

of independent African states, John Dugard's observation that the National Party government 'resorted to international-law fictions as a substitute for constitutional-law solutions' seems especially apt.)

An edited interview between Nthato Motlana and John Barratt is included and where the merits of 'one man, one vote, one value' are considered. While the inclusion of this interview is, of course, necessary, one questions the validity of the inclusion of Motlana's Buthelezi-bashing which seems inappropriate in a book of this nature.

Gavin Maasdorp's 'Forms of Partition' is a scholarly and impressive paper dealing with what is often regarded as a 'last resort' or 'extreme solution' to the problems facing South Africa. But the problem with partition is that it tends, more often than not, to externalize conflict. As Hedley Bull, in his paper on South Africa's relations with the West points out, partition 'often leaves a legacy of bitter international conflict'. (India and Palestine are obvious examples). Maasdorp's view that partition need not necessarily be followed by a hostile political climate 'provided that it were negotiated prior to armed conflict' is indeed comforting, but it is difficult to conceive of partition without the prior conflict given the rival claims of Afrikaner and black nationalisms.

Arend Lijphart's learned paper on federation and consociation draws heavily on comparative material and provides useful theoretical frameworks for the policies of the various

white political parties. However, the absence of a meaningful inclusion and understanding of black political aspirations may lead one to question the relevance of these concepts for both the short and long term future of South Africa.

While all the contributors agree that South Africa is an example of a plural society, the nature of this pluralism differs. For example, whereas Robert Rotberg views the South African problem in terms of colonialism, Percy Oboza, on the other hand, points out that 'we are not here dealing with the usual colonial problem'.

More puzzling though, is the virtual neglect of economic issues in understanding the nature and causes of conflict in South Africa. Any solution, constitutional or otherwise, to the problems facing South Africa must of necessity consider these. Thus, Walter Dean Burham's submission that Apartheid is based on 'the famous laager mentality among Afrikaners', while no doubt providing a convenient scapegoat theory, simply ignores the relationship between white-owned capital and black exploitation which is, some would argue, what Apartheid is ultimately all about.

Perhaps the resolution of such issues is impossible within a constitutional framework which regards race or ethnicity as the cause of conflict. Nevertheless, until these issues are resolved, the future prospects for South Africa may well appear to be characterized by conflict rather than compromise. □

# FROM CATO MANOR TO KWA MASHU

— class formation and political opposition in KwaMashu township, 1958 — 1980.

By A. Manson

**Note** This article is partially based on oral evidence collected by myself and Ms. D. Collins while employed by the Killie Campbell Africana Library, Durban. The material is housed in the Killie Campbell Audio-Visual archive (KCAV).

Those concerned with the schools boycott of 1980 in South Africa and in Natal particularly will have noted that the boycott received strong support from the students and parents of KwaMashu, a large township of over 300 000 people to the north of Durban. The stayaway in KwaMashu began on the 29 April and continued intermittently to the middle of July.<sup>1</sup> Two particular features of the boycott were, firstly, that it was totally opposed by the KwaZulu government which increasingly assumed the state's role in suppressing the strike, and secondly that the boycott was not adopted by any of the African townships around Durban or Pietermaritzburg despite attempts by students in KwaMashu to elicit support from fellow students in these areas. Despite the vigour of official attacks on the boycotting students and the violent reaction it evoked among many Inkatha supporters the students were not intimidated by Inkatha's opposition and have continually rejected any assistance from Inkatha officials in solving the continuing education crisis.<sup>2</sup>

In order to explain the extent of the opposition posed by the people of KwaMashu in this period it is important to trace the origins of the township and to sketch the social, political and economic environment, that, it will be argued, created the particular conditions for political resistance there. A second aim will be to examine the class structure of KwaMashu, an important factor when considering political response and activity in the township. As will become apparent the Cato Manor removals and the re-settlement of its inhabitants at KwaMashu is a Key factor in both these processes.

## Section A.

The *raison d'être*, planning and construction of KwaMashu is a fascinating story in itself. However, it is only possible here to give the bare outlines. During the 1930's the African population of greater Durban was mainly housed in the Lamont location, created and controlled by the Durban City Council (DCC). In the early 1940's the war-stimulated industries of the city attracted thousands of African labourers to Durban and its African population grew from about 43 000 to 109 000 between 1935 and 1947.<sup>3</sup>

It was then impossible to accommodate this population

at Lamont or in the city and the DCC turned to the next most obvious source of land for African housing – the Umlazi Mission Reserve to the South of Durban. This site was convenient because it was near to Durban's industrial centre and was topographically reasonably well suited to urbanisation. In 1942 the DCC did manage to acquire 200 acres of the Umlazi Glebe for urbanisation but the Government refused permission for further land purchase on the grounds that the Natal Native Trust was the sole Trustee of mission Reserves.<sup>4</sup>

In 1947 the Council appointed its own one-man Judicial Commission to investigate the possibilities for housing Africans in the greater Durban area. Not surprisingly the Commissioner (Justice Broome) urged the development of Umlazi Reserve to Durban's south and suggested the possibility of limited urbanisation to the north of the city on the farms 'Richmond' and 'Zeekoe vallei'.<sup>5</sup> Broome was able to furnish legal reasons why the Africans at Umlazi did not have automatic freehold rights in the Reserve.<sup>6</sup>

Despite Broome's findings the newly elected Nationalist Government refused to sanction the idea of further land purchase in Umlazi, though it was later to use Broome's arguments to support its own actions in urbanising the Umlazi Reserve. The Government was more enthusiastic about the recommendation that land to the north of Durban be bought for African housing.<sup>7</sup>

From the Council's point of view the problem of finding accommodation for the Black population at the end of the 1940's had been aggravated by two factors. The first of these was the growth of a large squatter community of over 30 000 people at Cato Manor, a district within the Durban municipal area and only 4 kilometers from the centre of the city, and the subsequent conflict there between Indians and Africans in 1948–49, the most sustained rioting ever experienced in South Africa up to that date. The second factor was that the Nationalist Government repudiated the findings of the 1946–48 Fagan Commission which recognised Africans as permanent dwellers in urban areas, and reaffirmed the recommendation of the Stallard Commission that Africans were to be temporary sojourners in white towns.<sup>8</sup>

As the black population of Durban continued to grow in the 1950's so the Council came increasingly under pressure from the white inhabitants of Durban who wished, for reasons of security, to clear Durban of its slum areas and from the Nationalist Government which, by the Group Areas Act of 1950, was forcing local authorities to segregate urban areas. The result was that the DCC. was now compelled to take action in regard to the housing of the African population of the city.

Temporarily to ease the situation at Cato Manor an Emergency Camp was set up in 1952 on a site and service basis. The Council then turned to a longer-term measure. Under the circumstances it had no choice but to purchase land to the north, at 'Richmond' and 'Zeekoe vallei', despite the fact that initial investigation revealed it to be too steep for close settlement and that the area was subject to flooding.<sup>9</sup> True to the tendency for locations in South Africa to be established in the vicinity of rubbish depots or sewage farms, the proposed land for the new location was close to the rubbish depot near the Umgeni river.<sup>10</sup>

There then followed a period of prolonged negotiation and planning for the purchase of the land and the building of the township. The DCC had to submit its plans to the central government for approval. For its part the government was determined to pursue its ideological aim of segregation in

urban areas and plans were frequently rejected because they did not meet the strict requirements of the Group Areas Act. The DCC not only had to ensure that 10 000 Indians were removed from the Duff's Road village which fell within the boundaries of the new township but it also had to place buffer zones between African and Indian neighbourhoods and ensure that there were no connecting roads between them.<sup>11</sup>

In addition the Natal Estates Ltd, the owners of the land, were determined to drive a hard bargain on the sale, and offers and counteroffers were made on three occasions, the government rejecting the final agreement of sale between the Council and Natal Estates and thus necessitating a fourth round of negotiations.<sup>12</sup> Natal Estates also attempted to get the Council to agree to contributing towards the cost of maintaining firebreaks and erecting a 6ft high barbed wire fence between the new township and their property.<sup>13</sup> Finally in June 1956, over five years after the decision had been taken to re-locate Durban's African population to the north of the city, a final agreement of sale was approved by all parties. A price of £350 000 was paid for the land.<sup>14</sup>

In this condition of splendid isolation KwaMashu was born. Plans for the actual construction of the township were presented to the Cato Manor Native Advisory Board simply for approval. The Cato Manor residents were allowed to contribute nothing to policy or planning. Their removal was looked upon as an awkward administrative task and a party of Councillors made a special trip to the Transvaal to investigate how they had moved Africans there from Alexandra to Meadowlands and Daveyton.<sup>15</sup> Even the name KwaMashu was suggested in a competition held by the **Daily News** to find a suitable name for the township.<sup>16</sup> This name was opposed by the Native Advisory Boards in Durban who favoured the names Mahlatanyane (after A.W.G. Champion – Mahlali) or Mafukezela (after Dube – The veteran African politician).<sup>17</sup> A.W. Champion, in his capacity as Chairman of the Joint Locations Advisory Board, attacked the City Engineer's plan to build semi-detached houses in KwaMashu. He suggested that Africans be given sites "where they can build houses of their own choice, out of wood, iron and tile, or wattle and daub – the semi-detached houses are against our lifestyles".<sup>18</sup> Although S.Q. Bourquin, Manager of the Bantu Affairs Department,<sup>19</sup> supported Champion's views,<sup>20</sup> the City Engineer ostensibly for reasons of space and economy, persisted in his intention and Champion's recommendation was overlooked.<sup>21</sup> The first houses were built in September 1957 and in November the Council took the first steps towards organising the removal of Africans from Cato Manor. Thirty-six thousand circulars were distributed in Cato Manor extolling the virtues of home-ownership<sup>22</sup> and industries were contacted and asked if they would assist in the removal of their employees.<sup>23</sup> Bourquin reported soon after that there was a "hardening of resistance (to removals) in many quarters"<sup>24</sup> and the Chamber of Commerce and Durban Chamber of Industries, which maintained a close liaison with the Council over the removals, reported that "groups are exploiting the antagonistic feelings towards resettlement in Cato Manor."<sup>25</sup>

The ANC was the most active of these groups and was able to exploit the discernible defiant attitude of the Cato Manor residents in the wider political struggle which was growing in pace and intensity in the late 1950's.<sup>26</sup> More mention of this will be made shortly.

By the beginning of 1958, partly in response to local business interests, Bourquin recommended that sites be set aside for

professional offices, a market, shops, service stations, banks and building Societies, YMCA Halls and other social amenities. The extent of white entrepreneurial interest in the Township was reflected in the Town Clerk's request to the Group Areas Board in September 1958 to zone the land around the borders of KwaMashu for African occupation (as agreed in 1956) as these areas had become an "attractive investment not only to business men with an eye to participation in native trade but also to speculators."<sup>27</sup> In 1962 a railway line connecting KwaMashu with Durban was inaugurated. By 1970 it was carrying 44 102 workers daily for Durban's workforce.

In March 1958 the first removals took place from Cato Manor. By August 1958, the notorious **Raincoat** district had been cleared, but the removals were slowed down by groups (mainly traders) which took legal action to prevent the demolition of their shacks, and by individuals who simply re-erected their dwellings after demolition.<sup>28</sup> In June 1959, this passive opposition flared into open conflict and a period of sustained rioting broke out initiated by the illegal brewers of Cato Manor who saw in the demolition of the shanty-town the loss of their livelihood. The ANC was particularly successful in linking this discontent to the wider protest movement in Natal.<sup>29</sup> The period from 1957 to 1962 was characterised by risings in the rural areas of Zululand and Pondoland, a reaction to poverty and depreciation in those areas and the Government's attempts to control the influx of people from the countryside into the cities. The culmination of their resistance was the destruction of the dipping tanks in Zululand by women who were forced to maintain them without pay. It was this mood of defiance that the ANC was able to harness to draw attention to grievances in the urban districts of Natal. In 1960 further riots in Cato Manor took on a more pronounced political outlook after declaration of a state of emergency in the major magisterial districts of the country after the Sharpeville and Langa atrocities.<sup>30</sup>

From the end of 1960, the opposition to removals diminished. It seems that people moved more willingly because the attractions of Cato Manor — its relative freedom from police and administrative control — had lessened by the expansion of police activity during the state of emergency.<sup>31</sup> Furthermore with the Liquor Amendment Act of 1961, Africans over 18 were allowed liquor, and the Minister of Justice authorised local authorities to allow licenses for the sale of liquor in African townships.<sup>32</sup> Cato Manor thus began to lose some of its attraction as the 'watering-hole' of Durban. It seems that opposition was also defused by Bourquin's decision to remove, at first, only those who indicated willingness to move. However the high level of political awareness among Cato Manor residents was a legacy which was inherited by KwaMashu.

By February 1962 the population of KwaMashu had reached 40 000 people, the majority of whom had been removed from Cato Manor, although pockets of Africans were removed from other city locations (particularly Baumanville) to KwaMashu. Problems of administration concomitantly grew more complex and the Town Clerk as early as August 1962 approached the Department of Bantu Administration with a view to a government take-over of the township.<sup>33</sup> The Bantu Affairs Administration Act of 1971 finally provided for the establishment of boards to replace the departments of local authorities in the Republic. This legislation has been seen as an attempt by the central government to control more thoroughly

the lives of the black inhabitants of the country. While this is undoubtedly true the correspondence of the Durban Town Clerk's Department contains abundant evidence to suggest that the municipality was only too keen to relinquish the task of administering KwaMashu. In 1973 the Port Natal Bantu Affairs Administration Board took over control of KwaMashu.

The most important feature of control by the Bantu Affairs Administration Boards (BAAB) was that they were to be financially self-supporting. Consequently they relied on money from rentals for most of their income. As these were insufficient to cover costs of administration and maintenance of the townships, the Boards established a monopoly over the sale of beer and liquor, generally generating more than half their income from this source. The Port Natal BAAB also cracked down heavily on illegal hawkers and others engaged in informal sector activities to ensure further income from trading licenses. The fruit and vegetable vendors around KwaMashu complain bitterly of the harassment they received from the Board's officials. In 1977 the Port Natal BAAB handed KwaMashu over to KwaZulu and since then the township has been administered on a shoe-string budget by a locally elected council.

As brief as this description of the formation of KwaMashu has been, it has hopefully indicated the issues that concerned the state and its attitude towards the approximately 300 000 people who have settled in the township since its first formation.

## Section B

The clearance of Cato Manor and the re-settlement of its inhabitants at KwaMashu was a process of great upheaval for them. It appeared to many of the illegal traders, 'shebeen-queens' and shack landlords who freely operated at Cato Manor that they would lose their livelihood. For those people who were not entitled to be in an urban area it meant certain deportation out of Durban if they were discovered by the municipal authorities. The number of Africans who simply "disappeared" during the course of the removals, estimated at 20% of the population of Cato Manor (30 to 40 thousand people)<sup>34</sup> is an indication of the number of Africans resident at Cato Manor without rights to urban residence, though some of these people may have vanished in order to escape resettlement at KwaMashu specifically or for other reasons such as fear of arrest for criminal activities.<sup>35</sup>

For those who moved to KwaMashu it meant greatly increased travelling costs and inconvenience in terms of commuting to work, and increased costs in accommodation. These grievances were given frequent and vigorous airing by some of the former Cato Manor residents, by the ANC and in various sections of the press.<sup>36</sup>

Attention will now be given to the social, economic and political changes that occurred as a result of the formation of KwaMashu and the imposition of municipal, governmental and, finally, 'homeland' control of the township. Building primarily on oral sources it is hoped that the processes of change can be fleshed out from the bare facts of township life.<sup>37</sup>

Probably one of the most fundamental changes in the lives of most of the KwaMashu residents was that they were subject to a barrage of rules and regulations that controlled their everyday activities. Rents had to be regularly paid, permission had to be gained to purchase, build or rent a house, licenses had to be obtained for trading, and permits to run businesses. Bozzoli has observed the fact that

“townships are not **governed** — they are administered”.<sup>38</sup> In other words the administering body is **not** answerable to those it administers. Thus the residents found KwaMashu very different from the informal and unstructured existence of Cato Manor.

In addition the neighbourliness and familiarity of life in Cato Manor was replaced with alienation and unfriendliness. The networks of informal relationships that had developed in Cato Manor were virtually broken down overnight. For example the kind of intimacy that grew up through the custom of warning people about the approach of the police (by banging on shack walls or by warning calls) was destroyed.<sup>39</sup> The colourful names given to districts in Cato Manor (Raincoat, Fairbreeze, Two Sticks, Dabulamanzi) were replaced with sections A–F. However the residents were quick to give some of the areas in KwaMashu their own names. A story goes that one man, on returning to KwaMashu for the first time after being removed from Cato Manor, was unable to find his house in the dark on account of the uniformity of the houses in the section. On entering a house he presumed to be his own, he was confronted by an angry woman who attacked him. This part of E section was called **Kwamfazi ushayi indoda** (woman beats the man) from this time onwards. The other part of E section was notorious for robbers and murderers who attacked innocent people on their return from work. This was given the name **Kwavezunyawo** “the place where feet (of the dead) stick out”.<sup>40</sup>

The institutions that allowed for the creation of an official class in KwaMashu were first established in 1961 in the form of a Residents Committee. In the mid-sixties this Committee was elevated to the status of a Council and was given a measure of control over the allocation of permits and licenses and the siting of shops, schools and social amenities. The handing over of administration to KwaZulu in 1976/77 meant that new administrative posts were created and as local Councils have assumed more control over amenities, housing and personnel so they are increasingly becoming areas of competition between groups seeking to gain power and jurisdiction in the township.<sup>41</sup> Thus Inkatha backed officials fiercely contested the first elections to the Council, ousting the ‘old Guard’ who had held office from the late sixties.

In addition, the state created links with the ‘outside’ through social, cultural and economic bodies or organisations, such as Chambers of Commerce, Church groups, the Joint Council Organisation and Welfare Societies. The municipal Bantu Administration Department went to great lengths to provide sites for shops, banks, building societies, markets, theatres, professional offices, Churches (over 70) and halls for the Y.M.C.A. and Boy Scouts.<sup>42</sup>

In this way the foundations were laid for the planned growth of a black bourgeoisie in KwaMashu — the kind of foundations which were non-existent at Cato Manor. And indeed many residents were quick to seize the opportunity to give expression to aspirations that had been largely denied to them in Cato Manor — an ‘illegal’ settlement. Charles Mbutho provides a typical example of such a person. The son of an American mission Board convert, Mbutho first came to Durban in 1936 to complete his school education at the Taylor Street Continuation school. Although qualifying later as a teacher Mbutho chose to expand a clothes-washing business which he had begun while a scholar and living at the Somtseu Road location. In 1954, somewhat against his wishes, he moved into the Dabulamanzi quarter at Cato Manor.

Although engaged in an informal sector activity, like many others at Cato Manor, Mbutho objected to being regarded as a typical Cato Manor resident. He complained that the “Police did not behave . . . they would surround any group of people . . . everybody had to climb in the van and be sorted out at the police station. The following day you’d be before the magistrate, the cases were tried summarily in bulk, people came in groups of ten. You’re told, “You’ve been drinking **shimiyane** and you’re charged for drinking, ‘£1 fine’. “If you protested and said ‘Your worship, I’m from church, here is my Bible, ‘£2’, Please Sir! ‘£3’; until you shut up.”<sup>43</sup>

Mbutho obviously saw his chance for social and economic elevation in collaboration with white state officials. He made contact with Bourquin and in a series of clandestine meetings advised him in the removal of the notorious ‘Ecabazini’ district of Cato Manor by suggesting that Bourquin print his name on removal notices and that removals be conducted by Corporation officials only; the police taking a back seat.

Although he complained to Colonel R.D. Jenkins, the Port Natal Deputy Commissioner of Police about the treatment meted out by some policemen to the residents of KwaMashu he took care to stress that the “conservative self-respecting type of African (like himself) in all walks of life who have not decided on any positive struggle for the African cause . . . want to work within and along the so-called right channels.”<sup>44</sup>

Mbutho went to KwaMashu voluntarily. The move was “personally to my advantage . . . the life in Cato Manor to me it was a bore. I was not selling liquor, not selling daggá, or enjoying drinking. I had no business there, I had to stay there because there was nowhere else”.<sup>45</sup> Certainly he profited from the move. In 1962 he was elected to the municipally-created Residents’ Committee and he served on the Council from 1968–79 (holding the position of vice-chairman for two terms of office) before being ousted by an Inkatha-backed candidate in 1979.<sup>46</sup> Economically too Charles Mbutho profited. While he continued to teach he also continued his laundry business in KwaMashu. “Luckily”, he was able to secure the custom of the ‘single’ man’s hostel in the township which allowed him and his family to build up quite a thriving business.

Given the degree of organised political opposition to the Cato Manor removals and the politicised climate in which KwaMashu was created it is not surprising that Mbutho’s activities did not go unchallenged. In 1962 his house was fire-bombed, together with two other members of the Residents Committee. Mbutho gave evidence in the Supreme Court in Pietermaritzburg some four months later when these men had been caught and brought to trial. They were all ANC supporters.<sup>47</sup>

Mbutho’s case is cited as a good example of those who stood to gain from ‘legitimation’. A look at the records reveals numerous instances of former Cato Manor residents applying for licenses as shop-keepers, undertakers, tradesmen or seeking sites for cinemas, professional offices, service stations and restaurants. In some cases the people who established themselves in businesses in KwaMashu were known to have been ‘illegal’ traders at Cato Manor.<sup>48</sup>

For many others however the removal was disastrous. SJ Shange, a herbalist who had been a Cato Manor resident for 28 years, reported that he lost nearly all his customers when he was obliged to open up his practice in KwaMashu. His former customers were so scattered around the new township that they were unable to travel the long distance

to his shop. In addition he received no compensation for the R1 000 he had invested in a large 12 – room shack in Cato Manor.<sup>49</sup> Political activists among the Cato Manor ‘traders’, particularly those who enlisted the legal support of Roly Arenstein, the banned Durban lawyer, were apparently unable to gain official sanction for the resumption of their business in KwaMashu.<sup>50</sup> The brewers and shack landlords of Cato Manor lost their sources of livelihood altogether. The extent of their losses, both actual and potential, is reflected in the profits of the municipal beer halls, what one commentator has termed the “control institution of the native location”.<sup>51</sup> In 1948–49 the corporation beerhalls sold 2,36 million gallons of beer in the Durban district, in 1964–65 11,4 million gallons and in 1971 28,76 million gallons (realising a net profit of R1 270 000).<sup>52</sup> By appropriating the source of their income the state was able to cut off the brewers from their means of reproduction as a class. As a result of these financial deprivations and the economic demands of the state, in the form of rents and payments for services, many people in KwaMashu were forced to find work in Durban’s growing industrial sector. Thus, while the municipality encouraged the growth of a powerful but **controllable** group of economically active blacks in KwaMashu, and the consequent growth of a “traditional” petty bourgeoisie (traders and shopkeepers) and a “new” petty-bourgeoisie (an official elite),<sup>53</sup> the imposition of official control also effectively forced many more thousands into the labour force. Durban’s industrial bosses in fact anticipated this, thus their co-operation with the DCC in the establishment of KwaMashu (see Section A) and their concern over the provision of an adequate transport system to move workers in and out of Durban. The effect of administration over KwaMashu township was thus to split the class unity that existed in the uncontrolled Cato Manor settlement where the common states of illegality had helped to preserve class unity.

It seems therefore that the class structure of KwaMashu has changed fairly dramatically since its foundation. As I have indicated a black bourgeoisie was encouraged to develop in the township and it did develop. On the other hand the working class nature of KwaMashu has become increasingly apparent. In this respect it stands in some contrast to other urban locations in Durban like Umlazi and Clermont where Africans have had title to land and where a semi-rural elite has developed from the 1920’s and 1930’s. According to M.P. Gwala, the writer from Mpumalanga, most of the ‘professionals’ – social workers, academics, Radio Bantu announcers and teachers – have gravitated to Umlazi in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Most of these people are apparently “out-of-towners” in the first instance and have chosen to live in Umlazi rather than KwaMashu.<sup>54</sup> Nor have Umlazi or Clermont developed in the same intense political environment of KwaMashu.

It is also important to note that opposition in KwaMashu has not been confined to the period of the Cato Manor removals and the school boycotts of 1980. The ANC opposed the state-created organs such as the Residents’ Committee in the early and mid-1960’s claiming that they did not represent the views of the majority of the inhabitants of the township. It was this opposition that was expressed in the fire-bombing of Mbutho’s house in 1962. During the Soweto uprising in 1976 Gwala observed that there “was a tendency for the youth in KwaMashu to run out of the country” (for military training). Gwala went on to claim that “KwaMashu is more advanced in the sense that people are more aware of things . . . In the case of

Soweto in 1976 it became more painful to KwaMashu than for Umlazi.”<sup>55</sup>

It is possible too that a political consciousness has been perpetuated in KwaMashu by rituals such as the annual celebration when the graves of those who died resisting removals at Cato Manor are visited and animals slaughtered in their remembrance.<sup>56</sup> Political resistance in KwaMashu seems therefore to be related to the intense political activity which preceded the Cato Manor removals (and after) and to the predominantly working class nature of the township. There often has been a tendency to regard urban blacks as a homogeneous group. It is true that they share common political features and have common experiences of segregated township life. However I have tried to indicate in this article on KwaMashu’s history how differences evolve both in class formation within a township and between urban areas with different historical origins. In the particular case of the schools boycott this difference helps to explain why the residents of KwaMashu and not Umlazi defied not only the white authorities but also the full weight of the Inkatha movement. If any organised opposition arises to Inkatha, and the signs are certainly positive, then it is to be expected that the residents of KwaMashu will be in the forefront of this opposition.□

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The fullest and most lucid account of the boycott in Natal is in *Work in Progress* no. 15 (1980).
2. See *Sunday Post*, 26 October 1980.
3. G. Maasdorp and H. Humphreys (eds) *From Shantytown to Township* (Durban, 1975) C.L.I.
4. Municipal Bantu Administration (BAD) files, S.O. Bourquin to Town Clerk, 14 February 1961.
5. Durban City Council, ‘Report of Judicial Commission on Native Affairs in Durban’, p. 42, submitted by Justice F.N. Broome, January 1948.
6. *Ibid* pp. 39–40
7. L.K. Ladlau, ‘The Cato Manor Riots 1959–60 (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Natal, (1975), p. 12.
8. D. Welsh, ‘The growth of towns; in Wilson and Thompson (eds) *Oxford History of S.A.* vol. II, p. 191.
9. BAD Files H2/R2, pt I, City Water Engineer to Town Clerk Durban, 8 October 1952, quoting Council report of July 1948.
10. The ‘sanitation syndrome’ in the creation of urban townships in S.A. has been noted by Swanson, See M.W. Swanson. “The Durban system”, roots of urban apartheid in colonial Natal, *African Studies*, 35 (1976).
11. BAD Files, Confidential memo. by Town Clerk, 21 September 1953. This was alleged to prevent exploitation by Indian traders of the African population.
12. See BAD Files H2/R2 part II.
13. BAD Files, Confidential letter from Town Clerk to Sec. of Native Affairs, 5 December 1955. Memo by City Treasurer, 6 June 1956.
14. *Ibid*.
15. *Natal Mercury*, 13 November 1956.
16. See *Daily News*, 11 September 1956.
17. BAD Files, memo. on ‘Miscellaneous matters for consideration’, by Town Clerk, 15 February 1957.
18. BAD Files, A.W.G. Champion to Town Clerk, 20 March 1957.
19. S.O. Bourquin retired as Head of the Port Natal Bantu Affairs Administration Board in 1979. In many respects his views differ from the usual incumbents of such posts. His recollections of the Cato Manor removal are recorded on tape in the Killie Campbell Library.
20. BAD Files, Notes of meeting of Inter-departmental sub-committee for KwaMashu, 26 February 1957.

FOOTNOTES CONTINUED:

21. Ibid. Possibly interests in construction consortiums stood to lose business if the residents of KwaMashu had built their own houses.
22. BAD Files, no. 5, Chief Native Affairs Commissioner, Pmb., to Town Clerk, Durban, 17 July 1957.
23. Africans were allowed to buy their own houses in KwaMashu and by 1969 nearly 6 000 had. They were not permitted to buy land in freehold.
24. BAD Files, no. 5, Bourquin to Natal Chamber of Industries, 11 November 1957.
25. Quoted in *Natal Mercury*, 13 March 1958.
26. G.M. Gerhard, *Black Power in South Africa* (Berkeley 1978) pp. 167–172.
27. BAD files, no. 7, Town Clerk to Secretary Group Areas Board, 10 September 1980.
28. See Ladlau, 'Cato Manor riots', Ch. 3; KCAV, Interview with S. Bourquin, 18/10/79.
29. L. Kuper, 'African Nationalism in South Africa', *OHSA*, vol. II, pp. 464–65.
30. Ladlau; Cato Manor Riots, p. 126.
31. Ibid, p. 127.
32. *Race Relation Survey*, SAIR, 1962, p. 130.
33. BAD Files, Department of Bantu Administration to Town Clerk, 7 August 1962.
34. See BAD Files, memo. by Bourquin, 21 April 1961; Maasdorp and Humphrey (eds). *Shantytown to Township*, pp. 61–63.
35. KCAV 175, Interview with S. Bourquin, 4 September 1979.
36. Ladlau; 'Cato Manor Riots', pp. 140–150.
37. These facts are to be found in Maasdorp and Humphreys (eds.), *Shantytown to Township* and in Moller, Schlemmer, Kuzwayo and Mbana, *A Black Township in Durban: A Study of Needs and Problems* (CASS, Durban 1978).
38. B. Bozzoli (ed.), *Labour, Townships and Protest, Studies in the Social History of the Witwatersrand* (Johannesburg 1978) p. 8.
39. KCAV 145, interview with Mrs A. Muguni, 19 July 1979.
40. KCAV 142, interview with C.C. Majola, 20 June 1979,
41. KCAV 137, interview with C.C.L. Mtolo, 12 June 1979, and unrecorded interview with "Mayor of Umlazi", 17 August 1979. More research is needed to clarify the interests of factions standing for election. The election of three independent candidates in KawMakutha (Amanzimtoti) in 1979 is seen by some as a defeat for Inkatha, see KCAV 162, interview with M.P. Gwala, 28 August 1979.
42. See BAD Files, Bourquin to City Engineer, 13 February 1958.
43. KCAV 168, interview with C. Mbutho, 25 October 1979.
44. C. Mbutho Papers K.C.A.L., Mbutho to Col. R. Jenkins, 20 April 1960.
45. KCAV 168, interview with C. Mbutho, 25 October 1979.
46. Mbutho has now clearly seen Inkatha as a respectable organisation. He is a paid-up member and in his capacity as Chairman of a local High School has given support to the introduction of Inkatha as a school subject.
47. KCAV 168.
48. The Mnguni's provide a good example. See KCAV 172.
49. KCAV 179, interview with S.J. Shange, 24 July 1979.
50. KCAV 151, interview with J. Moeli, 3 April 1979.
51. J. Rex, "The Compound, the Reserve and the Urban location; the Essential Institutions of Southern African Labour Exploitation", *S.A. Labour Bulletin* No. 4, 1974.
52. Maasdorp and Humphreys, *Shantytown to Township*, p. 85.
53. K. Sole makes this distinction in "Class, continuity and change in black South African writing", p. 145 in Bozzoli (ed) *Labour, Township, Protest*.
54. Interview with M.P. Gwala KCAV 162, 28 August 1979.
55. KCAV 162, interview with M.P. Gwala, 28 August 1979. This was confirmed by J. Moeli, whose own son fled the country in 1976.
56. KCAV 142, interview with C. Mbutho, 20 June 1979.

# ORGANISED BLACK POLITICAL RESISTANCE, 1912 – 1950

First Part of a talk to NUSAS (1912–1930)

By Tom Lodge

In this talk I am going to be concerned with the evolution and development of organised black political resistance in the period 1912 to 1950. The period itself spans the years following the foundation of the South African Native National Congress in 1912 (the organisation which from the 1920s has been known as the African National Congress) to the opening of the decade of mass political organisation in 1950. I will principally be concerned with the progress of two organisations – the African National Congress and the Communist Party of South Africa – and the relationship which developed between them. I think it is important at this juncture to make the point that in restricting my scope to political organisations I am dealing with only one dimension of African protest and resistance to authority in these years, though an important one. Both the African National Congress and the Communist Party tended to be

urban-oriented organisations though the ANC did try and extend its influence in the countryside by attempting to gain the support and loyalty of the chieftaincy. I do not have the time here to discuss the various instances of rural protest and rebellion that occurred in this period though it must be emphasized that they form an essential backdrop to the militancy of the 1950s<sup>1</sup>. Another category of protest that we shall rather neglect is the more informal manifestations of resistance that took place – the more or less spontaneous riots, or, to use the official jargon, disturbances, that spatter the inter-war history of virtually all South Africa's major towns. These were usually sparked off by an immediate grievance – price rises, shortages, municipal brewing monopolies, police provocation, pass raids, and so on – but reflected a generalised pattern of worry, tension, and discontent. Of course the concerns of