

THE ALFRED AND WINIFRED HOERNLÉ
MEMORIAL LECTURE 1974

1974

**WHITE AND BLACK
NATIONALISM, ETHNICITY
AND THE FUTURE
OF THE HOMELANDS**

by

Chief M. Gatsha Buthelezi



SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS

60c

THE ALFRED AND WINIFRED HOERNLÉ
MEMORIAL LECTURE 1974

**WHITE AND BLACK
NATIONALISM, ETHNICITY
AND THE FUTURE
OF THE HOMELANDS**

(Can the Homelands concept be the basis of a formula
for a future South Africa?)

ISBN 0 86982 084 2



THE ALFRED AND WINIFRED HOERNLÉ MEMORIAL LECTURE

A lecture entitled the Alfred and Winifred Hoernlé Memorial Lecture (in memory of Professor R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, President of the South African Institute of Race Relations from 1934 to 1943, and his wife, Winifred Hoernlé, President of the Institute from 1948 to 1950, and again from 1953 to 1954), is delivered under the auspices of the Institute. Invitations to deliver the lecture are extended to people having special knowledge and experience of racial problems in Africa and elsewhere.

It is hoped that the Hoernlé Memorial Lecture provides a platform for constructive and helpful contributions to thought and action. While the lecturers are entirely free to express their own views, which may not be those of the Institute as expressed in its formal decisions, it is hoped that lecturers will be guided by the Institute's declaration of policy that 'scientific study and research must be allied with the fullest recognition of the human reactions to changing racial situations; that respectful regard must be paid to the traditions and usages of various national, racial and tribal groups which comprise the population; and that due account must be taken of opposing views earnestly held'.

List of previous lecturers:

- The Rt. Hon. J. H. Hofmeyr, *Christian Principles and Race Problems*
- Dr. E. G. Malherbe, *Race Attitudes and Education*
- Prof. W. M. Macmillan, *Africa Beyond the Union*
- Dr. the Hon. E. H. Brookes, *We Come of Age*
- Prof. I. D. MacCrone, *Group Conflicts and Race Prejudices*
- Mrs. A. W. Hoernlé, *Penal Reform and Race Relations*
- Dr. H. J. van Eck, *Some Aspects of the Industrial Revolution*
- Prof. S. Herbert Frankel, *Some Reflections on Civilisation in Africa*
- Prof. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *Outlook for Africa*
- Dr. Emory Ross, *Colour and Christian Community*
- Vice-Chancellor T. B. Davie, *Education and Race Relations in South Africa*
- Prof. Gordon W. Allport, *Prejudice in Modern Perspective*
- Prof. B. B. Keet, *The Ethics of Apartheid*
- Dr. David Thomson, *The Government of Divided Communities*
- Dr. Simon Biesheuvel, *Race, Culture and Personality*
- Dr. C. W. de Kiewiet, *Can Africa Come of Age?*
- Prof. D. V. Cowen, *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity—Today*
- The Most Rev. Denis E. Hurley, Archbishop of Durban, *Apartheid: A Crisis of the Christian Conscience*
- Prof. Gwendolen M. Carter, *Separate Development: The Challenge of the Transkei*
- Sir Keith Hancock, *Are There South Africans?*
- Prof. Meyer Fortes, *The Plural Society in Africa*
- Prof. D. Hobart Houghton, *Enlightened Self-Interest and the Liberal Spirit*
- Prof. A. S. Mathews, *Freedom and State Security in the South African Plural Society*
- Prof. Philip Mayer, *Urban Africans and the Bantustans*
- Alan Pifer, *The Higher Education of Blacks in the United States*

WHITE AND BLACK NATIONALISM, ETHNICITY AND THE FUTURE OF THE HOMELANDS. (Can the Homelands concept be the basis of a formula for a future South Africa?)

Introduction

At the outset, I must frankly state that it was with reluctance that I accepted the great privilege offered me of honouring the memory of two such great South Africans as Alfred and Winifred Hoernlé. I did not feel that I had the attributes which qualified me to perform this great task adequately. Moreover, as a Black man I am also only too aware of how my motives in accepting the director's invitation could be misread by both the left and the right, by both White and Black. These are days when the Black man has become so disillusioned that it should be understandable when he has doubts and no longer knows when he is doing the right thing in our racist society. There is today a strong lobby amongst Blacks which feels that any acknowledgement that there is a concern for social justice among White-skinned South Africans endangers recognition of the important fact that the Black man is in the final analysis on his own in this battle in a racist society such as ours. Whilst I can see some validity in such a view, I am one of those Blacks who, whilst going along with Black consciousness, believes that the White liberal has not only a right to do his own thing, but that he has also an important rôle to play within his own White group.

I never had the privilege of meeting the Hoernlés. I was, however, fortunate to have as my professor a great African patriot in the person of Dr. Z. K. Matthews. He was my professor when I read Native Administration II (as it was called then). He prescribed as one of our set-books *South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit*, the four Phelps-Stokes lectures delivered before the University of Cape Town by Professor R. F. Alfred Hoernlé in May 1939.

I then learnt to admire and respect Professor Hoernlé for his convictions. It is historic that I should be the first Black man to deliver this memorial lecture, in the light of what Professor Hoernlé wrote in a preface to this very book: "What the non-European population feels and thinks is, on the whole, ignored by the White group in its preoccupation with itself; and when non-European utterances of discontent or criticism reach White ears, the first spontaneous reaction of many Whites is a feeling of resentment, often tinged with fear.

“For a member of the White group to be concerned about the impact of White domination on the non-European population of the Union, or for such a one to plead for fuller knowledge, or more humane consideration, of non-European needs and interests, is to earn for himself the title of ‘negrophilist’, *kafir-boetie*, or—most scathing of all—liberal. The White heretic on the subject of race relations is felt by many of his fellow-Whites to be a traitor to his own group.”¹

I can only salute a man who stuck to his guns despite being tarred with such approbrium. At his funeral “there was no sermon, but before the closing prayers the Dean spoke these words:

‘I bid you give thanks for the life and example of Alfred Hoernlé; for the inspiration of his teaching for the wideness of his social service for the subject races of this land, for his indignation at all that was less than just in man’s relationship to man, for the witness of a life in which the values of freedom, opportunity and justice for all were consistently set forth’.”²

I also never met Winifred Hoernlé, but her husband’s tribute in the same book, and what I have read about her, make me respect her no less than her illustrious husband. In acknowledging her assistance and inspiration Alfred Hoernlé writes to his wife: “Only one individual acknowledgement I cannot forbear to put on record. It is to my wife who, both by her example of practical activity in the field of race relations and by her help in the thinking out of principles, is to me always a living embodiment of the liberal spirit at its best.”³

Growth of Nationalism

When slavery was abolished in the Cape in 1836, the slave-owners resented this interference with their way of life and this, together with several other grievances against the Cape Colonial Administration, led to their migration northwards. The trekkers were still convinced that there could only be one place for their former slaves and any other men of colour and that was in a subordinate position. When their efforts to seek new pastures were rewarded with the founding of the two Boer Republics in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, this principle was enshrined in the Republican Constitutions. The Grondwet of 1858, Clause 9, states that the people desire no equality between people of colour and the White inhabitants either in Church or State. This was the first entrenchment of the concept of White domination in South Africa. The word “people” (*volk*) was used restrictively in the sense of “our own people”, or “we Boers”.⁴

The various clashes that are too well-known to repeat here, even including the unfortunate incident of the murder of Piet Retief in 1838, were crude attempts by Black nationalism to counter White nationalism. The Great Trek was the most important single event in the history of the Afrikaner people. By the establishment of their republics, it seemed that the Voortrekkers had achieved the aims which they had set before themselves when they left the Cape. They had land in abundance, they had the geographical isolation which they valued and, above all, they were independent of Britain and free to "preserve their doctrines in purity". The Afrikaners had achieved their ethnicity as the Volk.⁵

When the Union was formed by former foes, the Britons and Boers, in 1910, we see the birth of a White nationalism with roots in South Africa. British or Boer ethnicity, whilst not abandoned, could be subordinated to completely White interests which would be paramount in the whole of South Africa.

A shrewd politician might have calculated, by 1910, that the future of South Africa lay with the Afrikaner — provided that he was not swamped by the Bantu or divided against himself. General Smuts saw, no less clearly than Milner had done, that the future of South Africa would be determined in the Transvaal. It was for this reason that he preferred a unitary state of federation.⁶

As a reaction to the motives behind Union, Africans of different ethnic groups put aside their ethnicity and founded the African National Congress in 1912. There is no reason to go over the well-known history of how Black nationalism reacted to domination by White nationalism. This involves the whole history of the African National Congress and other banned liberatory movements.

It became a standard Nationalist technique to evoke the black peril at election time. Backveld audiences of Afrikaners were reassured to be told that their candidate's policy was that of "die Kaffer op sy plek, die Koelie uit die land" (keep the Black man in his place, send the Indian back to where he came from).

In 1929 General Smuts said in an election speech: "Let us cultivate feelings of friendship over this African Continent, so that one day we may have a British Confederation of African states — a great African dominion stretching unbroken through Africa." This was enough for the Nationalists to depict Smuts as the advocate of racial equality, who would submerge South Africa in a sea of colour. Hertzog, Malan, Tielman Roos (the Nationalist leaders in their respective provinces) produced the **BLACK MANIFESTO**, which denounced Smuts as "the man who puts himself forward

as the apostle of a black Kaffir State — extending from the Cape to Egypt — and already foretells the day when even the name of South Africa will vanish in smoke upon the altar of the Kaffir State he so ardently desires".⁷

Even this great international statesman, General Smuts, succumbed to the temptation of pandering to these feelings when he realised that even English-speaking Natal was not immune to these racist prejudices and his Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act of 1946 was an attempt to placate his English-speaking racist constituents in Natal, who were anti-Indian.

There is no question about the fact that until fairly recently it was not disgraceful for White politicians to state that they stood for White domination. Thus two constitutional lawyers could state:

"Nowhere in the World does there exist a system of executive despotism similar to executive administration of Native Affairs in South Africa. In other portions of Africa we may see an absolute control of the Native population; but this control is control by an external power; there is no pretence to parliamentary government. In the Union, however, we see all the trappings of parliamentary government side by side with the absolute autocratic power of a despotism."⁸

Amongst Blacks we see the emergence of African nationalists who belonged to all the African ethnic groups. There was, for instance, Mr. A. P. Mda, from the Transkei, who maintained that African nationalism belongs to the period which sees the end of the struggle as a nation fighting for the right to rule in Africa. One of the most articulate spokesmen for the African nationalists was the late Anton Lembede from Natal. He stated that the history of mankind is the history of the liberation of mankind. Throughout the ages man has fought and struggled to free himself from one kind of serfdom or another. This history of man to emancipate himself from slavery is well known. It is the history of Europe after the French Revolution, of England after 1215, of Russia after the revolution in 1917, of India, China, Indonesia and other countries of the East after World War II. It is indeed the history of Africa today. In Africa this bondage to a colour slavery is attendant with complexes of superiority and inferiority, complexes and intentions that are grave to the African. Nature has endowed the African with all the elements of power, of creation, and of nobility. Africa must, after what has been a lull, surge forward to conquer knowledge and the world. Africans have played a rôle they cannot deny themselves of or be denied. Here

is a vision to fight for liberation, to fight in defence of greatness and nobility of the sons and daughters of Africa.

With spokesmen and leaders of this calibre it was clear that African nationalism and White nationalism had polarized. As Elie Kedourie states: "The sentiment of nationality once it arises amongst the masses spreads easily over neighbouring peoples. Once awakened, it leads to revivals in moral life, in language, in literature, and in economic and political life by reinforcing the feelings of solidarity, sacrifice and struggle among its supporters." No wonder one of the first things the present regime did was to abolish the Natives Representative Council established under Hertzog's Representation of Natives Act of 1936. As provision was made for elections to take place on a regional and not on a tribal or ethnic basis, this Council was in effect a national body representative of Africans of all ethnic groups. Despite the manifestly unsatisfactory nature of this system of representation, it did at least provide a central forum to articulate Black aspirations. This was felt to be a potential danger to the dominance of White nationalism which alone could entrench the paramountcy of White interests in South Africa. From the time the present regime acceded to power in 1948 the whole mystique of White domination was based on the concept of White unity and on the promotion of separate Black ethnicities.

From Apartheid to Separate Development

The homelands concept was propounded by the Government and its supporters in response to the pressures of world opinion. It should be seen as an attempt to meet, however feebly, the criticism of the international community. The concept of separate independent areas was not at first envisaged. Dr. Malan's vision of apartheid did not encompass the more extensive hopes of some of his younger followers. He had rejected complete territorial separation as impossible. It would, he said in 1950, be an 'ideal state' if it could be achieved, but it was impracticable in a country where the economic structure was based on Native labour. He had been wary of formulating a precise definition of apartheid. It was not, he insisted, a policy of oppression. "On the contrary, like a wire fence between two neighbouring farms, it indicates a separation without eliminating necessarily legitimate and desirable contacts in both directions, and although it places reciprocal restrictions on both sides, it, at the same time, serves as an effective protection against violation of one another's rights."⁹

In 1949 it was claimed by the Opposition, however, that one candidate whom the Minister did acknowledge as a party nominee (for Senate elections) had told the Zulus that a Zulu state would be set up by the Nationalist Government. Dr. Jansen (the then Minister of Native Affairs) repudiated this idea with all the force he could command. He knew of no Nationalist candidate who had promised the Zulus that they would form a Zulu State, and, he said, he could find no confirmation of the Opposition's contention that the candidate and an organiser of the National Party supporting him had told a meeting that a section of Natal and Zululand would be given back to the Natives.¹⁰

When the Synod of the Dutch Reformed Churches met in Bloemfontein in 1950 it was agreed that for apartheid to be morally justifiable it had to be complete. This was a clear challenge to the politicians. As we are all aware, not even under Mr. Strijdom as Prime Minister was apartheid clearly defined. It was left to Dr. Verwoerd, when he became Prime Minister, to define it in clearer terms. He came out clearly with the concept of independent homelands.

South Africa was under tremendous pressure from both outside and from within. The hurricane of African nationalism swept through Africa, and African Nationalism within South Africa gained momentum. There were pressures on South Africa in the Commonwealth and at the United Nations. The proliferation of Black States in Africa must have influenced Dr. Verwoerd to pass the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959. This envisages the creation of eight African 'national units' for the Africans. He enunciated three principles:

God had a divine purpose for every people, irrespective of race or colour;

every people had an inherent right of existence and of self-government;

personal no less than national aspirations should be fulfilled within one's own community.

He talked of an eventual commonwealth of South African states, Black and White. Where Malan had said that territorial separation was impracticable, Verwoerd declared that if faced with the alternative of a small White state or a larger one that was multi-racial, he would choose the smaller. Dr. Verwoerd attempted to bring down to mother earth the nebulous concept of apartheid. Political scientists and many Africans consider it a tragedy that his life was ended so untimely because *inter alia* it would have been interesting to see whether he would not have gone much further

than his successors by now. He had after all spoken of the sacrifices which he asked the White man to make for his privileged position. He could not have it both ways, enjoy both affluence and security, retain the African as a labourer and servant and simultaneously be secure from the political pretensions of a Black proletariat. Dr. Verwoerd, however, did not envisage rights for Africans in the cities, arguing that Europeans were also rightless in the African areas. He brought into use the more euphemistic term of "separate development" to replace apartheid.

From Separate Development. . . .

At this point I wish to come to the crux of my question, whether the concept of apartheid or of separate development can be used as a formula for a future South Africa. I have come here as a scholar, in the sense of someone groping in the dark. What I am saying will be clearer if I remind you that these concepts of ruling us from the day of our conquest have always been conceived by Whites only, from their all-White perspectives. Not even when we co-operate in the implementation of the White man's political dreams for us, are we given the privilege of making any concrete contribution or even suggesting improvements. Any suggestion by us is suspect. I can understand this mistrust of a person like myself who stated his reservations about the philosophy of apartheid from the outset. But not even those who state complete belief in separate development are good enough to make concrete suggestions that are taken seriously. The example which makes my utterance worthy of your credence is this question of consolidation. Not a single African homelands leader is involved in the actual suggestions on where the boundaries should be. It is all worked out by Pretoria on its own.

However, since I am here as a student rather than as the head of KwaZulu Government, I shall avail myself of the luxury of indulging in some hypothetical political doodling. I am convinced that the homelands concept could easily be the formula for the basis of a future South Africa, provided certain conditions were met.

I have always said quite honestly that I realise that the fears of the White man in South Africa of being a minority group are inevitable. I say so without justifying the irrational White reactions to this fear. I am at the same time prepared to acknowledge the fact that what has happened to minority groups in certain parts of Africa inevitably affects Whites and accentuates the problems caused by this fear.

Professor Hoernlé himself acknowledged this fear in the talks I mentioned earlier in these terms: "---- the price which the White caste pays for its domination is fear — fear for a continuance of its own superiority; fear for its future. And fear is incompatible with the liberal spirit."

Another cause for this fear is suspicion that the Black man might wish to wreak vengeance if he is given any latitude or stake at all. I think this is quite groundless. It is, however, common to the White groups riddled with a guilt-conscience. I will allay the fears of my White countryman through the words of a man with whose views in general I disagree. On this matter I believe he had a point, and I refer here to a statement by the late Malcolm X:

"The 22 million Afro-Americans are not yet filled with hate or desire for vengeance as the propaganda of the segregationists would have you believe. The universal law of justice is sufficient to bring judgement upon those Whites who are guilty of racism. It will also punish those who have benefitted from the racist practices of their forefathers and done nothing to atone for them. Most intelligent Whites will admit without hesitation that they are already being punished for the evil deeds committed against the Afro-Americans by their fathers. Thus it is not necessary for the victim, the Afro-American, to be vengeful".¹¹

The Africans are magnanimous people and that is why even against their strong feelings, they still co-operate in the hope that the White man might in turn show real goodwill. Africans are also realists enough to understand that since these homelands are now set up they cannot be undone at this stage. They also realise that no White political party, including those opposed to apartheid, has committed itself to dismantling the homelands.

Africans would be happy if independence of homelands would mean that all exiles and the African political prisoners would be returned to us in the homelands. I am sure that it would be a strong attraction to the concept of independence, if this were to be conceded even before it was demanded as one of the conditions for a consideration of independence.

If White members of certain departments of the Republican Government ceased to interfere in the homelands politics, at least the Black man would accept the *bona fides* of the White rulers. No less than five homelands leaders have told me about the interference of certain departments of the Republican Government in their elections. On 17 November 1973, I informed the Prime Minister, Mr. B. J. Vorster, of the interference of certain officials

of one of the departments of the Republican Government in Kwa-Zulu politics. This further undermines the confidence of Black people in the system and the White man. One political scientist makes the following observation which I consider to be pertinent here: "Less important political decisions and bureaucratic functions are delegated to various non-White local and regional self-governing bodies, whose members work under White supervision. Apart from the propaganda effect, these institutions prove useful to the central authority in at least three respects: first, upwardly mobile and politically ambitious individuals are absorbed into this administration; second, immediate discontent of non-Whites is directed toward members of their own groups since they represent the overall system; and third, the real authorities are freed from burdensome and tedious spadework and thus only confine themselves to 'advisory' functions without losing factual control".¹²

If such practices were eliminated even the doubting Thomases amongst Blacks would at least have some trust in the political honesty of the policy-makers. As it is, the present set-up lends credence to the view that this may be a form of neo-colonialism. The following statement seems pertinent to what takes place at the moment: "Totalitarianism represents, in part, an attempt to allocate functions without granting control over the resources that the function requires, in order to prevent the growth of independent bases of power in the hands of subordinate".¹³

If the authorities took advantage of the remoteness of a revolution from below at present, to make certain concessions and to move more quickly, the homelands would have greater potential as a basis of a future South Africa. If only there were a change of attitude on the part of the powers-that-be. For example, suggestions by us on how their system can be improved should not be construed by them as demands or ultimatums as is the case at present. We are not even in a position to make demands or lay down ultimatums. After all, any suggestions we make are by way of compromises since the whole idea of homelands is not our baby. Even if the idea and the system are imposed, the fact that we are prepared to make serious suggestions should be good enough to warrant our being drawn into full participation in decision-making on this policy.

To rely on the fact that the White group is armed to the teeth is short-sighted if we are to go by the history of man. The mere existence of a vast military and security apparatus does not guarantee that there will be no revolution forever. Those who

believe in change through non-violent methods should explore other possibilities of averting such a danger.

Dialogue, and meaningful dialogue, can begin on the basis of homelands policy. After all, the Lusaka Manifesto adopted by all African States and the United Nations Organisation implied negotiations with South Africa under certain conditions. By participating in the implementation of separate development we are by implication committed to a meaningful negotiation even on its basis. This to me is dialogue without any prior conditions. After all, we certainly realize that the government has a mandate from its electorate to implement its policy. This policy could easily be the basis of a future South Africa if the government were prepared to negotiate with us seriously. The government, as representatives of the White electorate, can negotiate with us without fears of any back-lash from the White electorate. After all, as we have shown earlier, this whole policy has in any case undergone considerable evolution since the days of Dr. Malan.

Immediately a meaningful dialogue commenced here, even on the basis of homelands policy, all the pressures on South Africa would abate or even cease altogether. After all, White baasskap is no longer advanced even by representatives of the government as the basis for separate development. However, it is not what is said that matters but what we do in its implementation which is the acid test of whether it is no longer so.

Until even a few years ago, it was not even thinly masked that the purpose of separate development was to entrench white supremacy and baasskap forever. Now that the basis is the Promotion of Self-government Act of 1959 whose objects we have just seen, this should be an ideal time for eliminating some of the contradictions in the policy that corrode credibility. An example of these contradictions is to talk of total independence in one breath, and in the next to state that coastlines, security and defence matters will continue to be controlled by the Republic of South Africa. This would amount to much less than total independence in the dictionary sense of the word. If the aim is to convince Blacks that the policy is not based on any inferred inferiority of the African people or any attempt to dominate them, this should be made more manifest.

Africans find it impossible to accept that all developed parts of South Africa, which include all the major metropolitan areas, are "White territory". After all, the homelands which are regarded as Black territory were fixed and pegged under the 1913 Native Land Act of the SAP government.

The emotive arguments as to who was where, are no longer relevant less than 30 years before we reach the end of this century. Since all parties agree that both White and Black are permanently here to revive these emotional issues does more harm than good. If we seriously want dialogue then we must ensure that our dialogue takes place in as calm an atmosphere as we can muster. Dialogue implies that South Africa as we all know it should not be broken up into a series of independent states by unilateral decisions of the White group only. Even on the basis of the homelands concept we need to work out every detail jointly: this means by leaders of both Black and White.

The present on-going debate as to what independence is and its extent generates more heat than light because issues are fudged in numerous ways. The essential factor is that no-one wants the break-up of the resilient economy of South Africa. I have in the past referred to it as the goose that lays the golden egg for all South Africans, whether they be White or Black. This is so regardless of the question as to which section has the lion's share of the egg. This is an issue that should also not be skirted for too long. This is where we should begin to agree that the economy of South Africa belongs to all the people of South Africa.

It is also quite amazing to us that the boundaries cannot be discussed with us around a table and not through emissaries of one section to us as representatives of the other section. To base the determination of boundaries on ensuring that White farmers and predominantly White villages are not controlled within the envisaged Black states appears absolutely ridiculous. There is not a single African state on this continent that has not within it property owned and controlled by non-citizens of the state. This is not an issue that has any nexus with the question of boundaries of these states at all. It does not follow that all property, either in the form of farms or houses, in an African state must belong to Africans. Let there be no confusion of this issue with the entirely different question of how to secure and guarantee property rights of individuals or firms in such states. That is an entirely separate issue.

A Common Market?

Let us agree that the homelands policy means the emergence of states in which African interests are paramount. Let us also get clear the point that independence or autonomy of these new states should not be conditional on the breaking up of the integrated economy which is the life blood of all the peoples of South

Africa. The change should revolve on allowing each and every group to maintain its identity through new constitutional and political arrangements. After all, some people have even spoken of a Common Market for Southern Africa. Some South African economists envisage the formation of a Common Market (comprising all ten countries of "Southern" Africa (south of the Zaire-Zambezi divide). Among the reasons given for such a step is the fact that South Africa has invested large sums in neighbouring territories. South Africa's own mines and industries provide work and wages, and therefore foreign exchange, for more than a million foreign African immigrants who send back between 30 per cent and 60 per cent of their earnings to their own "homelands". South Africa sells large quantities of machinery, food, clothing and manufactured goods to all these territories and is in a position to supply technical aid at any time. Economists, however, point out that a successful Common Market relies on the fact that the economies of all its members are roughly about the same level. But the fact that at the present moment different stages of economic development of the ten countries militate against any closer association in the immediate future, should not entail abandoning the idea.¹⁴

If we all accept that the economy of South Africa belongs to all, let us also accept that the emergence of independent homelands is not contradictory to the idea of all the states, White or Black, being associated on certain matters of general concern.

A Federation?

As I have stated before, I believe, together with the Chief Minister of the Transkei, Paramount Chief K. D. Mantanzima, that this can be reduced to concrete constitutional terms through the federal formula or a federal commonwealth, such as we see in Canada, Australia or the United States.

When South Africa was made a unitary state, there was a strong move in favour of federation. The strong delegation of the Transvaal was, however, solidly behind the idea of a unitary state, led by General J. C. Smuts. The main reason why the unitary state lobby won the day was because all accepted the main argument that there was a need for a common policy on the Native questions or "problems" in the four provinces. In view of the present homelands policies pursued here there is no longer any need to adhere to this argument. The very fact that the Nationalist Government states that it is, through its homelands policies, giving Africans self-determination, is in itself a bold admission of the fact that the aspirations of Africans and of other

Blacks are not yet fulfilled or satisfied. That point having been conceded, there is justification for a harder look than was taken in 1910 at the present constitutional position in South Africa. The whole concept of separate development presents an ideal opportunity for the presentation of a federal structure in which Black and White fulfilment can be justly reached. One can sense a certain fear within Afrikanerdom that the creation of a federal state would not remove competition for power at the centre between the African majority and the White minority. However, it is complete separation that is fraught with more hazards we cannot predict than our togetherness in separate autonomous states linked together through a federal formula. These states would co-operate on certain vital matters of common concern. This would eliminate possibilities of the so-called "sacrifices" and "disasters" about which we have heard so much in the past decade or so. Black people are opposed to any idea of robbing the Whites of their birth-right and interests in the benefits of the South Africa they have contributed so much to build. At the same time this takes into account the understandable fears of the White people in relation to their economic position and standard of living. This will satisfy most aspirations of Blacks for the foreseeable future. This is the time when we should define problems in greater detail by leaving the ideological plane and getting to practical facts and figures.

We should start debating over which matters each state should exercise full authority and which they would wish to share. It should be debated now for which purposes the states should fall under the federal government. It seems obvious that a federal formula of the kind that raises the whole issue of power at the centre should be avoided. This seems to be the actual point of conflict between White and Black in our land. It should be possible to establish a common machinery for certain matters without raising the hardy annual of demand for control of a central parliament. This issue which bedevils any mutual understanding and mutual confidence could at least be postponed for several generations. During that time mutual confidence could grow to a point where agreement could be reached at the centre as well. The emphasis here is on constituent independent states that should be established in terms of the government's policy of separate development. If the homelands and other states are established justly in a manner which accommodates the aspirations of the African people and their economic interests, South Africa could have solved her problems through the homelands policy.

The financial implications of establishing such states will cost millions of Rands. The cost should, however, not exceed the astronomical figures that are at present set aside for defence. The need for spending so much would be eliminated once present inter-racial tensions in South Africa were eased by every group's security being guaranteed under this federal structure.

Three types of states could be envisaged in a federal republic or commonwealth:

- (1) States in which the interests of an African ethnic group are paramount;
- (2) States in which the interests of White people are paramount;
- (3) Special or federal areas which are multi-ethnic in character in which no particular group interests are designated.

It should not be impossible to agree on actual boundaries through negotiations, provided due regard is taken of the point already mentioned, namely, that the boundaries, as agreed upon, will include within a particular state farms or property owned by non-citizens of that state. For instance, if a state is established within boundaries of the Great Fish River in the west, the Katberg and Drakensberg mountains, the Umzimkulu River and the East Coast, such a state would be one in which the Xhosa national group's interests, are paramount. This would be so without depriving White farmers or Coloured workers of the right to own farms or work and live there, or the right, if they so desired and had the requisite qualifications, to be citizens of this State. It is nonsensical to imply that the establishment of a state in which a certain group's interests are paramount, means that all others must leave the area. It is this very failure to draw a clear distinction between state boundaries and the protection of vested interests, particularly of White voters, which causes the government to hesitate in the consolidation of states. Moreover, the talk of the concept of independence as meaning the total break-up of the Republic of South Africa bedevils the issue. It is a confusion of issues that is not necessary and that should be clarified now.

Matters such as various aspects of the economy and finance should be left to a federal authority in order to preserve the essential dynamism of the South African economy. At the same time we should dispense with old-fashioned constraints and restrictions such as those contained in the pass laws and influx control regulations. The harnessing of the labour force by means of compulsion and restraints of all kinds is chiefly associated with these methods of control. In the distant past there could have been

justification for the passes as a crude and effective means of ensuring that labour flowed in certain directions. Now that South Africa has reached such a high level of economic development this is unnecessary. I also think that no African state worth its salt would allow the humiliation of its citizens under the pass laws as they are operated at present. This is the time to design a system of labour and employment exchanges such as those that operate in European countries, for instance, for their so-called "guest workers". These function without any of the constraints and compulsion found in South Africa under our pass laws and influx control regulations. The emphasis should shift from a prohibition of "entry" into towns to a prohibition of entry into states. We should now work out effective state boundary regulations, so that the whole question becomes one of controlling movement from one state to another. An internal passport would ensure free travel outside a state provided the necessary formalities had been completed. A person travelling to another state would have a local passport or combined identity travelling document. This travel document would be endorsed for travel to that state either for a visit or to work. If it is the latter there should be in the passport a work permit issued in the home state in conjunction with the immigration department of the state to which the person is proceeding.

I and my Executive Council presented these suggestions to the Prime Minister of South Africa, Mr. B. J. Vorster, in a comprehensive memorandum in March last year. He appeared willing to listen to us and he conceded that a discussion of these suggestions was necessary between us and the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development. These discussions have not yet materialised. We hope we shall have the opportunity to pursue the matter with the Minister even before independence.

It should be clear, therefore, that the policy of establishing states in which this or that group's interests are paramount does not necessarily mean the break-up of the economic integration achieved in the economy of South Africa. All it means in effect is that provision is made for a common federal citizenship in addition to any state citizenship each person will enjoy. A common citizenship of South Africa as a whole is something which I believe all South Africans, whatever their colour or ethnic identity, will want to preserve.

The distribution or devolution of power from a unitary centre to a number of autonomous states would greatly reduce or even eliminate altogether for a long time the obsession of all groups

with central power or control thereof, which at the moment threatens the country with unrest and revolution.

Political power within each state must be based on popular will. Each state will naturally have the right to determine or draw up a constitution that suits itself as is already happening within the various homeland governments. Attempts would have to be made to ensure that in our participatory democracy in the Black states the educated African elite is included. These are people who would help the smooth running of the government machinery in these new states.

Each state would determine the question of franchise rights for itself. In most homelands anyone who has reached the age of 18, male or female, has a vote.

I have not come here to draw maps. I believe that the drawing of maps should be a matter of negotiation between representatives of Blacks and representatives of Whites. I am therefore giving the following examples of what I have been talking about without drawing actual maps in seriousness. I have no mandate to draw such maps either from the KwaZulu Government or any other homeland government, nor, for that matter, from the Republican Government which reserves for itself the right to determine these at present.

- (a) By way of illustration, there will be states in which a particular group's interests are paramount. Such states would be the White state or states, say, covering the Southern Transvaal, the Free State and Western Cape. Likewise, within this group fall states such as KwaXhosa or KwaZulu covering the "traditional" lands of these large African groups.
- (b) The other type of state would be that designated a federal state or a special area. This could be confined to a particular city or to an area. I am thinking here of something like the City-State of New York, or West Berlin in Germany. These are areas which it may not be expedient to designate for one particular group. For instance, it might be desirable to designate Cape Town as a federal area. This in practice would mean that the area or city is under one federal control. This will be clearer when the organisation of government at state or federal level is considered.

It might be helpful in fixing the boundaries of states to be guided in certain areas by what was the historical area of a particular people. Let me illustrate my point hypothetically by saying that for the Xhosa group, for example, it might cover an area encom-

passed by the Great Fish River; the Katberg Range; the Drakensberg mountains; the coastline from the Umzimkulu River to the Great Fish.

In the same hypothetical sense it might be suggested that Kwa-Zulu should, historically speaking, include the whole of the territory of present-day Natal. But at the very least then it can be suggested that such a territory should cover the areas over which King Cetshwayo ruled before the Zulu War of 1879.

In the same sense a third state of African paramountcy would be Sekhukhuniland (present-day Lebowa) as it was in the day of King Sekhukhuni.

A fourth would be the area previously known as British Bechuanaland which was always the land of the Batswana (present-day Bophuthatswana).

There would be other areas of African paramountcy, but I will not go into all of them since I do not want anyone to misunderstand my illustration as an attempt on my part to produce any blue-print.

Under these circumstances the central part of the White-controlled states might include the area known as the Natal Colony; the Southern Transvaal, the Orange Free State; the Cape; excluding the Tswana and Xhosa States. Since this would include virtually all the major cities of the Republic except East London, a major concession of this nature could only be possible within the framework of a federal structure. The rights of all the people permanently resident in such states, including urban and rural Africans, Coloured people and Asians, would have to be guaranteed to ensure that they would enjoy full citizenship status. In such states, the ethnic origin of their African citizens would be irrelevant. Africans, like Whites, would not be divided into ethnic groups for residential and other purposes, as is the position now.

All states, whether a specific group has paramountcy or not, will have the same legislative and executive powers and functions. There will, obviously, be no first and second-class states. Far-reaching change of this nature entails the abolition of the present provincial system as it exists under the present unitary form of government. Parliament in its present form would also cease to exist. Its place would be taken by a federal parliament composed of representatives of all the constituent states. It would be empowered to carry out those functions which by agreement have been vested in it.

The establishment of central and state parliaments would mean a shift of political attention from the single all-powerful parliament

which we have in South Africa at present. The advantage of the federal concept is that the federal principle ensures that the states and their legislatures will not be subordinate to a central parliament. The powers of a federal parliament and those of the states will be co-ordinated except in regard to those few matters which it is agreed should be left to the central federal parliament.

At present in the homelands, the powers of the legislature are specified. These powers are not exclusively held by homelands' legislature, as the Central Parliament can still legislate on the same subjects and in that event the will of the central legislature prevails. This makes the legislative powers of homelands' legislatures almost shadow powers.

The powers under a federal formula consist of:

- (a) those matters over which each state has exclusive control;
- (b) those matters over which the federal or central parliament has exclusive control;
- (c) those matters in which there is concurrent control in which case it must be specified which body has over-riding authority in the event of conflict. It would have to be agreed as to where residual power resides.

It might be wise to discuss whether the central or federal power should, generally speaking, control external immigration; boundaries and coastlines; currency and coinage; federal citizenship; defence and security except such specified local or state security as does not affect national interests; posts and telegraphs; external borrowing and loans and general banking control; have the right to declare a state of emergency either in each state or nationally. Then all other matters other than these might be vested in the states. Any matters which are unspecified or unforeseen which require legislation might fall under residual powers given to the central federal legislature.

State governments, as at present in the homelands, should continue to be led by a Chief Minister and a Cabinet responsible to him. The representation of the central government in each state could be through a governor who would be the head of the state and whose duties would be to perform the constitutional functions at state level which are performed by the Head of State at national or federal level.

From experience we know that the belief that the White people need security forces to preserve their property and vested interests is not correct. There can be no lasting security through oppressing other people. The maintenance of such forces to keep under control unarmed people has the effect of oppressing them and

creating hatred and resentment. After all, it is almost a century since Whites and Blacks were involved in any pitched battle. This is apart from the skirmishes during the Bambata Rebellion in KwaZulu in 1906.

This matter would therefore need delicate and careful handling as it is a sensitive issue. Each state or homeland needs its own state police force. Federal police should only interfere during a state of emergency. The presence of security forces in the homelands keep homelands' citizens under great fear. As long as the security forces are so active in homeland areas, it is false to say we can look forward to unrestricted politics without fear of victimisation. The exclusive control of military and security matters by Whites is cause for great resentment by Africans and is cause for great mistrust, since it is plain that Whites do not trust us either. A KwaZulu Government without any para-military force to patrol our own boundaries and to look after our own property is like a hornless bull. If this situation is perpetuated, it would mean that we were still hostages of Whites and independent only in name. It is essential that the control of these important spheres of activity are shared.

Foreign policy should be determined through participation by all citizens of a country, regardless of race. African officials at the OAU spoke for the African countries when they told me last month that they are not interested in dialogue with White South Africa unless there is meaningful dialogue in South Africa between Black and White. Africans in other states seems more attractive than Africans here. Is it because another man's grass always looks greener than one's own? Or because Africans here, on account of the subordinate position they are placed in, lack the mystique and charisma of Africans from independent states? Is it just a human trait that the girl from far away looks more exotic and attractive than the girl next door who, because of familiarity, looks plain and unattractive? Is it not true that invariably the girl next door tends to be more stable and more reliable? It is only if Africans in South Africa participate in the formulation of South Africa's foreign policy that they can be in a position to assist in carrying it out and defending it anywhere in the world. It might be advantageous for individual states to have their own trade representatives, but to have unified political representation by the Federal State on behalf of all the states.

Conclusion

Under the circumstances I have attempted to set out here, it should be possible for the homelands policy to be used as the basis of a formula for the South Africa of the future. My great concern is that we have so little time. It is urgently necessary for us to move in the directions I have indicated if the homelands policy is to be accorded any credibility within this country or abroad. Otherwise this policy will appear as no more than a form of neo-colonialism without the finesse of the former colonists. If the policy is static and no progress is made, what Professor Adam states, will be seen to be accurate: "Afrikaner domestic neo-colonialism, at least the Verwoerd and Vorster version, is much more enlightened than the traditional colonial methods of an Ian Smith in Rhodesia or of Portugal in Mozambique and Angola, both of whom manage without formal racial separation. Under the pressure of world opinion and the growing urbanized African proletariat, as well as a small non-White professional elite with a fifty-year-long struggle for emancipation behind them. Verwoerd realised that he had to create a political outlet for African Nationalism. The Bantustan policy is supposed to fulfil this function. It deflects political aspirations to areas where they are no danger to White rule. It meets the world-wide demand for African political rights in a fading colonial period by granting them the vote in remote areas, but not in their living and working places where they are merely given the status of rightless 'guest workers' ".¹⁵

In this connection it is just as well to look at another comment by another political scientist worth reading: "In the light of the external as well as the internal pressures that formed the setting within which the South African government embarked on the Transkeian experiment, would independence for the territory do anything to assuage foreign criticism and African resentment? By itself, and with its extremely limited resources, such a development would seem almost meaningless except, perhaps, to its small group of leaders and local inhabitants. The almost total dependence on the South African economy for even the livelihood of those in the territory, the lack of attractiveness of rural life to Africans brought up in urban areas, and the relatively small numbers affected in relation to the total African population of South Africa would all seem to make independence for the Transkei relatively unimportant in the total context. Even if the South African government should decide to pour massive funds into the Transkei and other African areas for which it plans comparable developments, it can hardly

be expected that either the Africans themselves or the outside world would feel that what was virtually a unilateral settlement by Whites for a small, impoverished area could compare with the progressive extension of political, social, and economic rights for Africans within the present boundaries of South Africa".¹⁶

This comment applies to all the homelands, and this will be a final verdict on the future of all of them unless there is a radical change of attitude by the powerful in this land, and unless the tempo and style of dialogue are also radically changed in the manner I have outlined in so much detail. This is my conviction. It is not a Trojan horse. It represents sleepless nights of many of my people about the future of their country and their own.

It is no attempt at pontification about the crisis in our land. It represents our attempts as Black people to bend over backwards, in our attempts to meet our White countrymen who wield power over us. We are still willing to participate in meaningful dialogue even on the basis of formulae such as separate development, which were conceived by Whites solely from all-White perspectives. What more can we do?

REFERENCES

- ¹ *South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit*, by R. F. Alfred Hoernlé — Preface, p. (vii).
- ² *Apartheid And The Archbishop*, by Alan Paton, p. 112.
- ³ *South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit*, by R. F. Alfred Hoernlé — Preface, p. (vii).
- ⁴ *Black And White In South Africa* (The Politics of Survival), (Library of the 20th Century), by G. H. L. Le May, p. 22.
- ⁵ *Ibid*, p. 21.
- ⁶ *Ibid*, p. 45.
- ⁷ *Ibid*, p. 53.
- ⁸ *The Law And Custom Of The South African Constitution*, by W. P. M. Kennedy and H. J. Schlosberg, pp. 459-460.
- ⁹ G. H. L. le May, *op cit.*, p. 93.
- ¹⁰ *From Union To Apartheid*, by Margaret Ballinger, p. 316.
- ¹¹ *By Any Means Necessary*, by Malcolm X. (Edited by George Breitman), (Pathfinder Press, Inc., New York, 1970), p. 178.
- ¹² *Modernizing Racial Domination* (The Dynamics of South African Politics) by Heribert Adam (University of California Press), p. 70.
- ¹³ *Political Power And Social Theory* (Cambridge and Harvard University Press 195-8), p. 22.
- ¹⁴ *South Africa: Nation Or Nations*, by Professor David L. Niddrie (Van Nostrand Searchlight book), Princeton, New Jersey, Toronto, Melbourne, London (1968), p. 120.
- ¹⁵ Heribert Adam, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.
- ¹⁶ *South Africa's Transkei* (The Politics of Domestic Colonialism) by Professors Gwendoline Carter, Thomas Karis and Newell M. Stulz, pp. 180-181.