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BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES DELEGATIONS, WASHINGTON D.C. : 17-19 MARCH 1983

1. Delegations from South Africa and the United States met in Washington on 17-19 March 1983 to exchange views on wide-ranging questions of common concern related to southern Africa. The South African delegation was lead by the Director-General of Foreign Affairs and Information and included representatives of his Department, the South African Defence Force, the Security Branch of the South African Police, the National Intelligence Service, Mr Danie Hough and three academics. The United States delegation was lead by Dr Chester Crocker and included officials from the State Department and the C.I.A.
  
2. It is clear that the United States proposed the discussions with South Africa with a purpose in mind. We may speculate that the prime U.S. objectives were:-
  - to influence South African policy-makers, after it had become clear that South Africa and the United States had divergent approaches to the strategic situation in southern Africa, and
  
  - to gain clearer insights into South African intentions in southern Africa.

3. The general message conveyed by the United States delegation was clear:
  - 3.1 The United States was attempting to counter the expansion of Soviet influence in a number of areas of the world - including southern Africa - which was regarded as a secondary or tertiary Soviet priority.
  - 3.2 In fulfilling its global role the United States accorded central importance to its relationship with its West European allies.
  - 3.3 The transition of power to Andropov in the Soviet Union presented the United States with certain possibilities to stem Soviet influence - particularly in southern Africa.
  - 3.4 The Soviet Union, although in a strong position in Angola and Mozambique, did not control the government of either country. The MPLA and FRELIMO governments could accordingly be weaned from the Soviet sphere by skillful U.S. and South African diplomacy.
  - 3.5 However, the Soviet Union would escalate its military involvement in both countries if it were challenged by an increase in South African, UNITA or MNR military activities.

- 3.6 The Soviet Union had the logistical capability to project its power in southern Africa and could introduce massive reinforcements of troops and modern weapons into the region at short notice. It was already deploying modern weapons systems - including SA-8-missiles - in Angola.
- 3.7 President Dos Santos of Angola was consolidating his position with moderate blacks within the MPLA at the expense of the left and right wings of the party.
- 3.8 UNITA had no possibility of achieving total military victory in Angola, even should the Cubans withdraw. It accepted that its best prospect was a political agreement with the MPLA. Any advance made by it would jeopardize the withdrawal of Cuban forces and would weaken President Dos Santos.
- 3.9 In Mozambique FRELIMO would be prepared to limit the activities of the ANC if South Africa would limit the activities of the MNR in a similar fashion.
- 3.10 Time was not on the side of South Africa and the United States because of
- problems in keeping the Contact Group together;

- restlessness among the Frontline States which would be exacerbated by a series of anti-South African conferences which were likely to culminate in a Security Council meeting in May or June;
- President Reagan would have to contend with the presidential election next year;
- the military situation might get out of hand at any time.

3.11 South Africa should accordingly avoid any military escalation in southern Africa by its own forces, and by implication, by the MNR and UNITA as well.

3.12 South Africa should continue its bilateral negotiations with Angola and Mozambique, with a view to achieving an agreement with the former - thus facilitating United States negotiations on the withdrawal of the Cubans - and to doing a deal with the latter in respect of restraining the activities of the MNR and the ANC.

3.13 South Africa should work with the United States in stabilizing the situation in Zimbabwe.

3.14 The United States continued to insist that Cuban withdrawal from Angola was an absolute condition for implementation of Resolution 435 in South West

Africa/Namibia. By the same token South Africa would be expected to implement Resolution 435 if the Americans succeeded in bringing about a Cuban withdrawal.

3.15 If South Africa was not prepared to work with the United States with regard to the above-mentioned matters the United States would not be able to help South Africa any further. However, if South Africa agreed to this approach the United States would use its diplomatic influence and that of its West European allies to diminish Soviet influence in southern Africa. It would even consider a trade-off in its global relationship with the Soviet Union to persuade the USSR to accept a reduction of its influence in southern Africa.

4. The South African delegation gave a clear presentation of the Republic's perceptions of

4.1 the ideological orientation of our neighbouring states and the role which they and "liberation movements" play in global Soviet strategy;

4.2 the economic problems and viability of our neighbouring states and the cultural obstacles which prevent them from achieving the substance of development, as opposed to its bureaucratic trappings;

- 4.3 the role which the SADCC is playing and might play in southern Africa and the importance of avoiding polarisation between it and the RSA;
  - 4.4 the outlook and political position of leading politicians in neighbouring states;
  - 4.5 the nature of the Soviet threat to southern Africa;
  - 4.6 the progress made by UNITA and the MNR and the situation in Zimbabwe and Lesotho;
  - 4.7 the nature of the threat posed by the ANC, its links with the South African Communist Party and the degree of support which it receives from our various neighbouring countries.
5. At the close of the meetings the United States delegation presented the South African side with an "Agreed Note Describing Points of Consensus and Positions of the Two Governments". For the text of the Note please refer to Annexure 'B'.

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BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA  
AND THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 17-18, 1983

Agreed Note Describing Points of Consensus and Positions  
of the Two Governments:

1. Stability in all the nations of Southern Africa reduces potential opportunities for further Soviet inroads in the region.
2. Both the U.S. and South Africa wish to reduce Soviet influence and presence, and thus have an interest in enhanced stability in the nations of the region.
3. As concerns the region as a whole, the South African side emphasized the growth in recent years of Soviet (and Cuban and East German) military presence and influence, particularly in Angola and Mozambique. The U.S. side agreed with many of the data presented on communist troops, advisors and equipment deliveries. The U.S. side stressed the significant potential for further escalation of Soviet involvement and the steadily expanding Soviet capabilities for military power projection in Southern Africa. It was agreed that while Southern Africa may not rank high on the list of Soviet global priorities, Moscow will (1) continue to fish in troubled waters and exploit targets of opportunity and (2) feel a need to escalate its military involvement in circumstances where its interests and image as a global superpower are directly challenged.
4. There was discussion about the reversibility of existing Soviet gains in the region. It was agreed that while it may be too early to demonstrate this point, Soviet gains elsewhere in Africa (Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, Egypt) have been reversed. It was further agreed that an effort must be made to achieve this result in Southern Africa.
5. As concerns Angola, the two sides confirmed that an agreement on Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola is necessary if there is to be a Namibia settlement. At the same time, they confirmed that a satisfactory agreement in this regard is the only remaining obstacle to the implementation of UNSC RES. 435.

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6. It was further agreed that no Angolan party can achieve an outright military victory. Unita might be capable of controlling a significant portion (perhaps 60-70%) of Angola if the Cubans are withdrawn. That portion would be smaller assuming the Cubans do not withdraw.
7. The U.S. side observed that President Dos Santos is attempting to consolidate his political base in order to have the necessary base for achieving a negotiated solution to Angola's problems. The U.S. stressed the importance of doing nothing to undercut his position at this delicate juncture, since he must be able to demonstrate results if he is to survive and succeed.
8. The two sides agreed that there is substantial potential for further Soviet escalation of military involvement in Angola in the absence of a settlement and in circumstances where the MPLA's position and survival are seen to be at risk. They took note of recent deliveries of front-line hardware in the Soviet inventory, and the possibility of further deliveries of advanced air defense systems, combat aircraft and other materiel as well as Soviet bloc personnel to operate them. The possibility of substantial additional Cuban troop deployments was also noted.
9. It was agreed that, for a variety of reasons, time is of the essence in achieving a settlement.
10. As concerns Mozambique, the U.S. side stressed the importance it places on the continuation of the negotiating process begun at Komatipoort as a means of capitalizing on the Mozambique government's opening to the West. The two teams exchanged views on the general political and economic situation in Mozambique. The South African side intimated the extent to which they contribute to the economy of Mozambique and that their relationship with that country was less problematic than that with Angola. South African representatives explained South Africa's preoccupation with the continued use by the ANC of Mozambican territory as a springboard for terrorist activities against South Africa. The U.S. side noted its view that the Mozambique government is prepared to exercise control of the ANC in a context of parallel restraint on the NRM. It was agreed that opportunities existed to heighten distrust between Moscow and Maputo and to create resistance to current and future Soviet blandishments. These must be considered in decisions on the renewal of direct South African-Mozambique talks.

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11. As concerns Zimbabwe, it was agreed that an unstable Zimbabwe lends itself to Soviet exploitation and manipulation which is inimical to the interests of all of Southern Africa. A stable Zimbabwe is in the best interests of both South Africa and the United States. Both countries should seek to influence Zimbabwe in the direction of stability.

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