

SECRET

MINUTES OF A MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNETH KAUNDA
AND SOUTH AFRICAN REPRESENTATIVES : LUSAKA :
25 JUNE 1984

Present:

Zambia:

President K Kaunda

South Africa:

Genl P W van der Westhuizen
Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Mr D W Steward
Department of Foreign Affairs

GENL VAN DER WESTHUIZEN said that he wished to report to President Kaunda on the discussion which had just taken place between him and Mr Steward and President Dos Santos and Minister Rodrigues. He said that he had reiterated what South Africa had said at earlier meetings. South Africa was very concerned about peace in the region. He had told President Dos Santos that incidents both within the area in question and in Namibia had increased since the Lusaka Agreement had been signed. President Dos Santos had replied that it was necessary to look at the spirit of the Agreement as well as the letter. The Angolans had said that they could not control SWAPO unless there was an agreement on the implementation of Resolution 435. That was a matter of great concern to South Africa. South Africa doubted this since all SWAPO's logistical supplies came through Angolan controlled channels. Yet the Angolans said they could not control SWAPO. Maybe they were right. He had re-emphasized South Africa's proposal for a joint

statement on non-aggression. The Angolans, however, had not yet replied to this idea. South Africa had also offered economic cooperation with regard to the Calueque scheme. This could earn Angola \$8 - \$10 million per year. He had pointed out to President Dos Santos that SWAPO was a legal party inside Namibia and could meet with the Administrator-General at any time. The Administrator-General could convey any message from Sam Nujoma to the South African Government. It should be recalled that the Administrator-General would remain in power in terms of Resolution 435 until independence.

GENL VAN DER WESTHUIZEN said that he had expressed South Africa's concern over the future of the Joint Monitoring Commission once it has reached the border. So far all decisions relating to movements of the JMC Headquarters had been taken jointly. South Africa had suggested that the JMC be replaced by a Joint Peace-keeping Commission. South Africa had also made it clear that if SWAPO continued its violations of the border there would be a return to the status quo ante.

MR STEWARD then informed President Kaunda of the number of violations which had taken place since the JMC had been established. He also pointed to the increase in the number of SWAPO incidents within South West Africa since the Lusaka Agreement.

PRESIDENT KAUNDA asked the South African representatives to assure Prime Minister Botha that Zambia was guided by the philosophy of humanism. It genuinely wanted to see what Zambia and South Africa could do to promote peace within

the region. Zambia was concerned about developments within the region, including developments within each country of the region. He had publicly risked his political career by expressing his belief in the sincerity of Prime Minister Botha. He had made statements to this effect at a graduation ceremony of the Namibia Institute and at the graduation of Zambian soldiers. Both of these had been sensitive forums. He wanted the Prime Minister of South Africa to believe that Zambia and South Africa were in this region together. All the countries in southern Africa were together in a canoe which was heading toward a cataract. If these countries did not row together they would all perish. He wanted to assure South Africa that Zambia was guided by certain principles. Although he knew that Prime Minister Botha would not agree, it was his belief that the problems of the region emanated from apartheid and from the fact that Namibia was not yet independent. Zambia was not motivated by hatred but by a spirit of great concern over the explosion which it felt was about to take place in South Africa. His dialogue efforts to promote peace with South Africa were not palatable to colleagues. South Africa should do a number of things to help him to bring genuine peace to the region. He wanted to see Prime Minister Botha alive for a long time to come. With him at the helm there would be changes which would help to avoid an eruption.

PRESIDENT KAUNDA said that he did not have a simplistic view of South Africa's problems. He knew that the situation in South Africa was not the same as it had been in Zambabwe, Kenya and Zambia. He realised that there was an Afrikaner nation with other white groups on its

periphery. He implored Prime Minister Botha to release the Mandela's, the Sisulu's and others to form a safety valve which he would be able to use. This would help to bring about peace. When Minister Botha and Genl Malan had first come to Lusaka he had been anxious that there should be progress toward a settlement before the South African forces reached the Angolan border. He had also had problems with SWAPO when they had been in Zambia. He had not had enough troops. The SWAPO members and members of our national liberation movements had killed one another. He knew how hard it was to control movements such as SWAPO and understood the MPLA Government's problems. FAPLA was fighting UNITA. Under these circumstances one could not expect it to be able to control SWAPO as well. They would have to have the means to enforce control, but he did not think that they had it.

PRESIDENT KAUNDA said that it would be unfair for the South African Government to return to the status quo ante. This would mean the end of the dialogue between South Africa and Zambia and a return to confrontation. Zambia had been insulted over the conference between the MPC and SWAPO which had been held in Lusaka. His critics accused him of having sold out. However, this was immaterial to him. There was no way that the Angolans could keep SWAPO out of playing a role. The best way now would be to restore forward momentum. Resolution 435 presented the necessary opportunity in this regard. SWAPO said that it wanted a ceasefire along the lines of Resolution 435. If such a request could be acceded to, it might be possible to buy time.

PRESIDENT KAUNDA knew that South Africa had a problem in respect of the Cuban troops in Angola. However, South Africa had made a mistake by involving itself in this question in the first place. He wished to plead with Prime Minister Botha to please consider the following propositions. South Africa was powerful enough to re-occupy southern Angola. However, he valued the relations which he had established with South Africa. His dream was to see all of the countries of the region develop in peace in God's good time. The countries of the region should not rush toward militarising the situation.

GENL VAN DER WESTHUIZEN thanked President Kaunda for his kind words. He had been really concerned about what he had heard tonight from the Angolans. Kito used to say that as long as South Africa was in his country he could not control SWAPO, but now they were saying that they will not be able to control SWAPO even when South Africa has reached the border. If this was the case, how would they be able to control 35 000 Cubans and other East-European forces? What would they be able to do with 70 000 UNITA troops? Would there ever be peace on the other side of the border? It seemed that the MPLA was not in a position to control anything. Nevertheless, Dos Santos had said that he would sign a peace agreement with Namibia to guarantee that no Cubans would go to South West Africa. How could he guarantee anything? Zambia had also had SWAPO elements in its country, but it had controlled them very effectively. There had been no incidents along the border with Zambia because there had been a good understanding between South Africa and Zambia. Without such control, there could be no peace. It was possible to have a cease-fire before

implementation of Resolution 435. However, the way things looked now, if South Africa were to revert to the situation which had obtained before the Lusaka Agreement, it would be better-off. Nevertheless, one should not be too pessimistic. South Africa wouldn't close any doors.

PRESIDENT KAUNDA replied that it was not fair to compare what Zambia had been able to do in its country and what the MPLA could do in Angola. Angola was still in the process of transforming its guerrillas into a regular army. They had never been allowed to settle down as a nation. They had been occupied by South Africa and they also had to fight UNITA. These situations could not be equated. Zambia had a strong political party, particularly in the border areas, which could inform the Government of guerrilla movements.

PRESIDENT KAUNDA said that he wished to believe that Prime Minister Botha had a conscience. Was it wrong to appeal to him? South Africa had asked Zambia not to tell the United States about the meeting which had taken place earlier in the year between Genl Van der Westhuizen and Nujoma. It had honoured this request but SWAPO had leaked the story during the conference between the MPC and itself on the 13th of May. However, Zambia had stuck to its word. He had denied that such a meeting had taken place in an interview which he had given to two journalists, just before the same journalists were told a different story by SWAPO.

PRESIDENT KAUNDA said that he appreciated South Africa's independence of mind on many subjects. It was able to

choose a path according to its own interests. This was what Zambians called non-alignment. He asked why the problem of linkage should be allowed to block the independence of Namibia? Would it not be possible for Prime Minister Botha to accede to the Angolan request that Resolution 435 should be implemented? This would prove his sincerity. It would stop the deaths of young Namibians and young South Africans. Zambia wished nothing but good to the people of South Africa. However, the question of Namibian independence was artificial and could be easily solved. The question of South Africa was more real. Apartheid affected the beliefs of human beings. Zambia had denounced the presence of the Cubans and the Russians in Angola at one time and would certainly not hesitate to denounce any move by the Cubans to Namibia. Such a development would unite African opinion against the Cubans.

GENL VAN DER WESTHUIZEN undertook to convey the points which President Kaunda had made to the South African Government.

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