

A MAPPING OF THE  
KWAZULU NATAL POLITICAL  
CONFLICT WITH REFERENCE  
TO INKATHA (1990 1993)

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## DEDICATION

To my late father, Enock Vumbu and my brother Gcina Esau.

We Must  
always look  
to the future.  
Tomorrow is  
the time that  
gives a man  
or a country  
just one  
more chance.  
Tomorrow is  
the most  
important  
think in life.  
It comes into  
us very clean

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(Author unknown)

## ALPHABETICAL LISTING OF ABBREVIATIONS/ ACRONYMS USED

ANC	=	African National Congress
AZAPO	=	Azanian African Peoples Organisation
COSATU	=	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DEC	=	Department of Education and Culture
IFP	=	Inkatha Freedom Party
KZN	=	KwaZulu Natal
NGO	=	Non-governmental Organisation
NRP	=	New Republican Party
PFP	=	Progressive Federal Party
RSA	=	Republic of South Africa
SABC	=	South African Broadcasting Company
SAGA	=	South African Black Alliance
SACP	=	South African Communist Party
UDF	=	United Democratic Front
USA	=	United States of America
UWUSA	=	United Workers Union of South Africa
ZG	=	KwaZulu Government



## A MAPPING OF THE KWAZULU NATAL POLITICAL CONFLICT WITH REFERENCE TO INKATHA (1990-1993)

### ABSTRACT

Black political participation in South Africa has experienced many challenges whether under the then restrictive apartheid rule or under the new democratic rule. Because of its very nature, black political participation is a source of ongoing conflict and is in a constant state of change that has a deep impact on behaviour and on society as a whole. A mapping of the KwaZulu Natal political conflict and violence in the early 1990s with particular reference to Inkatha's role has never been undertaken, hence the importance of this study. The purpose will be to analyse and show the role played by Inkatha and its relationship with other actors from 1990 to 1993 in order to avoid a repetition of conflict and violence.

According to Tessendorf (1990: 1) "Violence has plagued KwaZulu Natal since 1985 although the roots can be traced back to a list of events which began in 1980. These include the school boycotts of 1980 and the initial community conflicts in Hambanathi and Lamontville in the period 1983 to 1985. These conflicts have assumed violent manifestations since 1985 and have intensified to the present day. This happened while Inkatha was playing a free role as other political organisations including the ANC were banned. When the United Democratic Front and other political organisations were unbanned Inkatha's unchallenged operation changed dramatically.

This resulted in political conflict which escalated into political violence.

Inkatha claimed to be predominantly ethnic in the early 1990's. Campbell (1995: 288) writes: "The term 'ethnicity' embraces two manifestations which intertwine but are nevertheless distinct and need to be kept analytically separate: The fashioning and mobilisation of this experience by political onlookers for political ends. Inkatha's success with ethnic mobilisation in 1990 and 1993 was based on the astute way in which Buthelezi and Inkatha played and treated the ex-Kwazulu homeland as the Inkatha home, hence separated the Zulu's from other ethnic groups."

## TEN KEY WORDS

MAPPING

NATAL POLITICAL VIOLENCE

RELATIONSHIP

CONFLICT

STRUGGLE

INTERACTION

ETHNICITY

CONTENDERS

ROLES

ISSUES

INKATHA

ALLIANCES

## CHAPTER ONE

Chapter One will focus on the importance of a study of this nature. It will explain in context the mapping of the KwaZulu Natal political conflict from 1990 to 1993 with specific reference to Inkatha.

### INTRODUCTION

The contents of this treatise focus on situations and circumstances that caused political conflict and violence in KwaZulu Natal. Each subtopic is analysed in context by using the steps used in mapping conflicts. In this process, conflict sources are put into the context of political, historical and sociological conflict factors. The main and supporting contenders of political parties are identified together with the roles that they played. The author will also look at latent and manifest issues. An attempt will be made to identify the cause of the conflict, and indicate where it is at present and how it fits into various conflict cycles. An attempt will also be made to predict the outcome of the conflict.

Each chapter will draw its own conclusion, while Chapter Six will attempt to give a distinctive conclusion to the whole treatise. Chapter One introduces the purpose of the treatise, i. e. to analyse and map the KwaZulu Natal political conflict. It will paint a picture of the role that Inkatha played and its relationship to other actors from 1990 to 1993 in this particular political conflict.

Chapter Two provides information on the background of Inkatha. It also discusses the effects that Inkatha had on the conflictual behaviour of the society in which it was

established. Brewer (1996:11) states: "The problem within Inkatha evolved primarily from its bridging stance between conflicting positions." This refers to the fact that Inkatha was a referee and a player at the same time. Inkatha acted as though it was at war with the Republic of South Africa while it was the Republic's "little darling" in terms of its operations, in the KwaZulu Bantustan. This caused conflict between Inkatha and other organisations fighting for freedom. This led to great misunderstanding in Inkatha's interaction with other organisations like the ANC, UDF and COSATU.

Chapter Three looks at the problems within Inkatha particularly the attitudes of the youth, the older members and the traditional leaders. The contenders took issue over three themes, namely, Inkatha as the Zulu nation, the past mobilising in Inkatha's politics of ethnicity and how Chief Buthelezi understood ethnicity and mobilisation. The activities of Chief Buthelezi in the former KwaZulu Bantustan is discussed in relation to Inkatha's impact on other parties. The author looks at how Buthelezi was able to succeed in ethnic mobilisation during the liberation struggle in the early 1990s in KwaZulu Natal.

Chapter Four presents conflict as an inevitable activity in human interaction. Inkatha's relations and interaction with other organisations is discussed in depth, including its relations with the Zulu royal family, white interest groups, the South African government, black groups and relations with international groupings.

In Chapter Five, the author looks at the power struggle which resulted in conflict in KwaZulu Natal. The mapping of conflicts and steps used in this process will be fully

described. Reasons will be given why this particular process of mapping was adopted. The conflicts experienced, the general pattern of conflict and the main incidents during 1990 to 1993 will be discussed. The discussion will be guided by mapping variables which include: conflict history, conflict context, conflict parties and issues. Finally the author will specify where the conflict is at present.

Chapter Six will conclude the discussion of these events and will give a summary of each chapter. To give final substance, the author will summarise the conclusions of each of the chapters in the treatise and demonstrate insights gained from this study. Finally, a summary of the mapping approach will be included.

The causes of the conflict will be looked at specifically in relation to Inkatha's opposition to apartheid and its impact on the organisation that caused conflict both intrinsically and extrinsically. The author will examine how conflict affected the organisational structures and influenced the existing authority structure. Political, sociological and historical conflict will be contextualised. The major and minor contenders and their roles will be identified indicating their present position and how they fit into conflict cycles. Manifest and latent issues will be discussed and finally an outcome or possible solution will be presented.

The purpose of this study is to illustrate the role of Inkatha in the Kwazulu Natal political conflicts prior to the first democratic elections in 1994. It is anticipated that a mapping of the conflict will provide new and useful information for the purpose of attempting to end the conflict in the area, thus eliminating the political violence and preventing a repeat of history. The hypothetical question that this treatise attempts to

answer is "Can mapping of the KwaZulu Natal political conflict from 1990 to 1993 show the role played by Inkatha?"

Conflict and violence prevailed in KwaZulu Natal because of the stance taken by Inkatha that it was an apolitical organisation and was established as a cultural movement for the Zulu nation. Inkatha felt intimidated by political organisations such as the African National Congress and the United Democratic Front and this fueled the political conflict.

### 1.1 METHODOLOGY

The study will consist of six chapters each focusing on different aspects of "The mapping of the KwaZulu Natal political conflict in the early 1990s with reference to Inkatha".. Conflict is seen as inevitable in human interactions as it is experienced daily, hence the author deals with Inkatha's interaction with other organisations and with the power struggle in KwaZulu Natal between Inkatha and other political parties that form the core of the political conflicts in the area. Conflict arises as a result of certain constraints in society, for example, perceptions of real and unreal expectations, competition for scarce resources such as socio-economic, political, environmental and natural ones, in order to secure survival, hence the power struggle emerged (Himes, 1980:14).

Now that the field of study has been specified, attention needs to be devoted to the manner in which the research and theoretical study was conducted (methodology). According to Rossouw (1996: 14) "Methodology encompasses research design, research samples, population, data collection, data analysis, method and techniques".

Two research components were used to investigate the topic, namely, mapping of the KwaZulu Natal political conflict from 1990 to 1993 with reference to Inkatha. The first component of the methodology used was an in depth literature review which involved an analysis of a variety of books, journals and articles. This was more of a theoretical and less of an empirical research project. The second component constituted empirical research conducted by means of structured interviews. This was a formalised schedule for collecting data from respondents.

The literature review consisted of document analysis which was undertaken focusing on issues that are conflict related. Different academic sources were used. Less reliable and tainted sources such as newspapers were avoided. According to Magi (1998: 93): "The greatest advantage of the document analysis technique is that it is always accessible and non-reactive to the researcher as a person. The sample size of documents that can be used is often very large, depending on availability". Document analysis has many advantages over other research methods that are not always accessible to the researcher or which are reactive to the researcher as a person.

The conflict described in the KwaZulu Natal power struggle is broad and general in its scope, so the map which involves the following variables will guide the discussions. Moore (1986:26) and Wehr (1979: 18) describe the mapping variables as:

- **Conflict History** : The origins and major events in the evolution of the conflict and its context will be explored;



- Conflict Context: The character of the setting within which the conflict takes place will be described by identifying the cause of the conflict and stage it has reached;
- Conflict Parties: The parties involved in the KwaZulu Natal power struggle will be identified including their roles. A broad picture of the characteristics of the parties both directly and indirectly involved in the conflict will be explored. Their values, beliefs, motivations and the nature of the relations between them will be described;
- Issues: Various issues both overt and covert arise in the course of the conflict and these will be identified and grouped according to the primary generating factors that are fact-based that is (What is) value-based, (What should be) interest-based, (Who will get what) and non realistic. A solution or outcome will be provided as a possible means of resolving the conflict; and
- Where is the conflict now? This questions considers the power struggle in KwaZulu Natal which has claimed so many lives. The author will give his opinion. Reference will also be made to the opinions of the respondents to the interviews conducted.

The empirical part of the research consisted of structured interviews which were conducted with academics and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in KwaZulu Natal. According to Melville and Goddard (1995: 44), "The interview involves a one-on-one verbal interaction between the researcher and the respondent". The writer preferred to make use of the interview as a tool for the research because if a respondent could clarify answers, the researcher could follow up those of interest. Interviews were also used in one area in order to obtain information from people who

cannot read, but in this study it was not the case. Interviews were also preferred since the author was dealing with fewer respondents. The interview method was also preferred to avoid non-return as a problem which can be experienced with questionnaires. (Melville and Goddard, 1995: 66). The researcher furthermore preferred the use of an interview tool since the researcher administered the questions personally. Payton (1994: 95) writes, " ... the questions in an interview are administered by the researcher." When answering an unstructured question, respondents answer questions in their own words.

The target population as an element of this study included five KwaZulu Natal Non Government Organisations (NGOs) which included: the Institute for a Democratic Alternative South Africa (IDASA), Multiparty Democracy, Vuleka Trust, Inkatha Institute and Accord. These NGOs were selected as they have been operational for some time in KwaZulu Natal and hence were considered credible. Another element of the research included KwaZulu Natal academics from the four KwaZulu Natal Universities, namely Durban Westville, Zululand, Natal and the local branch of UNISA. Defining a population, Melville and Goddard (1996: 47) explain, "The whole in which the research is concerned is called the population. The subset of the population which the researcher observes, is a sample". The targeted population/respondents in which this research is concerned included academics and NGOs. It was not possible to conduct interviews with the whole targeted population, i.e. the four KwaZulu Natal universities and the five NGOs. A stratified random sampling was followed, because stratified random sampling, "... have prior information regarding certain characteristics of the population". (Melville and Goddard, 1996 : 32). Regarding the academics, two respondents from the department

of political science at each university were interviewed, totalling eight respondents. With regard to the NGOs, only two respondents from Senior Management were interviewed. These particular personnel were targeted to secure their expertise regarding experience, knowledge and education of which there were ten in total. Therefore a total number of eighteen respondents were interviewed.

The field operation was completed successfully. The researcher contacted the respondents, administered the questions, recorded and returned the data to a central location for processing. Interviews were organised by appointment. The researcher simultaneously took notes and recorded the data on a tape recorder. The interviews took place in October 2000 at the various institutions and were recorded on the prepared interview schedules. Each interview lasted approximately two hours. The researcher used an interview schedule but in some cases digressed from the pre-arranged interview schedule if the need arose. Few problems were encountered and the interviewees were generally happy to give the researcher of their time and to answer the questions. Only on one occasion was the researcher required to cut short the interview due to time constraints. In some instances, additional discussions were held with interviewees in order to expand on the information obtained. The details used in the interview schedule are attached as Addendum A. (Bailey, 1987:16).

The interviews consisted of open-ended questions and the researcher took notes as the interviewee responded. According to Rossouw (1996: 32), "An open-ended question requires the respondents to provide their own answers to the question. This is often referred to as a free-response or free answer question." The researcher preferred open ended questions as they have advantages over the other question types.

According to Rossouw (1996: 32) "An open ended question requires the respondents to provide their own answer to the question. This is often referred to as a free-response or answer question." The interviewer probes the respondents to answer freely. Open ended questions allow the interviewees to express their opinions, ideas and perceptions rather than answering "yes" or "no". The open ended questions in the interview schedule covered areas such as: Inkatha's relations with the state; with other organisations; the Zulu royal family and the international community. The semi-structured questions were built around the essence of the investigation. The interview schedule was meticulously prepared and tested in advance by the researcher to ensure its viability. All responses were categorised, encoded and fed into a computer for analysis and the formulation of graphs and tables.

The question method was used because the research was carried out via the interview material. A copy of the interview schedule was given to respondents to enable them to refer to it when answering. To avoid any error in measurement, the questions were put to the respondents by the researcher and the researcher's purpose for asking the questions was explained to the respondents so as to encourage the accuracy of their answers. Short open discussions were held soon after the conclusion of each interview session in order to gain a better understanding of data processing, presentation and reporting. A tape recorder was used for recording responses during the interview sessions and during discussions. This helped in data procession and analysing (Melville and Goddard,1996: 47).

According to Rossouw (2000: 8), "Data processing refers to the manner in which the data is recorded, interpreted and presented. This provides either text or statistical

information which had then to be analysed, interpreted and recorded in a report or some form which can be consulted for the findings of the research." Data processing has been done electronically by computer for accuracy, neatness and quickness. The tape recordings, statements and scribbles by the researcher have all been integrated (Rossouw, 2000).

Data analysis was both quantitative and qualitative, data was broken down, categorised and organised clearly. This was followed by descriptions and explanations. The data was presented in the form of tables and graphs. The quantitatively and qualitatively presented data was interpreted with the purpose of explaining and finding the meaning of the results in order to draw inferences about the research objectives. The data was in a form of document analysis plus the information obtained from schedules as per interviewees' or respondents' responses. The analysis was in the form of graphs, tables and statements. The computer assisted with tables, graphs and even statements (Rossouw, 1996: 14).

## 1.2 THE DEFINITION OF CONFLICT

Authoritative authors quote: "Conflict can be regarded in either a 'narrower' or a 'wider' sense, in terms of which it is either seen as simply the violent interactions among parties, or alternatively, it focuses primarily upon the underlying situations, and the relationship between social systems/conflicts" (Bercovitch, 1984: 4). According to Wehr (1979: 3-5) "Conflict is perceived to be either positive and functional or negative and dysfunctional for social systems. The theorists who believe conflict to be dysfunctional tend to seek to avoid or prevent it while those who support the positive view of conflict also tend to believe that conflict cannot be

prevented or avoided". "Conflict exists whenever incompatible activities occur", Deutsch (1973: 10). According to Himes (1980: 14) "Social conflict refers to purposeful struggles between collective actors who use social power to defeat or remove opponents and to gain status, power, resources and other scarce values". Inkatha was very active and played a free role when the ANC and its allies were banned. This resulted in conflict when these parties were unbanned.

The writer perceives conflict as inevitable to human interaction as all human kind experience it most of the time. The writer understands social conflict to be inherent in society as a result of human interaction. Conflict arises as a result of certain constraints in society, namely, perceptions of differences both real and imagined and as a result of competition for scarce resources. Therefore social conflict refers to power struggles in society resulting from competition for access to socio-economic, political, environmental and natural resources with a view to survival. Conflict provides society with an indicator of disturbances within its communities and comes as a catalyst for change. Conflict is evidenced by disagreement. It centres in such issues as role and status definition, decision-making powers, accountability structures, flexibility and control and in a conflict of personal values and goals, beliefs and ideologies. Conflict is a ubiquitous social phenomenon. Conflict refers to disagreements between people with different ideas or beliefs. Conflict is an inevitable aspect of human existence since all individuals are basically different with regard to perceptions, ideas, behaviours, opinions, attitudes, beliefs and values (Wehr,1979: 3-7).

### 1.3 CONCLUSION

If at any stage the conflict is not managed or mismanaged conflict spirals will develop. These lead to conflict escalation, manifesting itself in violence. A mapping of the conflict will provide new and useful information for the purpose of attempting to end the conflict in KwaZulu Natal. The political violence will be eliminated hence preventing a repeat of history. The literature review which consisted of document analysis was successfully undertaken. This was augmented by an empirical research conducted by means of structured interviews. Data was efficiently collected from respondents to the interviews. The interview involved a one-on-one verbal interaction between the interviewer and the respondent as outlined by Melville and Goddard (1995: 44).

The targeted population of this study responded well. This population included NGOs in KwaZulu Natal and KwaZulu Natal academics from four universities. Inkatha's relations and interaction were wide hence it could not avoid conflict. As Wehr (1979: 5) states, "Conflict is an inevitable part of human existence". Conflicting parties were basically different with regard to perception, ideas, behaviours, opinions, attitudes, beliefs and values.

The mapping approach used helped to determine the conflict history, conflict context, conflict parties, issues and where the conflict is at present. This study focussed on the management of the conflict. In this regard, conflict was seen as negative and dysfunctional as Wehr (1979: 24) stipulates.

## CHAPTER TWO

### INTRODUCTION

Inkatha was originally a cultural movement with the aims and objectives of preserving the Zulu culture of which the Zulu nation was very proud. Its full title was Inkatha - "Yenkululeko Yesizwe" which translates as Inkatha for the "Freedom of the Nation". It has since become a political party that calls itself the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).

#### 2.1 THE BACKGROUND TO AND ESTABLISHMENT OF INKATHA

Inkatha was founded as a cultural liberation movement in 1975 by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi who drew his legitimacy and power base from his family's central role in traditional Zulu politics and from his participation in the administration of the self-governing KwaZulu Bantustan. The party claims to have adopted a multi-strategic approach that includes development programmes within KwaZulu and attempts at initiating a wider political alliance involving interested parties both in and outside the officially "recognised" political system. Inkatha's influence extends beyond the borders of KwaZulu Natal to national and international levels (Salloojee,1991:110).

According to Brewer (1986: 11), "The problems within Inkatha evolved primarily from its bridging stance between conflicting positions." This can be geographically illustrated by comparing Inkatha's ambivalent stance with the shifts in the tectonic plates of the earth's surface, for where there is movement, eruptions occur. "In Inkatha's case, its antithetical stance and strategies have created the potential for great conflict and, indeed, violence within both the organisation and wider society" (Tessendorf,1990:19). Inkatha in its mobilisation process has been forced to rely on



traditional/SOCial structures such as the "amakhosi" (chiefs), "izinduna" (councillors), "amabutho" (warriors) and state agencies such as schools and churches. To this effect, the history of Inkatha formed part of the curriculum prescribed by the ex-KwaZulu Government's Department of Education and Culture which resulted in social tensions being transferred to Inkatha's structures. Inkatha's reliance on controversial institutions resulted in it being identified with the unpopular KwaZulu Homeland structures. Traditional chiefs were very unpopular. Gwala (1988:85-90) confirms this by saying that "Inkatha has been tainted by allegations that incumbents of social and authority structures were appointed through corruption and nepotism". The tension between Inkatha and the KwaZulu population arose because Inkatha's structures overlapped with traditional structures and authoritarian figures such as the King, Chiefs and Izinduna (Councillors) and because of the competing strands of hierarchical priorities (Gwala, 1985: 85-90).

According to Brewer (1986: 9), "Inkatha's paradox lies in its dichotomous reliance on modern traditional structures. Inkatha has diversified leadership. Leadership in rural areas is usually in the form of a chief and his councillors whilst in urban and pen-urban areas, councillors and KwaZulu members of Parliament together with shack lords/warlords comprise the leadership structure". This perpetuated the political violence and conflict as not all Zulus belonged to Inkatha under a Chief or Induna (Councillor) and even though the community is Zulu, they are affiliated to different political parties. The hierarchical nature of Inkatha leadership has caused great conflict. Himes (1980: 14) writes, "Conflict refers to purposeful struggles between collective actors who use others to defeat or remove opponents and to gain status, power and other scarce values". Members of Inkatha had advantages because they

received favours such as employment, property and licenses to operate businesses from both the leadership of Inkatha and the KwaZulu Bantustan. Their cognitive and aesthetic needs as identified by Maslow in Fisher (1990: 91) were identified as satisfactory. These needs included, "Self actualisation needs; the ultimate motivation. Esteem needs: the need for achievement, competence, mastery, recognition, prestige and status... Belongingness and love needs: needs that are satisfied by social relationships". Inkatha members received basic requirements that human beings need for survival and development in both physical and social terms. There seems to be an exclusive ethnic identity associated with Inkatha.

Sharp, Boonzaaier and September (1994: 418) state that "In the course of the 1980s Inkatha's leaders adopted a specific version of what it meant to be Zulu with ever increasing vigour. They too used their particular vision of the past - of a nation united by shared ethnicity - to address the present and the future". This meant that true Zulus could not conceivably belong to other political parties such as the African National Congress (ANC), Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) or South African Communist Party (SACP) to name but a few. It was realised by Inkatha that some Zulus were identified as being card carrying members of the ANC, COSATU or SACP. It was also noted that some Zulus continued with their membership of the Tripartite Alliance even after they were ordered to cut the ties and some Zulu members even did recruitment for these parties. Hence Inkatha's desire that their members should not join the Tripartite organisation was not honoured, instead, membership of the ANC, COSATU and the SACP was observed to be increasing. It was evident that Zulus were affiliated to other political parties, whilst according to Campbell (1995: 290) "Political affiliation was a matter of life and death

for many people." This makes clear, the sensitivity surrounding Zulu affiliation to the ANC and its allied movements. This caused political violence and conflict which led to bloodshed in KwaZulu Natal

The formation and expression of Zulu identity through political means according to Sharp and Boonzaaier (1994: 414) was according to "Inkatha's version of Zulu ethnic identity is not the outcome of a similar dialogue. Even though it elicits favourable response from a proportion of its target population, it remains an imposition. This is because Buthelezi had the power to declaim a vision of what it meant to be Zulu. He derived this power from two principle sources, neither of which had any direct connection with the popularity of the people on whose behalf he claimed to speak. One lay in his command of the structures of the bantustan states and in recent years, it has become particularly noticeable that he has increasingly conflicted the leadership of the Zulu nation with Inkatha and the KwaZulu Homeland". Buthelezi's interpretation of Zuluness is validated and reinforced by influential outsiders. Inkatha's power to pronounce a specific Zulu identity does not include an ability to enforce universal conformity but it does provoke conflict around the issue of ethnic identity which resulted in violence breaking out in KwaZulu Natal.

The writer defines Zulu identity as being of a particular ethnic group that is Zulu. A Zulu cannot be a Xhosa or a Sotho, this refers to individuality. Identity refers to sameness such as keeping to or practising a certain tradition to show that one is a Zulu for instance, manner of dress or of speech. In KwaZulu Natal this is exhibited in events such as King Shaka's commemoration day. On this day, Zulus dress in a

particular way and celebrate by way of singing, dancing and carrying traditional weapons. This is a genuine representation of a Zulu.

## 2.2 BUTHELEZI'S IDEA OF ETHNICITY/NATIONHOOD AND ETHNIC MOBILISATION

Campbell (1995: 287) states that "... a gap exists between the political mobilisation of ethnicity and the use of ethnicity as a source by people in accounting for their everyday lives, and that more research needs to be done on the latter dimension in particular". 'Zuluness' as a politicised version was promoted by Buthelezi and the Zulus were housed in the KwaZulu Bantustan created by apartheid South Africa. In the early 1990's, there were competing claims about ethnic identity in KwaZulu Natal. These claims were being violently played out, with momentous consequences for the KwaZulu Natal region. According to Mare in Campbell (1995: 288), ethnicity is characterised as a form of social identity deriving from the combination of three elements. These elements included a commitment to culturally distinctive symbols and practices which are not so much evidenced except in language (Zulu) which is spoken. A sense of common historical origin is also one of the elements. This element came about because all Zulus are from KwaZulu Natal and most Zulus take pride in that fact. The third element is a sense of belonging. This element still exists in rural areas but in urban areas such as suburbs, townships and towns, residents now consist of mixed groupings comprising of many tribes. Zuluness tended to be domestic and local rather than political and regions /national as claimed by Buthelezi. Christianity has provided a replacement of the old fashioned rural-based ways, hence the passing on of customs is a fact of life (Campbell: 1995: 289).

"Mare's study suggests that in mobilising ethnic sentiment, Buthelezi often refers to the glorious Zulu past, symbolised by heroes such as Shaka, Cetshwayo and Dingane, men of mythical wisdom and bravery, supported by a cast of disciplined warriors capable of awesome anger when provoked" Campbell (1995: 293). The heroes of the past are mere stories or tales told by Buthelezi in his speeches when addressing the Inkatha rallies and conferences. Buthelezi's references to Shaka resonate with a people's personal history. Language and religion are facets of Zulu identity that have been drawn on by Buthelezi and Inkatha not unlike the Afrikaners. Afrikaners mobilised around language rights in the twentieth century. The writer assumes that Buthelezi made a mistake by not mobilising around language since Zulu language was the home tongue of the Zulus. It was also used in personal relationships, domestic and community rituals and networks. Respect is not a feature that was explicitly linked with Zuluness yet it was the most consistent with Buthelezi's mobilisation of an ethnic identity, meshing in too with the notion of Shaka as a social order symbol. Mdluli agreed with this concept when he commented that the concept of respect forms the backbone of Inkatha's Ubuntu-botho school syllabus. This was also cited by Sallojee (1991: 367) when Inkatha was referring to intimidation when dealing with student uprisings in Kwazulu. The writer concludes that exercising intimidation of students was regarded as a means of instilling respect in the young Zulus (Mdluli, 1987: 49).

It is clear that Buthelezi had more success in the rural areas than in the urban areas. This is true when we note that Campbell (1995: 300) states: "We know that Buthelezi has been more successful in mobilising rural people than he has been successful in

mobilising the urban people". The writer would like to suggest that Buthelezi's claims did not resonate easily or automatically for urban area residents in the conflictual and exclusive form in which he expressed them. Buthelezi emphasised customs that cannot be practised as readily as before and a glorious warrior past that cannot be remembered or recaptured. Buthelezi did not appeal to the full complexity of their life experiences as urban people struggling to survive. It is also clear that Buthelezi never considered that they were members of the racially suppressed group, Christianity has changed their life styles and as workers they have been influenced by the life styles of their co-workers. Buthelezi was assisted by the issue of regionalism and the specific powers allowed the KwaZulu Natal regional government. This related to the setting of spatial and administration government boundaries to ethnic identities. This was fully evidenced when the KwaZulu government at the end of 1992 presented a constitution for a strong federal state for KwaZulu Natal (Campbell 1995: 303).

From the results of the interviews recently conducted, the following can be concluded on the formation and leadership of Inkatha:

An overwhelming majority of eighty percent felt that Inkatha's leadership (largely characterised by elderly men) should be transformed in favour of younger blood including women. Younger men and women should play a pivotal role in decision making. A minority of approximately ten percent admired Chief Buthelezi's good intentions in promoting Zulu culture, norms and values of a traditional society. Of the ten percent only a handful were concerned about the centralisation of power in the hands of a few and

allegations were made that if you did not have Buthelezi's trust, you were out of Inkatha no matter how strong or intelligent you might be. Decision making was questioned - surely a mandate should be sought from the membership before each and every action or decision was taken.

### 2.3 CONCLUSION

The ethnic mobilisation by Inkatha caused conflict escalation particularly during the time when the United Democratic Front (UDF) was in operation. Inkatha's policy of ethnicity has proved to be successful even though with violent consequences.

Although initially King Zwelithini supported the idea of ethnic Zulu mobilisation, he later turned his back on it. This caused tension between Buthelezi's Inkatha and King Zwelithini's royal family members which impacted negatively on the Zulu nation. The formation of Inkatha proved problematic because its structures were based on the unpopular traditional leadership such as Amakhosi (Chiefs) because sine Amakhosi were very undemocratic. Buthelezi and his Inkatha Freedom Party were largely discredited due to the relationship between Pretoria and the KwaZulu bantustan. However, Buthelezi's ethnic mobilisation was successful and this enabled him to remain and serve the Government of National Unity (GNU). The relationship between Buthelezi and the Zulu Royal family needs to be regulated in order to reduce the political violence and conflict in KwaZulu Natal. The relationship between Inkatha and the other political parties needs to be improved in order to promote peaceful co-existence. It has been well documented that the formation and expression of Zulu identity by political means has resulted in ethnic political violence and conflict.

## CHAPTER THREE

### INTRODUCTION

The problems within Inkatha were varied and multi-dimensional They included the fact that:

- Inkatha was seen as being the Zulu nation; (Mare, 1992)
- its mobilisation drawing on its Zulu history; (Sallojee,1991) and
- Inkatha's politics of ethnicity which created its own problems (Waetjenj990).

The problems in Inkatha were many. These problems were varies and multi-dimensional. In this chapter these problems will be explained in detail and context in paragraphs 3.1 to 3.3.

#### 3.1 INKATHA SEEN AS THE ZULU NATION

Mare (1972: 73) writes, "From 1975, however, the idea of a pre-existing nation was given additional organised form in the Inkatha movement". Buthelezi had, before 1975, revitalised the idea of the Zulus being seen as a nation by participating in the chieftancy, in the Zulu Territorial Assembly and the KwaZulu Bantustan Legislative Assembly. Mare (1972: 23) stated "Inkatha is the first and foremost example of politicised ethnicity. Its symbols serve to mobilise a constituency which finds expression through local and regional structures, women's and youth organisations, events, a variety of media, museums, styles of dress, education, etc." In the form of "Ubuntu-Botho" and citizenship, Inkatha was made a part of the ex-KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture. Schools were made to pay for Inkatha



conference expenses from school funds because each and every higher primary and secondary school was compelled to send a minimum of 10 delegates to annual youth conferences (Mdluli, 1987: 71). The Zulu identity as an ethnic group was linked to Inkatha's politicised version. Inkatha was linked and regarded as an extension of the Inkatha KwaZulu organisation which was founded in 1928 by King Solomon kaDingizulu. In Isizulu, Inkatha was a sacred coil symbolising the unity of the people. Chiefs and izinduna (councillors) were seen as central to recruitment to Inkatha. The branches of Inkatha were planned to coincide with the areas of tribal authority since Inkatha was the "Zulu nation". Under the leadership of Chief Buthelezi, regular gatherings of Chiefs were held which served to confirm the idea of Zulu ethnic mobilisation (Fisher, 1990: 46).

Mare (1972: 76) further reaffirms that Inkatha was seen as the Zulu nation by stating that, "... all members of the Zulu nation are automatically members of Inkatha if they are Zulus. There may be people who are inactive members as no one escapes being a member as long as he or she is a member of the Zulu nation." Initially, Buthelezi saw all members of the Zulu nation as 'members of Inkatha'. On many occasions, King Goodwill made it clear that if traitors and infiltrators existed, they should be brought to book to be chastised or rooted out. Zulus had to belong to Inkatha.

Mare (1972: 101) "When the ANC and COSATU called for the dismantling of KwaZulu as a political structure and the scrapping of the KwaZulu police force, Buthelezi claimed this was an attack on the Zulu nation and on the King. He claimed that all Zulus were affronted." The author assumes that he used one of the strong statements by the labour unions that is, injury to one is injury to all. If you insult

KwaZulu then every Zulu is insulted and every Zulu will stand up to oppose the insult. In 1990 when Inkatha became the IFP it was opened to all races, hence it could no longer claim to be the party of the Zulu nation without alienating new Zulus. The traditions used by Inkatha have served to mobilise and control the people. The Inkatha movement was mobilised as the organisational representative of the Zulu and national liberation (Campbell, 1995: 95).

According to the recent interviews conducted, two different views were expressed by the respondents who were interviewed as to whether Inkatha is the Zulu nation or not. The author established that over fifty percent felt that Inkatha was the Zulu nation as nationalism implies a general empathy of the people to a particular language (Zulu), a particular ethnic group (Zulus), a particular set of symbols (Zulu for example the shield, stick and spear) and Zulu culture and values. The researcher further established that less than forty percent of respondents felt that Inkatha's representation provincially and nationally including local governments, accommodated and represented the "rainbow" nation. Thus proving that Inkatha is not the Zulu nation. They agreed that Inkatha was not precisely the Zulu nation although the media are trying to prove otherwise.

### 3.2 MOBILISATION

Once Inkatha had gained control over the KwaZulu bantustan, Buthelezi declared it the Zulu nations' `home'. Expanding the Zulu `home', Inkatha took back the Ingwavuma area under Chief Tembe which had been given to Swaziland. Museums were established to reinforce the legitimacy of KwaZulu as a political entity. Zulu warriors were praised by Buthelezi in a Shaka Day celebration speech in 1991. Chief

Buthelezi had offered to organise the first King Shaka's Day in September 1954 which was applauded by all Zulus since they knew that Shaka was the founder of the Zulu nation. Shortly hereafter Shaka's Day was declared a public holiday by the South African Government. The release of the film "Shaka Zulu" was also greeted with enthusiasm. In 1990 circuit school inspectors were instructed to form Youth Brigades at schools. Allegations were made that as a disciplinary power Inkatha assaulted pupils and adults who tried to reject Inkatha. Both the Education department and the Justice department (the police) were part of the drive for ethnic mobilisation by Inkatha. Chief Buthelezi was the KwaZulu Minister of Police at the time (Tessendorf,1990 : 21).

According to the respondents to the question of whether conflict was caused by Inkatha's mobilisation of the post painted the following scenario was painted.

Thirty percent of respondents indicated that Inkatha had a strong support base in the rural areas of KwaZulu Natal especially among the elderly who were ill informed about politics, this number included traditionalists such as Chiefs and their councillors. These people were compelled to associate themselves with Inkatha for the sake of peace and tranquillity. Seventy percent of respondents maintained that the following weak points allowed for problems/conflicts to arise within Inkatha's mobilisation:

- Centralisation of power in the hands of a few top leaders;
- Haphazard decision making for example Inkatha's late entry into the 1994 elections which jeopardised its campaign;

- Its support base was largely conservative rural Zulus and warlords who lacked focal thinking;
- Democracy was loosely applied with no control;
- Losing the skills of the young prominent educationists, as they withheld membership, viz., Dr Zibi Jiyane, Dr O Dlomo and Musa Myeni among others. It is believed that they would have taken Inkatha much further from where it is now.

### 3.3 INKATHA'S POLITICS OF ETHNICITY

"The term 'ethnicity' embraces two manifestations which intertwine but are nevertheless distinct and need to be kept analytically separate:

- (i) the lived experience of ordinary people as perceived as ethnic group members; and
- (ii) the fashioning and mobilisation of this experience by political brokers for political ends" Campbell (1995: 288).

In this treatise, focus is concentrated on the latter dimension which has dominated discussions of Zulu ethnicity. Ethnicity is characterised as a form of combined social identity which include:

- a) A commitment to culturally distinctive symbols and practices (language) linked to
- b) A sense of common historical origin and (born in KwaZulu); and
- c) A sense of belonging to the group (Zulu group/tribe).

The manipulation of ethnicity was used by the South African government in an attempt to control the majority (the African population) through apartheid and separate development (the bantustan system). Ethnic mobilisation failed during the liberation struggle with the exception of Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha. Inkatha's success was based on the astute way in which Buthelezi and Inkatha played and treated the KwaZulu homeland as the Inkatha home. The apartheid regime failed to separate groups from each other, but Buthelezi was able to do it using Inkatha and the Zulu nation. Describing ethnicity, General Louis Botha, in 1910, painted apartheid as two streams each following its own course, flowing in one direction but separately that is, black and white (Campbell, 1995: 99).

"The idea of a homeland is of a place embodying social, cultural and historical essence, that legitimate claims to a natural sovereignty" Waetjen (1990: 654). A homeland is where rootedness and grounded community is found. Inkatha was seen as a nationalist movement. Waetjen (1990: 654) writes "Inkatha was founded in 1975 to challenge apartheid's dehumanising doctrines and policies. A class based culture and tradition to mobilise its constituencies, Inkatha aspired to become the central arm of the struggle for liberation in South Africa." Buthelezi played a big role in challenging Pretoria's plan to create pillars of apartheid, that is, tribal states or homelands, namely, Ciskei, Transkei, KwaZulu, KwaNgwane, KwaNdebele and Bophuthatswana. Inkatha's ambiguity resided in its fusion of the ethnic homeland system with an anti-apartheid movement. Chief Buthelezi claimed to be fighting the system from within. Inkatha proposed a federalist South Africa to retain its leadership powers (Waetjen, 1990: 58).

Inkatha employed narratives of 'home' to mediate profound regional, social and territorial fragmentation. Social control over Zulus was secured by empowering existing Chiefs, creating new Chiefs and izinduna (councillors) for administrative purposes. Recruitment for mining and agricultural capital were initiated by chiefs who were Inkatha supporters. Therefore Inkatha had a certain way of nation building which was solidified under apartheid/separate development. The mass displacement and relocation of African people was a consequential process in the KwaZulu homeland. People were sent to barren regions. Buthelezi's solidification of bantustan authority was explicitly vested in ethnic nationhood. Buthelezi rose to power in 1970 as a Chief Minister for independence of the KwaZulu bantustan (Sallojee, 1991: 413-420).

The founding of Inkatha in 1975 by Chief Buthelezi was considered a solution to keeping the liberation struggle alive in South Africa as the ANC was banished in 1960. The only big mark was that Inkatha was firmly linked to the governmental structures of the KwaZulu Bantustan. Inkatha possessed and effectively utilised the resources, military and monetary of the KwaZulu Bantustan. It was closely associated with the political machinery of apartheid. This created a rift between the ANC and Inkatha. Inkatha promoted a vision of cultural tradition and Zuluness that rested firmly on patriarchal privilege (Campbell, 1995: 297). The brothers born of warrior blood by Shaka through Mfecane, infused the Zulu nation with genetic continuity and cultural traits ordaining loyalty to the contemporary politics of Inkatha. Through the mass media, speeches and celebrations, and his Inkatha, Buthelezi promoted a vision of cultural traditions and Zuluness. Inkatha claimed to be the rightful heir of the banned ANC. The Zulu King, Zwelithini was Inkatha's

most important cultural leader. According to Waetjen (1990: 661) "Home and nation carried meanings that were largely determined by the social and geographical location of groups of people. Inkatha was attempting to mobilise - nation referred to Zuluness and home referred to the KwaZulu Bantustan." Women were mobilised as subjects already staying within KwaZulu and as Zulus. The men only went for urbanised work but acknowledging that they must return to KwaZulu as this is their home. Home for the men is the centre of their power and privilege, it is where man is king, head of the house with the final say and the decision maker. All of these qualities were denied the men in the workplace. All such visions and practices are lost these days where democracy rules and feminism operates. Feminism is catered for in KwaZulu Natal but has a long way to travel (Waetjen,1990: 661).

When Buthelezi was addressing Jeppe Hostel residents in Johannesburg in 1984, he empathised with their loneliness but assured them that Inkatha was their natural ally in the liberation struggle. Social change had to some extent intermingled all races and cultural groups. Zulus state that KwaZulu is their forefathers' land, where their ancestors herded their cattle, fished and tilled the soil. Inkatha included some effective tactics for ethnicising geographical and social spaces namely through the inauguration of schools, offices and an airport, the unveiling of monuments of heroes and kings for example Zwelithini stadium, Mangosuthu Technikon, Prince Mangosuthu Airport at Ulundi, the Princess Magogo Stadium, etc. The installation of new chiefs for example, Chief R Khumalo in Utrecht, 72 kilometres east of Newcastle in June 1998, the annual celebrations of descendants of heroes, King Shaka's Day that provided a platform for Chief Buthelezi and King Zwelithini to

compare the figure of Shaka with Inkatha - its qualities, political vision and his character which also included 'prayer days' (Zulu, 1993 ; 79).

According to interviews conducted, conflicting views were expressed by the respondents who were interviewed as to the role played by Inkatha's politics of ethnicity. A sixty percent majority felt that Inkatha had moved away from the politics of ethnicity since 1990. They felt that Inkatha commanded a lot of support from predominantly Zulu speaking people. Other ethnic groups such as whites, Indians, coloureds, etc., also belong to and support Inkatha. Forty percent of respondents stated that Inkatha's politics of ethnicity still exist, is very parochial, is located in rural areas, is patriarchal, that is male dominated, tribally and community orientated and particularistic.

#### 3.4 CONCLUSION

When culture and ethnicity is not well maintained it can result in conflict because different views or interpretations can bring about different meanings or pictures which in turn when not well managed can result in violence. This is what happened in Natal under Inkatha leadership between 1990 and 1993. Buthelezi has restored the pride and national consciousness of the Zulus. Women were referred to as bearers and rearers of the warriors. The Women's Brigade of Inkatha provided important illustrations of the role of women within Inkatha and within the Zulu nation. Matters taken to the fore included poverty, ignorance, disease, education, misleading of children by some political parties. Women were regarded as the 'homemakers'. Women were supposed to nurture their children properly to avoid the youth type behaviour during June 1976. The Chief's stand anointed by tradition and Inkatha's



version of the Zulu ethnic group sanctions male dominated gender relations. Human relations were not well maintained within Inkatha's various structures for example, the Youth, Woman's Brigade, older members and the traditional leaders. This created conflict within Inkatha. The Zulus had a sense of belonging since they spoke Zulu, lived in KwaZulu Natal and belonged to the Zulu group. This helped Buthelezi in promoting Inkatha's politics of ethnicity.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### INTRODUCTION

Inkatha enjoyed a wide range of relationships with various power groupings within the broader South African political context. These parties included Black extra-parliamentary movements, the Zulu royal family, White interest groups, the State and Black "system" groups. This interaction took place at local, regional, national and international levels. On another level was Inkatha's relationship with international interest groups. This interaction was influenced by the structural constraints imposed by these organisations and the larger environment. This was reflected in Inkatha's choice of allies and strategies. Inkatha's relations with each of these groups will be discussed in greater detail below (Gerhard and Georgina, 1 987: 279).

#### 4.1 INKATHA' S RELATIONSHIPS AND INTERACTION

Inkatha had many relationships and wide interaction. These relationships and interactions will be focussed on indepth and in context in paragraphs 4.1 to 4.8.

#### 4,2 INKATHA'S INTERACTION WITH OTHER ORGANISATIONS

When analysing Inkatha's relationships with other organisations, it is necessary to consider the role of its leadership in this regard. There is a need to consider the constraints under which the organisation must act as well as the structural constraints which the various organisations themselves place on the communication patterns operating between them. The main restriction is the ethnic base of Inkatha which inhibits the creation of effective cross-ethnic links within the wider Black community. This factor, however, has not been a deterrent in its interaction with

White interest groups and international actors. The second constraint is that of its financial dependence on the State and the private sector to assist in its development plans as this has led to accusations that it operates on behalf of the State and business interests, especially in the fields of social control (Salloojee, 1991: 260).

Inkatha's decision to selectively participate in State-created structures has had the effect of alienating it from other major Black extra-parliamentary groups. Inkatha like all other organisations and parties in South Africa is faced with the wider environmental problems of a growing population with its increased pressure on the supply of scarce resources and the satisfaction of human needs through the provision of services and the creation of employment opportunities. It is within the parameters of these constraints that Inkatha has to base its interactions with other organisations. It is the very nature of the individual relationships with other organisations that decide whether the interaction is co-operative or conflictual. If it is conflictual it will possibly lead to violence. A dominant feature of Inkatha's structure is that much of its interaction with other organisations is carried out by its leader, Chief Buthelezi. Inkatha's decision to participate within state structures and its attempts to secure the allegiance of the Zulus through a process of ethnic mobilisation has led Mare(1989; 28) to conclude: "that Inkatha has built up a substantial regional power base in Natal" The extent to which this has been done and the dynamics involved will be discussed later.

In his interaction with audiences, Buthelezi makes use of particular symbols and terms to generate the response he desires from them. The interpretation of these words and designs will largely be influenced by the historical context and socio-

material condition in which the receiver finds himself. These factors determine the parameters within which the contents of the sender's message will be understood and reacted upon. At the same time, the success of the sender in achieving his desired objective will largely be influenced by the extent to which his message reinforces and reflects the receiver's perceptions and world views (Salloojee,1990: 29).

Chief Buthelezi relies on both a mythical and purposive-rational worldview in his communication with various organisations and audiences. A characteristic of his speeches to rural inhabitants and urban migrants is the reference to Zulu history and folklore. This being reinforced by the manipulation of traditional symbols such as dress and song. Although he may stress the need for obedience and loyalty to the Inkatha leadership, this created an obligation on his part to live up to to the expectations of his followers. This sets the parameters within which all interaction between Chief Buthelezi and his followers takes place. The need to placate these expectations has inevitably influenced the direction and degree to which Inkatha has sought relationships with other institutions and organisations. These relationships are facilitated by the power derived from the interaction between Chief Buthelezi and the members of Inkatha (Campbell, 1995: 3&41).

The second part of Chief Buthelezi's strategy is that of the purposive-rational worldview. Elements of this aspect are found in discourse with both Inkatha members, parties and organisations external to the movement itself. The contents of Chief Buthelezi's speeches in this regard reflect some degree of rationality as emphasis is placed on the socio-economic realities of unemployment, poverty and the detrimental effects of sanctions. The purposive-rational world view becomes

apparent in Chief Buthelezi's interaction with the intelligentsia and business community. The reference to economic and social realities is based on rational thought patterns. Chief Buthelezi portrays himself as the leader of the majority of Black South Africans, while Inkatha's political and economic principles are presented as corresponding with those of Western democracies. Chief Buthelezi stresses the need for economic development to overcome the socio-economic problems facing his constituency and accordingly adopts a stance critical of the disinvestment campaign waged by the extra-parliamentary groups such the UDF and COSATU. Buthelezi's speeches appeal to the conservative world view held by most businessmen and Western politicians who held office in the 1990s. This was achieved by references to the need for a free market economy and the establishment of democratic values in a future South Africa (Gehard and Georgina, 1 987 : 246).

The nature of Chief Buthelezi's speeches and Inkatha demanded the Zulu's conformity to Clegg's Model of a surface and a deep structure. An example of this was Inkatha's public support for a free market economy and for deregulation in the form of the abolition of legislation which prohibits Black ownership of land. A careful study of this wording indicates an underlying message in that by dressing up their demands in widely-accepted terminology, Inkatha was actually calling for a far-reaching demand to be satisfied, namely that of redistribution of land. This seems to indicate that Buthelezi's motive for seeking closer links with business groups revolved around his perceived need for alternative financial sources necessary to support development projects aimed at securing the socio-economic and political advancement of Black South Africans, particularly those in Kwazulu Natal rural areas (Buthelezi,1985:18).

#### 4.3 INKATHA'S RELATIONS WITH THE ZULU ROYAL FAMILY

Both Inkatha and the Zulu royal family share the Zulu constituency. The writer would like conflict to be seen as a human relations regulator in this regard. Therefore conflict is not an all-bad approach to the life situation of human beings and it should not always be regarded as a negative experience. Anstey (1991: 5) refers to Himes (1980: 198) when he states that "[it] addresses the issue of conflict as a legitimized process, pointing out that all societies struggle with tensions between conflict and co-operation in an ongoing way over time. When two or more people interact, conflict cannot be avoided. Each person has his own needs which he must attain". It stands to reason therefore that their conflict can affect human relations. Affected human relations cannot be left like that but must be addressed. Coser (1956: 121) quotes Simmel's notion that, "... the very act of entering into conflict with an antagonist establishes relations where none may have existed before. Conflict is seen as a binding element between parties that may previously have stood in no relation to each other". Since this is so, conflict is a factor amenable to a negotiated settlement.

Inkatha is led by Chief Buthelezi and the Zulu royal family by King Zwelithini.

Buthelezi was the Chief Minister of the former KwaZulu Homeland. So it was assumed that he should be the traditional prime minister to the King. He was also the senior advisor to King Cyprian Bhekuzulu, the father of King Zwelithini. When King Zwelithini took the throne this issue was not discussed but Buthelezi automatically became the traditional prime minister to the King. This occurred because he controlled the former KwaZulu Government, was senior advisor to King Cyprian and he was a member of the Zulu royal family. Buthelezi's great

grandfather (Mnyamana) was King Cetshwayo's prime minister. Chief Buthelezi quotes all these facts when he emphasises his authority as a traditional prime minister (Buthelezi, 1994: 29).

Human relations existed between Inkatha of Chief Buthelezi and the Zulu royal family before 1990, although there had been some technical difficulties. The situation worsened when the ANC tried to gain the support of King Zwelithini as it had gained the support of the late Prince Mcwayizeni. King Zwelithini acted as he saw fit for his position and did not consult the Zulu constitution or the royal family. This decision was not popular with Chief Buthelezi as it indicated a change in their relations. Both the King and Chief Buthelezi had to work at the conflict that this move had caused and their constituencies were either directly or indirectly affected by this conflict. Prior to this decision, the King had always consulted with Chief Buthelezi as his senior adviser (Tessendorf, 1990: 29).

Chief Buthelezi was a symbol of unity for the Zulu nation and every Zulu respected him. Buthelezi was seen to have served the Zulu population by maintaining their "Zuluness", preserving the Zulu homeland, by refusing to settle for independence. The King on the other hand had a very fluid and general relationship with the Zulus irrespective of their political affiliation, he was in fact apolitical. This suited Chief Buthelezi well especially in the late 1990s. A misunderstanding between the King and Chief Buthelezi came about as a result of King Zwelithini attending functions hosted by the ANC which Chief Buthelezi took as a sign that King Zwelithini aligned himself with the ANC. A second factor in the misunderstanding between the two leaders resulted from that fact that the King was no longer comfortable attending

Inkatha functions which were based on ethnicity, an example being the King Shalca annual celebration. The ANC took advantage of this misunderstanding by ensuring that King Zwelithini was invited to all their functions (Maninger, 1984: 64).

The writer would like conflict to be seen as a method of setting up new principles. Conflict came about because the interests of the two parties were infringed upon by each side. "If there was no common interest in some objects, there would, scarcely be conflict since there would be nothing to fight about" (Coser, 1956: 123). Chief Buthelezi as an adviser to King Zwelithini was supposed to have been consulted initially on the King's proposed decisions. Escalation of their conflict surfaced when Chief Buthelezi in 1994, declared a "cold war" on the King. During 1990 when the then banned ANC was mobilising the masses, Inkatha-controlled learning institutions were used by the ANC in some areas. This was seen as an alignment with the "enemy" as the KwaZulu bantustan was assumed to be the home of Zulus and Inkatha only. Buthelezi seemed to have forgotten that everyone has the right to freedom of association. Moreover the King was no longer obliged to maintain close relations with Inkatha as he was "apolitical". Coser (1956: 124) explains Simmel's approach by saying he (Simmel) "... implies that in the course of conflict, new rules are continuously created and old rules modified. By bringing about new situations, which are partly or totally defined by rules and norms, conflict acts as a stimulus for the establishment of new rules and norms". Hence a paradigm shift should have been allowed by Inkatha's ethnicity politics (Coser, 1956: 124).

According to Gerhard (1992: 96): "... parties that were formed in opposition to Buthelezi and Inkatha, used names like "Inala" ... and Shaka's spear". By this time



Chief Buthelezi had already sidelined King Zwelithini into a symbolic figure head of the Zulu nation. At the same time, the King had never wanted any opposition to his uncle (Buthelezi). As Inkatha was for the Zulu nation only, the King had indicated that he wanted all those anti-Inkatha disciplined or removed. By 1982 no fewer than three palaces were built as Inkatha political projects. According to Gerhard: "Since the King's function has involved two central elements; to give symbolic meaning to the Zulu nation and to maintain order in its name and to confer legitimacy on Buthelezi as the central political representative of the nation" (Gerhard,1992: 96).

According to du Pisani (1988: 19) "(Aggression) is benign and positively functional," He also distinguishes a second type of "uninstinctual" aggression, which he views as malignant". It has to be brought to Chief Buthelezi's attention that his frustration with the King's attitude to the three issues of conflict between them was affecting other people as well (Zulus and their constituency). On one occasion the Royal Family was attacked and badly beaten. The second occasion was when the King's palace was stoned by the Inkatha youth. Neither of these two events prevented Chief Buthelezi from continuing with his Inkatha ethnicity politics. This divided the constituency that was shared between the King and the royal family and Chief Buthelezi because the perpetrators of the violence mentioned above were Zulus who loved their King but who were exposed to propaganda suggesting that the King was aligning himself with an opposition political party namely the ANC. The Zulus were divided by an action on the part of their King but they took different approaches to resolving their problems (du Pisani, 1988: 19).

The majority (ninety percent) of respondents to the question of the importance of good relations between the King and Chief Buthelezi agreed that Chief Buthelezi played a major role in consolidating the Zulu monarchy. The good relationship between the two players is important to prevent black on black violence in Kwazulu Natal. These respondents claimed further that Inkatha was better able to articulate the needs and aspirations of black people especially the Zulus than any other fragmented party. This last statement definitely provided proof of support for Inkatha's politics of ethnicity.

#### 4.4 INKATHA'S RELATIONS WITH THE STATE

The rules governing Inkatha's interaction with the South African State are largely influenced by South Africa's control of the allocation of financial resources to the Kwazulu Natal administration and to a lesser degree, its access to the conventional media. Yet within the parameters provided by these rules and resources, there is a momentum that allows Inkatha to exploit these devices for its own ends. An important element of Inkatha's formative years was characterised by its outrage at attempts by the State to undermine the position of both the organisation and its leader within the orbit of Zulu politics. Thus Inkatha leadership attempted to mobilise legitimacy by portraying the State as the scapegoat commonly associated with and responsible for the oppression of Black South Africans. The allocation of financial resources by the State to the Kwazulu administration that was mainly controlled by Inkatha, headed by Chief Buthelezi enabled this organisation to create and maintain extensive networks within Kwazulu and Natal. Popular dissatisfaction with these measures and the ability of the State to halt the flow of finance to Kwazulu is a negative dimension to this component of the relationship (Sailoojee,1991: 392-396).

Adam and Moodley (1986: 81) have termed the Inkatha-State relationship "Pragmatic Institutional Opposition" with the inference that both the State and Inkatha enjoyed a symbiotic relationship. The state's apparent tolerance of Inkatha's criticisms is based on two facts. It allows the state to portray itself in a more favourable light at an international level while its apparent patronage of Inkatha by, for example, providing South African police units to deal with unrest in Kwazulu, allowing for its continued policy of divide-and-rule. This had the effect of sowing distrust between Inkatha and the various Black opposition movements such as the African National Congress and the United Democratic Front. Inkatha's reliance on the State's financial assistance places it in a subordinate position and seriously inhibits the ability of Inkatha to satisfy the socio-economic needs and aspirations of its members. On the other hand, selective participation in the system has been to Inkatha's advantage in that it has allowed it the opportunity to institutionalise its control over its membership through the allocation of patronage and other material resources. This has led to the rise of a Black bureaucracy which is unwittingly trapped in the task of maintaining wider social control over Black people on behalf of the State (Adam and Moodley, 1996: 81).

Inkatha has also secured admission to the dominant media systems in the country, especially the press and, to a lesser extent, radio and television. Although these media carry the views of the status quo, Inkatha's access to these means of communication allows it greater freedom of expression than that allowed to the extra-parliamentary groups. Inkatha's mobilisation drives and activities have not suffered State repression as in the case of the extra-parliamentary groups, but the initial distrust

between Inkatha and these groups, together with its subsequent violent manifestation, has provided the state with the opportunity to indirectly manipulate Inkatha's membership to ensure a measure of social control, the "Black-on-Black violence" phenomenon (Soul, 2001: 46).

Inkatha's relationship with the State has taken the form of oscillation between outright rejection of Inkatha's constitutional moves and the creation of structures similar to those proposed by Inkatha. An example of this was the KwaZulu-Natal Joint Executive Committee which was an attempt by the State to facilitate better co-ordination of public services as provided by the Natal Provincial Authorities and the KwaZulu administration respectively (Soul, 2001: 50).

The point of view of the respondents to the interviews about the relationship between Inkatha and the South African government during the early 1990s reflect the following: The response of the large majority (eighty percent plus) of both the KwaZulu Natal academics and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) agreed on the fact that this relationship was cordial. In the 1990s, after F W de Klerk's famous speech of unbanning political liberation movements, the relationship between Inkatha and the South African government was severely strained. The minority (20 percent and less) agreed that a conciliatory relationship was the order of the day as Inkatha and the government were both pro capitalist. Inkatha was able to obtain foreign funding for many economic and social development projects which also benefitted the South African government. This forms part of the reason for Inkatha's firm stand against disinvestment.

#### 4,5 INKATHA'S RELATIONS WITH WHITE INTEREST GROUPS.

Inkatha sought the support of organisations and interest groups that enjoy a love-hate relationship with the State. In the South African context such parties included sectors of the business community, the press and white groups within the white conservative community. These 'groups possessed some of the financial resources necessary to solve the socio-economic problems of South Africa. Inkatha's leadership has attempted to acquire these resources by portraying the movement as a moderate Black organisation free of the radical connotations associated with the extra-parliamentary groups and the lack of political viability expressed by many of the other homeland parties. In exchange for this access to financial resources, Inkatha has had to make sacrifices in the political sphere in the form of compromises on issues such as majority rule. To many Black South Africans these compromises were unacceptable and this has had a negative influence on Inkatha's relations with the extra parliamentary groups (Waetjen,1990: 60).

The overall advantage of Inkatha's initiatives was that they have introduced the idea of negotiation with Whites with the possibility of compromise on the part of both Black and White communities. In doing so, Inkatha's leadership has indicated the need by Blacks to realise the necessity of White participation in any post-apartheid economic system together with the need for freeing investment to underpin the massive social investment programmes that will have to be undertaken by any future government. The premise of a free-enterprise economic policy together with assurances of a compliant labour force could go far to encourage investment in this regard (Brewer, 1996: 72).

Inkatha's use of its relationship with these interest groups has manifested itself in the form of press coverage and financial support for projects aimed at reaching regional political settlements. Such projects include the KwaZulu Natal Indaba and the Lombard and Buthelezi Commissions and have witnessed joint constitutional exercises involving representatives from White interest groups and those representing Inkatha. Inkatha has also concentrated on building links with Afrikaner youth bodies such as Jeugkrug S A and this development can be seen as being essentially long-term in that it is an attempt to influence future Afrikaner leaders to decisions and actions more advantageous to Inkatha and Black South Africans (Brewer, 1996: 76).

The potential of Inkatha's relationships with White groups was and had been undermined by the continual violence between it and the extra-parliamentary groups. Although this has allowed Buthelezi to portray Inkatha as a moderate alternative to these organisations, it has undoubtedly contributed to larger white fears concerning the possible consequences of Black rule. The effects of this can be judged by Buthelezi's inability to persuade White voters in Natal to support the PFP-NRP alliance in the 1987 General Election. This had been reinforced by the State's portrayal of the violence in Natal as "Black-on-Black violence" and has probably led to questioning in some quarters of the White community as to the viability of being too closely identified with Inkatha (Salloojee, 1990: 97).

#### 4.6 INKATHA'S RELATIONS WITH BLACK EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS

These relations mirror the divisive nature of Black politics in South Africa and have centred around the issue of an appropriate strategy with which to secure liberation

and to effect the long-term development of Black economic conditions. Inkatha's relationship vis-a-vis the other Black opposition groups has ranged from cordiality to hostility and violence between supporters of these groups. In a way, this reflects the divisions within Black politics in the face of the State's desire to divide and rule the Black people and the wider debate within Black politics concerning the decision to either participate or boycott the State structures. Coupled to this is the debate concerning the shape and dynamics of a post-apartheid economy and the role of Whites in any future dispensation. These issues have spawned a large number of Black organisations which have drawn up strategies and policies based on these issues in an attempt to capture the support and imagination of the wider Black population. Many of these strategies have appeared contradictory and have facilitated tension and conflict between organisations, a move partially the lack of a common vision for the future which is characteristic of all parties to the South African conflict (Tessendorf, 1990: 7).

Inkatha was in favour of a free-market economic model in opposition to the mixed and socialist models proposed by the ANC, UDF and COSATU respectively. The source of tension between Inkatha and these organisations extends much further than disagreement on the adoption of a desirable post-apartheid economic model. The presence of the ANC posed a threat to Inkatha in that the latter largely derives its legitimacy from the former. This created problems for Inkatha in that it inhibited the search by the latter for an identity independent of that provided by the ANC. This uneasiness on the part of Inkatha is reflected in its differentiation between what it termed the ANC of Albert Luthuli and James Xhuma and the ANC Mission-in-Exile which was often referred to as the External Mission of the ANC whose purpose it

was to mobilise international support for the internal liberation struggle. Nevertheless, an important part of Inkatha's identity is still attached to that of the ANC especially in the form of its colours and uniform which resemble those of the ANC including the carrying of traditional weapons. The moves by Inkatha to draw up its own Statement of Belief and its rejection of the Freedom Charter also underline Inkatha's efforts to build an alternative identity. The pre-1960s relationship between Inkatha and the ANC revolved primarily around Buthelezi's participation in and membership of the ANC. This period of time has been selectively used by Inkatha to emphasise its position within the South African political spectrum and as a slogan designed to ensure Black support. This image was marred by a number of events and the rise of organisations such as the UDF which have laid claim to the charterist tradition and led to the search for a new identity (Brewer, 1996: 90).

Inkatha's response to this has been to portray the ANC in a negative light and to portray the UDF as a surrogate of the former. This has been an attempt on the part of Buthelezi to strengthen his ties with influential groups within the white community so that he can play on the emotions and fears fostered by the State apparatus. The London meeting of 1979 between Buthelezi and other representatives of Inkatha and members of the ANC can be seen as an attempt to loosen the identity links between Inkatha and ANC organisations. The ANC did not dismiss Inkatha in the wake of its attempts to gain maximum press coverage out of the meeting and its own response did not include any rejection of future alliances and support with Inkatha. In many ways Inkatha has served as a guinea pig for the ANC in that it was already in a governing position and has, as such, indicated the problems and



limitations associated with the administration of limited resources to a large community (Tessendorf, 1990: 40).

The antagonistic relationship between Inkatha and the UDF and COSATU can be related to their negation of Buthelezi's political role as one of collaboration. Buthelezi's description of the UDF as "Johnny-come-lately heroes" and his accusation of the latter of being surrogates of the ANC can be explained with reference to Burton's analysis of " ... one of the causes of conflict as being insecurity of one of the parties to the relationship" (1987: 140). The rise of the UDF and COSATU may have been perceived by Buthelezi and senior Inkatha officials as a threat in that these organisations exposed an ideology which held the possibility of attracting many Inkatha members in the lower echelons of the movement.

A large majority of seventy percent of respondents view Inkatha's relation with the Republic of South Africa as a surrogate of the South African government. Supporting this, the meeting in 1979 between Inkatha and the ANC leadership in London was quoted, where it was made clear that Inkatha connived with the Republican government. The author also found that to be in line with Tessendorf (1990: 11) who stated: that "a split between them materialised, fuelled by the difference in strategy and leadership". The minority of twenty eight percent said the ANC viewed Inkatha as the apartheid government's puppet as it had worked with the "enemy" or "oppressor". They acknowledged that Inkatha brought temporary relief to Black South Africans but stated that Inkatha could not liberate Black people completely since it commanded loyalty from a much smaller percentage of the people.

#### 4.7 INKATHA'S RELATIONS ON AN INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

One of the best examples of Inkatha's potential to mobilise its communicative power is its interaction with interest groups and politicians on an internal scale. In 1985 Buthelezi undertook two tours of the United States of America (USA). Interesting patterns of interaction evolved from these trips. In his tour in February 1985, Buthelezi spoke to a cross-section of interest groups within the USA. These groups in order of priority were the media, academic audiences, politicians, business groups, State officials and churchmen. In his tour of November 1985, Buthelezi delivered most of his speeches before business and academic audiences with attention also being given to discussions with U S politicians. Considerably less attention was spent on press conferences and television performances. These facts allow for the following conclusions to be drawn (Buthelezi, 1985: 49).

The February 1985 tour was undoubtedly aimed at marketing Buthelezi and Inkatha as a moderate alternative in any post-apartheid settlement, while the second tour indicated a follow-up on the results of the first tour with attention being given to specific interest groups namely academics and business groups. The implications of Buthelezi's ties with foreign business leaders and politicians are of such a nature that they allowed the establishment of a symbiotic relationship which could be maintained indefinitely. Such international links helped to strengthen Inkatha's bargaining position at any future negotiations, while it secured much-needed overseas investment in the rural areas that Inkatha controls and had promised to develop. The establishment of such ties would allow U S politicians to muster additional domestic support, while Inkatha could moderate any moves in a post-apartheid society, which

could be detrimental to U S interests in South Africa. Inkatha's reliance on possible financial inputs from international business requires it to maintain interests external and contrary to the actual needs and expectations of its members. This had undoubtedly lead to tensions within the organisation itself (Salloojee, 1990: 110)

Thirty percent of the respondents felt that the British government under Margaret Thatcher and the American government under George Bush gave limited recognition to Inkatha. The chief reason being that the ANC in exile under the leadership of Oliver Tambo had gained international support while Inkatha was not well known. This is the reason that sanctions were levelled against South Africa despite the resistance to such a move by Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi. Sixty percent of respondents stated that Inkatha was respected and admired because of Chief Buthelezi's efforts to uplift the Zulu people

#### 4.8 INKATHA'S RELATIONS WITH INTERNAL BLACK GROUPS

These groups included those organisations and parties which participated in State structures. Inkatha has made several attempts to initiate Black internal alliances involving homeland parties and client partners within the Indian and Coloured communities. Examples of these alliances included the Black Unity Front and the South African Black Alliance (SABA) which consisted of Inkatha, the Coloured Labour Party, the Indian Reform Party and several other homeland groupings. "SABA did not succeed in obtaining any concessions from the State and in any event dissolved following the expulsion of the Labour party after its decision to participate in the tricameral parliamentary system" (Mare and Hamilton, 1 987 ; 161).

These relationships were dominated by Inkatha and the failure of these alliances can be attributed to this domination. A case in point being Chief Buthelezi's reprimand of Enos Mabuza of KaNgwane after the latter's meeting the ANC in 1983. The lack of a viable support base and an inability to influence the State to effect the desired changes has gone a long way to undermining the basis of these alliances. These relationships were further inhibited by the rejection of the extra parliamentary groups (Mare and Hamilton, 1987: 64).

#### 4.9 CONCLUSION

One of the principal problems with most definitions is the assumption that group members have common goals and purposes. There are many examples of groups devoid of common goals or purposes according to Hersey (1996: 362): "It is important, therefore, that this aggressive behaviour to a large uncontrollable crowd, had to be addressed by making one influential person see these conflict issues in a correct perspective, in this case Chief Buthelezi". According to Reece and Brandt (1996: 349) "Those who use this strategy listen to all points of view, define the basic issues, and create an atmosphere of trust among all involved. Everyone must believe that the problem will be settled on the merits of the case rather than through political or personal influence". The battle in this instance concerns one constituency (the Zulus) that is the Zulu as a nation and Inkatha's Zulu. As a result the King is cherished by all Zulu subjects but Buthelezi is also adored by Zulu Inkatha members who formed the majority of the Inkatha membership. Hence the formation and expression of Zulu identity came about through political means. Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha were losing parties as it had become clear that the KwaZulu bantustan was not a home for ethnic Zulus who strongly belong to Inkatha but a home for all Natal

citizens who are affiliated to different political groups. The creation of structures by the State and Inkatha's participation therein, served to promote the perception of collaboration with the apartheid system. There were deliberate advantages which each party sought to obtain through their participation. The creation of a body such as the KwaZulu Natal Joint Executive Authority places an obligation on the State to make additional finance available for developmental projects in Black areas in exchange for Inkatha's participation and legitimation of this structure. The negative implications of this for Inkatha was that it focuses any Black dissatisfaction with the lack of services and development on Inkatha rather than on the State. Research has clearly shown that there was a breakdown in the relationship between the two parties between 1990 and 1993. The State did not meet at the bargaining table with all liberation movements especially the ANC who posed a major threat to Inkatha's comfort (Hersey, 1996: 370).

The political advantages which Inkatha sought to obtain from the Indaba proposals allowed its leadership to mobilise its supporters into recruitment drives which facilitated the wide-spread violence which swept over Natal approximately fifteen years ago. UWUSA was formed in an attempt to put down the membership of COSATU. This happened but unfortunately for Inkatha it was on a limited scale only. The relationship between Inkatha and the UDF was likely to remain tense yet cordial in that both constituted a substantial threat to the structure and power base of the other. The establishment of information offices in both the United States and Western Europe together with Buthelezi's foreign tours, increased the possibility of Inkatha's utilisation of its communicative powerbase.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the writer will discuss the conflict in KwaZulu Natal which resulted from the power struggle. The general pattern of conflict and the main incidents from 1990 to 1993 will be discussed in order to provide a broad understanding of this power struggle. The period was crucial to the survival of KwaZulu Natal and its struggle to transform itself. The mapping approach will be used in the presentation of this case. It is important to explain the mapping approach and why the researcher chose it. The mapping approach steps will be divided into paragraphs that contain corresponding factual information gathered theoretically by empirical means.

#### 5.1 THE POWER STRUGGLE IN KWAZULU NATAL

From 1990 to 1993 a power struggle was evident in KwaZulu Natal which resulted in conflict. In presenting this chapter the mapping approach was chosen as it is the first step in intervening to manage a particular conflict. Mapping has many advantages. The paragraphs will discuss the mapping approach, conflict history, context, parties and issues as variables of mapping.

#### 5.2 WHAT IS MAPPING?

Mapping is the first step in intervening to manage a particular conflict. It gives both the intervenor and the conflict parties a clearer understanding of the origins, nature, dynamics and possibilities for resolution of the conflict. Mapping serves as a framework for conflict analysis. Mapping permits an informed judgement about whether the intervention should continue. The map is also helpful in assisting

conflict parties to move back from and make sense out of a process to which they are too close. The map helps demystify the process of conflict that, for so many people, seems a confusing, unfathomable, inexplicable and thoroughly frustrating phenomenon (Wehr, 1979: 19-22).

The researcher deems it necessary and important to point out some limitations. According to Wehr (1979: 19), "Because a conflict is a social process and is continually changing, any map of it will be valid for only a certain period of time and must be periodically updated." The researcher suggests that to counter that limitation, one has to fast track the mapping and it has to be updated from time to time.

The writer has made use of a mapping approach since it has many advantages. "Scholars of conflict have stressed the need for a map of the conflict which will give a clear understanding of the origins, nature, dynamics and the possibilities for the resolution of the conflict " (Moore,1986: 26 and Wehr,1979: 18). One needs a map as a framework for intervening to manage a particular conflict. The mapping process notes resources for limiting and perhaps resolving the conflict, albeit in a preliminary way.

Mapping has organised variables namely, conflict history, context and parties plus issues. The conflict map is most useful (and quite essential) as the initial step in conflict intervention. Mapping permits an informed judgement about whether the intervention should continue. The map is also helpful in assisting conflict parties to move back from and make sense out of a process to which they are too close. If the

mapper decides to further intervene, sharing the map can loosen up the conflict, making it easier to resolve. Finally the map helps demystify the process of conflict that, for so many people, seems a confusing, unfathomable, inexplicable and thoroughly frustrating phenomenon" (Wehr, 1979: 20-21).

### 5.3 MAPPING VARIABLES

The conflict described in the KwaZulu Natal power struggle is broad and general in its scope, so the map which involves the following variables will guide the discussions. The contents will be treated under the mapping variables, hence the headings are ;

- 5.3.1 Conflict History - which will explore the context of the origins and major events in conflict evolution
- 5.2.2 Conflict Context - this will describe the character of the setting within which the conflict takes place by identifying the cause of conflict and the stage it has reached
- 5.2.3 Conflict Parties - The parties involved in the KwaZulu Natal power struggle will be identified including their roles and characteristics. Their values, beliefs, motivations, and the nature of the relations between them will be described.
- 5.2.4 Issues - Various issues both overt and covert arise in the course of the conflict and this will be identified and grouped according to the primary generating factors that are facts-based (What is), value-based (What should be), interest-based (who will get what) and non-realistic. A solution outcome will be provided as a possibility (Wehr, 1979: 19).



### 5.3.1 Conflict History

KwaZulu Natal was undergoing a transitional process and with this came the breaking down of the old mechanisms and structures of social life and the establishment of new ones. Conflict had increased and there was a whole range of economic, political and social problems facing the province. The writer proposes that the main reason for this was the competition of different groups for scarce resources. In times of uncertainty, people may not know how to behave and this may lead to the testing of new boundaries and undesirable behaviour. A period of transition provided the opportunities for a distribution of resources and power struggles became intense and conflicts flared up rapidly between the IFP and the ANC. Thus behaviour is not only the consequence but also the cause of conflict. Previous patterns of interaction were no longer acceptable, traditional methods of exercising authority were rejected and people were unwilling to relate in a subservient way (Anstey, 1999: 96).

### 5.3.2 The Conflict Context

The causes of the KwaZulu Natal conflict were many and varied. Conflict causes may generally be classified into groupings such as scarce resources, differing goals and desires for autonomy, power, authority, imbalances, ambiguity and interdependence. The KwaZulu Natal political conflict from 1990 to 1993 had multiple causes which were obscured and clouded by the dynamics of the interaction.

"Conflicts are rarely uni-dimensional but are based on many different causes simultaneously. The dimensions of the Kwazulu Natal conflict under apartheid were complex and included: racial domination, ethnicity, ideological beliefs, class

stratification, inequitable wealth distribution, authoritarian rule by Buthelezi and subversive "third forces" who were trying to destabilise the peace processes. The most obvious source of conflict is the differing goals of the parties especially when the relationship is characterised by interdependence and scarce resources. The parties cannot achieve their goals without co-operation and neither party can afford to destroy the relationship. Conflicts can also arise over procedures as parties perceive their power or needs being limited by the demands of others" (Anstey, 1993: 28).

The conflict cube used at the University of Port Elizabeth proposes that conflict has up to six different bases, namely, interests, values, structural conflicts, data conflicts, relationships and needs. These different bases of conflict as sources were applicable to the KwaZulu Natal political conflict from 1990 to 1993. These are discussed below:

Interest-based conflicts Much conflict is based on the fact that most of the material requirements of human beings are in great demand and in limited supply world-wide. People are in constant competition over scarce resources such as money, land, jobs and powerful positions. Cloete (1994: 32) says that "South Africa is experiencing conflict among various competing interest groups in the country about increasing their respective share of scarce resources such as wealth, power, status and dignity". In the KwaZulu Natal conflict, the competing interest groups were the IFP and the ANC with their alliances. Interest conflicts were caused by actual or perceived competition over substantive procedural or psychological interests.

Value-based conflicts These conflicts have their origins in the fact that different people hold different values. Value-based conflicts were evidenced between Zulus and Xhosas and Burton (1990: 37) says "values are those ideas, habits, customs and beliefs that are characteristic of particular social groupings. They are linguistic, religious, class, ethnic or other features that lead to separate culture and identity groups". Values were at the centre of the clashes between Zulus and Xhosas in the Republic of South Africa just the same as the clashes between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland.

Structural Conflict was caused by the unequal control, ownership or distribution of wealth, power or authority. In KwaZulu Natal fifteen years of apartheid resulted in enormous imbalances in the distribution of wealth in society, unequal access to education, business, health and welfare and the removal of political rights such as freedom of movement, association and expression and access to justice. Inkatha bore the brunt of the apartheid critics because it connived with the South African government. Change and renewal are key concepts within the economic and socio-political realities facing South Africa today and organisations will have to adapt to function in turbulent environments. Cultural diversity and organisational transformation holds great potential for conflict and means that organisations can no longer be managed through autocratic and rigid control. Buthelezi should be reminded that power can no longer be centralised at the top and participatory structures must be created within which individuals can win the right to participate on the basis of individual responsibility and accountability (Verwey, 1994: 481-485).

Data-based Conflict resulted because of misperception and miscommunication. The South African government had controlled the media and the flow of information in many KwaZulu Natal areas in order to suppress the opposition press and to maintain their power. For the political parties, the possession of specialised knowledge and skills is a source of power and people will jealously guard their knowledge in order to maintain their power base. Participation and commitment depend on information sharing and thus individual empowerment can only take place through information sharing. Lack of shared, legitimated information gives rise to power struggles and mistrust and suspicion amongst colleagues/comrades. When there is mistrust, people do not understand their colleagues/comrades' position and they misinterpret and misread others circumstances and power realities. Speculation and rumour was rife and because the conflict parties did not have a common data base, conflicts revolved around positions and principles based on guesswork (Anstey,1991: 99).

Needs-based conflict resulted from the denial and frustration of fundamental human needs. All human beings have universal and ontological needs that must be fulfilled for them to grow and develop and for societies to function harmoniously. The needs were universal and individuals strove to satisfy these needs. Individuals entered into relationships to form identity groups such as communities to enhance their prospects of securing the resources necessary for the gratification of their needs.

In KwaZulu-Natal, some communities of the ex KwaZulu Government have been denied the most basic human needs of housing, education, work and health care, and have been dispossessed of their land, rights and security. This has resulted in much deep-rooted conflict and according to Burton (1990: 15) "the power of human needs

is such that individuals will strive to satisfy these needs, even at the cost of personal disorientation and disruption". Individuals whose needs were not met by the dominant values of society, engaged in deviant behaviour to fulfil these needs.

### 5.3,3 Where is the conflict now?

The fact that various peace efforts have failed to secure an end to the political violence can be attributed to the fact that the terms of agreement do not satisfy the human needs of the various parties and individuals to the conflict. According to Tessendorf (1990: 25) "Although efforts to secure a resolution can only yield success at the grass roots level of the conflict, the whole nature of the economy and the political system has to be analysed and purposefully changed if there is to be any hope of resolving, if not the conflict, then at least its violent manifestations." A certain amount of political tolerance has been observed among the political parties (Tessendorf,1990: 68)

When addressing this conflict mapping, it is important to point out that it resulted in the creation of negative feelings of anger, frustration and dissatisfaction among the younger population and these negative feelings were directed against the existing social structures. The outbreak of political violence indicates that the youth desire greater participation in decision making processes and a sense of distributive and redistributive justice which will allow each individual a greater perception of recognition, security and a feeling of control over his/her life. An example of this is the demand made by some learners for greater participation in school activities (De Haas and Zulu, 1993: 79).

According to the respondents to the interviews conducted in 2000, over ninety percent believe that the conflict is predominantly between Inkatha and the ANC and its allies. This belief is supported by Tessenorf (1990: 3) when he states: "... the violence is the manifestation of a power struggle between Inkatha, on the one hand, and the UDF, ANC and COSATU on the other". The problem that caused the power struggle was political, control of areas, political affiliation, etc. The rivalry and bitterness preceding the 1994 elections have not disappeared but it is worth mentioning that the power struggle has been curtailed. Political violence and conflict has become a verbal one in the provincial and national parliaments since 1994 (Salloojee, 1990: 201). Reese and Brandt (1996: 18) state: "But there are vestiges of violence much later than this."

#### 5.3.4 Conflict Parties

The factors leading to the KwaZulu Natal political conflict lie within the composition of society itself. "Societal tensions generate conflict between and within various social strata and groups with the result that each conflict assumes particular characteristics in the form of the actors, processes and triggers." (Tessenorf, 1990: 26). The main contenders in the Natal power struggle include Inkatha and the ANC and its allies (United Democratic Front, Congress of South African Trade Unions, etc.). Their contending roles are discussed below.

#### The African National Congress versus the Inkatha Freedom Party

According to Tessenorf (1990: 10) "... The leading role in the struggle against Apartheid is accorded to the ANC, given its historical role as dominant Black

opposition party post 1910, This role, ... it is (the) "mother" of offshoot organisations such as the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and Inkatha." While the ANC was banned, Inkatha evolved as a new Black political grouping. From 1990 to 1993 conflict took another direction when talks about the unbanning the then banned political organisations got under way. Their contending roles are fully explored under paragraph 5.2.5, hence the reference to it.

#### 5.3.5 Issues.

Various issues both overt and covert arose in the period 1990 to 1993. These issues are discussed in context in the ensuing sub-headings:

##### 5.3.5(a) Overt Issues

According to Tessenorf (1990: 3) "...Inkatha is portrayed as an extension of the state owing to its involvement in Bantustan structures and through the participation of some of its members in attacks on members of the UDF and COSATU". Words like warlords, violence, impis (warriors). Etc.. were often used in the 1990s. Tessenorf continues: "The roots of the power struggle between Inkatha and the ANC, UDF and COSATU lie in the perceived need by past African Nationalists to build a united front, to oppose the divide-and-rule tactics of a minority regime." (1990: 10). The strategies and tactics used by parties caused the conflict, for example, the author believes that Inkatha never believed in an armed struggle whilst the ANC and its alliances fully believed in an armed struggle. Another issue is that Inkatha and the UDF were competing for the allegiance of the general population in anticipation of some post-apartheid settlement. The relationship between workers in COSATU and youth organisations was perceived as another area of tension. Inkatha relied on

traditional social structures, (Chiefs, councillors, warriors, warlords and MPs) in its mobilisation drive which caused social tension to arise in its own structures. Lack of trust was evidenced within the structures. This reliance meant that Inkatha was linked to the unpopular Bantustan system.

#### 5.3.5(b) Covert Issues

According to Soul (2001: 5), "Moreover, ongoing attempts by the South African military and police both to strengthen the hand of Chief Buthelezi and his conservative (IFP) party in the jockeying for political positioning that occurred and to actively undermine, in this and other ways, both directly and indirectly, the capacity of the ANC to emerge as a hegemonic force in a new South Africa." This clearly indicates the role played by the South African government in structured violence, which resulted in much criticism being levelled against its apparent bias. Structured violence by the regime was used to such an extent that it was referred to as a "Third Force". It produced and heightened the tensions between the parties and intervened in such a way as to discredit the actions and behaviour of the parties towards each other. Inkatha held sway in the KwaZulu Homeland which was part of Natal and to which the ANC and its allies were opposed. The conflict was seen to exist between 'progressive democracy' and 'conservative tribalism'. The generational tensions within the UDF have arisen out of the decentralised nature of its structures. The UDF was faced with attacks on its office bearers and members together with state harassment as its members were detained time and time again (Soul, 2001: 5).



#### 5.4. CONCLUSION

The power struggle between Inkatha and the UDF reflected elite insecurities while intra community and generational conflicts indicate the negative attitude in the distribution of resources, hence human needs were not satisfied. The UDF created a problem with the youth when in order to secure the support of the youth it provided them with a change for initiative and participation in decision making structures and allowed the youth to establish structures which promote a feeling of distributive justice. The tensions inherent within the organisations to the conflict is seen as one of the major causes of the power struggle in KwaZulu Natal. Inkatha maintained links with a wide range of organisations representing a cross section of the South African population. "These relationships stretched from the ANC to the state ranging in nature from violent hostility to pragmatism and co-operation." (Tessendorf and Boulton, 1991: 94). Therefore Inkatha became deeply involved in the KwaZulu Natal power struggle due to its relationship with other organisations including the state. Political violence became a way of life in KwaZulu Natal during the 1990s where killings, bomb blasts and police shootings were experienced. According to Sikhakhane (1988: 61) "There have been battles between affiliates of AZAPO, the UDF and COSATU and UWUSA which is linked to Inkatha" (Sikhakhane, 1988). In organisations undergoing transformation, the potential for conflict is great. Even in stable conditions, there are chances for the development of conflict among colleagues/comrades because their activities and aspirations are so intimately linked.

Destructive conflict had been experienced in KwaZulu-Natal. This destructive conflict had escalated and expanded resulting in mutual attacks, misperceptions, misjudgement and violence. As a result no impetus for creativity and innovation were

given. No human relationships were promoted but it fostered miscommunication, misunderstanding, mistrust and insensitivity. As Deutsch (1987: 40) wrote, "... it is not the conflict *per se* that should be regarded as functional or dysfunctional but the way it is handled by the parties". A dysfunctional conflict was experienced in KwaZulu Natal from 1990 to 1993. This leads the author to conclude that conflict is a natural process common to all societies with predictable dynamics and amenable to constructive regulation.

## CHAPTER SIX

### CONCLUSION

This treatise has attempted to demonstrate the effects and the role played by Inkatha between 1990 to 1993 (before the first democratic elections in South Africa were held on 27 April 1994). Natal (KZN) has without a doubt come a very long way in the past few years. One hopes to see further changes especially within Inkatha and the KwaZulu Natal province. Inkatha's influence has extended beyond the borders of KwaZulu Natal to national and international levels. The relationship between extra-Parliamentary groups and Inkatha has been influenced by contradictory claims on both sides as to who has represented the Zulus.

Inkatha has succeeded in building relationships with specific interest groups within the white community while enjoying a partially symbiotic relationship with Pretoria. This paper has tried to focus on Inkatha's relationships which have impacted with far reaching results on KwaZulu Natal province namely in the area of conflict and violence.

The power struggle between Inkatha and the UDF reflect significant insecurities while intra-community and generational conflicts/violence indicated the negative effects of structural imbalances on the attempts of individuals within Inkatha to satisfy their human needs. It is clear that the factors leading to the conflict lie within the societal composition. Efforts were made to resolve the conflict at grass roots level but indications are that the whole nature of the economy and the political system need to be changed in order to resolve the conflict and its violent manifestations. The links between Inkatha and the Zulu Royal family members has taken a metamorphic but

stable step forward. Many members of the royal family have "crossed the floor" from Inkatha to the ANC, an example being the late Senior Zulu Prince Mwayizeni Zulu who is a blood cousin of the Inkatha leader, Chief Buthelezi. It is the author's respective opinion that this move contributed greatly to an escalation of the political violence in KwaZulu Natal in the early 1990s.

This treatise has tried to demonstrate that if at any stage, conflict is not managed well or is mismanaged, conflict spirals develop. Finally conflict escalation and violence occurs. The literature review consisting of document analysis was successfully completed. This was augmented by an empirical research for which structured interviews were undertaken. The research had positive feedback from the respondents to the interviews. The conflict in KwaZulu Natal between 1990 and 1993 was perceived as dysfunctional as it was totally mismanaged.

Inkatha's policy of ethnicity proved to be successful even though it had violent consequences. The ethnic mobilisation by Inkatha caused conflict escalation between 1990 and 1993. The tension between Buthelezi's Inkatha and King Zwelithini and his family had a negative impact on the Zulu nation. The Zulu nation was split into two constituencies one belonging to King Zwelithini and the other to Chief Buthelezi. This conflictual situation needed to be regulated to reduce the political violence in KwaZulu Natal. Peaceful co-existence was not possible in KwaZulu Natal between 1990 and 1993. Inkatha's influence on the conflictual behaviour of society in the area had far-reaching consequences.

The Zulu king, Zwelithini was Inkatha's most important cultural figure and yet it was Inkatha itself that maintained the culture and ethnicity. This resulted in conflict and violence. The King initially supported the notion of ethnic mobilisation but when the ANC started mobilising in the period 1990 to 1993, the king rejected the Zulu mobilisation. Once again this resulted in conflict and violence. The stigma attached to Chief Buthelezi and his Inkatha movement resulting from their involvement in the KwaZulu Bantustan structures with their access to its military and financial resources was viewed negatively and was seen as proof of their close association with the political machinery of the minority regime.

On the positive side, Chief Buthelezi has restored the pride and national consciousness of the Zulu nation. His speeches encouraging national pride were appreciated by the Zulu people. On the negative side, women were excluded from occupying positions of importance and were regarded merely as homemakers, thus the underdevelopment of women as national leaders. Conflict is viewed as inevitable in human interaction and this is evident in Inkatha's relations and interactions with groups in and outside South Africa.

The mapping of the conflict provided new and useful information. This information could be useful in finding ways of ending the conflict in KwaZulu Natal. The ANC was attempting to destroy Inkatha's structures and this resulted in a power struggle which quickly turned to conflict and violence. The intolerant behaviour of the ANC and Inkatha was at the root of the conflict. For instance the Amakhosi who were part of Inkatha's structure refused to allow the ANC to mobilise in their territories and this

further fuelled the violence. Inkatha members were instructed not to vote and this further heightened the tension and conflict.

The mapping approach proved ideal as a means of dealing with the issues surrounding the power struggle in KwaZulu Natal. The mapping variables proved extremely useful in discussions on the power struggle in the area. The mapping variables used were conflict history, conflict parties and issues. KwaZulu Natal underwent a transitional process and this brought about the break down of the old mechanisms and structures of social life and new methods had been established. This was a major cause of the conflict.

The conflict causes were classified and grouped according to scarce resources, differing goals and the desire for autonomy and power, ambiguity and interdependence. These groupings were discussed under the heading of "context". The conflict cube was examined. The six bases of the cube were used as headings for the causes of conflict in KwaZulu Natal.

The various peace efforts undertaken have clearly not secured the end to the KwaZulu Natal power struggle. The mapping approach clearly indicated the negative feelings of anger, frustration and dissatisfaction that were experienced by the people in the social structures of the region. The overt and covert issues were many and varied.

In societies undergoing transformation, the potential for conflict is great. This was manifest in KwaZulu Natal in the years between 1990 and 1993. There was much bloodshed particularly between the ANC and Inkatha as the transformation

progressed. Political violence became a way of life in the region. Inkatha was deeply involved in the power struggle because of its relationships with the other organisations, the Royal family, South African government and Black communities. This was the period of the ANC marches which resembled those of Gandhi during the defiance campaign. Even in stable conditions, there is a chance that conflict will develop among the roleplayers as their activities and aspirations are so intimately linked.

Destructive conflict has been experienced in KwaZulu Natal. This destructive conflict has escalated and expanded resulting in mutual attacks, misperceptions, misjudgement and violence. This fostered miscommunication, misunderstanding, mistrust and insensitivity. Human relationships had no chance of developing. The KwaZulu Natal power struggle is proof that conflict is dysfunctional. The conflict in the region was badly mismanaged and hence escalated. Surely, conflict is a natural process common to all societies with predictable dynamics and yet open to constructive regulation.

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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

(Indicate your answers by means of a tick (I) in the appropriate box)

SECTION A

1, Respondents particulars:

Years	20-25	26-30	31-45	46-50	51-55	56-60	61-
Tick							

**1.2 Sex**

Male	Female
Tick	

.....											
Academic/ Standard	8	9	10	Course I	Course II	Course III	Honours	B. Ed	U. Ed	Masters	Doctor
Tick											

	100%	±60%	-30%
Tick			

SECTION B

RESPONDENT : \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

POSITION/OCCUPATION: \_\_\_\_\_

AGE:

APOLITICAL : YES OR NO \_\_\_\_\_

*NB: This is for the period 1985 to 1994:*

1. Briefly give your opinion about the relationship between Inkatha and the South African government during the abovementioned period:

1.1 \_\_\_\_\_

1.2 \_\_\_\_\_

1.3 \_\_\_\_\_

1.4 \_\_\_\_\_

1.5 \_\_\_\_\_

1.6 \_\_\_\_\_

1.7 \_\_\_\_\_

1.8 \_\_\_\_\_

1.9 \_\_\_\_\_

1.10 \_\_\_\_\_

1.11

1.12

2. How did the other organisations (ANC and its Alliances) view Inkatha's relations with the state (RSA)?

**2.1** \_\_\_\_\_

**2,2** \_\_\_\_\_

**2.3** \_\_\_\_\_

2.4 \_\_\_\_\_

2.5 \_\_\_\_\_

2.6 \_\_\_\_\_

2.7 \_\_\_\_\_

2,8 \_\_\_\_\_

2,9 \_\_\_\_\_

2.10 \_\_\_\_\_

2.11 \_\_\_\_\_

2,12 \_\_\_\_\_

3. Why do you deem it important to maintain good relations between Inkatha and the Zulu Royal Family or between Inkosi Buthelezi and Ingonyama Zwelithini (Zulu King)?

3.1 \_\_\_\_\_

3.2  \_\_\_\_\_

3.3  \_\_\_\_\_

3.4 \_\_\_\_\_

3.5 \_\_\_\_\_

3.6 \_\_\_\_\_

3.7 \_\_\_\_\_

3.8 \_\_\_\_\_

3.9 \_\_\_\_\_

3.10 \_\_\_\_\_

3.11 \_\_\_\_\_

3.12

4. Inkatha is the Zulu Nation? Yes or no, give reasons for your answer.

4.1 \_\_\_\_\_

4,2 \_\_\_\_\_

4.3 \_\_\_\_\_

4.4 \_\_\_\_\_

**4.5** \_\_\_\_\_

**4.6** \_\_\_\_\_

**4.7** \_\_\_\_\_

4.8 \_\_\_\_\_

4.9 \_\_\_\_\_

**4.10** \_\_\_\_\_

**4.11** \_\_\_\_\_

**4.12** \_\_\_\_\_

S.SaY something about Inkatha's politics of ethnicity.

5.1 \_\_\_\_\_

5.2 \_\_\_\_\_

5.3 \_\_\_\_\_

**5.4** \_\_\_\_\_

**5.5** \_\_\_\_\_

**5.6** \_\_\_\_\_

5.7

5.8

5.9

5.10

5.11

5.12 \_\_\_\_\_

6. The power struggle in Natal (KZN) has taken many lives. Who were the conflicting parties? And where is the conflict now?

6.1 \_\_\_\_\_

6.2 \_\_\_\_\_

6.3 \_\_\_\_\_

6.4 \_\_\_\_\_

6.5 \_\_\_\_\_

6.6 \_\_\_\_\_

6.7 \_\_\_\_\_

6.8 \_\_\_\_\_

6.9 \_\_\_\_\_

6.10 \_\_\_\_\_



6.11 \_\_\_\_\_

6.12 \_\_\_\_\_

7. What conflicts/problems do you see in the mobilising of the past by Inkatha?

7.1 \_\_\_\_\_

7.2 \_\_\_\_\_

7.3 \_\_\_\_\_

7.4 \_\_\_\_\_

7.5 \_\_\_\_\_

7.6 \_\_\_\_\_

7.7 \_\_\_\_\_

7.8 \_\_\_\_\_

7.9 \_\_\_\_\_

7.10 \_\_\_\_\_

7.11 \_\_\_\_\_

7.12 \_\_\_\_\_

8. What was Inkatha's status like at International level?

8.1 \_\_\_\_\_

**8.2** \_\_\_\_\_

**8.3** \_\_\_\_\_

**8.4** \_\_\_\_\_

**8.5** \_\_\_\_\_

8.6 \_\_\_\_\_

**8.7** \_\_\_\_\_

**8.8** \_\_\_\_\_

**8.9** \_\_\_\_\_

**8.10** \_\_\_\_\_

**8.11** \_\_\_\_\_

**8.12** \_\_\_\_\_

9. How do you view the formation and leadership of Inkatha?

9.1  \_\_\_\_\_

9.2 \_\_\_\_\_

9.3 \_\_\_\_\_

9.4 \_\_\_\_\_

9.5 \_\_\_\_\_

9.6  \_\_\_\_\_

9.7  \_\_\_\_\_

9.8 \_\_\_\_\_

9.9 \_\_\_\_\_

9.10 \_\_\_\_\_

9.11 \_\_\_\_\_

9.12 \_\_\_\_\_

10. Did the anti-disinvestment campaign by Chief Buthelezi fuel the poor relations between Inkatha and the ANC and its Alliances? Yes or no. Please give reasons for your answer.

10.1 \_\_\_\_\_

10.2 \_\_\_\_\_

10.3 \_\_\_\_\_

10.4 \_\_\_\_\_

10.5 \_\_\_\_\_

10.6  \_\_\_\_\_

10.7 \_\_\_\_\_

10.8 \_\_\_\_\_

**10.9** \_\_\_\_\_

**10.10** \_\_\_\_\_

**10.11** \_\_\_\_\_

**10.12** \_\_\_\_\_