nkrumah, " Positive action in Africa " in *Africa Speaks*, eds. J. Duffy and R. A. Manners (Princeton : D. Van Nostrand, 1961), p. 50.

‡ See Kenneth Kaunda and Colin Morris, *Black Government* (Lusaka : United Society for Christian Literature, 1960). The emphasis is original.

enough, Kaunda seemed to believe that there was something unnatural in being non-violent. He did not share the romanticism which saw man as being essentially peaceful. On the contrary, Kaunda felt that " man, just like any other animal, is violent."*

Yet Kaunda also believed that man could shed the nature he had carried with him all these centuries—and develop a higher nature.

> First of all we must understand that non-violence is, as Mahatma Gandhi described it, " a big experiment in man's development towards a higher realisation of himself." This is obviously a slow process as all recorded history shows. Man . . . is violent. But he has so many finer qualities than other animals that we should entertain this Gandhi thought . . . .†

Because violence has been the more natural order of things so far, and yet a poor substitute for what man is *ultimately* capable of, Kaunda is ambivalent in his attitude to non-violence. There was an element of pathos in what he was driven to do to cope with the Lumpa Church soon after independence in 1964. Followers of Alice Lenshina, the Prophetess of the Church, exploded into acts of brutal vengeance against those they regarded as their legitimate victims. Kaunda, an essentially peaceful man, was driven to make ruthless decisions—like the order for Alice " dead or alive ". He decided on a drive against the fanatics—and became almost guiltily defensive as he said : " Let them call me a savage ! "‡

Had Kaunda completely renounced his old Gandhian principles ? In his defence it can be argued that the doctrine of " absolute non-violence " could only make sense if one was struggling *against* a government. It could not make sense as a policy of a government in power. One could say to a government : " Do not use more force than is necessary." But it would not be meaningful to say to a government : " *Never* use violent methods of law enforcement ! " What if the Government was up against a gang of armed law-breakers ? What if one group of citizens was using violence against

* See the journal *New Africa*, Vol. 5, No. 1, Jan. 1963, p. 14.

† *Ibid.*

‡ See *Uganda Argus*, Aug. 7 1964. For an early account of the Lumpa Church see Robert Rotberg, " The Lenshina movement of Northern Rhodesia ", *Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Journal*, No. XXIX, June 1961, pp. 63–78.

another? What if there was an armed insurrection by an extremist minority? In order to cope with such crises no government can afford to renounce the use of armed force. Indeed, political analysts since Max Weber have sometimes defined government and the state in terms of their " monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory ".*

Kaunda in 1960 was a man struggling against a government. He was in a position to say: " I reject absolutely violence in any of its forms as a solution to our problems." What he must have meant was that he rejected the use of violence by his fellow citizens against the government of the country. But Kaunda by August 1964 *was* the government of the country. And the Lumpa Church could only be subdued by counter-violence from government forces.

As for the degree of Kaunda's anger against the Lumpa Church, it might have been due less to the use of violence as such by the Church than to the apparent " pointlessness " of it all. In an impassioned speech to Parliament in Lusaka, President Kaunda attributed to the Lumpa Church " a queer teaching that men must kill before they die ". In response to people with such a belief, Kaunda assured the House:

> my government will spare no efforts to bring them down as quickly as possible. Even if it means other people calling me savage then I am going to be one.†

Fortunately it was not long before the Prophetess Alice appealed to her followers to desist from their acts and uphold law and order. Peace was restored in Zambia. Yet the Lenshina outbreak remains a major landmark in the evolution of Kaunda's attitude to violence. With a rude shock he was forced to face the ultimate responsibilities of governing. Perhaps he even suddenly remembered that Gandhi himself never formed a government. *Satyagraha* worked in India

* See Max Weber, " Politics as a vocation," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press Gallaxy Book, 1958), pp. 77–8. Gabriel A. Almond has broadened Weber's definition in order to include types of political organisation other than the state. See Almond's " Introduction " to Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 6–7.

† Reported in *Uganda Argus*, Aug. 7, 1964.

as a strategy for winning self-government, but its relevance was limited in the *exercise* of self-government. Zambia in turn was now self-governing. But the strategy which enabled it to win this status was not " operational " as a method of governing.

The ideological shock which Kaunda sustained as a result of the Lenshina outbreak was an important preparation for his attitude when Ian Smith unilaterally declared Rhodesia's independence the following year. Kenneth Kaunda was among the most vocal advocates of the use of military force against the Smith régime. Kaunda not only asked Britain to send troops into Rhodesia in order to safeguard the Kariba Dam, his government even claimed a secret understanding with Britain that physical force would be used against Smith by a certain date if economic sanctions failed to work. The British Government denied that there had been any such understanding. But even if " the understanding " was wishful thinking on the part of Kaunda's government, it was a measure of a new attitude towards the legitimacy of violence.*

What remains to be answered is whether this new attitude was entirely due to the assumption of governmental duties. Was the apparent disappearance of Kaunda's Gandhism merely the result of his responsibility for the maintenance of law and order at home on attainment of independence and for ensuring adequate defences against a hostile neighbour ?

To a certain extent the change in Kaunda was part of a more general African disenchantment with Gandhism since the All-African Peoples' conference at Accra in 1958. We have indicated that at that conference the Algerians had some difficulty in getting black Africans to support the principle of insurrection against colonial rule. But by 1963 Kenya's Tom Mboya—who had been Chairman of that Accra conference five years previously—could observe in his autobiography that :

> even those African leaders who accept Gandhi's philosophy find there are limitations to its use in Africa.†

What limitations ? One limitation might lie in the African himself;

* See *Africa Diary*, Vol. vi, No. 5, Jan. 24—30, 1966, pp. 2706–7.

† *Freedom and After* (London : Andre Deutsche, 1963), pp. 50–52.

another limitation might lie in the régime that he is struggling against. The limitation in the African might be a lack of sustained discipline to prevent the resistance from becoming violent. The limitation in the régime might be a lack of sensitivity to moral pressure. Either of these could make Gandhism in Africa less effective than it was in its native Indian soil. In South Africa it might well be the régime's lack of sensitivity to moral pressure that has been the greatest obstacle to passive resistance.

On whether the African had the capacity for passive resistance, one opinion was expressed to Nkrumah soon after he threatened Positive Action in the Gold Coast. Nkrumah was called before the Colonial Secretary, Mr. R. H. Saloway. According to Nkrumah, Mr. Saloway warned him in the following terms:

> But don't you see that this positive action that you are planning will bring chaos and ultimate disorder into the country? . . . . Now India was a very different matter. The Indian was used to suffering pains and deprivations, but the African has not that spirit of endurance.*

If this was a claim that the African was more prone to violence than the Indian, the claim is highly dubious. In the history of decolonization there have been few slaughters more appalling than the carnage between Hindus and Muslims when the sub-continent was partitioned. And the history of India since then has been characterised by recurrent outbursts of linguistic, religious and other forms of riots. On the other hand, Positive Action in Ghana was by no means the chaotic failure that Saloway thought it would be. Strategic strikes and demonstrations were managed with effect. Nkrumah had been haunted by the fear that Saloway might be vindicated. As Nkrumah put it "Mr. Saloway's words hammered in my brain in mockery—'Now, had this been India . . . .' "† But positive action in the Gold Coast contributed its share to the country's progress towards self-government.

Yet, on at least one major point, Saloway was right. It *was* true that the Indian was used to certain forms of suffering and deprivation the like of which was virtually unknown to most Africans. For one thing, poverty in India can get more severe than it hardly ever gets

* Nkrumah, *Autobiography*, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

† *Ibid.*, p. 97.

in Africa. But from the point of view of passive resistance an even more important consideration is that Hinduism sometimes makes a virtue of suffering and hardship. As E. W. F. Tomlin put it in a somewhat dramatic form,

> If a half-naked or wholly naked Hindu . . . [deliberately] starves himself to within an ace of death or nearly buries himself alive—or actually does so—we tend to dismiss these acts as mere wanton aberrations, the product of ascetic high spirits. Such a judgment is superficial . . . . The Yogi is simply a man who takes the Hindu philosophy to its logical conclusion.*

This Hindu philosophy was an important contributory factor both to the success of Gandhi himself in Indian politics and to the viability of Gandhism in the sub-continent. Gandhi became acceptable as a spiritual leader because the society valued the qualities of asceticism and self-discipline which he embodied in himself. And Gandhism worked in India both because Gandhi himself had become a spiritual hero and because the qualities of martyrdom and physical endurance which he demanded for passive resistance were far from alien to Hindu temperament. This is an important contrast to the situation in Africa. As I had occasion to say elsewhere, Africa has no ascetic tradition of the Hindu kind. The idea of lying across a railway line as a form of passive resistance would fire few imaginations on the African continent. As for the idea of " fasting unto death ", this has become almost uniquely Indian. There are indeed instances where the spirit of non-violent resistance needs a certain suicidal resignation to work effectively. This temperament of " suicidal resignation ", complete with a philosophical tradition behind it, is more evident in India than in Africa.†

Another prerequisite for the success of passive resistance is a

* See Tomlin, *The Oriental Philosophers* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1963), p. 231.

† See Ali Mazrui, " Sacred Suicide ", *Transition*, Vol. 5 (ii), No. 21, 1965, p. 12. The myth of ascetism is still an important part of the Indian style of politics. Speaking of the leader of Congress Party, J. Anthony Lukas observed in Feb. 1966: " Kamaraj must still conform outwardly to the Gandhian image of self-sacrifice and humility which Indians demand of their politicians." See " Political python of India ", *New York Times Magazine*, Feb. 20, 1966, p. 27.

characteristic of the régime against whom the resistance is directed rather than a quality of the resisters themselves. This is where we resume contact with John Locke. Passive resistance works if the régime gives it a certain degree of legitimacy. It has been said that the world would not have heard of Gandhi had he been born in Stalinist Russia. Gandhism needed to have an enemy with a political ethic which did not equate all political resistance with treason. Anglo-Saxon liberalism was such an ethic. In fact, sustained Gandhian tactics in this century have only worked against Anglo-Saxon régimes. They worked against the British in India and, to some extent, in the Gold Coast. And under the leadership of Martin Luther King and his colleagues, those tactics have also been working against the old racial ways of the United States.

The fountain-head of this Anglo-Saxon liberalism is John Locke. And John Locke is a philosopher of the right of rebellion. As a former African rebel, K. A. Busia of Ghana, reminds us, "John Locke was recalled" in the American Declaration of Independence itself:

> We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness . . . . That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government . . . .*

In the history of empires Lockeanism was then first used by one set of Anglo-Saxons against another. But by the twentieth century it was helping the cause of Asian and black peoples in their rebellion against Anglo-Saxon supremacy at large. Lockeanism helped the Asian-Negro cause in two ways. That part of Locke's philosophy which was a legitimation of the right of rebellion enabled passive resistance in the colonies and in the United States to be a viable strategy of protest. That part of Lockeanism which eulogised individual freedom and majority rule helped to inspire Afro-Asian nationalists in the first place in their desire for democracy. Dame Margery Perham had a point—though an exaggerated one—when

* See Busia, *The Challenge of Africa* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 76–77. Dr. Busia is, of course, the former Leader of the Opposition in Ghana who went into exile abroad, when Nkrumah was in power.

she said : " The ideal of democratic freedom . . . [has] been learned very largely from Britain herself."*

In some cases the Lockean ethic found its way into African nationalism almost as much through American influence as through British. The most distinguished founding fathers of West African nationalism were Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Nnamdi Azikiwe, the first President of independent Nigeria. Both were educated in the United States and exposed to the liberal rhetoric of American militancy. Their early speeches betray this marked influence of liberalism in their conception of " democracy ". As late as 1952 Azikiwe was reminding members of his political party of John Locke's conception of the origins and nature of legitimate government. What Azikiwe quoted from Locke in addressing fellow Nigerians was the following :

> A State is established through the agreement of a number of persons who unite themselves to live together in peace and protect themselves in common against others, and who, for this purpose, subject themselves to the will of the majority. This was—and only that could have been—the beginning of every legally constituted government.†

In 1954 James S. Coleman, the distinguished American student of developments in Africa, confirmed the widespread suspicion that nationalist movements in Africa were " activated by the Western ideas of democracy . . . and self-determination ".‡ Whether by accident or design, Coleman was right in putting " democracy " first on his list of influential ideas—and " self-determination " only later. The sense of " democracy " which was influential in British Africa was, as we have indicated, predictably the Anglo-Saxon version of the liberal ethic. This ethic remained basically oriented towards *individual* freedom. The principle of self-determination, on the other hand, is usually oriented towards the freedom of a *group*. The paradox of the African experience is that

* Perham, *The Colonial Reckoning* (London : Collins, 1961), p. 22.

† Presidential address to the National Executive Committee of the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons held at Port Harcourt, Nigeria, on Oct. 3, 1952. See *ZIK : A Selection from the Speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1961), p. 86.

‡ Coleman, " Nationalism in Tropical Africa ", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 2, June 1954, p. 407.

nationalism in Africa derived its original intellectual stimulation from an ethic of individualism. The result was that the rhetoric of African nationalism, at least in British Africa, was *not*, in fact, filled with repetitions of the word " self-determination " as might have been expected. What was more common in the language of nationalism were terms like " individual freedom," " one-man, one-vote " and " majority rule ".

Individualism in the Anglo-Saxon ethic reached its maturity in the nineteenth century. But John Locke remained the fountain head. And so some of the postulates were implicit in that Lockean Declaration of Independence of the first rebels against British imperialism. The American example of 1776 did not escape even those African nationalists who were not educated in the United States. This was partly because the American War of Independence feautured prominently in the history of the British Empire—and almost every school child in British Africa had to learn Empire history. At first the teaching of Empire history helped to give the Empire itself greater legitimacy in the sight of the colonised peoples themselves. But certain aspects of Empire history gradually came to contribute to the growth of African nationalism. Among those aspects must be included the American rebellion against British rule. As Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika said of the American Declaration of Independence, " This was the first time in history that the principles of a struggle for freedom from foreign domination had been clearly defined."*

Claims about something being done " for the first time " often contain an element of exaggeration. Moreover, we can dispute Nyerere's assumption that the American struggle in the eighteenth century was really against " foreign " domination. The British in the eighteenth century were no more " foreigners " in American eyes than Harold Wilson was a " foreigner " to Ian Smith when the latter declared Rhodesia's independence in November 1965. The American War of Independence was indeed a war against colonial rule. What Africans, Asians and sometimes even contemporary

* Nyerere, " Africa's Place in the World ", *Symposium on Africa* (Wellesley College, 1960), p. 150.

Americans are apt to forget is that " colonial rule " need not be *foreign* rule. The American War of Independence was much more like a civil war than a war against " foreign domination ". The rebels were objecting to being treated like second-class Englishmen. They were demanding the rights of first-class Englishmen—" No taxation without representation." When they failed to get those rights, they decided that—to use the words of Thomas Paine—" *'Tis time to part !* "

But even if the American War of Independence was not really a model of opposition to foreign rule, what matters is that sophisticated African nationalists like Julius Nyerere regarded it as such. This part of Empire history in African and Asian colonial schools might therefore have contributed to the ideological forces which led to the disintegration of the third British Empire.*

But what was Locke's contribution to Gandhism itself? In a sense, Locke was a prophet of *violent* revolution, while Gandhi stood for non-violence. We ought to remember that the Lockean Declaration of American Independence was a legitimation of armed conflict. If a government ignored the inalienable rights of " Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness ", even violent resistance by the people was justified. Hence John Locke's first impact on imperial relations resulted in a *war* of independence. The experience of this war became in turn an additional argument against going back and retracting the secessionist intentions of the Lockean Declaration. As that embodiment of the Englishness of America, Thomas Paine, once put it:

> Everything that is right and reasonable pleads for separation. The blood of the slain, the weeping voice of nature cries, " 'Tis time to part."†

Yet, although Locke in America was stained with blood, the

* For our purposes the first British Empire was the American ; the second consisted of what are today the older Dominions, South Africa and the Asian countries ; the third consisted of different combinations of the second *plus Africa*. George Padmore, the West Indian founding father of Pan-Africanism, regarded Africa on its own as the third empire. See his *Africa : Britain's Third Empire* (London : Dennis Dobson, 1948?).

† See his book *Common Sense*. Paine was born in England and became a prophet of the American Revolution when the American controversy with Britain broke out afresh in the 1770's. Paine became an American citizen.

original Locke of the 1688 English Revolution was not. The English philosopher had provided moral justification for an English revolution—yet the revolution against James II had been bloodless. It was a " Glorious Revolution " in an almost Gandhian sense. The English had used non-violent resistance against their King—and forced him out of their country. More than two hundred years later a somewhat similar spirit of " bloodless resistance " helped in turn to force the English themselves out of India.

Yet in practice India's struggle was accompanied with blood. Perhaps Gandhism was in an intermediate stage between the spirit of the English Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the spirit of the American Revolution a century later. Gandhi intended to keep the struggle in India bloodless—but the nature of the British response, and the internal divisions of Indians themselves, demanded of the cause of India's independence the price that the American rebels had paid before—" the blood of the slain " and " the weeping voice of nature [crying] *'Tis time to part.*" The most agonising parting was between Indians themselves—the blood-stained separation between Hindu and Muslim India. The break with Britain was less complete than the American break had been. There was now a British Commonwealth of Nations to which India and Pakistan could accede—and both decided to do so.

But perhaps the most direct relationship between Locke and Gandhism lies in the link between constitutionalism and non-violent resistance. As liberalism developed in the West it came to make assumptions about " constitutionalism " as a principle of government. There was a growing conviction that people who lived under a liberal system of government should only use " constitutional methods " in their demands for any reforms. But gradually this idea of using the so-called " constitutional methods " became an independent principle in its own right. Constitutional methods came to be considered good in themselves almost regardless of whether the constitution itself was " good " or liberal.

By the time of the Afro-Asian struggle constitutional methods had come to mean almost the same thing as non-violent methods. Certainly the two concepts reinforced one another in British India.

No other non-Western country has been more deeply affected by the Anglo-Saxon liberal ethic than India. This ethic found its way into the very methods that Indian nationalism used in its struggle against Britain.

In Africa, too, constitutionalism and non-violence were wedded together. Nkrumah once contrasted British armed defence against two German attempts at invasion on one side with " the victory over British imperialism in India by moral pressure " on the other side. For him the struggle of the Gold Coast had to be of the latter kind.

> . . . there were two ways of achieving self-government, one by armed revolution and the latter by *constitutional* and legitimate non-violent methods . . . . Positive Action [was] the adoption of all legitimate and *constitutional* means by which we could attack the forces of imperialism in the country.*

Enumerating the specific methods Nkrumah referred to " the *constitutional* application of strikes, boycotts and non-co-operation based on the principle of absolute non-violence, as used by Gandhi in India ".†

In effect, the methods of non-violent resistance and direct action as used by Gandhi and as enumerated by Nkrumah were, in the words of a Western student of Gandhism, " extra-constitutional ". They were " extra-constitutional " because they did not " rely upon the established procedures of the state (whether parliamentary or non-parliamentary) for achieving their objective ".‡ Yet so powerful was the myth of constitutionalism in the liberal ethic that it was invoked even by nationalists seeking to overthrow the existing colonial constitutions. Again the parallel with the glorious rebels of 1688 is striking—for those English revolutionaries too accomplished an extra-constitutional revolution and legitimised it on the basis of constitutional usage.

We know now that this combination of non-violence and constitutionalism worked in India and then in Ghana. When it achieved

* Nkrumah, *Autobiography*, *op. cit.*, p. 92. The emphasis is mine.

† *Ibid.* Emphasis is mine.

‡ Gene Sharp, "The Meanings of Non-Violence: A Typology (Revised)," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. iii, No. 1, March 1959, pp. 44-45.

its purpose converts to Gandhism elsewhere drew extra strength. Kaunda in his autobiography tells us how he was " determined to combine Gandhi's policy of non-violence with Nkrumah's positive action ". He coupled this determination with a letter to Iain Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies, assuring him that

> when we say we believe that " all men are created equal and that they are endowed with certain inalienable rights among them LIFE, LIBERTY and the PURSUIT of HAPPINESS," we mean that this applies to all men on earth regardless of race . . . .*

And so the link between the Gandhian ethic and that Lockean rhetoric keeps on re-asserting itself. Perhaps that link is *internal.* Perhaps the political philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi was indeed a child of both Hindu philosophy and British liberalism. And in the streets of Accra and Lusaka it entered the ethos of African nationalism.

* Kenneth Kaunda, *Zambia Shall be Free, An Autobiography* (London: Heinemann,) 1962, pp. 140–2. The capital letters are Kaunda's.

CHAPTER 2

The African "Conquest" of the British Commonwealth

"WE are today as much an Asian as a Western Commonwealth." So said Patrick Gordon-Walker, then Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, in October 1950.* That was three years after the accession of India, Pakistan and Ceylon to the Commonwealth.

By Gordon-Walker's description, Africa had as yet no share in the Commonwealth. The Union of South Africa was one of the founder-members of the Commonwealth. But presumably the Commonwealth Secretary regarded South Africa as part of the "Western" sector of the Commonwealth. This was in accord with the self-image of South Africa herself, whose rulers had always regarded her as "an outpost of our Western European civilization".†

Yet the fact that South Africa was part of the African continent gave her a distinctive role within the old Commonwealth. We might even say that Africa's first impact on the shape and development of the Commonwealth was through the influence exerted by South Africa. In a sense, this was the genesis of what later became a partial African "conquest" of the British Commonwealth. By the end of 1964 the Commonwealth had almost become an Anglo-African association. It was "British" because the United Kingdom was still a kind of focal point of Commonwealth relations, and

* Speech to the Royal Empire Society on Oct. 12, 1950. See *United Empire* (journal of the Royal Empire Society—later *Commonwealth Journal* of the Royal Commonwealth Society), Vol. xli, No. 6, 1950, pp. 333–4.

† A description used by, among others, Prime Minister D. F. Malan of South Africa in a broadcast from London on Apr. 28, 1949. See Nicholas Mansergh, *Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs*, 1931–1952 (London : Oxford University Press, 1953), Vol. ii, p. 1153.

because the remaining old Dominions of Australia, New Zealand and Canada were still substantially " Britannic ". The Commonwealth was now also crucially " African " because the African states now constituted the largest single group of states and exerted substantial influence on Commonwealth decisions. There had, in fact, developed two centres of influence within the Commonwealth—Britain herself was one centre, the African group of nations was the other. The remaining members of the Commonwealth often found themselves in the orbit of one or other of these spheres.

We propose to examine in this chapter the forces which gave rise to this bi-centrism within the Commonwealth. And since Africa's first impact on the shape of the Commonwealth was through the Union of South Africa, it is with South Africa's historic role that we must start.

An Oxford historian has suggested that it might have been Smuts' ideas which " largely shaped the first Commonwealth, that of the Statute of Westminster ".* If that is the case, then the influence of Africa on the Commonwealth has always been towards greater equality. The white South Africans were, in their majority, the least " British " of the original members of the Commonwealth. Partly because of that, Jan Smuts fought for sovereign equality between member states of the Commonwealth. Years later the Commonwealth became multi-coloured—and the new African states like Ghana found themselves, as it were, the furthest removed from " whiteness ". The equality they demanded of the Commonwealth was therefore different from that demanded by Smuts. For these new members of the Commonwealth it was not merely sovereign equality between states which mattered : it was also human equality between races.

Yet Smuts' fight was still a contribution to the later dignity of African states. After all, these states came to demand sovereign equality between countries as well as racial equality at large.

But what was Jan Smuts' stand in the old Commonwealth? The

* See George Bennett (ed.), " Introduction ", *The Concept of Empire, Burke to Attlee* 1774—1947 (London: Adam and Charles Black, 2nd edition 1962), p. 20.

answer lies in the very preference Smuts had for the name " Commonwealth ". In a sense, General Smuts virtually christened " the British Commonwealth of Nations ". This is not the same thing as saying that he was the first to apply the word " Commonwealth " on its own to Greater Britain. Other people before him, and even some of his contemporaries, had used the term " Commonwealth ", either on its own or in combination with some other epithet, to denote the British imperial organisation.* At the Imperial War Conference of 1917 Sir Robert Borden of Canada spoke of "an Imperial Commonwealth of United Nations ". But it was also at that conference that General Smuts spoke more simply—and prophetically—of " the British Commonwealth of Nations ".

But why did Smuts feel a need for such a name ? The answer had a direct bearing on the development of the principle of sovereign equality between the constituent parts of the Britannic association. At that time the term " Empire " was still the prevalent expression for both Dominions and colonies. At a banquet given in his honour by members of both Houses of Parliament in London in May 1917, Smuts had this to say :

> I think the very expression " Empire " is misleading, because it makes people think as if we are one single entity . . . . We are not an Empire. Germany is an Empire, so was Rome, and so is India, but we are a system of nations, a community of states, and of nations far greater than any empire which has ever existed.†

Smuts then went on to elaborate on the principle of diversity within the British association :

> This community of nations, which I prefer to call the British Commonwealth of nations . . . does not stand for unity, standardisation, or assimilation, or denationalisation ; but it stands for a fuller, a richer, a more various life among all the nations that compose it.‡

Diversity is the breeding ground of freedom for each member of the community. And so Smuts went on to say :

> We are not going to force common Governments, federal or otherwise,

* For a valuable but somewhat different interpretation see S. R. Mehrotra, " On the use of the term ' Commonwealth ' ", *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Vol. ii, No. 1, Nov. 1963, pp. 1–16.

† See *The Concept of Empire, Burke to Attlee, op. cit.*, p. 389.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 390.

but we are going to extend liberty, freedom and nationhood more and more in every part of the Empire.*

In this insistence on autonomy Smuts was, in a sense, following the trail of the Canadians. The author of the historic Durham Report of 1839 was, of course, a former governor of Canada. The Earl of Durham advocated the granting of " responsible government ". The recommendation was the beginning of a revolution in the British concept of empire. Ultimate responsible government for the dependencies gradually became an established aim of British colonial policy. The process of imperial decentralisation got under way. By the 1921 imperial conference the famous Balfour Declaration was, as we have indicated, adopted. The Dominions were defined by the Declaration as " autonomous communities within the British Empire, in no way subordinate one to the other in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations ".†

The principle of sovereign equality had at last been achieved, and the achievement was as much Canadian as it was South African. Yet South Africa's role in the struggle was still distinctive. It is true that both Canada and South Africa had a large community of white people who were not British. Canada had its French-speakers; South Africa had its Boers. But while in Canada the French-speakers were *not* the dominant community, in South Africa the Boers were. In her relations with the rulers of Canada, Britain was still dealing with people who were substantially of British extraction. But in the case of the rulers of South Africa, it was the Boer element which predominated and with which Britain had to deal. The fact that the Boers were not British often made Britain more flexible in her relations with them and more wary of offending their sensibilities. It is considerations such as these which made South Africa important in the history of sovereign equality within the Commonwealth.

But just as Britain had to make allowances for the Boers, the

* *Ibid.*, p. 391.

† See Imperial Conference, London, 1926. Summary of Proceedings, Cmd. 2768.

Boers in turn had to make allowances for their English-speaking compatriots in their midst. Some of these English-speaking South Africans were becoming concerned about the increasing autonomy of the Union from Britain. The Status of the Union Act of 1934 described South Africa as " a sovereign independent state ". Fears were expressed in the South African House of Assembly about the significance of this. Was this not a radical departure from " existing practice " ? On this issue of the autonomy of South Africa Jan Smuts was emphatic. He referred the critics of the Status of the Union Act to the governing Balfour declaration of the 1926 conference. Smuts said :

> To my mind the most important part of that declaration . . . is what I may call the equation between Great Britain and the dominions . . . . She is mentioned with them, she is lumped together with them, in this declaration. That I call the great equation of our Commonwealth, upon which our Commonwealth rests. If that equation is fundamental, if that is really what this great declaration of 1926 meant, then how can you conceivably argue that the dominions are not sovereign international independent states, without denying that Great Britain, which is equated with them, has that status in the world ?*

It is one of the ironies of Commonwealth history that the same nation which symbolised the struggle for sovereign equality between member states of the Commonwealth should later have symbolised resistance to equality between different races. But on at least the issue of India's admission into the Commonwealth Jan Smuts as Prime Minister was not without magnanimity. In a statement he issued from Cape Town in June 1947 Smuts said :

> In spite of India's recent attitude towards South Africa I hope she will not resent my expression of deep interest in the settlement which Mr. Attlee has announced in the House of Commons . . . . In these stormy, troublous times it must be a matter of no small importance to India that she starts her career within the grand community of the Commonwealth, with all the stability and prestige that that fact implies . . . . In that association she will have all the good will from her fellow members, which may be a precious asset in the dangerous years to come and the vast changes they may bring.†

It was over the accession of " Negro states " to the Commonwealth that South Africa became particularly perturbed—the more

* South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 23, cols. 2072–8.

† See *The Times* (London), June 5, 1947.

so after Jan Smuts was succeeded by the more racialistic D. F. Malan as Prime Minister of the Union. In 1951 the prospect of the Gold Coast's independence was beginning to assume a sense of nearness. The idea of having more coloured members of the Commonwealth brought to the fore South Africa's disaffection with the very precedent which India had set. And so in February 1951 Prime Minister Malan referred with gloom to recent declarations of British colonial policies. He said he recalled a recent speech of the British Minister of Colonial Affairs not only welcoming in advance " the new West African Negro state " as a member of the Commonwealth but also announcing the policy of converting the British colonies, one after another, into free and independent members of the Commonwealth, " presumably on an equal footing in all respects with the existing members ". Dr. Malan was also perturbed by Gordon-Walker's prophecy at about the same time that the accession of West Africa was to be followed by that of the British West Indian Islands. Malan said :

> The Commonwealth can, and could in the past, exist only as a result of . . . specific common interests and a sufficient degree of political and cultural identity . . . . But now . . . this question must necessarily arise : what greater measure of identity or commonality or one-ness exists between South Africa and India than exists between South Africa and the Netherlands or . . . between Australia and the Negro State of West Africa than between Australia and the United States of America ?*

When the Conservatives came to power in Britain Malan took an even tougher line on the issue of the Gold Coast as a candidate for Commonwealth membership. Some observers in the diplomatic world began to wonder if the Conservative government in Britain would risk a breach with a founder member of the Commonwealth for the sake of the novelty of an African member. Other observers, though a little apprehensive, were more confident. Chester Bowles, former United States' Ambassador to India, said on his return from a recent visit to Africa in 1955 :†

> Within two years the British will face a profoundly important test. The

* *Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs, op. cit.*, pp. 1287–8.

† Bowles was to become U.S. Ambassador to India again.

> Gold Coast will request membership in the British Commonwealth as soon as it achieves independence. Race-conscious South Africa indicates that if the Gold Coast is accepted, it will withdraw. I have no doubt that the British will make the right decision.*

By June the following year matters were much clearer. As a writer in the *News Chronicle* put it:

> Dr. Malan once vowed that if the Gold Coast were admitted to membership South Africa would walk out. Now, only two or three years later, Mr. Strijdom [Malan's successor] is ready to accept the Gold Coast, and the next time the [Commonwealth] Premiers meet an African will join the Asians, the Boer, the French-Canadian and the Anglo-Saxons.†

The admission of Ghana into the Commonwealth was both a measure of South Africa's waning influence on Commonwealth decisions and a causal factor of further decline. From then on the Commonwealth lime-light was turned on to the new emerging states of black Africa. By 1961 the threat of " withdrawal from the Commonwealth " as a device for keeping someone *else* out was turned against South Africa herself. Ghana joined Tanganyika and declared " It is either South Africa or Ghana—Commonwealth must decide ". The tables were turned.‡

Verwoerd, Strijdom's successor, decided after all not to apply for re-admission into the Commonwealth after the Union became a Republic. South Africa's withdrawal marked the end of this first phase of Africa's influence on the shape of the Commonwealth. It also demonstrated the second phase of that influence—the impact of the new black states on this community of nations. By the end of 1964 the Commonwealth was decidedly *bi-centric*—with one centre of influence in Africa and another in the United Kingdom. The

* See *Africa Digest*, Vol. iii, No. 4, Oct. 1955, pp. 21–2.

† *News Chronicle* (London), June 26, 1956. At the 1957 conference Nkrumah was indeed in attendance. South Africa was represented—but not by her Prime Minister. The reasons for Strijdom's absence were described as " personal ". See *Manchester Guardian*, May 3, 1957, for example.

‡ As we shall further indicate in a later chapter, a decisive factor was Julius Nyerere's article in *The Observer* (London : Mar. 12, 1961) saying that Tanganyika would not apply for membership if South Africa remained a member. Nkrumah took a similar position. See J. D. B. Miller, " South Africa's departure ", *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Vol. i, No. 1, Nov. 1961, pp. 56–74.

Asian members sometimes found themselves swept into the anti-colonial militancy of the African members as a token of " Afro-Asian solidarity ", and sometimes drawn towards the United Kingdom in urging moderation. Canada often continued the tradition of serving as a bridge between the old conservative forces of the Commonwealth and the reformist pressures of the new radicals.

But what made it possible for the new African members of the Commonwealth to assume a position of such influence within the community ?

There was first the factor of numbers. At the end of 1964 there were nine African members of the Commonwealth, two West Indian, four Asian, three old Dominions, the United Kingdom, Malta and Cyprus. The African states were the largest single group. If you included the West Indian states, the black states constituted a majority in the Commonwealth already. Africa was well placed in terms of influence-potential. It could influence the Asian members by tacit assumptions of Afro-Asian sentiment, and could influence Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago on issues which concerned " the dignity of the blackman ". Cyprus was also responsive to anti-colonial sentiments. And Canada had her tradition of radicalism within the Commonwealth.

Yet why should the numerical superiority of such small members of the Commonwealth be so decisive ? It is true that Nigeria was the most populous member of the Commonwealth outside Asia, but the other black states were on the whole relatively small. Would it not have made better sense if the Commonwealth had been " Anglo-Asian " in its bi-centrism ? After all, India alone had more people than the rest of the Commonwealth put together.

What made the Asian members of the Commonwealth less effective than they might have been were the deep divisions between India and Pakistan and between Malaysia and Indonesia. Indonesia was not, of course, a member of the Commonwealth. But the dispute that Malaysia had outside the Commonwealth made her anxious for support within the Commonwealth. It not only made Malaysia militarily dependent on Britain, but also tended to make

her diplomatically responsive to African states in the hope of winning their support in the quarrel with Indonesia.*

Another factor which made African states influential in spite of their size was the very concept of a conference of heads of governments. To the development of this concept too Jan Smuts made a contribution. As far back as 1917 he was pleading for more regular meetings of Empire leaders. As he put it to members of both Houses of the British Parliament at that banquet in his honour:

> Everyone admits that it would be necessary to devise better machinery for common consultation than we have had hitherto. So far we have relied upon the Imperial Conference which meets every four years, and which, however useful for the work it has done hitherto, has not, in my opinion, been a complete success . . . . After all, what you want is to call together the most important statesmen in the Empire from time to time—say once a year, or as often as may be found necessary—to discuss matters which concern all parts of the Empire in common, and in order that the causes of friction and misunderstanding may be removed.†

The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference as it evolved was not exactly what Smuts had in mind. But, curiously enough, it did become more nearly what he had envisaged when black African states in 1964 insisted on a frank discussion of Rhodesia. In the old days of the Imperial Conference an argument that Britain was having with one of her colonies would have been regarded very much an affair for Britain herself. And while it could be discussed at an Imperial Conference, the United Kingdom virtually decided how much of the issue could be made subject to Commonwealth consultation. But by 1964 the initiative on which matters were to be discussed at the conference was less with Britain than it had ever been before. Of course, London as the host capital for such conferences still had considerable latitude in working out the agenda. But there was a general dispersal now of initiative, and less inhibition among members in discussing sensitive issues than there might have been in the more " gentlemanly " days.

The conference as a diplomatic medium tends to yield advantage

* Both Malaysia and Indonesia sent goodwill missions to African countries. See, for example, *The Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam), Jan. 20, 1965, and *Uganda Argus*, Apr. 9, 1965.

† See *The Concept of Empire, Burke to Attlee, op. cit.*, pp. 392–3.

to the side with more *voices*. Numerical superiority within the conference chamber can be more decisive than the number of people at home that each voice represents. The voices of three African Prime Ministers, representing less than twenty million people in their own countries, could be more important at a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting than the lone voice of, say, India's Prime Minister. That is the logic of the principle of "sovereign equality" in Commonwealth relations on which South Africa had once insisted. And it is the principle of "sovereign equality", operating in the favourable medium of a conference, which has helped to give the numerically superior African heads of governments such influence in the deliberations of the community.

Another factor which has contributed to African influence is the very emergence of "racial equality" as the dominant principle of the Commonwealth, and global racial harmony as its ultimate ambition. It was a British Prime Minister who warned that as the confrontation between the Western world and the Soviet Union was coming to an end, there was the danger of a widening gulf between rich and poor, between coloured nations and the rest. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said at the Commonwealth Press Union's annual conference in 1964 what he and other British leaders have said elsewhere—that the Commonwealth had a great opportunity to help avert the widening gulf. "If we have the wisdom to take our opportunities," declared Sir Alex, "we can make the influence of the Commonwealth felt."*

In 1965 Arnold Smith, the Canadian diplomat who became the first Secretary-General of the new Commonwealth Secretariat, expressed similar convictions. He said:

> The division of the world between the white and other races, which coincides too closely for comfort with the division between the affluent industrialised peoples and the poor underdeveloped peoples is, I think, the most difficult and potentially dangerous problem in the world.†

This sort of analysis of the world situation has an inherently

* *East African Standard*, June 16, 1964. For an earlier speech by Sir Alec on the same theme see the extensive report "U.K. warning on World division", *East African Standard*, Feb. 8, 1964.

† See *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, July 1, 1965.

pro-African tendency. In general, Africans are *not* the poorest people in the world. There is considerably more poverty in India and Pakistan than there is in most countries of Africa. But the black people are the most aggrieved of all races in moral terms even if they are better off economically than many Asians. It was Nehru himself who once told his countrymen :

> Reading through history, I think the agony of the African continent . . . has not been equalled anywhere.*

If the Commonwealth is then to be primarily based on the principle of racial equality, African participation is more expressive of egalitarianism than Asian. After all, the black man is the furthest removed from the white man in colour, and the Negro race has historically been looked down upon more universally than almost any other race. To accord the black man full dignity is therefore the ultimate measure of racial equality. This factor has tended to make white champions of the Commonwealth ideal more responsive to African views and demands than they might otherwise have been.

A related factor to this is that African members of the Commonwealth are, in any case, more racially sensitive than their Asian counterparts. The very idea of a racial confrontation between white and coloured people now sounds more convincing when one is thinking of Africa than of Asia. There is a good deal of " anti-Americanism " in Asia, and even " anti-Westernism "—but the sentiment of being *anti-white* as such has considerably subsided in the Asian continent in the last decade. Asia is in any case more racially heterogeneous than Africa. And the deep divisions between Asians themselves, either as racial groups or as competitive nation-states, have sometimes made anti-*white* passions almost incidental.

But Asia, after all, does not have the equivalent of a South Africa in its midst. The most blatantly racialistic régime in the world happens to be in Africa, and this has been a major contributory factor to the persistence of racial sensitivity in the rest of the continent. Many African leaders feel that the dignity of the African race is indivisible. As Kenya's Tom Mboya once put it, " as long

* See Jawaharlal Nehru, " Portuguese colonialism : an anachronism ", *Africa Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 3, Oct.—Dec., 1961, p. 9.

as any part of Africa remains under European rule, we do not feel that Africans will be regarded in the right way."*

The passions aroused over Rhodesia are to be explained in similar terms. After the withdrawal of South Africa, Rhodesia soon became the last major symbol of white supremacy in the British Commonwealth and Empire. The very fact that the last major "white-settler" problem in British imperial history was geographically situated in the African continent gave extra weight to the views of the independent African members of the Commonwealth on this problem, and added to their influence within the Community generally.

Finally, there is the relevance of *degrees* of anglicisation within the Commonwealth. John Plamenatz, the Oxford historian and political theorist, has suggested that the Indians are perhaps the most deeply Westernised of all non-Western peoples.† It is perhaps true that educated Indians as a group are the most anglicised of all former subjects of Britain in Asia and Africa. It is pertinent in this generalisation to limit ourselves to Asia and Africa—for the Indians are *not* the most anglicised of *all* coloured members of the Commonwealth. It is with some justice that Jamaicans and people of the other islands of the former British West Indies have sometimes been described as "Afro-Saxons".‡

The African members of the Commonwealth are, however, different. In general, they are the least Westernised of all members of the Commonwealth. It is true that the impact of Britain on Africa has had deep consequences. And even culturally, as we shall show in a later chapter, there has been a significant British influence on African thought and literature. But relative to the other members of the Commonwealth, the degree of Westernisation in Africa has been less pronounced than elsewhere in the community. It is

* Reported in *Mombasa Times* (Kenya), Jan. 11, 1962.

† John Plamenatz, *On Alien Rule and Self-Government* (London: Longmans, 1960).

‡ See Rex Nettleford, "National identity and attitudes to race in Jamaica," *Race*, Vol. vii, No. 1, July 1965, p. 62. See also Kenneth Ramchand, "Decolonisation in West Indian literature", *Transition*, Vol. 5 (iii), No. 22, 1965, pp. 48–9.

perhaps arguable that the Greek cypriots are less " British " than educated Ghanaians. Yet by definition the Greeks are more " Western " than Ghanaians—and Western culture must therefore be presumed to have had deeper roots in Makarios than in Nkrumah.

But what has degree of Westernisation got to do with African influence in the Commonwealth ? The answer hinges on the psychology of trying to maintain friendship with some one whom one does not as yet fully understand. If you met someone from another culture whose ways of thought were unfamiliar to you, and whose reactions to things were as yet unpredictable to you, you are likely to be much more inhibited in what you say to him than you would be if you knew him better. And if you then found out that the stranger had some strong feelings on this or that issue—feelings whose intensity you do not yourself share nor indeed understand—you would nevertheless be likely to be more indulgent towards the stranger than you would be to a fellow countryman with similar views.

This is a gross oversimplification of the psychological factors at work in the indulgence one sometimes accords to people *whom one sympathetically accepts as different.* But roughly the same factors operate in Commonwealth relations. The African members are more influential precisely because they are the least anglicised. They have been deemed to be in greater need of tolerant indulgence from the others than was needed by the Prime Minister of Jamaica or of India. On the whole, there is more mutual understanding between the United Kingdom and these latter two than there is between the United Kingdom and many of the African states. The United Kingdom has therefore had to be more wary with African sensibilities than with those of the more anglicised members of the Commonwealth.

Yet the very fact that the Africans are, in spite of the significant impact of Britain on them, still relatively the least " British " of the members, does reveal a major continuing theme in the Commonwealth. As Professor S. A. de Smith put it in 1964, " in many ways it has remained a Britannic association ".*

* Cited by H. Victor Wiseman, *Britain and the Commonwealth* (London : George Allen & Unwin, 1965), p. 55.

On the other hand, it is indicative of African self-confidence in influencing the Commonwealth that Julius Nyerere has talked of trying to de-anglicise the Commonwealth further. At a Press conference in Dar es Salaam on his return from the 1964 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, President Nyerere referred to the conference as an " eye opener ", and said it was " incredible " how Western and in particular how very British the Commonwealth was. He urged that the Commonwealth should more nearly reflect the diversity it represented. He said :

> Millions are represented by the Commonwealth and not all of them see problems with the same view as the Western world. If the Commonwealth is to play its part it must reflect the opinion of the millions it represents. Change must come.*

The curious thing was that, with the exception of Sir Albert Marghai, Julius Nyerere was possibly the most anglicised head of government from Africa at the 1964 conference. His masterly use of the English language, his Edinburgh education, his intellectual turn of mind, even his translation of Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* into Swahili, all contributed to giving him an image of anglicised if rebellious sophistication. Perhaps it was a measure of that sophistication that he now wanted the Commonwealth itself to be less Britannic.

Was that wish a little too ambitious ? Perhaps it was. " We are today as much an Asian as a Western Commonwealth ", Gordon-Walker had, as we have noted, observed in 1950. Fourteen years later a new African group in the Commonwealth had overshadowed in some respects the Asian sector that Gordon-Walker was referring to. A new bi-centrism had emerged—an Anglo-African one. Perhaps that is the furthest that Africa should attempt to go in its " conquest " of the Commonwealth. To try and de-anglicise the Commonwealth much further might be to risk dissipating its sense of fellowship. The most important tie between Commonwealth countries is one which has not to be mentioned. It is implicit but unproclaimed. For its own survival as a tie it must remain unobtrusive and unacknowledged. Yet, in the ultimate analysis, what

* *The Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam), July 29, 1964.

could a New Zealander have in common with a Jamaican or a Zambian, if not the bonds of a shared British-ness ?*

* To de-emphasise the British-ness of the Commonwealth has become the policy of Britain herself. In a speech given in February 1964—soon after British troops had subdued army mutineers on behalf of the East African governments—the Director of the British Information Services in Kenya, Mr. J. R. Carr-Gregg, emphasised that the Commonwealth was not called " the British Commonwealth " but was essentially a large association of independent countries who were " all equal ". See the *Mombasa Times*, Feb. 6, 1964.

CHAPTER 3

The Rhodesian Problem and the Kenyan Precedent

THERE was a time when colonies in Africa were classified according to two broad divisions—those which had a sizable white settler population and those which did not. Within British Africa the colonies which had the most significant settler problems were Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Kenya. Virtually all the other colonies seemed fairly straightforward. The path for these latter colonies was supposed to be a gradual one towards African majority rule. The path for Kenya and the Rhodesias was one of indefinite white leadership, with the ultimate goal of some kind of multi-racial division of power between whites and non-whites. The incorporation of Nyasaland into a federation with the Rhodesias did not fundamentally alter this basic picture.

Of these racially difficult British colonies in Africa the first to settle the issue and attain independence was Kenya. The last is going to be Southern Rhodesia. In this chapter we propose to bring these two countries alongside each other, and try to discern the common themes which have governed their political evolution. There have been significant differences between them in their history. But both have also had a bearing on important themes of constitutionalism, race-relations and diplomacy within the British community of nations and beyond.

In a sense, the most crucial common denominator between Kenya and Rhodesia in their history is the simple act of *rebellion.* Both the Mau Mau insurrection and Ian Smith's U.D.I. were, of course, acts of rebellion against the colonial régime. Our comparative analysis in this chapter will start with this particular common

denominator. We shall then briefly trace the evolution of an egalitarian society in Kenya, using the issue of school segregation as a measure of changing conditions. Next for analysis will be the history of Rhodesia as a distorted embodiment of values shared by the African nationalists themselves. We shall conclude the chapter with a comparative examination of the diplomatic implications of Rhodesia's independence as compared with the implications of Kenya's struggle for majority rule.

In comparing the Mau Mau insurrection with Ian Smith's rebellion, one contrast about which many Africans have felt deeply is Britain's reaction to each. To the outbreak of the Mau Mau insurrection Britain responded with troops and fought a local war which lasted more than six years. To Ian Smith's threat of a complete break with Britain, no less than the British Prime Minister himself responded by making a special trip to Salisbury to have a chat with the impending rebel. Time and again in the last eighteen years British heads of government had finally had to talk with *former* rebels from different colonies. The range of such rebels is from Nehru to Nkrumah, Makarios to Kenyatta. But in 1965, for the first time in imperial history, a British Prime Minister himself left England to go and meet an impending rebel *before* the event. In 1958 Archbishop Makarios could never have got Macmillan to go to Cyprus to discuss the merits of enosis. And neither Winston Churchill in 1952 nor Anthony Eden in 1955 could conceivably have gone to Kenya to listen to what Jomo Kenyatta might have had to say about how African loyalty could be secured. As for the possibility of personal negotiations between Winston Churchill and the Mau Mau leader Dedan Kimathi, the very imagination " rebels " against the hypothesis.

And yet why? Was there a racialistic explanation? Would the dignity of a British Prime Minister have suffered if he had "stooped" to talk things over with an African or Indian rebel before independence? It is true that on his visit to Rhodesia in 1965 Harold Wilson did make it a point to meet African leaders in detention. But this was incidental to his main mission in Rhodesia. In any case, it was not Joshua Nkomo or Ndabaningi Sithole who were

threatening a unilateral break with Britain. It was Mr. Wilson's host in Salisbury.

It might be retorted that some of these hypotheses are unfair to successive British Prime Ministers. In 1952 Jomo Kenyatta was not as yet head of government in Kenya. Nor was Makarios head of government in Cyprus in 1958. But Ian Smith was Prime Minister in Salisbury in 1965. His formal status made it easier for a British Prime Minister to engage in official discussions with him about the future of the colony.

These legalistic arguments about ministerial status are not without weight. The African nationalists themselves have sometimes based their behaviour on considerations of formal status. Why was Julius Nyerere only an observer at the pan-African Conference in Addis Ababa in June 1960, instead of being a fully accredited participant? Because, unlike the other participating African leaders at the conference, Nyerere had one year to go before becoming the formal head of an independent country. Why was independent Africa bitterly divided in January 1962 in connection with the pan-African Conference at Lagos? Partly because more than half of the African states had refused to admit the head of the Algerian government-in-exile into the conference as an equal since his government was still merely an " exile government " and not a formally established one.

More examples could be cited of the way in which Africans have been sticklers for status and formal credentials. Even in terms accepted by the Africans themselves it might therefore seem understandable that no British Prime Minister extended to an African nationalist before independence the diplomatic dignity that Harold Wilson extended to Ian Smith when he visited him on the eve of his rebellion.

Yet we know there were other factors at play in these matters apart from status. It might be true that Harold Wilson could not have " stooped " to visit Ian Smith had the latter not had a formal status of colonial Prime Minister in his own right. But, when we are honest with ourselves, we know it is *not* true that the only reason why Winston Churchill could never have " stooped " to discuss African grievances with Kenyatta in 1952 was because Kenyatta

did not have a formal status in Kenya. Churchill and his successors would not have discussed problems of stability and loyalty with Cheddy Jagan either, in spite of the fact that Jagan did indeed have the formal status of head of government in British Guiana when he clashed with the British Government. Admittedly, ideological considerations helped to compromise Jagan's credentials. But for certain purposes so did his *race*. When all is said and done, only a fellow Briton in the colonies could threaten rebellion against Great Britain and still entertain a British Prime Minister to dinner pending the final break.

A related phenomenon was the promise given by the British Prime Minister well in advance that should Smith embark on a unilateral declaration of independence, he could rest assured that no British military force would be used against him. This prior veto of the use of physical force against Smith dramatised the gulf between Britain's response to the Mau Mau insurrection and her attitude to rebellious Englishmen in Rhodesia. The Mau Mau movement felt the brunt of British military power, extending over several years. But no British pistol was allowed to go off as Ian Smith defied Her Majesty's Prime Minister and took the reins of power. Could the two types of British response to colonial rebellion be defended? Or was there a double standard ultimately reducible to the racial difference between the two sets of rebels?

At the Lagos Conference in January 1966 Harold Wilson explained to his African critics the military dimensions of any policy of physical force against Smith. The white Rhodesians were well entrenched, with a well-trained army and reserve force and a small air force. Should they decide to resist military action by Britain, it would take quite a while to subdue them and would cost a lot of lives.

All this was true as far as it went. Yet it was doubtful if a British confrontation with the Smith régime would have lasted anywhere near the six years it took to subdue the Mau Mau, or cost anywhere near the total number of lives which were lost during the Kenya emergency. In fact, if Britain had told the white Rhodesians forcefully enough prior to their rebellion that she would have to inter-

vene militarily if they rebelled, it is almost certain that a solution short of military confrontation would have been reluctantly accepted by the settlers.

But could any British government have threatened military force against white Rhodesians and maintained its hold on its own party, let alone the country? The answer might well be "No." But if it is, the reason was surely quasi-racialistic. "British public opinion would not stand for military threats against white Rhodesians"—yet successive British governments had managed to carry much of British public opinion with them in the exercise of military force against other colonies. "Britons could not be expected to shoot down their kith and kin"—So the argument went. And to substantiate it there was a real possibility of British officers resigning their commissions should Harold Wilson have been rash enough to order military operations against Rhodesia. Yet, in the final analysis the "kith and kin" argument was an assertion of racial fellowship.

But what is wrong with racial fellowship? Surely that is the whole basis of the Africans' own concern for the fate of Rhodesia. Why else should Nkrumah or Nyerere feel so strongly for the fate of Joshua Nkomo if not for reasons of racial identification?

This is a powerful counter-argument. Yet it somehow misses the point. The problem of race prejudice arises not out of identification with one's own group but out of serious discrimination against another group. It was not merely British reluctance to fire a gun against white Rhodesians which hurt African pride—it was the *contrast* between this and a previous British readiness to open fire against others.

For non-white former subjects of Britain, there is the additional humiliation of their own complicity when the British Raj opened fire on their people. The guns in India were often fired by Indian soldiers, in Africa by African *askaris*. The British, who have themselves shrunk from shooting each other, had often succeeded in their colonies to get others to shoot themselves.

But was there really no moral justification whatever for Britain's reluctance to resort to arms against Smith in spite of previous military involvements in the colonies? One possible line of defence

is to argue that the lessons of those previous military involvements themselves dictated against taking the same action in Rhodesia. By 1965 Britain was tired of colonial wars, and was reconciled to a speedy dissolution of her Empire.

Disillusion with military solutions to colonial problems was almost certainly a factor in British reluctance to use force against Smith. But this consideration should not be overrated. The argument implies that if white Rhodesians had declared their independence ten years previously, when elsewhere Britain was evidently still a believer in military solutions to colonial problems, Britain would indeed have used force against Rhodesia too. This is highly implausible. On the contrary, in 1955 Britain might not even have applied an oil embargo against white Rhodesian rebels. For one thing, ten years ago there would have been no black African states exerting diplomatic pressure and demanding stronger sanctions against Rhodesia. For another, the very fact that Britain was engaged in local wars in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus, might have disposed her to a policy of accommodation with fellow British people in Rhodesia. What kept white Rhodesians well behaved ten years ago was the belief that, if they waited a little longer, they could take Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland with them into a white-dominated independent federation. So there was no U.D.I. by Southern Rhodesia ten years ago. But if there had been, far from Britain's reaction being tougher, it would more likely have been milder. It would have fallen short not only of military action, but probably also of oil sanctions.

Yet in that very range of possible British reactions to a Rhodesian rebellion lies the only major argument in favour of differentiating it from the Mau Mau insurrection. There were no oil sanctions which could be employed against the Mau Mau. Indeed, no economic punishment against the Mau Mau rebels was feasible short of trying to starve out the tribal areas. Only against this background does Britain's response to the Rhodesian problem in 1965 approach moral legitimation. In the Rhodesian crisis there was indeed an economic alternative to physical force. Admittedly, there was no guarantee that the economic alternative would work. But at least an economic

answer was practically feasible—and, for that very reason, might have deserved to be tried.

On a different plane of argument, an economic answer was feasible in the case of the Mau Mau too. This was the solution of tackling land hunger and other economic causes of the insurrection. But while economic sanctions against Smith are a form of punishment for rebellion, giving land to the Mau Mau rebels would have been a form of reward. It is true that the Mau Mau rebellion was, in the end, a victory of the vanquished. But what matters in this analysis is not the long-term resolution of the causes of Mau Mau, but the more limited choice of sanctions against the movement which Britain could employ at the time.

So far we have discussed the means used by Harold Wilson in 1965 and 1966 against the background of stiffer alternatives. We should also remember the point made earlier that ten years ago Britain's response might have been even milder. The change in the international atmosphere is part of the egalitarian revolution in the contemporary world. It is to this factor that we must now turn.

African influence in the United Nations, as in the Commonwealth, has been substantially helped by the revolution of egalitarianism in world politics. There was a time in the history of international relations when Europe virtually decided what should be the Law of Nations. Indeed, international law as it exists today is a product of Europe when Europe was the legislator of mankind. But today there are already pressures that certain things in international law should be changed to conform with some of the values of the new members of the international community. New offences are now envisaged. Among the proposed new ones is the offence of flagrantly violating the principle of racial equality. According to the traditional Western-derived law of nations, blatant external intervention in South Africa to end *apartheid* might be deemed " illegal." But according to the new canons of international morality, *apartheid* itself is an exceptionally grave offence against the code of mankind. If *apartheid* is not itself internationally " illegal " as yet, it is at least " wicked " enough to legalise external intervention against it.

Yet decisive international action against South Africa has not so

far been attempted. Can it ever be attempted? It is partly this question which converted the Rhodesian crisis into a test-case on the efficacy of sanctions. Admittedly, even if the sanctions worked on Rhodesia, there was no guarantee that they would one day work against South Africa. The Rhodesian crisis was a test-case *negatively*. If, in other words, the sanctions did not work against Rhodesia, the prospect of successful economic action against South Africa was gloomy indeed. And the ideal of racial equality in that part of the continent might have to wait a generation or more before approaching fulfilment.

But what is the place of this egalitarian revolution within Africa itself? It should be remembered that almost all over Africa what the Africans asked for first was not independence but equality.* Ideas of equality came into Africa through several channels, to reinforce certain egalitarian elements in tribal life. The external sources of egalitarianism included the impact of Christianity and the principle of human neighbourliness. There was also the impact of Islam which demonstrated greater racial toleration than was achieved by most Christian Churches in Africa. There was also the historial background of the African himself who, because of his relative isolation from other races in his history, had not, in any case, had time to accumulate as many racial prejudices as the paradoxically more " cosmopolitan " white man. And latest among the channels through which the ideas of equality have entered Africa is European Socialism—of the Marxist, Labour Party and other shades of colour.

Africa has not, of course, been the only area of the world which has witnessed a denial of such principles of equality on grounds of racial differences. The United States in particular has had a continuing racial and constitutional crisis on the issue of civil rights for the Negroes. Yet segregation in Africa has sometimes been more complex in its ramifications than even in the United States. In education, for example, the segregation of old Kenya was not simply between white schools and non-white schools. Among

* For a fuller discussion of this point see Ali A. Mazrui, " On the concept of ' We are all Africans ' ", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. lvii, No. 1, Mar. 1963.

government schools or government-aided schools there were those which were exclusively for Europeans, those exclusively for Indians, those exclusively for Arabs and those for Africans. In addition there were private schools for groups within groups. Among these were Goan schools (for that section of the Asian population which came from former Portuguese Goa), and Aga Khan schools (for that section of the Indian Muslim community who were followers of the Aga Khan). Christian Mission schools were also segregated. Mr. Tom Mboya, himself a product of a Catholic African school in Kenya, has been known to complain that missionaries had condoned the colonial order in Africa " to the point of complying with such things as segregated schools and segregated churches . . . ."*

As pressures for school integration in Kenya mounted, the usual argument advanced *against* integration was that integration was bound to " level down educational standards ". The European schools were the best in the country. If they were " immediately flooded " with children from poorly educated or completely illiterate non-white families, " the result would not be to bring up the Africans to the level of Europeans, but to bring down European standards of education to the level of the poorest and crudest schools of the nation." This, it was contended, was a wasteful way of achieving equality. It was like the philosophy sometimes attributed to socialism by its critics—that " if everybody cannot become rich then everybody must become poor ". Such a philosophy of bringing down educational standards of Kenya's white population was, so the argument went, short-sighted and misguided for a country which needed highly skilled local people even if they should happen to have a white skin.

Comparing this with American experience one detects a different kind of reasoning from that which was used in the United States to support segregated schools before the Supreme Court decision of 1954. Until that year, the American Constitution had been interpreted to mean that people could be segregated and still be equal.

* Television conversation between Paul Niven and Tom Mboya, Apr. 16, 1961. See CBS Television Network *Transcript*, Washington, D.C., p. 2. See also Mboya's book, *Freedom and After* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1963).

Negroes could have separate schools from whites, provided the Negro schools were comparable in quality and facilities with schools for white children. This whole principle came to be known as the " Separate but Equal " condition of segregation under the American Constitution.

Segregationist argument in old Kenya rested on a fundamentally different premise. It rested on the premise that the standards of the segregated schools were *not* equal. Indeed, it rested on the admission that the European schools were superior, and that the superiority was on no account to be sacrificed at the altar of the Goddess of Abstract Equality if Kenya was to make the most of her resources of personnel regardless of race.

In 1954, while Kenya was in the agony of the Mau Mau insurrection, the United States was changing its mind about the principle of " Separate but Equal ". The American Supreme Court decided that the very insistence on segregation implied an assertion of racial gradation. In any case the effect of segregating the schools had resulted in standards which were *not* equal. With that Supreme Court decision the American Civil Rights revolution of the mid-twentieth century was launched.

Five years later it was Kenya's turn to start a reappraisal of its own segregationist tradition. Against the thesis that the standards of Kenya's best schools should not be sacrificed " for the sake of an abstraction," it was now contended that a temporary lowering of standards of Kenya's European schools was not too high a price to pay for getting the next generation of Kenyans to grow up together into less racially-conscious citizens. It was not too high a price to pay for a new Kenya in which no child eager for the best education that the country had to offer would be driven to wish that it had a racially different set of parents.

The segregationists in Kenya have failed. Even Kenya's best schools have now embarked on at least token integration. That in some cases the segregation is still little more than " token " in spite of independence is a measure of African patience when a principle has already been accepted. That the Africans want integration at all shows how grossly exaggerated was the assertion sometimes

made that African independence would just " reverse the colour bar ". This assertion might apply to the question of who is permitted to wield political power. Africans might insist on ruling the country to the exclusion of other races. The assertion might also be vindicated in certain areas of economic activity—that instead of Europeans and Asians being the economically privileged or dominant section of Kenya's population, discrimination might now be applied to give the Africans a chance to shift the balance of economic power.

Yet the phrase " Africa's reversal of the colour bar " is still a distortion. It implies a continuation of *social* segregation, as well as a shift in political and economic advantage. One just cannot see the African insisting, as the white man insisted before him, on segregated schools for Africans, segregated hotels and dancing halls, or segregated restaurants and residential areas. To put it crudely, one cannot imagine the African insisting on a mere exchange of public lavatories. For the African to concede racial segregation at the social level would be to defeat the whole object of African self-assertion. The African government in Kenya—unlike its colonial predecessor—therefore makes a virtue of racial mixture rather than of racial separation. And who knows what greater racial toleration might in time emerge out of this greater social intermingling ?

By 1960 the shape of the new Kenya was beginning to be discernible. Racially exclusive hotels were disappearing. Scholarships for study abroad were no longer in racial quotas. The country's doctors were planning to merge the colony's European, Asian and African medical associations which had always been separate. Into the higher ranks of the civil service there was soon to be a determined policy to introduce as many Africans as possible. Scales of salaries according to race—regardless of similarity of work or identity of qualifications—had already been abandoned. The White Highlands—for decades reserved exclusively for white settlers and prospective white immigrants—were soon to be legally no longer " white." The Kenya Regiment Training Centre was about to accept its first non-European recruits. The new electoral roll following the first Lancaster House conference of that year had not only been substantially integrated, but had also allowed for an

elected African majority in the legislature. Even the lavatories were beginning to lose the familiar signs of " European " and " Non-European." And where the signs were still hanging, they could now be ignored with impunity. It was symbolic that even such small details of personal intimacy were beginning to conform with the integrationist principles of the new Kenya.

By 1964 Jomo Kenyatta, as head of the government of independent Kenya, was attending his first Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference in London. For this man who was once convicted as an alleged Mau Mau leader, inter-racial harmony was something he preached at the Commonwealth Conference and, to some extent, tried to practice in his own country. At the conference in July 1964 Jomo Kenyatta was asked to respond to Sir Alec Douglas-Home's welcoming address to Commonwealth leaders. In his own speech, Mr. Kenyatta emphasised that there was " a definite commitment for each Commonwealth country to build a society providing for equal opportunities and non-discrimination for all its people." He cited his own country as an attempt to realise the Commonwealth ideal.*

A year later, when Ian Smith of Rhodesia was on the verge of declaring independence, leaders of the European community of Kenya sent him an appeal. Michael Blundell, Humphrey Slade and other eminent Kenya Europeans tried to reassure Ian Smith that life for Europeans under an African government was not the nightmare that Smith described it to be. The Kenya whites referred to their own misgivings once-upon-a-time about the prospect of an African assumption of power. Yet the life of Europeans in Kenya under Mzee Kenyatta had proved how wrong white settlers could be in their evaluation of this or that African leader.

The appeal of Kenya settlers to their Rhodesian kinsmen was in vain. As we have noted, on November 11, 1965, Ian Smith effected his break with Britain.

But how wrong was the act of independence itself? Was not

* See *Harambee ! The Prime Minister of Kenya's Speeches 1963—1964* (Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 52.

† See *East Africa and Rhodesia*, Oct. 14, 1965.

independence the ultimate value of African nationalism itself? Yet the world in 1965 and 1966 witnessed African states demanding that Britain should risk a colonial war that might cost African lives —all in order to re-establish British colonial rule in Rhodesia for the time being.

The paradox was in fact part of an old tradition of Rhodesia as a distorted embodiment of values shared by African nationalists themselves. It all goes back to the famous dictum of Cecil Rhodes, the founder of Rhodesia. It is not often remembered that Rhodes' principle of " equal rights for all civilized men " was regarded as reasonable by the founding fathers of African nationalism itself. At meetings in London and Paris in the early twenties the most important demand of black nationalists was " The recognition of civilized men as civilized despite their race or colour."*

The second Pan-African Congress in the 1920's sent W. E. B. Du Bois, the distinguished American Negro, to see officials of the League of Nations. The League published the petition as an official document. The petition said :

> The Second Pan-African Congress desires most earnestly and emphatically to ask the good offices and careful attention of the League of Nations to the condition of civilised persons of Negro descent throughout the world. Consciously and sub-consciously, there is in the world today a widespread and growing feeling that it is permissible to treat civilised men as uncivilised if they are coloured and more especially of Negro descent.†

It seems evident that Rhodes' dictum was part of the ideology of black nationalism itself at that time. The grievance that black nationalists might have had against Cecil Rhodes was that he did not live up to his own dictum. The Pan-African ideology at the time would not mind a policy which discriminated on the basis of education and Westernisation. What nationalists felt strongly against was the refusal to recognise Africans as equals even when they attained the specified standards of acculturation. It was this refusal which converted " Rhodesianism ", or the ethic of Cecil Rhodes,

* See *History of the Pan-African Congress*, ed. by George Padmore (first published 1947) (London : William Morris House, 1963. 2nd edition), pp. 19–20.

† *Ibid.*, p 21.

into a perversion of the basis of black nationalism itself at that time.

The Capricorn Society of East and Central Africa later tried to fulfil Cecil Rhodes' dictum. But it was too late. In the 1920's and 1930's black people had wanted to see Rhodes' dictum fulfilled, but white liberals were content merely to recite it as an ideal. By the 1950's white liberals wanted to fulfil Rhodes' dictum, but black nationalists now had new horizons. Criticising the Capricorn Contract and its basic idea of " equal rights for all civilized men ", a relatively unknown African leader in East Africa was asserting at the begining of 1958 that

> human values can only be measured in regard to individual human beings, not by the abstract yardstick of comparable cultural prizes.

The assertion was by Julius Nyerere.*

Another aspect of Rhodesian history which amounts to a perversion of African aspirations was the country's status as a " self-governing colony." Rhodesia was the first colony in Africa to get internal self-government. Yet all other colonies, including Kenya, achieved that status only when the principle of majority rule had been conceded. With Southern Rhodesia it was different. The colony was granted responsible government in 1922-23, with the whites in power. With Rhodes' dictum for guidance, and a loose commitment to a common franchise, Southern Rhodesia seemed to have what an Oxford professor has called a " potential role as a liberal lever on South Africa."†

By 1960 black nationalism in Rhodesia was questioning the accuracy of the very status of a " self-governing colony." As Joshua Nkomo put it to readers of a Pan-African journal published in Ghana :

> You might have been led to believe that Southern Rhodesia is a self-governing country . . . . Southern Rhodesia is NOT self-governing but the settlers in the country are self-governing.‡

* See his article " The entrenchment of privilege ", *Africa South*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Jan.—Mar., 1958, p. 86.

† Kenneth Kirkwood, *Britain and Africa* (London : Chatto & Windus, 1965), p. 57.

‡ See Nkomo, " One man, one vote—the only solution in Southern Rhodesia ", *Voice of Africa*, Vol. i, No. 4, Apr. 1961.

By the begining of 1962 questions about the validity of the term " self-governing " as applied to Rhodesia were being seriously asked in the United Nations.

The General Assembly was setting up a Committee of Seventeen to investigate and report on the fulfilment of the Assembly's 1960 Declaration urging speedy independence for all colonial peoples. In January 1962 ten countries of Africa and Asia, joined by Yugoslavia, asked that the new Committee should also " consider whether the territory of Southern Rhodesia has attained a full measure of self-government." Some observers at the time assumed that the request was merely an attempt to embarrass Southern Rhodesia and Britain following the colony's militancy on the side of the Katanga secessionists.* But, as it was soon clear, there was a growing African concern for the future of Southern Rhodesia as an issue in its own right. The " perverted principle of self-government " in Rhodesia had gone unchallenged long enough.

A third role played by Southern Rhodesia as a distorted embodiment of African aspirations is the Pan-African role. Rhodesia's conversion to the principle of unifying Central Africa was one of the major exercises in regional integration undertaken in the African continent. President Milton Obote of Uganda saw the Pan-African side of the federal experiment between the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. On attainment of Uganda's independence, Obote refused to extend diplomatic recognition to the government of the Federation under Sir Roy Welensky. In spite of that, Mr. Obote was against the dissolution of the Federation. In his view what was wrong was not the federal principle in Central Africa, but white domination within the federation. Dr. Obote had detected yet another perversion by Rhodesia of an honoured ideal of African nationalism.

These then are the roles that Kenya and Rhodesia have played in the history of inter-racial idealism. Kenya's story was an agonising journey towards the fulfilment of the Commonwealth principle of racial equality. Rhodesia's story, on the other hand, has been more a

* See *The Times* (London), Jan. 15, 1962.

† See *Uganda Argus*, Nov. 10 and 11, 1962.

distortion of *African* ideals than an evolution of the Commonwealth principle.

Behind both stories is a record of the moral dilemmas of an imperial power. " How do we cope with this demand ? How do we deal with that rebellion ? When do we give in ? " It is all part of the biography of Great Britain in the throes of shedding off her past.

But have there been any special peculiarities in the diplomatic implications of Rhodesia's independence as compared with the implications of Kenya's struggle for majority rule ?

Some of the most important aspects of the Rhodesian problem have been *international* rather than strictly colonial. And this is a difference of great significance from the experience of the old Kenya. Nor is this internationality of Rhodesia something which began with the unilateral declaration of independence. It is to be traced back to the very status that Rhodesia had as a " self-governing colony." As we have noted, that status gave the white settlers immense powers internally with little control from Britain. The colony even had significant armed forces of its own, temporarily integrated with the federal armed forces while the central African federal experiment lasted. Rhodesia could not have direct diplomatic relations with other powers abroad. The very strain between Britain and Portugal early in 1965 on the issue of the Rhodesian envoy to Lisbon was evidence of the novelty of direct Rhodesian representation in foreign capitals. Apart from this limitation, white Rhodesians, acting either territorially or through the federal government while it lasted, exercised considerable control over matters affecting themselves. They could even keep out members of the British Parliament of whom they disapproved.

What this meant then was that even the relationship between the British Government and the Government of Southern Rhodesia came near to having the diplomatic stiffness of inter-state relations—sometimes almost as if these two governments were negotiating from positions of complete equality. The British Government was virtually unable to give direct orders to the government of one of its own colonies.

But a more specifically international complication in the issue of Rhodesia was that the British Government had to take into account the views of a large number of *independent* African states. Contrast this with the position of Kenya a few years previously. White domination in Kenya was broken at the beginning of 1960 when the first Lancaster House conference gave Africans a majority of seats in the Legislative Council. At that time Britain did not have to worry very much about diplomatic repercussions with African states. For at the very begining of 1960 the only sub-Saharan African colony which had so far been liberated was Ghana. Most of the rest of Africa was still under colonial rule, though a large section of it was going to gain independence later in that same year. So in breaking white domination in Kenya in January 1960 the British government was not under quite the same degree of diplomatic pressure from other countries as the British government came to be in regard to Rhodesia. By 1965 about 30 *more* African states had come into being. On the issue of Rhodesia Britain could not therefore afford to ignore the views of all these new and highly articulate sovereign states. Rhodesia wanted independence under white rule, the rest of Africa asked Britain not to grant independence under those terms.

A related diplomatic consideration was the fact that these African states were all members of the United Nations. We discussed in a previous chapter the partial African " conquest " of the Commonwealth. We should also note that there has been a partial African " annexation " of the floor of the UN General Assembly. Indeed, one additional reason why Commonwealth Africans have become more influential within the Commonwealth is that they are part of the similarly influential African group in the United Nations.

On an issue like that of Rhodesia Britain was therefore exposed to pressure from at least two major sources. There was the direct pressure of African states themselves, acting either through the Organization of African Unity or through the African members of the Commonwealth. And, secondly, there was the possibility of pressure from the United Nations, responding in part to the insistence of the African states themselves. Moreover, in the context of UN politics, African states on an issue like Rhodesia could count

on the support of at least the communist countries. Hence Harold Wilson's fear that if Britain did not act convincingly in breaking the Smith rebellion, the prospect of a " Red Army in blue berets " in Rhodesia could not be discounted. In the initial stages of Wilson's sanctions this argument, perhaps more than any other single one, helped to give the Labour Government the backing of the Conservatives for the time being.

The full consequences of the events of 1965 and 1966 will take a while to reveal themselves. Ousting Ian Smith and handing over Rhodesia to black Africans could not by itself guarantee the triumph of equality and human dignity. All that was certain at the time that Ian Smith asserted himself, and was cautiously cheered by Portugal and South Africa, was that the cause of that racial equality was bound to be *lost* if Rhodesia was allowed to remain under a white minority.

It was time that Rhodesia was diverted to follow the course which Kenya had taken, despite the risks involved. It was time that Rhodesia ceased to be a mere *distortion* of African values—and tried from now on to reflect them more clearly. Perhaps Kenneth Kirkwood's optimism might yet be vindicated in the years ahead—as Rhodesia at last fulfils her " potential role as a liberal lever of South Africa ".

CHAPTER 4

The European Economic Community and the British Legacy in Africa

WHEN in 1965, Britain's Conservative Party chose Edward Heath for its leader it helped to sharpen its image as the party which stood for British entry into the European Economic Community. But the Liberal Party is also for Britain's entry. And even the Labour Party has increasingly become " European " in its policies.

Within the European Community itself British entry has also had strong supporters. And although De Gaulle's veto in 1963 made British membership impossible for the time being, there is widespread feeling in Europe, Britain and the United States that it is only a matter of time before Britain joins the Community. All this is assuming, of course, that the Community retains its vitality and continues to survive the internal crises which periodically shake it.

If then a new British application for membership of the Community is probable in the days ahead, there is a case for taking another look at its implications for Commonwealth Africa. Some of those implications arise directly out of the imperial legacy. We can perhaps best capture this historical background if we linked some of the issues with the ideas of that greatest of British administrators in colonial Africa, Lord Lugard. There are assumptions underlying Lugard's vision of a " Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa " which have a direct bearing on the principle of African association with the European Economic Community.

French-speaking Africa's association with the Community goes back to the original Treaty of Rome itself in 1957. The issue of associating Commonwealth Africa did not seriously arise until Harold Macmillan's Government applied for a British entry in 1961.

Most of the leaders of Commonwealth Africa were opposed to the whole idea of being institutionally associated with the European Community. Since then Nigeria and the East African countries have sought a looser kind of trade arrangement with the Community. But there still persists in Commonwealth Africa an opposition to being intimately linked with the European Economic Community. The kind of ties which exist between the Community and French-speaking Africa are regarded with some suspicion by English-speaking nationalists.

Our analysis here will use some of Lugard's ideas as pegs on which to hang a discussion of the African issues which arose when Britain first applied for membership of the Community. There is a possibility that some of the same issues would still be there should Britain ever decide to apply again in the days ahead.

I

Lugard's vision of the Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa was, in a sense, part of the imperial ideological tradition which was already inclining towards a concept of " partnership " between Africa and Europe *as a whole*. Lugard's view was that the Tropics could only be successfully developed if the interests of the European powers, then in control, were " identical " with those of the natives. He regarded the Tropics as a " heritage of mankind " and felt that

> neither, on the one hand, has the suzerain Power a right to their exclusive exploitation nor, on the other hand, have the races which inhabit them a right to deny their bounties to those who need them.*

Lugard was, in fact, putting forward an ethical basis for a doctrine of interdependence between the undeveloped tropics and the developing Europe. By the time that Europe was negotiating the Treaty of Rome in the second half of the 1950's that doctrine of interdependence was implicit in the French vision of " Eurafrica " on which the French based their case for the association of French Africa with the European Economic Community.†

* Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (Edinburgh and London, 1926 edition), pp. 60–2.

† For a discussion of this see Uwe Kitzinger, *The Challenge of the Common Market* (Oxford : Blackwell, July 1962), p. 93.

And yet, if at the beginning of the century Lugard was a little ahead of his time in such a vision, in the second half of the century the French were a little behind theirs. In the initial stages of that Eurafrican interdependence Europe needed her colonies more than the colonies consciously needed Europe. And Lord Lugard himself was arguing as late as the 1920's that it was impossible for the European democracies to satisfy their " right to work " unless they had the raw materials of the tropics on the one hand and their markets on the other.* But as had happened in the nineteenth century, the Western capital that went seeking those raw materials in the colonies was an instrument of development in those colonies themselves, and there did develop something approaching the aforesaid interdependence between a metropolitan centre of industry and a colonial periphery of producers of raw materials.

Why the French vision of " Eurafrica ", at least as an economic assessment, was a little behind the times in the 1950's was because a significant shift had taken place in the relationship of reciprocal dependence between Africa and Europe. By 1941 Lugard himself was already drawing attention to this shift and invoking the authority of international statisticians of the League of Nations and findings of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.† The main staples of industry such as iron, cotton and petroleum were, Lugard noted, produced by the older Dominions and India " and not by the Colonies ". It was also from them that the chief food supply of the world was derived—wheat and other cereals, meat of all kinds, dairy produce, animal and vegetable oils and fats. The conclusion to which Lugard drew attention in the findings of the experts was that except in the case of rubber, colonial areas accounted for " only about three per cent of the world's production of raw materials ".‡ Lugard was still insisting that great potential wealth still remained untapped in the colonies, " especially in Africa ", but he was beginning to come to terms with the fundamental shift in the idea of Afro-European interdependence.

* *The Dual Mandate, op. cit.*

† See Lugard, *Federation and the Colonies*, Federal Tract No. 7 (London : Macmillan, 1941), pp. 7–8.

‡ *Ibid.*

The trend has persisted. Since then reports have indicated that Europe's internal production has continued to grow more rapidly than its need for imports, and some of the previously imported raw materials can now be produced within the frontiers of at least the West as a whole. Barbara Ward, in a study of the economics of underdevelopment in relation to the richer countries, draws attention to the emergence of such items as artificial rubber, new fabrics for textiles, petro chemicals and " conceivably even ersatz chocolate ". She notes specifically that the Western world's " pull of development " on the outside world has declined in magnitude since the early days of the West's industrial expansion.*

What all this means is that the greatest problem that a newly independent Africa has to face now is the problem of an increasingly independent Europe.† And within the context of that problem, Lugard's vision of " the abounding wealth of the tropical regions " was now deflated into " the dangerous poverty of the underdeveloped areas ".

II

Closely linked with the original idea of " The Dual Mandate " was a notion to which Lugard almost passionately subscribed—that there be pursued in Africa the policy of " equal opportunity " for the commerce of *all* European countries and an " unrestricted market to the native producer."‡ He often quoted Joseph Chamberlain about the role of Britain in the Tropics being that of a trustee for the commerce of the world as a whole and not just of Britain.

Even under the stress of the anti-German emotions aroused by the First World War he insisted that the policy of discriminating against Germany was to remain only a temporary necessity. Well before Keynes' book on *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* was

* See Barbara Ward, *The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations* (New York : W. W. Norton, 1962), pp. 31–4. Some of these issues are also discussed in my article " African attitudes to the EEC ", *International Affairs*, Jan. 1963.

† Here the issue is of Europe's independence of her colonies—not her independence of the United States militarily.

‡ *Dual Mandate, op. cit.*, p. 61.

written, Lugard was dismissing as untenable the proposition that " the industrious and intelligent population of Germany and Austria, numbering some 121,000,000 [*sic*] of people, should or could be excluded from the trade and commerce of the world."*

He was to reiterate emphatically his own guiding principle that " the very foundations of the British Empire rest on its tolerance and the ' Open Door ' which it has always afforded to all the world."†

When the Imperial Preference came to parts of Africa—much to Lugard's disapproval—this " Open Door " ceased to be completely ajar to goods from outside the Empire. But even the Imperial Preference remained an improvement over the policy of economic integration which France pursued in regard to her own colonies.

Then in 1957 came the institution of associate membership of the European Economic Community for " Overseas Territories ". It is true that the terms of African association with the Community left an African country free, at least in theory, to impose tariff duties on European goods wanting to come in.‡ This did indeed go against Lugard's idea of ensuring that the native *consumer* had his pick of imports from Europe as a whole without additional duty costs. But since the European Community insisted that when an associate imposed a tariff she had to do so without discrimination as between one Member State and another, this arrangement was still an improvement over a tariff that benefited the Mother Country as against *all* other European competitors.

It was, of course, with a dependent Africa that Lugard himself was concerned. What must not be overlooked is that so was Part IV of the Treaty of Rome in specifying the terms of tropical associate membership. That membership was hammered out to accommodate the concern of the French for their colonies and was, in fact, part of the price that the other members of the Community had to pay for French accession to the Common Market. What emerged

* See Margery Perham, *Lugard : The Years of Authority*, 1898–1945 (London : Collins, 1960), p. 567.

† Proceedings of the Nigerian Council, Dec. 29, 1916, p. 22.

‡ There are the provisos that the duties must be needed for the protection of local industries or for fiscal reasons—presumably not for giving, say, advantage to some African country that is not associated.

was a step towards the realisation of "Equal Opportunity"—a gradual equalisation of access to the African territories.

What was ironical five years later was that it was precisely the Commonwealth Africans, some of them once "wards" of Lord Lugard himself, who rejected associate membership of the European Economic Community. The irony became even sharper when it is remembered that Commonwealth Africans have been able to afford such a rejection partly because of the very policies of relative free trade which Lugard championed. Even the Imperial Preference as a system was more conducive to the economic independence of British colonies from the Mother Country than the French integrationist policy ever was in regard to French colonies. Many of the French territories emerged into *political* independence in 1960 finding themselves exceptionally dependent on France *economically*. Associate membership of the European Community was obtained for them by France while they were still colonies, and was an extension of their original economic integration with their colonial ruler. And the acceptance of their dependent status was facilitated psychologically by that side of French assimilationist policy which encouraged French subjects to identify themselves culturally and ideologically with France. When against this French cultural assimilation is juxtaposed Lugard's quasi-Burkean ideas of preserving the best in the *native* traditions of British Africans, the contrast between the French-speaking Africans and the English-speaking Africans after independence found an additional explanation in the differing colonial policies pursued prior to that independence.

From the more self-assertive Commonwealth Africans there could be no enthusiastic response to His Highness the Aga Khan's vision that a British entry into the European Community might lead, at least in Africa, to an amalgamation of the British Commonwealth and the French Community.* To the Nkrumah school of African thinking, the African in the Commonwealth had greater sovereign dignity than the African in the French Community. And an amal-

* Aga Khan, address given in Cambridge. See *Commonwealth Journal*, Vol. v, No. 4, July—Aug. 1962, p. 187.

gamation of the two might pull down the Commonwealth African to the level of dependence of the French-speaking African rather than pull up even, say, the Ivory Coast to the level of self-assertion open to Ghana. Thanks to the more liberal trade policies pursued by Britain in her colonies, Ghana by 1962 did already have a considerable amount of trade with the members of the European Community. But dependence on Italy, Germany, France and Britain as separate customers was different from a new dependence on them as a unified economic entity, collectively bargaining for the same terms. Associate membership would formalise this latter type of dependence. The situation would be worse if associate membership did imply, as French-speaking Africans had been known to insist, an obligation not to associate with other groupings which might be rivals to the European Community.* For example, if—as the Chairman of the E.E.C. Commission confirmed†—the Common Market was partly inspired by economic competition with the Eastern bloc, would there be extra-treaty obligations over and above those which, in *practice*, the African associates would be required to undertake? Would the associated countries be called upon to refrain from "helping" the Communist "economic offensive" by "too much" trade with it? In other words, would the world be faced with the ironic situation in which Europe herself traded with the East but sought to discourage her associates from doing the same?‡ If this were indeed to happen Lugard could still be on the side of those who rejected association with the European Community—for the "Open Door" to him was not a door that welcomed only Western Europe, but one which welcomed the

* 100 Parliamentarians from French-speaking Africa, at a conference with the E.E.C. European Parliament in June 1961, argued that the new association envisaged for 1963 should be open to all African states "on condition that none of them belong to another economic group whose objectives were incompatible with those of the association itself". This rendering is from *Africa Digest*, Vol. ix, No. 6, June 1962, p. 205.

† See the E.E.C. *Bulletin*, No. 5, May 1962, p. 6.

‡ This, as a hypothetical possibility, is implicitly recognised by Thomas Balogh, "Africa and the Common Market", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Summer 1962, p. 101. It is also recognised by Uwe Kitzinger, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

commerce of the world as a whole. As for the " native producer "—of whom Lugard was as concerned as he was with the native consumer—he was to be free to look for markets in different parts of the globe. This freedom was particularly vital if Uwe Kitzinger was right in saying in 1962 that " the Communist bloc, having reached the present age in improving its living standards, may soon become the fastest growing market for tropical products in the world ".*

But while Lugard might agree with his ex-African " wards " on this question of broadening the market area for the African producer, there might still remain a fundamental difference between him and his former " wards " on the issue of protecting the African *consumer*. This difference arises because one of the major objections raised initially by Nigerians and Ghanaians to association with the European Community was the possibility that association might compel them to give the African consumer of European imports an easy time in the short-run while retarding the emergence of an African manufacturer of the same products. Notwithstanding the European Community's assurances to the contrary, many Africans shared the fear expressed by the United Nations Commission for Africa—the fear that " if the associated territories were to try to diversify their economies, by increasing the protection of their local industry against the competition of the E.E.C., it is doubtful if the E.E.C. would continue to offer the same advantages to the export of primary products by the associated countries."† The terms granted by the Community to African associates did grant freedom to those countries to protect their industries by tariffs. What in 1962 was yet to be unequivocally declared was whether this cheque of " tariffs for protection " was indeed all *blank*—whether the African countries could indeed fill-in *any* amount of protection they considered essential according to their own estimation. There was, in addition, the related danger which the United Nations Commission also noted—that in the transient comfort of associate membership, " the

* Kitzinger, *ibid.*

† " The impact of Western European integration on African trade and development ", U.N. Economic and Social Council document E/CN. 14/72, Dec. 7, 1960.

associated African countries might prefer the short-run advantages of tariff concession from the E.E.C. to the long-term advantages of industrial expansion ".*

Such a preference might commend itself to a Lugard who saw the economic relationship between Europe and Africa as being essentially one in which tropical raw materials left Africa to go to Europe and then some of them returned to Africa " converted into articles for the use and comfort of its peoples ".† Presumably even cocoa had best be converted into chocolate in Europe and then go back to the Ghanaian chocolate consumer at the cheapest price possible in the short-run. In Lugard's terms such an arrangement would be preferable to the initiation of processing industries in the countries producing the raw materials themselves, considering that in the short-run the locally produced might conceivably be more expensive than the imported.

It is such a scale of values that nationalists in Commonwealth Africa might regard as just an extension, perhaps glorified twentieth-century version, of the old idea of allotting to the African the role of a " hewer of wood and drawer of water ". Such at least was the reasoning of Ghana's High Commissioner to the United Kingdom when he addressed fellow Africans in London early in 1962.‡ And such is a suspicion which has been articulated repetitively.

Like Dr. Tom Soper, Lugard might retort: " If wood is wanted and people are prepared to pay for it, I fail to see what is lost by being a hewer of it."** After all, producing tropical products can be an instrument of development in its own right. But there have been developments since Lugard's time which should justify African misgivings about concentrating on primary products—and they are developments which critics of African attitudes have not always considered in precisely this connection.

An article on African association with the European Community written in 1961, for example, drew attention to the fact that while

* *Ibid.*

† *The Dual Mandate, op. cit.*, pp. 60–62.

‡ See *Ghana Today*, Feb. 28, 1962.

** Tom Soper, " Africa and the Common Market ", *The Listener*, Aug. 10, 1961.

prices of manufactured goods have been moving slowly upwards for a decade or more, the trend of primary products in the same period has too often been downwards. And yet the same article found it possible to argue that it was not European groupings which threatened the African economies as much as this instability of commodity prices.* If a European grouping could be instrumental, if inadvertently, in delaying the emergence of African manufactured goods and prolonging African dependence on unstable commodities, it is difficult not to view the European grouping as at least an indirect threat to Africa's ultimate economic interests. There is at least a measure of plausibility in the observation of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa that unless certain precautions are taken " association with the E.E.C. can easily tend to perpetuate economic dependency and thus turn out to be a long term disadvantage to the country concerned ".†

In any case, it is one thing to deny that associate membership would prolong the role of " hewing wood " for the African. It is quite another to defend, like Dr. Soper did, that very role itself in spite of falling prices.

And even if tropical products remained in demand, and Europe continued to buy cocoa from Ghana, there would remain the serious imbalance in what little " interdependence " is left between the producer of cocoa in Africa and the buyer in Europe. Europe could presumably live without buying chocolate, but could Ghana live without selling cocoa ? Could she do so if her economy depended overwhelmingly on cocoa ?

Of course, Ghana could set about growing other tropical products —diversifying her economy not as between industry and agriculture but as between one agricultural crop and another. But if to increase production meant to mechanise agriculture, there would presumably come a time when the choice would be between diverting some of the labour to non-agricultural industries or producing surpluses on an ever increasing scale—risking a further fall in the price of the commodities and a new rise in semi-employed labour. And Africa

* *National and Grindlays Review*, 1961.

† Document E/CN. 14/72, *op. cit.*

as a whole may learn too late that she could not, in Nkrumah's words, improve even her standard of living by remaining an agricultural continent indefinitely or " improve the skill and ingenuity of her peoples by keeping them solely as workers in rural areas ".* Africans must, in other words, abandon the role which Lugard had conceived for them for the indefinite future. And to do this they may have to protect from European competition any infant processing and manufacturing industries that may be born. " The Open Door " is already not so widely open. It may be increasingly guarded through the years.

III

Implicit in this African fear of remaining " The Continent of the Proletarian Peoples "† and " The Needy of the World " if they do not diversify their economies, is the fear that their need may expose them to the danger of being " bought ". This particular peril is often expressed by the Africans in the new term of " Neo-Colonialism "—which Nkrumah described as " a logical development of the theory of indirect rule ", which in turn was Lugard's major contribution to British imperial ideology as regards Africa.

Neo-colonialism is often more than a mere excess of being dependent upon someone else. Arising out of that dependence is a sense of being vulnerable to too much " persuasion ". Flowing from this sense of vulnerability is the fear of being manipulated politically by those on whom you might let yourself be exclusively dependent—and an African government may gradually become a puppet government.

This is where the link with Lugard's concept of " Indirect Rule " comes in. In regard to the internal control of Uganda by the British, for example, Lugard said : " The object to be aimed at in the administration in this country is rule through its own executive government."‡ And in the case of Northern Nigeria it was, in

* See *Ghana Today*, Feb. 28, 1962.

† See Sékou Touré, " Africa's destiny ", *Africa Speaks* (eds.) James Duffy and Robert A. Manners (Princeton : D. Van Nostrand, 1960), p. 37.

‡ Lugard, *The Rise of Our East African Empire*, Vol. ii, p. 649.

Lugard's estimation, " desirable to retain the native authority and work through and by the native emirs ".*

Presumably on such evidence, on paper and in practice, Nkrumah worked out his own definition of indirect rule—in his own words, " to let the African Chief appear nominally in control while actually he was manipulated from behind the scenes by the colonial power."† Neo-colonialism was to him a more refined form of this process—the African Chief being granted a flag, a national anthem and a seat in the United Nations—but essentially still being manipulated behind the scenes. African dependence on the E.E.C. presented such a danger.

The source of Lugard's own concept of Indirect Rule was, in part, his own paternalistic temperament. And this paternalism later led Lugard to the conviction that the people of the dependent territories would, in the ultimate test, identify themselves with the Mother Country. In his time proposals for a political unity of Western Europe posed, among other questions, the problem of how the separate empires of the imperial West European countries would be governed should a federation of Europe emerge. In a pamphlet on " Federation and the Colonies," published in 1941, Lugard came out against transferring British colonial responsibilities to a federal European organ. His objection to this was based in part on practical considerations. But it was also based on ideological or moral considerations. He felt that at that late stage of the imperial game it was wrong to play around with the lives of Africans in the council chambers of European capitals—and share out the " natives " over their heads. And were the " natives " in British colonies to be consulted, Lugard himself was convinced that they would prefer to be associated primarily with the Mother Country rather than with Western Europe as a whole.‡

In this particular psychological insight, Lugard was, to an extent, prophetic even in the context of the independent Commonwealth

* Cited by Margery Perham, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

† Address to the National Assembly on African Affairs, Aug. 8, 1960. For a more extensive treatment of this subject by Nkrumah see his *Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism* (Nelson, 1965).

‡ *Federation and the Colonies, op. cit.*, p. 5.

Africa of 1962. It is true that Commonwealth Africans were much more self-assertive than the French-speaking Africans. But there still did remain a grain of truth in Lugard's estimation of his own " wards ". Given that the Commonwealth was a successor to the Empire, and given further that neo-colonialism was a possible successor to colonialism, one would have thought that a system of Commonwealth preferences which encouraged African economic dependence on Britain, even on a modest scale, was at least as good a candidate for neo-colonial suspicion as any alternative E.E.C. arrangement. And yet it was, in part, against the ending of this special relationship with his former colonial ruler that the African nationalist was implicitly protesting in 1962. He seemed to feel that Britain on her own, or as a member of a group consisting of herself and her former colonial possessions, was more to be trusted than Britain as part of Europe.

Essentially, the Nkrumah school of African nationalism—influential as an ideology in spite of Nkrumah's personal fall in stature—was distrustful of major " European " settlements which even incidentally appeared like occasions when Europeans sat together and decided what to do with the Africans. Nkrumah himself viewed the Treaty of Berlin of 1885 as having found a successor in the Treaty of Rome—" the former treaty," he said, " established the undisputed sway of colonialism in Africa; the latter marks the advent of neo-colonialism in Africa . . . [and] bears unquestionably the marks of French neo-colonialism."*

But why should there be a distrust of Britain when she, for her part, acts in her capacity as a European power? This is where the ideological analyst has to delve into the connotations, undertones and overtones of terms. Inevitably " Europeans " have both a regional and racial identity. In American eyes Europeans may be little more than inhabitants of another continent—cousins, perhaps, across the Atlantic. But to Africans and Asians, Europeans are both inhabitants of another continent and members of another race or group of races. Indeed, the term " European " in colonial Africa had a particularly high racial content. " European " schools in

* Address to Ghana National Assembly, May 30, 1961.

Kenya; " European " Legislature seats in pre-independent Tanganyika; " European " privileges in Southern Rhodesia! One could not run a country on such a basis without making the noun " European " appear virtually interchangeable with the term " white man ".

In 1941 Lugard analysed a provision in some draft Constitution for the future Federation of Western Europe with a multi-racial principle in mind—that " if the intention is to discriminate on account of race or colour it would be opposed to British policy ".* But Lugard was, in effect, projecting his own moral principles forward and mistaking them for principles that were at the core of British colonial administration all over. We know, however, that colonial administrations at least on the spot, and especially in East and Central Africa, were sufficiently discriminatory to give the term " European " a high racialistic connotation.

In 1962, this had an effect on African conceptions of the " European Community." It is true that some African languages will, in any case, take a long time before they stop translating " European Economic Community " into the broader concept of a " Trade Partnership between the Lands of White Men ". But even the concept of " the white man " would not have been oppressively charged with racialism but for the aggressive self-consciousness of some local representatives. Given all this, the idea of *association* with the " European " Community could not but evoke its own connotations—complete with the mental image of being like a second class member of a White Man's Club like the old Nakuru Club in Kenya.

If it is argued that in East and West Africa at any rate the term " European " should now shed off its racial content, someone like Tom Mboya could always retort that " as long as any part of Africa remains under *European* rule, we do not feel that *Africans* will be regarded in the right way."† In other words, the racialistic content of the term " European " would only become obsolete when there

* *Federation and the Colonies, op. cit.*, p. 32.

† Speech to the United Kenya Club, Mombasa, Kenya. Reported in the *Mombasa Times*, Jan. 11, 1962. Italics are mine.

were no more " Europeans " crusading for " White Civilisation " in significant parts of the continent.

Shifting the analysis to the role of the concept of " The Commonwealth " in African thought, an interesting contrast emerges. Inevitably the term has much less romanticism in Africa than it has in Britain—but on the specific issue of *race*, the concept of " The Commonwealth " has, as we have noted, tended to connote an exact antithesis to the racialistic associations of the term " European ". As an objective before the eyes of the nationalists in pre-independent Africa, future membership of the Commonwealth as an independent country appeared as the ultimate recognition of " Sovereign Equality ". In some ways it constituted more of such recognition than a seat in the United Nations—given the fact that the United Nations had *always* been multi-racial.

We know that there used to be a time when direct allegiance to the British Crown was deemed as the essential link that kept the Commonwealth together. The accession of India and Pakistan established that a republican form of government was not inconsistent with membership of the Commonwealth.

There used further to be a time when the ultimate test of " Reciprocity in Defence " in the face of an enemy was regarded as the final proof of the oneness of the Commonwealth. It cannot be seriously suggested now that non-alignment is inconsistent with membership of the Commonwealth.

Nor could the time have been forgotten yet when it was taken for granted that common *democratic* ideals constituted the essential common heritage of the Commonwealth. We know that the emergence of a benevolent dictatorship in Pakistan, and of authoritarianism in Ghana, had established that departures from parliamentary ideals were not inconsistent with membership of the Commonwealth.

And now, since 1961, it has been argued by champions of Britain's entry into the Common Market that even the disappearance of the Commonwealth Preference would not weaken the links between Britain and other Members of the Commonwealth.

What then is it that forms the core of Commonwealth fellowship ? The expulsion or withdrawal of South Africa in 1961 vindi-

cated the African image of the Commonwealth as a recognition of " Sovereign Equality "—it established that gross forms of racial intolerance were indeed quite inconsistent with membership of the Commonwealth.

Against this background, a British entry into the European Economic Community even now might suggest that, after a brief exercise in sovereign multi-racialism, Britain turned her back on it —and went all " European ".

However, this would only arise if Britain's entry into Europe led to the disintegration of the Commonwealth. And yet the persistent question which must remain is whether such a disintegration can really be avoided. The multi-racialism of the Commonwealth Club may indeed be attractive—but only if the Club really exists and is not merely a name. Can the Commonwealth be anything more than a name if Britain goes into Europe ?

The issue of immigration is a useful point of departure for a discussion of this. Even in those early days of Pan-European ideas in 1941, Lugard was already discussing as a relevant issue the question of " the migration of Natives in search of employment to or from the Colonies of Member-States in the East and in Africa."* The context was different—but the issue is pertinent to the present adventure in Pan-Europeanism too. A British entry into Europe now would gradually complete the process started by the Conservative Commonwealth Immigration Act and Labour's subsequent legislation on quotas. It would *not* eliminate distinctions between an alien and a Commonwealth citizen. British entry would create a *new* distinction—in favour of some " aliens " and *against* Commonwealth citizens. That would be the day when the romantic Italian, previously snubbed as " foreign ", has *easier* access to " Mother " England than any of her children. If there are any exceptions, they would be Mother England's " European " offsprings from Cyprus and Malta.

Another " family " tie that would be severed is the aforesaid economic preference accorded to members. It would be a strain enough that Britain should have to admit European goods on more

* *Federation and the Colonies*, op. cit., p. 26.

favourable terms than many of the Commonwealth goods. But on the day that Britain has to admit products from the Ivory Coast on more favourable terms than products from Ghana, it would be surely time to declare the ideological language of "family" in reference to the Commonwealth as well as truly obsolete.

But would not the ideal of multi-racialism be kept alive by the favours accorded to the Ivory Coast? Would not all this be a mere substitution of one set of Africans for another?

Such an assessment would be correct but for two important considerations. The first is that even if the substitution saved multi-racialism, it would take some imagination to credit it with having saved the Commonwealth. A more serious objection, however, is that while the Ghanaian now enjoys favours in the British Market by virtue of being a *full* member of the Commonwealth Club, the Ivory Coaster would be enjoying them on the less dignified credentials of being a distant *associate* of a "European" Club. The cause of multi-racialism would hardly be advanced by selling the British concept of the Commonwealth for the French vision of "Eurafrica" as so far evolved.

But for the Englishman who values both the Commonwealth and Europe there is another argument which might be invoked: and it is a measure of a nation's instinct to avoid certain approaches to problems that this alternative idea has not been faced squarely by Britain. This alternative idea entails *destroying* the Commonwealth and, in that destruction, more effectively helping the countries that were once members. The Commonwealth is after all an *association* of states. Like all associations, this one can be dissolved without necessarily destroying the *members*. It can conceivably be dissolved and *help* the states—should it turn out to be true that a British entry into Europe would help to make the Community more "outward looking" and get the Community as a whole to help in the solution of Indian, Nigerian and Ghanaian problems. What has to be faced is that ultimately India, Nigeria and Ghana would, in fact, be no more than ex-members of a now defunct club.

And yet in Africa it is difficult to see how the Commonwealth can be destroyed to the *advantage* of those Nigerians and Ghanaians—

unless the present kind of " overseas " associate status of the European Common Market is, paradoxically, destroyed with it. Within the present climate of opinion in Britain, many of those who favour British entry into Europe tend to feel that they are somehow called upon to be in favour of associate E.E.C. membership for Africans as well. There is, in effect, no logical necessity for defending African formal association just because one is championing British entry. Indeed, it is possible for, say, an African to champion British entry precisely because it might help in the *destruction* of the present kind of associate membership as a criterion for aid. Britain might strengthen those forces in the Community—possibly Germany and the Netherlands*—which stand for a less discriminatory approach to the problems of underdeveloped countries. The formal institution of association, with all its discrimination, could then be succeeded by an open declaration more-or-less to the effect that :

> certain African products, regardless of source, would be admitted into the Community on the best terms devisable ; *any* African country can submit plans for a development project and apply for Community aid ; the Community will help to seek ways of stabilising the prices of commodities ; the Community would positively take the initiative to negotiate with other developed countries on how best to make all this even more effective.

There would probably be G.A.T.T. and other snags to be overcome, but there have been snags on every important step taken by the European Community. What has yet to be fully grasped is that there are other ways of helping Africa effectively than through the institution of associate membership as so far evolved. One is indeed impelled to inquire whether there is any justification for that principle of formal " association " other than the fact that some one thought of it—to cope with a specific colonial situation in 1957. In demi-official circles the institution has not even shed off its colonial language—but continues to talk of Associated Overseas " Terri-

* See *Common Market* (A Monthly Review of European Integration and Economic Development), Jan. 1962, p. 5.

tories " when the bulk are now sovereign states.* The ideological analyst might well be driven to the conclusion that the device of " association " is as obsolescent as parts of its officialese. It may even be as obsolescent as some of the nationalistic language in which it is attacked—but possibly twice as harmful in its ultimate repercussions, and much less necessary.

If a British entry were to lead to a destruction of the institution of association Africa might yet be grateful that such an entry took place. A new concept of " The Dual Mandate " might emerge. Like the old one of Lugard, it would indeed involve Europe in the task of developing the Tropics in the interest of the Tropics and of the world at large. But it would be a Mandate in which the peoples of the Tropics would more actively participate in determining what constitutes such an interest. And as the image of " The European " ceases to connote the passions of the past, the new Mandate might even be acceptable as a New Concept of the White Man's Burden, stripped of the racial arrogance and cultural self-righteousness of its predecessor. To be so stripped, the " whiteness " of the benefactor must, of course, be deemed accidental—and the burden be deemed not of the superior towards the inferior, not even of the teacher towards the pupil, but essentially a burden of the materially more fortunate towards the less.

And if all this were to flow from a British entry into Europe, optimistic as such an outlook is, it may yet be said that the Commonwealth made the ultimate sacrifice for the benefit of its members—it destroyed itself in the cause of a higher alternative.

* It is only fair to point out that the ultimate official documents of the E.E.C. do make a distinction between states and " territories ". Nor must it be overlooked that slips into the language of " African territories " are by no means limited to the E.E.C. itself in reference to African association with it. *The Guardian* (Leonard Beaton, Nov. 16, 1962) was perfectly representative of British journalese in talking about " Commonwealth countries which have refused the status of associated overseas territory ". So was *West Africa* (London : Sept. 15, 1962). These are perfectly understandable slips into terminological obsolescence.

CHAPTER 5

Romantic Self Images: British and African

IT is almost part of the national consciousness of a people that they should have an idealised picture of their place or role in the world. The picture itself is a joint product of three agents—psychology, creative imagination and history. A psychological need for a sense of identity disturbs the imagination of the people. The imagination turns to the history of that people, scans it, and tries to discern some moral or intellectual qualities which the people can now claim as pre-eminently theirs. The interest of all this is not in what it really tells about the people's past, but in what it explains about their present and what it may portend. What must be remembered is that no people think of themselves in exactly the same terms generation after generation. The self-image changes with time—and the pace of change varies with each people.

Among the many transformations which the people of Africa are undergoing must surely be counted a distinct revolution in self-evaluation. Almost suddenly the African has now come to feel that he can no longer accept Western disparaging assessments of his past record and present capacities. He has therefore set out to re-interpret himself to himself—and, at the same time, invite the rest of the world to reconsider its judgement on him.

But the judgement which the rest of the world has to reconsider was never really passed on, say, Tanzanians as Tanzanians. Until independence at any rate, it was passed on Tanzanians as specimen *Africans*.*

* This point is discussed more thoroughly in my article " On the concept of ' We are all Africans ' ", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. lvii, No. 1, Mar. 1963, pp. 88–97. For stimulation on some of the other points in this chapter I am particularly grateful to Mrs. Prudence Smith.

If therefore Nyerere cannot now get the rest of the world to stop generalising altogether, he can at least seek to persuade the world to generalise along different lines.

In any case, Tanzania, Ghana, Senegal, have all had such short histories as territorial entities that their self-images must turn to the history of the continent as a whole for some of the raw material with which the images are to be forged.

It is this continental aspect that I am concerned about in this chapter—that part of the African's self-portrayal which disregards the territorial and tribal frontiers. I shall not take up the question of regional variations even though these certainly exist and may well develop further.

A factor which strikes one immediately is the ease with which one can contrast the African self-image with the British self-image. It is as though the two peoples prided themselves on qualities which were nearly the opposite of each other. If one looked for a single quality by which the British like to distinguish themselves from the rest of mankind it is surely the quality of pre-eminent political sophistication, with all its wealth of mature experience in government and diplomacy. It is this " myth of sophistication " which makes Britons visualise themselves as playing " Greeks " to American " Romans ", saving Europe from itself, and serving as a moral force in the world at large.*

On the other hand, if one looks for a single quality which Africans today see themselves as personifying, it is the quality of innocence. They too see themselves as an actual or potential moral force in the world—but by virtue of their " myth of innocence " in contrast to the British " myth of sophistication ."

It might at first appear that this can only be a *contrast* if the sense of innocence which is meant here is the sense of " Not knowing " rather than the sense of " not guilty ". In fact, both senses come

* Harold Macmillan was representative of this school of British thought. The very idea of playing Greeks to American Romans is attributed to him. And some of his reasoning in 1962 about the need for a British entry in the European Economic Community also saw Britain as a moral leader—destined to make Europe more " outward-looking ".

into play in African nationalistic thought, and British sophistication can be a foil to both.

Consider first the image of the naive African, rather than that of the guiltless. To the African what saves the naiveté from being a fault is, first, its self-awareness and, secondly, what you might call its suicidal trend—its intention to put an end to itself. The image is of a new arrival on the world stage, with a self-imposed duty to seek out everywhere all the good examples which he might follow. Thus the pan-Africanist may look to the United States for an instance of national might through continental unity. But for an example of rapid economic growth, seemingly due to centralised planning, the African might look to the Soviet Union. Those who stand for political devolution in each African country often cite Switzerland as a model of federalism on a small scale. Those who prefer bigger units in spite of multi-lingualism prefer the example of the Indian Union. Israel is sometimes examined as a possible model of a co-operative economic system. Even Formosa's irrigation and other projects have been held up for African emulation by at least one African Minister returning from there.*

In short, many a country is keen to invite African visitors, display its wares and persuade itself and others that it, too, is a " model " in this or that respect. And if Leopold Senghor's view is at all representative, the African for his part is all set to be receptive to what Senghor calls " all the fertilising contributions of the various civilisations and continents ".† In this particular sense of " not knowing " the innocent African must cease to be innocent as rapidly as possible. In the meanwhile, he is confident that he has the capacity to select which skills he really needs and the capacity to master them.

But there is, of course, that other sense of innocence—guiltlessness —which demands to be preserved rather than ended. And here again a contrast emerges with the British self-image of maturity.

* See Leon M. S. Slawecki, " The two Chinas in Africa ", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. xli, No. 2, Jan. 1963.

† Senghor has discussed this idea in different places. See, for example, " Negritude and the concept of universal civilisation ", *Presence Africaine*, Vol. xviii, No. 26, Second Quarter, 1963. See also " West Africa in evolution ", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. xxxix, Jan. 1961.

The British have all too often attributed their sophistication in world affairs to the almost global experience acquired through their imperial role. In African estimation, however, the British lion should never have trespassed into the African jungle for an exercise in kingship. It follows that there is guilt in the very experience that the lion has acquired. And the African innocence in both its senses is, in part, a reaction to it all.

This immediately suggests a related contrast in temperament between the two peoples—their respective attitudes to nationalism. In almost every context where this word is used today the Englishman dismisses what it denotes as a sign of immaturity—and therefore decidedly " un-British ". This is largely self-deception, even if you waive the question of nationalism among the Scots and Welsh. What in others the Englishman disparagingly calls " nationalism " he would in himself have approvingly called " patriotism " had he been similarly subjugated.* Moreover, if nationalism is militant patriotism, it can sometimes be inspired not by a desire for self-rule, but by a desire to rule others. And it was such a form of nationalism which proudly looked at the British race as, in the words of Joseph Chamberlain, " the greatest of the governing races that the world has ever seen ".†

Contrasting all this with African national consciousness, the distinction the African claims is that of having been the most victimised subject-race the world has ever seen. In her first Reith Lecture, Margery Perham pointed out that African history was certainly not without African versions of imperialism.‡ This is true. But if one were making a colonial reckoning as between the expansionist records of Africans and Europeans, there must surely be a comparison of *scale* as well as of principle. Inter-tribal conflicts in Africa should surely be balanced against inter-territorial wars in Europe. What

* Tom Mboya discusses the two concepts of nationalism and patriotism in his book *Freedom and After* (London : Andre Deutsch, 1963). See Chapter 11 especially.

† See, for example, Joseph Chamberlain's speech at the Imperial Institute on Nov. 11, 1895 : *Foreign and Colonial Speeches* (1897), pp. 88–90.

‡ Margery Perham, *The Colonial Reckoning*, The Fontana Library (Collins, 1963), pp 13–18.

the African has done to the African should be balanced against what the European has done to the European. But what African equivalent is there for what the white man continues to do to the black man in the black man's own continent?

The obvious retort to this could still be that what matters is the moral principle—and that this can be as effectively violated between tribes as between races. But it is still open to the utilitarian to insist that it *does* matter who has been responsible so far for the greatest unhappiness of the greatest number. This, of course, is an extreme way of putting the case against Europe. Many Africans will concede that the Empire brought certain blessings and benefits as well as suffering and indignity. But I am discussing here the *debating* positions which have sometimes to be taken. Starting from the isolated premise that to impose yourself on other people is wrong, the more people you impose yourself on the more culpable you are deemed to be. And the British Empire prided itself on being the biggest in history.

Slavery is another relevant issue. It has been argued that the African was a slave-dealer as well as a slave. This again is true. What must not be forgotten in a comparative reckoning is that the European and Arab intruders into the African continent were only slave-dealers—certainly never slaves of the African himself. In any case, given the nature of the trade, there were naturally many slaves to every African dealer. It is therefore understandable that the present-day African should identify himself with the preponderant *enslaved* Africans rather than with the relatively few African dealers. Internal African slavery—captives from tribal warfare, and tribal feudalism—do not appear to touch upon the exposed nerves of guilt and recrimination. They can be exhumed from the past of almost any nation. In any case, the blanket term " slavery " can so easily conceal a fundamental difference between a hierarchical structure in some African society on the one hand and the trade which the Arabs and Europeans carried out on the other. Within the term "slaves" when applied to a category of people in an African society we might, on closer observation, identify what in reality were more like the " serfs " of Western feudalism, or even the equivalents of the " labourers " of later Western history.

" But utilising war captives in this way is something which Europe outgrew ages ago ", a Westerner might here point out. " Yes, we have had our prisoners-of-war and even our concentration camps. But once the war was over we liberated our captives—instead of using them in domestic bondage ".

And the African might answer : " In this century you have indeed liberated your captives once a war was over—and demanded instead the colonies of the defeated nation ".

What all this trend of reasoning suggests is that if, until recently, British patriotism revelled in the sophistication of the governing aristocrat, African nationalism has continued to draw inspiration from the moral innocence of the pre-eminent underdog. Behind this sense of the African martyrdom is the conviction that, when all is said and done, it was on the African that humanity committed its worst crimes against the human personality. With a sense of martyrdom comes a sense of mission. And the African feels that by fighting for himself, he has been fighting for nothing less than that personality itself. It is perhaps this line of reasoning which makes it possible for Julius Nyerere to say that " there is no continent which has taken up the fight for the dignity of the common man more vigorously than Africa ".*

And yet the idea of respect for the human personality as a moral principle came nearest to being conceptually perfected outside Africa. This is not to imply that the African had no notion of the value of man as man. But a genuine belief in the morality of " human one-ness " must be tested at least against an awareness of the extent of human diversity. The African's relative isolation denied him this awareness. It was the European, more than any one else, who exposed himself to contact and conflict with his

* See Nyerere's contribution " The African and democracy " to a symposium entitled *Africa Speaks* (eds. James Duffy and Robert A. Manners) (Princeton : D. Van Nostrand, 1961), p. 31. In an address to a seminar organised by the Indian Council for Africa in 1961, the late Jawaharlal Nehru also referred to the fate of the African as the pre-eminent underdog in human history. Nehru said : " Reading through history I think the agony of the African continent has not been equalled anywhere." See *Africa Quarterly*, Indian Council for Africa, Vol. 1, No. 3, Oct.—Dec., 1961, p. 9.

own human kind by a global expansion. He evolved the ethics of human fellowship—but failed the test which these implied.

But what was it which inspired African nationalism? Was it Europe's achievement in the realm of ethical ideas? Or was it Europe's failure in practical behaviour? In a sense it was the gap, the discrepancy, between the two. African nationalism can then be viewed as an instrument by which Europe has been forced, in the last decade or so, to start closing the gap between her principles and her behaviour in her relationship with other races. In this reflection many African leaders find a sense of mission which goes beyond narrow nationalism and race consciousness.

It becomes apparent that while the innocence of " not knowing " might, with certain qualifications, imply the duty that the African must learn, the innocence of " not guilty " tends to imply the duty that the African must teach. This seems to place a special responsibility on the African. In Tom Mboya's estimation, the African personality would be " meaningless " unless it were identified with the moral principles Africa fought for.*

But is there not an important deficiency in a myth based on innocence? If, as Gibbon claims, history is little more than the register of the crimes, follies and misfortunes of mankind, a people which considers that it has little more than innocence to show for its past may come dangerously near to confessing that it has no history worth registering. Are not such people important only insofar as they were victims of " the crimes and follies " of others and suffered " misfortunes " as a result? Do the Africans " signify ", or consider themselves to signify, only as part of the history of others? Is innocence essentially a passive virtue?

Not necessarily. To be innocent of the charge of neglecting your duty implies something positive—the *doing* of that duty. In African nationalistic thought this active sense of innocence is illustrated in claims about the nature of traditional African societies. *Duty* is a very potent concept, a regulating force, in African society. Indeed, the scale of values of such societies has consisted in a belief in what Mamadou Dia of Senegal has called " a surplus of duty " over

* See Mboya, " Vision of Africa ", *Africa Speaks*, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

rights.* What is involved here is a distinct interpretation of the ultimate human need of the individual. Western liberal democracy used to start from the axiom that what the individual needed above all else was his liberty. Indigenous African systems, on the other hand, have seemed to start from the premise that what was most important for the individual was in fact a sense of being needed. In the traditional African view " freedom from care " is not something to be coveted. It imposes on the mind of the individual a lonely burden of insignificance. As in liberal democratic thought, this scale of values does indeed agree that the individual matters. But the traditional African scale of values goes on to add that the individual must *feel* to matter. And this he can best do by identifying with a social complex of responsibilities above all to his kin, both living and dead, and to his elders and chiefs. The detribalised African may be freer in a Western liberal sense, but he labours under the burden of a quest for a new set of duties which can command his allegiance. He is what Dame Margery Perham calls " the socially orphaned ".† But she is wrong in reducing this plight simply to a desire for a father-figure to look up to. The anomie of the detribalised African is not even just a need for a parent to look after *him*, but also a parent that the young man could look after in turn. Nor is that new parent necessarily a *person*. It can be a new order of life to which he can make a contribution. If he is lively the young man may be converted to nationalism—and feel himself committed to the service of a " mother Ghana " or even a " mother Africa ". And the leader he follows is a father-figure only if he succeeds in symbolising the mother-country.

Given all this, the paramount problem of the new states is not merely to devise a Constitutional Bill of Rights which will work in practice. It is more often a problem of how to evolve a Bill of *Duties* transcendent enough to command the allegiance both of the detribalised citizen and of the tribesman who still recognises only narrow duties. Nkrumah sometimes looked even

* See, for example, Mamadou Dia, *The African Nations and World Solidarity* (translated from the French by Mercer Cook) (London: Thomas and Hudson, 1962), p. 27.

† *The Colonial Reckoning*, *op. cit.*

beyond this allegiance of the individual to his own country. In one passage in a broadcast to his people in April 1963, Nkrumah seemed to be calling for a Universal Declaration of Human Duties—a new " international " morality which was at once inter-state and inter-individual. This, at least, is one possible interpretation of his vision of a new doctrine designed to " inculcate in the *individual* a sense of his responsibility for the fate of his fellow men ". It may sound almost mystical. But essentially this universal vision was just an extension of Nkrumah's domestic pre-occupation—the task of inculcating in each Ghanaian a sense of responsibility for at least the economic fate of all Ghanaians in those cruel years of national consolidation.

A British Colonial Secretary under a Labour Government, the late Creech Jones, once declared that he did not consider it the duty of his office to impose socialism on the colonies. It has now turned out that he did not have to. No ideology seems to have greater and more widespread attraction in emergent Africa than socialism—though, as in Europe, it is socialism of various different shades. What worries the African nationalist in command of affairs is whether his vision of " socialism in One Continent ", or even in each country, can ever be the sum total of multiple-ethnic traditions each involving " Collectivism in One Tribe " and no more. To put it in another way, his problem is whether numerous " Welfare Tribes " added together in Ghana or Tanzania can ever give you the sum total of one " Welfare State ".

And yet, even if the socialism of, say, Nyerere cannot really be traced to the collectivism of the people of Tanzania added together, that socialism may well be affected by his conviction that it can be so traced. Indeed, the myth of continuity can be even more important to an African radical, searching for a new historical identity, than it is to a European conservative who merely seeks to preserve his old one.

This is where the preoccupation of the African politician touches that of the growing school of African scholars, something which emerged very clearly at the first Congress of Africanists in Accra in 1962.*

* Consult *The Proceedings of the First International Congress of Africanists* (London : Longmans, Green, 1964).

For both the African politician and the African scholar, Africa's past has been concealed for too long behind a cloud of dust. The dust was raised by Western travellers and their tales, traders with their limited objectives, administrators with their practical problems, and even by Western scholars whose vision had been distorted by the preconception that the African past, insofar as it could be discovered at all, was a record of savagery, meaningful only when viewed as an aspect of the imperial or colonial history of European powers.*

The *indigenous* explorer feels that it is now his turn to start looking. If need be he must marshall his instincts to his aid in the search. But above all he must replace the damaging, or false, assumptions of the Western explorers—he must postulate the possibility of more favourable findings.

Where much is still so uncertain, historiography can too easily settle down to the slumber of a dogma. Until more is known, the dogma needs a challenge which contradicts, if necessary, every unproved assumption on which the dogma is based. Out of the clash of assumptions, and of any new evidence, historians will re-think their positions. And partly out of the thoughts of their historians, African nations—as all others—will re-shape their myths.

In the meantime, one reflection above all others remains persuasive for Africans. The reflection is that just as one nation's defeat in battle is another's day of honour, so one people's civilising crusade might well be another's martyrdom. But the image of innocence in Africa today is far from a mere assertion of grievance. On the contrary, it gives signs of great latent strength, and of a consciousness of purpose which has been forcefully taking shape in spite of the cruel damage of history—and partly, indeed, because of it.

* The latest eminent Western historian who holds this kind of view is Professor H. Trevor-Roper of the University of Oxford. For a summary of his stand see " Trevor-Roper and African History ", *West Africa* (London), Jan. 18, 1964, p. 58.

CHAPTER 6

The Royal Theme in African Nationalism

GEORGE VI died on February 6, 1952. His elder daughter was in Kenya at the time. It was to Kenya then that England turned when the pronouncement was made: "The King is dead; God save the Queen." We might therefore say that the present British Queen became Queen on African soil.

But that was by no means the only major point of contact between the British monarchy and the recent history of Commonwealth Africa. The principle of allegiance to the Crown has inadvertently got involved in some of the more sordid aspects of Commonwealth wrangles in the last ten years, including the issue of racialism in South Africa, the consolidation of authoritarianism in Ghana and the problem of Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence. This chapter will concern itself with some of these issues.

A wider aim of this chapter is to advance the hypothesis that republicanism is, to a certain extent, *alien* to the African style of politics. It is true that almost all Commonwealth Africa has opted for republican status. What this paper hopes to demonstrate is that this was not necessarily because African nationalism was inherently opposed to monarchical values. The real reasons for ending the allegiance to the British Queen had little to do with the fact that she was a Queen.

But first let us glance at the origins of republican status within the Commonwealth. Republicanism in the Commonwealth is to be traced back to India's desire to remain a member while ceasing to owe allegiance to the British Crown. Could these two desires be reconciled? It was decided that to owe direct allegiance to the

Crown was different from recognising the King as a symbolic head of the association. India could accept the latter but not the former. After a meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in April 1949, India was permitted to become the first republican member of the Commonwealth, but on the basis of accepting :

> The King as the symbol of the free association of its independent member nations and as such the Head of the Commonwealth.*

Explaining this to the Indian Constituent Assembly, Pandit Nehru said :

> There is a reference in connexion with the Commonwealth to the King as the symbol of that association. Observe that the reference is to the King and not to the Crown. It is a small matter, but it has a certain significance. But the point is this, that in so far as the Republic of India is concerned, . . . she has nothing to do with any external authority, with any king, and none of her subjects owe any allegiance to the King or any other external authority.†

This was one more issue on which India set the precedent for the future African members of the Commonwealth. However, the curious thing about it all was that it was a South African who regretted the weakening of the royal link in the Commonwealth. Jan Smuts was worried about the consequences of the republican precedent. " The King is something of a reality in our system, even if he does not exercise functions." With the breach in common allegiance there was a danger that the Commonwealth might become something which " is merely a matter of language and has nothing behind it "—and like the Holy Roman Empire, the British Commonwealth might continue to exist as a name for hundreds of years after it had ceased to live.‡

* See Nicholas Mansergh, *Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs*, 1931–52, Vol. ii (London : Oxford University Press for Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953), pp. 846–7.

† Speech to the Indian Constituent Assembly, May 16, 1949. *India, Constituent Assembly Debs.*, Vol. 8, pp. 2-10.

‡ Nicholas Mansergh, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, Problems of Wartime Co-operation and Post War Change*, 1939–1952 (London : Oxford University Press for Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1958), pp. 254–5.

More than ten years later, General Smuts' successors in the Union wanted to avail themselves of the precedent which India had set—they wanted to become a republic while remaining in the Commonwealth. But by severing her links with the British Crown South Africa was forced to re-apply for membership in the Commonwealth. That provided her opponents with the opportunity they needed. The pressures against her re-entry into the association finally forced South Africa to withdraw her application for re-admission. Her racialistic policies were now deemed inconsistent with membership of the Commonwealth—and it was the formal issue of South Africa's new republican status which provided the Commonwealth with the pretext for a dramatic assertion of this principle.

Five years later, there was yet another milestone in the story of the Commonwealth and the principle of allegiance to the Queen. On November 11, 1965, Ian Smith issued a unilateral declaration of Rhodesia's independence—and concluded that declaration with the affirmation " God save the Queen ! " This whole issue was yet another " constitutional " innovation. India, as we have noted, established the principle that a country could cease to owe allegiance to the Queen and still remain within the Commonwealth. What Ian Smith sought to establish was a converse principle—that a country could, to all intents and purposes, cease to be in the Commonwealth and continue to owe allegiance to the Queen. As Smith unilaterally assumed independence, Britain's Prime Minister suspended the Commonwealth preferential tariff for Rhodesia. Other members of the Commonwealth were soon expressing disapproval of the Smith régime and withholding recognition of it. There was no doubt that the Smith régime was beyond the pale of the Commonwealth. But the régime continued to assert its allegiance to the Head of that Commonwealth. As David Holden put it in an article in the *Sunday Times* a few days after UDI :

> With this oath of loyalty, appended to the " new Constitution of Rhodesia, 1965 " . . . the rebels of Rhodesia can now affirm that they are not rebels, after all. Whether Queen Elizabeth likes it or not, they have made her their Queen. Whether the British Government approves or disapproves, the Union Jack will fly and the National Anthem will

> be sung as symbols of Rhodesia's "true allegiance". Never in the course of human affairs has there been so obsessively "loyal" a rebellion.*

But it has not been merely with the problem of race-relations in the Commonwealth that the monarchy has been inadvertently involved. It has at times also been drawn into controversies about that other old link of the Commonwealth—the old bond of a shared parliamentary system of government. When for the first time Asian countries became full members of the Commonwealth, the late Liaquat Ali Khan, then Prime Minister of Pakistan, had occasion to say that since India, Pakistan and Ceylon acceded to the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth had changed its "complexion".

> Now it is a Commonwealth of free nations who believe in the same way of life and in the same democracy. To my mind, these ideas are even stronger than racial ties.†

This argument of Pakistan's Prime Minister was echoed by others. The ideal of blood solidarity in the Commonwealth had now been succeeded by bonds of democracy—or so it was asserted by those who shared Liaquat Ali Khan's conception of the new Commonwealth.

Yet, as history would have it, it was Liaquat Ali's own country which became the first Commonwealth country to abolish parliamentary democracy. In 1958 Ayub Khan overthrew the corrupt parliamentary régime and established a military paternalism in Pakistan.

A less candid abolition of parliamentary democracy was later to take place in the first African country to become an independent member of the Commonwealth. Kwame Nkrumah's methods of eliminating parliamentary politics were less candid than Ayub's because of the gradualism with which Nkrumah weakened Parliament as an effective force and because of the type of harassment to which his opponents were subjected.

* See Holden, "Diary of a rebellion", *Sunday Times* (London), Nov. 14, 1965. See also Nora Beloff, "Wilson, the Queen and the crisis", *The Observer* (London), Oct. 24, 1965. See also Anthony Lewis, "Queen's Role—Rhodesia points up question", *New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1965.

† Cited by Mansergh, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

And yet of all the Commonwealth leaders of Asia and Africa, to none had the British monarch shown greater consideration than to Nkrumah. Royal consideration tends to be mainly in symbolic terms—and there was respectful symbolism in the appointment of Nkrumah as a Privy Councillor of the Queen after Ghana's independence. On this appointment, Nkrumah had the following to say to his own people in a broadcast given soon after. Nkrumah said:

> As you know, during my visit to Balmoral I had the honour of being made a member of the Queen's Privy Council. As the first African to be admitted into this great Council of State, I consider it an honour not only to myself, but also to the people of Ghana and to peoples of Africa and of African descent everywhere.*

Even before he left England, Nkrumah had received a large number of telegrams and letters of congratulations from his people in Ghana in this connection.† Ghanaians generally were apparently as flattered by the appointment as Nkrumah seemed to be.

Another symbolic royal gesture to Nkrumah was to confide in him that the Queen was pregnant before the news was actually announced. The Queen was scheduled to visit Ghana in November 1959. But on discovering that she was pregnant a postponement of the visit became necessary. Nkrumah was told about the pregnancy a few weeks before it became world news. The advance confidence was an important symbolic gesture. As Nkrumah recounts in one of his books:

> I was informed of the Queen's condition some weeks before the news that she was expecting a baby was made public. I believe I was the first person, outside the immediate royal circle, to be told.‡

But the Queen's gestures to Nkrumah did not become directly related to the erosion of democracy in Ghana until the eve of her actual visit in November 1961. By that time there was already some

* See Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom, A Statement of African Ideology* (New York : Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 179.

† *Ibid.* Perhaps it was instances such as these which led John Holmes of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs to the conclusion that "Africans seem to have a fondness for Queens". See his article "The impact on the Commonwealth of the Emergence of Africa", *International Organization*, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (Spring, 1962).

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

evidence that Nkrumah was out to suppress opposition to himself. The Preventive Detention Act had already been in operation for some time, and discontent with the régime was now finding an outlet in violence. Bomb explosions in the streets of Accra raised questions about the safety of the Queen when her visit started. Nkrumah was obviously still keen that the visit should take place. Britain sent Duncan Sandys in advance to talk to the Ghanaian Government and assess the security situation. Those people in England who were not convinced of the wisdom of the visit had two main fears. One was indeed fear for the safety of the Queen's own person. But another was the fear that the Queen's visit would be used to bolster up a régime which was becoming increasingly intolerant of its opponents. The visit nevertheless took place.

Was the timing of the Queen's visit an asset to Nkrumah in his own domestic struggle for survival? It seems difficult to believe that a mere visit by a foreign monarch could make a difference to the destiny of a ruler seemingly as entrenched as Nkrumah. Yet 1961 was indeed a crucial year in the fortunes of the régime. There was a serious setback in the economy when the cocoa prices began to fall and the Government was obliged to draw heavily on its reserves. A harsh budget in mid-July, which bore heavily on skilled and semi-skilled workers, resulted in a major strike among the railway and harbour workers in Sekondi-Takoradi. It was the first major strike since independence. A state of emergency was declared in the town. Violence broke out as the strike went on for two or three weeks. Even in retrospect it is still possible to argue that while " the Sekondi strike was not perhaps a major threat to the régime, . . . it was one that might well become so."*

A curious feature of the grievances of the strikers was an accompanying disaffection with the new republican status of the country. It was as if the strikers partly attributed their difficulties to the total constitutional break with Britain. In admonishing the strikers, Nkrumah referred to their suggestion that " our Republican Constitution should be abolished and that we should go back to the

* This is Dennis Austin's assessment in his *Politics in Ghana* 1946-1960 (London : Oxford University Press for R.I.I.A., 1964). See pp. 400–2.

system of having a Governor General ".* To Nkrumah this was evidence that the strike had been instigated by sinister forces. But what matters here is that grievances against the régime were being identified—however naively—with the new republican system. Two months later the Queen herself was the guest of the republican régime.

Another special feature of 1961 in the fortunes of Nkrumah was that it signified a high water mark in the process of Nkrumah's renunciation of former colleagues. As Dennis Austin has put it:

> By the end of 1961 . . . the CPP was bereft of its early leaders. In their place were those who had very little authority in their own right . . . . Eager to establish their authority they echoed Nkrumah's attacks on colonialism, neo-colonialism, and the hidden enemies within the state who were said to be saboteurs of " African socialism ".†

Finally in 1961 there was the increasing tension between Ghana and Togo, culminating in a total break towards the end of the year.

This was the general background of the Queen's visit. Curiously enough, Nkrumah's régime in 1961 came to use Britain's name for domestic purposes in two contradictory ways. In December 1961 the Ghana Government accused the British Government of complicity in an attempt to subvert the government of Ghana. This was perhaps a case of gaining domestic support by portraying Britain as an enemy. And yet Nkrumah's keenness on the royal visit a few weeks earlier had been a case of trying to gain greater domestic prestige by portraying the British Queen as a friend of Nkrumah's régime.

But why should a visit from a British Queen be regarded as prestigious by citizens of a proud African country? One part of the answer concerns African attitudes to the British royal traditions as such. The other part of the answer is even deeper—it concerns African attitudes to the very concept of royalty itself.

On the issue of African attitudes to British royal traditions, there is first the factor that however offensive African nationalists have

* See *Ghana Today*, Sept. 27, 1961.

† *Politics in Ghana*, *op. cit.*, p. 407.

wanted to be towards Britain, they have almost always fallen short of being offensive about the British Queen. In some ways this is odd. When a person has his feelings hurt there is a great temptation to hit back at the most tender area of his opponent's sensitivities. Africans have often enough had their feelings hurt by real or imagined racial insults from British individuals or British governments. On such occasions it must have been obvious that there were few ways of hurting back British feelings which would be more effective than the use of abusive or even mildly disrespectful language about the Queen. An African militant could have taken a posture like this—" If you insult my race I will insult your Queen ! " To a Briton, insulting the Queen would indeed be more offensive than insulting " the British race "—the British being less sensitive to racial taunts than the Africans. Yet hardly any African militant has gone as far as publicly to denounce the British monarch. Why not ?

The simple answer is that there is a definite *limit* as to how deeply African nationalists care to hurt British feelings even in moments of great emotional stress. It is true that over the Rhodesian issue both the Duke of Edinburgh and Princess Margaret became targets of African gestures of protest. In the case of the Duke, the African reaction was in reply to something that the Duke had himself said. In a speech at Edinburgh the Duke had suggested that Africans were not patient enough in their desire for a democratic solution to the Rhodesian problem. Kenya's Joseph Murumbi soon answered from Nairobi, criticising the Duke for these remarks.*

A few months later Ian Smith unilaterally declared Rhodesia's independence. The crisis which followed coincided with a semi-official visit to the United States by Princess Margaret and the Earl of Snowdon. The African delegates at the United Nations felt that Britain's sanctions against Smith were soft and less than adequate for the purpose they were supposed to serve. In this mood of disaffection with the British response to Rhodesia's independence, all the delegates of African states at the United Nations boycotted a drinks reception that was held at the United Nations in honour of

* See *The Times* (London), July 3 and 6, 1965.

Princess Margaret and her husband. It was, of course, a protest against Britain rather than against the Princess herself.*

Some years earlier the Queen Mother had also been boycotted by African nationalists when she visited Kenya. This was before independence, and the gesture of protest was part of the struggle for self-rule in Kenya.†

But the most that Africans have ever done is to be deliberately absent from some cocktail party or parade arranged for a royal visitor. They have never actually spoken out against the visitor as such. Moreover, even this limited kind of protest has virtually never been directed against the Sovereign herself—it has affected some other member of the royal family.

A major reason for this African restraint is their reluctance to go too far in hurting British feelings. A related reason is that Africans in British Africa came to accept Britain's own constitutional convention that the Queen was above politics. But both these reasons are minimal reasons for African attitudes to British royalty. In at least some cases there might be deeper psychological reasons.

When Prime Minister Harold Macmillan visited Ghana in January 1960 Kwame Nkrumah had occasion to say to him:

> I can assure you, Sir, that the [Republican] constitutional change which will be introduced this year will in no way affect . . . that warmth of our affection for the Queen.‡

To a certain extent this kind of language has a certain amount of extravagance about it—perhaps justified by diplomatic considerations. It is not necessarily " affection " that many Africans in former British Africa feel for the British sovereign—it is a lingering awe. It is that awe which made Nkrumah so sincerely appreciative of being appointed a member of the Queen's Privy Council. It is the same awe which has given the history of independent Africa four

* See " Margaret unperturbed by boycott at U.N. ", *New York Times*, Nov. 20, 1965.

† In fact, even before she arrived in Kenya, the African elected members of the Legislative Council sent her a telegram assuring her that their boycott of her visit " must not be taken as a sign of discourtesy or disloyalty ". See *The Times*, Jan. 30, 1959. See also *The Times*, Jan. 20, 1959.

‡ Nkrumah, *Hands off Africa ! ! ! A Selection* of *Speeches*, (Accra: Owusu-Akyem, Ministry of Local Government, 1960 [?]), p. 57.

knighted Prime Ministers, one knighted regional premier, one knighted President and one knighted Vice-President—some of them are still referred to with the knightly " Sir " by their countrymen. Like Nkrumah himself, many of these are no longer in power. And some were considered " conservative ". But the significant thing is that none of them had their Knighthoods held against them. The Prime Ministers in question are Sir David Jawara of the Gambia; the late Alhaji Sir Abubaker Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria; Sir Albert Margai and the late Sir Milton Margai of Sierra Leone : the regional Premier was the late Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello of Northern Nigeria; the President and Vice-President were Sir Edward Mutesa and Sir Wilberforce Nadiope of Uganda. These four countries involved account for over sixty per cent of the population of Commonwealth Africa as a whole.

But is all this responsiveness to British royal traditions itself part of a deeper African attachment to the concept of royalty itself? Is there such an attachment? This is what brings usback to our thesis that republicanism is, in a sense, alien to the African style of politics. And it is more directly to this thesis that we must now turn our attention.

It might at first appear that this is another attempt to establish a continuity between modern politics in Africa and the usages of tribal rule in traditional Africa. In fact, republicanism is alien less because of non-conformity with tribal usages than because of its partial inconsistency with nationalistic sentiments. Yet even this is a distortion—for the nature of nationalistic sentiments is itself partly determined by the legacy of tribal ways.

But which nationalistic sentiments are ill at ease with the notion of republicanism? Part of the answer lies in the following observation by a Professor of African History in an American university :

> One of the principal functions of history is to help the ' individual define his personality '. The African as well as Western man, must see himself within . . . a stream of historical consciousness. . . . To spring from an unhistoric past is to be without character and without a place in the mainstream of universal history.*

* See William H. Lewis's review of *Africa in Time-Perspective* by Daniel F. McCall (Boston : Boston University Press, 1964). The review was in *African Forum*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Summer 1965, pp. 158-60.

This is an exaggeration, but one which has many converts among black nationalists, both in Africa and in the United States. Because of the nature of humiliation to which he was subjected, the Negro has often shown a passionate desire to prove that he has a past glorious enough to form part of " the mainstream of universal history ". Occasionally, especially in the New World, the Negro has even become what a fellow Negro has called :

> . . . the rash and rabid amateur who has glibly tried to prove half of the world's geniuses to have been Negroes and to trace the pedigree of nineteenth-century Americans from the Queen of Sheba.*

But why the Queen of Sheba ? Partly because she *was* a *Queen.* In other words, the whole concept of a " glorious history " is too often associated with the achievements of great monarchs. Taking pride in an ancient kingdom has therefore become part of the black man's quest for a historical identity.

Sometimes, the black man's interest in some splendid phase of history in Africa is a mere cultural assertion—and does not affect policy or concrete political behaviour. An example of this is the desire of nationalists like Cheikh Anta Diop of Senegal to prove that the Pharaohs were Negroes. As he put it in a talk given at the first International Conference of Negro Writers and Artists held in Paris in 1956 :

> the ancient Egyptian and Pharaonic civilization was a Negro civilization . . . and . . . all Africans can draw the same moral advantage from it that Westerners draw from Graeco-Latin civilization.†

But there have been occasions when pride in an ancient kingdom has actually resulted in a significant policy decision. Such occasions include those which resulted in renaming the Gold Coast " Ghana " and Soudan " Mali ". Nkrumah even found it possible to sympathise with the pride which the British people feel for the old Empire. As he said to a British Prime Minister once :

* See Arthur A. Shomburg, " The Negro digs up his past " in Sylvestre C. Watkins (ed.), *An Anthology of American Negro Literature* (New York : The Modern Library, 1944), pp. 101–2.

† See Diop, " The cultural contributions and prospects of Africa ", the *First International Conference of Negro Writers and Artists* (Paris : Presence Africaine), Vol. XVIII–XIX, pp. 349–51.

> We know that some of the older nations [i.e., the old Dominions] were willing members of the British Empire and we appreciate the historical significance of that institution, just as we look back with pride on our own African history to the Empire of Ghana.*

The same country which was soon to declare itself a Republic had gone out of its way to name itself after an ancient empire. The paradox has other analogies in the history of African nationalism. The late W. E. B. Du Bois, a founding-father of pan-Africanism, was a Marxist; but he continued to have a proud interest in ancient African monarchs. As he once put it:

> In Africa were great and powerful kingdoms. When Greek poets enumerated the kingdoms of the earth, it was not only natural but inevitable to mention Memnon, King of Ethiopia, as leader of one of the great armies that beseiged Troy. When a writer like Herodotus, father of history, wanted to visit the world, he went as naturally to Egypt as Americans go to London and Paris. Nor was he surprised to find the Egyptians, as he described them, " black and curly haired ".†

Du Bois's own first visit to Africa was after the pan-African conference in Lisbon in 1923. By the accident of a pun on a name, the paradox of monarchical republicanism was this time implicit in his very mission to Africa. Du Bois tells us:

> I held from President Coolidge of the United States status as Special Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to represent him at the second inaugural of the President King of Liberia.‡

Another ideological influence on pan-Africanism was Marcus Garvey, the West Indian who launched a militant Negro movement in the United States after World War I. In his own autobiography Nkrumah came to admit that he was greatly impressed by the ideas of Marcus Garvey. It is not clear which Garveyite ideas left a durable mark on Nkrumah. What needs to be pointed out is that the paradox of monarchical republicanism was present in Garvey too. The International Convention of the Negro People of the World which he called in August 1920 was characterised by a kind of royal pomp and fanfare.

* Speech in honour of Harold Macmillan on his visit to Ghana in Jan. 1960. See *Hands off Africa ! ! !*, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-57.

† W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, *The World and Africa* (first published in 1946) (New York: International Publishers, 1965, enlarged edition), p. 121.

‡ See George Padmore (ed.), *History of the Pan-African Congress* (first published in 1947) (London: William Morris House, 1963).

> Garvey was elected provisional president of Africa . . . . As head of the African republic he envisaged, his official title was " His Highness, the Potentate" . . .*

Forty years later Kwame Nkrumah was President of a more modest African republic. His equivalent of a quasi-monarchical title was the *Osagyefo*, or the redeemer.

This brings us to another reason why republicanism is somewhat alien to the African style of politics since independence—and the reason is the need which African leaders have sometimes felt to spiritualise their own offices and lend a halo of sacredness to themselves as founding fathers. As David E. Apter has put it in his discussion of " political religion " in the new states :

> The " birth " of the nation is thus a religious event, forming a fund of political grace that can be dispensed over the years. The agent of rebirth is normally an individual—an Nkrumah, a Touré who, as leader of the political movement, is midwife to the birth of the nation.†

Apter then cites the adulation accorded to Nkrumah, illustrating with the eulogy by Tawia Adamafio, the former general secretary of the Convention People's Party :

> To us, his people, Kwame Nkrumah is our father, teacher, our brother, our friend, indeed our lives, for without him we would no doubt have existed, but we would not have lived ; there would have been no hope of a cure for our sick souls, no taste of glorious victory after a life-time of suffering. What we owe him is greater even than the air we breathe, for he made us as surely as he made Ghana.‡

This *degree* of adulation for a leader was perhaps not typical, but almost everywhere in Africa there has been a tendency to spiritualise the head of state or government. It is this tendency towards sacred leadership which, more than any other factor, makes republicanism somewhat unsuited to the African style of politics. This is to assume that republicanism is usually a governmental system of *secular* orientation, but the assumption is more than merely defen-

* See E. U. Essein-Udom, *Black Nationalism, A Search for an Identity in America* (Chicago : Chicago University Press, 1962), pp. 38-9.

† See Apter, " Political religion in the new nations " in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States* (New York : Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 82-4.

‡ Adamafio, *A Portrait of the Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah* (Accra : Government Printer, 1960), p. 95. See Apter, *Ibid.*

sible historically. What monarchical republics of Ghana's type under Nkrumah are now out to assert is the new doctrine of the Divine Right of founder-Presidents. Nor is the doctrine entirely without justification in countries which have yet to establish legitimacy and consolidate the authority of the government. As Apter has put it, " the sacred characteristic becomes essential to maintain solidarity in the community ".* The British Queen may be no more than a *symbol* of national unity ; but the head of a new state may be an essential *basis* of such unity. He, too, might need to be accepted as " God's anointed "—and feel " this hot libation poured by some aged priest ! "

This is where Africa's own traditional royal ways became pertinent in at least those communities which have a monarchical background. Some modern equivalent is sometimes needed for the old Stool of the Chief. As K. Macneil Stewart, the West Indian poet living in Ghana, once put it :

> Here, faith, religion, centres in one thing
> The Stool : take this away—the nation dies
> And even colour fades out of the skies of Africa . . . .
> In yon mute things repose a nation's soul—†

Hence titles like " Osagyefo " for Presidents of Republics. Such titles help to lend traditional sacredness to modernising leadership. The words themselves have connotations that might sometimes defy the visiting student of African politics. As Ruth Schachter Morgenthau has put it :

> We are accustomed to discuss the pattern of authority within parties as collective, or personal charismatic, institutionalized, but each word has a history and a set of associations, mostly western. How are we to understand references to *Fama*, roughly " king " in Malinke, used in referring to Sékou Touré of Guinea ?‡

There have indeed been occasions when attempts to " royalise " an African republic have been resisted by the leader himself. The most striking example of this so far has been Julius Nyerere. He

* *Ibid.*, p. 83.

† See his " Ode to stools and stool worship ", *African Affairs* (Journal of the Royal African Society) Vol. 52, No. 208, July 1953, pp. 185-7.

‡ Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1964), p. xviii.

has tried to discourage even such minimal ways of adulation as having streets named after him or having too many photographs of himself distributed to the public. And when, on the eve of the Presidential election in Tanzania in 1965, Zanzibari newspapers were saying " Let us elect President Nyerere as our President for life ", Nyerere warned the people of Zanzibar about the dangers of excessive surrender to a leader. He said:

> I might stay on until I am too old to do my job properly and then tell my son to act for me. When I died he might claim a right to the Presidency—and call himself Sultan Nyerere I; and there might be a second and a third.*

But in many ways Nyerere is an exception. And, in any case, the mere fact that there were public demands for his installation as President for life is an indication of the responsiveness of ordinary Africans to certain monarchical ways.

It was perhaps fitting in the history of African nationalism that the three most moving cases of exile in the colonial days should have concerned African monarchs. There was the flight and exile of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia following Mussolini's invasion of his country. This was an event which gave early African nationalists and Negro radicals in the New World a deep sense of personal humiliation.†

Then there was the exile of the Kabaka of Buganda in 1953—a case of an African King defying a British Governor, and then being sent away from his people as punishment.

A few years earlier there had been the exile of Seretse Khama, King of the Bamangwato—kept away from his people by the British because he had married a white girl.

All three exiles during the colonial period were pregnant with

* See *East Africa and Rhodesia* (London), Vol. 42, No. 2138, Sept. 30, 1965, p. 72.

† Nkrumah tells us his reaction when, on arrival in London in 1935 he saw the placard of a newspaper stand " Mussolini invades Ethiopia ". " At that moment it was almost as if the whole of London had declared war on me personally. " He glared at the faces that passed him, wondering whether they appreciated the essential wickedness of colonialism. " My nationalism surged to the fore. "—See his *Autobiography* (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1957), p. 27.

powerful symbolism for African nationalists everywhere. The sense of racial humiliation was sharpened by the very fact that these were African *Kings* who were suffering the indignity of expulsion from their own kingdoms.

Today exile of African rulers by colonial powers is, by and large, a thing of the past. But the royal theme in African nationalism has only found new expressions. The capital of pan-Africanism is Addis Ababa, which of course is also the capital of an old dynastic African empire. The President of the Ivory Coast has built himself a Palace which is almost an African equivalent of Versailles. The President of Malawi invokes witchcraft to spiritualise his absolutism. Admirers of the President of Kenya have at times come near to borrowing the symbols of " the King of Kings " for their hero. The highlight of the Kenyatta Day celebrations on October 20, 1965, for example, nearly became a " Last Supper "—commemorating the last supper that President Kenyatta had before being arrested in connexion with the Mau Mau uprising.*

Both the palaces and the political prayers are sometimes intended to create the necessary awe towards authority and make national integration possible. In a sense, the phenomenon bears comparison with the dual position of Elizabeth II—Queen of England and Head of the Anglican Church. This tie between Church and State in England is now little more than a formal legacy of British history. But in Africa the spiritualisation of the Head of State is part of the struggle for national cohesion. And for as long as that spiritualisation continues to be deemed necessary, the secular rationalism which we normally associate with republicanism will have a touch of incongruity in an African political universe.

* See *The Times* (London), Oct. 7, 1965. For protest against the supper, couched in racialistic anti-African terms, see *East Africa and Rhodesia*, Oct. 14, 1965, p. 108. In fact the Kenya authorities deferred to the pleas and sensitivities of religious groups in the country, and avoided a " Last Supper ".

CHAPTER 7

Shakespeare in African Political Thought

BRITISH cultural influence on her former colonies is perhaps least pronounced in the fine arts like painting and sculpture. But the impact of English literature on Africa is a significant historical phenomenon. And the curious thing is that African exposure to English literature in the formative days of nationalism achieved historical importance more for its influence on the development of African political ideas than for its impact on African literary forms.

In this brief analysis we are using Shakespeare as a case-study of the political significance of a literary figure. But our concern here goes beyond Shakespeare. We are in fact examining the whole role of literary education in the growth of nationalistic sentiments in a colonial situation.

Almost inevitably the kind of nationalism which grows out of literary education starts by being *cultural* nationalism. We shall therefore open our discussion with an examination of the phases of cultural nationalism in Africa. We shall then assess the impact of English literary figures on the language of African nationalism and on some of their ideas. We shall conclude with an evaluation of whether or not literary education in colonial days has turned out to be the right type of education for the kind of élites needed on attainment of independence. Underlying the whole discussion will be the Shakespearean theme—a symbol of England's literary conversation with a responsive Africa at a formative moment in historical time.

Cultural nationalism in Africa went through three main phases. The first phase was an attempt to prove that the African was perfectly

capable of mastering Western culture. There was a risk involved in this first phase. In his enthusiasm to master the culture of his conqueror, the African was all too easily carried away into extravagant imitation. " At one time it was a compliment rather than an insult to call a man who imitated the Europeans a ' Black European '", President Nyerere reminded his countrymen not long ago.*

But the next phase of cultural nationalism in Africa was an attempt to repudiate Western culture and to unearth Africa's own cultural heritage. Way back in the 1930's Jomo Kenyatta had said : " It is the culture which he inherits that gives a man his human dignity."† In that simple proposition lay the whole philosophy of Negritude—a philosophy which came to be the most distinctive school of African cultural revivalism. Negritude is the belief that there is a deep aesthetic value in African traditional ways.

A third phase of cultural nationalism is the capacity to take pride in some aspects of African culture without feeling an urge to renounce Western culture at the same time. But when a cultural nationalist reaches this stage, he is in fact gradually ceasing to be a nationalist altogether in this cultural field. He is beginning to accept the proposition that there is such a thing as a global pool of mankind's cultural achievements from different lands. And such an attitude is not neatly nationalistic. It is perhaps internationalism at the aesthetic level.

Where does Shakespeare come into this ? At the risk of being artificial, we must here distinguish between two identities which Shakespeare assumes. There is, first, Shakespeare, the master of the English language. And, secondly, there is Shakespeare, the great creator of human characters and eternal situations. These two identities are, in the process of literary creation, intimately connected. But there is a difference between them worth noting. Sheer mastery over the English language without a massive creative imagination would not have given us such a towering dramatist. On

* President's Address to the Tanganyika National Assembly, Dec. 10, 1962. Special publication, p. 21.

† *Facing Mount Kenya* (first published 1938) (London : The Hollen Street Press, 1959 reprint), p. 317.

the other hand, the same imagination using a linguistic medium other than English would not have been precisely Shakespearean.

African attitudes to Shakespeare have at times been merely concerned with Shakespeare as a master of the English language. There was a time when fluency in the English language was for an African more than just a simple status symbol. In that first imitative phase of African cultural nationalism, there was linguistic extravagance as some Africans tried to display their knowledge of the English language. This extravagance was " in the misuse or overuse of long words, in the use of pompous oratory, and in the ostentatious display of educational attainments ".*

The three elements of long words, oratory and display of educational attainments could all find expression by quoting Shakespeare, as well as quoting other great figures in English literature. One of the first warnings which Nnamdi Azikiwe sounded on his return to Nigeria from the United States in 1934 was against what he called the " by-products of an imitative complex ". He urged that the African should go " beyond the veneer of knowledge ". And he emphasised that " Ability to quote Shakespeare or Byron or Chaucer does not indicate original scholarship."†

Did the reputation of Shakespeare among Africans have to go through the second phase of African cultural nationalism—the phase of being rejected as non-African ? An interesting phenomenon is that Shakespeare has never been under the cloud of rejection in Africa, though the language in which he wrote has known its moments of disrepute among cultural nationalists in Africa. Politically Shakespeare in Africa has continued to have a double role—first, as a status symbol for those who want to display their assimilation of Western culture ; second, as a genuine inspiration for those who are prepared to be mentally provoked by mighty lines or by imaginative examples and analogies of recurrent human

* See James S. Coleman, *Nigeria : Background to Nationalism* (University of California Press, 1963), p. 146. This linguistic extravagance was by no means peculiarly Nigerian. It was in other parts of West Africa too, as well as in East Africa.

† From a speech given in Nov. 1934 in Lagos. See *Zik: A Selection from the Speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe*, Cambridge University Press, 1961, p. 23.

situations. We have already touched on Shakespeare's function as a status symbol. What of Shakespeare's role in stimulating thought?

The issue which this question raises is, in fact, the place of poetry in the entire universe of ideas. There has already been a good deal of discussion on the importance of political philosophers in generating new lines of thought among Africans. The imperial powers wanted cheap clerical aid, and therefore set about creating a class of Africans literate enough to be of use at the lower levels of modern commercial and administrative activity. But " the man who can keep accounts or a register can also read John Stuart Mill, Macaulay and Marx ", as one observer put it.*

We can therefore discern the influence of Western political theorists on some of the key figures in the history of African nationalism. In discussing the development of political parties in Nigeria in an address delivered at Oxford University in 1957, Azikiwe found it relevant to go back to Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau.†

Speaking to Wellesley College in February 1960, Julius Nyerere talked about how he came to think of the problem of government in terms of creating the right institutions rather than merely of getting the right personalities to govern. Nyerere referred to " mad fellows like me who read Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln and John Stuart Mill [and got] the silly idea in their minds that government should become an institution ". Nyerere used the word " silly " in a spirit of amused sarcasm—because of the initial resistance of the Provincial Commissioner and the Governor to " the demand to turn government from personalities into institutions ".‡

Sometimes the influence of a Western political philosopher on an African mind is neither direct nor conscious. A Western philosopher might influence the language in which an African expresses himself or the assumptions he makes about an African situation. In 1962 and early 1963 Kenya looked to be on the point of disintegration into

* See, for example, D. W. Brogan, *The Price of Revolution* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1951), p. 139.

† See *Zik*, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

‡ Nyerere, " Africa's place in the world ". *Symposium on Africa*, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Massachusetts, 1960, p. 156.

tribal factions. The chaos of the Congo seemed at times to be the kind of fate which awaited Kenya too. And the Congolese chaos was perhaps the best real-life illustration yet of what an English philosopher called " a state of war ". Thomas Hobbes had argued in the seventeenth century that there were selfish tendencies in men which could only be curbed by a strong ruler. Where no such ruler was available, the result was a state of war—with " everyman against everyman ".

But by December 1964, Kenya had managed to move from the condition of being a near-Congo to the unified status of a voluntary one-party state. This was a revolution in unity unprecedented anywhere else in Africa. What had made it possible? Was it a strong ruler of the kind Thomas Hobbes would have recommended?

In the estimation of Mr. Oginga Odinga at that time, Mr. Kenyatta had indeed been such a strong ruler and leader. In his tribute to Mr. Kenyatta at the unveiling of Kenyatta's Statue in December 1964 outside Parliament buildings in Nairobi, Mr Odinga asked: " Who is this man on whom the [Kenya] Republic is bestowing this highest honour?" Mr. Odinga answered his own question in the language of Thomas Hobbes. " Mzee Jomo Kenyatta . . . is the man who delivered the nation from a life that was poor, nasty, brutish and short ", Mr. Odinga said.*

All these are indications of the influence of Western political theorists on African ideas and idiom. What has been seldom discussed is the influence of poetry on African political thought. Of

* See *East African Standard* (Nairobi), Dec. 15, 1964. It will be remembered that Hobbes had described a state of nature as that in which there is " no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short ". *Leviathan*, (1651), Everyman's edition, 1957, pp. 64-5.

In spite of what Mr. Odinga's words might inadvertently suggest, Kenyatta was not exactly what a Hobbesian sovereign was supposed to be like. Kenyatta did not unify his country merely through the threat of force. All the same, he was a crucial factor in the revolutionary transformation of his country from a near-Congo to a one-party state by the end of 1964. Circumstances helped Kenyatta. Had it not been for him, there would have been a rivalry for leadership between the younger leaders of KANU. And a divided KANU at that time would not have been able to unify Kenya. Mr. Odinga himself was later to form an Opposition party to KANU. But that was at a slightly less dangerous time for the nation.

the peoples of Eastern Africa, those whose poetry is most closely linked to nationalism are perhaps the Somali. In his book about the Somali, John Drysdale talks about Somali nationalism being fostered with " the emotional appeal of Somali poetry ". And Colin Legum has examined how recent poems " are strongly tinged with ideas of 'the amputation' and 'the dismemberment' of the Somali nation ".* But Somalia is almost the only country in sub-Saharan Africa that is a " nation " in the sense of Western experience—a " nation " based on linguistic and cultural homogeneity. Most other countries in Africa consist of different tribal and cultural groups. And the tradition of songs and poetry in such countries is a tradition of tribal songs, rather than national ones.

So the first poetry which fired the imagination of nationalists in such countries was not African poetry (which was tribalistic) but Western. The teacher of English literature in a village school in Africa in the olden days did not grasp the political implications of poetically expressed ideas. The teacher had either forgotten or never been told of Plato's " gravest charge against poetry "—the charge that poetry had " a terrible power to corrupt even the best characters ".† Plato himself was in favour of submitting poetry to censorship " designed to expunge everything unsuitable to its educational purposes ".‡ But the teacher of English poetry in an African village was blissfully oblivious of the new horizons which his literary lessons were unveiling. " Some of the mighty lines of Shakespeare must have influenced my outlook on life ", Nigeria's Chief Awolowo confided in his autobiography many years later.**

* John Drysdale, *The Somali Dispute* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 15. Colin Legum, " Somali liberation songs ", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 4, Dec. 1963, p. 505.

† This rendering is from the Penguin Classics' edition of *The Republic*, 1963 reprint, Book x (" The Effects of Poetry and Drama "), p. 383.

‡ Michael B. Foster, *Masters of Political Thought*, Vol. 1 (London: George G. Harrap, 1961 reprint), p. 62.

** " Shakespeare is my favourite. I have read all his plays, and have re-read some of them—like *Julius Caesar*, *Hamlet*, *The Tempest*, *Antony and Cleopatra* and *Henry V*—more than three times. Some of the mighty lines of Shakespeare must have influenced my outlook on life. " See *Awo : The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo*, Cambridge University Press, 1960, p. 70.

For Nkrumah it was not Shakespeare but Tennyson who gave an exciting expression to some longing of his. In 1934, Nkrumah applied to the Dean of Lincoln University for admission. In his application, he quoted from Tennyson's *In Memoriam*:

> So many worlds, so much to do,
> So little done, such things to be.

In his autobiography, Nkrumah says this verse " was to me then, as it still is today, an inspiration and a spur. It fired within me a determination to equip myself for the service of my country."*

As for Julius Nyerere, the mighty lines which gave poetic expression to his political longings were Shakespearean. Among Nyerere's earliest publications is a small pamphlet entitled *Barriers to Democracy*. This was in the days when he was still organizing Tanganyikans to press for greater democracy on the road to independence. Nyerere's clarion call at the end of the pamphlet are lines directly from Shakespeare:

> There is a tide in the affairs of men,
> Which, taken at the floods leads on to fortune;
> Omitted, all the voyage of their life
> Is bound in shadows and miseries.
> On such a full sea we are now afloat;
> And we must take the current when it serves,
> Or lose our ventures.

And then Nyerere invokes one more line from Shakespeare before he closes his *Barriers to Democracy*. He quotes: " Men at some time are masters of their fates ".

The tide in the affairs of Africans was indeed taken at the flood. The struggle for emancipation assumed greater and greater urgency. Ghana had been the first to attain the modest fortune of internal self-government. By 1952, a pamphlet of the *Daily Graphic* (Accra) was already eulogising Nkrumah's achievement in Shakespearean terms:

> If Hamlet, who once told Horatio that there were more things in heaven and earth than were dreamt of in his philosophy, were present at the Legislative Assembly when it was officially proclaimed that the Gold

* *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (1957), Thomas Nelson's paperback edition, 1960, p. v.

Coast Premier would be elected soon, he would have turned to his stooge and said with prophetic pride—" I told you so. "*

The pamphlet went on to spell out the moral more clearly—" For who would have guessed that the little boy who was born in a small village of Nzima in 1909, would one day make history by becoming the Gold Coast's first premier ?"

But was the education which produces ability to quote Shakespeare the right preparation for African self-government ? This question now has a ring of obsolescence but it used to be central to discussions on educational policies in colonial days. The issue involved was how far education was to concern itself with the basic material needs of the peoples in the colonies. Sir Ivor Jennings, Master of Trinity Hall, Cambridge, must be included among those British people who played a significant part in influencing educational policy for the colonies. Among other capacities, he once served as Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ceylon. In 1946 Sir Ivor complained in a British journal about the effects of basing Ceylon's system of education upon syllabuses drafted in London for the benefit of English students. He said he had no doubt that in " English literature " the following colloquy was common in a colonial school :

TEACHER : " O daffodil, we weep to see you fade away so soon. "
PUPIL : " What is a daffodil ? "
TEACHER : " Just an English flower, but the examiners will not ask questions on that. Take this note : The imagery in this poem . . . ."

What Sir Ivor said of schools in Ceylon was largely true of schools in British Africa too. But here we must distinguish between two types of educational omissions. To teach Shakespeare in India and not teach Tagore is one kind of omission. To teach both Shakespeare and Tagore but not teach modern farming methods is another type of omission. British colonial policy, particularly in its later phases, made some allowances for local cultural variations—The British were capable of giving a small corner in a syllabus to a Tagore,

* " Life Story of the Prime Minister ", *The Gold Coast and the Constitution*, Pamphlet of the *Daily Graphic* (1962), p. 3.

though only a small corner. But while teaching a lot of Shakespeare and a little Tagore, the British did not teach enough of modern farming methods.

French colonial policy in education seemed to be supremely indifferent both to farming methods and to any local equivalent of the poet Tagore. The French taught only French culture.

For the Belgians in the Congo there was little room in the syllabus either for a Belgian " Shakespeare " or a Congolese " Tagore ". The emphasis of Belgian educational policy in the Congo was on practical subjects like modern farming methods.

These descriptions are, in fact, gross oversimplifications of the real operation of the three colonial policies. But the descriptions we have given are useful nonetheless as indicators of the balance of emphasis as between the policies of the three imperial powers.

The difference between the French and the British must not, however, be exaggerated. The allowance which Britain made for African culture in African schools was very limited. As Professor James Coleman has noted, the great events that were taught in Nigeria were European and colonial wars of pacification, the evolution of the British constitution, and the growth of the British Empire.

Professor Coleman goes on to add : " In literature, Shakespeare and the Bible held the stage. Even today, it is not uncommon to find a semi-educated Nigerian working as a steward who can . . . quote the Bible, and recite Hamlet, but has little knowledge of the geography, the proverbs and folk tales, or the prominent leaders and outstanding events in the history of his own country."*

In retrospect, can this old British policy be defended ? On the basis of later developments, the British emphasis has on the whole been vindicated—though the vindication has little to do with the conscious intentions of the policy-makers at the time.

But what is the nature of this subsequent vindication ? In order to answer the question, let us once again distinguish between the two types of educational omissions mentioned earlier. Were the British justified in concentrating on the teaching of liberal arts rather than farming methods and engineering ? And if they had

* *Nigeria : Background to Nationalism, op. cit.*, pp. 111-15.

to teach liberal arts, were they justified in concentrating on British arts rather than African culture?

If someone had told the British in 1945 that they had fifteen years in which to prepare Africa for independence, the British would still have been justified in giving priority to producing arts graduates rather than engineers. This is because the basic prerequisite for independence is a collection of competent rulers—a collection of good decision-makers at the top political level. An independent country needs Ministers—and on the decisions of Ministers might depend so much else in the country. It would be helpful if the Ministers were educated—and the right education for them is education in the liberal arts and other theoretical subjects, rather than practical training in, say, the different fields of engineering or medicine. This is not to suggest that an engineer or a medical doctor cannot be a good Minister. On the contrary, there are a number of such Ministers in different parts of Africa. Yet an engineer or medical doctor who is a politician is, in an important sense, *wasted*—but an arts graduate in politics is not wasted in the same sense. A graduate in history holding the portfolio of Housing and Labour is serving his country well—but a surgeon or electrical engineer holding the same portfolio can hardly be said to be using his skills to the best advantage.

Yet on attainment of independence, Africa would still need engineers and doctors and mechanics. Why then should not Britain have concentrated on producing these instead of the potential Ministers? The reason is, of course, that while an independent African country can import a few doctors and engineers on loan from other countries or from the United Nations, it cannot import Ministers from abroad to rule it. If Britain had then been given fifteen years in which to prepare a colony for independence, it would still have made sense to create first of all a potential ministerial ruling élite—and then let this ruling élite after independence produce the mechanics, engineers, doctors and agricultural experts with the help of other independent countries. The British emphasis on liberal arts is therefore one reason, among many, as to why British colonial policy in Africa today must be regarded as having been more successful than

Belgian colonial policy. The Belgians concentrated on producing the mechanics and farming experts—and forgot the need for a ruling élite. The kind of mind which can understand Hamlet is a better investment for self-government than the kind of hands which can repair a railway engine. This is not necessarily a compliment to the liberal arts. On the contrary, it might merely mean that an engineer is too valuable to be wasted in election campaigns.

But what justification could there have been for putting Shakespeare not only above engineering but also above the local culture of the people concerned in the colonies?

The reasons must vary according to which aspects of the local culture were being subordinated. Except in the case of one or two African languages, there was little written creative literature in African cultures in any case. There was even less literature that was in the form of plays. So the issue of subordinating some African playwright to Shakespeare in an African syllabus did not arise. There was no African playwright to be subordinated.

Another point to be noted was that formal education as given in schools was itself a Western importation. For this kind of systematic education, a special kind of training was needed for the teacher. The best trained teachers were often expatriates. But expatriates were not qualified to teach African culture in any case. There was a case for not teaching African culture in formal schools of the Western-type until such time as such a school system had taken root in the new Africa and until African scholars themselves had done systematic research into African traditions and history. It was therefore defensible that the British should have taught Africans that which the British could teach best of all—Shakespeare and other aspects of Britain's own intellectual tradition.

Yet another factor to be noted was the attitude of those Africans who were already Western-educated. Here again Nigeria's experience was quite typical. "One of the major grievances of most educated Nigerians was not that Western education was literary in character, but that there was not enough of it. They wanted neither a glorified system of African education, nor European-sponsored schemes for educating them along their own lines . . . . When the

government began to take a more active interest in education in the 1930's, and suggested that the curriculum be based on African rather than on English standard, educated Nigerians protested strongly."*

Nor is it surprising that educated Africans should be opposed to a system of education based primarily on African culture. What the new Africa needed above all else were new and ever-widening intellectual horizons—and not just a new system of propagating the old ancestral ways. In order to produce its own scientists Africa had to learn from Newton. In order to produce its own dramatists, Africa has had to learn from Shakespeare.

But more immediate than the emergence of an African Newton or Shakespeare was the emergence of discussion groups with literary interests. The genesis of some of the political parties in Africa today is some literary or cultural organization in the early days of African political consciousness. In a short article on " the pre-history of TANU ", Ralph A. Austen referred to the Tanganyika African Civil Servants' Association which was formed in the town of Tanga in 1924. Civil servants then symbolized the emerging intelligentsia of Africa, and their associations started the tradition of organized discussions of public issues in modern Tanganyika. At a conference of government officers and missionaries in Dar es Salaam in 1925, the President of this Association, Samuel Chiponde, attended in his capacity as Government Interpreter. Austen points out that " much of the discussion at this conference reflected the current pre-occupation in British colonial thought with ' adapting ' educational systems to the mentality and culture of Africans ". But as far as the President of the Tanganyika African Civil Servants' Association was concerned, those eminent missionaries and expatriate government officers at the conference had missed the whole point of African aspirations. Samuel Chiponde, like his fellow civil servant from Tanga, Martin Kayamba, opposed proposals to " compromise standards of English literary education ". Chiponde himself is reported to have bluntly asserted : " People can say what

* James S. Coleman, *Nigeria : Background to Nationalism, op. cit.*, p. 120.

they want, but to the African mind, to imitate Europeans is civilization."*

But the literary groups which later gave rise to political parties were not always preoccupied with Western culture as such. Sometimes the impact of Western culture gave rise to a new possessiveness about local culture—and associations emerged to serve the interests of a tribal or linguistic heritage of a local group. According to Thomas Hodgkin, the biggest political party in Nigeria on attainment of independence was a recent offspring of a predominantly Hausa cultural society, the *Jami'a.* As for the Action Group—another Nigerian party on attainment of independence—this was born out of a Yoruba cultural association which was inspired and created by Chief Obafemi Awolowo.†

But to Awolowo, as we have noted, culture did not start and end with his own Yoruba culture. " Shakespeare is my favourite ", comes the echo of his autobiography. " Some of the mighty lines of Shakespeare must have influenced my outlook on life."

Is Awolowo the only founding-father of African nationalism who bears a Shakespearean influence ? All we can say with conviction is that, in some important sense, African nationalism has literary origins. The liberal arts in schools played their part in giving shape to ideas. The English language afforded access to new intellectual interests. The early cultural associations started the tradition of organized political disputation. But it is in the nature of nationalism to be inhibited in acknowledging a debt to foreign inspiration. Shakespeare stands for a Western literary tradition. Africans can respect Shakespeare as a Western genius—but Africa can only rarely acknowledge him as an African inspiration. And why not ? Let an African nationalist himself give the answer. The African nationalist is Ndabaningi Sithole of Rhodesia : and the answer he gives to a similar question does itself bear a Shakepearean stamp. Why are the origins of African nationalism not

* See Ralph A. Austen, " Notes on the pre-history of Tanu ", *Makerere Journal,* No. 9, Mar. 1964, p. 2.

†Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (1956) (London : Frederick Muller Limited, 1962 reprint), pp. 154–5. See also pp. 88–9.

acknowledged by the nationalists ? Sithole answers by quoting thus :

> But 'tis a common proof,
> That lowliness is young ambition's ladder,
> Whereto the climber-upward turns his face :
> But when he once attains the upmost round,
> He then unto the ladder turns his back,
> Looks in the clouds, scorning the base degrees
> By which he did ascend.*

* *Julius Caesar*, II. i. Quoted by Ndabaningi Sithole in his book *African Nationalism* (1959) (Oxford University Press, 1961 reprint), p. 57. James Coleman had said elsewhere that in a colonial school " Shakespeare and the Bible held the stage ". What Sithole was concerned with in this particular chapter was the influence of the Bible and the Church on the growth of African nationalism.

CHAPTER 8

The African Symbolism of Julius Caesar

IT is perhaps safe to say that into languages yet unborn William Shakespeare will one day be translated. What matters for East Africa for the time being is that one Shakespearean play exists in Swahili. The play is *Julius Caesar* and the translation is by Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania.*

When Nyerere's translation came out three years ago how novel was the idea of Shakespeare in an African language? Lyndon Harries, then of the University of London, pointed out at the time that there had been translations of Shakespeare into Zulu as long as thirty years previously.† Nevertheless, there was a special significance in the Swahili venture. The significance lay partly in the fact that the translator was the head of an African state, and partly in the accident that the particular play he translated happened to be *Julius Caesar*. At a certain level *Julius Caesar* is the most political of Shakespeare's plays. It is, at any rate, pregnant with much of the sort of political symbolism which is of relevance to Africa.

We propose in this analysis to start with the significance which lies in the unusual fact that the Head of an African state has bequeathed to his country a translation of a major English play. This is an issue which would have an intimate connection with questions of linguistic nationalism and of the cultural impact of Britain on Africa as we discussed them in the previous chapter. We shall then

* *Julius Caesar*, mfasiri Julius K. Nyerere (Nairobi : Oxford University Press, 1963).

† See Harries's review of Nyerere's translation in *Sunday News* (Dar es Salaam), Sept. 8, 1963. Dr. Harries is now at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.

examine in this chapter the style of the translation itself as a poetic revolution in the Swahili language. Next for our analysis will be the political symbolism of the plot of the play, and how this relates to the African scene. The theme of assassination, as well as other aspects of the politics of *Julius Caesar*, will be placed against a background of concrete African experience.

I

Julius Caesar was a play which Nyerere studied in his first year at Edinburgh University. It is one more measure of the impact of an education that when Nyerere had risen to the highest office of his country the play still had a sufficient hold on him to compel him to translate it. It is almost as if the ghost of Shakespeare had accompanied this gifted African politician on his journey to the heights of eminence—and then demanded homage in African words.

There is little doubt that the Tanzanian's translation of Shakespeare into Swahili gives him one more claim to immortality. In the words of a Dar es Salaam newspaper, " In the years to come the original manuscript of President Nyerere's translation of *Julius Caesar* will be of considerable historical value. "* Evidently sharing this view, the publishers of the translation, Oxford University Press, have arranged for the manuscript to be kept in the archives of the University College, Dar es Salaam—" available for future generations to see ".†

Will the translation be famous because it was Nyerere's ? Or will Nyerere be extra-famous because he was the first to translate Shakespeare into an East African language ? The answer presumably must be that this is a case of reciprocal immortalisation. What is more significant, perhaps, is the fact that nationalistic East Africa continues to take pride in a translation of an English play. This looks like another case of a cultural heritage from the West transcending the narrow sensitivities of Africa's rebellion *against* the West.

All this sounds persuasive until one stops to ask whether trans-

* *Sunday News*, Sept. 29, 1963.
† *Ibid.*

lating Shakespeare into Swahili is not itself a manifestation of that anti-Western rebellion. At the level of aesthetic *universalism*, Shakespeare might be deemed to be part of the heritage of mankind as a whole. At the level of national *parochialism* he might be asked to remain confined within the boundaries of the *British* heritage. But there is a third possibility which lies between aesthetic universalism and cultural parochialism. This third alternative is to regard Shakespeare neither as a universalistic Mr. World nor as a parochial Mr. England, but as a genius writing in the English language. Between the whole world on one side and England on the other there is the third entity of the English-speaking world, of which England itself is only a part. Shakespeare belongs to that English-speaking world.

That sounds persuasive as far as it goes. The question which arises is whether Africa can legitimately be included in the English-speaking world as yet. Admittedly, Commonwealth Africa as a whole is ultimately under the rule of an élite educated in the English language. But so far it remains true that only a small minority of the one hundred million Commonwealth Africans speak English.

And yet, what is to prevent that number from increasing? What is to prevent Commonwealth Africa from becoming a truly English-speaking area of the world? The answer is, presumably, a possible upsurge of linguistic nationalism—an attempt by the élite to ensure that they themselves are the last of the English-speaking rulers of their countries. Is this a real possibility in present-day Africa? And what is the significance of translating Shakespeare into an African language instead of encouraging Commonwealth African children to continue to read him in the original English?

As it so happens, African nationalism has, on the whole, been strikingly devoid of self-regarding linguistic passions—at least when compared with nationalism in Asia and, historically, in Europe. Indonesia went quite near to inventing a hybrid indigenous language rather than continue to use Dutch. And English has been chosen as a second language in Indonesia purely for reasons of maximum utility.

India—whose influence on African thought has been significant

—has shown only a modest determination to do away with English, in spite of the old constitutional provision that it should be replaced by Hindi. Does that mean that there is no strong feeling for native languages in India? On the contrary, English is enjoying a long life in India not because there is no strong feeling for local languages but because there is too much feeling for them. It is estimated that at least forty per cent of the Indian population speak Hindi. That is perhaps double the number of Indians who speak English. And yet English remains preferable precisely because it is a foreign language to *all* Indians. Southerners especially argue forcefully that the adoption of Hindi as the official language would give professional advantage to those who speak it as a mother-tongue. English, on the other hand, is a language which every Indian has to learn from scratch. The principle of " equal opportunity " in Indian democracy would therefore be better served by sticking to English as a universal handicap rather than by adopting Hindi. The late Prime Minister Shastri tried to fulfil the old nationalistic ambition of giving India Hindi as a national language. But the riots which broke out in the South against this policy have given English a new and indefinite lease of life.

Multi-lingual countries are the rule in Africa too. But the big difference is that African languages are not as profound a part of African cultures as Asian languages are of Asian cultures. In Asia even religion is often all bound up with language. This arises when ancient scriptures are written in the local language and accumulate strong spiritual veneration over the centuries. After all, the bigger the written literature of a given language, the greater is the sense of loyalty that language is likely to arouse in its people. And in general African languages so far are behind Asian languages in the size of written literatures available in them.

The two most important sub-Saharan African languages are Hausa and Swahili. Hausa is associated mainly, though by no means exclusively, with Northern Nigeria. And the very fact that it is a little too closely identified with a particular region of a particular state makes it unlikely that it will ever be accepted as the national language of a whole country.

Swahili, on the other hand, suffers no such handicap on the opposite side of Africa. There is no dominant linguistic group in East Africa with whom Swahili is associated. The great majority of those who speak Swahili speak it as a second language—their first being a tribal language like the Kikuyu or Chagga languages. East Africa has developed nationalistic sensitivities at a time when Swahili is already a lingua franca of the region as a whole. It is universally spoken in Zanzibar. And next to Zanzibar and Somalia, Tanganyika is the nearest thing to a linguistically homogeneous African state south of the Sahara. That is to say, Tanganyika comes near to having an African language which is spoken widely enough in the country to be capable of being adopted as the national language. And adopting it is precisely what Dr. Nyerere's Government has done. Swahili has been declared the national language of Tanzania. And although English has not been abandoned yet and may never be abandoned altogether, the logic of Dr. Nyerere's policy might be to try and make Swahili as self-sufficient as possible. Part of this policy is inevitably an attempt to prove the point that the vocabulary of Swahili is capable of doing justice to the complex subtleties of something originally written in the English language. It cannot, of course, be expected to cope with highly technical and scientific literature without a systematic building up of vocabulary. But, then, technical and scientific idiom tends to consist of broadly the same words in most languages of the world—and if Russian, Japanese, Chinese and Arabic could borrow a whole body of technical terminology from Western languages, so could Swahili.

What could *not* be borrowed quite as easily is the complex of associations and subtle intimations of the language of creative literature. Swahili must turn to itself, and look into itself, for this complex. And that is precisely what Julius Nyerere has tried to make it do in his translation of *Julius Caesar*. To change the metaphor, Nyerere called upon the Swahili language to carry Shakespeare on its back —and both the language and Shakespeare appear to be comfortable after the event.

What is not certain is whether the native Swahili literature itself will ever be the same after this intrusion from beyond.

II

Dr. Nyerere's translation of *Julius Caesar* is in blank verse. The instinctive retort is perhaps : " So was the original play by Shakespeare ! " And yet blank verse can be admissible as poetry in the English language and still fall short of poetic stature by the canons of Swahili. A lot of *Julius Caesar* in the original was both blank verse and poetry. A translator into Swahili might therefore have had to make up his mind whether he wanted to save the blankness of the verse or save the poetry itself. It seemed that he could not save both in the course of translating the play into an entirely different medium.

Yet Julius Nyerere has translated Shakespeare into blank Swahili verse and the attempt has been acclaimed. Is this an intrusion of politics into literary evaluations ?

Purists among students of Swahili poetry could conceivably take such a stand. They could argue that it was feasible for the literary heterodoxy of political heroes to acquire some of the prestige of national heroism itself. Blank verse in Swahili might therefore be made respectable through the respectability of Nyerere himself. If that happened, Nyerere would have established the ability of Swahili to carry Shakespeare only by distorting the canons of Swahili poetry.

Dr. Lyndon Harries, the British scholar of Swahili, argued that it was time there was a revolution in Swahili poetry in any case. In his review of Nyerere's translation of *Julius Caesar*, Harries applauded Nyerere for freeing himself from the " fetters " of rhyme.* There seemed to be a suggestion that if Swahili would not accept blank verse following the precedent of the English language, it might as well do so following the President of an African country.

Perhaps ultimately a poetic concession by Swahili scholars might indeed be granted out of deference for the political stature of Nyerere. It is certainly not enough to say that just because the English language has admitted blank verse, other languages should

* Harries's review, *op. cit.*

do the same. As the late Sheikh Amri Abedi of Tanzania said to Dr. Harries following the latter's advice to Swahili to adopt blank verse, the whole exhortation was reminiscent of the words of the cat who lost its tail and advised the rest to cut off theirs.* In any case, can it not be argued that the English language, because of the role of stress, finds it easier to dispense with the additional adornment of rhyme than even French poetry has managed to do so far? The poet and statesman, Sheikh Abedi, mentioned Arabic, Urdu and Persian as yet more languages in which nothing was poetry which had no rhyme.† It is even arguable that rhyme in Arabic or Swahili poetry has greater evocative power than rhyme in English—and that an Arabic or Swahili poem would lose more by dispensing with rhyme than its English counterpart has done.

Admittedly, there is a certain arbitrariness in every canon of aesthetic evaluation. Yet the ultimate criterion is not so much the experimental enterprise itself as the enjoyment of that enterprise by the rest of us. In general, it remains doubtful whether readers of Swahili verse would enjoy blank verse at the same aesthetic depth as they now enjoy poetic rhyme. This is so in spite of William Wordsworth's optimism that a poet can create the very taste by which he intends to be enjoyed. It might even be so despite Wordsworth's own success as a revolutionary in the poetic diction of the English language.

Does all this mean that Shakespeare's first entry into the Swahili culture was at the level of the *sub-poetic*? Did Julius Nyerere sacrifice some of the poetic power of *Julius Caesar* by retaining the blank nature of the original English verse? Should Nyerere have introduced rhyme into the play where Shakespeare himself had used none?

Just as it stands Nyerere's translation is extraordinarily good. Yet there is little doubt that a skilful use of verse in the translation would have added substantially to the stature of the translation as a work of Swahili art. However, if Lyndon Harries is right about the need of a poetic revolution in Swahili, a good starting point is a

* See *Sunday News*, Sept. 15 and Sept. 29, 1963.
† *Ibid.*

translation of a famous foreign play by a famous local man. It is indeed true that the heterodoxy of the great can acquire some of the prestige of greatness. If blank verse in Swahili is heterodox, its best chance of winning ultimate respectability is if it is associated with a great name like Nyerere's. And if the first major work in blank verse is, in any case, a translation from a foreign language, the Swahili purists are likely to be more tolerant of the experiment.

Shakespeare and the President of Tanzania between them might yet have launched a poetic revolution in one of the most literary of all African cultures.

Another remark that Lyndon Harries made in that review of the translation is the following:

> In this case Shakespeare's play will be looked into again by some to find if there are any parallels between the politics of Rome and the politics of Dar es Salaam. And they will look in vain.*

In this latter conclusion, Dr. Harries was perhaps hasty. Parallels between the politics of Rome and the politics of present-day Africa as a whole are by no means all that hard to find. On the one hand, there is a danger in treating a great play as an exercise in political parallelograms. On the other hand, the greatness of the play is in part derived from its attempt to portray more than just ancient Rome. There are certain facets of human activity that endure. Great literature is often great precisely because it has succeeded in distinguishing the deep and enduring from the superficial and transitory. And there is no reason why men engaged in political intrigue in ancient Rome should necessarily be all that different from men engaged in a similar activity in Dar es Salaam or Accra many centuries later. A good deal might be different between the two sets of men—but a good deal may also be comparable.

In the minds of some commentators on Nyerere's translation, perhaps the most dramatic connection between the plot of *Julius Caesar* and the plots and intrigues of contemporary Africa lies in the idea of assassination.

At the annual delegates conference of the Tanganyika African National Union in January 1963, Nyerere announced to the dele-

* Harries's review, *op. cit.*

gates the murder of Sylvanus Olympio, first President of Togo. This was the day following the assassination. Nyerere wept as he made the announcement. And the delegates then stood up and observed a one-minute silence.

For those who combine a sense of history with an imaginative responsiveness to its echoes, there was a touch of tragic poetry in the tears of the first African President of Tanganyika over the assassination of the first President of Togo. It will be remembered that before the First World War, both Tanganyika and Togoland were German colonies. The immediate cause of the First World War was itself an assassination—the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne, the archduke, Francis Ferdinand in 1914. For Africa one result of that war was the partition of German Togoland. For those who continue to insist that the explosive Togolese frontier with Ghana had, either directly or indirectly, something to do with Olympio's murder, one long-term effect of the partition of German Togoland was therefore the assassination of the first President of an independent Togo. From the assassination of Ferdinand to that of Olympio—if there ever was such a thing as the wheel of the assassin it completed one of its bloody circles in little Togo. It was a curious case of " dust to dust ", at least for those who are yet to be convinced that the death of Olympio was not really intended by those who shot him.

And what of Tanganyika ? Ferdinand's assassination precipitated the First World War ; that war was to end German rule in Tanganyika. The substitution of British rule has resulted in Tanganyika being part of Commonwealth Africa today and in its leaders being *English-speaking*. And the result of all this is that Tanganyika's president has translated *Shakespeare* from the English instead of Goethe from the German. There is, then, a causal connection of at least an imaginative kind between the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in 1914 and our play in Swahili about the assassination of Julius Caesar published half-a-century later !

But what political factors were involved in the assassination of Julius Caesar in any case ? At the level of personalities and the kind of clashes which arise between them, Caesar was killed because

some of his own old colleagues could no longer bear " to walk under his huge legs and peep about " while the big hero " doth bestride the narrow world like a Colossus ". Here is the theme of jealousies between old friends. It is a situation not unlike one in which one leader of an African country comes to overshadow all others. And those who were once his comrades-in-arms in the old fight against colonialism now look at him enviously from a distance —and, like Cassius, exclaim bitterly under their breath " And this man is now become god ! "*

Perhaps the African leader that came nearest to being adored on the extravagant scale accorded to Julius Caesar was Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. And both personalities sometimes knew when to exhibit humility. Shakespeare's Caesar was offered a crown three times—and, to the applause of the masses, he declined it. Kwame Nkrumah was offered the Presidency of Ghana for life—and, to the acclaim of his people, declined it. Rather than enjoy a life-Presidency, Nkrumah preferred to stand for periodic election. He later changed his mind.

Was Nkrumah, like Julius Caesar, merely angling for applause? That is possible. A less controversial instance of an African rejection of a crown concerns Julius Nyerere himself. As we indicated in a previous chapter, voices were heard in the 1965 Tanzanian elections urging that Nyerere should be elected President for life. But Nyerere himself warned the people of the dangers of launching a new dynasty with " Sultan Nyerere I ".†

Nyerere gave that speech in Zanzibar. The choice of the word " Sultan " was, of course, an allusion to the régime which had been overthrown on the island the previous year. Neither the Sultan of Zanzibar nor his Ministers were themselves assassinated in this revolution. But many others were killed. In any case, the mere fact that this was a sudden and brutal end to an old régime makes it comparable to the situation which arose when Julius Caesar was assassinated. The optimism that the mere ending of an old régime

* Act I, Scene ii.

† See *East Africa and Rhodesia*, Vol. 42, No. 2138, Sept. 30, 1965, p. 72. This event is also referred to in " The Royal Theme in African Nationalism ", p. 105, above.

would inaugurate a new era of liberty is strikingly recurrent. As soon as Caesar fell, Cinna cried out " Liberty ! Freedom ! Tyranny is dead ! ", or as Nyerere translated it, " *Uhuru! Uhuru! Udhalimu sasa umekufa !* "

And Cassius added : " Some to the common pulpits, and cry out ' Liberty, freedom and enfranchisement ! ' "* The old order had been brought down—and the optimists do echo in exultation *Uhuru ! Uhuru ! Uraia !* "

Since Nyerere translated *Julius Caesar* at least ten regimes in Africa have been overthrown. And several prominent African leaders have been assassinated. The play has therefore assumed even greater relevance for events in Africa than it had at the time that Nyerere was translating it.

The assertion that life is freer under a new régime than under an old one has continued to be a refrain of all *coups*. And so, like Brutus, every new revolutionary who has overthrown the old guard says to the multitude : " Who is here so base that would be a bondman ? If any, speak ; for him I have offended . . . . Who is here so vile that will not love his country ? If any, speak ; for him I have offended. " Perhaps the patriotism of ancient Rome and the nationalism of contemporary Africa constitute one single tradition—waiting either to be of genuine service to its country or to be exploited by succeeding bands of politicians.

As for the significance of Mark Antony's speech in succession to that of Brutus, it demonstrates the phenomenon that Bertrand Russell once called " collective excitement in politics ". In his book on *Power*, Russell discusses oratory—and argues that the capacity to arouse collective excitement was " an important element in the power of leaders ". The leader need not share the feelings which he arouses. And to illustrate this point Russell cites Shakespeare's Antony.† In other words, a cynical African orator might, like Antony, say to himself after a rousing speech :

> Now let it work : mischief, thou art afoot,
> Take thou what course thou wilt !

* Act III, Scene i.

† See Russell, *Power* (first published 1938) (London : Unwin Books, 1962 edition), p. 20.

Yet to some African heads of one-party states, it served Brutus right that he was faced with mischief and civil strife so soon after eliminating Caesar. He just should not have let Mark Antony on to that platform. Brutus had himself used the art of arousing collective excitement. Under his oratorical spell, the crowd had been easily converted to the view that Caesar was someone who deserved to be slain. Not so long previously, that same crowd had been known to hail Caesar in his imperial processions and ceremonies. What lesson should this have taught Brutus? That his people were still a little too impressionable to be exposed to rival exercises of oratory. But Brutus just had not learned this lesson. In a trusting mood he let Antony address the multitude—and it was not long before Rome was torn asunder in an inter-factional civil strife. A good many present-day African leaders have no intention of running the risk which Brutus ran. They have no intention of letting a possible "trouble-maker" take his turn on the platform—lest the trouble-maker should succeed in arousing collective excitement on the wrong issue, and then let loose a torrent of civil strife.

Does this kind of reasoning characterise Julius Nyerere's own country? Was his decision to convert Tanganyika into a one-party state *de jure* inspired by a fear of gifted Mark Antonys on public platforms in Dar es Salaam? Or was it more a case of introducing a Preventive Detention Act in order to forestall a possible assassination of an African Julius?

As it happens, Julius Nyerere is perhaps the most sincere of all African champions of one-party democracies. His experiment of competitive elections under a one-party structure in 1965 was a search for genuine liberalism under conditions of precarious stability.

Yet a few months after the publication of his translation of *Julius Caesar*, Nyerere was forced into temporary hiding. Soldiers had gone amock in the capital, and some people feared for the President's life. At least in terms of vulnerability, Julius Caesar and Julius Nyerere had more in common than either their first names or their shared immortality in a Shakespearean play. And the parallels which continue to spring to mind help to underline the fact that

there is more to the Shakespearean play than merely the politics of an ancient city.

Finally, we might ask, is there a danger in East Africa that access to Shakespeare in Swahili might reduce the number of those who read him in the original English? Nyerere might answer that his translation was a tribute to the playwright, and not an attempt to replace him in the original. " I have come to praise William, not to bury him ! " It is a tribute to Swahili that it has been able to carry Shakespeare. But it is also a tribute to Shakespeare that he was considered worthy of the attempt.

APPENDIX I

The Lure of Commonwealth Membership

IN these days when there is a natural tendency among the races of man to come together in their natural groups, it will be insincere of us to pretend that African nationhood does not interest us . . . But . . . our fundamental policy . . . is to maintain strictly inviolate the connection of the British West African dependencies with the British Empire, and to maintain unreservedly all and every right of free citizenship of the Empire and the fundamental principle that taxation goes with representation.

> J. E. Casely Hayford, eminent African barrister and one of the founding fathers of Gold Coast nationalism. Address to the National Congress of British West Africa, Lagos, 1929. Quoted in Magnus Sampson, *West African Leadership* (1949).

The British Empire and the British Commonwealth remain as one of the greatest things of the world and of history, and nothing can touch that fact. But you must remember that the Empire and the Commonwealth are mostly extra-European. Those are the overflows of this great British system to other continents. . . .

We are an Empire and a Commonwealth. We are a dual system. In the dual system we follow two different principles. In the Commonwealth we follow to the limit the principle of decentralization. In the Commonwealth this group of ours has become wholly decentralized as sovereign states. The members of the group maintain the unbreakable spiritual bonds which are stronger than steel, but in all matters of government and their internal and external concerns they are sovereign States.

In the Colonial Empire, on the other hand, we follow . . . the opposite principle of centralization. And the centralization is focussed in this country, in London.

> Prime Minister J. C. Smuts of South Africa. Speech to the Empire Parliamentary Association, London, Nov. 25, 1943.

We join the Commonwealth, obviously because we think it is beneficial to us and to certain causes in the world that we wish to advance. The other countries of the Commonwealth want us to remain because they think it is beneficial to them . . . . [the Commonwealth] is a method, a desirable method, and a method which brings a touch of healing with it. In this world which is

today sick and which has not recovered from so many wounds inflicted in the last decade or more, it is necessary that we touch upon the world problems, not with passion and prejudice and with too much repetition of what has ceased to be, but in a friendly way and with a touch of healing . . . . And the fact that we have begun this new type of association with a touch of healing will be good for us, good for them [who have accepted us into the Commonwealth] and, I think, good for the world.

> Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India. Speech to the Indian Constituent Assembly on the continued membership of republican India in the Commonwealth, May 16, 1949.

It is important for it to be realised that the material basis for the independence of Ghana exists . . . . The foreign policy of Ghana will not, therefore, be dictated by the need for us having to seek assistance from other countries. I mention this because during the debates both in the House of Commons and in the House of Lords on the Ghana Independence Bill, there was considerable discussion on the future of aid to Ghana and to other territories likely to attain independence . . . .

The Gold Coast has contributed, on an average, 25% of the net dollar earnings of the British colonial territories . . . . It will be seen, therefore, that though the Gold Coast is small and, by Western standards, not a very wealthy country, it has made a significant contribution to maintaining the stability of the sterling area . . . .

[However] because price of cocoa so varies on the world market, we have the greatest difficulty in planning our development because we never know what revenue we may have available . . . . For that reason we think we would be justified in entering into negotiation with other members of the sterling area for a scheme by which we are insured against any prolonged depression in the price of cocoa and other dollar producing commodities in exchange for an undertaking on our behalf to continue to manage our economy so as to produce gold and dollar earnings for the sterling area . . . .

It would be wrong, however, for us to consider our membership to the Commonwealth in purely economic terms.

> Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Speech to National Assembly, May 5, 1957.

APPENDIX II

Race and the Commonwealth

The following article was written by Julius K. Nyerere, then Chief Minister of Tanganyika and first published in The Observer (London) on March 12, 1961. It was Mr. Nyerere's contribution to the debate then raging at the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in London on whether South Africa should be readmitted into the Commonwealth. The position taken by Tanganyika was a contributory factor to the withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth :

The people of Tanganyika are working to build a non-racial democratic society. We fought successfully against our classification as a multi-racial State because what we want is a society where the individual matters, and not the colour of his skin or the shape of his nose. Racial group privileges or discriminations are incompatible with this aim.

Success in these efforts will not come easily. It is true that we have made a good start ; visitors to Tanganyika are struck by the prevailing atmosphere of inter-racial harmony. But the people of Tanganyika are the same as those elsewhere in the world—subject to reason and prejudice, to feelings, of sympathy and revenge, selfishness and self-sacrifice. Also we have to overcome a legacy of inter-racial suspicion, as well as to change an economic structure where the high correlation between income and race mocks the concept of fundamental equality.

FORMIDABLE

The task is formidable. But we believe its difficulties can be overcome, and we are determined to take every action which is necessary to weaken the possibility of racialism in our country.

We have not decided on this policy because we expect to gain economically by it. On the contrary, if it becomes necessary we shall accept economic loss. We are following this policy because we believe it is the only one which is morally justifiable. In our struggle for self-government and independence we have spoken of brotherhood and the equality of man. We are not hypocrites who merely used these phrases for our own ends. Now that we are in a position of responsibility, we are continuing our attempts to establish conditions where these concepts can become the stuff of everyday life.

The *apartheid* policies now being practised in the Union of South Africa are a daily affront to this belief in individual human dignity. They are also a

constantly reiterated insult to our dignity as Africans, about which we cannot be expected to remain indifferent and which could inflame our own passions if not otherwise dealt with.

If we are to succeed in building up a good society in our country, we must therefore make our detestation of the South African system apparent in every action. The Tanganyika Government cannot afford to have any relations with the South African Government, and it must, within the bounds of international law, lend support to those who struggle against the system of *apartheid.*

Boycott

It is for these reasons that we have as a Government already indicated our support for a boycott of South African goods and have ended labour recruitment contracts, despite heavy economic costs to this economically poor territory.

Now that the question of South Africa's membership of the Commonwealth is under discussion, our attitude is inevitable. We believe that South African membership under present conditions makes a mockery of the interracial composition of the Commonwealth.

There are, it is true, many people who sincerely dislike South Africa's policies, yet feel that her exclusion from the Commonwealth would destroy the organisation. For this reason they would have us ignore the problem now facing the Commonwealth. They say correctly that the republican issue, which is the occasion for the present Prime Ministers' conference discussing South Africa's membership, is irrelevant to the *apartheid* issue. Yet the fact remains that the Commonwealth has now to take a definite stand on the question of South African membership—because of a decision within South Africa.

All matters affecting this issue must be considered. The whole world would take the readmission of South Africa into the Commonwealth as a condonation of her policies or, at the very least, as a cynical dismissal of all principles of human political activity. Speeches, however phrased, will make no difference. The judgment of the world, and particularly of Africa, will be based on actions.

No one realises better than we, who have been looking forward to our admission, that this question would wreck the very structure of the Commonwealth. But if this happens it will be the result of South Africa's attitude, not of ours. Her policies are a daily challenge to the basic concepts of the Commonwealth. Neutrality is not possible.

Still, there are some people who are worried about the possible future implications of excluding South Africa. The great virtue of the Commonwealth, they point out, is that each individual country remains completely free, while at the same time obtaining the intangible benefits of association with other peoples. They often use this analogy of a club. But no club exists which allows a member to get all the benefits of association while he continues deliberately to commit serious offences against other members and against the principles of the club itself.

The systematic attempt to degrade the non-European population of South Africa is not—as South Africa claims—an internal affair and thus no concern of other Commonwealth members. Every country in Africa feels the effects of South African policies in its own life. Political and social pressures working against our aim of non-racialism are greatly strengthened by events in South Africa.

Better Idea

It is not that we fear a resurgence of discrimination against Africans in Tanganyika; what we fear are the evils of racialism and its results on the minds of majorities and minorities alike. It is this which we must guard against, and we know an evil idea can be defeated only by clear and unqualified support for a better idea, pursued with all the energy at our command. We believe that the dignity of man is the idea which can defeat racialism; but we know that any action of ours which appears to compromise with the evil we fight must weaken the execution of our own policies.

This means that we cannot join any "association of friends" which includes a State deliberately and ruthlessly pursuing a racialist policy. To do so would be to confuse the minds of our people and to jeopardise our own purposes. By refusing to join we should be making it clear that we are prepared to do anything which is necessary to protect our society from spiritual as well as material evil.

We believe that the principles of the Commonwealth would be betrayed by an affirmative answer to South Africa's application for readmission as a Republic. Inevitably, therefore, we are forced to say that to vote South Africa in is to vote us out. This decision we have made reluctantly in full knowledge of what it might mean to us—an underdeveloped country determined to overcome the poverty, ignorance and disease which now afflict many of our nine million people.

No Illusions

In announcing this stand now we are under no illusions. Even if we wished to do so we could not blackmail Commonwealth members or the United Kingdom on this issue. The Union of South Africa is an old member of the Commonwealth; it is comparatively wealthy and has a large number of people of European descent. We are smaller, poorer, and not yet even independent. But we have an elected Government representative of people committed to fundamental human values which are rooted in world-wide traditions, and we wish to have the greatest opportunity to apply these principles in our country.

We want the Prime Ministers' conference and all other people to understand our position, for we believe it epitomises the choice before the Commonwealth.

APPENDIX III

Retreat from Westminster

THANKS to the growth of political consciousness in this country, our people are becoming acquainted with the practice of parliamentary democracy. This has been used as a criterion to determine the political maturity of any people under the rule of others and we can be no exception. As a matter of fact, it is a declared policy of Britain that no colony can be considered ready for self-government until it has made parliamentary democracy a political reality. In plain words, Britain is unwilling to confer the honour of self-government on any of its colonial territories until there is a full-fledged two-party system in operation.

> Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria. Presidential Address to National Executive Committee of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, at Port Harcourt, Nigeria, Oct. 3, 1952.

I have always expressed both in public and in private that we need a strong and well-organised Opposition Party in the country and the Assembly . . . . We must not forget that democracy means the rule of the majority though it should be tempered by sweet reasonableness in the interests of the minority. In a parliamentary democracy legitimate constitutional opposition is part of the fabric . . . .

> Kwame Nkrumah. Speech at the Sixth Anniversary Rally of the Convention People's Party, Accra, June 13, 1955.

There is a new fangled theory now being propounded with erudition and gusto in the countries of the so-called Western democracies. The proponents of this theory hold the view that it is inappropriate and hardly fair to expect a newly emergent African nation to practise democracy as it is known and practised in the countries of Western Europe and the United States. Every mortal blow that is struck by an independent African nation at the vitals of democracy is rationalized by these theorists as the African's peculiar method of adapting democratic usages to his barbaric and primitive environment . . . .

In acting as the apologists of those who destroy and discredit democracy, the spokesman of the Western democracies do grievous harm to that noble ideal which they profoundly cherish, and which they are prepared to defend with their lives (as they have done in the past) if its practice in their homelands is at any time threatened . . . .

Democracy and a one-party system of government are, in my opinion, mutually exclusive.

> Obafemi Awolowo, founder of the Action Group of Nigeria. See *Awo : The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo* (Cambridge, 1961), pp. 302–304.

The responsibility of Her Majesty's Government is to all the inhabitants of Kenya . . . . It would be a betrayal of that responsibility if we were to abandon our ultimate authority prematurely . . . . First, there must be in the territory as a whole a sufficient understanding of parliamentary institutions, and sufficient sense of responsibility in public affairs to hold out a reasonable prospect that parliamentary institutions, representative of the people, will produce responsible government . . . . Self-government, I think we would all agree, is but a mockery if it is purchased at the expense of personal freedom.

> Alan Lennox Boyd, Colonial Secretary. Speech to the House of Commons, Apr. 22, 1959.

We reject a blueprint of the Western model of a two-party system of government, because we do not subscribe to the notion of the government and the governed being in opposition to one another, one clamouring for duties and the other crying for rights.

Nor are we prepared to justify our predilection for a one-party system of government by using the fragile argument that parties are the expression of social classes, and that therefore there must be only one party . . . .

At this stage, we have no choice to make. Through the historical process which has taken place since the last century, we find ourselves with myriad relevant grounds and conditions for a one-party state. It is inevitable. In our particular situation, practice will have to precede theory. But should relevant grounds for a multi-party state evolve in the future, it is not the intention of my government to block such a trend through prohibitive legislation.

> Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya. Speech on Aug. 13, 1964.

Those whose political thinking has been moulded by the Western parliamentary tradition have now become so used to the two-party system that they cannot imagine democracy without it . . . . " How can you have democracy with a one-party system ? " It may surprise them to know, therefore, that some " heretics " like myself—who also claim to be democrats—are now beginning to ask : " How can you have democracy with a two-party system ? " . . . .

In a two-party parliament there would be, of course, the need to avoid giving accidental support or encouragement to the rival party by any lack of unity between the leaders and their backbench supporters . . . . Given the two-party system, then some limitation of freedom is essential—both at election time and in debate—in order to enforce party discipline and unity . . . . These restrictions are not necessary where you have only one party. It seems at least open to doubt, therefore, that a system which forces political parties

to limit the freedom of their members is a democratic system, and that one which can permit a party to leave its members their freedom is *un*democratic ! . . . .

Furthermore, [within a national single party system] there would be no need to continue with the present artificial distinction between politicians and civil servants—a distinction desirable only in the context of a multi-party system where the continuity of public administration must not be thrown out of gear at every switch from one " party " government to another. For, once you begin to think in terms of a single national movement instead of a number of rival factional parties, it becomes absurd to exclude a whole group of the most intelligent and able members of the community from participation in the discussion of policy simply because they happen to be civil servants. In a political movement which is identified with the nation, participation in political affairs must be recognised as the right of *every* citizen, in no matter what capacity he may have chosen to serve his country.

> Prime Minister Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika, *Democracy and the Party System* (Dar es Salaam; Tanganyika Standard, 1962).

People [in Ghana] have been talking about a coup for some time. It was a question of timing. The government has been running out of money and prestige rather fast in the past two years . . . . Like Nigeria, Ghana was an oligarchy government based on pre-independence plebiscites. It takes only one free election to put a régime in power and then it is entrenched until overthrown . . . . In Nigeria there was much talk of democracy, but there was none. In Ghana the talk was of socialism, but there was none.

> Conor Cruise O'Brien, former Vice Chancellor of the University of Ghana, on learning of the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah's government on Feb. 24, 1966.

In Africa, where parliamentary institutions are new, and where there is such a massive preponderance of conditions favouring authoritarian rule, the battle for personal liberty and democracy is a hard one, with the odds heavily against the few who are fighting for it . . . . It is well known that people in power tend to be corrupted by it; at least they do everything to remain in power . . . . But none of the prevailing circumstances that are favourable to the establishment of authoritarian rule are unalterable. Personal freedom constitutes a challenge of African nationalism . . . . The choice has to be made by African states.

> K. A. Busia, former leader of the Opposition in Ghana. *The Challenge of Africa* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 141-2.

APPENDIX IV

Residual Pax Britannica in Africa

I DO not say that all our methods of [governing] have been beyond reproach; but I do say that in almost every instance in which the rule of the Queen has been established and the great *Pax Britannica* been enforced, there has come with it greater security to life and property, and a material improvement in the condition of the bulk of the population.

> Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary. Speech at the Royal Colonial Institute Dinner, Mar. 31, 1897.

The European prides himself on having done a great service to the Africans by stopping the " tribal warfares ", and says that the Africans ought to thank the strong power that has liberated them from their " constant fear " of being attacked by neighbouring war-like tribes .... It would have been much better for the Africans to continue with their tribal warfares, which they fought with pride and with the loss of a few warriors, rather than receiving the so-called civilising missions which means the subjugation of the African race to a perpetual state of serfdom.

> Jomo Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya* (Secker and Warburg, London, 1938).

The Commonwealth association is of value to us because it unites us to countries who have the same system of law .... as we have. One crucial problem, which the world must face, is how colonial territories can emerge as free, equal and independent nations without having to experience the violence of armed revolt and those material losses which always accompany violence. The Commonwealth can, I believe, become a pilot scheme for developing the most effective methods by which colonialism can be ended without revolution or violence and under conditions in which the former colonial territory still retains a close and friendly association with the former imperial power.

> Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah. Speech to National Assembly, Mar. 5, 1957.

When we gave independence to our colonial territories, we meant them to keep it, and to be given a fair chance to preserve that independence, their identity and their own way of life.

We have responded five times in the past two weeks to appeals, when their independence was threatened. In Malaysia we were there to prevent a Commonwealth country being dismembered by subversion and force. In Cyprus we were there to prevent an unhappy people suffering from civil war, and to try and prevent Greece and Turkey being drawn into a war. In Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda we are there following specific requests from their governments, to prevent takeovers by mutinous elements who would overthrow the elected governments only a few months or weeks old. I hope, therefore, the Commonwealth countries understand that when the chips are down, the Commonwealth can rely on Britain.

Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home. Speech to House of Commons, Feb. 6, 1964.

Nothing was more evident than that discipline was vanishing from our troops, and indiscipline mounting up. No popular government can tolerate an army which disobeys its instructions . . . . Therefore yesterday evening I decided to ask Britain for help. Fortunately, Britain agreed . . . .

I am told that there is already foolish talk that the British have come back to rule Tanganyika again. This is rubbish . . . . Any independent country is able to ask for the help of another independent country.

Asking for help in this way is not something to be proud of. I do not want any person to think that I was happy in making this request. This whole week has been a week of the most grievous shame for our nation. But those who brought this shame upon us are those who tried to intimidate our nation at the point of a gun. The torch of freedom will still burn on the top of Mount Kilimanjaro.

Uhuru na Amani [Freedom and Peace].

President Julius Nyerere, nation-wide broadcast following the disarming of the Tanganyika Rifles by British Troops, Jan. 26, 1964.

I would like our African Commonwealth partners to know that we want to take our troops out of their countries as soon as they feel it is safe for us to do so. We have no other motive for having them there except to help them keep order. We look forward to discussing ways and means of helping them in any way they can suggest that would help them maintain stable conditions in their countries in the future.

Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home. Speech to the House of Commons, Feb. 6, 1964.

Britain has already defence links of a special kind with various Commonwealth countries. Canada is a member with us of NATO, and in the Far East the Commonwealth strategic reserve of land, sea and air forces drawn from Britain, Australia and New Zealand has been constituted since 1955.

The British Government would welcome common defence arrangements between Commonwealth countries in other regions of the world, and would be glad to consider participation in them where this was the wish of the

Commonwealth countries concerned . . . . [However] I do not believe it would be practically or politically feasible to have a single defence force representative of the whole Commonwealth to act rapidly in an emergency.

Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home. Remarks in House of Commons, Feb. 4, 1964.

APPENDIX V

Pan-Africanism and the Commonwealth: Are they in Conflict

The following, slightly condensed, is a lecture given by Mr. Tom Mboya, then Kenya's Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, on August, 10 1964 at Makerere University College, Kampala. Mr. Mboya had accompanied Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta to the 13th Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London and the Second Conference of African Heads of State and Government in Cairo from which they had just returned.

We all know that Africa's colonial history included the establishment of strong economic, political, cultural and educational ties with different European powers. Those ties do not disappear when independence is gained. Nor is it true that they are necessarily any longer serving only the interests of the former colonial powers.

On gaining independence, every African State is faced with the need for rapid economic development. This means increasing investment, seeking more capital and looking for expanded markets and technical aid.

In every case they start planning within the traditional markets, which revolve around the former colonial power. In our own self-interest, therefore, we have found it necessary to continue economic and trade relations with former colonial masters. This includes relations in such matters as education and research.

In many African States, even after independence, there continued to be projects supported by grants and long-term loans and technicians from former colonial powers. In many cases, too, new States continue to ask for new or additional grants and loans through organisations like the Department of Technical Co-operation, recruitment and subsidies for expatriate technicians needed for the country's development.

In the defence and military fields many African States rely on former colonial powers for training and supply of technicians and equipment in establishing new armies. Most African States belong to the franc, dollar or sterling currency zones. Thus their currencies are tied up with that of the former colonial power.

Perhaps it may be asked whether this continued contact undermines our newly won independence and whether it would impair our relations in Africa. When we fought for independence we often made it clear that our struggle was not against the British people as a people but against the British colonial power—against the régime they imposed upon us.

Often, too, we were at pains to explain that we would preserve friendship and establish new relations and fields of co-operation with the British after we gained our independence. We wanted co-operation and friendship but not colonialism and imperialism.

African States have always accepted that any policy of isolation would be negative and in fact impossible in this century. It is significant that even the Republic of Guinea, which suffered so much at the hands of France when its leader Sékou Touré decided for immediate independence instead of the membership of the French Community, has today established close relations with France. There must, therefore, be no confusion as to the relations which continue between the former colonial powers and the new African States. These relations are on a completely new basis.

There is, of course, the danger that our economic weakness and our urgent need for development could be manipulated to force us to pursue policies accepted by the former colonial powers. This danger must be recognised and it is up to the African States themselves to ensure they do not fall victims to any such attempts on the part of the former colonial powers.

I must add that the attempt to exploit our economic weakness and our urgent needs would not be confined to former colonial powers. Other developed countries to whom we may look for assistance may be tempted to do the same. They may be tempted to try economic colonialism or neocolonialism.

It is conceded that there is nothing wrong with our continued contacts and some ties with former colonial powers; then we in the Commonwealth must examine whether our becoming members of the Commonwealth adds any new strings that may impair or undermine our independence and participation in pan-African functions.

Within the Commonwealth the relations are to a large extent bilateral. There is no central machinery or multilateral commitments in trade. It does not stand for a political bloc.

One Commonwealth country trades with another, one may give technical aid to another. Because we have similar institutions left behind by the British and because we have a common language, these relations are made that much easier.

It is true we have Commonwealth education conferences, Finance Ministers' conferences and so on. But these merely establish some agreed policy, then leave it to each country to participate individually and for the member States to deal directly with each other. This is the position with regard to the Commonwealth Scholarship scheme.

It is true we have things like Commonwealth trade preferences and institutions like the Commonwealth Development Corporation, but these are initiated by Britain and facilitate or promote mainly relations as between Britain and other members of the Commonwealth. It means in effect a form of bilateral trade and other relations between Britain and individual Commonwealth countries.

The absence of a central Commonwealth machinery or institution arises from the old theory that Britain is the " mother " country and we are all her children. I think also the present trade arrangement is because Britain is the

most developed of all the Commonwealth countries and also because we all belong to the sterling currency area controlled from London.

In the last few years Britain seems to have had second thoughts about continuing to play the role of the " mother " country. She applied for membership of the European Common Market without insisting that all members of the Commonwealth come in with her.

Secondly, she decided on new immigration laws which now limit the right of entry into Britain by people from other Commonwealth countries. Today the word " British " has been dropped when referring to the Commonwealth of Nations.

All along the Commonwealth has been conceived as an association of free but equal sovereign States. A British colony does not become a member automatically on gaining independence. Each new State has to apply for membership and we are all members by free choice. It may be argued that there is indirect inducement, but we are free to reject this inducement. Having become members, we are still free to leave when we like.

It is also accepted that each member State is free in her internal affairs and in her external relations with non-Commonwealth countries. Thus, although members of the Commonwealth enjoying the benefit of certain economic relations within the Commonwealth, we are free to trade with other countries and to seek technical assistance and loans elsewhere. We are free to develop our own political and social institutions.

This flexibility in the Commonwealth enables republicans and monarchists to remain in this club together. Flexibility and the fact that the concept of the Commonwealth has been able to move with the times has made it possible for us to become members.

When India opted for a republican Constitution, the Queen could no longer be the Head of State of the Republic of India. Today she is Head of the Commonwealth but not head of all the member States. India also decided to adopt the policy of non-alignment and this too has led to non-aligned States and committed States sitting together and cooperating within the club.

Whereas this political accommodation is workable at the moment, it is difficult to envisage whether it would work smoothly if one of the member States were to choose to belong to the Communist Eastern bloc. The non-aligned States as well as the committed States would find themselves under exceeding strain were that to happen.

The nearest to this was the South African question. The strain was so high that it became a matter of choosing between South Africa and the African States.

It is significant that those States which elected not to become members of the Commonwealth on gaining independence have not kept so close to the Commonwealth individually in their trade or commercial relations. Their centre of gravity has shifted elsewhere—away from London.

It is difficult to believe that even the present accommodation can be regarded as permanent. When Commonwealth conferences discuss or review world affairs there is bound to be a difference in approach between the two groups. There is bound to be a time when the committed nations will

try directly or indirectly to influence the views or stand of the non-aligned States and vice versa.

Here lies the potential weak link in the Commonwealth today. It is in fact at this point that conflict is bound to start sooner or later. I do not believe that there is any danger of division on the basis of race, nor do I think it will come strictly on the differences between the nations of the " haves " and the " have-nots ".

I know we would all like to see the more developed members give greater assistance to the developing members, but this will not, as I see it, get over the cold war differences.

But, against this, South Africa seems to be treated as though she were still a member by the White members of the club. This could become a serious point of conflict in future.

Can we expect things to remain the same in the Commonwealth? The emergence of a large number of African States and the formation of the Organisation for African Unity is bound to have some influence on the Commonwealth. So are developments in the European Community and the improving relations between the East and West, and especially between individual Eastern European States and Western Europe.

Three things which emerged from the recent Commonwealth Conference [of 1964] may prove of future significance. First there was the suggestion by Ghana to set up a Commonwealth Secretariat. This would be the first time for the Commonwealth to adopt any permanent form of centralised machinery . . . .

There was even talk of Commonwealth conciliation machinery. Would such innovations really keep the Commonwealth together? Would they not begin to create commitments that would lead to conflict in our loyalties to pan-Africanism and the break up of the Commonwealth itself?

Secondly, the conference discussed the possibility of permanent multilateral trade and technical aid arrangements and institutions. How far would these conflict with OAU efforts and the bilateral arrangements entered into between African member States and other non-Commonwealth States?

Thirdly, for the first time the communiqué issued after the conference went beyond the normal expression of pious, polite words. Some issues were discussed and decided upon and an attempt was even made to secure a commitment to certain ideals and standards to be applied to all member States. In other words, a possible code of behaviour for all members!

It is evident that the African States tried to secure agreement on issues which concerned them most and on which they were due to report to the OAU at the Cairo Conference. These included the questions of Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and even the Portuguese territories.

Will the next conference break up on disputes as to what should go into the communiqué? Will the African States demand more than the Western Powers in the club can agree to support and still remain loyal members of their own bloc? These are important points in considering this question.

At the second meeting of the Council of Ministers of the OAU, the African members of the Commonwealth were specifically asked to raise certain matters at the Commonwealth Conference and to use their influence with

Britain on the Southern Rhodesian question. The implication here must lead one to ask whether members of the Commonwealth will in future be able to come to OAU to plead for a point of view of the Commonwealth on a given matter.

Or will they expect to plead only the OAU point of view at Commonwealth conferences ? It is difficult at this stage to see the way ahead. However, it appears that for the moment there is no conflict.

One might even pose the question as to whether African States will continue to agree to make regular pilgrimages to London for these conferences. Already people discuss openly the need for rotation of the conferences in the capitals of the different States.

Also there is the question of the Queen being Head of the Commonwealth. In my book I posed the question as to why the Head should not rotate. Some people may not like even to discuss this at the moment, but I believe it will soon be a matter for open debate.

The formation of the OAU and even of a pan-African Government is not based on any inward-looking policy. There is no question of pursuing an isolationist policy. Before there is a continental Government, the OAU remains an association of free and equal Sovereign states. But with the setting up of a permanent secretariat and the specialised commissions, a Development Bank and so on, we are on the way towards not only pan-African cooperation but co-ordination.

Such co-ordination and harmonising of foreign policy and the need for a joint or common African front at international trade and social conferences and at United Nations must mean that we put pan-African relations first and our other relations second.

There will be occasions when this desire or decision may conflict with the bilateral arrangements we make with other countries or with our Commonwealth arrangements. This is a development which we cannot avoid but which should not necessarily require withdrawal from the Commonwealth.

In any case, I believe that most African States will, for a long time to come, decide issues on the basis of their own national interests. The OAU will have to accommodate this fact.

One development which may precipitate immediate withdrawal from the Commonwealth by some member States would be if a regional federation were formed including an African Commonwealth country and one or two non-Commonwealth countries. This is likely to happen in the event of a merger between Gambia and Senegal. It could also happen if a union were formed between Malawi and Mozambique.

Perhaps one thing worth mentioning is that pan-Africanism has already proved stronger at the United Nations. African States have come together and there is no Commonwealth bloc there. Even French-speaking African States which originally used to vote with France are now active members of the African group.

In conclusion—our present membership of the Commonwealth is an accident of history. This is also the case with regard to the membership of ex-French territories in the European Common Market.

All this is a stage in the evolution of Africa. How long it will last nobody knows. Its future is subject to both pan-African and international developments. Some of this we cannot predict.

For the time being there is no conflict between membership of the Commonwealth and pan-Africanism. For the future, let us wait and see.

APPENDIX VI

The English Language in African Politics

DESTINY seems to have forbidden the extension of Sierra Leone to the northward, and to have favoured her growth to the southeast, so that now that her territory adjoins that of Liberia, we have a continuous, English-speaking Negro State from the Sierra Leone River to the San Pedro River—a distance of over 800 miles. For 200 years, the Portuguese language was spoken along this coast. Villault says when he landed here, at Cape Mount and at Cape Mesurado in 1666, " all the Negroes who came to trade spoke the Portuguese language ". (But [now] . . . the English language and English laws assist and regulate the intercourse of the tribes of this whole region and for hundreds of miles inland . . . . English is, undoubtedly, the most suitable of the European languages for bridging over the numerous gulfs between the tribes caused by the great diversity of languages or dialects among them. It is a composite language, not the product of any one people. It is made up of contributions by Celts, Danes, Normans, Saxons, Greeks and Romans, gathering to itself elements from all peoples, from the Ganges to the Atlantic.

> Edward W. Blyden, Professor and President of Liberia College and twice Liberia's Ambassador to the Court of St. James, England. See his *Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race* (London, 1888), pp. 243–244.

The extensive use of the English language in [colonial] school curricula, made necessary by Nigeria's linguistic diversity, was a decisive contribution to acculturation . . . . All instruction at higher levels was in English. The Nigerian who acquired a knowledge of English had access to a vast new world of literature and ideas, and his contact with it awakened new aspirations, quickened the urge towards emulation, and provided the notions and the medium for the expression of grievances. Moreover, the English language (and its corrupted form, pidgin English) served as a lingua franca for communication among the educated elements of all tribes, a bond of decisive importance in the development of a Pan-Nigerian, or even a regional nationalist movement.

> James S. Coleman, *Nigeria : Background to Nationalism* (University of California Press, 1960), pp. 114-15.

One of the most obvious difficulties which face Africa south of the Sahara is the multiplicity of languages and dialects. Everyone of us in this Assembly today has to conduct his parliamentary business in a language which is not his own. I sometimes wonder how well the House of Commons in the United Kingdom, or the Senate in the United States, would manage if they suddenly found that they had to conduct their affairs in French or in Spanish. Nevertheless, we welcome English as not only providing a common medium for exchange between ourselves, but also for opening the door to us to all the heritage of the world. At the same time, however, it is essential that we do consider seriously the problem of language in Africa. At present, such is the influence of Europe in our affairs, that far more students in our university are studying Latin and Greek than are studying the languages of Africa. An essential of independence is that emphasis must be laid on studying the living languages of Africa, for, out of such a study will come simpler methods by which those in one part of Africa may learn the languages of those in all other parts.

> Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah. Speech to National Assembly, Mar. 5, 1957.

The practice of lumping African languages together and contemptuously referring to them as " the vernacular " is a degradatory imperialist trick. Who ever heard an Englishman referring to English as " the vernacular " ? . . . . The African dupes of the cultural imperialists are made to accept the idea that not merely should we speak English but that we must speak it like the natives . . . . Many of us feel quite ashamed, to the extent of openly jeering when an African makes an elementary grammatical mistake in speaking or writing English, such as using a plural noun with a singular verb. But do we feel the same way if he makes the same mistake in speaking his own language ? . . .

The cultural aspect of the African personality does not imply that Africans should stop speaking English . . . . African nationalists are nationalists, not political jingoists or cultural chauvinists. But if, through historical accident, we have become people of two cultures, we must insist that we genuinely are people of two cultures.

> Klang Nabi, " Cultural imperialism : ideas we must fight ", *Voice of Africa* (Accra), Mar. 1961.

An Englishman thinks English is his own property. He is living on the moon . . . . It is not at all wisdom on the part of a tiny English population in this wide world to claim that English, as represented and pronounced by Americans, Canadians, Africans, Indians, and the people of Madras State, is not English. It may not be the Queen's English, but then what ? Has the Englishman the sole right to decide upon the form and style of a universal language ?

Strictly speaking, English cannot be called " English " at all, since it is a universal language belonging to all. It is difficult to understand why it is still known under that horrible name ; it should have had another name.

The right pronunciation in this language is the one which is clear and easily understandable by all listeners, and the pronunciation need not necessarily be a bland imitation of the speaking style of any particular class of people . . . .

English as spoken by an Englishman is not at all pleasant to listen to . . . , let alone easy to follow.

Letter in *East African Standard* (Nairobi), Feb. 15, 1965.

APPENDIX VII

The English Language in African Culture

AFRICAN literature as now understood and practised is merely a minor appendage in the main stream of European literature. Both creative writers and literary critics read and devour European literature and critical methods. The new drama of J. P. Clark [the Nigerian playwright] is seen in terms not only of the classical past of Aristotle and the Greeks, but in the current present of Tennessee Williams, and the Absurds . . . .

The consequence of this kind of literature is that it lacks any blood and stamina, and has no means of self-enrichment. It is severely limited to the European-oriented, few college graduates in the new universities of Africa, steeped as they are in European literature and culture. The ordinary local audience, with little or no education in the conventional European manner, and who constitute an overwhelming majority, has no chance of participating in this kind of literature . . . .

The purpose of this article is not to discredit these writers who have achieved much in their individual rights within an extremely difficult and illogical situation. It is to point out that the whole uncritical acceptance of English and French as the inevitable medium for educated African writing is discredited, and has no chance of advancing African literature and culture. In other words, until these writers and their western midwives accept the fact that any true African literature must be written in African languages, they would be merely pursuing a dead end, which can only lead to sterility, uncreativity and frustration . . . .

An African writer who thinks and feels in his own language *must* write in that language . . . . One wonders what should have happened to English literature, for instance, if writers like Spenser, Shakespeare, Donne, and Milton, had neglected English, and written in Latin and Greek simply because these classical languages were the cosmopolitan languages of their times. Even though a man like Milton could write even more easily in Latin and Greek, he did his major works in his own mother tongue without playing to the gallery of international fame.

Literature, after all, is the exploitation of the possibilities of language. It is the African languages that are in crying need of this kind of development, not the overworked French and English . . . .

The basic distinction between French and German literature, for instance, is that one is written in French and the other in German . . . . What therefore

is now described as African literature in English and French is a clear contradiction, and a false proposition, just as " Italian literature in Hausa " would be.

> Obiajunwa Wali, " The dead end of African literature ? " *Transition* (Kampala), Vol. 4, No. 10, Sept. 1963, pp. 13-14. Mr. Wali is a leading Nigerian critic.

I do not see African literature as one unit but as a group of associated units—in fact, the sum total of all the *national* and *ethnic* literatures of Africa.

A national literature is one that takes the whole nation for its province, and has a realised or potential audience throughout its territory. In other words a literature that is written in the *national* language. An ethnic literature is one which is available only to one ethnic group within the nation. If you take Nigeria as an example, the national literature, as I see it, is the literature written in English; and the ethnic literatures are in Hausa, Ibo, Yoruba, Effik, Edo, Ijaw, etc. etc. . . . .

There are not many countries in Africa today where you could abolish the language of the erstwhile colonial powers and still retain the facility for mutual communication. Therefore those African writers who have chosen to write in English or French are not unpatriotic smart alecs with an eye on the main chance—outside their own countries. They are by-products of the same processes that made the new nation-states of Africa . . . .

So my answer to the question, Can an African ever learn English well enough to be able to use it effectively in creative writing ? is certainly yes. If on the other hand you ask : Can he ever learn to use it like a native speaker ? I should say, I hope not. It is neither necessary nor desirable for him to be able to do so. The price a world language must be prepared to pay is submission to many different kinds of use. The African writer should aim to use English in a way that brings out his message best without altering the language to the extent that its value as a medium of international exchange will be lost. He should aim at fashioning out an English which is at once universal and able to carry his peculiar experience . . . .

Writing in the London *Observer* recently, James Baldwin [the Amercian Negro writer] said :

> My quarrel with the English language has been that the language reflected none of my experience. But now I began to see the matter in quite another way . . . . Perhaps the language was not my own because I had never attempted to use it, had only learned to imitate it. If this were so, then it might be made to bear the burden of my experience if I could find the stamina to challenge it, and me, to such a test.

I recognise, of course, that Baldwin's problem is not exactly mine, but I feel that the English language will be able to carry the weight of my African experience. But it will have to be a new English, still in full communion with its ancestral home but altered to suit its new African surroundings.

> Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe, " English and the African writer ", *Transition*, Vol. 4, No. 18, 1965, pp. 27-30.

It has been suggested that what we call African writing is really primarily English or French . . . and only secondarily African. It is possible that I am splitting hairs, but I disapprove of this suggestion. I would prefer to consider that what we call African literature is *primarily African* and *secondarily English or French*, etc. It has also been said that writing in any of the indigenous languages of Africa is unequivocally African. This would appear to imply that if you wrote a novel, say, in Ijaw, it would be unequivocally primarily African literature, or if you wrote this same novel, or translated it, into English, it would then become primarily English literature and secondarily African. I think the emphasis on the language is misplaced.

. . . coming nearer to the definition [of " African literature "], there are two elements . . . which should, if they are present, give us the confidence to speak of African literature, elements of, let us call it, nationality and experience. If an African writes about an African situation, that is clearly African literature. If he goes to France for five years, and writes of his experience in France, then he is still writing African literature. And on the other hand, I would want to leave out Joyce Cary's novels, which are very good in their setting of Africa, but I would still prefer to call it English literature in an African setting, just as Wole Soyinka's poems based on his experience in London are African literature in an English setting.

D. I. Nwoga of University of Nigeria. See *African Literature and the Universities*, ed. Gerald Moore (Ibadan University Press, 1965), pp. 84-85.

Index