

# A NEW PARADIGM OF THE AFRICAN STATE

Fundi wa Afrika



MUENI WA MUIU  
AND GUY MARTIN



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Mueni wa Muiu and Guy Martin

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*To you, African children, so that you  
may continue to fight for a free Africa*

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## ACRONYMS

ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
AFDL	<i>Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo</i> (Alliance of democratic forces for the liberation of Congo) [DRC]
AGOA	Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (United States)
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ANC	African National Congress (South Africa)
AU	African Union
CFA	<i>Communauté financière africaine</i> (African financial community)
CIAT	<i>Comité international qui accompagne la transition</i> (International Committee for the Support of the Transition) [DRC]
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FAR	<i>Forces Armées Rwandaises</i> (Rwandan Armed Forces)
FAS	Federation of African States
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GEAR	Growth, Employment & Redistribution (South Africa)
GNU	Government of National Unity (South Africa)
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction & Development (World Bank)
IFI	International Financial Institution
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party (South Africa)
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Greater Horn of Africa)
IMF	International Monetary Fund

LDCs	Less Developed Countries
MCA	Millennium Challenge Account
MLC	<i>Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo</i> (Movement for the Liberation of Congo) [DRC]
MNC	Multinational Corporation
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo]
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NNP	New National Party (South Africa)
NP	National Party (South Africa)
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ONUC	United Nations Operation in Congo (DRC) [Opération des Nations Unies au Congo]
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress (South Africa)
PTA	Preferential Trade Area for Eastern & Southern African States
RCD	<i>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie</i> (Congoese Rally for Democracy) [DRC]
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme (South Africa)
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SACP	South African Communist Party
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
TNC	Transnational Corporation
UAM	Union of the Arab Maghreb
UDPS	<i>Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social</i> (Union for Democracy & Social Progress) [DRC]
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific & Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Infant & Children's Fund
UPC	<i>Union des Populations du Cameroun</i> (Union of the People of Cameroon)
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

## CREDITS

As a new paradigm, *Fundi wa Afrika* was first introduced by Mueni wa Muiu as an article entitled “*Fundi Wa Afrika: Toward a New Paradigm of the African State*” in the *Journal of Third World Studies* 19, no. 2 (Fall 2002): 23–42.

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## INTRODUCTION

# THE RATIONALE FOR A NEW THEORY OF THE AFRICAN STATE

AFRICA IS A VERY LARGE CONTINENT (FIG. 1.1). Its population is diverse in terms of culture, class, gender, religion, ethnicity, and race. African societies differ in their development. In some regions (e.g., West Africa), indigenous institutions have survived in some form longer than in others (e.g., East and Southern Africa). Every country has some mineral resources. While some countries' resources have been systematically exploited (e.g., Algeria, Angola, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and South Africa), others (e.g., Ethiopia, Eritrea, Malawi, Mali, and Senegal) are still relatively undeveloped. Some countries—like Egypt, Ethiopia, and Nigeria—have large populations. In addition, there is a variety of religious beliefs. By “African,” we mean people who identify themselves as such and who consider Africa their home. By “Africa” we mean all fifty-four African member states of the African Union, including North Africa and the Atlantic and Indian Ocean island states.

Africanist scholars working on—and international organizations dealing with—Africa have a tendency to subdivide the fifty-four states making up the continent. Being considered predominantly Arab and Muslim, North Africa is usually linked to the Middle East. “Sub-Saharan Africa” is used to refer to Africa south of the Sahara and north of the Limpopo River. It is in this region that chaos, conflict, disease, and hunger prevail. The Western media generally portrays sub-Saharan Africa as hopeless and its people as helpless victims who can only survive through Western assistance. In this representation, South Africa is treated as an exceptional case. This study rejects the premise of South African exceptionalism. The South African type of colonialism (or settler colonialism) also prevailed in other countries on the continent, such as Algeria, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, and Kenya. As Mahmood Mamdani has noted, *apartheid* was, in essence, an extreme form of colonialism.<sup>1</sup> Its Bantustan policy was a form of British indirect rule in Nigeria. In addition, African studies are plagued by the tendency to emphasize ethnic differences as one of the major causes of conflict in Africa. For example, the pre-civil war stability in Somalia was explained in terms






Figure 1.1 Source: Wayne Edge, *Global Studies: Africa* (Dubuque, IA: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2006), 3.

of its ethnic homogeneity. When it comes to Africa, social groups are subdivided *ad infinitum* to the smallest unit to explain the inherently violent nature of African states and societies.

The image that emerges is that of Africans as “barbarians,” though in a more nuanced form than during the social Darwinism of the mid-1800s. By using Western concepts to study African countries, rather than studying them in their own right and in the context of their indigenous culture and institutions, Africa then emerges as a complete failure; indeed, the imported Westphalian state system itself has been a dismal failure. Furthermore, most studies assume that the only path open to African countries is westernization. Africa can only be understood when it is studied in its own right rather than as a mere reflection of Western countries.

The representation of Africa as a hopeless basket case is not accidental (see Figure 1.2). Negative representations of Africa are plagued by contradictions. On

the one hand, African countries are presented as poor, chaotic, overpopulated, and dependent, always in need of foreign assistance. On the other hand, Western firms, nongovernmental organizations, professionals, and farmers compete to settle in these countries in what constitutes a “new scramble for Africa.” A long-term historical perspective will explain why Western countries continue to perceive African resources as naturally belonging to them.

The authors of this study acknowledge the existence of similarities across the continent that act as unifying factors in indigenous African communities. By indigenous Africa, we mean Africa from the ninth century BCE. (before the Christian era) to AD 1500 (the onset of the trans-Atlantic slave trade). In this study, we focus exclusively on the trans-Atlantic slave trade because of its devastating impact on politics, economies, and societies of Africa. Some features of indigenous African institutions changed as groups migrated from one region of Africa to another, or as they were conquered by other groups who forced them to adopt their own cultures and traditions.

First, as we will demonstrate in Chapter 2, there is a fundamental cultural unity of Africa that can be traced back to Egypt and Kush (ninth century BCE). This



**Figure 1.2** Africa going down the drain. Source: Bado, *Le Droit* (Ottawa, Canada), November 1996; reproduced from Kevin C. Dunn, *Imagining the Congo* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 168

common cultural foundation informs African social structures. Second, indigenous Africa was characterized by social stratification and economic inequalities. Third, indigenous African religions were informed by a variety of belief systems found in Kimit (Egypt) and Kush. Religion mystified power. Physical events were linked to the spiritual sphere, and communities' leaders were involved in both.

Fourth, power was not personalized, but was linked to the institution. The leader was the custodian of the peoples' property and wealth—be it land or minerals—and held it in trust for the whole community. In matrilineal communities—such as the Luba/Lunda—women owned property in their own right. In Dahomey and Monomotapa, elite women soldiers were rewarded with property, including land.

Fifth, political systems and institutions were based on kinship and ancestry (lineage) informed by a founding myth. They were also based on custom and tradition in which constitutions were not written. Members of the community learned their history through oral tradition that was passed on from generation to generation. In West Africa, *griots* (praise-singers) were instrumental in keeping the memory of the community.

Sixth, the gender division of labor also exhibited some similarities. For example, in patrilineal societies, men were hunters and women tilled the land. In matrilineal societies, women also sometimes engaged in hunting. Seventh, organizations acted as support bases for the system by providing for the social welfare of the community. For example, secret organizations—whether made up of only male or female members—helped rulers govern by advising them. Raising children was a communal affair because any adult, anywhere, could punish a child who misbehaved.

Both slavery and colonialism fundamentally transformed African communities and altered the fabric of African societies. “Legitimate” trade replaced a type of slavery in which Africans worked on large plantations with little or no pay. As we shall see, this trade was much more beneficial to Western countries than to Africa. Violence and moral decay became the norm rather than the exception. Human beings ceased to be the center of development. Power, authority, and respect now depended on the possession of wealth, slaves and weapons. The long-term historical approach used by *Fundi* throws new light on the atrocities of colonialism that are usually downplayed and glossed over.

The Westphalian state system, which was imposed on African countries with the introduction of colonialism, continued to inform these countries. Since their economies were tied to their former colonial powers in a dependent and unequal relationship, African countries could not follow a path leading to economic independence. Such an attempt usually resulted in currency devaluation, chaos, and sometimes, in civil war. Whenever a system became inefficient or unpopular, some of its aspects were changed. Thus one-party, authoritarian rule became unpopular with the fall of the Soviet Union and the demise of socialism. It was replaced by liberal, multiparty democracy based on the rule of law and on free and fair elections—as in South Africa—but the (colonial) essence of the African

states did not change. These cosmetic changes helped silence the majority of the people in African countries, as well as Western critics of imperialism. Furthermore, “independence” silenced critics of colonialism by transferring power to a moderate African elite who did not question the economic hold of Western countries on their economies once a few crumbs were thrown their way. As a result, in most African countries, endemic, low-intensity conflict keeps the majority of the population on the verge of starvation and has become the norm rather than the exception.

To maintain the image of Western countries as “liberators” of Africans from chaos, disease, and war, it is important to present African history from the 1850s, when these societies were marked by endemic conflict and chaos, rather than using a long-term historical perspective that looks at Africa from antiquity to the present. By focusing on Africa from 1500 or the 1850s, African history and political institutions are fragmented so that the reader is left with the impression that Africans have always been dependent on Western countries. Most positive aspects of indigenous institutions are ignored. African institutions are presented as if they began with the advent of colonial rule. The fallacious pretext—contradicted by the recent progress of African historiography—given for this omission is a supposed “lack of sources.” African history is taught as a chronology of the triumph of Western agencies over African leaders in most schools. This perspective tends to downplay the role of Africa’s first independent states such as Egypt, Kush and Ethiopia. Without success stories to look up to, it is easy to believe that Africans have made little or no contribution to world civilization. It also justifies the constant meddling by Western countries in the internal affairs of African countries.

We can only understand the multifaceted crisis that affects most African countries today (a dysfunctional and bankrupt economy, disease, ethnic conflict, and war) by adopting an interdisciplinary and long-term historical perspective. We must necessarily address the population issue, which is often glossed over in African studies. Thus, we link the Western need for access to African resources with the promotion and implementation of African population control policies, leading to genocide. A multidisciplinary perspective is necessary because only then can we get a panoramic view capable of fully explaining the conditions prevailing in contemporary Africa. Ideally, such a perspective should include history, archeology, linguistics, literature, anthropology, sociology, geography, geopolitics, political science, and economics. For practical reasons—and because of our disciplinary specialization—the present study focuses primarily on history, political science, geopolitics, and economics, but also (to a lesser extent) on anthropology, sociology, and literature.

Some readers may find such a perspective too broad and may say that it is incredibly bold. It is broad because what we present here is a template for understanding Africa. Because of limited space, we obviously can analyze only two case studies. Furthermore, it behooves African studies scholarly community to apply *Fundi* to specific country case studies to prove its validity. *Fundi* is bold because in order to find solutions that address the root of Africa’s problems, rather than

the symptoms, one has to be bold. The rationale behind our analytical focus on African institutions has to do with our belief that the contribution of Africa to world development is much more complex than the portrayal by the international media of Africa as a zone of chaos, disease, conflict, and war. Such an approach enables us to highlight the contribution of Africa to world civilization, as well as its potential for economic development. *Fundi* uses Congo (the Democratic Republic of Congo, ex-Zaire) as one of its case studies. Congo presents a unique case in Africa because of its size, population, strategic location at the heart of the continent, abundance of natural resources, high level of conflict, and meddling by both African and foreign powers. Using *Fundi* to analyze the Congo case highlights the complexity of the interests at stake. An understanding of the African state and of the impact of slavery, colonialism, neocolonialism, and liberal democracy on Africa begins with an analysis of the Congo case. Rejecting the premise of South African exceptionalism, *Fundi* uses South Africa as another case study. Why South Africa? Like Congo, South Africa is large in size and population, is strategically located, and is richly endowed in mineral resources. The colonial encounter began in 1652, but it was only in the mid-1890s that African indigenous leaders were militarily defeated. Protest against colonial rule continued by other means. South Africa is the most westernized African country culturally and institutionally, thus providing a challenging case for *Fundi*. This theoretical framework best explains South Africa's trajectory. Furthermore, a new Congolese and South African leadership using *Fundi* as ideology can contribute enormously to Africa's development through an efficient use of its mineral resources. South Africa was allowed to industrialize and to build a strong security apparatus because a white minority—allied to the West in the struggle against "communism"—controlled it. Congo, on the other hand, was not allowed to industrialize beyond some copper mining refineries in Katanga. *Fundi* throws light on the issues at stake and how these issues continue to influence policy. Congo and South Africa are crucial in understanding the African predicament. One presents a picture of disease, conflict, war, and chaos, while the other presents an image of political stability and economic growth based on a liberal democracy that condemns the majority of the population to poverty. Yet Congo and South Africa have three features in common. First, in both countries, the majority of the people are poor. Second, foreign values and ideals—rather than African culture and traditions—continue to shape development in both countries. Finally, both countries are richly endowed with natural and human resources. Indeed, from a geopolitical standpoint, both Congo and South Africa hold the key to Africa's development. This explains why we chose these two countries as case studies.

Some readers may argue that *Fundi* is anti-Western and "ungrateful" for all the Western efforts to "modernize" Africa and to "uplift" Africans from poverty. While this theory uses a long-term historical perspective to study the African state, it does not imply that African countries are homogenous. They are informed by gender, class, religious, and racial cleavages. Regarding the responsibility of Western countries in the exploitation of Africa, *Fundi* does not generalize because the

degree and methods of exploitation vary according to country and circumstances. It is important to note in this regard that *Fundi* does not put all the blame for Africa's predicament on the West and does not exonerate African leaders for their share of responsibility in this situation. It simply tries to present the facts as objectively and dispassionately as possible. And the historical record shows without a doubt that Western countries do bear the primary responsibility for Africa's current political, economic, and financial problems. Ultimately, however, Africans alone will have to assume responsibility for their own development.

Other critics may say that *Fundi* is "nostalgic" and that it seeks to "glorify the past" and to go back to a bygone "golden age." Is it any more "nostalgic" to say that Western civilization began with ancient Greece, as is commonly taught in all the schools of Western countries, than to say that African history begins in the ninth century BCE with Egypt and Kush (which is rarely, if ever, taught in African schools)? Is Africa the only region in the world where such an approach is uncalled for, and if so, what is the cost of this omission?

The most extreme critical reaction to *Fundi* to date comes from the African social sciences academic community itself. In December 2005, Mueni wa Muiu had the opportunity to present *Fundi* at the eleventh General Assembly of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) in Maputo (Mozambique)—with the appropriate theme, "Rethinking African Development: Beyond Impasse, Towards Alternatives"—in front of an audience of about sixty scholars from across the continent. An older generation of African scholars—mainly from Congo, Tanzania, and South Africa—took Mueni to task and peremptorily declared that there was nothing new in these ideas, that some of these ideas—notably Africanism and pan-Africanism—had already been put forward in the 1900s (Edward Blyden), 1960s (Kwame Nkrumah), and (within a Marxist framework) 1970s (Issa Shivji). In other words, according to these scholars, *Fundi* was simply "old wine in new bottles," a mere rehash of old theories and worn-out clichés, and (as one commentator put it) a mere "wish list" or "shopping list." These scholars seem to conveniently ignore the fact that, contrary to our argument, Blyden was an enthusiastic advocate of Western culture and saw no redeeming value in African culture and traditions and that Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist ideal of a Union of African States did not entail—as we suggest—the destruction of the colonial states or reconnecting with the best features of African indigenous culture, tradition, and institutions.

**Chapter 1** reviews various theories and approaches used to study the African state. This review includes older—but still used—theories and approaches, namely modernization, dependency, and statism. This chapter also examines various reconstructionist approaches of the African state, namely, the failed, criminalized, or chaotic state; comparative geopolitics; the quasi-state, the colonial state in comparative perspective; postmodernist; and compatible cultural democracy. It concludes that, except for the latter, none of these theories and approaches satisfactorily explains—and offers a way out of—the African predicament (though each offers partial insights on African politics).



**Chapter 2** uses *Fundi* to analyze indigenous African political systems and institutions from the ninth century BCE to the nineteenth century AD. Our survey shows that indigenous African states were based on a bottom-up—rather than a top-down—approach to political power: they were people-centered rather than authoritarian. Political power was not the ultimate goal, but only a means toward a higher purpose. Power was sufficiently decentralized to allow for popular participation. Most important of all was the fact that the state was wholly institutionalized and part and parcel of the society, as it was based on the interests, priorities, and needs of the people.

In **Chapter 3**, we analyze the changes that African political institutions underwent under colonial rule. Some of these changes—for example, the divide between the modern and rural sectors, divorcing rulers from their subjects, using coercion to govern rather than consent, and marginalizing African intellectuals—were entrenched during colonialism. Colonial rule refers to the direct occupation and control of Africa by various European powers, and to the exclusive use of African resources for the development of Europe.

**Chapter 4** uses *Fundi* to link conflict and genocide to African resources. We argue that from the trans-Atlantic slave trade of the fifteenth through the nineteenth centuries to the present time, Western countries with the support of some African leaders—have pursued policies designed to eliminate Africa's population in order to gain exclusive access to the natural resources of the continent. Africa also serves the west's commodity requirements, and constitutes its main source of mineral resources. Given the size of the continent, we note that Africa is underpopulated. In **Chapter 5**, we argue that World Bank policies, democratization, and globalization are not geared to improve the dire conditions of the majority of people in Africa. Instead, these policies are meant to strengthen the unequal relationship between Western and African countries in which the former dictates development in the latter. In post-cold war Africa, the North-South conflict centers around Western access to cheap labor, markets, and resources from the continent.

**Chapter 6** introduces the reader to our first country case study: the Congo. Using *Fundi*, this chapter explains Congo's predicament in terms of its burdened historical relationship with the West based on political and sociocultural domination and economic exploitation, and the pursuit by the West of a consistent and systematic policy of "balkanization" or "divide and rule" vis-à-vis the Congo. **Chapter 7**—which focuses on Belgian imperialism and colonialism and on the first three republics of independent Congo—takes the political history of the Congo into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. **Chapter 8** begins the case study of South Africa by examining indigenous Southern African political institutions and how these changed under segregationist British colonial policies. The chapter focuses on four areas: the relationship between rulers and subjects, the role of political institutions, the responsibilities of individuals as members of the community, and gender relations. This is followed, in **Chapter 9**, by a study of

how Afrikaner and British administrations transformed African political institutions between 1910 and 1948 and by a discussion of the origins of the modern South African state—particularly its relationship to the ruled. This discussion reveals the progressive alienation of Africans from their institutions and the South African state. This **chapter** also examines how indigenous institutions under the apartheid regime in South Africa (1948–94) related to the African population and to the state. It shows the demeaning of African culture and how that culture continued to be bastardized under apartheid. The chapter also examines the state under the African majority rule of the African National Congress (ANC) government.

**Chapter 10** introduces our paradigm: *Fundi wa Africa*. It shows how governance, as well as economic and foreign relations, must be restructured to benefit the majority of the people. *Fundi wa Africa's* main focus of analysis is the state. It examines the nature of the African state, how it was shaped, whose values shaped it, and how this affected the state's relationship with its citizens. Indeed, the nature of the African state determines the framework of its political, economic, and social interaction with the subregional, regional, and international environment. Such an approach implies that the state becomes the main unit of analysis and the central focus of our study. In the remainder of the chapter, we examine, in some detail, the federal politico-institutional structure and economic policy of this new, reconstructed African state, the *Federation of African States* (FAS), based on five subregional states (Kimit, Mali, Kongo, Kush, and Zimbabwe).

Our **conclusion** restates the case against contemporary theories and approaches to the study of African politics, against the unreformed and dysfunctional colonial African state, and for *Fundi wa Afrika*. We emphasize the need to build a new, viable modern African state. In brief, Africa must solve its problems the African way. Therein, we conclude, resides the secret to Africa's resolution of its predicament and the key to its future development.



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# THEORIES OF THE AFRICAN STATE

## FROM MODERNIZATION TO RECONSTRUCTIONIST

### MODERNIZATION THEORY

THE BASIC PREMISE OF MODERNIZATION THEORY IS THAT AFRICAN SOCIETIES ARE “in the process of becoming modern rational entities in which efficiency and scientific logic replace traditional values and belief systems.”<sup>1</sup> Since 1960, development in African countries has followed the modernization path. Peter Schwab uses modernization theory to study state collapse using case studies from Africa.<sup>2</sup> He argues that the nation-states of sub-Saharan Africa “exist only nominally [and] have all but ceased to exist as coherent and organized entities.”<sup>3</sup> Schwab notes that sub-Saharan Africa has, in the past decade, been visited by the “Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse,” namely Conquest, War, Famine, and Death.<sup>4</sup> Schwab explains—with case studies from Ghana, South Africa, Kenya, and Mozambique—that globalization has largely passed Africa by.<sup>5</sup> According to him, the high rate of the AIDS epidemic in African countries, lack of democracy, and neglect by the United States have limited the chances for these countries of achieving economic development.<sup>6</sup> According to Schwab, “The slave trade, colonialism, and the Cold War left Africa with a ruinous heritage that has been exceedingly difficult to subdue.”<sup>7</sup> He concludes that it is up to Africans to take the development initiative for the continent.<sup>8</sup>

Bill Berkeley’s main argument is that “ethnic conflict in Africa is a product of tyranny.”<sup>9</sup> He provides a detailed analysis of colonialism and, especially, its “indirect rule” variant.<sup>10</sup> He observes that tribalism is a modern phenomena that “evolved in response to outside interventions rather than in spite of them.”<sup>11</sup> Ethnic conflict in African countries may be compared to organized crime (the Mafia) or to the street gangs of south-central Los Angeles (California). But in Africa, the stakes are higher.<sup>12</sup>

Scott Peterson provides a rare insider's view on conflict in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda.<sup>13</sup> Several themes connect these conflicts. First, the Somali conflict demonstrates that United States' foreign policy toward Somalia as the trial run of the new world order was a total failure. Second, the United States' failure to intervene in Rwanda's genocide, and its refusal to call the killings a genocide, resulted in the death of between 800,000 and one million Rwandese.<sup>14</sup> Peterson discusses the extremes that inform the complexities of war to demonstrate the "dark side" and "the hope, love, and healing that sometimes emerge despite of it."<sup>15</sup> Comparing the former Yugoslavia war tribunal's effect in exposing war crimes to the injustice he witnessed in these case studies, Peterson notes that it was "as if a decision had been made somewhere, that Africa and Africans were not worthy of justice."<sup>16</sup> Innocent civilian populations were attacked in contravention to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.<sup>17</sup>

Daniel Bergner tells the "Story of White and Black in West Africa."<sup>18</sup> Bergner aims at answering the following question: "Could a place so abject be even partly rescued?"<sup>19</sup> Sierra Leone longed to be recolonized, thus confirming the modernization paradigm. When the British soldiers arrived in Sierra Leone, government officials welcomed them back as "our colonial masters" who would set "our country straight."<sup>20</sup>

Roel van der Veen argues that Africa should forget about ever industrializing and should concentrate on production and export of the primary products (agricultural and minerals) that "Africa has possessed in abundance since time immemorial" and for which it has a distinct "comparative advantage."<sup>21</sup> According to this author, the modernization paradigm also points to specifically African cultural obstacles to development.<sup>22</sup> Similarly, African politics presumably suffers from a lack of adequately educated people.<sup>23</sup> In brief, internal factors are to blame for Africa's failure to develop.<sup>24</sup>

In a recent survey of Africa, Martin Meredith views European leadership as indispensable for economic development in British east and central Africa. Meredith argues that the degree of development achieved by various ethnic groups and nations in Africa depends on the length of contact and degree of closeness with European colonialists, as well as on the presence—or absence—of a sizeable white settler community viewed as the engine of development.<sup>25</sup> Modernization theory has been much criticized for treating African societies as though they had no history, and for assuming that African indigenous culture, traditions and institutions were an obstacle to economic development. Based on this approach, African states should follow a pattern of development similar to that of the West. Modernization theory has led to Western countries, transnational corporations, and non-governmental organizations' total control over African countries, leaders, resources and economies. Since 1960, economic, political, social and cultural development in African countries has followed—with dire consequences—the modernization trajectory, in spite of the theory's obvious shortcomings and dismal failure.

### DEPENDENCY THEORY

According to this approach, external factors (especially the world capitalist economy) explain Africa's predicament. This puts the periphery (less developed countries) in a situation of permanent dependence vis-à-vis the center (European countries). Such a situation, these authors argue, is inherent in the capitalist system itself. Thus, while some authors are of the opinion that possibilities for autonomous capitalist development exist in the periphery countries, others advocate the complete withdrawal (or delinking) of these countries from the world capitalist system. The latter see such a delinking as a prerequisite to the autonomous, self-centered, independent development of the periphery countries.<sup>26</sup>

A prime example of neo-Marxist analysis of underdevelopment and dependency applied to Africa is Walter Rodney's *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*.<sup>27</sup> According to Rodney, the answer to the two key questions—why Africa has realized so little of its potential and why so much of its present wealth goes outside of the continent—resides in two factors that have brought about underdevelopment throughout the period of Africa's participation in the capitalist economy, namely, wealth from African labor and restrictions on African's economic capacity.<sup>28</sup> Western European capitalists—assisted by African sellouts, or accomplices—actively extended their exploitation to cover the whole continent.<sup>29</sup>

Dependency theory has been much criticized for its pessimistic evaluation of Africa's future development prospects.<sup>30</sup> Colin Leys identified the following as the most problematic aspects of the theory: (i) it does not provide a clear and operational definition of "development"; (ii) it is unclear whether the masses in the underdeveloped countries suffer from exploitation or not; (iii) dependency theory is far too broad; (iv) dependency theory tends to be economicist; (v) the concept of "imperialism" appears in dependency theory only as an "extra"; (vi) it is not clear what the central unit of analysis in dependency theory is; (vii) it does not provide any explanation of why more capital did not get invested and accumulated in the Third World in the past.<sup>31</sup> It is not really an accident that it is the simplistic binary concepts that are at the core of dependency theory. This fact, in his view, explains why the concept of "underdevelopment" is empirically so weak as to be almost meaningless.<sup>32</sup> André Gunder Frank concludes: "Development theory based on any idea of 'autonomous' national development, on any conception of 'de-linking' is, therefore, an illusion."<sup>33</sup>

### THE STATIST APPROACH

Statist scholars argue that African leaders "have created structures of domination that have enabled them to misuse their offices to reap personal gains at the expense of the pressing needs of the bulk of the population."<sup>34</sup> Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar use a variant of this approach in an edited volume.<sup>35</sup> They propose six specific attributes of the state: monopoly of coercion; territorialization of rule; fixed population; sovereignty; economic and cultural activities; and recognition by other states.<sup>36</sup> The authors go on to identify five different types of states,

ranging from the most effective to the least effective: integral, developmental, prebendal, predatory, and cadaverous.<sup>37</sup> The authors clearly give primacy to the internal (over the external) factors in their analysis.<sup>38</sup>

Leonardo A. Villalon refers to three components of the African state: first, elites find themselves forced to make reforms because of pressures for change on the state; second, the choices made during the critical juncture are constrained by past choices; and finally, “the concept of a critical juncture suggests that choices made and actions taken in this period will shape the nature of the state and of state-society relations for some relatively significant time to come.”<sup>39</sup>

In an incisive and thought-provoking introductory chapter, Nzongola-Ntalaja analyzes the meaning of democracy, examines the major problems facing democratic transition in Africa today, and concludes that democracy is a moral imperative as well as a continuous social process of expanding political space in the interest of the people.<sup>40</sup> In the following chapters, four prominent Nigerian political scientists (J. Ibrahim, S. Adejumo, A. Momoh, and D. Olowu) take a critical look at various political, social, and institutional obstacles impeding progress towards democracy in Nigeria.<sup>41</sup>

Robert Fatton, Jr., takes issue with the characterization of the African state as “soft.” He argues that the perception of the state in Africa as a “weak, factionalized, and ineffective bureaucratic apparatus that consistently fails both to improve its authority and to serve the general interest” is flawed because it assumes that a “hard” state is necessarily efficient and promotes the general or national welfare or serves the common good. Fatton argues that states cannot be “divorced from the material, political, and ideological interests of the ruling class.” Fatton believes that the African state is “hard,” but is going through a development stage in which it is being used to “coordinate both the emerging rule of the ruling class, and the subordination of the dominated classes.”<sup>42</sup>

According to S. N. Sangpam, “overpoliticization clearly distinguishes the third world state from the capitalist democratic state of the West.”<sup>43</sup> In a case study of Nigeria, Richard Joseph introduced the notion of the “prebendal state.” In his view, politics is the struggle over scarce resources. This struggle differs from country to country. It does not follow a continuous pattern. The core of a prebendalist state is to protect its immediate interests and those of its associates.<sup>44</sup> William Reno developed the concept of “shadow state,” by which he refers to “a very real, but not formally recognized, patronage system that was rigidly organized and centered on rulers’ control over resources.”<sup>45</sup> In the same vein, authors of the French *École de Bordeaux*, led by Jean-François Bayart, reject approaches that focus on the state. They argue that African political analysis must rather concentrate on the subtle and covert (yet efficient) methods of resistance and protest developed by the oppressed masses, thus depicting African societies as active subjects (rather than passive objects) of history. The most sophisticated theoretical elaboration of this approach is that of Bayart in his *The State in Africa*.<sup>46</sup>

Bayart *et al.* stress the potentially positive and systemically functional role played by such otherwise disruptive and dysfunctional factors as war, crime,

corruption, witchcraft, and economic dependence in contemporary African politics. Indeed, Bayart goes as far as to argue that war has become *the* dominant mode of state formation in contemporary Africa.<sup>47</sup> For Bayart, the African state of the future will definitely be a predatory and militarized state: “Most of the contemporary wars are the extreme expressions of the ‘system of states’ (based on terror) which has thus constituted itself south of the Sahara.”<sup>48</sup> In *Africa Works*, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz provide a superficial analysis of contemporary African politics. According to these authors, the present crisis in Africa results from modernity. African culture and personality are core determinants of African politics and state action. Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz’s paradigm, which they call “the political instrumentalization of disorder,” is a new and improved version of modernization theory.<sup>49</sup>

Michael G. Schatzberg looks at government in what he calls “middle Africa”: Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania. He notes that existing paradigms misunderstand the nature of political legitimacy in Africa because, since the 1990s, there is an underlying assumption that electoral democracy is legitimate. According to Schatzberg, this approach is wrong because it undermines Africa’s political culture.<sup>50</sup> Jeffrey Herbst analyzes the problems of state creation and consolidation in Africa over the last one hundred years from the precolonial to the postcolonial eras.<sup>51</sup> He argues that “states are only viable if they are able to control the territory defined by their borders” and, following Harry Eckstein, he develops “an analytic perspective that allows the African experience to be understood in comparative perspective.”<sup>52</sup> Briefly stated, Herbst’s argument is that the fundamental problem confronting leaders of African states is “how to broadcast power over sparsely settled lands.”<sup>53</sup> More specifically, “African leaders across time and space have faced certain similar issues when trying to rule and have often come to similar conclusions on how to solve the problems they have faced . . .”<sup>54</sup> Herbst notes that “the traditional bias in favor of large states is irrelevant to Africa” and that “small size is an advantage given the particular challenges faced by African countries.”<sup>55</sup> Herbst concludes that “the Berlin Conference [of 1884–5] . . . had little immediate effect on politics in most of Africa.” Herbst’s unfavorable comparative analysis of African and European state-building tends to over-emphasize the role of raw power, conflict, and war in Africa while minimizing such factors in the European context. Ultimately, this line of reasoning takes us back to modernization theory.<sup>56</sup> Christopher Clapham examines the impact of personal rule on African states. According to him, African rulers have devised ways of survival. Weak economies and bureaucracies characterized monopoly states. The state was identified with the leader and political opposition was not common.<sup>57</sup>

In “Botswana: Comprehending the Exceptional State,” Abdi Ismail Samatar looks at the role of a homogeneous elite in limiting internal strife. Seretse Khama—Botswana’s first president—surrounded himself with talented people who had the country’s interests at heart: “To the peasants he was chief; for the small elite he was one of them; he was a cattle owner; for the chiefs he was one of them; for the Europeans, he was one of them in language, dress and behavior.”<sup>58</sup>

Robert H. Jackson introduces the concept of quasi-states. According to his argument, the international system recognizes these states, but they fail to meet the demands of states. For example, the states' lack of effective control over their territories, nor are they able to defend themselves against external attacks. Such states have negative or juridical sovereignty because even though other states respect their sovereignty, they do not possess the positive sovereignty that only comes with effective control.<sup>59</sup>

In "Coping with Diversity: The Nigerian State in Historical Perspective," Abdul Raufu Mustapha looks at the process of state formation, its organization and resistance, and how attempts at establishing hegemony have failed. Mustapha focuses on the states' deep ethno-regional divisions, the military's specific role between 1966 and 1999, and finally, the complexity of issues facing the state as a result of its reliance on oil. According to Mustapha, statehood is made up of a country's ability to control its territory, legitimacy within the society, its ability to collect taxes, and its potential for autonomy.<sup>60</sup> Mathurin Hounnikpo argues that the main reason why Africa has experienced neither genuine development nor real democracy since independence essentially has to do with the fact that it has been bedeviled by an incompetent, dishonest, self-serving, greedy, and predatory politico-bureaucratic elite, camouflaged since the early 1990s under a pseudo-democracy that he calls *démocrature* (a French term that uneasily blends the two polar opposites of *démocratie* and *dictature*).<sup>61</sup> He argues that, "in effect, the African state is a unitary state in the sense that all state powers are concentrated within a single political, administrative and judicial institutional framework . . ."<sup>62</sup>

Hounnikpo takes his analysis one step further and argues that, "after decades of reliance on the excuse of colonialism, Africa's 'maldevelopment' clearly has more to do with its own leaders than centuries of colonial exploitation."<sup>63</sup> He notes that because of its colonial inheritance, the postcolonial African state is totally dysfunctional.<sup>64</sup> As a result, the state is removed from indigenous institutions.<sup>65</sup> Africa is yet to be transformed by democracy since the majority of the people have not benefited from it.<sup>66</sup>

Achille Mbembe laments the extreme poverty of the political and economic literature on Africa.<sup>67</sup> One of the characteristic features of colonial rule, according to Mbembe, was the confusion between the public and the private spheres. The concept of civil society thus arose as a residual category, as a result of the demarcation of an autonomous legal sphere distinct from state sovereignty.<sup>68</sup> At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Mbembe sees basically only two exit options for Africa: the first would be to meet, head-on, the challenge of globalization by trying to take advantage of any opportunity offered to it by the world economy; the second would be to return to the situation prevailing during the nineteenth century.<sup>69</sup>

## RECONSTRUCTIONIST THEORIES

Reconstructionist scholars start from the observation that none of the existing theories of the African state reviewed in the previous sections—namely, modernization, dependency, and statist—adequately explain the African predicament, and none propose a viable way out of this predicament. All these scholars came to the realization that in order for the African state to be able to perform its basic functions—that is, providing security, democracy, and development to its people—it will have to be reconstructed (or reinvented) in some shape, way, or form. While all these scholars agree on the need to reconstruct the African state, they differ on the ways in which this objective is to be achieved.

Crawford Young provides a detailed analysis of the complex factors that shaped the African state. He concludes that the crisis facing the African state “lies in this lethal combination of the colonial state heritage, the failed vision of the integral state, and the prebendal realities of political management.” Young then asks, “Can a new state be invented that sheds the debilitating traditions of the past?”<sup>70</sup>

According to Basil Davidson, the crisis facing African states is primarily a “crisis of institutions.”<sup>71</sup> Built on European colonial models, these nation-states were naturally illegitimate in the eyes of their subjects. Contrary to what prevailed in Japan, modernization meant alienation in Africa.<sup>72</sup> Davidson notes that nation-statism necessarily leads to a negation and rejection of African traditions.<sup>73</sup> Davidson observes that in indigenous Africa, the rule of law was linked to the visible and invisible world.<sup>74</sup> The wholesale acceptance of nation-statism by the African political elites marked the victory of the “national” over the “social,”<sup>75</sup> Davidson makes a strong case for some form of “rational federalism.”<sup>76</sup> He concludes that what is required is nothing less than the invention of a new state based on African tradition, culture, and historical experience.<sup>77</sup>

Sheldon Gellar proposes *Tocquevillian analytics* as an alternative methodology to the predominantly ahistorical and state-centered approach used by many scholars studying democratization processes in Africa.<sup>78</sup> According to Gellar, “Tocqueville visualized popular sovereignty as directly exercised by and with the people through their participation in politics and self-governing institutions at all levels of society, not just in national elections.”<sup>79</sup> Tocqueville also had an original conception of the state and of the role of the state in a democratic order.<sup>80</sup> Tocqueville viewed liberty as essential to an authentic democracy and as the most important safeguard against tyranny.<sup>81</sup>

According to Gellar, most precolonial societies exercised a degree of constitutional choice in organizing their political orders.<sup>82</sup> Gellar further observes that “the legacy of the nation-state has been one of the major obstacles to building viable democratic societies in post-colonial Africa.”<sup>83</sup> Gellar argues that “rather than the state imposing its will on civil society, civil society should hold the state accountable for its acts and influence state policies.”<sup>84</sup> He concludes that state failure has forced people to seek alternatives.<sup>85</sup> The lesson to be learned from all this is that Africans themselves should be left to sort out their own problems.<sup>86</sup>



In *Disciplining Democracy*, Rita Abrahamsen argues that many newly elected governments in Africa face two irreconcilable constituencies: external donors and creditors and their poor domestic majorities. While African governments are crucially dependent on both for their financial survival and re-election respectively, they cannot satisfy both at the same time. The first casualty of this dilemma is the democratic process itself. She argues that the form of democracy demanded by donors and creditors (including the Bretton Woods institutions) offers African incumbents and elites the possibility of holding on to, or capturing power, without giving in to any of the demands for social welfare and redistribution at home. In this sense, says Abrahamsen, a *de facto* alliance occurs between the African elites and the donors and creditors, in that they share a broadly similar conceptualization of democracy that centers on political rights and a continued economic liberalism.<sup>87</sup>

In *Imagining the Congo*, Kevin C. Dunn employs a postmodernist analytical framework to try to make sense of the current war and political crisis in the Congo. Dunn shows that the Congo was “inverted,” defined, and delineated through various imperial and colonial discourses. The Congo was presented as an empty space, undeveloped, and thus at the disposal of the European.<sup>88</sup> Central to Dunn’s thesis is the argument that Western views and understandings of the Congo remain firmly rooted in colonially scripted images of African backwardness, primitivism, and irrationality derived from Enlightenment and social Darwinist racist theories of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

George Ayittey investigates how Africa can build and improve upon its indigenous political and economic institutions.<sup>89</sup> He refers to the postcolonial elite in Africa as the “hippo generation.”<sup>90</sup> These African elites and leaders are “bereft of original ideas” and “cannot use their imagination to craft authentically African solutions to African problems.”<sup>91</sup> Indeed, this generation made a fatal mistake when it rejected its own culture.<sup>92</sup> In African countries, indigenous economic systems are the key to development because they allow free trade and movement.<sup>93</sup> Ayittey observes that “the colonialists did not really introduce any institutions in Africa. What they introduced were merely more efficient forms of already existing institutions.”<sup>94</sup> He argues that Africa should build on its indigenous institutions.<sup>95</sup> “Modernization” does not mean “westernization.”<sup>96</sup> Given the dismal failure of the postcolonial statist development model, argues Ayittey, a completely new approach or paradigm is needed to take Africa to the next level.<sup>97</sup> Africa’s hope, argues Ayittey, lies with the “cheetah generation,” namely, a new generation of young African graduates and professionals.<sup>98</sup> Given the fact that it has broken down, the African state cannot simply be reformed—it requires a *complete overhaul*.<sup>99</sup> Ayittey’s second key observation is that, ultimately, African problems can only be solved by Africans themselves.<sup>100</sup>

John Mukum Mbaku uses public choice theory to analyze economic growth and development in Africa. Mbaku argues that during the last fifty years, “the major policy problem in the African countries has not been poor leadership *per se*, but inappropriate institutional arrangements and market incentive structures

that encouraged and handsomely rewarded corruption, rent seeking, rent extraction and other forms of opportunism."<sup>101</sup> The African elite who captured the state after independence used their monopoly of political power to plunder the economy for their own benefit.<sup>102</sup> This is why, according to Mbaku, it is essential that the African people be front and center in any constitution-making process.<sup>103</sup> Inefficient and nonviable institutional arrangements in the African countries are partly to blame for the persistent poverty of the continent and of its people.<sup>104</sup> The most significant way to enhance constitutional compliance, according to him, is to make certain that the people are enfranchised through a democratic constitution-making process.<sup>105</sup> Mbaku's analysis exhibits a number of contradictions and inconsistencies.<sup>106</sup> Who are the masses that Mbaku constantly refers to? What are their interests? Why would Mbaku believe that overhauling existing constitutional and institutional arrangements would, *ipso facto*, create the necessary and sufficient conditions for genuine popular development when the same old bankrupt, corrupt and predatory political elite would continue to be in power, and hence be in a position to undermine and subvert such development?

Adebayo Olukoshi and Liisa Laakso discuss the reconstitution of the nation-state. For them, this reconstitution must begin with an acknowledgment of the diverse cultures involved. "As part of the reconstitution of the nation-state project in Africa, governments have to re-capture their economic policy-making responsibilities from the multilateral financial institutions."<sup>107</sup> A reconstituted state, they argue, will function from below rather than according to an authoritarian, top-down model. In "Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry," Makau wa Mutua argues that the decolonized state in Africa trapped these countries because they were created by European powers without any regard for the people.<sup>108</sup> Mutua's main argument is that because it is constructed on the foundation of the colonial state, the postcolonial state is bound to fail, as it lacks moral legitimacy.<sup>109</sup> Mutua calls for a redrawing of the map of Africa to reflect indigenous institutions. Such a redrawing would result in fourteen states. Mutua argues that within the postcolonial state, indigenous entities must exercise their right of self-determination. Only such a radical restructuring can legitimize the postcolonial state.

In a series of articles, Kelechi A. Kalu also discusses the need for redrawing African states' borders.<sup>110</sup> In "The Political Economy of State Reconstitution in Africa," Kalu analyzes development problems in African states. After the cold war, development strategies were framed in three ways: neoliberalism; state collapse arguments replacing statist analyses; and finally, the International Financial Institutions replacing Western government's policy makers. According to Kalu, Africa's integration into the world system is the single most important factor to consider in any transformation project.<sup>111</sup> The use of violence to remain in power is inherent in the nature of these states.<sup>112</sup>

According to Kalu's argument, two options are left for African states. First, reconstitution of contemporary states based on culture and language similarities, and second, the erasure of existing borders, followed by the creation of five

out of the fifty-four states.<sup>113</sup> In “An Elusive Quest? Structural Analysis of Conflicts and Peace in Africa,” Kalu argues that conflict can only be resolved within reconstituted states.<sup>114</sup> The nature of the colonial state did not allow measures for conflict resolution since Europeans assumed Africans were stateless or preferred authoritarian rule.

Godfrey Mwakikagile argues that the modern African state is “a fragile,” “corrupt,” and “despotic institution.”<sup>115</sup> The state is controlled by “tyrannical and ethnic-minded individuals who thrive on violence.”<sup>116</sup> African states must be transformed from within. Furthermore, because capitalism is predatory by nature, it must be humanized to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor.<sup>117</sup> Marc-Louis Ropivia proposes a new theoretical approach to federalism and economic and political integration in sub-Saharan Africa. Ropivia summarizes the whole problematic of African federalism and of political integration in sub-Saharan Africa in six statements:

1. Being of North American origin, Pan-Africanism has only had a limited impact on the African continent. As a result, this ideology has not elicited a movement toward political unity in sub-Saharan Africa.
2. The whole of sub-Saharan Africa cannot be considered as a single cultural unit.
3. A federalism based on an association of independent states can only be built on the foundation of a prior cultural unity.
4. An ideology of the political unity of sub-Saharan Africa based on cultural unity naturally leads toward a unitary continental state, but does not create a federal continental state.
5. Sub-Saharan Africa must be considered as an entity predominantly characterized by cultural diversity.
6. Africa’s cultural diversity is, at the same time, a regional diversity that leads to federalism in the form of a multiplicity of federal regional states.<sup>118</sup>

This new African federalism is based on two-state integrative units called “bi-state nuclei” or “federative dyads” within which the two federated units are linked to each other by a federative link. Thus this constitutes a gradual strategy to build federalism in sub-Saharan Africa, based on a two-state nucleus that is progressively expanded until it ultimately leads to a continental federal state.<sup>119</sup>

A federative link (or direct link) is characterized by an initial bi-state nucleus based on two states sharing the same colonial inheritance, and leads to the most intensive type of integration. An indirect federative link usually develops around a core ethnic group that straddles one or several borders in states with different colonial inheritances, and results in a lesser degree of integration.<sup>120</sup> Ropivia concludes by saying that while nuclear federalism might be rightly viewed as utopia, it is on the basis of utopias that the great transformational political projects of humankind have been built. And Africa would thus be reborn as the phoenix rising out of the ashes.<sup>121</sup>

According to Daniel Osabu-Kle, neither liberal democracy nor socialism or the military provide the cure to Africa's democracy and development predicament.<sup>122</sup> Osabu-Kle's main thesis is that a democracy based on African culture is the only type that can lead to development.<sup>123</sup> To protect the continent, an African high command should be created, as well as a youth organization to educate youth about African culture and history. The author concludes that it is only when Afrocentrism replaces Eurocentrism, and a new type of democracy—*Jaku* democracy—is established that Africans both inside and outside the continent will be proud.<sup>124</sup>

Claude Ake points to the fallacy of analyzing development in terms of failure.<sup>125</sup> According to Ake, the state in Africa is not a public force, but tends to be privatized.<sup>126</sup> The politics of the African elites has led to the marginalization of the role of African people in development.<sup>127</sup> If people are the end of development, they are also necessarily its agent and its means.<sup>128</sup> According to Ake, the suitable democracy for Africa should have the following four characteristics: a democracy in which people have some real decision-making power; a social democracy that emphasizes concrete political, social, and economic rights; a democracy that puts as much emphasis on collective rights as it does on individual rights; and a democracy of incorporation, which should be as inclusive as possible.<sup>129</sup> The development strategy derived from such a people-driven democratization process should be based on: a popular development strategy; self-reliance; empowerment and confidence; and self-realization rather than alienation.<sup>130</sup>

Claude Ake takes this argument one step further by contrasting liberal democracy with popular democracy. In the eyes of the people, the African state is "alien and remote, uncaring and oppressive."<sup>131</sup> By contrast, the contemporary democracy movement in Africa is based on the people.<sup>132</sup> The African people are very clear about the type of popular democracy that they want.<sup>133</sup> More specifically, the democracy movement in Africa "is the popular movement which is concerned with a 'second independence' from the African elite."<sup>134</sup> The popular democracy movement in Africa "will be more concerned with the social and material upliftment of ordinary people, more with concrete economic and social rights."<sup>135</sup> Eventually, the African state, characterized by "a very rudimentary modern public displaced and retarded by a multiplicity of primordial publics: ethnic, national, communal and subnational,"<sup>136</sup> must be radically transformed in one of two directions. One direction—which implies a highly accelerated capitalist development—is not a likely prospect in contemporary Africa. The other direction "is for the community to become the state. This will entail the breakdown of African countries into something like ethnic politics, a process which could be extremely violent and traumatic." Ake points to a possible compromise, which could be "a confederal, federal or consocietal arrangement."<sup>137</sup>

#### FURTHER READING

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- Olukoshi, Adebayo O., and Liisa Laakso, eds., *Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa* (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1996).
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## CHAPTER 2

# INDIGENOUS AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS

Amongst their [Maninka] good qualities is the small amount of injustice among them, for of all people they are furthest from it . . . Among these qualities there is also the prevalence of peace in their country, the traveler is not afraid in it nor is he who lives there in fear of the thief or of the robber by violence.

—Ibn Batuta during his visit to Mali, quoted in Said Hamdun and Noel King, eds.,  
*Ibn Batuta in Black Africa*, 58

### INTRODUCTION

AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS WERE TRADITIONALLY BASED ON kinship and on lineage (that is, on common ancestry), sanctioned by a founding myth. First, they were based on an elaborate system of checks and balances. Second, political succession was carefully institutionalized in such a way that family, clan, and ethnic competition for power was minimized. Third, the basic political unit was the village assembly, where major decisions concerning the society were adopted. While some indigenous African political systems were more elaborate and institutionalized than others—the so-called “state societies”—all of them had some form of centralized power and authority. Thus our approach rejects Fortes and Evans-Pritchard’s anthropological distinction between “state” and “stateless” societies.<sup>1</sup>

### STATE-BUILDING IN ANTIQUITY: ANCIENT EGYPT

City life began in Egypt in the sixth or seventh millennium BCE. Egypt was divided into two regions: the fertile land from Aswan to modern Cairo was referred to as Upper Egypt. Lower Egypt was the broad triangle that formed in the course of the millennia from silt deposits of the river flowing north into the Mediterranean. Agriculture developed between 4500 and 4000 BCE. By 3000 BCE, Egyptians had discovered the plough and shifting agriculture, through which nomads turned to agriculture. The development of the hieroglyphic

writing system made it possible to organize the economy and distribute food, including barley and wheat. It also enabled the state to control floods along the Nile by erecting dykes.

Egypt exported clothing, footwear, paper (papyrus), textiles, ropes, and sails. Development was made possible by a good transportation system. These also constituted the foundations of a centralized Egyptian state, ruled by pharaohs who believed in divine rule. In the Old Kingdom, pharaoh meant the great house of the prince, including ministers. In the New Kingdom, pharaoh meant the king who was situated above mankind, as indicated by the names, statues, pomp, and the style of the tombs. The pharaoh was a god-king who married many wives. The son inherited his father's power, but the king could also choose his successor. Rituals reinforced the god-king belief. There were four women pharaohs: Nitokris, Sebeknefu (who marked the end of a dynasty), Hatshepsut, and Tausone. All four were treated as usurpers by posterity. Women had a key role in the system. For example, Ahmosis-Nefertari was influential under Amenhotep I. Similarly, Ahhotep wielded influence in political and religious matters under Amasis.<sup>2</sup>

By 3500 BCE, sacral chiefdoms and petty sacral kingdoms gradually emerged in Nubia, in the southernmost part of Egypt. Recent archeological work shows that these political and cultural institutions and traditions then spread from southern Egypt northward into Lower Egypt around 3300 BCE, culminating in the establishment of a unified Egypt around 3100 BCE. Between 3400 and 3200 BCE, the most powerful of the small states may have been the Ta-Seti, actually located in the northern Nubian stretches of the Nile, just south of Egypt. The Ta-Seti kingdom, which extended as far south as the confluence of the Abbai and the Nile, claims to have conquered and ruled over Upper Egypt for a time.

By the thirty-second century BCE, the power and wealth of Ta-Seti was in decline, and the balance of power had shifted to the rulers of Upper Egypt. Sometime around 3100 BCE, the Upper Egyptian rulers brought all of Egypt under one rule. The final blow for Ta-Seti came when the First Dynasty king Aha sent his forces southward to destroy the last remnants of the kingdom. The unification of Egypt in the late fourth millennium completed its social and political transformation. The sacral chiefs of the Middle Nile Basin cultural area became the divine kings of Egypt. South of Egypt, under the monotheistic Sudanic religion, the later kings of Nubia retained their sacral aspects but could never be viewed as gods themselves. In contrast, in Egypt it was possible, by the time of the Third Dynasty, for a king to claim to being included among the gods. We can therefore speak of divine kingship in relation to Egyptian culture, but only of sacral kingship within the context of Sudanic/Nubian civilization.<sup>3</sup>

The centuries from 3500 to 1000 BCE in Egypt are generally thought to comprise six main historical periods. The long predynastic era, characterized by a string of independent local polities, came to an end around 3100 BCE. Between 3100 and 2500 BCE came the period of the Old Kingdom. From around 2900 to 2500 BCE, the rulers of the Third and Fourth dynasties consolidated and elaborated on the royal ideology of divine kingship, including the development of

pyramids as the proper form of a royal tomb. A readjustment of power between kings and subjects seems to have taken place after the Fourth Dynasty. During the Sixth Dynasty, provincial governors (especially in the Upper Nile) seem to have gained increasing autonomy. The long rule of the fifth king of the Sixth Dynasty, Pepi II, marks the effective end of the Old Kingdom.

The collapse of the Middle Kingdom in the early eighteenth century BCE was followed by the Second Intermediate Period. In the last third of the century, a people of Asian origin, the Hyksos, conquered the Nile Delta and, from that base, exerted their power and influence over other parts of Egypt, introducing the horse, the chariot, and body armor in the country's military practice. Amhose I, the founder of the Eighteenth Dynasty, built a powerful military. He broke the power of the Hyksos by pursuing them north into Palestine and penetrating as far north as Phoenicia. He then turned his forces further southward into Nubia than Egyptian armies had ever penetrated before, carrying his conquest as far south as the Third Cataract and the borders of the Kerma heartland. But it was his grandson, Thutmose I, who completed the conquest of Kerma itself between 1530 and 1520 BCE, and his great grandson Thutmose III who consolidated Egyptian hegemony and influence in Palestine and Syria. One of the most intriguing characters of the New Kingdom was the ambitious Queen Hatshepsut, who ruled just after Thutmose I. She commissioned a number of important building projects and reinstated the trade with Punt (present-day Somalia), which had lapsed for several hundred years. Another intriguing individual was Amenhotep IV (later renamed Akhenaton), who tried to change Egypt over to a new, monotheistic religion with a single God symbolized by Aton, the sun's disk. Egypt retained its empire on through the thirteenth century BCE. Its power extended as far north as Lebanon during the sixty-seven-year reign of Rameses II. After the death of Rameses' successor, the power and influence of Egypt again waned. It lost its Asian possessions, and Nubia regained its cultural and political independence.<sup>4</sup>

The first pharaoh (dynasty) ruled in 3000 BCE after Neolithic peasants had settled as agriculturalists. By the Fourth Dynasty, Egypt was a centralized monarchy. It relied on the Nile for agriculture and developed dyke construction to prevent floods. The population increased as a result of bountiful food production. All foreign trade, mining, and quarrying—as well as production and distribution—activities were controlled by the state. Private individuals could engage in commercial activities without any middlemen. The only commercial agents were in the service of the king and the temple. In principle, the kings' religious duties were to preserve the cosmic order and to ensure the security of Egypt and happiness of its people, both in the present and afterlife.

The king was also responsible for ensuring worship of the gods by sharing economic goods with the temples. As the sole priest, judge, producer, and warrior, the pharaoh delegated power to officials who were given land in return for their services. State monopoly of the means of production was more theoretical than real, because private individuals were also owners of the means of production. Inability to pay taxes was the only way that landowners lost their land. Skills were



handed down from father to son on the basis of a strict socio-professional hierarchy, which included artists, bakers, educators, flower arrangers, goldsmiths, draughtsmen, potters, sculptors, and water carriers. Artists and excavators decorated kings' and queens' tombs in exchange for grain. Education—exclusively provided by scribes—was the gateway to all professions. The monuments owed their existence to the organization of labor and construction materials by the scribes.

The government was organized hierarchically and structured around specific functions: priesthood; distribution of religious obligations of the priests; royal or priestly administration of the arable land; flocks; wines; granaries; treasuries; justice and river transportation. Government officials could be ordered by the king to lead expeditions. It is interesting to note that Egypt's success and influence abroad lay more in its efficient organization of government than in aggressiveness. The civil service was under the authority of the prince (pharaoh), but power was delegated to the *vizier*. The vizier was a prime minister responsible for public order who was likened to the god Thoth, and who was the supreme legal authority after the pharaoh and the minister of justice. Some viziers dominated political life. In the new kingdom, in addition to other counselors, there were two viziers who advised the king. Pharaonic law was individualistic in the sense that all people were equal before the law. Women had the same rights to property and judicial relief as men. According to Yoyote, Egyptian law differed from that existing in the rest of Africa and “curiously anticipates the modern societies of Europe.”<sup>5</sup> Democracy was understood as the equality of men before both the gods and the rulers.

The success of agriculture—with barley and wheat as staple foods—provided the base for commerce and financed the construction of “the pyramids and other monuments that Cheops and his successors would begin to build around 2500 BCE.”<sup>6</sup> Wealth also enabled the pharaohs to engage in conquest, especially of its southern and western neighbors. As a result, certain Egyptian techniques—such as horse-drawn chariots—were introduced among the Libyans. Egyptian traders reached as far south as the land of Punt and Axum (modern day Somalia and Ethiopia). By 2500 BCE, trade from the Red Sea to the land of Punt brought back myrrh, ebony, and metal, which added to the state's wealth. By the Sixth Dynasty, the pharaohs further developed trade through the conquest and control of Nubia. Pharaoh Pepi I conscripted Nubians in the royal army to protect its northern borders. It was the Eighteenth Dynasty pharaoh (Tutmosi 1) who penetrated furthest south to Kurgus, four hundred miles south of Meroe. After his death, the Kushites revolted against Egyptian rule. The Egyptians never conquered Punt, although sea-borne trade continued between the two countries. Ships from Punt arrived in Egypt carrying fruit, ebony, and ivory, as well as monkeys and some animal skins.

**STATE-BUILDING IN ANTIQUITY:  
KUSH/NUBIA (NAPATA AND MEROE)**

Kush (the Nubian kingdom) refers to the upper Nile Valley south of Egypt, and to the diverse civilizations that occupied all or part of that region from the second millennium BCE to the end of antiquity (the fourth century of our era). It coexisted with Egypt. Its capital, Meroe, was located at the junction of the Nile and Atbara rivers in central Sudan. Meroe was about four hundred miles north of present-day Khartoum. In addition to producing gold, salt, and silver, Meroe was the largest iron-smelting industry south of the Mediterranean coast.<sup>7</sup>

Meroe thus grew into a significant manufacturing center, not only because of iron smelting, but also because of cotton cloth production for export. Greeks and Romans called the area *Kushi Aethiopia* (the land of burnt people). Its inhabitants were hunters, farmers (who grew millet), and nomads. Kushites contributed to civilization through their art, such as painted pottery. They also introduced an alphabet based on the Egyptian hieroglyphic writing system, and engaged in iron metallurgy, which exists to this day. The Meroitic alphabet—which has yet to be properly deciphered—was developed during the final three centuries BCE and then became the written language of government and religion in the kingdom. The Kushites relied on an intricate trading system that included southeast Asia and the Mediterranean. Kush was involved in the trans-Saharan trade in ivory, ebony, incense, animal products, tortoise shells, ostrich feathers, iron, cotton cloth, slaves, and gold. Kush's proximity to Egypt made it an ideal intermediary in trade. Events in Egypt also affected the development of Kush. For example, Kush was at its strongest when Egypt was weakest.

The powerful Egyptian army regularly invaded Kush. To avoid Egyptian conquest, Kush—sometime between 640 and 300 BCE—moved its capital much further south, from Napata to Meroe. In 750 BCE, under its fourth known king, Peye ("Piankhi"), Kush launched an invasion of Egypt, and in the next several years, Peye was able to establish his rule over the southern portions of the country. Under Peye's grandson, Taharqa, the Napatan dynasty extended its control in the early seventh century over most of Egypt. Following Egypt's conquest by Assyrian, Persian, Macedonian, and Roman armies, Kush totally liberated itself from Egyptian rule. The high period of Meroitic power and influence lay in the centuries between 300 and 100 BCE.

Throughout the Meroitic kingdom, the prevailing belief system remained the Sudanic religion, with its one divinity or spirit associated with the sky. One named deity predominates in the record of Meroitic religion: Apedemak, symbolized in sculpture by a lion figure. The striking feature of Napatan religion was that it most commonly evoked a single Egyptian god, Amun. Priests, civil servants, and military leaders played a crucial role in Kush. For example, these leaders chose the best person among them, who was presented as having been chosen by the gods. It was believed that the gods, through the prescription of customary law, directed all actions. The king was not allowed to deviate from customary law. His actions were also regulated by many taboos. Kingship was hereditary, based on

specific royal lineages. The crown passed from the king to his brothers before the next generation. For example, of the twenty-seven kings chosen before Nastasen, fourteen were the king's brothers. People of dubious character were not chosen. It was commonly believed that exclusive rule and good looks were fortune's gift to the Kushites.

The king was expected to take care of the people, and the king's wealth was seen as a means of providing for them in times of crisis. Kings were chosen because of their courage in war. The favored candidate was carried around during a festival in which the people chose him to be their king. For their coronation, kings journeyed to the religious capital, Napata; otherwise, they lived with their royal brethren in Meroe. Once chosen as king, the leader followed the rules set by the ancestors of Kush, which included avoiding the execution of wrongdoers, regardless of the severity of their crimes. Rather than executing the criminal, the king sent a symbol to the offender, who then immediately committed suicide. Priests occupied the highest public offices in the society. Once a king died, his companions had to die, too. The people considered their fate as tied to that of the king; as a result, they could not conspire to harm him.

Political rule was believed to be divinely ordained. Kush was characterized by political stability and continuity based on tradition and customs. As in other parts of Africa, the queen mother played a crucial role in the political system. As "Mistress of Kush," she sometimes adopted the wife of her son to ensure new blood into the kingship. On some occasions, kings honored their sisters. For example, Anlamani's inscription says that he dedicated each of his four sisters to one of the four temples of Amun to be sistrum players and to pray for him before this god. In religious matters, the queen was only second to the king. Queens could also act as co-regents when they assumed power after the death of their husbands. Sometimes queen mothers—rather than their sons or husbands—directly assumed political office. Once they proclaimed themselves sovereign, these queens adopted the title Son of Re, Lord of the Two Lands (*sa Re, neb Tawy*) or Son of Re and King (*sa Re, neb Tawy*). According to Hakem, many of these queen mothers became famous, and "in Graeco-Roman times Meroe was known to have been ruled by a line of *Candace, Kandake* or queen-regnant."<sup>8</sup> These *Kandake* were uncommonly powerful figures, often able to act as the full-fledged rulers of the kingdom and, in such cases, to be buried with full royal ritual. The king's daughters could also be chief priestess *Dewat Neter* to god Amun in Thebes. For example, the King of Kush gave the position to his daughter when Egypt was under his rule. Royal ladies also held prominent positions as temple priestesses of Amun at Napata and elsewhere. The elaborate system of political succession in Kush had three advantages. First, because of adherence to customs and tradition and the influence of civil officials, as well as military leaders, unsuitable candidates were removed. Second, the system brought in new blood through the queen mother's adoption practice. Third, the system had built-in checks and balances on abuses of power, for example, through the queen mother's rightful descent and the royal family.

From 712–664 BCE, Kushite kings conquered Egypt. They reunited the country and contributed to a cultural renaissance when the greatest works of art of Egypt were created. These kings also reintroduced Egypt into the world system, where it became a core player. The leaders of Kush also protected Egypt from conquest by its southern neighbors. As a result of trade, Kush reached its height in wealth seven centuries later. Its leaders created the Twenty-fifth (or “Ethiopian”) Dynasty, which ruled from the Mediterranean to the border of modern Ethiopia, thus briefly making Kush into a world power. In the fourth century, Kush fell victim to attacks from eastern and western Sudan, organized by the rulers of Axum (present-day Ethiopia).

Nubians ruled the new kingdom that emerged after the conquest of Kush. Nubia acted as a link between central Africa and the Mediterranean. Toward the end of the sixth century, Nubia was a Christian country consisting of three regional kingdoms: Nobadia (north), Makuria (center), and Alodia (south). Located along the Nile, Nubia’s small kingdoms rose to power between the conquest of Kush and the Arab conquest of Egypt in 639 BCE. Makuria’s capital was Dongola, while Alodia’s was Soba. Both kingdoms had been occupied by Kush from the third century BCE to the third century of our era, and were thus strongly influenced by Kushitic culture.

By 580 AD, many Nubians were Christians, but Islam was introduced in 651 AD when Dongola was besieged by Muslims. The Nubian state was located between the First, Second, and Third Cataracts, which controlled the Nile Valley. The king converted to Islam, but conversion of the masses was a much longer and slower process. Nubia traded with Egypt in gold, ivory, and slaves. Nubia paid tribute in slaves to Egypt when it fell under Arab rule in 641. Kush was strongly influenced by Egypt. For example, its rulers relied on Egyptian craftsmen to build monuments and temples. However, Kushitic culture and crafts work were distinct from those of Egypt. Kush’s prominent role, assigned to its queens, in political and economic affairs was also reflected in its art. Kushitic art also displayed the long-horned cow that was familiar among its people. Kushitic art reflected its people’s life and culture, as demonstrated by the local people’s practice of marking their faces as a sign of beauty, a practice still found among certain ethnic groups in contemporary southern Sudan.

The nomads of the Nubian Desert (called “Troglodytes” by the Greeks) who lived in the mountains east of Meroe were eminently peace-loving people. When war did occur, it was as a result of conflict over pastureland. The fight first began with stones, until some people got wounded. This was followed by the use of bows and arrows, resulting in a number of deaths. Once conflict broke out, it became the responsibility of the older women to resolve it. These women intervened by acting as intermediaries between warring camps—no one could attack a woman sent as emissary, and as a result, the conflict immediately ended.

Kush/Nubia/ traded with many nations that it also influenced. Meroe was attacked by Axum from the south, nomadic Blemmyes from the east, and Nubia from the west. It was conquered by Axum in the fourth century. The varied and

sophisticated customs and traditions of Kush—such as its elaborate political system, rules of succession, and iron-smelting techniques—outlived its power. Thus it can truly be said that Kush actually marks the dawn of African history.<sup>9</sup>

### STATE-BUILDING IN ANTIQUITY: AXUM

Axum—sometimes spelled “Aksum”—emerged after the fall of Kush during the first century AD, although it was informed by civilizations that developed between the fourth and first millenniums, notably that of the Agaw peoples of the northern Ethiopian Highlands (In the third century, the kingdom was the third most powerful in the world.) The state was founded in the early first millennium BCE. Various ethnic groups vied for power until the ruler of one of them, the Habashas (Abyssinians), chose Axum as the capital in the last century BCE. Axum’s territory included present-day Eritrea and the northern highlands of Ethiopia (Tigray), and extended as far south as the middle Takkaze River. The power of Axum was based on military conquest. Its empire extended over northern Ethiopia, southern Sudan, and southern Arabia.

Axum was well-placed to benefit from trade routes that connected the Mediterranean to northeast Africa and Saudi Arabia. Trade also involved northeast Africa and the Red Sea through Axum and Port Adulis. From the first to the seventh centuries AD, Adulis was the single major coastal port of Axum on the Red Sea through which all the kingdom’s trade flowed. Restricting the activities of foreign merchants to Adulis allowed efficient collection of the custom duties that supported the state and its military power. The foreign policies of the kings of Axum focused on two key objectives: to control the African outlets of the Red Sea trade, and to bring the South Arabian land routes of the trade into the Axumite sphere of influence. The prosperity of the state depended very much on the lucrative Red Sea and Indian Ocean trade. The collection of duties on the trade provided kings with the revenues to support military campaigns and to afford the outward trappings of power. Goods traded included cloth, glass stones, soft copper (used for making cooking utensils), and iron ore (made into spears). There was also trade in gold, in exchange for meat and salt. Ivory, exotic skins, spices, tortoise shells, and slaves were also collected in Axum.

The name “Axum” refers to both the state and to the city that became the administrative capital and religious center of Africa’s oldest Christian empire. Axum, as the capital, became a particular center of monumental buildings, including a multistory royal palace. At its height, Axum’s kings ruled from the upper Nile Valley in the west to Yemen in the east. This empire was considered one of the four great empires (with Rome, Persia, and China) that divided Eurasia and Africa between them. By the middle of the third century, Axum had acquired an empire that included modern Ethiopia and southern Arabia. This state was based on a federal system in which the king and his family controlled the military and the capital, while other areas were left under the power of traditional local rulers who paid tribute to the king. Axum ruled the outlying parts of the kingdom

by exacting tribute and other duties from communities that otherwise remained largely autonomous in handling their own day-to-day affairs. Power was based on conquest of other nations, which led to territorial expansion. An Axumite king who governed in the second or third century would first pretend to engage in peace talks, and then conquer its neighbors by force.

To commemorate their victories, Axum's kings had inscriptions written in Greek, Ge'ez, and Sabeian (Semitic languages). They also introduced the first African coins, which were inscribed with the kings' names and the period of their rule. One of the achievements of an Axumite pagan king who ruled in the second or third century was to create a road that linked Axum to Egypt, which resulted in increased trade between the two countries, to the benefit of the latter. If a king died, his elder son replaced him. If a son was too young to govern, the queen ruled with the help of other members of the community. Other vassals paid yearly tribute to the king, or in-between his travels to his domains to gather tribute. Between the second and fourth centuries AD, Axum was a feudal empire, with the city of Axum as the state's capital. By the fourth century, power was exclusively based on military conquest led by the king, by which he expanded his territory and created more vassal states. He also centralized political power by bringing all vassal states and leaders under his direct authority. Upon assuming power, a king engaged in a campaign to make sure that all his subjects accepted his authority. Warlike groups—such as the Abyssinians—were settled on border areas in order to act as a buffer against invasion.

Leadership was a monopoly of the king's family—his relatives were appointed as administrators. During the second and third centuries AD, Axumite rulers managed to spread their power and influence north along the Red Sea hills and into parts of South Arabia. In 340 AD, King Ezana embarked on a major military campaign into the old territories of Meroe. When Egypt fell under Arab rule in 641 AD, the lucrative trade of Axum was disrupted, the city ceased to be the capital, the vassal states regained their independence, and the state disintegrated.<sup>10</sup>

### STATE-BUILDING IN NORTH AFRICA: CARTHAGE (*CARTHAGO*)

Carthage (*Carthago* in Latin) included parts of present-day Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco, then collectively referred to as "Libya." Carthage was the major African *entrepôt* in the Mediterranean Sea. It was in control of much of the trans-Saharan trade, and also benefited from trade on the Atlantic coast of Africa. The indigenous inhabitants of Carthage were Berbers. In 814 BCE, the Phoenicians who settled in Carthage called it *Kart Hadasht* (new city). By the sixth century BCE, Carthage was an independent state that had created an empire in North Africa. It traded with cities on the Western coast of Italy. Because it had a small population, Carthage's defense and security were entrusted to mercenaries. Libyans—referring to all North African Berbers west of Egypt—constituted the bulk of these mercenary armies. Numidians (from Algeria) and Mauritanians (from Mauritania and Morocco) also contributed to these armies. As a result of

population increase based on abundant food production, Carthage was driven to an imperialist strategy of conquest of more territory in other parts of Africa. The conquered people were then forced to pay tribute to Carthage.

Phoenicians—known as “African Phoenicians”—were the most privileged because they ruled Carthage proper, while conquered groups ruled the rest of the state. The vassal people were allowed to have their own coinage with their leaders’ inscriptions. The worst off were Libyans who lived in ethnic structures that collected tribute for Carthage, enrolled soldiers for its armies, and provided the core military protection of the state. Whenever they sensed a weakening of Carthage’s political power, Libyans revolted against its harsh rule. Carthage exploited the Libyans through labor, resource extraction, and taxation. Carthage encouraged the emergence of a Libyan leadership inclined to please and to cooperate with it. According to Warmington: “The Carthaginians had admired and honored not those governors who had treated their subjects with moderation and humanity but those who had exacted the greatest amount of supplies and treated the inhabitants most ruthlessly.”<sup>11</sup>

Carthage traded in foodstuffs, textiles, metals, and slaves. From Libya it obtained gold, silver, and tin iron, from which it made weapons. It also traded with Morocco. One of its rulers, Hano, was responsible for building settlements along the Moroccan coast. The constitution of Carthage was one of the most elaborate in antiquity. Political leadership was based on heredity. Kings assumed sacral, judicial, political, and military powers. Certain families were prominent in its political life. For example, the Magnid family ruled between the fifth and sixth century BCE. This was a period of state consolidation through increased control over conquered territories. In the fifth century BCE, the powers of the king declined and were progressively eclipsed by the rise of *Siefets* (judge and governor). This change was triggered by developments in Greece and Rome, where *Siefets* were prominent. The power of the wealthy aristocracy increased during this period. The aristocracy appointed a council of state, as well as a court that was made up of one hundred members who controlled the state.

In general, the wealthy and privileged classes dominated politics, although average citizens participated in the election of the king. Kings, councils, and *Siefets* decided on all important political matters—such issues were only brought to the masses’ attention if the elite disagreed. Carthage did not have a standing army. Instead, generals were appointed in an ad hoc fashion, as the need arose. Carthage was plagued by recurrent, rural-based popular rebellions. For example, Libyans revolted and introduced their own coins—“Libyon” (meaning “Libyan” in Greek). As central power weakened, client states were left to their own devices. These states regained their autonomy, resulting in the progressive decline of Carthage. The cultural influence of Carthage persisted even after Roman conquest. A mixed Libyan-Phoenician culture developed as a challenge to Rome’s domination.

Direct Roman rule only effected change in urban areas, leaving rural areas unaffected and in a permanent state of rebellion. The Roman conquest ended



the Phoenician era in the Maghrib. Rome ruled these areas through provincial governors called proconsuls—it laid waste to the region's farmlands and encouraged Roman ex-servicemen to settle there. Roman senators and tax collecting companies benefited at the expense of Libyans, whose land they seized. Military conquest was slow because of Libyan resistance. Roman rule finally ended in the second century AD. Roman colonization was a purely urban phenomenon that had absolutely no impact on the Berber people in the rural areas—it lasted for four centuries (five in other areas), then the Vandals (of German origin) replaced the Romans. The Vandals made Carthage the metropolis of the new state. As a result of their rule, a period of social and moral crisis and decay followed. A rural-based Berber movement against Christianity and Roman influence also developed. This ended the ancient period, which was then replaced by a hybrid system of social and political institution-building informed by Magribian/Berber culture and traditions, while reflecting the steadfastness of the region's sense of political independence.

#### **STATE-BUILDING IN WESTERN AND CENTRAL SUDAN: GHANA, MALI, SONGHAY, AND KANEM-BORNU**

Highly advanced and sophisticated African states and civilizations developed between the sixth and the sixteenth centuries—perhaps even much earlier—in a vast area known by historians as the Western Sudan. The Western Sudan—including the indigenous states of Ghana, Tekrur, Mali, Songhay, and Kanem-Bornu—refers to the Sahelian belt of Africa comprised of the area from the Sahara Desert (to the north) and the subtropical coastal areas (to the south) and from Senegal and Mauritania on the Atlantic coast (in the west) to the area around Lake Chad (in the east), the latter being sometimes referred to as “Central Sudan.” This period in history is usually known as the “Golden Age” of the Western Sudan. Sources on this period are varied and abundant, and include archeology; the chronicles of Arab or Berber travelers/scholars, such as Ibn Battuta and Ibn Khaldûn; the writings (in Arabic) of Arab and indigenous African scholars such as al-Bakri (author of the *Tarikh-al-Fattash*) and al-Sadi (author of *Tarikh-al-Sudan*); oral traditions; linguistics; accounts of preimperial European travelers (such as Leo Africanus and Mungo Park); and the unparalleled eight-volume UNESCO *History of Africa*. Perhaps the greatest scholar of them all, and acknowledged founding father of modern social science, was Abd-ar-Rhamân Abu Zayd ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Khaldûn (known as Ibn Khaldûn, 1332–1406), a Berber/Carthaginian statesman, jurist, historian, and scholar who traveled widely in the Western Sudan, wrote profusely, and developed the concept of “*asabiyah*” (solidarity) to explain the rise and decline of states (“dynasties”) in this area as well as in North Africa.<sup>12</sup>

State-building in the Western Sudan exhibited a number of characteristics common to all the states included in this area (Ghana, Tekrur, Mali, Songhay, and Kanem-Bornu). First, a great leader—Sunjata Kéïta and Mansa Musa in Mali;



Sonni Ali Ber and Askia Mohammed Ture in Songhay—emerged at some point to unite small kingdoms and ethnic group confederations into large kingdoms and empires. Second, these leaders set up centralized political systems with an elaborate national and provincial bureaucracy. Third, state formation occurred among highly stratified societies divided among nobles, commoners, merchants, castes, and slaves, with clear social distinctions, precise socio-professional specializations, and marked differences in terms of access to political power and economic wealth. Fourth, these states possessed large armies—first conscripted, then professional—making regular use of iron weapons (from Ghana, onward) and of cavalry. Ghana's army was 200,000-strong, while Mali's and Songhay's was 100,000-strong. Trans-Saharan trade—mostly based on the exchange of gold for salt—was key to state-building in the Western Sudan.

Islam quickly became the religion of the ruling elite, while the masses remained faithful to their indigenous beliefs. The pilgrimages of Mansa Kanku Musa (1324–25) and Askia Mohammed Ture (1496–97) to the holy city of Mecca in the Arabian Peninsula are among the most memorable ever chronicled by historians, mostly because of the enormous amount of gold generously distributed by these emperors on their way. In addition, these states highly valued education, culture, and scholarship. Such world-renowned centers of learning as Timbuktu (Sankore University) and Djenne—first in Mali, then in Songhay—attracted students from all over the Muslim world, including North Africa (Egypt) and the Iberian Peninsula (Portugal and Spain). Ahmed Baba, the last chancellor of the University of Sankore (in Timbuktu), was the author of more than forty books on a variety of subjects and disciplines, and his personal library of 1,600 volumes was destroyed during the Moroccan invasion of Songhay in 1592. Finally, each of these states entertained full diplomatic relations based on strict equality and reciprocity with a number of North African (Egypt and Morocco) and European (Spain and Portugal) states.

## GHANA

Founded in the third century by Soninke people, Ghana reached its apex during the dynasty of Cisse Tunkara (eighth through eleventh centuries). The conquest of Awdaghost (c. 990) marked Ghana's control over the Berber tribes. During the period 1076–87, the Almoravids—a Berber people from Western Sahara—took over Ghana, which led to the secession of the smaller vassal kingdoms of Dira and Sosso. In 1203, the king of Sosso took over Ghana. In the fourth century, Ghana emerged as an intermediary of the trans-Saharan trade between the Mediterranean and Europe. The westernmost route linked Ghana with Awdaghost, continuing across the western edge of the Sahara and along the Atlas mountains in southern Morocco to Sijilmasa, which tied it to the routes north to Marrakesh, Fez, and beyond. Ghana's economic power rested on the control of gold, trade, and tribute from other states. Tension arose between Ghana and other states over the control of gold (from Wangara) and the capture of salt deposits (north of Taghaza), which

dominated long-distance trade caravans. Ghana controlled the gold, while Mali had both gold and salt.

The kingdom of Ghana was well advanced in its use of iron. It used swords and spears, while other states still fought with wooden clubs. El-Idrisi noted that “the people of Barisa, Sila and Ghana make forays into the land of Lamlam and capture its inhabitants. They bring them to their own countries and sell them to the visiting merchants. The latter export them to all the countries.”<sup>13</sup> Members of the upper classes imported female slaves from Turkey and Arab countries. The king of Ghana kept the gold in trust for the people. It was not for his personal use: “All nuggets of gold that are found in the mines of this empire belong to the king; but he leaves the gold dust that everyone knows. Without this precaution gold would become so plentiful that it would practically lose its value.”<sup>14</sup> In the Sudan, the people entrusted the choice of the king to a snake that lived in a cave. To make the snake come out, the people lined the mouth of the cave with food, and then whistled for the snake.<sup>15</sup>

The king was known throughout the kingdom for his sense of justice. Only his sister’s son could inherit the throne. El-Bekri described the women of Ghana as very beautiful and free to choose their sexual partners. The king lived in a small enclosure surrounded by religious leaders, idols, and the king’s tomb. The king listened to all his subjects’ complaints. Trials of people who were suspected of having committed crimes were done by water. The judge (king) used a piece of wood that was sour and bitter; he poured water on it then gave it to the defendant to taste. If the defendant vomited, it was a sign of his innocence; if he did not vomit, then he was guilty of the crime.<sup>16</sup> Ghana was not able to grow in power and prosper in peace because of constant fighting between the Soninke and some of their neighbors, notably the Lemtuna and Jedala, to the north, and the Maninka, to the south. Weakened by Almoravid rule—who had taken over the capital, Kumbi Saleh, in 1076–77—Ghana was eventually captured (and its people enslaved) by its former vassal state of Sosso, led by one of its greatest rulers, Sumanguru Kante, in 1203.<sup>17</sup>

## MALI

Recent archeological finds reveal that as far back as 250 BCE, Mali was the site of a great civilization that thrived for sixteen centuries before succumbing to a series of successor cultures driven by Islam. Indeed, by 250 BCE, the city of Djenné-Jeno—adjacent to modern Djenné—was already a thriving commercial center whose inhabitants mastered ironworking technology, were skilled in the art of pottery, and crafted fine gold ornaments. Djenné-Jeno’s elite lived in spacious, rectangular mud-brick houses, had sophisticated burial rites, and practiced ancestor worship. One of Africa’s oldest cities, Djenné-Jeno, was, by the year 1,000, a great walled agglomeration where perhaps 20,000 people lived. Remarkably, the city predated contact with Arabic-speaking people of North Africa by four hundred years—it was mysteriously abandoned in the late fourteenth century.

The founder of the Mali Empire, Sunjata Kéïta, defeated Soso (led by Suman-guru Kante) at the battle of Kirina (1235) and built on the small Maninka kingdom founded in 1213 by Allakoi Kéïta. The Tekrur kingdom was captured by Mali at the end of the thirteenth century. One of Sunjata's successors, Abubakari II, never returned from a trans-Atlantic voyage to the Americas that he undertook in 1312.<sup>18</sup> A freed slave, Sakura, usurped the throne in 1285 and ruled until 1300, when the Kéïta dynasty regained power. Mali reached its apex during the reign of Mansa Kanku Musa (1312–37), who undertook a now famous pilgrimage to Mecca (1324–25); while in Egypt, he distributed such large quantities of gold that its value fell and still had not recovered twelve years later. By the time of his death (1337), Mali was a wealthy, prosperous, and well organized empire, with cities renowned throughout the Sudan for their culture and learning. One of Kanku Musa's successors, his brother Mansa Suleyman (1341–60), is well known to us thanks to the writings of Ibn Battuta. The Mossi invasion and pillage of Timbuktu (1337) marks the beginning of the decline of the Mali Empire. Mali was known for its intellectual center in Timbuktu. Mali was a matrilineal society, and succession was based on matrilineal descent; men traced their lineage to the brothers of their mothers rather than to their fathers. A person's heirs were his sister's sons, not his own sons. Maninka women enjoyed a high social status and a high degree of freedom. Thus, until the middle of the fourteenth century, the first wife of *mansa* was the second most senior person in the politico-administrative hierarchy of the empire. The key province of Jenne was under her direct authority. In one instance—that of Kasa, Mansa Suleyman's first wife—the first wife (unsuccessfully) attempted to overthrow her husband to replace him with her exiled cousin.<sup>19</sup>

The economic power of Mali was based on trade—the king levied taxes on all goods that came through the kingdom. Trade—in which Jenne and Gao played a prominent role—promoted wealth. Trans-Saharan trade also contributed to Mali's economic power and to the people's welfare. One heavily traveled trade route began in Zawila and ended at Lake Chad. Another began in Egypt and went all the way to Ghana. The trade routes were known for their security. For example, the route from Tlemcen, near the Mediterranean, to Sijilmasa and Walata had wells along the way. A drum beating signaled the beginning of the caravan, thereby alerting people along its route. Each community produced its own food, and exchanged items that were not produced in its region with others. For example, nomads would exchange meat and milk for vegetables or salt and agriculturalists would exchange vegetables for milk and meat. The threat of enslavement was used as a means of economic and social control and as a way to punish people who committed crimes. For example, a person who was robbed could decide to enslave the thief or to sell him to other people. Kings captured slaves from neighboring states whom they sold to other communities. Those who committed adultery were burned alive. This law was respected throughout the land. As observed by Ibn Battuta—who traveled in Mali between June 1352 and

February 1353—an exceptional degree of justice, peace, and security prevailed throughout the empire.<sup>20</sup>

The army of the *mansa* was based on the conscription of every young Maninka male, traditionally organized in hunter's (*Simbon*) associations. In case of war, each provincial governor had to provide a military contingent to the *mansa*. The clans who had initially collaborated with Sunjata and helped him win a decisive victory at Kirina (Konatè, Kondè, Traorè, and Kamara) benefited from a privileged status—namely, greater autonomy—within the empire. Conversely, those provinces that had opposed Sunjata (Diagan and Sosso) were subjected to a more direct form of administration in which the traditional local leaders were replaced by a representative of the *mansa*. The political power of the *mansa* was circumscribed by a council of elders made up of the traditional leaders of the five key Maninka clans: Kèita, Kondè, Traorè, Kamara, and Koroma.

In Mali, the king forced vassal states to pay tribute to him in gold, which he kept in trust for the people. Gold was exchanged for wool, copper, and beads with merchants from Morocco. Mali also imported blades, horses, and silk from Egypt. Cities with which Mali traded included Kano (present Nigeria), Tripoli, Cairo, Murzuk, and Ghat. Mali entertained diplomatic relations—and exchanged embassies, emissaries, and gifts—with various North African states, including Morocco, Libya, and Egypt, as well as with the Kingdom of Portugal. Progressively, various parts of the empire fell under the control of foreign people. In the north, the Tuareg captured Walata and Timbuktu, and the Mossi took parts of the south. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Mali's rulers unsuccessfully appealed to the Portuguese—who had settled on the West African coast—for help to reestablish their empire. By the middle of the seventeenth century, the once prestigious Mali Empire had shrunk back to its original heartland, the small Maninka kingdom, around Kangaba in the Upper Niger Valley. Yet, for more than two centuries (1238–1468), Mali's hegemony over the Western Sudan facilitated the movement of peoples and thus fostered a sense of nationalism based on common language and culture.<sup>21</sup>

### SONGHAY

The Songhay were farmers and fishermen who lived on the banks of the middle Niger. In the seventh century, a Berber tribe—the Dia—imposed political control over them, and Dia Kossoi introduced Islam around 1010. For a time—between 1325 and 1335—Songhay became a tributary state of Mali. In order to maintain their independence, the Songhay had to constantly fight neighboring people such as the Tuareg, the Mossi, and the Maninka (Mali). In 1337, Ali Kolen founded the Sonni dynasty. In 1464, an ambitious and able—if somewhat cruel and dictatorial—Soninke leader, Sonni Ali Ber, came to the throne of Songhay. A man of war and an empire builder, Sonni Ali took Timbuktu in 1468, and (after a long siege), Jenne, in 1473. By the time of his death (1492), Songhay was a fairly stable empire controlling much of the middle and upper Niger Valley. After his death,

the throne was usurped in 1493 by one of Sonni Ali's generals (with the support of the people), Muhammad Toure, who founded the Askiya dynasty. Askiya Muhammad set about organizing the empire into a properly administered state. He divided Songhay into provinces, with a governor—usually a member of his own family or a trusted friend—in charge of each province. He created a number of central offices (ministries) to look after all important state matters, including justice, finance, and agriculture. He instituted a system of taxation whereby each town or district had its own tax collector. He also made some improvements designed to benefit trade, such as putting an inspector in charge of each important market and making weights and measures uniform throughout the kingdom. The Askiya was both a religious and secular leader.

An imperial council made up of the court's dignitaries, the *Sunna*, advised the Askiya on the governance of the empire. As a devout Muslim, Askiya Muhammad encouraged the works of Muslim scholars. Under his rule, Timbuktu, Jenne, and Walata flourished as centers of religion and learning. Trade also prospered and brought added wealth to Gao and Timbuktu. Sudan gold, slaves, ivory, ebony, and ostrich feathers continued to flow northward; in exchange came copper, iron, brassware, sword blades, cloth, and salt. Timbuktu became a great center, and the University of Sankore—one of the first in Africa—attracted scholars from all over the Muslim world.

In 1496, Askia Muhammad set out on a pilgrimage to Mecca with an escort of 1,500 (including a cavalry of 800), where he arrived in 1497. From his treasury of 300,000 dinars, he gave 10,000 gold pieces as alms for the poor, and for the creation of a hostel for Western Sudanese pilgrims. He also received official recognition of his position as emperor of the Songhay and was appointed Khalife (religious leader) of the Western Sudan. On his return from Mecca, Askia Muhammad set out to extend his empire. He subdued peoples to the west and south, taking in all the land that had once belonged to Mali, all the way to the Atlantic coast. Next, he tackled the Hausa states to the east. He captured Agades, and took control of the important trade routes through Air (leading to Tunis, Tripoli, and Egypt). By 1515, Askia Muhammad—who ruled until 1528—had created the largest and wealthiest of all the empires in the Western Sudan. His successors Askiya Ishaq I (1539–49) and Askiya Daud (1549–82) further expanded the empire through a series of expeditions in the Mali Empire (1545–46, 1550, and 1558–59), resulting in the loss of Mali's western provinces to Songhay. The wealth and power of Songhay elicited the envy of Morocco. In 1590, an ambitious king of Morocco, Ahmad el-Mansur, decided to attack the Songhay Empire. With an army of 4,000 soldiers consisting largely of European captives and mercenaries equipped with gunpowder and firearms, led by a young Spaniard (Judar Pasha), the Moroccans defeated Songhay king Askia Ishak II's army—including an 18,000-men cavalry and a 9,000-men infantry—at the battle of Tondibi, near Gao (May 13, 1591). Powerful enough to destroy, but not sufficiently strong to build, the Moroccans failed to hold together the great empire that the askiyas had built. Without security, the Western Sudan dissolved into chaos.<sup>22</sup>

**STATE-BUILDING IN CENTRAL SUDAN: KANEM-BORNU**

Kanem and Bornu are states of the Central Sudan in the area of Lake Chad, to the east of Ghana, Mali, and Songhay. The Kanuri, the people of Kanem (and later of Bornu), are nomadic herdsman who claim to have come originally from Yemen in southern Arabia and who emerged as a distinct people in 800 AD. By about 700 AD, many peoples moved from the Upper Nile Valley westwards toward Lake Chad. One of these peoples were the Zaghawa, who settled in Kanem and always provided the rulers (kings) who—as in Egypt and Kush—were regarded as divine. Kanem emerged as a state around 900 AD, with the Saifi dynasty. According to the *Bornu Chronicle*—the written history of Kanem-Bornu—a number of pagan rulers succeeded each other between 800 AD and 1087 AD, when the first Muslim ruler, Humai (1087–97), came to the throne. Horses and camels were introduced in large numbers by the Kanuri at this time. The renowned and feared Kanuri cavalry then became the core of the king's military force.

During the next 150 years, Kanem extended its power. During the reign of Dunama I (1097–1150), Kanem began its expansion by gaining control of the desert caravan routes. In a process similar to what occurred in Ghana, Mali, and Songhay, a central government established loose control over a number of tribute-paying people. The king of Kanem appointed members of his family as governors—beyond a fairly large heartland, vassals retained their own rulers, language, and culture. King Salma (1194–1221) firmly established Islam as the religion of the political elite; Kanem then became part of the Islamic world, and Islamic—both Arab and African—culture, civilization, and centers of learning flourished. Dunama I undertook two pilgrimages to Mecca. During the reign of the next king (or “Mai”), Dunama Dibbalemi (1224–59), Kanem reached its apogee. It gained control of the whole Lake Chad basin, and of the trade routes as far north as Fezzan; it also established diplomatic relations with Tunis, where an embassy was created in 1257. This ensured that caravans could travel safely far south from the Mediterranean coast. Kanuri trade was based on the export of slaves in exchange for horses and manufactured goods from the north.

Over the next one hundred years, Kanem became weakened by wars and royal quarrels of succession, notably between the Muslim Saifi kings and the pagan Bulala clan. The lack of peace and stability in the kingdom led Mai Omar (1380–88) and many of his people to move west of Lake Chad and permanently settle there; their new lands became the kingdom of Bornu. Wars and raiding continued, and it was not until the reign of Mai Ali Ghazi ibn Dunama (1476–1503), that Bornu settled down and began to prosper. In 1484, Ali built a new capital city at Ngazargamu, on the river Yobé. In 1570, the most famous of the kings of Bornu, known chiefly for his military campaigns, Mai Idris Alawma, came to the throne. Equipped with firearms—and with the assistance of Turkish military instructors—Mai Idris Alawma subdued all his neighbors, defeated Tuareg tribes, and reconquered Kanem (now settled by the Bulala clan). An agreement was concluded between Bornu and the Bulala, allowing the latter to retain

their independence and—for the first time in the history of the Western Sudan—clearly demarcating the border between the two territories.

The prosperity of Kanem-Bornu was based on the trade in slaves. Idris made Islam the state religion, and Muslim law—administered by the *qadis*/Muslim judges—took the place of indigenous customary law. However, as in Ghana, Mali, and Songhay, Islam was, until the reign of Idris Alawma, confined to the ruling elite, while the ordinary people—as well as the Bulala clan in Kanem—retained their indigenous customs and beliefs. Mai Idris Alawma made Kanem-Bornu the most powerful of the states of the Central Sudan; when he died (1602), he left a well-established, original warrior kingdom. The kingdom enjoyed peace and prosperity up until the nineteenth century, when it was challenged by the rise of theocratic states in the west. Kanem and Bornu exerted the same civilizing influence on Central Sudan as Ghana, Mali, and Songhay had done in Western Sudan.<sup>23</sup> The process of late state-building in the Western Sudan (Bamana kingdom of Segu), but more particularly in the Lower Guinea coast (Oyo empire and Benin and Dahomey kingdoms), was intimately linked with the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Thus these states' political systems and institutions were informed and shaped by this inhuman, genocidal, and eminently destructive trade in human beings. The slave trade resulted in the development of political systems geared to serve primarily the political and economic interests of a small ruling elite and the Western intruders, rather than those of the indigenous African populations.

#### **LATE STATE-BUILDING IN THE WESTERN SUDAN: THE BAMANA KINGDOM OF SEGU**

In 1712, the Bamana state of Segu arose in the middle Niger from the ashes of Songhay, which fell after the Moroccan invasion of 1591. The river Niger was important to Segu for providing fish, facilitating long-distance trade, and as a form of transportation. The Bamana state used the Niger River to expand its territory from Timbuktu in the north to Odienne in the south, and from Bure (Guinea) in the west to the frontiers of present-day Burkina Faso in the east. According to Sundiata Djata, four population groups lived in the Segu region: the Bamana, the Maraka (or Soninke), the Sòmòndò, and the Fula (Fulani or Fulbe). Other ethnic groups also lived under the state's administration; these groups were allowed to maintain their cultural autonomy as long as they paid tribute to the king (*Fama*). In return, the *Fama* provided the Sòmòndò and Maraka with war captives.

The Mande (Maninka or Malinke) paid *Lisongo* (honey price) in gold to the *Fama* for protection. In times of war, an additional tax, called *kèlèwelefin*—meaning “things to call for the troops”—was levied to feed the troops.<sup>24</sup> Central power resided in Segu, where criminals were punished. For example, if a robber stole from a resident, the head of the two villages were forced to remain in Segu until the crime was solved. Theft and any other crimes were not tolerated.



The state was based on a strong professional army that developed from the *Tòn* (den), an age-grade association, under Mamari “Bitòn” Kulibali. The *Tòn* was developed by village leaders as a defense against external aggression. Whenever attacks were about to occur, village leaders sent young boys from their villages to meet with others, and together they protected the villagers. Based on cooperation between hunters and fishermen, the *Tòn* also attracted slaves, as well as the poor. Its relationship with the state varied according to the leaders. For example, under Bitòn Kulibali, the Bamana kingdom created new functions for the *Tòn* that fit into the egalitarian ideology of the state.

The state acted as a unifying agent of all the diverse ethnic groups who lived in the Middle Niger Valley. Each ethnic group was brought into the state not individually, but as a collective unit based on interpenetrating actors (for example age set, elders, clans, etc.), which further strengthened the state. Two groups acted as the pivot of the state. These were Bamana soldiers, who provided booty and slaves, and the farmers who produced surplus grain that kept its residents well fed. The soldiers enabled the state to develop a professional army that was intricately tied to the affairs of the state without controlling it. The state was based on conquest, which furthered its military and economic development. In the Bamana army, soldiers were divided into *kelebolow* (“arms of war,” or wings), each led by a *Tòn-jòn Kuntigi* (chief of slaves). The “arms” flanked a central group called the “chest” (*disi*), which was composed of *Tònjòn* (slave soldiers). The army also had a “head” and “feet.” A special battalion of pure *Tòn-kòrò-bolo* (old slave hands)—whose barracks were placed in strategic positions around Segu—formed behind the *disi*. Soldiers occupied a central position in the state in which they were powerful.<sup>25</sup>

Bamana social hierarchy consisted of the *horonw* (nobles), the *nyamakalaw* (casted groups), and *jonw* (slaves). The *tòn* associations changed Bamana society and transformed its politics. Bamana religion (*Batair*) was based on the belief in a divine being with lesser gods below him. It was expressed through all rituals in age sets, secret organizations, and religious organizations. Secret societies helped their members perform important roles in the community, such as preserving agricultural and religious duties. These members also served as intermediaries between the spiritual and temporal words.

The Bamana state exchanged gold for arms. Warfare was an expression of state power and its internal cohesion. In the Bamana state, war captives worked as slaves while others were incorporated into *tòn* associations. According to Djata, the rise of the Bamana state coincided with the climax of the slave trade. Thus, unlike previous states that we have discussed so far, the Bamana state relied predominantly on slavery, which affected the nature of relations between the subjects and the *Fama*. This explains, for example, the need for constant recruitment of young people into the military, and the selling of slaves to other regions. The Bamana state diversified its markets by exporting slaves to the desert and coastal (Atlantic) areas as well as to the interior of the region. Biton Kulibali’s second son, who was a leper, was a terrible *Fama*. He was such a dictator that he oppressed the *Tònjòn*, causing one of them to assassinate him.



The Bamana state structure remained intact in spite of conquest by the Fulani Islamic reformer, al-Haj ‘Umar Tall, in 1860. However, the Bamana people rejected Islam, and the Bamana language continued to be used throughout the state. The Bamana is a good example of the negative impact of slavery on the state, polity, and people, and of the need for constant warfare to capture slaves. The Bamana state’s key actors were soldiers and the kings (*fama*), unlike earlier states that were controlled by kings or emperors. During the state’s decay, it was the military that finally took control of the state. Infighting between different military leaders and factions weakened the state, thus facilitating French conquest in 1891 (although there were revolts in 1892–93). However, the French could not have succeeded without the assistance of Bamana soldiers—who sided with them in order to be protected from their fellow Bamana—and of some Bamana leaders involved in internal power struggles.<sup>26</sup>

### LATE STATE-BUILDING IN THE LOWER GUINEA COAST: THE OYO EMPIRE

The Oyo Empire was located between the Volta and Niger rivers in West Africa. It ruled over coastal states, which paid tribute to Oyo’s divine king, the *Olefin*. The king’s office was composed of the chief judge, the head of the Shango—a cult based on the king’s ancestors—and a treasurer. A Shango priest represented the king in every town. A council of nobles representing the aristocracy, composed of chiefs, shared judicial powers in the capital and adjudicated disputes between the Alafin and subordinate rulers, army commanders, and others. The *Alafin*’s power was checked by the council, which, in turn, was checked by a supreme council of nobles from Oyo’s great families who had religious and judicial powers, and on whom the *Alafin*’s priest had great influence. This system was reproduced throughout the state. Oyo’s efficient state structures and its strategic location enabled it to control all trade—including the slave trade—along the southern Niger River. Oyo also exerted enormous political power, though it failed to unite all Yoruba people under a central authority. As firearms progressively became available to them, Oyo’s coastal vassal states challenged its position. Its greatest challenges came from the Fon—who seceded in the nineteenth century—and the Hausa.

Because of high mortality due to the tsetse fly, Oyo was greatly dependent on import of horses from the Hausa states. The reliance on the slave trade sucked all the labor needed for the community and closed all avenues for alternative trade. Conflict over control of the slave trade increased between various leaders, as well as with neighboring states. New towns—Abeokuta, Ijaye, and Ibadan—emerged, as people sought refuge from Oyo. Its fate was further complicated by European intervention in African affairs during this period. Europeans aided one group against the other, further fueling conflict and accelerating the decline and eventual demise of the Oyo empire.<sup>27</sup>

### LATE STATE-BUILDING IN THE LOWER GUINEA COAST: THE DAHOMEY KINGDOM

The Fon people organized themselves around strong military leaders. Their state emerged in 1650 under King Agaja. It was able to capture all the coastal states controlled by Oyo, including Jakin, Whydah, and Grand Popo. The key incentive for creating the state was to halt the slave trade in which the coastal states were engaged. Agaja planned to replace slavery with legitimate trade once he took control over these states. Unable to halt the trade, Dahomey increasingly relied on it, as well as on guns and gunpowder. The state owed its greatness to the profits from the slave trade. The king's large professional army—composed of both male and female soldiers—helped create an aura of mystery around the king. Royal palaces helped symbolize the separateness of the king and his greatness. The king's main palace was Simboji, which acted as the center of political life. Here, the king held his court, surrounded by officials. The king controlled the distribution of property within the kingdom and lineage. His wives and other women helped in intelligence gathering. Annual festivals were held each year to commemorate the king's power and to thank the gods for success in wars. Although a council advised the king, he appointed and dismissed all state officials, and sanctioned religious officials. The state was divided into six districts, each administered by a king's political appointee. A group of women (often called the kings' wives) supervised these officials' work. Dahomey reached its apex between 1790 and 1850. Dahomey was definitely not a democratic state.<sup>28</sup>

Most of the women in Dahomey's army were slaves from other areas. In Dahomey, women had equal rights to men. They had the right to choose their husbands, and could divorce them at will. Women also composed the king's elite force. Daughters of slaves guarded the king's palace. Each private citizen was obliged to give the king a daughter who was recruited in the military. The military was also recruited from war captives, who were often slaves. The Amazon's basic purpose in life was to make war to capture slaves who were then sold. The sole loyalty of the Amazons was to the king. Wegbaja, the first king of Dahomey had the sole right to punish criminals, bought arms from Europeans, and introduced the military predawn strikes that Dahomey was famous for. Discipline often broke down after a king's death, and was not restored until another king was appointed.

In Dahomey, military strength governed all aspects of life, and the individual was subordinated to the state. Military valor was the most valued virtue in Dahomey. Its Amazon soldiers enabled Dahomey to defeat many armies, including that of France in the 1890s. The reason given for this success was the training of Amazons, which desensitized them to fear through such hardships as running over thorns and rough toil. The king of Dahomey claimed that the wars the state engaged in were not conducted to capture slaves, but as a means of defense against its neighbors' attacks, which led to endemic warfare. Dahomey

even manufactured its own gunpowder and muskets for war. It also repaired old guns bought from Europeans, and built workshops to make weapons.

As J. F. Ade Ajayi argues, a predominant trend at the end of the nineteenth century was “the determined effort on the part of various African leaders to strengthen their power and their capacity to defend African territories and interests. These efforts were, however, systematically undermined and eventually subverted by the European presence . . . trade became a major factor affecting access to firearms and the acquisition of wealth, and hence the rise and fall of states over wide areas of Africa.”<sup>29</sup>

The official policy of the Dahomey state was revenge on its neighbors that basically amounted to a slave hunt. Abomey, the kingdom’s palace, was a product of slavery that fell into decay after the trade ended. The state had no moral foundation. After various wars against France, the king was finally defeated in 1900. At that time, Dahomey came under direct French rule. Dahomey is a good example of institutional decay and of the rise of authoritarianism under slavery. For example, the power and authority of the king were absolute: there were absolutely no checks on his power, nor any councils of any kind to advise him. Furthermore, the citizens of Dahomey lived in fear because each household was required to provide daughters for the palace. In short, the Dahomey state resorted to state terror in order to enlist the loyalty of its people.<sup>30</sup>

#### **IMPACT OF THE TRANS-ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE ON INDIGENOUS AFRICAN POLITIES AND SOCIETIES**

The trans-Atlantic slave trade permanently changed relations between the leaders and their subjects.<sup>31</sup> During this period, many farms were left unattended and food production was neglected as populations fled from slave raiders in search of security. Mass population displacement occurred as groups fled from one region to another. The trans-Atlantic slave trade also rekindled indigenous African slavery.<sup>32</sup>

This process changed the demographic make-up of certain states. For example, the Bapende, who live along the Kasai River in the Congo, once lived on the coast of Angola but were forced to flee Portuguese slave traders. As a result of intermarriages along the coast between Europeans and Africans, a new, bi-racial ethnic group, which identified with the Europeans, emerged. This group played a significant role during slavery as middlemen between Africans and Europeans. As they were used to force people into slavery, religious institutions were also negatively affected. However, some authors (such as Fernand Braudel), counter critics of slavery by highlighting the numerous contributions of Europe to Africa.<sup>33</sup> Hugh Thomas goes as far as to assert, peremptorily, that the introduction of maize and cassava compensated Africa for slavery!<sup>34</sup> But as Inikori shows, the massive transfer of population resulting from the Atlantic slave trade-anywhere between 25 and 200 million-led to an absolute decline in the population of sub-Saharan Africa between 1650 and 1850. This “outright depopulation of large areas of

the continent discouraged the development of commodity production in Africa, both for internal trade and for export, and laid the foundation for dependency structures in the continent.”<sup>35</sup> As Ajayi rightly concludes, “underpopulation was definitely a factor of underdevelopment.”<sup>36</sup> This period of confusion was marked by increased conflict, both between states and within states. Conflict also arose between classes, as the upper classes (aristocracy and ruling elite) escaped slavery altogether. Moral decay also contributed to the destruction of families and to the rise of leaders whose sole base was the chaotic and predatory state produced during slavery. After the fall of the Oyo Empire, many royal families were destroyed; as a result, anarchy ensued and self-appointed leaders emerged.

After slavery, African leaders increasingly relied on coercion (rather than consensus) to govern. The state was no longer viewed as based on morally superior cultural and religious values. The state lost its autonomy because long-distance export trade replaced inter-African trade. Foreign trade did not bring any valuable items into Africa except weapons of physical and moral destruction, such as arms and rum. The slave trade also introduced various European powers that competed for slaves and African rulers’ support: the British, Danes, Dutch, Portuguese, and French had various trading outposts, from the gold and ivory coasts to the slave coast. Arab states also got involved in the African slave trade. Most slaves taken by Arabs were forced to work in contemporary Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other areas in the region. African leaders themselves were active in the Atlantic slave trade. They signed treaties with slave traders and allowed slave forts to be built on their own land. They abused their political and religious powers by selling their own people into slavery. *Fragmentation* of families, groups, institutions, and states tore apart the very fabric of African society.<sup>37</sup> People lost faith in African institutions since they were used to subjugate them. More importantly (and as Inikori demonstrates), by strengthening the military basis of state power and by putting aristocracies front and center in the new social and political order, the Atlantic slave trade totally transformed the nature of the African state:

. . . the export trade had a serious distorting impact on African political and social structures . . . The fact is that—directly and indirectly—the export slave trade stimulated frequent wars which distorted the political and social structures of African societies. One major distortion was the creation of military aristocracies that became so politically influential that they determined the direction of state policy in virtually all major African states of the period . . . the military aristocracies saw war as a means of acquiring more territories . . . This is why many of the states that emerged during this period were very limited in size, never achieved real political stability and collapsed rather quickly either from within or at the very first sign of trouble from a formidable enemy.<sup>38</sup>

Ajayi aptly summarizes the negative impact of the Atlantic slave trade in Africa: “The slave trade seems to provide the best explanation of why in most of Africa, of all continents, the political and economic structures at the beginning of the nineteenth century seem to have remained unstable and fragile.”<sup>39</sup>

Africans participated in their own destruction in three ways: first, slavery would not have been possible without a close cooperation between European slavers and the African ruling elite.<sup>40</sup> Except in Angola where the Portuguese went inland, everywhere else, African middlemen helped Europeans. Second, Africans such as King Afonso were led to believe that by adopting Christianity, the Portuguese would treat them as equals. Third, it is important to note that although many societies resisted slavery, there were some who were willing to cooperate with Europeans in enslaving fellow Africans. Some leaders tried to rebuild indigenous institutions, but Europeans were already on the continent, meddling and stealing its riches. As a result of the weakened institutions and the anarchy that followed slavery, these societies became easy prey for European conquest in the nineteenth century.

The structure of economic exchange between African and European states did not end with the abolition of slavery. Slaves were replaced by raw materials that brought little profit to African states. The pattern continues in contemporary Africa as it did during slavery, when puppet rulers were replaced by European powers with others who were more willing to serve the empire.<sup>41</sup>

As a result of slavery, new social structures that affected the state developed. First, Arab and European slave traders, clerics, and missionaries spread Islam and Christianity, which became political forces. As Pathé Diagne clearly shows, the development of a predatory economy based on piracy contributed to halting economic and technological growth in the southern Mediterranean. Furthermore, the predatory economy negatively impacted on the relationship between town and country, leading to the stagnation of the latter. In addition, “from the eighteenth century onwards, European traders ruined the native crafts and industries of the coast by wrecking the traditional networks. By cornering the ports they paralyzed the links between the coast and the interior.”<sup>42</sup> Slavery resulted in the emergence of new states: Kanem-Bornu, Kayor (in Senegambia), Bamana, Oyo, Dahomey, Angola, and Changaine (south of the Zambezi). Because they relied on slavery, these states did not provide a sound and viable economic base. The state that emerged after slavery was totally different in nature from the indigenous African state. First, it lost its autonomy. Second, inter-African trade was replaced by slave trade. Third, the leaders lost their legitimacy, as they were divorced from their subjects. Fourth, civil society ceased to act as a check on the behavior of the rulers because coercion replaced consensus as a method of governance. Fifth, acquiring and keeping power—rather than meeting their peoples’ needs—became the exclusive goal of the rulers. Sixth, rulers turned into selfish brutes living lavishly in the face of immense poverty and suffering of the majority of the people. Seventh, the complementary relationship that had existed between the desert, forest, and savannah in trade ceased. Finally, since slavery was taking place in coastal areas and urban centers, the rural sector stagnated and fell into economic and social backwardness and moral decay.

### INDIGENOUS AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND BASIC FEATURES

Six basic features characterized indigenous African political systems. First, they were based on kinship and ancestry. Second, custom and tradition—rather than written constitutions—established the rules and procedures of governance. Third, power in Africa was both secular and sacred. Fourth, women played a key role in indigenous African political systems and institutions. Thus, in antiquity (Egypt and Kush), women were active in political and economic affairs, either as queen mothers, princesses in charge of temples, or as co-regents with their younger sons. Fifth, indigenous African political systems were inherently democratic. Political succession was strictly regulated according to descent (patrilineal or matrilineal) and lineage. Finally, rural communities (villages) constituted the basic level of indigenous African political systems. The village assembly was convened when the council of elders could not reach unanimity on a contested issue. If we define development as a society's capacity to deal with its environment in order to enhance its people's standard of living then, without a doubt, indigenous African political systems and institutions are clear and incontrovertible evidence that Africa had reached a high level of development and civilization prior to any form of foreign influence or intervention.<sup>43</sup>

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## CHAPTER 3

# THE AFRICAN COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL STATES

The prevailing African state, in all African countries, is an implant from the European countries whose colony each African country was. The present postcolonial State in Africa did not grow organically out of the body of Africa: it is an implant on the African body, hence the grotesque features of some, or many of the elements of the contemporary African State, and of contemporary political parties in Africa, which are also implants on the African body; the African body is rejecting many of these elements of the Western State.

—Herbert W. Vilakazi, Commissioner of the Independent Electoral Commission at the KZN Election Indaba, Durban, South Africa, September 17, 2002:  
posted on <http://www.ifp.org.za>

### IMAGINING AFRICA: EUROPEAN CONSTRUCTION OF AFRICA

FROM THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY ONWARD, IN SPITE OF THE GOOD DIPLOMATIC and commercial relations that Europe and Africa enjoyed, Europeans chose to create a new image of Africa and Africans. Such an image allowed Europeans to exploit African labor and resources. Explorers, geographers, scientists, missionaries, and political, business, and military leaders engaged in the construction of the African as the “other.” Africa was also depicted as a passive object waiting to be reborn through various European forces.<sup>1</sup> According to John Barrow, who compared Africa to England, the land was ugly because it lacked control.<sup>2</sup> His account informed missionaries’ views before they arrived on the continent. Africa became the “dark continent” where “various white crusaders struck moral pastures.”<sup>3</sup>

Social Darwinism shaped imperial policy. Social Darwinists believed that the intellectual development of Africans was at the same level as that of animals (especially monkeys).<sup>4</sup> The idea developed that since “weaker” races could not survive, it was better to exterminate them to quicken the process. In Africa, the encounter with colonial powers meant only one thing: exterminate!<sup>5</sup>



### AFRICA'S WORLD ON THE EVE OF THE COLONIAL ERA

The trans-Atlantic slave trade (1492–1890) gave European countries and agents an excuse to meddle in African affairs. Three major developments occurred as a result of this most unique type of trade:

1. Africans experienced a permanent loss of population. Between 1650 and 1900, Africa's population increased from 100 million to 120 million, while Europe's increased from 103 to 423 million, and Asia's, from 257 to 857 million during the same period.<sup>6</sup>
2. As a result of slavery, African institutions also lost crucial technology that was needed for development during that period. For example, such typically West African skills as rice growing, basket weaving, iron smelting, and indigo tie-dye were later used among the Gullah people off the coast of South Carolina and Georgia in the United States.
3. Africans were divorced from their institutions. Most importantly, Europeans used the abolition of slavery as a pretext to meddle in African affairs. The mutual respect that had existed between Africans and Europeans up until that time ended. European civilization became the standard upon which all other civilizations were measured. Africa was no longer different and equal but different and *inferior*.<sup>7</sup>

### "CIVILIZATION IN ACTION": COLONIZING AFRICA

According to Rosa Luxemburg, capitalism must expand outside of its natural boundaries in industrializing capitalist countries in order to make a profit because its home market is insufficient. Superprofits cannot be made at home because of overproduction, underconsumption, and the subsistence wages. Cecil Rhodes knew how important foreign markets were for capitalism to make superprofits.<sup>8</sup> Imperialism changes the status quo of the invaded country. It is totalitarian since it rules every aspect of life: economic, political, and social. Imperialism is not static—it adapts to changing economic conditions. Nineteenth-century European imperialism differed from earlier forms in two ways: first, seven European powers agreed to divide Africa between them (Figure 4.1 shows the partition of Africa). Second, these European powers directly occupied African countries for more systematic exploitation and tighter control. In essence, colonialism is the continuation of imperialism by other means. Racism—disguised as paternalism—rationalizes and justifies imperialism.<sup>9</sup> The civilizing mission of colonialism was an inherently violent process.<sup>10</sup>

Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch provides a detailed account of the mission of enquiry on alleged atrocities committed by the Concessionary Companies in the French Congo. Led by the famed explorer Savorgnan de Brazza, the mission (April–September 1905) found that in Ubangi-Chari (present-day Central African Republic), the *Soci t  de la Lobaye's* agents had, in the village of Nguakombo,

rounded up fifty-eight women and ten children as “hostages” to force the men to produce their quota of natural rubber; forty-five women and two children later died for lack of proper care. In Fort-Sibut (Krebedje), the mission found another concentration camp comprising 119 women and children taken hostage during a raid in Uhame-Nana. De Brazza concluded that, in that particular region, taking women as hostages was a common practice to force the men to provide their quota of rubber, to submit to portage requisitions, or to pay their taxes in kind.<sup>11</sup>

In colonial Kenya, the British put members of the Kikuyu ethnic group who were fighting for their land and freedom in concentration camps. Some 300,000 people died as a result. Work camps, where freedom fighters were held in inhumane conditions, were set up throughout the country. These prisoners were worked to death. Torture was the norm in these camps. Men who refused to confess had their legs broken with stones. Others were castrated. Men were sexually assaulted, “sodomized with bottles and rifle barrels, and castrated.”<sup>12</sup> Eggs and bottles were stuffed into women’s vaginas. Women suspected of engaging in the war for land and freedom suffered on two accounts: as freedom fighters and as a result of their gender: “We were ordered to separate our legs with our knees raised. Failure to comply invited ruthless beating. Then a bottle full of a mixture of pepper and water was inserted into my birth canal and the contents emptied, inside of me, it is impossible to imagine the torment.”<sup>13</sup>

Who were the “civilizing” agents of imperialism and colonialism? We cannot speak about imperialism without identifying who the core players were. In general, colonial settlers were people who could not succeed economically, politically, or socially in their own countries. Far from being the cream of the crop, these colonial settlers were at the bottom of their societies’ economic and social hierarchy.<sup>14</sup> There is nothing romantic about conquest, no morals to keep nor lives to save. It is violent, brutal, and inhumane.<sup>15</sup> The idea of exterminating groups that were not European developed. This idea had cost millions of lives long before Adolf Hitler conceived of the Holocaust.<sup>16</sup> Even Charles Darwin, whose theory of the survival of the fittest was applied to “inferior” races by social Darwinists, was shocked by the speed with which Europeans murdered other races. Though he was used to the elimination of animals and plants by stronger species, his conversation with a Spanish commander in South America—General Rosas—in 1832 alerted him to the fact that human beings were being exterminated in a similar fashion.<sup>17</sup> Missionaries prepared Africans to accept Western culture as superior. Their letters and accounts have had the most negative impact on the African image. Explorers also participated in setting the scene for colonialism. They had to “discover” not only to please their sponsors but also to be the “first” ones in the area. Explorers were treated as heroes in colonial history. Their atrocities were glossed over. For such people, to expand the empire was a crusade against “ignorance” and “backwardness.”<sup>18</sup>

The British South Africa Company was a pioneer of Cecil Rhodes’ project of conquering Africa from the Cape to Cairo. According to his plan, British settlers would settle in Africa once the latter was conquered. These settlers would then

extend the rule of “empire” creating a larger Britain. Cecil Rhodes once said that if he could annex the planets he would. Rhodes financed the conquest of Nyasaland. Anyone who stood in his way was exterminated. He financed rebellions, invasions, and murders. Rhodes was one of the prime movers behind the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902 over control of South Africa’s wealth. He truly believed that there was no one that money could not buy. He used his wealth extensively and effectively to buy allies and silence enemies. Rhodes’ will, written at 24 in 1877, sketched an empire that his Round Table (elite secret society) would implement. According to his plan Britain would later work with the United States to protect Anglo-Saxons by protecting the interests of empire (especially economic ones).<sup>19</sup>

The Royal Niger Company (created in 1886) paved British rule in what became Nigeria in 1897. The British East Africa Company (1887) laid the groundwork for the annexation of Kenya and Uganda, which were placed under British rule in 1895. Once these companies began their operations, they set up trading posts, which later were protected by the state. Except for South Africa—occupied in 1652, but united after the Boer War through the Union of South Africa in 1910—the duration of colonial rule in the rest of the continent was relatively brief (sixty to seventy years), but brutal in every respect. As a result of colonialism, people were divided between two or more countries. For example, the Somali were in five colonies: Britain (Somaliland and north-eastern Kenya), Italy (Somalia), France (Djibouti), and Ethiopia (Ogaden). The Kingdom of Kongo was partitioned between the Belgians, the French, and the Portuguese.

The immediate result of this partition was loss of power and disunity among Africans, and, conversely, enormous economic benefits for the various colonial powers. For example, British colonial investment increased ninefold compared to local capital. Companies invested in the colonies where profits were higher because of forced labor and economic protectionism. Thanks to imperialism, Britain added 66 million people to its population and 4.5 million square miles to its area. This expansion entrenched the idea of a British Empire endowed with an unlimited supply of raw materials, labor, as well as captive markets for British-made goods. Some authors have tried to rewrite history by arguing that Britain and France did not really benefit from colonialism; instead, the colonies were seen as a drain on the resources of the metropolis.<sup>20</sup> As a result of colonization, France added 3 million square miles and 26 million people to its population as part of the French empire. Its colonies were eight times bigger than France proper. Germany added one million square miles and 13 million people to its population. King Leopold II of Belgium, who owned the Congo as his own private estate, added 1 million square miles and 20 million people to Belgium, in addition to a treasure trove of natural resources. This explains why Germany suffered such an economic crisis after World War 1, because it lost its African colonies in 1919. The height of imperialism (1880–90) changed the fate of Africa. These foreign entities were imposed on Africans without any considerations of culture, history, or the

environment because colonial powers presumed to know what was best for them. As African labor was mobilized for plantation work, indigenous food production was neglected. Africans were forced into this situation by the need to pay heavy hut and poll taxes. In essence, colonialism was designed to extract the highest economic profit from the colonized. In Rodney's words, "taxation . . . provided the major constraint driving Africans initially into wage labor or cash-crop production, and subsequent increases in taxation deepened African involvement."<sup>21</sup> The role of the state was also destructive since people were no longer mobilized for their own production, but for the needs of colonial powers. In areas where large numbers of colonialists settled (such as Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Rhodesia, and South Africa), the colonial governments used the state to force people into designated areas (reserves), leaving the best land for either European settlers or game parks. An artificial type of "tribalism," which became the daily reality of the colonial system, was used to divide the people. Europeans were always presented as homogenous, while hostile tribes made up the natives. Missionaries preached about Heaven but emphasized tribal identities, even creating ethnic groups where they did not exist. For example, the Kikuyu and Akamba of Kenya (or the Zulu and the Xhosa of South Africa), who have similar languages, were represented as different and distinct as Europeans and Africans. As a result of missionary propaganda, polygamy was banned. Yet polygamy was crucial in solving ethnic conflict because chiefs created alliances with hostile (or potentially hostile) ethnic groups through marriage. Conflict also flared up whenever Western firms needed access to natural resources.

Ethnicity was not important in African states. As A. Ajayi convincingly argues, in the process of state formation in Africa in the nineteenth century, the factor of state power was far more important than that of ethnicity:

. . . the nineteenth-century wars, while strengthening state power, did so at the expense of other forms of solidarity . . . little respect was shown for what we would now call ethnicity . . . this decline of ethnicity . . . became more general than ever before in the nineteenth century. In the conflicts and processes of state formation associated with the mfecane or the Yoruba, Asante, or Maasai wars of the nineteenth century, it is clear that the factor of state power was far more important than that of ethnicity . . . on the eve of the colonial conquest . . . the new state structures, which were not based on ethnicity, had become more important than ethnic solidarity in determining the response of various African peoples to the European challenge.<sup>22</sup>

Ethno-regional cleavages were reproduced in the colonial Nigerian state itself, making it very difficult to have a unified nation-state. Lugard's policy continued to influence the partition of Nigeria. For example, the Sudan province became Northern Nigeria, while the Maritime province became Southern Nigeria. Indirect rule as advocated by Lugard insisted on protecting "natives" from Western influences. The policy derived from a desire to recreate a hierarchal order similar to colonial India, but also from the contrasting views of Northern and Southern Nigeria held by colonial officials. It is this duality that explains the colonial roots

of the Nigerian state when the British merged both in 1914. This merger did not bridge the different perceptions of the two areas that colonial officials held. Eleazu has described it as a “farce” aimed at relieving Britain of “the onus of having to finance the administration of northern Nigeria.”<sup>23</sup> Tensions between the western and eastern regions (which were added to the state in 1939) were not as intense as those between north and south. This policy made ethnicity a keystone of the Nigerian state.

During colonialism, the role of the African state in the society also changed. It no longer served the interests of the people: food, security and shelter. Instead, the state became a coercive force. As Crawford Young has noted, the colonial state lacked three essential attributes that are to be found in any modern state, namely, sovereignty, nationalism, and external autonomy. These three attributes became the rallying cry for the African liberation movements. Indeed, the African colonial state was essentially a foreign construct that could not possibly take root on African soil.<sup>24</sup> African colonial states failed to address the decline in the rural sector. African priorities such as food self-sufficiency, universal health care, economic self-reliance, and democracy were in conflict with the aims of the colonial powers. The latter wanted African labor, resources, and markets.<sup>25</sup> Throughout “the nine tenths of the sixty-year period the aims of colonial governments were not those which Africans would have chosen for themselves, and their policies were not such as would have been recommended by planners of African development.”<sup>26</sup>

The colonial state was generally based on centralized authority. Strong governments were encouraged so as to attract and protect foreign investment. The state that developed during colonialism reflected neither Western values nor African ones. Africans did not develop any affinity with the new institutions, since these were used to oppress them. Their own indigenous institutions were dismissed as useless and “backward.” Furthermore, missionary propaganda negated African institutions. The colonizer used the latter to its own advantage, as traditional chiefs were maintained in power, while made accountable to colonial authorities. Thus Shaka Zulu’s well-organized and disciplined regiments were subsequently used to recruit labor for South Africa’s white farms and mines.

There was no enduring institutional support from which the African state could draw on. One of the most striking effects of the colonial state—especially where direct rule prevailed—was the destruction of indigenous civil society. Age-set organizations had played a crucial role in policing the society throughout history. With the onset of colonialism, missionaries strongly encouraged the elimination of such organizations. In indigenous political institutions, leaders respected age-set organizations because they represented sections of the community. These associations were crucial in teaching young men and women about the customs and traditions of the particular community. Christian organizations failed to achieve the social stability provided by age-set associations. During colonialism, civil society was never reconstituted. Instead, the people were further divorced from the state. Colonial education and Christianity alienated most Africans from their

environment. Islamic and Christian institutions were superimposed on indigenous African ones.

The most striking aspect of this foreign influence was the replacement of matriarchal societies with male-dominated ones. Colonialism restructured gender relations to the disadvantage of women. Thus, while in some indigenous African institutions, both men and women shared power equally without any inferior/superior divide, colonial states exclusively privileged men. European gender relations, which relegated women to the household as sex objects, mothers, and housewives, were imposed as a model for African gender relations. Men were the first to have access to technology; they were promoted as clerks, soldiers, and teachers. Furthermore, because the African woman was viewed as the epitome of African tradition (and thus an obstacle to modernity), she was marginalized politically and economically during colonialism. For example, women were accused of witchcraft; as a result, their property was taken and never returned to them. Individual tenure that privileged men denied women their economic means of support. The colonial authorities privileged African men and enlisted their support in marginalizing women—who had no economic or political decision-making power—in society.

To develop a rudimentary transport infrastructure (roads and railways), the colonial subjects were forced to pay taxes as well as provide labor. In this regard, it is interesting to note that most of the colonial railways ran from ports to inland areas of production; there were few branch or lateral lines, and almost no railway ran from one colonial territory to a foreign colony. For instance, there were no rail links between the various adjacent colonies of West Africa.<sup>27</sup> They also financed the development of the colonial powers by providing raw materials. After 1945, African nationalism forced European imperialism to change. Soldiers who returned to their countries after fighting in World War II stridently clamored for self-government. In the colonial powers themselves, some citizens opposed imperialism and pressured their governments to change. As a result, imperialism introduced some reforms to address these demands. It started reaching out to select members of the African elite who could be co-opted as potential allies. Up until then, colonial powers had not contributed financially to the development of the colonies. Britain and France promoted some degree of economic and social development in their colonies. France created the Investment Fund for Economic & Social Development (FIDES). In Britain, a Colonial Development and Welfare (CD&W) state agency was created for the colonies. Both funds from the Marshall Plan, which were partly earmarked for colonial development. By providing loans that were used, in part, to promote trade between the metropolis and the colonies (to the benefit of the former), both FIDES and CD&W contributed to further integrate the colonies into the world economy.

**“INDEPENDENCE” OR COLONIALISM BY OTHER MEANS?  
THE AFRICAN POSTCOLONIAL STATE**

In 1960, political independence in Francophone Africa was more a result of African resistance and protest than of French goodwill and self-interested realism. For the then French President Charles de Gaulle (and his adviser on African affairs, Jacques Foccart), a colony had seceded if it liberated itself without French support (as Guinea did in September 1958), while it was considered “sovereign” if the French had blessed its independence.<sup>28</sup> Nevertheless, except for Algeria, following the war of liberation, France imposed its conditions on the newly independent countries in various ways. Through the linkage established between the accession to international sovereignty, the signing of model cooperation agreements, and the wholesale adoption of the French constitutional model of the Fifth Republic, France managed to institutionalize its political, economic, monetary, and cultural preeminence over its former African colonies. In effect, Francophone African states surrendered key elements of their sovereignty—namely, foreign economic and monetary policy and defense—to France.<sup>29</sup> In most colonies, constitutions were already prepared before these leaders came to power. As Chinweizu notes, “[T]he new African administrators had signed agreements to uphold these conventions before they were allowed to enter into their new offices. They had promised to uphold ‘international law and morality’ (whatever that is); promised to join the United Nations and to abide by its rules and recommendations; promised not to expropriate foreign companies even if they robbed Africa poor.”<sup>30</sup> Duncan Sandys, who became Britain’s Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in 1960, was an expert in persuading African leaders to sign independence constitutions written for them. He kept the participants talking until they signed out of sheer exhaustion, usually in the early hours of the morning. Thus decolonization was just a façade barely disguising the continuation of colonization by other means and leading to the mere “flag” (or juridical) independence of utterly impotent and powerless quasi-states lacking the substance of sovereignty. African states were not allowed, by their former colonizers, to industrialize because they would not only displace established exporters but also close markets for manufactured goods.<sup>31</sup> This explains the fundamental nature of the postcolonial state, to which we now turn.

**THE AFRICAN POSTCOLONIAL STATE**

Did some of the African rulers who inherited the colonial state shape it to meet the needs of their peoples? First, except in Algeria, Angola, Congo/Zaire, Guinea, Mali, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, the elite that inherited the state was chosen by the colonial powers so that the latter’s interests would be preserved. In some



instances, the British actually *created* their own nationalists where none existed. British-sponsored nationalism would then replace colonial rule.<sup>32</sup>

In the case of Britain, its supporters were supplied and protected by British intelligence and security, which remained after decolonization. Its mercenaries took care of the radicals either through civil wars or endemic conflict. This resulted in a conveniently moderate African leadership that could work hand in glove with minority and Western economic interests and maintain the *status quo* and to continue business as usual. In Africa, formal independence was given by the colonial powers, but it was devoid of content and had very strong strings attached. First, independence was only nominal because exploitative multinational corporations, underpriced commodities, World Bank/IMF loan conditionalities, and permanent foreign military bases replaced the old form of colonialism and made genuine independence difficult. Second, in the former British colonies (the new nations), intelligence and security organizations were entrenched in order to eliminate revolutionary nationalism.

In the French colonies, in each territory, France created local intelligence units (*Postes de liaison et de renseignements*/PLR), advised and led by French intelligence officers so that, after independence, those intelligence units were organically and inextricably linked with the French secret service network (SDCE and *Réseaux Foccart*). Third, the new countries did not have enough trained personnel to take over, which meant that colonial officials stayed on for years as “advisers” doubling up as spies for the metropolis. Thus, in Côte d’Ivoire, president Félix Houphouët-Boigny (a key ally of the French in Africa), retained, until his death (December 1993), the services of two Frenchmen in the strategic posts of director of the president’s office and permanent secretary to the presidency: Guy Nairay and Alain Belkiri, respectively.

In Togo, Charles Debbasch—a French professor of constitutional law, former dean of the law faculty, and president of the University of Aix-Marseille III—was a key adviser to the late president Gnassingbé Eyadéma (a ruthless dictator) until his death on February 5, 2005; since then, he acts in the same capacity to Eyadéma’s son and successor, Faure Essozimme Gnassingbé, the (contested) winner of the April 24, 2005 presidential elections. As legal counsel to the president with ministerial rank, Dean Debbasch (as he likes to be called) holds wide-ranging powers, including vetting ministerial appointments and proposed legislation. Instead of removing African countries from the colonial yoke, independence tied them even closer to the colonial powers. It also silenced the people by giving them a sense of false hope. Now that the people had their Uhuru (independence), all they had to do was work hard, and all other fruits of freedom would follow. Various foreign agencies controlled the economy while African leaders opted for political power. But the rulers became more corrupt as they kept part of the proceeds for themselves in a game that was controlled by the West.

Various reasons—notably, an excessive population—were given as the African states’ failure to develop. Population control programs were introduced with the support of African rulers. Africa’s core problem was presented as its rapid population



growth. According to the *Economist*, “groups that carry on population or birth control projects are particularly controversial. Some are paid to carry out sterilization programs in the poor parts of the world because donors in the rich world consider there are too many people there.”<sup>33</sup> In an effort to open the African state further to foreign exploitation, and to “save” its economies, the World Bank and IMF introduced structural adjustment programs, which were, *inter alia*, aimed at reducing the size and power of the public sector, in general, and of the state, in particular. Development, as advocated by the World Bank/IMF, allows more foreign agencies to meddle in African affairs while controlling these economies. For example, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), bilateral agencies, and—in the case of countries in conflict, such as Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan—mercenaries have spread throughout the continent. The World Bank/IMF policies do not work within a democratic polity because their implementations require authoritarian rule.<sup>34</sup>

Leaders who satisfy the requirements of the West (by providing military bases, markets, land, and so forth) are rewarded through debt forgiveness, military support, and occasional state visits to the White House or the Elysée Palace. In this spirit, during Bill Clinton’s 1998 visit to Africa, Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame were hailed as a new brand of future African leaders. These regimes have acted as agents for the recolonization of Africa because they have brought the United States into every aspect of life in the region. Furthermore, they are well armed. The United States uses these regimes as agents of imperialism in the region so as to check or eliminate any nationalist movement or leader that seeks real economic and political self-determination.<sup>35</sup>

George W. Bush followed in Bill Clinton’s footsteps by visiting five African countries in July 2003: Botswana, Nigeria, Uganda, Senegal, and South Africa. During his visits, Bush called on the leaders of these countries to join the United States in its fight against terrorism. He also promised better trade relations with African countries. Thus the United States pledged to give \$15 billion to fight AIDS in Africa and the Caribbean. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that Botswana and South Africa happen to have the highest levels of HIV/AIDS rates of infection in the continent. Museveni, who was praised by President Bush, hardly qualifies as a democratic leader.

The postcolonial state aggravated the African crisis in various ways. First, the rulers who inherited the state did not alter it to meet the priorities and needs of Africans: continental unity, self-determination, and freedom from conflict, fear, and hunger. African leaders who attempted to radically transform these states—such as Patrice Lumumba, Modibo Kéita, Thomas Sankara, Marien N’Gouabi, Samora Machel, and Laurent-Désiré Kabila—were eliminated. Second, by Africanizing colonial institutions, these leaders further opened the African state to more Western exploitation. Third, since most of the leaders were chosen or supported by the West, they did their best to appropriate the state and steal from it as fast as possible. Fourth, African leaders totally ignored indigenous institutions, which could have been adapted and shaped into modern state institutions. Fifth,

an autonomous and vibrant civil society did not develop. Sixth, even the ruling elite of South Africa—an elite that attained majority rule in 1994, an elite that had keenly observed what had happened in the rest of Africa, an elite that could have learned from the rest of Africa—*failed* to radically transform the institutions inherited from apartheid. Any leader who seeks new ways of making his country self-sufficient is forced into conflict, as happened to Mwai Kibaki of Kenya in December 2007. Kenya is a very good example of how fragile African states are,



**Figure 3.1** depicts Africa going down the drain.

especially in the face of moral decay that rewards people for killing each other. Kibaki and the largest ethnic group in Kenya (the Kikuyu) were “marked” when he signed economic and military agreements with the Chinese government. Surrounded by American allies (Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda) and the threat of mass genocide, Mwai Kibaki was forced into a deal that included Raila Odinga (the favored candidate of the United States and the European Union). Such a deal will most likely reverse any economic gains made by Kenya. On September 15, 2008, a power-sharing agreement was concluded between Robert Mugabe and the opposition (Movement for Democratic Change, led by Morvan Tsvangirai). The economy of Zimbabwe is in ruins. It is precisely because the Kenyan and the Zimbabwean states are not rooted in African indigenous culture and traditions that they are so weak and fragile, and therefore so susceptible to moral decay, foreign influence and intervention. Now, Africans are fed up with living in subhuman conditions, angry and hungry. Their frustration builds up each day.<sup>36</sup>

### CONCLUSION

As Francis Jennings convincingly argues, it is during the wars of conquests of Scotland and Ireland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that the British honed the extermination skills that they would apply with deadly effect to the Indians of New England and, later on, to the Africans. The English held the view that the natives of these lands were outside the law of moral obligation, and thus fought by means considered dishonorable (even in those days) in war between “civilized” people. Paraphrasing Jennings—and replacing “Indian” with “African”—we can identify four specific policies, transferred from Scotland, Ireland, and New England (USA) to Africa, which profoundly affected the whole process of the European-African encounter:

- (1) a deliberate policy of inciting competition between natives in order, by division, to maintain control;
- (2) a disregard for pledges and promises to natives, no matter how solemnly made;
- (3) the introduction of total exterminatory war against some communities of natives in order to terrorize others;
- and (4) a highly developed propaganda of falsification to justify all acts and policies of the conquerors whatsoever.<sup>37</sup>

As a result of colonialism, the European Westphalian state system—based on political sovereignty, constitutional government, an institutionalized bureaucracy, clearly defined geographical boundaries, and territorial integrity—replaced indigenous political institutions. The most important aspect was recognition by other states based on international law, which only applied to relations between “civilized” states. Colonies were not key players in this process.<sup>38</sup>

Christian Potholm summarizes the main characteristics of all colonial states: “(i) they were maintained by the use of force; (ii) they were authoritarian; (iii) they were disruptive of local economic systems; (iv) they were essentially exploitative in

character [forced labor, extraction of primary products, captive markets for goods manufactured in Europe, and so on.]; (v) they imposed arbitrary boundaries all over Africa; and (vi) they “colonized” the minds of Africans.”<sup>39</sup> The European state system was based on capitalism as the exclusive mode of economic production, which replaced indigenous economic systems. The colonial state also integrated Africa into the world economy as a mere producer of labor and raw materials. Politically, the inheritance of the colonial state was characterized by a tradition of autocracy, an absence of nationalist ideology, and a total lack of democratic values and institutions.<sup>40</sup> George Ayittey rightly views the African postcolonial state as an essentially predatory and dysfunctional entity that will eventually self-destruct.<sup>41</sup>

The United States and European Union are currently being challenged by China in Africa. The old dictatorships are no longer rational from an economic and political point of view. Instead, liberal democracy is actively promoted in countries such as Botswana, Kenya, Rwanda, Senegal, Mali, and South Africa. These democracies are “liberal” because they promote free trade and “free” and “fair” elections. But when those elections result in leaders who want real change, measures are taken to destabilize the countries, thus continuing the old murderous game of empire.

Since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, on September 11, 2001, the excuse used for U.S. meddling in African affairs focuses on three areas: HIV/AIDS, conflict and conflict resolution, and the fight against terrorism. As a result, African countries are further integrated within the U.S./European military command, which uses these countries as “training” zones. African countries are increasingly divided into military zones. For example, the U.S. East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative provides \$100 million to fight terrorism in the greater Horn of Africa.

The Pan-Sahel Initiative (Algeria, Chad, Mali, and Niger) is meant to “enhance” the capacity for border monitoring, including coastlines. As a result, there is a strong link between military operations and oil companies in Africa. For example, in the next ten years, Africa will provide up to 30 percent of U.S. oil requirements. Equatorial Guinea, Chad, and Sao Tomé & Príncipe will join the traditional oil producers such as Angola and Nigeria. In addition, George W. Bush has introduced the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which was established in 2002 as part of the long-term U.S. counterterrorism strategy and the global war on terrorism. Congress will provide \$1 billion per year. President Bush promised up to \$5 billion starting in 2006. As of now, fifty African countries (out of a total of fifty-four) are under direct U.S. military command and control. The recently created African (AFRICOM) Command works with key allies and with African regional organizations in the war against terrorism. These organizations include ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), SADC (Southern Africa Development Community), IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development), EAC (East African Community), CEMAC (Central African

Economic & Monetary Community), and the Pan-Sahel Initiative.<sup>42</sup> Under the pretext of fighting terrorism, the U.S. military also meddles in internal affairs and silences and/or neutralizes groups that fight for economic freedom. In the following chapter, we will analyze genocide in Africa in relation to its natural resources.

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# GENOCIDE

## AFRICAN NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE WEST

Americans and Europeans are accustomed to thinking of fascism and communism as the twin evils of the 20th century but the century has really been home to three great totalitarian systems—fascism, communism and colonialism—the latter practiced at its most deadly in Africa. The West doesn't want to recognize this because they were complicit in it. Countries that were democratic in Europe conducted mass murder in Africa-with little or no protest from the U.S.

—General Secretary of World Council of Churches in a letter to its members in the Democratic Republic of Congo, WCC, Geneva, July 24, 2006, <http://www.oikoumene.org/index>

### INTRODUCTION

WITH A SURFACE AREA OF 11,700,000 SQUARE MILES AND A POPULATION CURRENTLY estimated at 800 million (resulting in an average density of population of 14.6 PER SQUARE MILE) spread over fifty-four countries, it can hardly be said that Africa is overpopulated.<sup>1</sup> We argue that from the trans-Atlantic slave trade (fifteenth to nineteenth centuries), to the present time, the West has consciously pursued policies designed to control, reduce, and altogether eliminate Africa's population for the avowed purpose of gaining exclusive access to the continent's best agricultural land. Such policies are also designed to serve the West's commodity requirements, as well as to access Africa's vast mineral resources, particularly those deemed "strategic" (i.e., indispensable to the advanced technology industries of the West, such as electronics, aeronautics, and space). We adopt the definition of genocide contained in the United Nations *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* of December 11, 1946. In Article 2 of this Convention, "genocide" is defined as "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures

intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”<sup>2</sup>

According to Stéphane Rosière, the difference between “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing” is that the former focuses on people (totally destroying a particular ethnic group), while the latter focuses on territory (removing a particular ethnic group from a given territory). In practice, it is often difficult to distinguish between the two concepts. A related concept—eugenic sterilization—emerged in the United States in the early 1900s. This concept was based on the belief that the oncoming tides of unfit foreign races—the genetically inferior “semi-barbaric hordes”—were said to threaten civilization itself.<sup>3</sup>

### WESTERN CONQUEST AND GENOCIDE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: “EXTERMINATE ALL THE BRUTES!”

The historical record clearly shows that relations between European conquerors and peoples of other cultures were based on genocide and dispossession, under the guise of civilization (and now, neoliberalism). From the very beginning, relations between European conquerors and peoples of other cultures were also based on naked physical force, under a thinly disguised legal veneer, according to the age-old principle of “might makes right.”<sup>4</sup> At the turn of the century, Alexander Tille concurred: “All historical rights are invalid against the rights of the stronger.”<sup>5</sup> In Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*, Marlow, a seaman and adventurer, reflects on the predatory nature of the Europeans’ conquest of the world:

They were conquerors, and for that you want only brute force—nothing to boast of when you have it, since your strength is just an accident arising from the weakness of others. They grabbed what they could get for the sake of what was to be got. It was just robbery with violence, aggravated murder on a great scale, and men going at it blind—as is very proper for those who tackle a darkness. The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much.<sup>6</sup>

In the same vein, Plumelle Uribe notes a consistent Western cultural pattern throughout the duration of the African slave trade: “the banishment of Africans from humanity, which justifies extermination, since the victims are supposed to belong to a different species.”<sup>7</sup> Similarly, Chinweizu points to the Euro-African connection as the main reason for exploiting and exterminating the African population. “For outside of the Amerindians who were exterminated, black Africans and their diaspora have suffered the most from the white peril.”<sup>8</sup>

From the middle of the fifteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century, millions of Africans were forcibly uprooted from the continent and shipped across the Atlantic Ocean to the Caribbean and to North, Central, and South America. The lower estimates vary between 11.8 and 15.4 million slaves exported during this period. Taking all types of the slave trade together (Atlantic, trans-Saharan,

Red Sea and Indian ocean), J. E. Inikori estimates that about 22 million people were exported from Sub-Saharan Africa to the rest of the world between 1500 and 1890.<sup>9</sup> A higher and more realistic estimate is derived by Joseph Ki-Zerbo: "One may safely conclude that 100 million men and women have been uprooted from Africa since the fifteenth century, 50 million being an absolute minimum."<sup>10</sup> This explains the massive depopulation of the African continent observed by Walter Rodney, who showed that while the population of Africa was practically stagnant between 1650 and 1900 (increasing from 100 to only 120 million), that of Europe increased from 103 to 423 million and that of Asia from 257 to 857 million during the same period.<sup>11</sup> Inikori has argued that there would have been "112 million additional population in sub-Saharan Africa had there been no export slave trade."<sup>12</sup> Zeleza shows that Africa's share of the world population declined from 13 percent in 1750 to 11 percent in 1800 and 8 percent in 1900.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, from the fifteenth century until the early nineteenth century, the mortality rate among the slave population of African origin in the Americas remained as high as 40 percent.<sup>14</sup> Between the beginning and the middle of the sixteenth century, the mortality rate among the indigenous Indian population of the Americas stood at 90 percent, resulting in a population loss of some 70 million in the space of a mere half-century!<sup>15</sup>

In the era of imperialism, "Exterminate all the brutes!" became the rallying cry of the murderous European travelers, adventurers, explorers, and soldiers.<sup>16</sup> The main reason for the "waste of human life" in the colonies has to do with the fact that "civilization" is represented by "the trader, the backwoodsman, the pirate, the bushranger," in other words, by whites who can do anything they like with no risk of criticism or control.<sup>17</sup> The "liberal" British settlers on a killing and burning spree of African people and villages in the Eastern Cape of South Africa in 1851–53 carried with them flags with a single word embroidered on them: "Extermination."<sup>18</sup> According to Moana Jackson, this culture of extermination is not new: "For hundreds of years, the states of Europe developed a culture which was based on genocide and dispossession of people who lived beyond Europe."<sup>19</sup> Similarly, the French philosopher-aristocrat and keen observer of early American society, Alexis de Tocqueville, writing in 1840, remarked: "If we reasoned from what passes in the world, we could almost say that the European is to other races of mankind what man is to the lower animals: he makes them subservient to his use, and when he cannot subdue them, he destroys them."<sup>20</sup>

A travel companion of Christopher Columbus in 1493, and Catholic missionary priest sent by the King of Spain to Hispanola (Santo-Domingo) in the early sixteenth century, Bartolomé de Las Casas observed that Spanish *conquistadores* were busily engaged in the genocide of the Indian population of the various Caribbean islands, which he describes as peaceful, friendly, and welcoming to strangers. Las Casas estimated that over a forty-year period (1492–1541), all but 200 of the 3 million Indians who lived in Hispanola had been killed, and the 500,000 inhabitants of Lucayes Island had known the same fate. According to Las Casas, the macabre labors of the *conquistadores* in the more than thirty Caribbean



islands, and on the continent (Central and South America), resulted in a total death toll exceeding 15 million Indians.<sup>21</sup>

Las Casas also shows that greed was the prime motivation for the *conquistadores* dastardly actions.<sup>22</sup> What is striking, in this regard, is the scale and intensity of the genocide of the Indians of the Caribbean islands and Central America. Thus Yves Bénot notes that within a fifteen-year period (1492–1507), the Indian population of Hispaniola was reduced from 1.1 million (3 million according to Las Casas) to 60,000. By 1520, only about 1,000 Indians remained on the island, and none remained on the island of Puerto Rico.<sup>23</sup> In New England, the Indian population declined from 90,000 in 1600 to 10,750 in 1674. In Mexico, there were about 25 million people when the Europeans arrived in 1519. Fifty years later, the figure had fallen to 2.7 million. Fifty more years later, there were 1.5 million Indians left. Over 90 percent of the native population had been wiped out in a hundred years.<sup>24</sup>

After British ships under the command of Captain James Cook reached Hawaii on January 18, 1778, he and his men left behind ferocious plagues. Their few weeks of contact with the native islanders, ranging from handshakes to sexual intercourse, produced the near extinction of the Hawaiian race. Cook's men set off an epidemic of venereal disease on the islands. The census of 1890 found that there were only 40,612 native Hawaiians left on the archipelago.<sup>25</sup> The European (Spanish, British and French) colonization of North America resulted, through war, epidemics, and diseases, in a drastic reduction of the population of indigenous American Indians. From a population estimated at 16 million in 1492, the North American Indians merely numbered 600,000 in 1800 and 375,000 in 1900, a loss of 15,625,000 people (or 97.6 percent of the original population)!<sup>26</sup>

In addition to cheap alcoholic beverages, the European explorers brought with them a number of diseases then unknown in Africa, which spread, epidemic-like, with deadly speed among the African population, who had no immunity or remedy against them, decimating entire villages and regions in the process. German anthropologist Georg Gerland observed in 1868 that the diseases of the whites were often a decisive exterminating factor. Even healthy whites could be infectious, as they carried a "miasma," a "dust of disease," which was the name, in those days, for what we would now call bacteria and viruses.<sup>27</sup> The annual reports of the Native Affairs Department in Natal Province, South Africa, "bore evidence of the increasing ravages of measles, leprosy, smallpox, enteritis, dysentery, pneumonia, enteric fever, malaria fever, venereal disease and tuberculosis."<sup>28</sup> Some of these diseases were deliberately spread among the African population. Thus the first deliberate use of biological weapons for genocidal purposes may be attributed to the British colonial army, which distributed smallpox-infected blankets to the North American Indian tribes, as well as to the Zulus of Natal in South Africa.<sup>29</sup>

Beginning with Columbus, the principle of genocide had been established as a way to depopulate and conquer territories so that they could be repopulated by another preferred group. The British considered the natives—be they Scottish, Irish, Indians, or Africans—to be outside the law of moral obligation and thus

fought by means that were considered dishonorable in war between “civilized” people, hence the “myth of the Indian Menace—the depiction of the Indian as a ferocious wild creature, possessed of an alternately demonic and bestial nature, that had to be exterminated to make humanity safe.” Dr. Cornelius Rhoads, director of the 1931, Rockefeller-funded Cancer Experiment in San Juan, Puerto Rico, did his best to exterminate the locals, “the dirtiest, laziest, most degenerate and thievish race of men” in this hemisphere.<sup>30</sup>

An interesting parallel may be drawn between Dr. Rhoads and the thoughts of Leonard Barnes on Africa and the Africans. Writing in the late sixties, Barnes—a former British colonial administrator—puts forward a rather unusual proposal for a rational exploitation of Africa’s vast resources, arguing that the main problem with Africa is *the Africans* themselves.<sup>31</sup> In other words, as one of Barnes’ fellow British colonial administrators remarked to him about Uganda in 1964, “We could make a paradise of this country in five years, if only there were no Africans in it.”<sup>32</sup> A similar observation was made by an Afrikaner, Hans Sterk, as he surveyed the fertile rolling hills of the Cape’s hinterland in South Africa: “This is a beautiful district. It is too good for a black savage to own.”<sup>33</sup> Amazingly, in a book entitled *Négrologie*, published as recently as 2003, Stephen Smith similarly argues that Africa would be wealthier if it was not peopled by Africans.<sup>34</sup>

Indeed, South Africa’s oldest indigenous populations, the Khoi (*Khoikhoi*) and the San (*Bushmen*), were ruthlessly and systematically driven from their hunting grounds and were virtually exterminated by the British and Afrikaner invaders through epidemics and numerous “hunting” expeditions. Thus Monica Wilson notes that, as a result of various smallpox epidemics, out of a total Khoikhoi population south of the Orange river of about 200,000 in 1652, only 20,000 remained by 1805.<sup>35</sup> Once the likes of Hans Sterk had determined that the Cape was, indeed, “too good” for the indigenous African inhabitants, the latter became the “natural enemies” of the Europeans.<sup>36</sup> “By 1770,” writes Katzen, “the conflict was so intense that trekboer Commandos systematically exterminated the San.”<sup>37</sup> The story of the 27,927 Boer refugees who perished between June 1901 and May 1902 in the concentration camps that the British set up in South Africa during the Anglo-Boer War is well known. Much less known is the fact that, during the same period, 115,700 Africans had also been interned in 66 refugee camps, 14,154 of whom died as a result.<sup>38</sup>

The first historically recorded—and little known—case of colonial genocide in Africa affected the Guanches, a Berber-speaking people of African origin who were the original inhabitants of the Canary Islands. In 1478, the Spanish ruling monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella sent an expedition with guns and horses to Grand Canary. By 1483, 600 Guanche warriors who had conducted guerilla warfare from the mountains, and 1,500 women, children, and old people capitulated; Las Palmas surrendered in 1494, and Tenerife in 1496. Finally, one lone indigenous woman signaled the Spaniards to come closer: “Where are you going, Christian? Why do you hesitate to take the land? The Guanches are all dead.” Bacteria—rather than guns—decided the outcome of the war. The indigenous

peoples called the unknown disease *modorra*. When Girolamo Benzoni visited Las Palmas in 1541, there was one single Guanche left. In a mere sixty-three years (between 1478 and 1541), the entire indigenous population of the Canary Islands—estimated at about 80,000—had been wiped out.<sup>39</sup>

**THE HUMAN TOLL OF COLONIALISM: WARS, FAMINE,  
EPIDEMICS, FORCED LABOR, AND CONSCRIPTION**

Between 1885 and 1910, the whole African continent was occupied by seven European powers: France, Britain, Germany, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, and Spain. In retrospect, colonialism—which basically ended in the early sixties—represented a relatively brief period in the history of Africa (sixty to seventy years), but it had an extremely profound and enduring political, economic, social, and cultural impact on African peoples and societies that is still felt today. A number of factors directly linked to colonialism contributed to the steady depopulation of Africa between 1900 and 1960, including military conquest, diseases, epidemics, famine, repression, forced labor, and conscription.

EUROPEAN MILITARY CONQUEST IN AFRICA: *LA GLOIRE DU SABRE*

African leaders did not willingly relinquish political control of their territories to Western invaders. As the cases of Al 'Haji 'Umar Tall's Tukulor empire, Samori Touré's Maninka empire, and the Ashanti kingdom demonstrate, African rulers bravely and steadfastly resisted colonial penetration, only to be overcome by superior European military technology. The repression that ensued was generally brutal and deadly.

Due to over thirty years of intermittent wars of conquest and occupation by Italy and allied forces, the population of Libya was reduced by 250,000 (from 750,000 in 1911 to 500,000 in 1942).<sup>40</sup> In Algeria, over thirty years of brutal French military conquest and occupation resulted in a six percent reduction of the Muslim population over a six-year period (from 2,652,000 in 1866 to 2,125,000 in 1872), representing a population deficit of 527,000.<sup>41</sup> Yves Bénot reckons that over a twenty-six-year period (1830 to 1856), the indigenous population of Algeria decreased by 700,000 (from 3 million to 2.3 million).<sup>42</sup> In December 1840, General Bugeaud was appointed governor general of Algeria by the Louis-Philippe government. Bugeaud then organized military repression of the numerous Algerian uprisings (notably that of Emir Abd-el-Qader, 1839–1847) against French colonial occupation. Bugeaud's instructions were clear: "deprive the people of any resource, exterminate them" in order to prepare the ground for settler colonization. Concretely, the French army—which increased from 30,000 to 120,000 over the years—was instructed to seize "all their possessions: women, children, herds, cattle, etc." and to systematically destroy and burn houses, villages, palm trees, apricot trees, and so on. If the villagers resisted, they were to be (in Bugeaud's words) "smoked out to death like foxes." Such methods, applied in Sheba and Ouled-Riah in 1845, resulted in 2,000 deaths. According to

one estimate, 6,846 Algerians were killed over a seven-year period (1840–44 and 1851–52).<sup>43</sup> Entire villages were wiped out in the process. Thus the entire population of Zaatcha was killed by the French in 1849. In Laghouat, on December 3, 1852, after the storming, the remaining third of the population—mainly women and children—was massacred. In one single well, 256 corpses were found.<sup>44</sup> These tried and tested French military methods were also applied with deadly efficiency in Western Madagascar, where, on August 30, 1897, 5,000 men, women, and children who were on their way to welcome the French troops were savagely massacred by these troops (Senegalese riflemen) under the command of Gérard in the city of Ambike, in the Ménabé region.<sup>45</sup>

In German South-West Africa (Namibia), General Lothar Von Trotha issued, on October 2, 1904, his infamous *Vernichtungsbefehl* (extermination order), which stated, “Any Herero found within the German borders with or without a gun, with or without cattle, will be shot.” The Germans simply drove the Herero into the desert and sealed off the border for a month, which resulted in the genocide of 65,000 Herero. By the 1911 census, only 9,800 out of 20,000 Nama, and 15,000 out of 80,000 Herero were found to have survived the war in South-West Africa.<sup>46</sup> In another German colony, Tanganyika, a peasant revolt against forced cotton cultivation in 1905 (the *Maji-Maji* rebellion) was brutally suppressed, and the systematic burning of grain crops resulted in a famine that killed between 250,000 and 300,000 people. According to Pakenham, “Perhaps half of the Vidunda, more than half the Matumbi, and three-quarters of the Pangwa died in the rebellion or its aftermath.”<sup>47</sup> The repression and famine that defeated the *Maji-Maji* rebellion not only killed up to one-third of the region’s population, but reduced the average fertility of the surviving women by over 25 percent, according to a study released years later.<sup>48</sup>

#### DROUGHT, FAMINE, DISEASES, AND EPIDEMICS IN IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL AFRICA

“War, drought, famine, pestilence, locusts, cattle-plague! Why so many calamities in succession? Why?” asked a perplexed François Coillard (a French missionary) in Bulozzi in 1896.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, one wonders why so many ills plagued Africa and Africans simultaneously and with such deadly force. Recent historical studies on the political economy, sociology, and ecology of imperialism and colonialism have conclusively demonstrated the interconnectedness between a series of seemingly unrelated occurrences such as drought, famine, diseases, and epidemics in imperial and colonial Africa. Mike Davis has convincingly argued that the great drought greatly facilitated the imperial designs of Portugal and Britain in late nineteenth-century southern Africa.<sup>50</sup>

Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch argues that the years of late imperialism and early colonization in Africa were marked by demographic regression, less on account of wars than because of the “opening up” of Africa to European penetration, “which, through the increased circulation of people, goods, and livestock, encouraged the spread of epidemics.” During this period, Coquery-Vidrovitch

observes that, because of dietary disequilibria caused by the colonizers' excessive and simultaneous demands for food supplies and labor, "the fatal cycle of drought/famine/epizootic disease/epidemics weakened populations unable to withstand this combined ecological and cultural shock."<sup>51</sup> Vidrovitch, like Mike Davis, also notes a coincidence of epidemics (specifically that of the rinderpest between 1820 and 1920) and drought and famine (particularly in southern Angola between 1911 and 1916) with the first wave of European colonial penetration, which thus encountered considerably weakened populations that offered little or no resistance.<sup>52</sup>

Coquery-Vidrovitch chronicles the major droughts that occurred in the nineteenth century in eastern Africa (seven between 1833 and 1898–99) and on the Atlantic coast of central Africa (six in Angola between 1835 and 1884–88). She then goes on to describe the pandemics that spread throughout Africa in the late nineteenth early twentieth centuries; cholera in eastern Africa (1817–23, 1826–37, 1842–62, and 1865–75, then chronically between 1881 and 1923, with 8,000 deaths in 1858–59, and 40,000 deaths in 1870 in Zanzibar alone); chronic smallpox in eastern and southern Africa (particularly in the Cape, Ujiji/east of Lake Tanganyika, and Ethiopia, with a 80 percent death rate among adults). Vidrovitch further notes that the rinderpest, introduced through cattle imported from Europe into Eritrea between 1880 and 1920, wiped out the herds of the Masai and Kikuyu people in central Kenya. This left whole areas impoverished and depopulated, as the first colonizers, who were under the impression that these areas were uninhabited, arrived. Because of these and other diseases from the West (tuberculosis and venereal diseases), there was a sharp decline in population in eastern Africa from the end of the nineteenth century up until the 1920s, when colonial public health policies began to reestablish the equilibrium upset by war, famine, and disease.<sup>53</sup>

But the most severe depopulation occurred in central and west Africa, where the combined impact of forced labor, conscription, lack of nutritious food, drought, trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), and rinderpest led to some 250,000 deaths in Southern Angola (Ovamboland) between 1911 and 1916. Similarly, the combined impact of forced labor, conscription, influenza, smallpox, and famines decimated the Fang in Gabon, whose population was reduced by 75,000 between 1911 and 1933 (decreasing from 140,000 to 65,000), literally depopulating the south of the country. The same conjunction of factors also severely depopulated the area adjoining Gabon, French Congo, and Ubangi Chari (Central African Republic) by 213,000 between 1913 and 1921 (the population decreasing from 800,000 to 587,000). In West Africa, an influenza epidemic killed at least 100,000 people in Ghana in 1918–19. Smallpox, the plague, and trypanosomiasis were also endemic in Ghana and in French West Africa between the early 1900s and the late 1930s, resulting in a life expectancy of twenty-eight years in Ghana in 1921. The European-imported Spanish influenza epidemic, which broke out in August 1918—initially in Freetown, Sierra Leone, then quickly spreading throughout West Africa—proved to be "the most severe short-term demographic

disaster in African history,” resulting in some 2 million deaths between August 1918 and April 1919. Recurrent droughts and famines plagued the Sahel region of Africa in 1901 to 1903, 1913 to 1914, 1930 to 1933, 1972 to 1974, and 1984, resulting in over 100,000 deaths in Karamoja (northern Uganda) in 1980 alone. Coquery Vidrovitch concludes that an increasing discrepancy is currently developing between the “modern” sector (mining, agro-industrial, and urban enclaves), on the one hand, and an “agrarian” sector (non-mining, non-oil producing areas) in the whole of West, equatorial, and East Africa.<sup>54</sup>

#### REPRESSION, FORCED LABOR, AND CONSCRIPTION IN COLONIAL AFRICA

##### *King Léopold's Congo, 1885–1912: Red Rubber*

In 1884, Léopold II, King of the Belgians, founded the *International African Association* (IAA). Its goal was to promote civilization and commerce in Africa. The IAA was soon transformed into the Congo Free State (CFS), a vast territory of one million square miles in the heart of the continent. King Léopold declared himself the CFS' sovereign, and the territory thus became, in effect, his private domain until he bequeathed it to the Belgian state in August 1908. Between 1891 and 1912, one of the most devious and ruthless systems of economic exploitation through forced labor ever conceived was put in place by Léopold, with devastating consequences for the Congolese population. Léopold formulated a policy whereby nine-tenths of the Congo territory was declared “vacant” and thus became his property in his capacity as “sovereign” of the CFS. By the same token, the Congolese population was declared to have no proprietary rights in that territory, or to the plants and trees growing upon it. As a result, the commodities produced in the Congo—ivory, rubber, resinous gums, and palm oil—became the property of the state. Congolese labor would be called upon to provide those commodities under the guise of “taxation.” The king farmed out a large proportion of the total territory to private Belgian chartered companies (*sociétés concessionnaires*), retaining half of the shares in each venture for himself.<sup>55</sup> On September 29, 1891, he issued a decree giving his representatives in the Congo a monopoly on “trade” in rubber and ivory, and requiring the Congolese to supply both rubber and labor. King Léopold's concept of *mise-en-valeur* of the territory was to get as much rubber and ivory out of the indigenous people as possible by all means necessary, that is, through brute and deadly force and coercion.<sup>56</sup> Brute force and fear of mutilation forced the Africans out of their homes into the rubber fields.<sup>57</sup> E. D. Morel chronicles, in graphic detail, the sheer inhumanity of this system.<sup>58</sup> Some of the Europeans employed by the chartered companies wrote home, boasting of their exploits.<sup>59</sup>

The situation was not much better in the “crown domain,” that is, the portion of the territory whose revenue the king kept for his own private use.<sup>60</sup> As Morel rightly argues, this situation led to endemic famine, and thus, effectively, to “*depopulation by starvation*.”<sup>61</sup> King Léopold's elaborate system of forced labor



exacted a horrendous human toll on the Congolese people. The population of the Congo fell from about 20 million in 1891 to only 8,500,000 in 1911. In other words, the king's system resulted in the death of between 10 and 11.5 million Congolese as "a very conservative estimate."<sup>62</sup> Ndaywel è Nziem puts the figure even higher, at 13 million.

In the neighboring colony of the French Congo—including the territories of Ubangi-Chari, Moyen-Congo, and Gabon—the French government adopted the same principles and policy that King Léopold had implemented in the CFS with such deadly efficiency. As a result, between March and July 1899, two-thirds of the French Congo's territory—that is, 650,000 square kilometers, or 70 percent of the territory—had been parceled out among forty private chartered companies (one-third of them Belgian) on a thirty years' charter. As in the CFS, the Congolese peasants were coerced into rubber and ivory production through taxation, usually payable in kind.

The same inhumane and degrading treatment to which the population of the CFS was widely subjected was systematically applied to the French Congo's population. Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch clearly shows that the taxation system—justified by the "moral superiority" of Western civilization over "savage" people—was meant to force the reluctant African peasant to produce the necessary quantities of rubber and ivory in order to procure the required cash, while inculcating a sound "work ethic" into the indigenous psyche.<sup>63</sup> Coercing a sufficient quantity of labor to produce the required tax revenues was the main problem of the colonial administration. The brutal and inhumane methods used to this end resulted in the depletion of an already sparse population. From World War I onward, epidemics and famine became endemic in the region.

Between 1898 and 1912, a sleeping sickness epidemic killed over half of the population of the Niari region. A flu epidemic originating in Europe killed over 35,000 people in the Bakongo area, and decimated 10 percent of the population of northern Ogooué; those who survived fell prey to a smallpox epidemic. In Gabon, out of a population of about 400,000, at least 10,000 people died between 1933 and 1955; this was a result of a very high adult mortality rate coupled with a low birth rate and a very high rate of infant mortality. In Ubangi-Chari, a huge decrease in population was observed in all the districts where chartered companies were operating, resulting in a population deficit of about 120,000 over a ten-year period (1920–30). In all, the whole population of the French Congo was reduced by about one-third (decreasing from 800,000 to 587,000)—a loss of 213,000 people—over an eight-year period (between 1913 and 1921).<sup>64</sup>

Jean Suret-Canale evokes the Gaud-Toqué trial of 1905, in which two French colonial administrators were tried, and lightly sentenced, for atrocities committed against African colonial subjects. Toqué summarizes the situation prevailing in the Upper Chari region up to 1903 as follows: "the system's operation was based on widespread massacre . . . We raid the villages; we kidnap women and children . . . These women and children often die of hunger or of smallpox."<sup>65</sup> Gaud's refined cruelty definitely equaled, or even surpassed, the worst atrocities

committed in the CFS in the name of the king. Suret-Canale recounts, “Gaud was accused of multiple murders and executions; of having baked a woman alive in an oven. Finally Gaud, with Toqué’s complicity, was accused of having boiled a human head and given the soup to drink to a man servant and, for good measure, to have blown up a prisoner with a stick of dynamite stuck in his bottom to celebrate 14 July 1903.”<sup>66</sup>

As a result of the Gaud-Toqué scandal, and following André Gide’s publication of his *Voyage au Congo* and E. D. Morel’s Congo Reform Association revelations of atrocities in the French Congo, the French government sent a mission to the region—led by the famous explorer Savorgnan de Brazza—to investigate the alleged atrocities (April-September 1905). The de Brazza mission found a disturbing pattern whereby African women and children were systematically kidnapped by representatives of the private chartered companies (in collusion with the colonial administration) in order to force the African men to submit to portage and to produce ever-greater quantities of rubber. In Ubangi-Chari, a representative of the *Société de la Lobaye* captured and detained some sixty women in the village of Ngouakombo; fifty-eight women and ten children died as a result of being detained in a confined space without ventilation. In M’Poko, a French colonial administrator named Marsault detained, without cause, forty-five women and two children, who died of starvation within five weeks. In Fort-Sibut (Krebedjé), on the territory of the *Société de l’Ouhamé-Nana*, a concentration camp containing 119 women and children was discovered. In the territory of the *Société de la M’poko*—1,500 km away from Brazzaville, close to the Ubangi-Chari territory—some 1,000 Africans were murdered in cold blood, prompting Governor Guibet to declare that the exploitation of the territory was “based on crime.” Guibet undertook a mission in the same territory (areas of Bogangolo, Bodera, Sabokiry, Yaka, Bimo, and Bussé), as a result of which he initiated legal proceedings in January 1907, leading to the indictment of 236 persons (including 17 Europeans) accused of murdering a total of 2,250 Africans (750 murders being characterized as “certain”, and 1,500 others as “probable”).<sup>67</sup>

A former French colonial medical officer, turned human rights activist, Paul Vigné d’Octon, documents a series of atrocities committed by European colonial troops.<sup>68</sup> The Voulet-Chanoine mission—part of the Central African Expedition sent by France to secure control of the River Chad’s northern bank in 1899—became infamous for its abominable atrocities. This top-heavy mission consisted of nine French officers (including Captain Paul Voulet and Lieutenant Charles Chanoine), 160 *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*, 400 auxiliaries, 800 porters, and 30 interpreters and agents—it eventually grew to 1,600 persons and 800 animals. On January 9, 1899, in Say (Niger), in retaliation for the death of a few soldiers, Voulet had twenty mothers with their babies still breast-feeding taken a few yards away from the camp and killed with spears. On January 13, for no apparent reason, the mission burned to the ground Sansane-Hausa, a thriving commercial town of 10,000 inhabitants, and massacred 101 men, women, and children. On January 17 in Libore, the section’s *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* brought to their commanding officer,



Captain Voulet, two freshly-cut hands; from then on, the habit of bringing the hands from the corpses of Africans killed—against a reward—became the rule. On January 24, in hot pursuit of Africans who had killed six of his men, captain Chanoine stumbled upon a neighboring village, and took twenty villagers hostage; in retaliation, he had ten of them killed, and their heads planted on sticks. On July 13, Voulet had 150 women and children executed as punishment for the death of two of his soldiers during an attack on a nearby village. Lieutenant-Colonel Klobb, sent by the French government to find Voulet and remove him from his command of the mission, found the bodies of thirteen women hanging in the trees in the village of Tibiri, 120 miles west of Zinder (Niger). Tired of these excesses, the mission's *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* eventually mutinied and killed both Voulet and Chanoine.<sup>69</sup>

French and German officers seemed to compete in their quest for the most cruel possible form of “entertainment.”<sup>70</sup> Traveling through the French Congo in the mid-twenties, the French novelist André Gide cited an official report of 1902 on the conditions prevailing among the Mandja of Ubangi-Chari (now the Central African Republic) as a result of forced labor as porters.<sup>71</sup>

Coquery-Vidrovitch's research confirms these observations. She found that as early as October, the Mandja's food reserves were depleted, leading to famine during the intervening months until the next crop. She estimates the death toll as a result of the harsh conditions of portage, police repression, malnutrition, and food deficit at 20,000 in two years in the Chari region alone. She adds, “Hunted relentlessly by the authorities, the Mandja took refuge in the bush where they fed on roots and eventually died of starvation.”<sup>72</sup> Suret-Canale seems to concur with Morel's observation that in both the CFS and the French Congo, *starvation* was the main cause of the region's dramatic depopulation.<sup>73</sup>

It is interesting to note, in this regard, that 20 percent of women born in this area before 1890 and interviewed in the 1960s had never borne a living child, as against 13 to 14 percent (itself a very high proportion) of similar women elsewhere in the region. Such a high rate of infertility is mainly attributed to gonorrhea, spread in Gabon by migrant workers in the timber industry.<sup>74</sup> In the French, as in the Belgian, Congo, the same system resulted, not surprisingly, in the same terrible human toll on the population. According to a French colonial administrator of the Upper Ubangi, the population of that region fell by one-fourth between 1903 and 1911. In 1900, the population of French Equatorial Africa was estimated at 15 million. By 1913, it was down to about 4,950,000, a loss of 10,050,000. According to official census statistics, the population of the French Congo had decreased from 4,280,000 at the end of 1911 to 1,577,565 in 1921, a 63 percent decrease in population (and loss of 2,702,435) in ten years.<sup>75</sup>

In the process of building the Congo-Ocean railroad between Pointe-Noire and Brazzaville in the colony of Moyen-Congo between 1921 and 1934, the French recruited 130,000 workers from French West and Equatorial Africa. A French journalist, Albert Londres, chronicled what must have been the most costly (in lives) railroad construction in human history, with a total death toll estimated at

28,300: “between October 1926 and December 1927, 30,000 Africans had gone through Brazzaville to go and work on “the machine,” and we met only 1,700 between the river and the ocean . . . in our colony, we had 17,000 corpses for 140 km of railway . . . and only 300 km of railroad remains to be built!”<sup>76</sup>

#### COLONIAL MASSACRES IN FRENCH AFRICA, 1945–1960

The French colonizing enterprise of the late nineteenth century was conducted under the banner of spreading the benefits of the Catholic faith and of French language, culture, and civilization to the “heathen and barbarous multitudes” in Africa and Asia. Yet, this purported “civilizing mission” (*mission civilisatrice*) was accompanied by a systematic, ruthless, and bloody repression of even the mildest expressions of protest and opposition to colonial rule by the indigenous people. Thus the first expression of Algerian protest for a change of status from “subjects” to “citizens” in Sétif was ruthlessly repressed by the French army the very day on which the Allied’s victory over the Nazis was being celebrated (May 8, 1945), resulting in a total of 45,000 deaths in one district and in two weeks (May–June 1945).<sup>77</sup> Between March 1947 and September 1948, the electoral victory of the proponents of independence in Madagascar (led by Jacques Rabemanjara) was followed by a savage repression by the French army (18,000, mostly Senegalese, troops), resulting (according to French military intelligence) in some 90,000 deaths.<sup>78</sup> Some 200 peaceful civilians demonstrating for independence were killed by (mostly Senegalese) French troops in Casablanca, Morocco, on April 7–8, 1947.<sup>79</sup>

In Cameroon, a radical nationalist movement for independence, the *Union des Populations du Cameroun* (UPC), was forced underground and engaged in guerilla warfare against the French administration. The ensuing repression of the French army and paramilitary forces (*gendarmérie*) took the form, during 1958–1960, of a scorched-earth policy, whereby entire villages of south-central and western Cameroon in the Bassa and Bamiléké areas were burned to the ground, resulting in between 60,000 and 100,000 deaths.<sup>80</sup> As Naba rightly observes, in all, 194,000 people died in Algeria, Madagascar, and Cameroon simply for mistakenly believing the promises of greater social justice and political autonomy made by General Charles de Gaulle in his celebrated 1944 Brazzaville speech on the future of the French Union (*Union Française*).<sup>81</sup> And as Bénot cogently argues, besides making a mockery of any purported *mission civilisatrice*, such unnecessary deaths were the result of denial by the French administration of some fundamental peoples’ rights such as peoples’ rights to self-determination, as enshrined in the *Atlantic Charter* of August 1941, and the citizens’ right to dissent and rebellion, recognized in the first draft of the 1946 French Constitution.<sup>82</sup>

In Kenya, from 1952 to 1960, after a violent uprising by indigenous Kenyans, referred to as the “Mau Mau insurgency,” the British detained and brutalized hundreds of thousands of Kikuyu—the colony’s largest ethnic group—who demanded their independence and claimed their land back. The British felt justi-

fied, in the name of “civilization,” in crushing the freedom fighters—portrayed as “savages”—who challenged colonial rule. Later, the British government ordered all documentation relating to the detention and torture during its last days of rule in Kenya destroyed. For more than eight years, the British detained nearly the entire Kikuyu population (some 1.5 million people). Inside detention camps and barbed wire villages, the Kikuyu lived in a world of fear, hunger, and death. In her meticulously researched study of these events, Caroline Elkins rejects the ridiculously low official British figure of some 11,000 freedom fighters killed, and rather estimates that between 130,000 and 300,000 Kikuyu were unaccounted for.<sup>83</sup>

Finally, the war of liberation waged by the Algerian nationalists—through the *Front de libération nationale*/FLN—against a 400,000-strong French army (November 1954-February 1962) exacted a heavy human toll among the Algerian population. It resulted in some 500,000 deaths and 2,137,000 internally displaced Algerians—out of a population estimated at 8 million in 1954—relocated in detention camps. In addition, 8,000 villages and one million hectares of forest were burned by the French during the war.<sup>84</sup>

#### SLAVERY AND FORCED LABOR IN FRENCH AFRICA, 1885–1946

In spite of a resolution of the Congress of Vienna (February 1815) recognizing the “necessity of universally and permanently abolishing the slave trade” Britain and France continued to intensively engage in slave trading through the port of Nantes, with over 700 French ships involved in the trade between 1815 and 1830, resulting in the deportation of some 125,000 Africans to the West Indies.<sup>85</sup> As undersecretary of state for the colonies, the prominent French abolitionist, Victor Schoelcher, pushed for the formal abolition of slavery, which was passed into law by the decree of April 27, 1848. Yet, as Manceron cogently observes, this decree constitutes a regression compared to that of 1794. The French revolutionaries simply reinstated the Africans in their inalienable human rights, whereas the legislators of the Second Republic granted freedom to the former slaves, who thus became indebted to their “benefactors.” Furthermore, the French colonialists actually reversed the abolitionists’ argument in their favor by using the fight against slavery as an argument in favor of a “right and duty of colonial intervention” of the “civilized” people against the “barbarism” of indigenous African slavery.<sup>86</sup>

Behind the colonial myth of the fight against slavery lies the sad reality of the perpetuation of slavery in the French colonies, not only in its traditional form—as indicated above, and as practiced by French slave traders in the Indian Ocean—but also under the new guise of “forced labor.” Thus, between 1888 and 1911, the French military and colonial administrators created some 159 “freedom villages” throughout French West Africa (Senegal, Guinea, northern Côte d’Ivoire, and French Sudan). These were, in fact, labor camps where slaves bought back by the French from African traders were forced to work on colonial public works proj-

ects—such as construction of roads and railways—without remuneration. Out of an estimated 8 million people in French West Africa in 1905, some 2 million were designated as “non-free.” It is such “non-free” labor that was at work on the Kayes-Niger railway (1881–1904) and on the Conakry-Niger railway (1900–1914), resulting in numerous deaths. In 1896 in Madagascar, two months after the formal abolition of slavery, French Governor Galliéni proclaimed the obligation for every Malagasy male to provide, each year, fifty nine-hours days of labor to the colonial administration. It was only through legislation categorically outlawing forced labor in all the French overseas territories—sponsored by Ivoirian nationalist leader Félix Houphouët-Boigny and adopted on April 11, 1946—that this outrageous practice was eventually abolished.<sup>87</sup>

#### CONSCRIPTION IN FRENCH AFRICA, 1857–1945

The colonial myth of the fight against slavery also provided the French colonialists with a unique opportunity to create, in 1857, a devoted and ruthless corps of African foot soldiers constituted almost exclusively of freed slaves, the famed *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* (Senegalese riflemen, actually originating from throughout French Africa), increasing from one battalion in 1882 to four in 1903. These troops, feared for their extreme ruthlessness and cruelty, constituted, under the leadership of French military officers, the bulk of the French colonial expeditionary forces in French West Africa and in Madagascar (1894). Through a decree of 1912, all male African subjects between the ages of twenty and twenty-eight were compulsorily conscripted into the army for a four-year period. As a result, the French administration managed to recruit large numbers of soldiers for the war effort. Thus the number of *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* increased from less than 6,000 in 1895 to 12,000 in 1910; 17,000 in 1914; 55,000 in 1920; and 110,000 in 1925.

In 1916, the French mobilized a total of 51,000 troops throughout West Africa, and 63,378 new recruits in 1918 alone, especially through the efforts of Senegalese Blaise Diagne, appointed High Commissioner in charge of the recruitment of African troops for the occasion.<sup>89</sup> Massive numbers of Africans were forcibly recruited for the war effort, either as soldiers, carriers, or military labor. Thus over 483,000 colonial soldiers—including 170,891 *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*—from all over Africa served in the French army during the war, and 260,000 porters from the Belgian Congo were mobilized during the East Africa campaign. All in all, over 2.5 million Africans—including one million troops—were involved in the war effort during World War I.<sup>90</sup> The death toll among African soldiers was estimated at 71,000, including 25,000 Algerians and 35,000 *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*.<sup>91</sup> About a million African troops and carriers—including 200,000 *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*—were used in World War II, and as many as 80,000 French African soldiers had been fighting on the European front when France fell to the Ger-

mans.<sup>92</sup> An estimated 36,530 (over 45 percent) were killed in combat, including 10,500 from Madagascar and 26,030 from sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>93</sup>

#### POPULATION CONTROL POLICIES IN AFRICA IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

From Cecil Rhodes's imperial project of a British Africa from Cape to Cairo to George W. Bush's neoimperialist project of the early twenty-first century, via George H. Bush's "*New World Order*" of the early nineties, a consistent policy designed to maintain the total and exclusive politico-strategic and economic dominance and control of the major powers over the lesser ones has been designed and implemented by a small, secretive, Western (mostly Anglo-American) elite, epitomized by Cecil Rhodes's *Round Table*. Based on the age old Roman principle of *divide et impera* (divide and rule), such policies—including population control—are meant to create divisions and conflict between the leaders and their people in order to allow the former to better manipulate and control the latter.<sup>94</sup>

In the mid-1970s, the U.S. government either directly—through the CIA and USAID—or indirectly—through such agencies as AFRICARE, CARE, the Peace Corps, PUSH, the Rockefeller and Ford foundations, and the World Bank—infiltrated African states to foment political unrest and wars. At that time, sub-Saharan African governments became the target of numerous clandestine activities designed to win their support of U.S. foreign policy. American foreign policy's primary focus then was Third World—and specifically, African—depopulation, as articulated in Henry Kissinger's *National Strategic Security Memorandum 200* (NSSM 200) of December 1974. Entitled *Implications of Worldwide Population Growth for U.S. Security and Overseas Interests*, NSSM 200 specifically identified the growth of populations in developing countries as a strategic threat to the U.S. Thirteen countries—including Nigeria and Ethiopia—were targeted for covert warfare to reduce their populations.<sup>95</sup> Dr. Kissinger established an explicit link between U.S. economic prosperity and population control policies in less developed countries (specifically Africa): "Wherever a lessening of population pressures through reduced birth rates can increase the prospects for such [political, economic, and social] stability [of the supplying countries], population policy becomes relevant to resource supplies and to the economic interests of the United States."<sup>96</sup>

Regarding the projected political effects of population factors, Dr. Kissinger observed that "there is a major risk of severe damage to world economic, political, and ecological systems and, as these systems begin to fail . . . urban slum dwellers may serve as a volatile, violent force which threatens political stability."<sup>97</sup> As a result, Kissinger recommended that urban slum dwellers and other people in less developed countries be culled through a variety of methods. In Brazil, such policies resulted in the sterilization of 25 million women of childbearing age by 1991.<sup>98</sup> Such policies seem to have been consistently pursued by both Republican and Democrat administrations in the United States. Thus a Carter adminis-

tration's State Department report of 1978 noted, "Overpopulation has been an underlying factor in certain international conflicts and major internal disorders. This danger continues and may intensify as populations burgeon and the scramble for scarce raw materials intensifies."<sup>99</sup>

In his *National Security Council Memorandum 46* (NCSM 46) of March 1978, Zbigniew Brzezinski (national Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter) virtually declared covert war against the African and African American peoples. This document was characterized by Dr. Leonard Horowitz as "one of the most disturbing documents you will ever read" [and] "the grossest certification of U.S. Government hypocrisy, propaganda, and state-sponsored genocide the world has ever seen."<sup>100</sup> In this review of developments in sub-Saharan Africa, from the point of view of their possible impact on the black movement in the United States, Brzezinski described various measures to produce total psychosocial submission through nonlethal forms of political and population control. Primary concern focused on the "danger of being deprived of access to the enormous raw material resources of southern Africa," [described as] "vital for our defense needs."<sup>101</sup> Specifically, NSCM 46 alleged that, unless measures were taken to undermine or eliminate African leaders and suppress African political movements, The African continent might fall under Soviet control and influence. In keeping with the divide and rule method, recommendations pursuant to this policy focused essentially on the ways and means to foster division, conflict, and mistrust among the popular political movements in Africa and among African Americans.<sup>102</sup>

Such Malthusian policies are consistent with those advocated in the late 1960s by authors like Leonard Barnes and Stanislav Andreski. For Barnes, the key obstacle to African development was clearly the uncontrolled increase of the African population. This led him to suggest that for such development ever to occur, it might be necessary "to empty the continent of Africans and to replace them with much smaller numbers of, say, Chinese or Japanese or even Americans."<sup>103</sup> Andreski was of the opinion that industrialization was an option that was not available to Africa under the circumstances prevailing in the late sixties.<sup>104</sup>

Having unequivocally stated that since the West is already industrialized, there is no space for Africa to do so, Andreski goes on to suggest, in distinctly Malthusian fashion, that war, famine, and disease will act, as necessary checks on the growth of the African population.<sup>105</sup> Indeed, over the last fifty-two years, Africa has been—and continues to be—one of the most conflict-ridden regions of the world, which has resulted in untold human suffering. Thus, while some 10 million people died as a result of violent conflict in Africa between 1955 and 1995 (a forty-year period), another 10 million died over the last twelve years alone (1994–2006). In Central Africa and the Great Lakes region of Africa alone, the death toll is over 9 million, including two million in Sudan, one million in the Rwanda genocide of April-June 1994, six million in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) [1998–2008], and 200,000 in Burundi. In West Africa, the civil war in Liberia resulted in 150,000 deaths, while in Sierra Leone, 50,000 people died over an eleven-year period. In Southern Sudan, some 250,000 people died in 1988 alone as a result of war-related famine, while about 3 million were internally



displaced. In Western Sudan (Darfur), 400,000 people have died, while 2 million have been (internally or externally) displaced since February 2003. In Algeria, over 100,000 people have died over a ten-year period as a result of low-intensity conflict. Out of forty-eight recorded genocides in the world, twenty occurred in Africa. Out of sixty-six minorities at threat worldwide, twenty-seven—representing 37 percent of the world's population—are in Africa. The continent is also responsible for about one-third of the world's 22 million refugees. Conflicts in more than fifteen countries in Africa forced at least 2 million people to seek asylum across borders in 2000. The ongoing war has resulted in another 2 million internally displaced persons in eastern Congo alone.<sup>106</sup>

In a report on the causes of conflict in Africa issued in April 1998, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted that fourteen of the continent's fifty-three countries were afflicted by armed conflict in 1996 alone, and over thirty wars have occurred in Africa since 1970, mostly within states. These accounted for "more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide" and caused over 8 million people to become refugees, returnees, and displaced persons.<sup>107</sup> A July 2001 U.S. Department of State report notes that, as of that year, conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa cumulatively claimed at least 8 million lives. By that same year, more than 3.5 million of the more than 14 million refugees and asylum seekers in the world were in Africa. Of the approximately 21 million internally displaced people in the world, more than 10 million were Africans.<sup>108</sup>

Could it be that the realist policy scenarios of Kissinger and Brzezinski and the dire Malthusian predictions of Barnes and Andreski have finally come to pass? In a carefully documented study, Wayne Madsen notes that from 1994 to 1997, a covert *de facto* Franco-American proxy war in the Great Lakes region of Africa cost an estimated one million lives. Madsen observes that the root of the new American foreign policy goals in Africa is to use the U.S. military to make the world safe, not so much for democracy, as for U.S. economic business interests. Lee Hamilton, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, clearly explained in June 1994 why Africa was of renewed interest to the United States: "Africa has the most economic potential of any region in the world; it has powerful rivers. It is rich in minerals and natural resources. It has the most arable land for farming in the world."<sup>109</sup>

A careful study of the geopolitics of war in post-cold war Africa reveals an intriguing pattern, namely, the almost perfect coincidence of conflict areas and location of strategic mineral resources, particularly diamonds, gold, copper, uranium, and oil. The role of timber and rubber in fueling the war in Liberia; of diamonds in fueling the conflicts in Angola, the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, and the DR Congo; of oil in fueling the conflicts in Angola, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Nigeria, and Sudan; and (in addition to diamonds) of copper, cobalt, tin, zinc, gold, iron ore, silver, cadmium, uranium, europium, columbite, tantalum, and thorium in fueling the conflict in the DRC have been abundantly documented in various recent reports and publications.<sup>110</sup>

Madsen observes that Western—particularly American and French—policy in Africa in the 1990s essentially focused on the systematic economic exploitation of the continent through such agencies as intelligence operatives, foreign mercenary outfits, and a coterie of exploitative Western corporate conglomerates hoping to cash in on Africa's mineral wealth.<sup>111</sup>

As if the horrendous death toll directly or indirectly resulting from war and conflict in Africa was not enough, the HIV/AIDS pandemic is currently wrecking havoc with the sub-Saharan African economies and societies. According to the latest statistics available, sub-Saharan Africa is the region of the world that is most affected by HIV/AIDS. In 2001, an estimated 28.5 million people were living with HIV/AIDS in Africa, a figure that increased to 29.4 million—out of 42 million worldwide, that is, 70 percent of the world total—in 2002. In the same year, the epidemic claimed the lives of an estimated 2.4 million Africans, out of a total of 3.1 million worldwide (i.e., over 77 percent of the world total). In 2002, 3.5 million people were newly infected with HIV (out of a world total of 5 million, i.e., 70 percent of the world total). In addition, 10 million young people (aged 15–24) and almost 3 million children under fifteen are living with HIV. In 2003, 26.6 million Africans were living with HIV/AIDS, including the 3.2 million who became newly infected; AIDS killed 2.3 million people in the same year.<sup>112</sup> Should HIV infection continue to increase at the current rates, it is estimated that in five years (by 2013), at the time of writing, the number of AIDS-related deaths in Africa is 24.5 million and in twenty years (by 2023), death from AIDS is estimated to reach 46 million. The AIDS crisis has led one author to characterize the pandemic in Africa as “one of the most serious bio-genocides in history,” and to accuse the U.S. and the European Union of “non-assistance to endangered populations,” which, in and of itself, constitutes a terrible “crime against humanity.”<sup>113</sup>

Viewed against this background, one must question the population control policies—especially family planning—vigorously and consistently advocated by major bilateral donors (the U.S. government through USAID) and multi-lateral agencies—most notably, the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), and the World Bank—in Africa. The World Bank and its soft-loan affiliate, the International Development Association (IDA), entered the population assistance field in 1968. The Bank quickly emerged as a major funder of population control. Thus its spending on population programs increased dramatically, from \$27 million in 1969–70, to \$500 million in 1990; \$1.3 billion in 1993; and \$2.5 billion in 1995. On July 17, 2008, the United States Congress approved \$ 600 million to be used for family planning programs in developing countries.

More significantly, population control policies have now become a key condition required for the disbursement of structural adjustment loans (SALs) by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund within the framework of their Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). SAPs, which virtually all African states are forced to implement in order to have access to international financial assis-



tance, involve the liberalization of African economies, which means that foreign companies are encouraged to take over designated sectors of the economy. SAP conditionalities typically include—in addition to devaluation, liberalization, and privatization of the national economies and of the health and education sectors—population control policies. Thus preparation of a *Population Policy Statement* is a typical condition for the disbursement of a SAL.<sup>114</sup>

Betsy Hartmann coined a new term for such policies: Malthusian Eco-Fascism (MEF).<sup>115</sup> Arguably one of the most perplexing population control programs has to be the one currently being planned in Rwanda, a country of 9.9 million people, of which one million—Tutsis and moderate Hutus—were killed in the genocide of April-June 1994. This sweeping population control program, designed by U.S. experts and financed by the U.S. government, aims to cut Rwanda's birthrate by at least half; it would include mandatory counseling on family planning, free contraceptive devices, and comprehensive sex education courses in all schools. One wonders why such a comprehensive population control program would be put in place in a country that barely, thirteen years ago, experienced one of the worst, fastest, and deadliest genocides in history, which resulted in the death of 12 percent of its population.

The forced withdrawal of African states from the health sector puts African children at the mercy of unscrupulous international organizations and pharmaceutical transnational corporations (TNCs), which are thus at liberty to use them as guinea pigs for testing various drugs and vaccines. Thus, in January 2001, the U.S.-based pharmaceutical TNC Pfizer used an experimental drug on children suffering from meningitis in Kano (Nigeria) without official authorization. As a result of the epidemic, 15,000 people died, while many others became deaf and blind. Pfizer treated only 200 children out of those who were affected.<sup>116</sup> In 2001, weak, debilitated, and malnourished children under five years old were vaccinated against polio in various central African countries affected by conflict, notably Angola, Congo, the DRC, and Gabon. By September 2001, 16 million children had participated in the first-ever synchronized massive immunization campaign in conflict-affected central Africa, cosponsored by WHO (World Health Organization), UNICEF (United Nations Infant & Children's Fund), and the CDC (Centers for Diseases Control), with the results one can imagine.<sup>117</sup> Indeed, what is the rationale for advocating population control policies when the mortality rate in Africa reaches an all-time high as a result of drought, famine, diseases, war, and epidemics (especially the AIDS pandemic)? Is this not tantamount to "indirect triage" or, more precisely, genocide? Trying to rationalize, in economic terms, the devastating impact of the AIDS pandemic on the African poor in South Africa, Whiteside and Sunter reason within an all too familiar Malthusian paradigm, reminiscent of arguments made by Andreski and Barnes in the mid-sixties: "It is a harsh *economic* reality that not all lives have equal value . . . if the majority of people [who die] were unskilled and resources were not taken from savings to

fund provision of care, then in *pure economic terms* the survivors could be better off and per capita income could rise!”<sup>118</sup>

### CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that from the trans-Atlantic slave trade of the fifteenth through nineteenth centuries, through the genocides of the imperial era and the repression, forced labor and conscription of the colonial era, to the diseases, epidemics, and wars of the present time, the West has consciously, consistently, and systematically pursued eugenics policies. Such policies are designed to control, reduce, and eliminate Africa’s population. As Chinweizu perceptively observed back in the mid-1970s: “The nonwestern world intends to use their resources to build themselves up.”<sup>119</sup>

Africa has never been able to systematically exploit its natural wealth, and most of the wealth it now produces is not being retained within Africa for the benefit of Africans. Walter Rodney frames the central question of African undevelopment thus: “In order to understand present economic conditions in Africa, one needs to know why it is that Africa has realized so little of its natural potential, and one also needs to know why so much of its present wealth goes to non-Africans who reside for the most part outside of the continent.”<sup>120</sup> This, according to Rodney, illustrates the twin paradoxes of African underdevelopment and Western development evoked by Chinweizu.<sup>121</sup> Rodney provides a clear and convincing answer to the two questions raised above regarding the root cause of African underdevelopment: “Throughout the period that Africa has participated in the capitalist economy, two factors have brought about underdevelopment. In the first place, the wealth created by African labor and from African resources was grabbed by the capitalist countries of Europe; and in the second place, restrictions were placed upon African capacity to make the maximum use of its economic potential.”<sup>122</sup>

Cheikh Anta Diop observed, in the early 1960s, that with half of the world’s reserves, sub-Saharan Africa has the greatest hydroelectrical potential of all continents.<sup>123</sup> Diop further argues that Africa actually has the energetic, natural resources, and food potential to sustain such a population, and he observes that the continent must, at the same time, implement strict immigration control policies and cease to act as a dumping ground for the world’s excess population.<sup>124</sup> Kwame Nkrumah’s proposal in the early 1960s called for a continental government for Africa in the form of a Union of African States.<sup>125</sup> Our analysis thus leads to the logical conclusion that in order for Africa to be able to regain control of its land and natural resources, and to embark on a path of self-sustained and autonomous development, such harmful population control policies should be actively and effectively countered.<sup>126</sup>

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## CHAPTER 5

# AFRICA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY

## HEGEMONY, GLOBALIZATION, AND RECOLONIZATION

Trade liberalization has cost sub-Saharan Africa U.S.\$272 billion over the past 20 years. Had they not been forced to liberalize as the price of aid, loans, and debt relief, sub-Saharan African countries would have had enough extra income to wipe out their debts and have sufficient left over to pay for every child to be vaccinated and to go to school.

—Christian Aid, quoted in *AfricaFocus Bulletin*, “Africa: The Costs of Free Trade,” posted on July 5, 2005 on <http://www.africafocus.org>

IN THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 WORLD, key U.S. foreign policy decision makers have characterized African oil resources as strategically essential to U.S. national interests. In 2003, sub-Saharan Africa already provided 14.5 percent of U.S. oil requirements; in 2015, that region will supply at least 25 percent of such requirements. Viewed in historical perspective, the process of dispossession is systematic, widespread, and persistent.<sup>1</sup> Globalization should be viewed as a mere continuation of the process of dispossession rather than a new development. In addition to being an economic and political project, globalization is also a cultural project. In this chapter, we adopt Gramsci’s definition of hegemony: “a socio-political situation [‘moment’] in which the philosophy and practice of a society fuse or are in equilibrium; an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations.”<sup>2</sup>

### AFRICA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY

Africa’s place and role in the world economy was determined by the European powers during the heyday of imperialism in the late nineteenth century. As Ajayi clearly shows, in the 1870s, under the slogan of “free trade,” European traders

forced African rulers and merchants into an unequal commercial relationship and into a situation of chronic economic and financial dependence which persists to this day, under the guise of “globalization” and via the agencies of the international corporations.

Free trade was the slogan by which Europeans fought against the right of African rulers to regulate trade. In the name of free trade, they sought more and more privileges for European traders. They encouraged African rulers to borrow heavily from European banks and dubious European adventures. They manipulated servicing of the loans to acquire rights to the produce and to customs duties years in advance. They signed one-sided agreements for the collection of debts and enforced these and other privileges of European traders to weaken the economies of the states and even more the control of the rulers over the economy . . . But free trade was only a slogan to give the European traders control of the economy so that they could begin to exclude not only African traders but also other European nationals.<sup>3</sup>

By all indicators, Africa currently finds itself at a lower level of social and economic development than it was at the time of independence in 1960. Overall, African economies are characterized by a sluggish agricultural sector, an embryonic industrial sector, a low rate of savings, a stunted process of accumulation, and chronic budgetary and financial deficits. Viewed in long-term historical perspective, the structure of African economies remains in 2008, essentially colonial in nature. African countries continue—as they did in 1950—to rely on the production and export of a limited range (one to three) of unprocessed agricultural commodities (cocoa, coffee, tea, cotton, bananas, peanuts, sisal) and minerals (bauxite, copper, iron ore, manganese, oil, uranium, etc.) in return for manufactured goods imported from the industrialized countries of Europe, North America, and Asia. In the process, African countries have suffered from constantly worsening terms of trade, as the price of manufactured goods steadily increases vis-à-vis their constantly depreciated commodities. As a result, African countries, which could easily feed themselves in 1950, have now become net importers of food items.

It is interesting to note, in this regard, that food imports had reached \$18.7 billion by 2000, slightly more than donor assistance to Africa (\$18.6 billion) during the same year. Africa comprises thirty-eight of the fifty least developed countries of the world. While representing almost 14 percent of world population in 2003, Africa accounted only for 1 percent of the world's gross domestic product (GDP), and for only 1.5 percent of world trade. In the early 1960s, Africa accounted for only 9 percent of the world's population, but for 14 percent of the world's trade. While Africa accounted for more than 17 percent of the agricultural exports in developing countries in the 1960s, its share fell to 8 percent in the 1990s. Between 1950 and 2000, the value of Africa's exports was divided by three. In 2002, out of \$534 billion of direct foreign investment worldwide, Africa's share was \$6 billion, instead of the \$75 billion that it should have received in regard to the size of its population.

Africa's dismal economic performance has resulted in its progressive marginalization from the world economy, and in a sharp increase in its foreign debt, which rose from \$84 billion in 1980 to \$227 billion in 1996, and \$350 billion in 2005. According to Christian Aid, trade liberalization has cost sub-Saharan Africa US\$272 billion over the past twenty years. Had they not been forced to liberalize as the price of aid, loans, and debt relief, sub-Saharan African countries would have had enough extra income to wipe out their debt and would have a sufficient amount left over to pay for every child to be vaccinated and go to school. It is estimated that roughly 40 percent of the wealth created in Africa is invested outside the continent. Capital flight out of Africa averages about \$150 billion annually, while (according to the African Union) Africa loses about \$148 billion per year as a result of corrupt practices. The African countries' total expenditure on arms and the military exceeds \$15 billion annually. If the annual cost of civil wars—at least \$15 billion in lost output, wreckage of infrastructure, and refugee crises—and of food imports (about \$19 billion) is added to this balance sheet, a total of \$347 billion—representing over 53 percent of Africa's total debt—is thus wasted in Africa each year.

This worsening state of African economies is in stark contrast to a steadily improving economic situation in Third World countries in general. Indeed, Africa's growth has continued to lag behind that of other regions of the developing world into the twenty-first century. Furthermore, the gap between Africa and developed countries continues to widen. Thus, in 1820, per capita income in Europe was 2.9 times greater than in Africa; in 1992, European per capita income was 13.2 times greater than in Africa. In Africa today, life expectancy has dropped to thirty-eight years, or about half of what it is in developed countries. The absolute number of poor people in Africa has grown five times more than in Latin America, and two times more than in South Asia. In spite of the fact that it represents only a minute share of world trade, Africa is the most internationalized continent in the world. African economies remain heavily extroverted. Thus, throughout the twentieth century, Africa's share of trade directed to other world regions (as a percentage of GDP) remained very high at 45 percent (as opposed to 23.7 percent for Latin America and 15.2 percent for Asia). As Africa was totally dependent on the colonial metropolis during the colonial era, so it remains heavily dependent on the capitalist centers of the world economy (the European Union, the United States, Japan, etc.) and on International Financial Institutions (IFIs: IMF and World Bank) today.<sup>4</sup> Initially created in 1944 to rebuild the war-torn economies of Western Europe after World War II with American capital, the Bretton Woods institutions were from the onset created by and for the West, with minimal input or influence from the world's less developed countries (LDCs).<sup>5</sup> The IMF was created to provide short-term relief funds for countries experiencing temporary balance-of-payments deficits, while the International Bank for Reconstruction & Development (IBRD/World Bank) was created to provide medium to long-term development financing. Walden Bello *et al.* show how, under Robert McNamara, the World Bank extended its programs to alleviate poverty directed at the 35 to

40 percent of the world's 2 billion people (700 to 800 million people) who were defined as living in absolute poverty.

Uganda provides a good case study of how the Western and African elite concretely work in alliance with the IMF and the World Bank to promote Western economic interests, recolonize Africa, and marginalize ordinary Ugandans. After experiencing a period of endemic political instability and steady economic decline since independence in 1962, Uganda's situation significantly improved when Yoweri Museveni militarily seized power in 1986. Soon after coming to power, Museveni—in spite of its Marxist sympathies—liberalized the economy and pursued a market-based strategy of development. As a result, the income of coffee farmers significantly increased, totaling US\$100 million between 1991 and 1997. The chief architect of Uganda's success story was Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile, an Oxford-trained economist who fully embraced the market.

Tumusiime progressively built, around himself, a core cadre of Ugandan technocrats—most of them trained in the United States, courtesy of the World Bank—imbued with the proper neoliberal ideology and with privileged access to president Museveni. “Team Tumusiime,” as this group soon came to be known, developed a close working partnership with the IMF, the World Bank, and a select group of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Focusing on poverty eradication, with particular focus on education, Team Tumusiime and the World Bank managed, in four years, to increase the share of the central government's grants for schools' non-salary expenses, which actually made it to the classrooms from 30 percent to 90 percent. By June 1998, the World Bank came up with \$155 million for education, and enrollment in the primary schools practically doubled. However, while enrollment increased, the quality of education lagged behind.<sup>6</sup> As a result of an increasing debt crisis and rising oil prices, by the end of the 1980s, many African countries had a lower GDP per capita than at independence. While the oil crisis had a negative impact on African economies, it had the reverse effect on Western economies. Newly rich oil producing countries—such as Angola and Nigeria—gave Western institutions a boost by depositing their earnings in their banks. As a result, there was more money available to loan to African governments, at lower rates of interest. Interest rates on these loans increased as a result of the second oil crisis of 1979. African countries' inability to diversify their economies did not improve matters, as the prices of primary commodities continued to fall precipitously.

The economies of African countries became more vulnerable than ever to outside shocks. A study carried out by Elbadawi and Ndulu found that deteriorating terms of trade clearly dominated African economies from 1970 to 1990, “accounting for an income loss of 3.85 percent of GDP, twice the 1.9 percent loss for other developing countries.”<sup>7</sup> Economic shocks further weakened African economies. Import price increases contributed to these shocks during 1973–1975, and in 1979 and 1980.<sup>8</sup> Funds became scarce for development and investment. As a result, most countries could not pay their debts. Cheap loans became the debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s. In the space of fifteen years, sub-Saharan Africa's

foreign debt had tripled from US\$84.1 billion in 1982 to US\$235.4 billion in 1997. By 2005, Africa's total debt stood at \$350 billion. For every \$1 Africans receive in grants, they spent \$13 in interest on the debt. The principal debtors to the United States include the Democratic Republic of the Congo (\$2.1 billion), Sudan (\$1.2 billion), Nigeria (\$871 million), Somalia (\$431 million), and Côte d'Ivoire (\$378 million). It has been estimated that the World Bank can write off Africa's debt without any negative impact on its credit rating. In essence, this debt has remained the continent's most serious problem, and the means that the IFIs use to keep these countries yoked to the global capitalist system in an unequal and dependent relationship. It has also given these institutions and Western countries a useful pretext to meddle in African affairs.

The ideology actively promoted by the IMF and the World Bank is the neo-classical free market ideology, presented as the universal model of development. This model assigns a central role to the private sector, rather than to the state in the economy, and even advocates the privatization of key welfare functions and policies, such as health care and education.<sup>9</sup>

New economic policies were accompanied by changes in military and security policy. Between 1967 and 1978, total U.S. loans, credits, and subsidies to African countries (excluding South Africa) totaled \$6,846 million (of which \$829 million was earmarked for military aid).<sup>10</sup> In Africa, where the United States had been intermittently present during the cold war (1950–90), direct U.S. military presence was established. The U.S. built five military bases between 1980 and 1982. Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya—where three naval bases were established—followed. Similarly, Morocco obtained U.S. \$130 million while Egypt received \$3.5 billion in military aid from the government of the United States. Liberia also received aid to finance the Voice of America programs.

In June 2002, the United States deployed 2,000 troops in Djibouti, traditionally a French stronghold. These troops are part of a “Combined Task Force,” which, under U.S. command, includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Tanzania, Somalia, and Yemen. There has always been a close link between military means and the economic base of the society. U.S. military bases were set up in eastern and northern Africa, while apartheid South Africa (as an ally of the United States) was given priority as the spearhead of imperialism in the region. The World Bank's *Berg Report* was the precursor of the neoclassical model in Africa. It noted “three major policy actions that are central to any growth-oriented program: more suitable trade and exchange rate policies; increased efficiency of resource use in the public sector; and improvement in agricultural policies.”<sup>11</sup> In addition to the financial facilities offered by the IMF and the World Bank, the United States provided African countries with high interest loans.

### STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS

Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) can be defined as a “conscious change in the fundamental nature of economic relationships within a society.”<sup>12</sup> Briefly



stated, SAPs are economic reform packages designed to reduce a country's trade and balance of payments deficits by cutting down public and private expenditures. SAPs are based on the "trickle-down" principle of economics, which (wrongly) assumes that wealth automatically trickles down from the rich to the poor. Typical SAP packages have two elements. These are short-to-medium-term macroeconomic stabilization measures designed to restore internal and external balances, which falls within the province of the IMF. SAPs involve the liberalization of African economies, that is, opening up these economies to foreign firms. SAPs are based on the premise that the private sector (rather than the state) is best able to manage a country's economy. National currencies are devalued as an export incentive, as exports become cheaper (but imports become more expensive). In the agricultural sector, food production is discouraged, as state subsidies on essential food items are eliminated. African countries are thus encouraged to produce a range of commodities for export, such as coffee, tea, horticultural products, or vegetables. As a result, SAPs not only weaken local economies, but they also integrate them further into the world economy by opening them up while the advanced economies resort to protectionism to close their markets up.

A fundamental principle of the adjustment regime is the role of *conditionality*. In exchange for financial support, African governments agree to a set of reform measures. The World Bank's first structural adjustment loan in Africa was extended to Senegal in 1979. By 1989, some thirty-six African countries had signed a total of forty-nine adjustment loans, plus an additional forty-one sectoral adjustment program loans with the Bank. In 1984, the World Bank established the Special Facility for Africa (SFA), which, in 1987, was replaced by the Special Program of Assistance to Africa (SPA), designed to provide quick-disbursing loans to highly indebted, low-income countries in the region.

In late 1999, the IFIs' structural adjustment policy was renamed "Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers" (PRSPs), a purely cosmetic change that did not, in any way, affect the substance and *modus operandi* of the SAPs. In December 1999, the Bank set up the highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) debt initiative designed to provide debt relief to (among others) qualifying highly indebted African countries.<sup>13</sup> Patrick Bond notes that out of twenty-one countries that should have benefited from the HIPC facility, for a total debt cancellation of US\$34.7 billion, only eight actually received debt cancellation of \$11.8 billion. If one adds the few other countries that received partial debt relief via the Paris Club (of bilateral holders of African public debt), total debt relief for the 1996–2003 period amounts to \$26.13 billion, leaving more than \$2 trillion of Third World debt still to be cancelled. This prompted Bond to conclude, "The lack of financial provision for HIPC in Western capitals reflects deep resistance to debt relief and, probably, the realization that there are merits to using debt as a means of maintaining control over Third World economies."<sup>14</sup> This observation confirms Western countries and firms' use of the debt as a means of control over (and blackmail of) southern countries and leaders, described below, in the way their agents, the Economic Hit Men (EHM), operate in these countries.

The imposition of SAPs has resulted in mass unemployment in African countries. For example, the state's cut in the clothing industry in Zambia resulted in 8,500 job losses. In Livingstone, forty-seven clothing manufacturing companies ceased production after the introduction of SAPs. Job losses were not limited to the manufacturing sector, but also affected the public service. Most of the people who lost jobs in the urban areas were forced to move back to the rural areas, where they put excessive strain on already overextended economic networks. In most cases, settlement packages that workers were given were totally exhausted within six months because of the obligation made to families to assume basic social expenses such as housing, school fees, and medical care.

In Zambia, the democratically-elected Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) government of Frederick Chiluba, which took over in November 1991, soon launched one of Africa's most ambitious programs to convert the state-run economy into a free market economy. Between 1991 and 1995, 60,000 civil servants lost their jobs. The most radical element of the liberalization program was the drive to privatize many state corporations in Zambia, which accounted for 80 percent of the country's economic activity.<sup>15</sup>

In some cases, foreign companies are the sole beneficiaries of state withdrawal. Thus, in Côte d'Ivoire, a Belgian bank, *Banque Belgo-laise*, now controls 80 percent of the capital of the Ivoirian branch of the International Bank of West Africa (BIAO-CI), for which Côte d'Ivoire received 5.6 billion CFA francs.<sup>16</sup> In the same country, until recently, the French multinational Bouygues had a complete monopoly of the utilities (water and electricity) and of the telecommunications sectors.

African countries are held to higher standards than those required of developed countries. Cutthroat competition is introduced in societies characterized by weak economies. While in advanced capitalist countries (such as France and the United States), free education, social security, and affordable health care is provided as a matter of course, African states are expected to turn over these services to the private sector. Over the years, the World Bank has progressively become involved in all sectors of economic and social development, from industrial and transport infrastructure and dams to (more recently) health, education, and the environment. This has led some observers to describe the IMF and World Bank officials "as a dictatorship of nameless, faceless, and unaccountable technocrats, obsessed with private market-driven growth that sees the masses of impoverished people as incidental to the wealth creation project."<sup>17</sup> Democracy, as promoted by the World Bank, fuses economic liberalism and governance into an essentially Western image of the good society that is reminiscent of modernization theory. Genuine democracy cannot operate within the context of foreign values; it entails economic and political decision-making power and economic rights. Such a democracy—for and by Africans—goes beyond the "free and fair" electoral model.<sup>18</sup>

African states are actively discouraged from testing alternative development models. Thus the central market in Bamko *caught* fire after the World Bank,

and IMF threatened to suspend a loan to Mali if the state did not ban illegal merchandise from being traded there. A market in Dakar (Kermel) burned under similar suspicious circumstances in 1993.<sup>19</sup> Revolutionary African nationalism is the greatest threat to SAPs for several reasons. First, within a nationalist framework, Africans will control their economies. In such an economy, an independent national elite would put the needs of the majority of the people at the center of policy (similar to the process that is developing in South America, where Venezuela is spearheading the creation of a new inter-American bank, thus ending World Bank/IMF tutelage in the region). Thus the greatest fear of Western countries is that nationalism might take root in Africa. In general, loss of economic sovereignty that Africa has experienced has resulted in increased levels of poverty, underdevelopment, and dependency. Who are the ultimate beneficiaries of this first stage in the recolonization of Africa? The exact same process that occurred during the Atlantic slavery, imperialism, and colonialism, when a small African elite collaborated with Western interlopers and contributed to the underdevelopment of Africa, continues in contemporary Africa under the guise of globalization.<sup>20</sup>

African leaders are participating in the recolonization of Africa in several ways: by providing military bases and spy stations for foreign governments, as in the case of Voice of America (VOA) Pinheira station in São Tomé & Príncipe, a transmitter and signals intelligence-gathering station set up in 1992; or by acting as “peace brokers” in African conflicts in negotiations that lead to the dispossession of Africans, as was the case during the Rwanda conflict. Thus, according to Wayne Madsen, during this conflict, the United States contributed significantly by providing Paul Kagame’s Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) with intelligence on refugee movements, weapons, and logistics. As a result, pro-American regimes have emerged in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda. The role of Nelson Mandela as a “peace-broker” was so commendable that former U.S. President Bill Clinton praised him.<sup>21</sup> African leaders are also complicit in the recolonization process by denying African people access to the natural resources in their own countries in order to satisfy their Western overlords.

As it was during the days of the Atlantic slave trade, of imperialism and of colonialism, the choice of the African elite is either to serve as agents of exploitation, or to be replaced by others who are more willing to act in that capacity. In some instances, leaders can be “persuaded” (with appropriate “incentives”) to relinquish power. Thus at a conference in Montreal in May 2002, Malian president Amadou Toumani Touré—an army officer who overthrew military dictator Moussa Traoré and managed Mali’s democratic transition from March 1991 to June 1992—candidly admitted that he had actually been offered between Canadian \$2 and \$5 million to step down from power by the Canadian prime minister Brian Mulroney.<sup>22</sup> Touré eventually came back to power through the ballot box in May 2002. The pattern persists in contemporary Africa as it did during slavery, “when the Europeans used one faction against another by giving titles to leaders who met their needs.”<sup>23</sup> For example, Uganda was the first country in East Africa to receive “a Green Force to train over 700 Ugandan troops for the African Rapid

Deployment Force being sponsored by the U.S. African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)—an initiative initially drawn up in 1996 without African advice.”<sup>24</sup> Some African leaders act as the agents of Western powers and are expected to do the dirty work on behalf of their Western overlords (as is the case for Yoweri Museveni in Kenya, Meles Zanawi in Somalia and Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo in Zimbabwe).<sup>25</sup> Most African leaders are incapable of acting independently of their Western overlords and are totally divorced from their peoples’ needs and concerns.<sup>26</sup>

### WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE GLOBALIZATION PROCESS

By all accounts, Western countries and institutions have benefited the most from the imposition of SAPs on African countries. SAPs’ immediate objective was to rescue Western financial interests that were under threat in these countries. The imposition of SAPs ensured Western financial institutions a steady flow of funds from African countries as “debt repayment.” By the 1980s, both the IMF and the World Bank were net recipients of African funds. So much funds are used to service debts that none are left for reinvestment. As a result, most people do not see any end in sight to the debt crisis; thus they are convinced “that *that*—the imposition of a state of permanent stagnation—was precisely the idea.”<sup>27</sup>

John Perkins pushes this argument further and shows how the antipopular alliance of the northern and southern elites works in practice. Perkins confesses that he was, for many years, acting as an “Economic Hit Man.”<sup>28</sup> His trainer clearly explained that his job entailed cheating “countries around the globe.”<sup>29</sup> He was told that there were two primary objectives of his work: “First, I was to justify huge international loans and that would funnel money back to MAIN and other U.S. companies through massive engineering and construction projects. Second, I would work to bankrupt the countries that received those loans, so that they would be forever beholden to their creditors, and so they would present easy targets when we needed favors, including military bases, UN votes, or access to oil and other natural resources.”<sup>30</sup> The main losers in this process were developing countries, which were burdened with huge loans. What John Perkins, an economic hit man with nine years experience (1971–1980) working for MAIN in Indonesia, Panama, Saudi Arabia, and Iran tells us deserves closer scrutiny. First, the main agents in this process are described by Perkins as a “corporatocracy,” namely a core group of Western interests including (engineering and construction) multinational corporations, banks (including the IMF and the World Bank), and governments.<sup>31</sup> By “governments,” Perkins really means the top politico-bureaucratic and economic elite in both northern and southern countries.

This system can best be illustrated by the way *La Françafrique*—a closely knit network of French and African leaders, firms, and public and private agencies—operates in central Africa, particularly in the oil-rich countries of Angola, Cameroon, Congo Republic (or Congo-Brazzaville, formerly French Congo),

Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Now privatized under the name of Total-Fina-Elf, the former state oil corporation Elf-Aquitaine (with its subsidiaries Elf-Congo and Elf-Gabon) has, for many years, functioned as a huge “laundering” money machine designed to recycle the enormous oil revenues from its central African operations.

Through an elaborate network of offshore bank accounts and advisers/intermediaries, and thanks to some creative accounting, billions of unaccounted dollars have found their way into the treasure chests of the major French political parties and into the offshore bank accounts of presidents José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, Paul Biya of Cameroon, Denis Sassou N’Gusso of Congo, Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, and Omar Bongo of Gabon, and their associates. The whole system was, for many years, managed by Elf’s “Africa point-man,” André Tarallo, and was based on various illicit modes of financial transfers to the African leaders, including “commissions,” “bonuses,” “subscriptions,” and “prefinancing.” The sums involved are considerable. André Tarallo estimated that in the 1990s, some \$60 million was allocated each year to each of the four central African countries’ leaders (evidently, a low estimate). Thus, in only three years (between 1989 and 1992), \$280 million was transferred on the bank accounts of Gabonese leaders, representing a yearly average of \$93 million. After 1997, Elf continued to pay a commission of “between 40 and 60 cents per barrel” to the leaders of Angola, Cameroon, Congo, and Gabon.<sup>32</sup>

A practice common to all central African presidents—and encouraged by Elf-Aquitaine—called “prefinancing,” consists in mortgaging future oil deposits revenues against substantial loans designed to cover current budgetary expenditure—such as the salaries of civil servants—and to supplement their “nest eggs” in offshore bank accounts. This explains the unusually high degree of Congo’s indebtedness, actually, the highest per capita in sub-Saharan Africa. The highest level of indebtedness in the Congo was reached in 1985 under the first Sassou N’Gusso government, when the country’s debt reached an all-time high of 10 billion in French francs, placing the country in virtual bankruptcy.

Under the presidency of the democratically elected Pascal Lissouba (1992–97), the country’s debt, which had been rescheduled in the intervening years, soared from F 1.4 billion in 1992 to F 3 billion in 1994, and F 3.8 billion in 1996. When Lissouba took over the presidency, the treasury was empty, the debt stood at US\$6 billion, and civil servants’ salaries were in arrears by five months. In April 1993, the Lissouba government concluded a “prefinancing” agreement of US\$1 billion with the American oil multinational firm Occidental Petroleum (Oxy), thus mortgaging the Congolese state’s share in the country’s wealthiest oil wells. In September 1993, the same government obtained a loan of \$150 million, guaranteed by a consortium of international banks, ostensibly to build high schools, modernize the justice system, and spur the economy. In fact, the money ended up partly in the bank accounts of high-ranking Congolese officials, partly in the electoral treasure chests of the main French political parties. It thus comes as no surprise that later investigations revealed that a total of US\$400 million was

found in the private bank accounts of three high-ranking members of Lissouba's entourage: Mounounga Nguila (minister of finance), Claudine Mounari (director of the office of the President), and Benoit Koukèbèné (minister of oil). In the spring of 1995, the Lissouba government sold its 25 percent share in Elf-Congo to Elf-Aquitaine for the paltry sum of F 270 million.

Furthermore, between June and September 1997, the Lissouba government borrowed another F 1 billion to buy weapons to fight a civil war against his archrival Denis Sassou N'Guesso. The latter, after having been in office from 1979 to 1992, came back to power by force of arms after defeating the forces of Lissouba in October 1997, with a lot of military help from his friends (Angola and France). In 2000, Congo's total debt stood at \$5 billion; by the end of 2005, it reached \$9.2 billion, an amount equal to five annual budgets. The high degree of Congo's indebtedness is also due to a number of "white elephants," that is, economically useless, but politically prestigious and very expensive, infrastructure and construction projects. Among such projects one should mention: a sugar refinery, *Sucrerie du Congo* (SUCO), which, by 1984, already had a F 118 million deficit; a brand new presidential palace; the Brazzaville headquarters of El-Congo, a twenty-story building towering over neighboring Kinshasa; and an international airport in the northern city of Ollombo, near Oyo, Sassou Nguesso's hometown (located in a very sparsely populated area). These projects benefited such French engineering companies as Bouygues, *Garantie mutuelle des fonctionnaires* (GMF), and *Compagnie générale des eaux* (CGE), as well as the Portuguese firm *Espirito Santo* (Ollombo Airport; cost: F 370 million), with Congolese magnate Pierre Otto Mbongo acting as intermediary between these firms and the Congolese government. Under the circumstances, one should not be surprised by the fact that \$943 million of the Congo's budget went unaccounted for between 2003 and 2005 (\$177 million in 2003, \$126 million in 2004, and \$640 million in 2005). As Verschave rightly concludes, "under the circumstances, it is not Congo which owes a debt to France; rather, it is France which has the duty to, one day, pay for the reconstruction of a Congo which it has completely destroyed."<sup>33</sup> Population control policies, which were popular among international donors in the 1950s and 1960s, remain a major issue.<sup>34</sup> According to Fletcher, development aid should be offered along with contraceptives.

By the 1980s, out of forty-seven countries in sub-Saharan Africa, thirty-six had implemented SAPs. Hewitt de Alcantara and Dharam Ghai note that incomes in the region declined by 30 percent. Some of the decline resulted from civil wars and famine, but most of it was due to the implementation of SAPs and the management of the debt. According to these authors, the decline was based on two factors. First, the deterioration was *simultaneous*, even in countries that did not experience any internal turmoil; the second factor was the *magnitude* of the deteriorating external financial position of countries that adopted SAPs. Throughout this period, there was an annual loss of US\$6.5 billion without taking capital flight into account. This total amounted to, "a third of total annual imports, 45 percent of export earnings, 10–11 percent of the region's combined GDP, and



60 percent of gross capital formation.”<sup>35</sup> By the early 1990s, per capita income in Africa had plunged to the level it had held at independence in the 1960s. By 2008, more than 300 million Africans—half of the continent’s population—were estimated to be living in poverty.

A former senior manager at the World Bank, Percy Mistry, has noted that Africa’s reliance on export-oriented trade is an obstacle to its economic development.<sup>36</sup> The more the African economies increase their ties with the West, the weaker they become. Africans are excluded from key decision-making that affects their lives. They have totally lost control of their economies and only receive advice and blame. However, the IFI “experts” who prescribe and administer the “medicine” are never blamed. Could it be that there are too many cooks “in the policy-making kitchen?”<sup>37</sup>

There are more expatriates in Africa now than during the colonial period because the World Bank and the IMF make it a precondition for loans.<sup>38</sup> Not only are these “experts” paid much higher salaries than local staff, they also take jobs that could be filled by nationals. Since the goal is to keep these “experts” in the country, they are not eager to teach their skills to local staff. These experts believe that they alone know what is best for Africa.<sup>39</sup> J. D. Sachs goes even further by noting that since independence, African countries have relied on their former colonizers for economic development, with very little positive results for the former.<sup>40</sup> As a result, about 100,000 expatriate technical assistance staff work in Africa, meddling in every aspect of policy analysis, advice, policy making, and implementation, and absorbing up to US\$4 billion per annum.

These “foreign experts” continue to influence all aspects of the society. Their number has also increased as the debt of African countries rises. For example, there are currently 200,000 to 250,000 Americans “employed as a consequence” of U.S. trade with Africa.<sup>41</sup> At the height of French presence in Africa in the mid-1980s, as many as 200,000 French expatriates lived on the continent, including 50,000 in Côte d’Ivoire alone, 25,000 in Gabon, and 12,000 in Djibouti.<sup>42</sup>

Structural Adjustment programs (SAPs) entrench the position of three actors to the detriment of the African people: the African elite, the IFIs, and the transnational corporations. The SAPs have, in effect, excluded Africa from the world economy except as primary producers. This is what Claude Ake calls “development against the people.”<sup>43</sup> SAPs benefit Western countries in several ways. First, they provide markets for their goods. Second, Western firms take jobs away from the local communities. Thus, in Côte d’Ivoire, since SAPs were introduced, one French multinational (Bouygues) provides utilities (water, electricity, and telecommunications) to Ivoirians, a service heretofore provided by the state. In Senegal, as a result of the liberalization of the fishing sector, big European fishing boats operate under the provisions of the ACP-European Union Cotonou Agreement, which gives them free access to Senegalese territorial waters; the immediate result is that many local fishermen are put out of business. These fishermen currently

provide (direct or indirect) livelihood for 600,000 persons.<sup>44</sup> Populist groups who dare to rise against this recolonization process are silenced or demonized. Third, Transnational Corporations (TNCs) have such a wide scope of activities that there is always another country to move to. Fourth, their actions are protected by the World Bank and IMF. For lending agencies, loan capital has various advantages: they can dictate loan use and the nature of both domestic and foreign policy. Finally, the IFIs provide the ideal way for Western countries to meddle in African affairs, in a pattern similar to what occurred under imperialism and colonialism. According to Sarah Bracking, “Structural Adjustment is a particular program beneficial to these market-makers because it codifies and legitimizes their powers of intervention.”<sup>45</sup>

As a result of the debt crisis and state cuts in health care, half a million children die each year in Africa. Following the chaos resulting from state withdrawal from the health sector, different actors—such as TNCs and Non Governmental Organizations (NGO)—have appeared on the scene. Some of these do not hesitate to use African children as guinea pigs. Privatization of education means that very few families can afford to educate their children. For example in Niger, 70 percent of school age children are not in school. In Kenya, when president Mwai Kibaki introduced free primary education as a result of his campaign promises, most people were elated.<sup>46</sup> At the political level, SAPs have resulted in instability. They have torn the social fabric of the society, resulting in general lawlessness. Consequently, political legitimacy has declined and political instability—including extra-constitutional means of transfer of power—has increased.<sup>47</sup> The “criminalization” of African states has resulted in numerous conflicts and has led to anarchy, as various international actors and “rebel” forces scramble for survival and compete for resources amidst “low-intensity” violence. Conflict becomes endemic because citizens are denied access to their natural resources and the right to lead a dignified life.<sup>48</sup> Endemic conflict in most African countries confirms Rosa Luxemburg’s argument, in the *Accumulation of Capital*, that capitalism can only make super profits by exploiting non-Western societies, which can only be done through violence.

In spite of mass popular resistance, and of the fact that they have been a dismal failure, the World Bank continues to insist that SAPs are successful. The record shows that the SAPs have failed to improve African economies by encouraging efficiency and foreign investment, and that they have also failed to resolve the debt problem: “Within Africa, adjustment has . . . come to be widely viewed as a failure. In common parlance . . . structural adjustment has become synonymous with the region’s economic crisis.”<sup>49</sup> When we look at SAPs’ “underlying strategic goals of shoring up the interest of the North and resubordinating the South within a North-dominated international economic system, SAP has been undoubtedly a tremendous success.”<sup>50</sup>



### GLOBALIZATION

In the early 1990s, individual freedoms, free market economies, and democratic governance were seen as the best way to transform Africa. Thus Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Hermann Cohen suggested that “massive doses of capitalism and free markets” were the answer to Africa’s marginalization.<sup>51</sup> Both foreign and African investors were encouraged to get involved in Africa, as is evidenced from a variety of governmental and citizen-based initiatives, such as Bill Clinton’s Africa Trade Initiative and the Summit on Africa meetings, concluded in Atlanta in 2002. Yet, in spite of all these efforts, the condition of the majority of African people has not improved.

Globalization should be viewed as both a description and a prescription. As a description, it refers to the expansion of the market by making capital flow, information, and technology easier. According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), as a prescription, globalization involves the liberalization of the market and the promotion of the free flow of trade. Globalization can be defined as a process that allows the economic, cultural, and political beliefs of one country to infiltrate another. It compresses time and space as technology allows money and people to cross borders as never before. According to Ankie Hoogvelt, this compression of time and space has introduced three ingredients in the economics of globalization. The first one is based on the belief that the economy is “shared,” which introduces new discipline in world markets. Second, it changes the way the economy is understood and organized. Finally, money becomes a “real time” that allows an international mobility previously unknown. Under globalization, international events shape local ones. For example, consumer patterns in the Netherlands affect flower producers in both Kenya and Tanzania. When buyers in the Netherlands change their flower preference from tulips to roses, flower business booms in Kenya and Tanzania.

Globalization is presented as based on economic necessity rather than political choice. In reality, markets are used to camouflage the real power structure and process of subordination and domination in the global economy. Money holders are the power brokers behind markets. There are two types of power brokers: transnational corporations (mainly with a home base in Western countries), and international financial institutions (multinational banks, the IMF, and the World Bank) that help them make their deals. Such an arrangement is crucial because if there are losers in the system, there is no single actor who can be blamed for the process. Globalization—in its political, economic, and cultural dimensions—means the transnationalization of capitalism, the breakdown of national economies, and the creation of a more interconnected world economy through improved communication and telecommunication systems. Globalization has also been presented as inevitable. In the following sections, we will examine how, and in what ways, globalization is part of the recolonization project of Africa by the West.

Throughout its history, South Africa was the “darling” of Western countries. It can truly be said that, without such support, apartheid could not have survived. To give just one example, in 1982, the IMF and World Bank gave South Africa a

\$1.1 billion loan. The U.S. government extended another \$623 million loan to the apartheid regime. These funds were equivalent to the regime's 1980–82 military expenditure.<sup>52</sup> Under apartheid, South African companies could not trade openly in African economies. With the demise of apartheid, these companies found themselves in a privileged position in the rest of the continent because they claimed to “know” African markets. The South African industry still produced battery-operated television sets, and stoves that were obsolete in Western countries. Better still, they “knew” how to pamper African rulers so as to corner the market. Such “pampering” involved loaning company jets to these presidents, champagne, and—in the case of Zaire's late dictator, Mobutu—instant chicken farms flown in, complete with eggs, from Johannesburg.

Under globalization, South Africa has become the springboard (or Trojan horse) from which Western firms penetrate the rest of Africa. According to the liaison officer at the South African High Commission in Maputo, Mosagrius: “Each and every Afrikaner farmer will bring his tame ‘Kaffirs’ who will be used to supervise the local workers.”<sup>53</sup> Afrikaners have bought or leased prime agricultural land in Mozambique for bargain-basement prices. Mozambican peasants who have sold their land have been resettled in apartheid-like townships. A South African official defended the project by arguing that Mozambique needed the money and the technical “expertise.” According to his argument, Afrikaners “favor an area which is not heavily populated because it is an Achilles's heal if there are too many people on the land . . . For the Boers, land is next to God and the Bible.”<sup>54</sup> Workers on these farms are paid \$18 a month. Under such conditions, superprofits are made at the expense of the local farm workers. By 2005, both De Beers and Anglo American were operating as far west as Mali. Eskom had branches in Ghana while South African Airways (SAA) had direct routes from Washington to Accra and New York to Dakar, Senegal. South African farmers and white farmers from Zimbabwe have also been given farm land by the Nigerian regime.<sup>55</sup> As more African countries are forced to produce commodities for export, thereby neglecting food production, famine becomes a frequent occurrence. For example, in 2000, residents in northern Kenya fought with monkeys over water that had been delivered by aid agencies. On this issue, general Roméo Dallaire, the UN force commander during the 1994 Rwanda Genocide, had this to say: “I am convinced that the international community would react more strongly if the 300 mountain gorillas of Rwanda were threatened with extinction than if the population itself was under such a threat.”<sup>56</sup>

Land has become a contested terrain. A case in point is Zimbabwe, where, since the 1890s, when the British seized land from Africans, the land issue has never been resolved. According to the 1980 Lancaster House Agreement, Britain agreed to create a fund of 77 million pounds sterling to compensate white farmers. By the mid 1980s, Britain had disbursed only 44 million pounds. In 1988, Britain refused to give more funds to the government of Zimbabwe to purchase land from white farmers. Throughout this period, landless African peasants were still waiting, in vain, to get their land back. In 1991, president Robert Mugabe

passed the Land Act, which gave the government greater control over land. Seven years later, Mugabe announced that land located in certain areas was to be bought back by the state. In 2000, Mugabe ordered the seizure of 5,000 white-owned farms. All this frightened white farmers and Britain. This move by Mugabe was seen as an end of an era when white-owned farms coexisted with African reserves. One-third of the best land in Zimbabwe is “in the hands of 4,500 white farmers, and almost half of all land is owned by the country’s 70,000 whites.”<sup>57</sup> As a result of his actions, Mugabe faced sanctions from the Commonwealth. It is interesting to note that, since the Zimbabwean government started taking back these farms, food production has dropped and the economy has collapsed.

Robert Mugabe’s involvement in the Congo conflict also turned both Britain and the United States against him. His military assistance to Laurent-Désiré Kabila in 1998 acted as a check on the power and influence of these two countries in the Congo. Economically, Zimbabwe had to be taught a lesson because it was competing with Western economic and South African mineral interests, and also because it was becoming economically self-sufficient. In May 2002, Mugabe refused to accept 100,000 tons of genetically modified corn from the United States, which further worsened his international pariah status.<sup>58</sup> Faced by food shortages that affect some 4 million people, Zimbabwean officials accepted 1.8 million tons of corn—a staple that the country used to export.<sup>59</sup> The economic crisis facing Zimbabwe is a good example of the fragile nature of African states on the world capitalist system. Each African generation has witnessed a new justification used by Europeans to dispossess them. A Zimbabwean white farmer justifies farming on land taken from African farmers because he provides employment, and if the land was given to Africans, they would not know what to do with it.<sup>60</sup>

Globalization represents a further stage in the development of capitalism. The most developed countries have retained the (more profitable) high technology industries and a monopoly over weapons of mass destruction. Meanwhile, southern (poor) countries that are involved in mass production yield lower value-added than those specializing in high tech products. Ankie Hoogvelt defines value-added as “the market value of a firm’s output minus the market value of the inputs it purchases from other firms essentially, therefore, it is the sum of the factor incomes, the wages and profits of the firm.”<sup>61</sup> Low-tech and low-value activities are concentrated in less developed countries. In the new international division of labor, advanced countries also have a monopoly over food production, while African countries produce non-essential goods such as flowers. This results in further inequality at the international level, as states that are linked to the world economy fare better than those which rely on subsistence agriculture. As the African economies become weaker, Western firms can move freely across borders in search of lower wages, best tax breaks, cheaper minerals, and most profitable markets.

Globalization works against African unity because it reinforces trading links between African and Western countries instead of promoting inter-African trade. Since the African state is made more vulnerable to outside influences, its ability to manage conflict is reduced. Globalization also exacerbates poverty

and hunger because the majority of the people are left to fight for survival in an informal economy. Globalization has increased the number of poor countries and social groups.<sup>62</sup>

The number of poor people in Africa will rise while poverty is reduced in other regions. The number of fabulously rich individuals in Western countries is also on the rise. For example, eighteen billionaires in the United States could pay off Africa's debt and still be left with change. At the same time, the wealth of the African elites stashed away in foreign bank accounts (particularly petrodollars) is increasing exponentially, currently totaling between \$700 and \$800 billion.

At the political level, globalization negatively impacts democracy because some African leaders are not accountable to their peoples, but to their Western overlords. The majority of the people in Africa are politically marginalized and disenfranchised. Progressively drawn into the globalization process, the African state is unaccountable to the people and more interested in attracting foreign capital than in economically uplifting the masses. The state "no longer primarily initiates action in, but rather reacts to, world wide economic forces."<sup>63</sup> In brief, globalization is equated with development and technology, and its advocates believe that development can only be achieved by adopting the neo-liberal model. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) member states retain, on average, 75 percent of the profits they get from oil. But in African oil producing countries (such as Nigeria or Gabon), the revenue ranges between 55 and 70 percent. A recent study estimates that the oil revenues of the seven major African oil producers—Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea—will total \$183 billion over the period 2002 to 2019, based on an average price of \$22.50 per barrel. However, a (more realistic) average price per barrel of \$70 would translate into revenues in excess of \$1 trillion for these seven countries over the same period, providing a huge bonanza to the small group of corporate and governmental beneficiaries involved.<sup>64</sup> There are four strategies to counter globalization's negative impact on African economies. First, African economies need protectionist policies so that they can industrialize. Second, Africans must control their economies. Third, Africans need popular democracy based on their values, whichever way they define them. Fourth, Africa needs massive investment in human resources to have an educated labor force.

## CONCLUSION

Hegemony is a complex concept with economic, political, and social dimensions. It helps one understand how consent is established in a capitalist society. On the international level, it helps make the system coherent. Hegemony also helps one understand the role of the state and civil society. Hegemony operates on the two levels: national and international. It is important because it mystifies power. International organizations that are created by hegemonic states link national to international hegemony. Western hegemony has been imposed in Africa through the World Bank and the IMF, nongovernmental organizations, and the Western

and African elite. The IFIs' policies have encouraged liberal democracy. But in reality, these sham democracies are merely a cover to better exploit the natural resources of the continent.

As a result of privatization, African economies have been further marginalized as some countries sell off and mortgage their natural resources to pay off (or reschedule) their debts. Poor health conditions continue to claim millions of lives. Africans have also lost control of their economies. As a result, five types of differentiation have occurred. First, the gap between Africa and the developed countries has become greater. Second, the division between rich and poor African countries has also increased. Third, the gap between the rich and the poor within African countries has increased; some people are completely left out of the process. Fourth, women and children have been the most severely hit by globalization. Fifth, various groups (including social classes) have been further fragmented, therefore increasing conflict in these countries.

Africa's debt, which has forced most countries to mortgage the future of their populations, must be completely written off. Odile Biyidi, widow of Cameroonian author and activist Mongo Bêti, explains how one must deal with an African debt that is morally obscene and fundamentally illegitimate: "The cancellation of the debt must . . . be followed by international investigations and law suits that would throw light on all these acts of financial fraud, otherwise it would just be encouraging delinquency. This is the people's money, and the people must know what has happened to it."<sup>65</sup>

# THE CONGO STATE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE I

## INDIGENOUS CONGOLESE POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS

The Kuba of Zaire [DRC] dazzled the first foreigners and all the ethnographers who later entered . . . the royal court . . . Clearly this culture has proven fascinating . . . But even in comparison with others there was something quite distinctive and extraordinary in this civilization . . . The pomp of public receptions and the ubiquitous art first arrested the attention of visitors, who next marveled at the poise and delicate manners of the people, the intricacy of the political system, and, finally, the sophistication of Kuba legal procedures. It is true that the complexity of its political organization matched that of any in Africa, while its judicial organization was unique in the whole of the continent.

—Jan Vansina, *The Children of Woot: A History of the Kuba Peoples*, 3–4.

### **INDIGENOUS CONGOLESE POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS**

STARTING AROUND 1000 BCE AND LASTING WELL INTO THE FIRST MILLENNIUM AD, Congo's ancient history was marked by several migratory waves, first of Bantu-speaking peoples coming from the Benue River area (present day Nigeria), then of Sudanic people coming from the Darfur and Kordofan regions, relegating the indigenous Batwa population to the grasslands north of the rainforest, along the Ubangi and Uele rivers. The Bantu-speaking groups contributed more than any other group to shaping Congo's remarkable cultural heritage, bringing with them two important social and economic innovations: intensive agriculture based on yam, vegetables, and palm oil, and metallurgy, based on ancient iron smelting techniques. This process accounts for the profound cultural unity of the western part of Central Africa (south of the equatorial forests), inhabited by peoples who speak dialects of the Kongo language and of other closely related languages.<sup>1</sup>

Remarkably, all, or almost all, the peoples in this area (the savannas north of the Zambezi and south of the equatorial forest) have developed kingdoms or chiefdoms, that is, political systems that have a centralized political structure and that are ruled by a single person. This section, therefore, is a political history of selected Central African states—Kongo, Luba-Lunda, and Kuba—which developed between the fifteenth and the nineteenth centuries within the territorial boundaries of present-day Congo.<sup>2</sup> All of these states exhibit strikingly similar systems of sovereignty and political organization, reminiscent of those to be found in Kush, the Great Lakes region of Africa, and Monomotapa.

Furthermore, all these states underwent a process of progressive social, economic, and political decay resulting from the deleterious influence of the Atlantic slave trade beginning in the late sixteenth to early seventeenth centuries, thus making them ripe for the European imperial and colonial conquest and occupation of the mid- to late nineteenth century.

### THE KONGO KINGDOM

Located south of the Congo River and east of the Kasai River, and extending over the entire region between the Benguela plateau and the Bateke plateaux, and from the sea to beyond the River Kwango—encompassing parts of present-day Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, and Angola—and culturally united by the Kikongo language, Kongo emerged as a major state in equatorial Africa in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Kongo remained the undisputed leader among the coastal states of Central Africa up until the end of the sixteenth century, when its supremacy was challenged by its neighbors and the Portuguese colony of Angola, founded in 1548.

The Kongo kingdom was highly centralized—it was structured around a tightly controlled core, and distant, relatively autonomous regions where central power and authority was far weaker, in the periphery. The basic unit of the political system was the village, which, in turn, was made up of tightly knit, extended matrilineal families known as *kanda*. The *kanda* (or clan) consisted of the descendants of a common ancestor connected to each other by blood. Women of free status were the pillars of the Kongo family, and, by virtue of their social status, only they could confer membership in the *kanda*. Within each *kanda*, power, wealth, and privilege were based on seniority and were usually passed by the male head of the *kanda* to his nephews, the sons of his sisters. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it was also common for women to be heads of *kanda*. Princes and kings were always born within a royal *kanda*, inheriting their rank through their mothers. In the late sixteenth century, the kingdom included about five million subjects and was divided into six main provinces: Soyo, Mpemba, Mbamba, Mpangu, Mbata, and Nsundi.<sup>3</sup> Each district or province was headed by a governor, who commanded broad military, fiscal, and administrative powers conferred by the king.



All the titleholders bore the title of *mani*, followed by the name of their district or province. In the case of officials at the royal court, the title *mani* was followed by the name of their specialized function, for example, the *mani lumbu* (governor of the king's quarters in the capital); *mani vangu vangu* (first judge and specialist in cases of adultery); and so on. All these titleholders formed the aristocracy.<sup>4</sup> The king (*Mani Kongo*) was the keystone of the system, and the strength of the state very much depended on the personality of the king. The king was selected from among the aristocrats by an electoral council of nine or twelve members, in which the *mani Kabunga* held a veto, and the *mani Soyo* and *mani Mbata* played a key role. When a king died, there were usually two factions at the court backing the two main challengers. The electoral council would then nominate the prince, who seemed to have the strongest backing. The absence of clear rules for succession to the throne led to the constant formation of opposing factions. In all his decisions, the king was advised by a council of elders.

After 1512, this council of elders lost some of its influence, as the *Mani Kongo* came to rely increasingly on Portuguese advisors. As in other indigenous African states, the king was both a secular and spiritual leader, entrusted with the duty of maintaining a harmonious relationship between the people and their environment, and thus held responsible for such natural dysfunctions as drought or epidemics. The king also acted as priest, guardian of legitimacy, and guarantor of good relations between the living and the ancestors; he embodied vital force and was both a god and a (physically and morally perfect) man. The military organization of the kingdom was simple. The king disposed of a permanent bodyguard, made up mostly of foreign soldiers. Other than this force, there was no standing army. At the end of the fifteenth century, the king of Kongo could field a powerful army of 80,000 men, thanks to the recruiting efforts of his territorial officials and provincial governors. After 1575, a new, specialized, permanent military formation—a royal bodyguard—was created. The kingdom derived its income from taxation and labor service. Tribute was paid in raphia cloth, ivory, hides, and slaves, and tolls and judiciary fines provided additional income.

The king had a monopoly over the kingdom's currency, *nzimbu* shells from the royal fishery at Luanda Island. All government income was supervised by a group of officials called the *mfutila*, the *mani mpanza*, and the *mani samba*. The income was used to grant gifts to the titleholders at court and sometimes to territorial rulers. The tax was paid once a year at a ceremony in front of the king's palace. All territorial officials would come, hand over the produce from their territory, and renew their oath of allegiance to the king; if he was displeased with them, he would dismiss them from their command; otherwise, he would reappoint them for a year.<sup>5</sup>

In 1491, King João II of Portugal sent a missionary expedition to Kongo. For the next two centuries, there followed an uneasy alliance between the Kongolese and Portuguese aristocracies. The Portuguese enticed the Kongolese aristocracy into embracing Catholicism, thereby creating a relation of dependence that



sparked dynastic conflicts and civil war and eventually led to the collapse of the kingdom. The conversion to Catholicism was restricted to the nobility and did not trickle down to the commoners.

This conversion thus created a gulf between the aristocracy and the rest of Kongo society, which remained faithful to indigenous beliefs and rituals. In May 1491, king Nzinga a Nkuwu was baptized, along with a few notables, and adopted the name of João I. On June 4, 1491, the queen adopted the new faith and took Eleanor as her Christian name. Under the leadership of João's successor, Afonso I (1506–43), Kongo experienced critical historical developments. Besides Portugal, which strived to maintain its monopoly in Kongo by preventing it from having contacts with other European nations, Afonso also established diplomatic relations with Spain, the Low Countries (the Netherlands), and the Holy See (Vatican) in Rome. In 1617, the *Mani Kongo* tried (unsuccessfully) to establish diplomatic relations with Ethiopia. Afonso also opened up Kongo to the activities of Portuguese merchants and missionaries, and he maintained missionary schools that catered to the Kongo elite.

Afonso first traded with the Portuguese via the island of São Tomé, a quasi-colony of Portugal since the early sixteenth century. In exchange for palm cloth, skins, honey, copper, and ivory, the *Mani Kongo* received, from the Portuguese, canons, guns, ammunitions, and luxury goods. But the Portuguese progressively transformed this mercantile economy into a predatory one based on chattel slavery and spurred by ruthless greed. Slaves became the staple of a trans-Atlantic trade that first linked Kongo to São Tomé and Europe, and then to the New World, once the Portuguese had moved their sugar plantations from São Tomé to Brazil. At the height of the trade, nearly 10,000 captives were exported each year from Kongo. The Portuguese missionaries openly participated in the slave trade.

Scholars generally agree that the Atlantic slave trade, practiced by all the Portuguese and their local agents, was a key factor in the destruction of the Kongo kingdom; it perverted social relations, undermined the political system, and affected the very substance of the population of the Kongo. Afonso unsuccessfully attempted to ban the trade and, in desperation, appealed directly to king Joao III of Portugal in a letter, written in July 1526, in which he deplored the ignominious slave trade that was ravaging his kingdom:

. . . so great, Sir, is their [Portuguese merchants] licentiousness that our country is being completely depopulated . . . And to avoid it we need from [your] kingdoms no more than some priests and a few people to teach in schools, and no other goods except wine and flour for the holy sacrament . . . *because it is our will that in these kingdoms [of Kongo] there should not be any trade of slaves nor outlet for them.*<sup>6</sup>

But Afonso's repeated complaints were to no avail. The Brazilian plantations were growing, and needed ever-greater number of slaves. Portuguese priests, traders, and adventurers, as well as many of Afonso's Europeanized vassals, disregarded Afonso's royal will, undermined the royal monopoly of Kongo's foreign trade, and plunged into the traffic in slaves. An era of disorders, raids, revolts, endemic

conflict, and social and political decay began. During the seventeenth century, the Portuguese colony of Luanda developed new trading routes that undercut Kongo's trade.

By 1665, several provinces had seceded, and the Portuguese had seized the island of Luanda, which had provided the *Mani Kongo* with his vital supply of *nzimbu* shells. The most crucial military conflict between Portugal and Kongo—under King Antonio I (1661–65)—occurred at Mbwila on October 29, 1665. Antonio was killed, his army of 100,000 soldiers disbanded, and the independence of Kongo permanently compromised. Some 400 aristocrats—including ninety-eight top administrators—were killed at Mbwila, thus effectively decapitating the ruling elite and incapacitating the state. From that time to the end of the seventeenth century, succession was chaotic and contested. Christianity itself, which had been promoted to the status of state religion, became a force of disunity as different Portuguese religious factions vied for influence within the court; this competition, in turn, caused rifts within Kongo society. “Modernists” favored the new faith at the expense of indigenous religion. They were pitted against “traditionalists,” who opposed European education, modernization, and Christianization, and “syncretists,” who favored merging Kongo's indigenous religion with some elements of the new faith.

At that time, anarchy set in and civil war became endemic, leading to a further division of Kongo into smaller units: from six provinces in the sixteenth century to twenty-two in the middle of the eighteenth century. Following the death of Antonio I, wars of succession became ever more ruthless and bloody, so much so that in a mere fifty years, more than thirty kings were killed. Interprovincial wars also erupted. Kongo's capital, Sao Salvador, whose population had peaked at nearly 50,000 inhabitants under the reign of Garcia II (1641–61), was eventually reduced to a mere village of a few hundred people. By the end of the nineteenth century (treaty of February 14, 1885), the final embers of Kongo sovereignty were extinguished, as the kingdom was divided up among the French, the Belgians, and the Portuguese.<sup>7</sup>

### THE LUBA AND LUNDA EMPIRES

Given the many similarities existing between the Luba and Lunda civilizations, their political systems are considered jointly. The political system developed by the Luba and Lunda affected cultural developments across a vast area stretching from the Kwango River to the Zambezi River, into parts of contemporary Congo, Angola, and Zambia. The two states arose initially from a single group, the Songye, that invaded the area and founded the Luba Empire during the sixteenth century. During the late sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century, they moved further west and established a second state, the Lunda Empire. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the Luba and Lunda had created a vast cultural area in southeastern Congo. In doing so, the Luba-Lunda obliterated the pre-existing political organization.

According to Luba oral tradition, around 1500, there appeared a legendary hero, Kongolo (the Rainbow), a Songye who migrated to the area from the north-east. Kongolo became the founder of the first Luba Empire; when he arrived in the country, he subdued villages and small chiefdoms, and built his capital at Mwibele near Lake Boya, in the heartland of the Luba state. Some time after Kongolo had settled there, Ilunga Mbili, a hunter from east of the Lualaba, arrived near the capital. He was well received by Kongolo and married the latter two half sisters, Bulanda and Mabela, but after a violent quarrel with Kongolo, he left again for his homeland. After he had left, Bulanda bore Kalala Ilunga, and Mabela Kisulu, Mabele. Kalala Ilunga proved to be a great warrior and helped Kongolo to subdue the southern part of the kingdom. But Kongolo, becoming suspicious of Kalala, tried to kill him, and Kalala fled to his homeland and came back with an army. Kongolo fled to the caves of the river Lwembe near Kai, where he was captured and killed. Kalala took the kingdom and built his capital at Munza, a few miles away from Mwibele. This was the beginning of what has been called the second Luba Empire (in fact, the same kingdom). The story of Kongolo and Kalala Ilunga has become the national Luba epic. As a political charter, it expresses an ideology that legitimized the political institutions and the sacred kingship created by the Luba founding ancestors. Most Luba kings used the myth of Kongolo and Kalala to lay claim to their authority on sacred—almost mystical—grounds.<sup>8</sup>

Luba kings ruled by means of a concept of sacred kingship based upon the genesis myth. The kings also controlled their territories through a political ideology of rule by proxies arranged in hierarchical order. The political ideology central to the main Luba kingdom consisted of two interlocked *bulopwe* (principles), that of the sacred character of kingship and that of rule through a closed association, the *bambudye* secret society. As the keeper of the genesis myth and of the charter, the *bambudye* was a key institution in the politico-religious order of the Luba Empire. Membership in this secret society was a prerequisite for holding high political office, and its members—including all Luba chiefs—were called *bang bamilopwe* (“children of the king”). The *bambudye* society was both an agent of the king and a counterforce to the king’s power and that of subordinate political leaders. The centrality of the *bambudye* to the Luba political system is well captured by Thomas Reefe:

The principles of control and conflict-resolution articulated in the genesis myth were matched by the role of the *bambudye* as an institution enhancing the influence of the Luba king and limiting conflict within the extended tributary domain . . . *bambudye* membership offered a protective environment within which abuses of political leaders could be checked. The *bambudye* society was a creature of the Luba Empire.<sup>9</sup>

All of Luba society was ordered hierarchically. Patrilineal relations among individuals and households dominated at the village level. One or several lineages would make up a village, and the village was directed by a headman officially appointed by a superior chief, but who could be the king himself. The headman

was assisted by a council of all the heads of the lineages existing in the village. Several villages together formed a chiefdom; several chiefdoms formed a province with a provincial chief, and all the provinces together made up the kingdom. All the chiefs were *bulopwe* (members of the lineages of Kongolo or Kalala Ilunga). Vested with supreme authority, the king stood at the apex of the pyramid. His authority was legally based on the concept of *bulopwe* (royal office). The Luba king was considered *a mulopwe*, a possessor of sacred, indivisible authority to rule. From his capital, the king ruled his vast kingdom as a divine monarch. He appointed chiefs and village heads, and could depose any chief at his discretion.

Although an absolute monarch, the *mulopwe* could not rule as a tyrant. Institutional checks built into the Luba lineage structure guaranteed that he exercised his power for the well being of the community. In particular, the king's power was tempered by the fact that he had half brothers who might rise against him, supported by their mothers' patrilineage, and that they would be backed by the court and the people if he were a tyrant. The central administration consisted of titleholders, ranked according to their functions, who supervised the collection of tribute, organized the military when it was necessary to coerce tribute, and advised the king through the *tshidie* (general council) and the *tshihangu* (court). The most prestigious government official was the *twice*, who acted as the head of a small police corps, the only standing police force in the kingdom. Other titleholders included the *nabanza* (keeper of the regalia and supervisor of rituals), the *lukanga* (senior judge), the *mwana Mwilamba* (head of the army), the *mwine Lundu* (keeper of tradition and of the unwritten constitution of the kingdom), the *fumwa pamba diyumbi* (the keeper and maker of charms and royal diviner), the *ndalamba* (queen mother with ritual role), and *nsikala* (ruler during an interregnum). The territorial administration was in the hands of the *bilolo* (singular *kilolo*), each responsible for a *kibwindji* (region).<sup>10</sup>

The dynastic history ("Age of Kings") spanned the years from about 1700 to the 1860s. The Luba Empire went through a period of conquest and assimilation of distant neighbors under kings Ilunga Sungu, Kumwimbe Ngombe, and Ilunga Kabale. The main lines of Luba expansion were directed along the path of least political and military resistance; thus expansion occurred mostly toward village populations organized into small-scale states, but the Luba Empire did not intrude into the domain of large-scale states. However, as the distance between the Luba heartland and the Empire's periphery grew, the necessity for using force and coercion also increased. It is not surprising, therefore, that the kingdom did not expand rapidly. The real expansion of the kingdom occurred in the valley of the Lualaba, along the Lovua (Kiambi) and south of the Upemba depression. After 1800, expansion continued toward the east, with the conquest of the lands between the River Lualaba and Lake Tanganyika.<sup>11</sup>

The Lunda commonwealth was, in many ways, similar to the Luba state. It was created in the eighteenth century in the upper Mbuji-Mayi river valley, replacing an existing state known as the Rund. At the height of its power, it extended from the Kwango River to beyond the Luapula River. The Rund kingdom became a

Lunda empire in the eighteenth century. Rund warriors overran the whole region from ca. 1720 to 1770, and wrought havoc on its small chiefdoms. They established several larger polities of their own between the Kwango and the middle Kasai, the largest being the Yaka kingdom of the Kiamfu. The succession of the *tubung* had been matrilineal, but succession for the royal title and at court was bilateral. The political system rested on the twin mechanisms of positional succession and perpetual kinship. This meant that every incumbent to a position or title was supposed to almost become his predecessor, and as a consequence, kinship was perpetual. Positional succession and perpetual kinship provided the mechanism by which the incorporation of far-flung territories became possible. The Lunda state could be conceived as an organization run by a single family and headed by the *Mwant Yav* (emperor). The provision of a family model for the empire automatically regulated relationships between officials. If the Rund state was a family writ large, it was a family of warriors and a family that would thrive on slavery. By about 1700, Lunda war expeditions had subdued the populations around the empire's core, incorporated them, and then moved further afield. The imperial administration was loose. The empire consisted of a core plus peripheral kingdoms whose rulers merely paid occasional tribute to the court. The capital of the kingdom (*musumba*) was not only a center of government but also a military hub. The role of the Lunda emperor was much less ritualized, and his power more despotic than that of the Luba emperor. The emperor's title *Mwant Yav* ("Lord of the Viper") referred to the distance between the king and mortals, but also to his ambiguity as he stood for both peace and war, prosperity and destruction.

The Lunda political system, as it existed around 1700, was based on the village. The villagers were ruled by a council of elders (*ciyul*) and by a matrilineally hereditary headman (the *mawaantaangaand*) who was especially responsible for the supernatural well being of the villagers. Because of his ritual powers, *a mawaantaangaand* could be deposed only by the king (because the king also wielded supernatural powers). The headmen would be ruled by the *mbay* (elder of the headmen), and they, in turn, were grouped into political districts governed by *a cilool*. The *cilool* mainly served as a tax collector. The same channel served for administrative purposes as well. Thus every district was linked to a special representative at court. Under the *cilool* were also *mwab*, officials who governed single villages. Over the *cilool*, and ruling the same district, was a *yikeezy*, who supervised the activities of the *cilool*. Besides *kakwata* (traveling chiefs), who constantly traveled with a militarized retinue to collect tribute or carry out orders in distant parts of the empire, there was no regular standing army. In addition to the *kakwata*, there was a small police corps at the capital. Indeed, tribute paying seems to have been the outstanding characteristic of the Lunda Empire. The outer provinces could do as they pleased as long as tribute was paid. The Lunda state was militaristic in nature and became actively involved in slave-trading activities. The militaristic nature of the Lunda state and its large-scale slave raiding led to devastation over huge areas. By the 1850s, both the Luba and Lunda empires had been adversely affected by international trade and could no longer control their

political structures; by 1891, the Lunda Empire had lost most of its territories and regional clients to slave merchants. By 1800, Luba and Lunda expansion had structured all the savannah area of Central Africa east of the River Kwango, all the way to the Luapula River. They had spread a common general culture over the whole area, giving its various peoples common worldviews, common rituals, common emblems and symbols, and a common political culture.<sup>12</sup>

### THE KUBA KINGDOM

The first foreign travelers and ethnographers who encountered the Kuba of Congo were dazzled by the original, complex, and extraordinary character of Kuba culture, civilization, and legal and political organization, strikingly different from the cultures of the surrounding peoples. Vansina even refers to a “Kuba miracle,” which needs to be explained.<sup>13</sup> Yet there are striking similarities between Kuba culture, civilization, and politico-legal institutions and those of Kush (civilization of Napata and Meroe), in the upper Nile valley, going all the way back to the ninth century BCE.

Kuba is a name given by the Luba to all the inhabitants of a kingdom that stretched between the lower Sankuru on the north and the Kasai and the lower Lulua on the west. It was bordered on the east by a line located east of the present border of the Mweka district (province of West Kasai). Its environment was unusually rich, including the forest, the savanna, and great rivers; it was well endowed with natural resources, with some areas especially suited to work iron ore. By the end of the nineteenth century, a number of local ethnic groups were recognized by the inhabitants who called themselves “the people of the king.”<sup>14</sup> These were made up of five distinct groups: the central Kuba, the peripheral Kuba, the Kete and the Coofa, the Cwa, and the Mbeengi. This division of Kuba populations into ethnic groups corresponds only partly to major cultural and linguistic differences. While the Cwa, the Coofa, and the Mbeengi have a different social organization from the others, the central and peripheral Kuba share a common culture—their distinction rests mostly on different historical traditions. Ethnic groups were divided into chiefdoms, which were not always adjacent. The Kete, Cwa, and Mbeengi were incorporated into the Bushoong and Ngongo chiefdoms, which meant that before 1899, 43 percent of the kingdom’s population was under authority of the Bushoong chiefdom. This area was the nucleus of the kingdom.<sup>15</sup>

The Kuba—excluding the Cwa, Coofa, and Mbeengi—were organized in matrilineal clans divided into shallow lineages whose depth did not exceed that of extended families. The combination of matrilinearity and the rules of residence resulted in a high geographical mobility. The corporate group involved in most domestic affairs was the clan section, the localized expression of the lineage; it was the residential unit within the village. Descent groups have little actual influence in Kuba society. Belonging to a clan was a badge of freedom, and meant that one was not of slave status. Compared to the descent groups, age-grades played



a minor role. In the Kuba cosmology, one or two gods created the world and the first nature spirit. After a man dies, he spends a short while as a ghost in the other world, and then is reincarnated. If he led an evil life, however, he cannot be reborn and stays in a kind of limbo. Diviners played the crucial role, although the task of priestesses serving the local nature spirits was almost as important. Cosmology and religion found expression in a wealth of symbols. Rituals involving kingship—with an array of symbolic thought were much more developed than any others. The populations surrounding the kingdom belonged to three different clusters of culture: the Leele to the west; southern Mongo groups (Songo Meno or Nkucu) to the north; Binji to the east; and Lubal/Lulua, Kete, and Biceng to the south and southeast. Nowhere, for more than a hundred miles around the Kuba kingdom, did any major chiefdom or state comparable to their own exist.<sup>16</sup>

The Kuba have a strong sense of history and have a tendency to place everything in a temporal framework. Woot is the first man, from which all others are descended and who created the general features common to all humans; Shyaam aMbul aNngog created the features that make Kuba society and culture so distinctive. Most historical traditions relate to political and social groups—the kingdom, the chiefdom, the village, the clan section. The framework was established by the largest structure—that of the kingdom.

Political organization is dominant in Kuba society; thus Kuba interest in history is closely related to their political organization. Villages became the basic social units in matters of land tenure, local defense, and local political organization. The village, in fact, became the cornerstone of the whole sociopolitical structure not only among the Kuba, but even among the Leele. The compromise arrived at between the matrilineal Kete and the patrilineal Kuba or Leele not only created strong villages, but also opened the way for a stronger political organization. The village council (*malaang*), comprising all the heads of village sections, had an appointed headman, the *kubol*. A council of notables advised the *malaang*, carried out its decisions, and represented the village at the higher political level. The council acted as a tribunal for all disputes involving members of different lineages, as well as all major disputes within a lineage. In order to maintain harmonious relationships within the village, the council tended to essentially resort to arbitration and to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. In some villages, a special court, the *Mbom a Ndoong*, was composed of the female ancestors of each clan section; it only examined disputes among women and imposed fines.

The village chief (*kubol*) was selected by the village assembly for life, but could be deposed by the superior (county or district) chief, who had to approve the *kubol's* nomination. The *kubol* presided over the village councils, and represented the village at the level of the superior chief or of the kingdom; as a representative of the superior chief, he transmitted his orders and ensured their implementation. As the ritual head of the village, the *kubol* was also the guardian of the village's magic symbols or charms, the *kiln*, which protected the village against the sorcerers and the leopards. Besides the *kubol*, a typical village would also be comprised of a number of notables (*koim*), chosen by the council and appointed for life (but

whose function was not hereditary). The village was politically divided into two parts. The *mbeem* represented the left side, and the *mbyeeng* represented the right side. Usually selected among older men, *mbeem* and *mbyeeng*, were the “fathers” of the village and were expected to bring any grievance from their half of the village before the *kubol*. To the extent that *mbeem* and *mbyeeng* defended the interests of the village when these conflicted with those of the chief, they were in fact the real leaders of the village. In addition, many villages had two women notables, the *mbaan* and the *katyeeng*, chosen by the council. As assistants to the *mbeem* and *mbyeeng*, they had responsibility for allocating collective work among women in their part of the village, and to bring women’s grievances before the council. The political organization of the village offered an opportunity for all the villagers to express their opinions through their lineage or section chief, or directly (for the notables), or through their *mbeem*, *mbyeeng*, *mbaan*, or *katyeeng*. All these leaders were invested with political authority. Decision making in all Kuba councils was based on the constitutional principle of unanimity; thus leaders tended to reach a consensus through compromise in order to avoid the emergence of factions that would threaten the unity of the village. Furthermore, the village’s political dichotomy (*mbeeng* and *mbyeeng*) led to a dilution of power, thus preempting any factionalism or organized opposition to the village chief. This political organization of the village was remarkable. Persons in authority were those who wielded power. Everyone could defend his or her rights and interests, and the people’s interests were paramount. The well-being and cohesion of the community was ensured by the division of political functions, which itself did not lead to powerlessness in the exercise of political authority. Finally, it was at the village level that social groups had formal political representation. All this explains why villages were never split up, and why they enjoyed exceptional endurance and stability over time.<sup>17</sup>

The *bushoong* village was merely a local political unit; it was linked territorially to the chiefdom through the county (*nnung*). The county was composed of five to six villages, headed by a county chief, the *kum dnnung*. Several counties constituted a district (*shin*), and the nine *bushoong* districts constituted a chiefdom. The land was entrusted to a “chief of the land” (*kum ashin*) who resided in the capital city (*nsheng*) and was part of the central administration as one of the top-ranking bureaucrats. All the villages were permanently represented in the capital city, and thus directly linked to the central administration. All serious legal disputes were dealt with at the central level, in the capital city. Thus any serious dispute arising between the residents of the same village were resolved at another level and did not threaten the unity of the village. Furthermore, the centralized political organization ensured that peace and security was maintained in all the adjoining villages. The fact that all the villages belonged to a common chiefdom ensured that they accepted the authority of the central political institutions on which the chiefdom was based.<sup>18</sup>

By the late nineteenth century, there were three categories of office: that of the king (*nyim*); that of the members of the crown council (*ngwoom incyaam*); and that of the bureaucrats (*koim*). The *koim* formed a power bloc in their own right



and became the backbone of a new social class—the aristocracy. *Koim* existed at all levels of the kingdom's administration: village, canton, district, and central. The king headed both the kingdom and the *bushoong* chiefdom, which constituted its core. The king headed the governmental apparatus and implemented the decisions of the council, of which he was a member; he was also responsible for law and order and played a key role in the judiciary system. Most importantly, the king had a sacred function, and the link between the kingship and the sacred pervaded all aspects of Kuba political life and institutions. Pageantry stressed the king's unique position not only as head of the bureaucracy, but as a person *sui generis*, deriving his legitimacy only from the kingship itself; without a king, society would wither and civilization would disappear. The king embodied the kingdom, its bureaucracy, and its people.

Four different types of councils existed at the central level of the kingdom: *ibaam*, *ishyaaml*, *bok ilaam*, and *ibaanc*. The *ibaam* met only during the king's coronation and induction, and (in exceptional circumstances) to reprimand the king or advise him in times of crisis. It was made up of eighteen crown councilors (*ngwoom incyaam*), who were the representatives of the *mbaangt* (founding clans). The crown councilors were the representatives of the aristocratic clans, nominated as such by their clan's section at the capital and confirmed by their peers. Both the *ishyaaml* and the *mbok ilaam* were advisory bodies to the king, dealing with day-to-day issues of common interest, the *mbok ilaam* including the king and other *koim*. When it met in council with the king, the *mbok ilaam* could, and did, veto any of his proposals; both councils could refuse to discuss any matter brought up by the king and could block royal projects by doing so. The *ibaanc* was a national council comprising all the *koim*, usually held on the capital's main plaza (from which it took its name). It was an assembly of the whole people, and met only exceptionally, when extremely grave matters, such as issues of war and peace, had to be examined. Decisions were based on the unanimity principle, without formal voting.

Since no decision could be taken until unanimity was reached, this process involved long and protracted deliberations prior to the council's formal meetings; opposition was expressed through public statements. Thus the council effectively acted as a moderator between different factions vying for political power and influence. As Vansina rightly observes, the *ibaanc* was a true instrument of people's power and represented the essence of the kingdom's popular will:

The people are at the center of the *ibaanc* political process, through which they express their agreement or disagreement. Nobody—not even the king—dares go against popular will, but each speaker will endeavor to rally the people to its point of view.<sup>19</sup>

The main difference between the various types of councilors and the *koim* was that the *koim* held their titles individually, and the authority linked to each title was precisely circumscribed. Each *koim* held a different title, a different office, wielded an authority different from that of the courts or councils he might belong

to, and exercised different functions. The *koim* were thus truly political affairs specialists. Although the statuses and roles of *koim* were highly differentiated, they all belonged to a single administrative system, which underlay all political institutions. By the end of the nineteenth century, some two hundred different titles were in use at the capital. Any free man could become a *koim* and acquire the corresponding prestige. The offices became so numerous that any man over forty had a good chance of holding at least a minor title. The bureaucratic system thus had the effect of involving most or all men in the operations of the administration, and of generating enthusiastic acceptance of the regime. The multiplication of titles from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century reduced the responsibilities, authority, and significance of earlier titles; it also led to a tighter control by the king over his revenue, which may have expanded his income and decreased the importance of older titles in those groups. The power of the *koim* was balanced by that of the king. A delicate balance of power among the different groups competing for decision-making was also established through overlapping memberships in other councils and in the representation in *ishyaami*, another council of all the groups involved, except the potential successors.<sup>20</sup>

By the late eighteenth century, the Kuba had developed a highly original and sophisticated judicial system. A single court (*ibaane*) existed at the capital, while *malaang* functioned as a moot court in the villages. Disputes between villages of the same county were settled by the county head. The court at the capital served as a court of appeal for all less-important rural cases and as a first court for the capital, or for cases involving different counties, as well as for all matters involving bloodshed or murder. A panel or jury of judges sat on the bench, and the judges were the *koim* who had jurisdiction in the matter or over the litigants. A competent jury for each case was assembled separately, which meant that there were as many panels as there were cases. The unique features of the system—the panel of judges, the jurisdictional procedure—set it apart from the moot courts. The separation of functions, the precision in procedure, and the hierarchy of the appeals are as much a product of the general political specialization of labor as is the jury system itself.<sup>21</sup>

A major characteristic of the Kuba kingdom is its surprising territorial and organizational endurance and stability, due essentially to the endurance and stability of the *bushoong* chiefdom and villages, with its elaborate system of checks and balances, which constituted the core of the kingdom. An almost perfect replica of that found in the kingdom of Kush, this complex political system of institutional checks and balances, and power-sharing mechanism between different political bodies and factions, of checks on despotism and institutionalization of popular power, as well as the strict regulation of the struggles for succession, are definitely among the most elaborate and sophisticated found anywhere in Africa.

## CONCLUSION

Our survey of indigenous political systems and institutions in the Congo clearly illustrates two extreme cases: one of progressive and complete social, economic,

and political decay, resulting from early and constant Portuguese influence and intervention (the Kongo kingdom); the other one of an extremely sophisticated and complex culture and society that managed to maintain its integrity against all odds in Congo's heartland, the Kuba. In Kongo, from the moment they set foot in the kingdom and king Nzinga a Nkuwu converted to Catholicism as João I in 1491, the Portuguese pursued a consistent and systematic policy of intervention and divide-and-rule. Beginning in the late sixteenth to early seventeenth centuries, the Portuguese set in motion a process of progressive social, economic, political, and cultural decay, resulting essentially from the deleterious influence of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Portuguese cultural, religious, political, economic, and social influence had a devastating, and ultimately fatal, impact on Kongolese politics and society. The enthusiastic embrace of Catholicism by the Kongolese aristocracy created a gulf between itself and the mass of the Kongolese people, who had remained faithful to their indigenous beliefs. As early as 1512, Portuguese advisors replaced the king's council of elders. Furthermore, the imposition of royal monogamy as a result of Christianization undermined the delicate balance of clan alliances created through the traditional institution of polygamy, thus destroying a fragile political equilibrium. As Balandier rightly observes, "matrimonial alliances were key to the political system. In this regard, there was a total incompatibility between Kongolese political power and Christianity."<sup>22</sup> As the king was both a secular and spiritual leader, responsible for maintaining harmonious relationships between the people and their environment and for intermediating between the living and the ancestors, the intrusion of Catholicism effectively destroyed this harmony and ruptured that link. Thus, one must conclude, following Randles, that the anarchy in which the kingdom progressively fell is a direct result of the rupture of the link between the Kongolese people and their ancestors as a consequence of Christianization: "during the Christian era, there was no evidence of the stabilizing role that the ancestors were supposed to play among the living with respect to the kings. Could we possibly explain in part the anarchy in which the kingdom progressively fell by the fact that the link between the Kongolese people and their ancestors was ruptured as a result of Christianization?"<sup>23</sup> Balandier makes much the same observation: "Traditionalist elements were extremely critical of the abandonment of traditional religious customs (*fu kia nsi*). Consequently, they predicted disorders and calamities, the vengeance of ancestors betrayed, and the multiplication of the dangers of a sorcery no longer contained by traditional customs . . ."<sup>24</sup>

During the factionalist struggles opposing Afonso I (a modernist) to Mpanza a Nzinga (a traditionalist) after 1506, Christians were assimilated to troublemakers (particularly the *ba-ndoki* sorcerers). It was believed that the kingdom was threatened by drought and sterility due to the erosion of the powers associated with prosperity derived from the protection of the ancestors.<sup>25</sup> In addition to the rift between the people and their leaders, Catholicism also introduced conflict and factionalism within the ruling elite itself, notably between the "modernists"

(supportive of Portuguese influence), the “traditionalists” (in favor of preserving indigenous traditions and beliefs), and the “syncretists” (advocating a middle position between these two). In the realm of external relations, Portugal wanted to maintain its position as exclusive intermediary between the Kongo kingdom and the outside world. Thus the Portuguese deliberately and consistently tried to prevent Kongo from having contact and entertaining diplomatic relations with European nations such as Spain, the Low Countries, and the Holy See (unsuccessfully), or with African states such as Ethiopia (successfully).

As Vansina shows, governance in West Central Africa was inherently democratic and firmly based on popular participation until it was altered by the Atlantic slave trade: “The most striking aspect of the history of the lands of inner West Central Africa is the persistence of small political units in which governance remained essentially collective.”<sup>26</sup> Indeed, by far, the most significant factor in the destruction of the Kongo kingdom was the Atlantic slave trade, which perverted social relations, undermined the political system, destroyed the economy, and affected the very substance of the state’s population. From 1514 onward, Portuguese adventurers, merchants, and missionaries, as well as sections of the Kongolesse aristocracy, actively engaged in the Atlantic slave trade. Some 10,000 captives, at the very minimum, were exported yearly, first from São Tomé to Europe, then directly to Brazil. This resulted in a severe depopulation of the Kongo: from a population estimated at around five million in 1775, the area only numbered some 300,000 to 400,000 inhabitants in the late 1950s.<sup>27</sup>

Following the battle of Ambwila in October 1665, anarchy and civil war became endemic. The king’s monopoly over nzimbu shells from Luanda Island (the kingdom’s currency) was terminated; wars of succession became ever more deadly (thirty kings killed in fifty years); the kingdom disintegrated and was divided from six provinces in the sixteenth century to twenty-two provinces in the mid-eighteenth century; and provincial governors engaged in the slave trade in alliance with the Portuguese challenged the power and authority of the king. Jan Vansina neatly summarizes the negative impact of the Atlantic slave trade on indigenous governance.

The Atlantic trade subverted the other institutions of governance as well. Offerings became a tribute in significant goods, rendering justice became a means to extort fines and to acquire pawns or slaves, wars were fought to capture slaves, and in internal affairs powerful chiefs centralized governance in their own hands and turned into despots who displayed skulls on their fences as a means of cowing their subjects.<sup>28</sup>

As we shall see, there are striking similarities between this process of anarchy and chaos and that which prevailed in the weeks and months immediately following Congo’s independence from Belgium under prime minister Patrice Emery Lumumba beginning on June 30, 1960.

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# THE CONGO STATE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE II

## FROM THE CONGO FREE STATE TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Tribal conflicts, we are told “flare up” unaccountably. I used to accept this, without much thought, but now when I hear of a tribal conflict “flaring up,” I try to find out in whose interest it was to drop a match. Take the case of the Baluba and the Lulua in Kasai. Their antagonism “flared up,” and was considerably more publicized than tribal fights normally are, when it was in the interests of *Forminière* that these things should happen and be known to happen. When that ceased to be the case, the Lulua and the Baluba seemed to become gradually reconciled.

—Conor Cruise O’Brien, *To Katanga and Back: A U.N. Case History*, 238.

### **KING LÉOPOLD’S CONGO FREE STATE, 1885–1908: RED RUBBER**

IN SEPTEMBER 1876, IN BRUSSELS, LÉOPOLD II, KING OF THE BELGIANS, convened a geographical conference of leading explorers of Africa and founded the *Association Internationale Africaine* (International African Association [AIA]) “for the avowed purpose of promoting the civilization and commerce of Africa.”<sup>1</sup> King Léopold declared himself the sovereign of the Congo Free State (CFS) and the territory thus became, in effect, his private domain, until he bequeathed it to the Belgian state in August 1908. Between 1891 and 1912, one of the most devious and ruthless systems of economic exploitation through forced labor ever conceived was put in place by Léopold, with devastating consequences for the Congolese population. Léopold formulated a policy whereby nine-tenths of the Congo territory was declared “vacant” and thus became his personal property in his capacity as “sovereign” of the CFS. The king farmed out a large proportion of the total territory to private Belgian chartered

companies (*Sociétés Concessionnaires*), retaining half of the shares in each venture for himself.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the companies in the CFS were authorized to use force to collect taxes.<sup>3</sup>

Léopold's concept of *mise-en-valeur* (*development*) of the territory was to get as much rubber and ivory out of the indigenous people as possible by all means necessary, that is, through the brute and deadly force and coercion exerted by the 16,000-strong *Force Publique*.<sup>4</sup> Roger Casement described the process of fortnightly delivery of rubber: "Those who brought short weight, or their wives, were detained [in the 'house of hostages'] until the difference was made up, or until they had worked it off."<sup>5</sup> In the same report, Casement detailed cases of Congolese being forced to drink white men's urine, having their bound hands beaten until they dropped off, being eaten by maggots while still alive, and fed to cannibal ethnic groups on death.<sup>6</sup> E. D. Morel chronicles, in graphic detail, the sheer inhumanity of this system that spread throughout the region.<sup>7</sup> According to Morel, some of the Europeans employed by the chartered companies wrote home, boasting of their exploits.<sup>8</sup>

The situation was not much better in the "crown domain," that is, the portion of the territory whose revenue the king kept for his own private use.<sup>9</sup> This situation led to endemic famine, and thus, effectively, to "depopulation by starvation."<sup>10</sup> King Léopold's elaborate system of forced labor exacted a horrendous human toll on the Congolese people. The population of Congo fell from about 20 million in 1891 to only 8,500,000 in 1911. In other words, the king's system resulted in the death of between 10 and 11.5 million Congolese.<sup>11</sup> Ndaywel è Nziem puts the figure even higher, at 13 million. The Congo Reform Association (CRA) launched a worldwide campaign against the Congo Free State. The international outcry caused by the revelation of these atrocities through the CRA forced King Léopold to transfer the sovereignty of the territory to the Belgian State in November 1908. As a result, the CFS became the Belgian Congo.

### THE CONGO UNDER BELGIAN COLONIAL RULE, 1908–60

Belgium proceeded to break up the larger indigenous political structures—such as Kongo, the Luba-Lunda, and the Kuba—into small local political units, the *chefferies* (chiefdoms), based on clans or families, and placed them under direct Belgian administrative control. In 1917, there were 6,095 *chefferies*, each with an average population of less than 1,000 people, headed by administratively appointed chiefs with no authority or traditional legitimacy.<sup>12</sup> As a result, "indirect rule" led to "a fragmentation of authority."<sup>13</sup>

The Belgian "colonial trinity" was constituted by the state, the Christian churches and missions, and the big industrial and commercial firms. The Christian (mostly Catholic) churches were in charge of the *mission civilisatrice* (civilizing mission), and were mainly responsible for education. Their objective was not to educate the majority of Congolese, but rather to create a small class of "évolués"

(westernized elite) to serve as subordinate auxiliaries in the colonial administration. Just how small this class of *évolués* was is demonstrated by the fact that, between 1954 and 1958, the Belgian colonial administration delivered only 217 identity cards (*cartes d'immatriculés*) out of a population estimated at 13.5 million.<sup>14</sup> On the eve of independence, there were 8,000 Christian missionaries in Congo (including 6,000 Catholics), and 966 mission stations.<sup>15</sup> Until the 1920s, the colonial economy was still based on the production and export of ivory, rubber, cotton, and palm oil, and King Léopold's vicious system of forced labor, managed by the private Belgian chartered companies, survived almost intact. Indeed, forced labor was institutionalized in the Belgian Congo. By the decree of February 20, 1917, each adult male Congolese owed sixty days of labor per year to the state—reduced to forty-five days in 1957—devoted to public works or to the cultivation of crops prescribed by the administration. In spite of the legal abolition of forced labor in 1910 (decree of May 2), except for works of public interest, forced labor was, in fact, maintained throughout the colonial period.<sup>16</sup> A total of 114,341 non-Congolese (including 88,913 Belgians and 1,582 Asians)<sup>17</sup> settled in Congo, one-third of them in the mineral-rich province of Katanga. In 1900, the *Comité Spécial du Katanga* (CSK) and the *Comité National du Kivu* (CNK) were created as mixed-economy corporations with broad, discretionary economic and administrative power and authority over their respective provinces. Development of copper and diamond production started in the 1930s. Mining activities were controlled by a huge Belgian holding company, the *Société Générale de Belgique*, whose main subsidiaries were the *Union Minière du Haut-Katanga* and the *Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga* (BCK) in Katanga, and the *Société Internationale Forestière et Minière* (*Forminière*) in Kasai, all of which were created in 1906. The inherently exploitative nature of the Belgian colonial system was well captured by King Léopold II, a pioneer imperialist: "Based on forced labor, colonization is meant to be doubly profitable for the metropole. First, it provides the indigenous population with secure property through taxation. Then these people must be inculcated with proper working habits; this can be achieved by taking away from them enough to force them to work for a living; this results in instant profit"<sup>18</sup>

The earlier manifestation of African nationalism took the form of a messianic movement initiated in 1921 by Simon Kimbangu. Kimbanguism—a synthesis of indigenous African religion and Christianity—became widely popular, especially among the Bakongo people. Worried by the distinctly anti-Belgian overtones of Kimbanguism, the Belgian colonial authorities promptly arrested and detained Kimbangu, who remained in prison for thirty years, until his death in 1951. It is among the Bakongo that the first modern African political party, the *Alliance des Bakongo* (Abako), was created in 1950; Joseph Kasa-Vubu became its leader in 1954, and in August 1956, Abako began to systematically agitate for independence. In 1958, Patrice Émery Lumumba created the first truly nationalist political party in the Congo, the *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC). Ethnically



based political parties multiplied in Congo between late 1956 and mid-1960. Thus, from 53 in November 1959, the number of political parties grew to 120 in the few months preceding independence.<sup>19</sup>

Throughout 1959, peaceful protest for independence by both the Abako and the MNC repeatedly led to violent repression by the Belgian colonial authorities: Léopoldville, following the last minute cancellation of an Abako rally (January 4); Leveville among the workers of the *Huileries du Congo Belge* (April); Luluabourg (August); Stanleyville, after Lumumba addressed a meeting of the MNC (October 30). The Belgians were rather heavy-handed in dealing with such protest.<sup>20</sup>

The pressure for independence proved irresistible, and in early 1960 (January 20 to February 20), a political Roundtable Conference on Independence was convened in Brussels. The conference purposely put off for discussion at a later date the matters of finance, defense, security, and foreign relations, but agreed that Belgium would grant independence to the Congo on June 30, 1960. However, Belgium obviously intended to make Congo independent in name only.<sup>21</sup> For Lumumba, however, nominal independence was not enough; he was determined to win *real* independence for the Congo. This entailed a fully Africanized government and administration, firm control by the national government of the diplomacy, the army, and the police, and Congolese control over the country's natural resources, economy, and finances. Lumumba's predicament was multi-pronged: internal and external security, as well as control over mineral resources.<sup>22</sup> Ominously, ethnic conflict between the Lulua and the Baluba erupted in Kasai in October 1959, followed by ethnic conflict in Katanga between the Baluba of Kasai and the Baluba of Katanga. As in many other instances, these were clearly politically instigated and manipulated ethnic conflicts.<sup>23</sup>

The distinction between the Baluba and the Lulua of Kasai is a purely artificial one that is not based on any real ethnic differences; indeed, both derive from a common Muluba group of seventeenth-century Katangese immigrants into Kasai: the Lulua branch settled in the centre and west of Kasai, the Muluba branch in the east and south.<sup>24</sup> René Lemarchand concurs: "What we have here is a new 'tribe' which was born after 1885."<sup>25</sup> Similarly, in Léopoldville, the so-called "Bangala" do not really constitute a distinct ethnic group, but rather are a conglomerate of diverse non-Bakongo, urbanized ethnic groups.<sup>26</sup> The Belgian colonial authorities promptly created, within Kasai, a breakaway province (called Mineral Muluba Province) centered around the capital of *Forminière* (Bakwanga), the moment Lumumba's MNC managed to unite previously divided political factions.<sup>27</sup>

Indeed, in a confidential report of May 1959, the chief of internal security in the Belgian colonial administration suggested that strategies of division of the Congolese nationalist movement based on ethnicity, which would give the Belgians an opportunity to act as referee, should be put in place. The same source indicates that the Baluba-Lulua ethnic conflict in Kasai was deliberately ignited by the colonial administration, in a typical "divide-and-rule" fashion.<sup>28</sup> It is a similar strategy that led to factionalism and, eventually, to a leadership split within

the MNC, with Lumumba on the one hand, and Joseph Iléo, Cyrille Adoula, Joseph Ngalula, and Albert Kalondji—who created a rival party, the MNC-K (Kalondji)—on the other.

### THE CONGO UNDER THE FIRST REPUBLIC, 1960–65

During the independence ceremonies (June 30, 1960), an ominous incident occurred between Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and King Baudouin of Belgium. To King Baudouin's paternalistic and patronizing speech, which praised the accomplishments of his great-great uncle King Léopold II, and basically told the Congolese not to destroy the valuable Belgian colonial inheritance bequeathed to them, Lumumba responded with an impromptu speech on the true meaning of independence for the Congolese people.<sup>29</sup>

From the very beginning, Belgium, the other Western powers, and their allies made every effort to politically neutralize Lumumba, viewed as an erratic and unpredictable leader, and as a dangerous "Communist" willing to open the door to Soviet intervention, when, in fact, he was merely an African nationalist leader trying to create a unified nation-state and to achieve genuine economic independence for his country and his people in the spirit of pan-Africanism. Thus the Belgian-inspired *Loi Fondamentale* (*constitution*) proved to be a constitutional straightjacket; in particular, it failed to clearly define the respective areas of power and competence of the prime minister (Patrice Lumumba) and of the president (Joseph Kasa-Vubu), thus opening the door to divergent legal interpretations and to political conflict. Furthermore, the massive exodus of Belgian colonial civil servants—only 1,600 out of 8,200 remained in Congo by August 1960—rendered the Lumumba government powerless, as it was unable to implement key policy decisions.<sup>30</sup> At the same time, the *Force Publique* (*police*—whose officer corps was almost entirely Belgian—remained firmly under Belgian military control.<sup>31</sup>

In July–August 1960, a mutiny of the *Force Publique* opened the door to a Belgian military intervention, followed by the secession of Katanga and South Kasai. Convened in Brussels in April–May 1960, the Economic Round Table negotiations between the Congolese leadership and the Belgian firms (notably *Société Générale*) and government resulted in a raw deal for the Congolese. All the Belgian state corporations (*Société Générale*, *Comité spécial du Katanga*, *Comité national du Kivu*) were disbanded (May–June 1960) and replaced by a Development Fund controlled by Belgium. Thus all the assets of these corporations were repatriated to Belgium, and the operation and management of the Fund remained firmly under Belgian control.<sup>32</sup>

The Lumumba regime was definitely set up for failure: with a top-heavy government of thirty-six ministers—which "amounted to a team of fantastically varied individuals of different classes, different tribes, and different political leanings."<sup>33</sup> Without effective control over the administration, the security forces (military and *Force Publique*) and the economy, and deprived of essential fiscal revenues and financial resources as a result of the secession of the mineral-rich provinces

of Katanga and South Kasai, the Lumumba government inherited an empty shell and empty coffers in lieu of state.<sup>34</sup>

The gold stock representing part of Congo's foreign exchange reserves was physically removed from Leopoldville to Brussels. In his address to Parliament on September 7, 1960, Lumumba explained the predicament of Congo's national bank and the issue of the money confiscated by the Belgians. "You must realize that on June 30, when independence was proclaimed, our gold reserves reached a value of 3,764,000,000 [Belgian] francs, while by August 15 we had 1,764,000,000—owing to the magical disappearance of two billion francs which Belgium had paid into [its] national bank in Brussels, supposedly in order to open a bank in Ruanda-Urundi."<sup>35</sup> It became increasingly evident that Lumumba stood in the way of a broad coalition of Western neocolonial interests, and therefore had to be eliminated.<sup>36</sup> The Belgian-instigated and unconstitutional destitution of Lumumba by Kasa-Vubu on September 5, 1960, marked the beginning of a long period of constitutional, institutional, and political instability in the Congo.<sup>37</sup> From then on, Lumumba was a marked man. The CIA director, Allen Dulles, sent several agents to central Africa to implement this directive, but none succeeded.<sup>38</sup> The Belgians, who strongly advocated Lumumba's "final elimination,"<sup>39</sup> then took matters in their own hands and concocted a plan—managed by the minister of African affairs, d'Aspremont Lynden—whereby Lumumba would be captured and handed over to his sworn enemies, the Katangese.

The plan for eliminating Lumumba was officially endorsed by the Belgian government, and its financing was secretly authorized by the Belgian parliament.<sup>40</sup> This helps to explain, and put in proper perspective, the endemic state of venality and corruption that prevailed in Congo/Zaire during the Mobutu regime. Finally, on December 2, 1960, Patrice Lumumba was captured as he was trying to escape to Kasai. On January 17, 1961, Lumumba and two of his ministers, Joseph Okito and Maurice Mpolo, were murdered by Belgian officers in the presence of Katangese government officials (Moise Tshombe and Godefroid Munongo).<sup>41</sup> The Belgians planned and carried out the murder of Patrice Lumumba with the help of their allies, especially the Americans.<sup>42</sup> Apparently, the timing of Lumumba's assassination had more to do with American political transition than with internal politics in the Congo itself. As Madeleine Kalb explains, ". . . one of the reasons for the hasty disposal of Lumumba may have been concern on the part of his enemies that the new administration would adopt a totally new policy . . . much of the sense of urgency in the first few weeks of January which led to the death of Lumumba came not from the internal situation in the Congo . . . but from fear of the impending change in Washington. The coincidence in dates is striking: Lumumba was flown to Katanga on January 17 and probably murdered immediately; the Kennedy administration took office on January 20, three days later."<sup>43</sup>

The character of Congo's political system was substantially changed by the new constitution adopted in April 1964 at Luluabourg. In particular, the fragmentation of the original six provincial units into twenty-one, through a process

of ethnic or local self-determination, led to the weakening and decomposition of central authority.<sup>44</sup>

A major consequence of the Congo crisis was a sharp social and political divide between the urban ruling elite and the urban and rural masses, that is, between the politicians and the people, and the leaders and the led. Crawford Young aptly summarizes this situation, "In the Congo . . . the extraordinary circumstances of independence have served to enlarge the gap between rulers and ruled and to produce a particularly sharp sense of alienation on the masses . . ."<sup>45</sup>

### THE CONGO UNDER MOBUTU: THE SECOND REPUBLIC, 1965–97

On November 24, 1965, Mobutu staged his second military coup and seized power by ousting Kasa-Vubu and Tshombe, thus bringing to an ignominious end Congo's first republic. Joseph-Désiré Mobutu was a sergeant in the *Force Publique* who dabbled in journalism and was initially close to Lumumba. Before independence, he was recruited by Belgian intelligence and by the CIA,<sup>46</sup> and eventually became Lumumba's nemesis and archenemy. Indeed, he was personally involved in Lumumba's assassination. Thomas Kanza explains Mobutu's strategic position in Lumumba's entourage: as private secretary to the prime minister, Mobutu "had access to all the information, public or confidential, official or personal, that Lumumba was given."<sup>47</sup>

During the four years of political chaos and instability that followed Lumumba's assassination (1961–65), Mobutu—acting through the Binza group—was the king-maker and the real power behind the throne. Thus the successive governments of Ileo (February–August 1961), Adoula (August 1961–June 1964), Tshombé (July 1964–October 1965), and Kimba (October–November 1965) were mere fronts for Mobutu's Binza group. The Binza group—constituted in September 1960 and composed of (in addition to Mobutu himself) Justin Bomboko, Damien Kandolo, Albert Ndele, and Victor Nendaka—was described by Kamitatu as an "association of the friends of Mobutu." The group was supported and financed by the CIA, which delegated Lawrence Devlin, former CIA chief of station in Léopoldville, to advise and financially aid it. So, in fact, the Adoula government (August 1961–June 1964) was effectively managed through the U.S.-supported Binza group.<sup>48</sup> Mobutu eventually decided to directly assume power—with U.S. encouragement and CIA involvement—through the military coup of November 24, 1965. Yet as early as 1964, a guerilla war challenging his rule was initiated in Kwilu by various former associates of Lumumba, including Pierre Mulele, Gaston Soumialot, and Laurent-Désiré Kabila.

Mobutu rapidly consolidated his power through a series of institutional reforms designed to firmly control the state. First, he created a rubber-stamp, powerless legislature. In March 1967, parliament was dissolved and a new one would not be constituted until 1970. Second, in order to curb the country's pervasive ethno-regional conflict, he progressively consolidated the twenty-one provinces into twelve, then eight larger administrative units; the provinces became mere

administrative divisions of a highly centralized state. In October 1966, the abolition of the premiership led to an effective concentration of executive powers in the office of the president. Single state-party rule soon followed when Mobutu founded the *Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution* (MPR) in 1967.

In 1974, the MPR became, by law the nation's only political institution. Through tight centralized control, the progressive elimination of the *Binza Group*, and direct appointment of high-level party and state officials, Mobutu then proceeded—from late 1967 to 1970—to establish an increasingly authoritarian and personal rule based on terror, political assassination, and co-optation. In typical patrimonial fashion, all power derived from the presidency, and all decisions were made by him. This extreme centralization meant that all key state personnel depended on Mobutu's continued favor to remain in office, fostering political insecurity among them.<sup>49</sup> An extreme personalization of power and cult of personality resulted. Mobutu tried to provide an ideological foundation for his regime by developing the doctrine of "authenticity" in the early 1970s, which degenerated into the creed of *Mobutuism*—defined as the teachings, thoughts, and actions of the president—by 1974.<sup>50</sup> In January 1967, the giant mining company UMHK (*Union Minière du Haut-Katanga*) was transformed into a state corporation, the *Générale des carrières et des mines* (Gécamines). In November 1973, Mobutu nationalized commerce and agriculture by turning foreign-owned stores and plantations over to individual Zairian "acquirers" (high-ranking politicians and bureaucrats), who quickly destroyed the firms they acquired, with dire consequences for the economy (the policy was reversed in late 1975, and completely abandoned in early 1976). Schatzberg explains what he calls the "dialectics of oppression" in Congo/Zaire in the late 1970s by the fact that as Mobutu's public servants' tenure depended on the president's whims, they were compelled to use their public office to accumulate as much private wealth as possible in the shortest time possible.<sup>51</sup> Through his nationalization project, Mobutu was pursuing two objectives, namely, diversification of dependency—reducing the Belgian colonial monopoly over the Congolese economy in favor of U.S. capital—and strengthening the ruling elite's economic base by reinforcing its bargaining power vis-à-vis foreign capital.<sup>52</sup> Nzungola also shows that this process of privatization of the state was a key factor in the collapse and eventual decay of the economy and of the state.<sup>53</sup> As the regime's legitimacy was progressively eroded, Mobutu increasingly ruled through coercion. As Schatzberg clearly shows, the army, the civil guard, and party youth wing, as well as the political police (*the Agence Nationale de Documentation* [AND]) were all used to control, coerce, and terrorize the civilian population through terror, extortion, arbitrary arrest, detention without trial, torture, and extrajudicial executions.<sup>54</sup>

Nzungola observes, "Nearly all of Mobutu's closest advisers worked in the security apparatus and used their positions as intelligence chief or security adviser to make themselves rich."<sup>55</sup> Internal opposition to Mobutu's regime was both military and political. The *Front de Libération Nationale du Congo* (FLNC) launched, in March 1977, from bases in Angola, its first invasion of Shaba (Shaba I). One

month later, 1,500 troops from Morocco—provided with transport planes by France and with logistical support by the United States—repelled the invasion. In May 1978, the FLNC again entered Shaba from Zambia, threatening the mines in Kolwezi and nearly toppling Mobutu's regime (Shaba II). This time, French and Belgian paratroopers, supported by U.S. logistics, intervened and defeated the FLNC.<sup>56</sup> The two Shaba invasions clearly showed that as long as Mobutu could count on active Western support, any armed opposition movement was unlikely to overthrow him. Mobutu's regime basically preserved Western economic and strategic interests. In the context of the cold war, Mobutu himself was perceived as a staunch and faithful ally of the West in Africa. As such, his regime could count on Belgian, French, and American military assistance whenever it was seriously threatened by internal opposition or external aggression. All three nations wanted guaranteed access to Zaire's mineral resources—especially, in the case of the United States, uranium, copper, industrial diamonds, and the cobalt and tantalum it needed for its aerospace industry.<sup>57</sup> Mobutu's patrimonial rule led to the obscene enrichment of himself and of his ruling clique. Thus, at the end of his regime in 1997, the personal fortune of Mobutu was equal to the country's total foreign debt, estimated at about \$15 billion.<sup>58</sup> Meanwhile, the Gross Domestic Product per capita stood at \$590, and life expectancy at birth was a mere forty-nine years.

As a result of the end of the cold war and the demise of the former Soviet Union, and under strong pressure from Western powers and donors, Mobutu reluctantly agreed to end one-party rule in April 1990 and to initiate a process of democratization. In August 1990, a Sovereign National Conference (CNS) was inaugurated in Kinshasa; it was suspended by Mobutu in January 1992, but resumed its work in April 1992, and, in August of that year, elected Étienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba—leader of the UDPS—as prime minister. The CNS brought together 2,842 delegates representing all sectors of Congolese society, plus no less than 204 political parties. A provisional legislature of 435 councilors, the *Haut Conseil de la République* (HCR), was elected by the CNS to continue its work. The CNS finally concluded its work in December 1992 without succeeding to unseat Mobutu, who had manipulated its participants and proceedings to stay in power.<sup>59</sup> Following the end of the cold war, Mobutu's Congo had lost most of its strategic value to the West, which eventually abandoned him to his fate, something he had not envisaged.<sup>60</sup>

A high-level U.S. delegation sent by president Bill Clinton and led by Ambassador Bill Richardson attempted, on April 29, 1997, to convince Mobutu to voluntarily relinquish power through an honorable, dignified, and suitably compensated exit. Presented with what he viewed as an "ultimatum," Mobutu indicated that he would accept the deal, but needed time to draft his response. Mobutu then reneged on his word, but agreed to a face-to-face meeting with Kabila.<sup>61</sup> Thus, following a mediation by President Nelson Mandela of South Africa, Mobutu subsequently met with Laurent-Désiré Kabila in Pointe-Noire (Congo-Brazzaville) on May 4, 1997 (the meeting was a total failure); and again,



on May 14, 1997 (when the meeting was sabotaged by the last-minute refusal of Kabila to attend).<sup>62</sup> By then, Mobutu's fate was sealed, and on May 18, 1997, he and his family hurriedly fled into exile in Togo, then Morocco. He died in exile in Morocco on September 7, 1997.

### CONGO'S THIRD REPUBLIC, 1997–2008

Created in October 1996 under the leadership of Laurent-Désiré Kabila as a broad anti-Mobutu alliance, the AFDL (*Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo*) invaded Congo from the east with the backing of Rwanda and Uganda, took over the country in a few months, and took power in Kinshasa on May 17, 1997. How can the lightning speed with which the AFDL forces took over the country be explained? As Michela Wrong shows, the AFDL'S *blitzkrieg* (fast advance) was due less to massive logistical support from the West than to the fact that Zaire's security system was collapsing as the AFDL liberators, backed by the troops of Rwanda and Uganda, stormed across the country at lightening speed.<sup>63</sup> There is also evidence of direct U.S. involvement in, and support of, the joint Rwanda/Uganda invasion in eastern Congo. In the months immediately preceding Kabila's rebellion, the United States had trained hundreds of Rwandan troops in everything from psychological operations to tactical special forces exercises.

Rwanda's strongman, Paul Kagame, had trained at the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Texas, and had visited Washington in August 1996, just six weeks before his country launched its invasion.<sup>64</sup> In addition, many U.S. Special Forces troops, as well as the U.S. military attaché, were spotted among the rebels in the combat zones.<sup>65</sup> Furthermore, from their base on the island of Idju (Kivu), U.S. Special Forces managed the rebels' entire communication system, and the AFDL's bold raid on Kitona was guided by American navy ships anchored in the port of Banane.<sup>66</sup> An American diplomat posted to Goma, in April 1997, Dennis Hankins, acted as liaison between Washington and Kabila.<sup>67</sup> During a *tête-à-tête* with the AFDL leader, Ambassador Bill Richardson—President Bill Clinton's personal envoy and representative to the United Nations—advised Kabila to “clean” his “act” (allegations of human rights abuse).<sup>68</sup> Ambassador Richardson's allusion to human rights abuses refers to a United Nations report about the disappearance of 100,000 Hutu from several makeshift camps that had come under attack from Kabila's army in the dense rain forest near Kisangani. Having already made common cause with Rwanda's Tutu-led government, the United States made sure that no UN or Western investigation was launched into these alleged atrocities.<sup>69</sup>

However, tensions soon arose between Kabila and his two African allies. In July 1998, Kabila removed Commander James Kabarebe from his post of chief of staff of the Congolese army and sent him back home to Rwanda, where he became chief of staff of the Rwandese army. Shortly thereafter, in August 1998, Rwanda and Uganda jointly attacked Congo in an attempt to overthrow Kabila. They

were joined in this endeavor by various rebel movements, notably the *Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo* (MLC), led by Jean-Pierre Bemba, based in the Équateur province, and allied with Uganda; and the Congolese Rally for Democracy (*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* [RCD]), which broke up into two, then three, factions in March 1999, one of which—the RCD-Goma—was based in eastern Congo, supported by Rwanda and led by Jean-Pierre Ondekane (the others being the RCD-ML/*Mouvement de Libération*, and the RCD-National). Again, according to nonofficial sources in Kigali, there is strong evidence of U.S. direct involvement in the military operations designed to overthrow Kabila, which were allegedly managed by U.S. Ambassador Robert Oakley, who was in Somalia in 1992–93.<sup>70</sup>

Having declared the Kivu region a demographic and economic security buffer zone, the Rwandan (but also Ugandan and Zimbabwean) military proceeded to systematically exploit the natural resources of the regions under their control—particularly Ituri, Kivu, and Maniema—both as a way to finance the war and as a means of personal enrichment. Geologists have determined that eastern Orientale Province (Ituri) and North and South Kivu (including Maniema) are regions of extraordinary, untapped mineral wealth, which could, in the future, constitute the engine of Congo's economic development. Ituri contains gold deposits so rich that modern refining methods could produce 6 to 7 kg of pure gold per ton, while the rich Kilo-Moto (Orientale Province) gold reserves are estimated at between 3,000 and 6,000 tons. The whole Kivu region (including Ituri and Maniema) is a treasure trove of rare, strategic minerals essential to Western advanced technology industries (aeronautics, space, electronics), such as copper, silver, cadmium, carbonatite, cassiterite, cobalt, columbite-pegmatite, columbo-tantalite (coltan), beryl, lead, nickel, niobium, tantalum, tin, uranium, zinc, and wolfram.<sup>71</sup>

In addition, huge oil deposits have recently been identified in Lake Albert, a few miles from Bunia (Ituri). Said to be equivalent to Angola's oil reserves, these deposits are under exploration by the British minor *Heritage Oil*, owned by Tony Buckingham, founder of the South Africa-based mercenary outfit *Executive Outcomes*: "We can easily imagine that ethnic conflict in Ituri will be resolved by private foreign militias who will ensure the maintenance of law and order around the oil fields."<sup>72</sup> A UN report on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in Congo notes that between September 1998 and August 1999, all the reserves of the areas of the DRC under occupation have been taken away: minerals, forest and agricultural products, cattle. The Rwandese military and their RCD allies organized the mining and transfer to Kigali of 2,000 to 3,000 tons of cassiterite, and of 1,000 to 1,500 tons of coltan from Ituri and Kivu between November 1998 and April 1999.

Rwanda's profits from coltan exports from Ituri were estimated at \$64 million in 2000 (and \$44 million in 2001); that same year, Rwanda's military budget amounted to \$70 million. A UN panel estimated that in an eighteen-month period (from 1999 to 2000), Rwanda earned \$250 million from Congo's coltan. Rwanda's war economy—financed by the export of Congo's minerals—is



managed by the *Congo Bureau* in Kigali, headed by a close associate of President Paul Kagame—James Kabarebe (army chief of staff)—working closely with Colonel Dan Munyoya on site in Congo.<sup>73</sup> The Ugandan military took over the rich Kilo-Moto gold mine in Ituri, producing on average annual revenue of \$100 million. Not surprisingly, Uganda's export of gold increased from \$35 million in 1996 to \$60 million in 1997.<sup>74</sup> Similarly, Uganda's export of coltan increased from 2.5 tons in 1997 to 70 tons in 1999.<sup>75</sup>

It is interesting to note that, at the time of its military intervention in Congo in 1998, Uganda benefited from a \$2.2 billion loan from the IMF and World Bank—including an immediate disbursement of \$830 million in 1999—generously authorized by the *Paris Club* of Western donors.<sup>76</sup> Uganda was also the first country to benefit from the *Highly Indebted Developing Countries Initiative* (HIDC); as a result, \$650 million (out of a total debt of \$3.6 billion) of its debts were cancelled.<sup>77</sup> Jean-Claude Willame suggests that what we might currently be witnessing is a kind of return to the private chartered companies (*sociétés concessionnaires*) of King Léopold's Congo Free State and their commercial outposts and *entrepôts*, under the protection not of the *Force Publique*, but of such foreign mercenary outfits as *Executive Outcomes*, *Sandline*, and *Military Resources, Inc.*, abandoning the hinterland to a motley band of predators: smugglers, middlemen, warlords, and religious leaders, who routinely use violence as a means of wealth accumulation.<sup>78</sup>

On January 16, 2001—almost forty years to the day after Lumumba—Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated by one of his bodyguards (Rachidi Kasereka), and the next day, his son Joseph Kabila took over power and promptly indicated its readiness to work with the West by embarking on state visits to Europe and to the United States. Soon after assuming power, Kabila, Jr., initiated an Inter-Congolese Dialogue, culminating in the signature, in April 2002 in Sun City (South Africa)—after seven months of negotiations—of a Peace Accord between the Congolese government and the various rebel factions. As part of this Accord, Rwanda and Uganda agreed “in principle” to withdraw from Congo, initially scaling down their troops to about 20,000 each.

In June 2003, a Transitional Government of National Unity, based on a power-sharing arrangement, was put in place—it provides for a truth and reconciliation process, the integration of all military forces into a single army, and for general elections, which were held in 2006. In October 1999, a United Nations Mission in Congo (MONUC) was established, with 16,700 troops from 109 nations (including 2,500 from South Africa), headed by a former U.S. diplomat, William Lacy Swing. Acting as a peace monitoring force, MONUC is, interestingly, strategically deployed in all the mineral-rich areas of the country: eastern Congo, notably Ituri (Bunia), Maniema (Kindu), North and South Kivu, as well as in Katanga. In addition, MONUC has deployed 1,000 troops in Kinshasa as security detail to the Transitional Government. Yet, conflict persists in the Congo in spite of the Peace Accord.

On March 28, 2004, a coup attempt by Mobutist forces in Kinshasa was contained by loyalist troops. During the same month, 150 homes were burned down by rebels in Lutwegi (North Kivu); on April 12, 2004, twenty-five people were killed in the same town, prompting a UN investigation. In Kazana (Ituri district), thirty-four people were killed by rebel troops on April 21, 2006.<sup>79</sup> Endemic ethnic conflict persists in various parts of the country, particularly in North Kivu (Ituri) and South Kivu between the Hima, Lendu and Nande, prompting the query, “In whose interest was it to drop a match?” Observing that ethnic conflict between the sedentary Lendu peasants and the nomadic Hima pastoralists occurs in an area extremely rich in minerals and agricultural potential, Colette Braeckman suggests that this conflict eventually aims at depopulating Ituri so that multinational oil (Heritage Oil) and gold (Ashanti Goldfields, Barrick Gold) companies may operate freely, and so that peasants from Uganda and Rwanda, or even white farmers from Southern Africa or Israelis kibutzin, may settle there in future.<sup>80</sup> The lure of Congo’s mineral resources actually sparked a falling out between Uganda and Rwanda. Thus, in August 1999, there was a confrontation between the Rwandan forces and the Ugandan army for the control of the diamond-rich city of Kisangani (Orientale Province).<sup>81</sup>

Why would the Western powers, after initially helping him to seize power and overthrow Mobutu in May 1997, turn against Laurent-Désiré Kabila and decide to overthrow and physically “eliminate” him, in a scenario eerily reminiscent of the assassination of Patrice Lumumba on January 17, 1961?<sup>82</sup> In order to answer this question, one must remember that L. D. Kabila was, for a period of twenty-five years, living in autarchy in the bush as leader of a Marxist revolutionary movement, the *Parti de la Révolution Populaire* (PRP), created in December 1967 with a few associates. The PRP ruled over some 300,000 Babembe peasants, organized in 350 families, living in total administrative and economic autarchy on the basis of a self-reliant communal system first centered on Hewa Bora, then moving in 1996 to Fizi-Baraka (Kivu).<sup>83</sup>

Politically, Kabila tried to progressively transform—through a democratic electoral process from below—the ADFL into a broad-based, people-centered political structure, the Committees for People’s Power (*Comités du Pouvoir Populaire* [CPP]). The attempt failed because the provisional CPPs were quickly infiltrated by the better-organized Mobutu loyalists, but also because—like Lumumba’s MNC—Kabila did not have sufficient time to put the structure in place. In the economic sector, L. D. Kabila and his team presented, at a donors conference in Brussels in December 1997, a minimal three-year development and reconstruction plan (*Plan triennial minimum*) designed to put in place a “social market economy” (*économie sociale de marché*). The plan—requiring a \$3 billion capital outlay—focused on rebuilding transport, water, and electricity infrastructures, on kick-starting agricultural production, and on restructuring the industrial sector with a view to reducing unemployment. An uneasy mixture of populism and liberalism, the plan was rejected by the “Friends of Congo.”<sup>84</sup> But as Martens rightly notes, “The Plan had great political significance: it was the first time in Congo

that the government had conceived a plan on its own, based on the most urgent needs of the rural and urban masses.<sup>85</sup> Having learned from experience that he should rely essentially on his own capabilities, Kabila then initiated a state-based policy of economic independence. On June 30, 1998—thirty-eight years to the day since independence—the Congolese franc was successfully launched. Having reluctantly agreed to pay back the overdue amount on the foreign debt, Kabila refused to meet with a visiting IMF delegation in early August 1998: the second war—financed by foreign firms—had already started. Kabila then proceeded to take a series of measures designed to tighten the state's control over the economy: centralization of the sale of diamonds, exclusion of foreigners from the diamonds sector (for mining, sales, and marketing), and creation, by decree, of a Congolese commodity exchange entrusted with the marketing and sales of 70 percent of the production of minerals and precious stones. Predictably, such measures led to the massive smuggling of Congolese diamonds on the world market, via the capitals of neighboring countries. Thus diamond revenues fell from \$328.7 million in 1998 to \$18.7 million in early 1999. Other populist measures, such as the creation of a National Bureau for Social Development (*Bureau national pour la promotion sociale*), of "Popular Stores" (*Magasins du Peuple*)—designed to provide the ordinary people with affordable goods—and of small, import-substitution industrial units, were adopted, but also failed.<sup>86</sup> However, the Kabila regime did achieve a measure of economic success in 1997: prices of basic foodstuffs stabilized, inflation was down to 7 percent (against 741 percent the previous year), and state customs and excise revenues increased to \$25 million (up from \$8 million in 1996).<sup>87</sup>

Of greater concern to Western economic interests were Kabila's attempts at achieving economic independence and at delinking Congo from the dominant north-south trading networks. Inasmuch as the goal of Western powers—through the convenient ideology of "African Renaissance"—is to better integrate Africa into the world economy, Kabila's policies were seen as going against the grain and as providing a "bad example" to other African countries.<sup>88</sup> The United States in particular was concerned by Kabila's renegeing on previously concluded agreements with minor mining companies,<sup>89</sup> on his insistence on demanding payment of taxes from foreign firms (who previously escaped their fiscal obligations through bribery), and on the decidedly socialist-populist and pan-Africanist orientation of his regime. The last straw for the United States was probably an agreement that Kabila concluded on the occasion of a state visit to China, whereby the Chinese Company of Non-ferrous Metals was granted a mining concession in Kolwezi for cobalt, a mineral of high strategic value to the U.S. manufacturing of fighter jets.<sup>90</sup> Ludo Martens' Marxist analysis of the situation is quite perceptive. According to him, Kabila's seizure of power in August 1998 would put in place a nationalist regime that would initiate a process of autonomous, self-centered development focusing on the basic needs of the Congolese masses. This would constitute a serious threat to the economic interests of Western imperialist powers, particularly

U.S. transnational firms intent upon retaining control over the fabulous mineral wealth of this strategic country.<sup>91</sup>

Joseph Kabila's eagerness to please the international community seems to confirm Martens' analysis. In May 2001—a few months after coming to power—he initiated an IMF-supported economic stabilization program that included liberalization of oil prices and exchange rates, and adoption of fiscal and monetary policy discipline. As a result, the country has been able (since June 2002) to access credit from the IMF and the World Bank, while bilateral donors have pledged to fund development and reconstruction projects. The Paris Club also granted the DRC *Highly Indebted Poor Country* status in July 2003; this has helped alleviate the country's external debt burden and freed funds for economic development. In 2007, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth was 7 percent, with an estimated total GDP of US\$19.03 billion and per capita GDP of US\$300.<sup>92</sup>

Actually drafted by South Africa, with Ugandan assistance and on U.S. instructions, the Lusaka Agreement of July 2, 1999 was in fact a trap—or “merely the continuation of war by other means”<sup>93</sup>—that sealed the political fate of L. D. Kabila and of his regime. By recognizing Rwanda's right of pursuit of the *Inter-ahamwe* (the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide) in eastern Congo (Kivu and Maniema), the agreement effectively enlisted the cooperation of a broad sub-regional—Uganda, Burundi, Angola, Zimbabwe—and international—UN—coalition in support of Rwanda's—and to a lesser extent, Uganda's—*lebensraum* policy, which views eastern Congo as their natural zone of influence and demographic and economic security buffer zone. Taking advantage of the endemic state of anarchy and of the power vacuum in this region—and supported by the United States—Rwanda and Uganda are encouraged to pursue their military occupation of eastern Congo, which will eventually lead to some form of partition of Congo and redrawing of the regional map to the benefit of the intervening powers and of the foreign multinational mining companies.<sup>94</sup> The statement by Marina Ottaway before the Senate subcommittee on Africa, is quite revealing in this regard: “The U.S. could intervene militarily to redraw the boundaries of Africa and create new political entities but it could be costly. *It is preferable to let African civil wars develop and to allow Rwanda and Uganda to intervene militarily in the Congo.* In this way *it is the Africans themselves who will divide up Congo* and central Africa will reach a new stability.”<sup>95</sup>

The “Pretoria Compromise” was signed in Pretoria, South Africa, on December 17, 2002, and ratified in Sun City, South Africa, on April 1, 2003. It adopted a transitional constitution with a president (Joseph Kabila) and four vice presidents representing, respectively, the MLC, RDC, the (unarmed) civil society opposition groups, and the presidential faction. A final constitution was adopted on May 13, 2005. General elections, initially scheduled for June 2005, were rescheduled for July 30, 2006. A national assembly of 500 members and a senate of 120 members have also been put in place. All major decisions are to be adopted by consensus. In addition, four institutions designed to strengthen democracy have officially been set up, namely: an Independent Electoral Commission; an Agency

for Monitoring Human Rights; a “Truth and Reconciliation” Commission; and an Anti-Corruption Commission.

In addition, an international supervisory body, the International Committee for Support of the Transition (*Comité international qui accompagne la transition* [CIAT]), chaired by U.S. Ambassador William Lacy Swing, has been put in place. A United Nations Mission in Congo (MONUC) was set up on November 30, 1999. Now headed by Alan Doss, this force is composed of 16,700 military, 475 police, and some civilian support staff. On December 21, 2007, the UN Security Council—through Resolution 1794—extended MONUC’s mandate to December 31, 2008 and increased its military personnel to 17,030 (plus 760 military observers and 391 police personnel). It is an understatement to say that the MONUC forces are vastly overstretched and thinly spread on the ground, and that their mandate—which precludes the use of force, except in self-defense—is woefully inadequate. Only in response to the killing of MONUC military and civilian personnel—127 in total since February 2005—in northeastern Congo, has their mandate been strengthened. Persistent rivalry and conflict between the four factions represented in the present government of national unity has resulted in a stalemate and blocking of the political transition process, as the four factions neutralize each other.<sup>96</sup> In its pre-electoral assessment report, the International Crisis Group (ICG) further noted that “between 60 and 80 percent of customs revenues are estimated to be embezzled.”<sup>97</sup>

Conflict continues unabated in eastern Congo (North and South Kivu, Ituri district of *Orientale* Province in the northeast and in (northern and central) Katanga between various armed groups, including the FDLR (*Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda* [Democratic alliance for the liberation of Rwanda], a Hutu Rwandese opposition group); the Mai-Mai militias (created by the late Laurent-Désiré Kabila); the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF); and the Congolese national army. In what the ICG calls the “Congo’s forgotten crisis” in northern and central Katanga (and in a scenario reminiscent to what Connor Cruise O’Brien already observed in 1963–64), the election campaign has reignited the old conflict between the Lubas of Katanga and the Lubas of Kasai. This conflict has created tensions manipulated by the politicians who, in 1992–93 (and again, in 1998), organized militias to fight a popular resistance force (the Mai Mai) and ethnically cleanse the province, which resulted in the killing of more than 5,000 Lubas of Kasai. The UN estimates that as a result of the latest wave of conflict, some 170,000 persons have been displaced within central Katanga alone, an area known as “the triangle of death.”<sup>98</sup>

In the run-up to the July 2006 elections, violence flared up again in eastern Congo, forcing tens of thousands of people to flee their homes yet again. The worst violence took place in the northeastern district of Ituri, where militias continue to fight for territory. Some 38,000 internally displaced persons have taken refuge in Gety (Ituri Province) in the wake of recent fighting between militias and government troops. In Kotoni, near Bunia (Ituri), more than 14,300

displaced people are in need of food assistance.<sup>99</sup> The UN estimates that 9,500 of the 17,500 foreign combatants—mostly from Rwanda—in North and South Kivu provinces refused to disarm and to return home.

In spite of this chaotic situation, presidential and legislative elections were held on July 30, 2006. The elections—made possible by a new electoral law adopted in March 2006, and financed by international donors to the tune of \$458 million—drew 32 candidates for president and 9,709 candidates from some 210 political parties, contesting in 189 constituencies and 11 provinces for the 500-seat national assembly; this required 50,000 polling stations for some 25.7 million registered voters. An Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)—chaired by Reverend Apollinaire Malu-Malu and composed of an electoral staff of 260,000—was set up, and some 47,000 national and 1,500 international observers monitored the process. Among the top presidential contenders were the incumbent, Joseph Kabila, and two former rebel leaders, Jean-Pierre Bemba and Azarias Ruberwa. Also in the running were the children of former presidents or prime ministers, including Patrice Guy Lumumba (son of Patrice Lumumba), Nzanga Mobutu (son of Mobutu Sese Seko), and M'poyo Kasavubu (daughter of Joseph Kasavubu). The incumbent president, Joseph Kabila, narrowly missed winning a majority, with 45 percent of the vote, while Jean-Pierre Bemba, a businessman and ex-rebel leader, took second place with 20 percent. As a result, a run-off presidential election was held on October 29, 2006. Joseph Kabila—with 9,436,779 votes or 58.05 percent of the votes—was declared the winner, while challenger Jean-Pierre Bemba received 6,819,822 votes, or 41.95 percent of the votes. On December 6, 2006, Joseph Kabila was officially sworn in as president at a ceremony in Kinshasa, attended by a number of African heads of state, including Jose Eduardo dos Santos (Angola), Thabo Mbeki (South Africa), and Omar Bongo (Gabon). Jean-Pierre Bemba, who did not attend the inauguration, nevertheless accepted the role of opposition leader.<sup>100</sup>

South Africa's own Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) has taken the lead in providing electoral assistance to the DRC, including 300 information technology technicians and a 128-member observer mission headed by Safety & Security minister Charles Nqakula. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that a 2,500-strong contingent of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has been operating for some time now in the DRC, alongside the UN security forces, to ensure peace and security in the country. The South African Police Service (SAPS) is also helping with the training of the Congolese police. In addition, major South African multinational firms, such as Eskom (electricity), Vodacom (telecommunications), and Mvelaphanda (mining), are already investing in the country.<sup>101</sup> Under the circumstances, the recent warning of the Catholic Bishop's Conference of the DRC that "in the current situation, all the conditions have not been met for a really transparent, free and democratic vote," and that "a combination of elements confirms the allegations of manipulations, deception, if not actual fraud" [a reference to the IEC's recent finding that nearly 1.5 million voters had disappeared from the poll register] is not surprising.<sup>102</sup> Neither is the



fact that a main opposition party headed by Étienne Tshisekedi, the *Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social* (UDPS), called for a boycott of the elections. As one party official bluntly put it, “We do not want these biased elections.”<sup>103</sup>

In Kasai province (Étienne Tshisekedi’s stronghold), voter turnout did not exceed 20 percent, while in Kinshasa, UDPS voters—confused by the contradictory signals emanating from their leadership—massively voted for ex-rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba. Furthermore, there were reports of violence on election day in southeastern Kasai, where eleven polling stations and voting materials were set alight by UDPS militants. As a result, in Mbuji-Mayi, election officials had to reopen 174 of the 1,041 polling stations on July 31, 2006.<sup>104</sup> The ICG’s assessment of the situation is that “the national elections scheduled for 30 July 2006 risk creating a large class of disenfranchised politicians and former warlords tempted to take advantage of state weakness and launch new insurgencies.”<sup>105</sup>

This assessment is confirmed by the Human Rights Watch, which, two days before the elections, noted its concern over rebel army general Laurent Nkunda’s threat to take action if minority groups were not included in the new administration.<sup>106</sup> The secretary general of the World Council of Churches is much more skeptical in his evaluation of the situation.<sup>107</sup>

It is interesting to note, in this regard, that the political transition process, the peace-keeping operation, and the peace-making process are all firmly controlled by the United States in the person of their ambassador, William Lacy Swing. While the United States is the undisputed leader of the International Committee for the Support of the Transition—which acts as a major advisory body to the Congolese government and is chaired by Ambassador Swing—the European Union (EU) is another key actor in this process. In April 2006, a UN Security Council resolution endorsed the deployment of a German-led EU reserve force to provide additional security during the elections. This 1,450-strong force named *Eufor-RDC*, which arrived in Congo on June 12, 2006, guarded the Kinshasa airport—where 1,000 have been deployed—protected strategic installations, and supported MONUC. A reinforcement contingent of 1,200 troops was posted to Libreville (Gabon).<sup>108</sup> The sad reality is that the interests of Western countries that supply weapons, of the neighboring countries such as Rwanda and Uganda and rebel factions and international corporations, are better served by continuing to fuel the conflict.<sup>109</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Forty-eight years after independence, Congo is still at war and as predicted by Marina Ottaway, is actually disintegrating under the combined forces of the external intervention of two African countries, and of inter-Congolese factional rivalry. While the war in eastern, north-eastern and southern Congo goes on, in spite of the July 1999 Lusaka Agreement and the April 2003 Sun City Peace Accord, ethnic conflict persists, widespread human rights abuses are occurring, and everyone (including Western firms) is pilfering the country’s vast mineral resources.

Furthermore, the Congo's predicament belies the argument of the "failed state" and "criminalization of the state" theorists, who vastly underestimate the responsibility of Western international, governmental, and nongovernmental agencies in this situation: "globalization has sustained the wars in Congo and other African governments played their part."<sup>110</sup>

Meanwhile, the death toll from the war in the Congo continues to rise and is currently estimated at about 5 million since August 1998 (equal to the population of Denmark, Finland, or Norway),<sup>111</sup> Congo is effectively partitioned into four autonomous regions, and its descent into chaos and anarchy continues. The United Nations estimates that, every day, 1,200 people (half of them children) die in the Congo because of violence, disease—including trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), malaria, meningitis, measles, and AIDS—and malnutrition. Doctors Without Borders estimates that for every violent death in eastern Congo, there are sixty-two nonviolent deaths. And, as the ICG notes, the Congolese state itself has become the greatest security threat to its own people. All of this, sadly, evokes the cry of Kurtz to Marlow: "The horror! The horror!"<sup>112</sup>

Some observers, like Ludo Martens, advocate the creation of a federal state regrouping Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi on the basis of a common popular project based on economic independence, autonomous, self-centered development, and people's power.<sup>113</sup> There are, in our view, four preconditions to an exit strategy from conflict, chaos, and political, economic, and social decay in Congo. The first condition is the immediate cessation of all types of foreign interference and intervention in Congo by African and Western countries, agencies, firms, mercenaries, and individuals. The message should be: leave the Congolese alone, and let the Congolese sort out and solve their own problems. The second condition is that the Congolese people should be allowed to regain full control over their country, their land, their natural resources, their economy, and their destiny. The third condition is the emergence of a new leadership fully committed to a radical transformation of the state, and genuinely in the service of the people.<sup>114</sup> The fourth condition stands in contrast to Crawford Young's observation that "there is no alternative in the Congo to the administrative framework bequeathed by the colonial state . . . it . . . cannot be totally replaced by a political party or any other structure."<sup>115</sup> On the contrary, our fourth condition places Congo as the core state within the larger Kongo State in central Africa, one of the five constituent units of the proposed Federation of African States (FAS).

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## SOUTH AFRICA

### AFRICAN INDIGENOUS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE FOREIGN ENCOUNTER

. . . Captains admonish him with great freedom and fidelity, when he abuses his authority to such a degree, that there is reason to fear that the nation will show him their displeasure. This is done if he treats the admonition with contempt, not by way of insurrection, or taking up arms against him, but most effectually, by gradual emigration.

—Van de Kemp, the first missionary among the Nguni  
in 1800 writing of the Xhosa chief Ngquika

All the Africans living in the reserves were placed under chiefs and headmen, and where the latter did not exist, new ones were created. But Shepstone did not lock up Africans in locations because he loved them. Rather, he clearly saw that coercive measures to produce labourers would only result in resistance, which the comparatively weak Natal colonial administration could not possibly cope with.

—N. Bhebe, “The British, Boers and Africans in South Africa, 1850–80, *General History of Africa. VI: Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s*, ed. J. F. Ade Ajayi, 154–55.

#### THE KHOIKHOIN

CATTLE HERDERS WHO CALLED THEMSELVES *KHOIKHOIN*, “MEN OF MEN,” were the indigenous inhabitants of the southwestern areas of present day South Africa. Based on oral tradition, the Khoikhoin believed that their ancestors traveled with their faces toward the setting sun until they reached the “great water,” and then travelled “southward down the Atlantic ocean . . .”<sup>1</sup> Their language was characterized by clicks. They were nomads who relied on hunting, as well as trade, for their livelihood. By the mid-1600s they possessed beads, bracelets, and ivory, which they obtained from trading with the Portuguese. They also traded with the Ovambo of Angola. The Khoikhoin of Longloof also traded with the Sotho.

Each camp or settlement where a group of people would settle, before moving on, was made up of twenty to fifty huts, housed by members of the same clan. A chief was in charge of each clan. Each *horde* was an independent political unit, although it was not based on kinship. Clans moved often in search of good land. Clans often split to form new ones. Members from different hordes often traded with each other. In war, they united against a common enemy. Seniority was emphasized and came with its own privileges. For example, in a horde, leadership was vested in the most senior clan. The position was hereditary, often transmitted from the father to his elder son.

Among the Khoikhoi, conflict was avoided at all cost. When it occurred, members of the horde tried to resolve it before a physical quarrel developed. Kolb, (an observer) noted, in 1707, that “the Hottentots [Khoikhoi] run to the suppression of strife that has seized a family as we do to putting out of a fire that has seized a house; and allow themselves no rest till every matter in difference is adjusted.”<sup>2</sup> Male members of the horde listened to disputes where each clan was represented. The chief of the horde tried disputes between different clans. If the chief passed the death sentence on a person found guilty, he struck the first blow, followed by other members of the clan. The chief did not have any say over kinsmen of a murdered relative because they had the right to demand vengeance on the murderer. Leonard Thompson and Monica Wilson note, “The institution of chieftainship thus emerges with the herders in South Africa, if we take arbitration in dispute and the enforcement of a decision by a court of some sort as the mark of chieftainship.”<sup>3</sup> The powers of the chief were limited because his tenure of office was based on the consent of the people. Writing of the Kora on the Orange in 1806, Lichtenstein noted that the authority of the chief “is exceedingly circumscribed, and no one considers himself as wholly bound to yield obedience to him; neither does he himself ever pretend to command them.”<sup>4</sup> Disputes between members of the same clan were not tried by the chief, but by senior clan members. Unlike what pertained to other African societies, the chief was not viewed as a spiritual and moral leader. He did not intercede with the ancestors on the group’s behalf, nor was he viewed as “divine” or as a person on whom the fertility of the land rested. Pressure from European settlers forced the Khoikhoi out of their land into more arid areas.

As more Khoikhoi lost land, they were forced to seek employment from the settlers. Khoikhoi who defected from their chiefs worked for the Dutch East India Company (DEIC). Sometimes, they sided with the Dutch against other Africans; on occasion, they defected from the DEIC. Khoikhoi learned Dutch, and in most cases, forgot their own language. Diseases such as smallpox, syphilis, and tuberculosis reduced their population, while the rest were hunted and exterminated like animals. In 1660, the Dutch East India Company introduced segregation, which was instrumental in disempowering the Khoikhoi; this first apartheid law separated Khoikhoi from Burghers. The latter were white farmers of Dutch and French descent who worked for the company. The company governor replaced the chief in mediating disputes between clans, thus establishing a

form of indirect rule over the Khoikhoi. Squeezed out of the Cape area, surviving Khoikhoi moved into the interior in search of land. In the interior, they still lost land to Dutch settlers who, under the pretense of finding pasture, settled on Khoikhoi land, transforming landowners into laborers in the process. Dutch commandos went on expeditions to capture Khoikhoi for forced labor. Some Europeans opposed the extermination of the Khoikhoi because they believed it was a waste of potential labor.

### THE KHOISAN

The Khoisan occupied the mountain areas of the present-day Drakenstein and Cedarberg ranges, as well as the Outeniqua, Camdeboo, Sneeuwberg, and Winterberg. Physically, there were no distinct differences between San and Khoikhoi, but there were some differences in their rituals. According to Richard Elphick and V. C. Malherbe, “the term ‘Khoisan’ is a compound word devised by scholars and derived from names for the two groups into which Khoisan are conventionally divided the Khoikhoi who kept cattle and sheep, and the San, hunter-gatherers, who did not.”<sup>5</sup> The Khoikhoi called the hunters *San*. Among the *San*, honey and water were invaluable although there was no private property in the community. The G/Wi (hunters) defined hunting territories as exclusive. But among the !Kung, prior rights were recognized. Hunters could follow game across boundaries. Rights over water and food were given to a custodian among the !Kung. The duties of custodians were hereditary, passing from father to son. If there was no son, the duties could be passed on to a daughter. The custodians did not have any authority over disputes or judgments. If a person wronged another, both fought, and whoever remained alive was the winner.

Severe measures were taken to avoid conflict because hunters were afraid of losing a clan member, which reduced the size of the group and thus meant less food. Custodians lit the first fire in a new camp, and then other people took from that fire to light their own. Khoisans lived in bands of twenty-five people or more. Each band was independent of the others. A custodian was in charge of a particular band, which sometimes had 200 members. A number of customs were common to the Khoikhoi, the Khoisan, and other African groups (notably the Nguni), such as burial rituals and the avoidance of close relations with in-laws.

### THE NGUNI

The Nguni (Zulu and Xhosa) lived in the east and south (Natal, east and central Cape, and Swaziland). Their institutions were informed by their culture. Elders were highly respected, as they represented the epitome of wisdom. Indigenous African political institutions were not static. They changed according to different influences within various groups, as well as shifting relations with outsiders through trade or war. The Nguni were made up of different classes, although the social cleavages were not deep. Commoners lived in homesteads under the leadership of a patrilineal head. Social relations were based on power, with a clear

hierarchy of roles between the rulers and their subjects. Women from the royal lineages were privileged compared to commoners; for example, they had workers and enjoyed privileged access to the rulers. According to L. D. Ngcongco, “the royal homesteads, of which there might have been several in each state, were organized differently. In addition to the normal production activities performed by the members of each house, including their relatives and retainers, the various royal homesteads also developed, especially from the late eighteenth century onwards, into military barracks.”<sup>6</sup> Each member of the community played a specific role. Early accounts about the Nguni do not tell us what names they used to represent themselves. Power was based on clan, ethnic, and kinship relations. Among the Zulu, leadership was divided between the chiefs’ brothers, who were subordinate to the king. This system enabled chiefs to rule fairly. Some chiefs were independent of the king, but others were dependent on him. On occasion, different ethnic groups supported the chiefs in quarrels with the king. These chiefs ruled in the king’s name and could be deposed for unbecoming behavior, such as mistreating members of the community. They also endeavored to satisfy the priorities and needs of their people to ensure that their administration was fair. If the people were dissatisfied, these chiefs lost their right to govern.<sup>7</sup>

Chiefs also acted as checks on the king’s power. When the king became too oppressive, the people killed him. Since land was abundant, the people could easily migrate, and, after choosing a more just leader, would create a new settlement. Councilors and commoners checked the power of the chief. Any member of society was important and could rise to a position of importance, under the watchful eye of those in power. Social relations were also informed by power based on gender, as well as communal differences. Males led the homestead, in which clans were united by their allegiance to the king. All land was under the king’s “protection,” held in trust for the people. The responsibilities of the king were both political and spiritual. Politically, the king led the people, as well as the army, in dealing with other clans. Spiritually, the king was a moral leader who was also responsible for the general welfare of the community. Kings were blamed for famines and other calamities. It was their duty to meet the community’s needs during times of crisis. The king was the supreme judge of the people, as well as the commander in chief of the army. A council of elders, which allowed each member to express their opinion, helped balance power. The king listened to the views of his council and always rallied to the majority’s opinion.

Among the Nguni, chiefs were called *Inkosi*. They recognized each other’s powers even though, occasionally, they might have fought against each other. Subordinate chiefs had to appeal to superior ones, and pay death dues and fines. They also attended meetings at the chief’s council when called upon to do so. The royal salute symbolized a chief’s seniority. Depending on relations with other groups, immigrants established themselves as either rulers (Ndebele, Nguni, Tshangane) or as subordinates of other Nguni or Sotho groups (Bhele, Zizi, Tolo, Hlubi). These immigrants formed less stratified chiefdoms in which status was based on origin. Chiefdoms (political units occupying a defined area under the authority

of a chief) split over leadership disputes between brothers (most often half brothers). The elder son—who was often referred to as “the right son”—was either the legal son of the first wife or his half brother. After a split, chiefs moved with their people to a new settlement. Chiefs married many wives, and their popularity depended on the number of followers. If a chief was mean-spirited, he lost followers who either left him or killed him. The number of the chief’s followers increased in direct proportion to his generosity. Chiefdoms also split as a result of population increase. Even after the split, their clusters were still referred to using the original names of the founding fathers. Within chiefdoms, members of the royal house were socially ranked higher than commoners. For example, the fine imposed for killing a member of royalty was higher than for killing a commoner. Poor members of the group also operated within a patron-client type of relationship—they looked after the cattle of wealthy members in return for the use of milk from the cattle. After a year, the poor person was compensated with the gift of some heads of cattle.

Indigenous Nguni society was democratic. The chief was both a religious and political leader. As a religious leader, the chief was born, not made. He came from a particular family, which had a good standing in the community. He was the link between the people and their ancestors. For example, if there was famine, the chief was blamed for having failed to make the necessary sacrifices to appease the ancestors. This belief was so strong that, among the Swazi, the fertility and virility of the nation were dependent on the well-being of the chief. His divine role was also evident during the celebrations for the new crop, when he and his advisors were treated with medicines. The common people only ate after the chief had eaten some of the new crop. The chief was not above the law. If he committed an offense, members of his privy council could sentence him to pay a fine. His own counselors, acted as advisers and kept him abreast of the sentiments of the people.<sup>8</sup> Matters of common interest were discussed in open general assemblies called *Imbizo*. Anyone was free to speak during these meetings. People who disagreed with a chief’s policies voted with their feet, that is, they moved elsewhere. European invasion into the interior halted this movement. As a result, conflict increased because people were forced to live under unpopular leaders. Since the best land was occupied by Europeans, ethnic groups or clans who were traditional enemies were forced to live in close proximity, therefore exacerbating interethnic or interclan conflicts. Since the power of a chief depended on how many followers were under his control, he had to be both just and popular to maintain a large following. People were considered to be more valuable than land because without them, the chief could not govern. Since everything was discussed openly, a chief could not make changes in the existing laws and customs without popular consent. The rivals of the chiefs included half brothers and neighboring chiefs who were also seeking followers to build up their own power.

All disputes were adjudicated by the king, acting as the supreme seat of justice. If the case was too serious for the king to address, he often referred it to an older king in his neighborhood. Once the offender was found guilty, he was obliged

to pay a fine to the king. Every member of the society was regarded as a chief's subject, and any assault on their person was regarded as an assault on the chief himself. If a member of the community was injured, the fine was paid to the king rather than to the members of his family. All cases were tried in the chief's court, in which all adult members of the society had a right to participate. In everyday life, the rule of law and order was supreme. Colonel Collins, a British officer traveling in the area in 1809, was surprised by the degree of security. He noted that the chief had never ordered an execution during his reign.<sup>9</sup> Nguni subsistence agriculture was based on millet and sorghum farming, which were used both for staple foods and for brewing purposes. The Nguni were also herders who highly valued their cattle. They shifted the cattle from one region to another in search of good pasture, thereby preventing soil erosion. Women tilled the land while men engaged in hunting. Occasionally, men became cultivators, either out of necessity or as a service to their chief. As a result of their hunting activities, chiefs were able to control the trade in ivory, which was a source of wealth and power. Hunting was also a sport, which the people enjoyed tremendously. Whenever a chief died, a hunting expedition was organized to mark the end of mourning, and another small hunt was carried out to purify the homestead.

Gender relations were based on equality. There were no inferior/superior relations between men and women. Homesteads were also made up of unrelated people who were welcomed to build within the homestead. Kinship was important and people identified themselves with the leader of their group. Women retained legal and kinship ties to their clans, to which they often returned when faced by catastrophe. Except on two rare occasions, the Nguni never engaged in the slave trade, either among themselves or with foreigners. A survivor from a shipwreck noted, in 1689, how difficult it was to buy slaves, "for they would not part with their children, or any of their connexions for anything in the world, loving one another with a most remarkable strength of affection."<sup>10</sup>

Trade was central to the economy of the Nguni. It was crucial in shaping Dingiswayo's kingdom, which relied on it for its expansion. No member of the community could trade with foreigners without the consent of the king. Dingiswayo encouraged Zulu traders to manufacture replicas of Portuguese objects at Delagoa Bay. In general, trade was regulated, disputes were settled in court, and the powers of the chiefs were circumscribed.

Conflict was a last result and was avoided at all costs. Before the group engaged in war, all measures were taken to inform the people why they were going to war. Once all attempts to reach a settlement were exhausted, a period of preparation for the war was set aside. A formal declaration of war was made. Among the Nguni, the army formed a *Giya* (to show their bravado as armies pranced in front of each other). The war ended when the defeated party fled. Women and children went to cheer the men. The rules of war were clear: only military targets were attacked; civilians, especially children and women, were protected. After the war, the victors did not destroy the resources of their victims or hold them prisoners. Even the victors did not let the vanquished starve to death. Among the

Zulu, during Dingiswayo's leadership, groups that surrendered after a war were allowed to retain their chiefs. A form of indirect rule based on tribute ensued, which encouraged conquered people to remain loyal to the Zulu king, thereby increasing his power. Dingiswayo returned any cows captured during a war to his enemies, but kept the oxen, which he distributed among his soldiers.

The rule of law was supreme. Political units were constructed in such a way that power was never absolute, and they discouraged forces of disruption because these units also created crosscutting alliances. For example, a member of one clan could also belong to the military or the village council. Chiefdoms were transformed under Shaka. First, loyalty was transferred to his military regiment, which emphasized age group rather than clan alliances. Second, chiefdoms were split based on the divided loyalties of their members. For example, Msilikazi created the Ndebele kingdom, while Moshweshowe created modern Lesotho. The "Great Trek" of the Afrikaners further transformed the political landscape in 1836. Third, "the new military structure greatly increased the power of the chief, because the tendency to splitting on territorial and kinship lines, hitherto so marked among the Nguni, was offset by regimental loyalties."<sup>11</sup> The *Mfecane* is a Nguni term that describes the wars associated with the rise of the Zulu kingdom. The *Mfecane* was marked by great migrations of communities, anarchy, conflict, and famine. The Sotho use *Lifagane* to describe the process in Sotho land. Several categories of states emerged as a result of the *Mfecane*: "the aggressive militarist-offensive states" (Zulu, Ndebele Gaza kingdoms).<sup>12</sup> These states were expansionist in nature. The kingdoms of Lesotho, Swazi and the Kololo are good examples of states "building defensive nations." These states did not keep standing armies.<sup>13</sup> Their subjects intermarried, creating stronger states. Another feature in these states is that they tended to accept missionaries as well as guns for defense. New leaders emerged during this period, such as, Shaka, the military genius of the Zulu; Mzilikazi, Sobhuza, Zwangedaba, Sebetwane, Moshoeshoe of the Basuto; and Faku, a Pondo chief who prevented the tide of war sweeping over the Transkei. J. D. J.D. Omer-Cooper captures the talent leaders demonstrated:

demonstrated not only courage, powers or leadership and military skill . . . but [also] the capacity for original thought and action; the ability to devise or adopt new institutions and new techniques to solve new problems; the statesmanship to rise above a narrow tribal point of view. They demonstrated the capacity of the Bantu to respond to challenges and that the traditional tribal education had a far less cramping effect on the development of the human personality than some supposed.<sup>14</sup>

In Pondoland, chiefs and headmen were political administrators. Power was based on consensus among the adult members of the group.

Although the *Mfecane* was not as devastating as the slave trade in east, central, and western Africa, it transformed communities and states. It can be viewed as a paradigm shift between indigenous states and the period before full conquest. L. D. Ngcongco, sums up the impact of the *Mfecane* on indigenous institutions:



It should be noted that many of the wars of the *Mfecane* period did considerably reduce African populations in, for instance, the areas of Natal and the Orange Free State. In a way the *Mfecane* could be said to have weakened many African states and to have rendered them less prepared to cope with or to withstand a second and more destructive *Mfecane*, namely that unleashed by Boer farmers who now encroached upon African lands with impunity, seizing not only land but also cattle and children.<sup>15</sup>

The *Mfecane* left open spaces as a result of either the death of large populations or forced mass migration. As during the period of the slave trade, the new states retained ancient customs. For example, through the age regiment, the relations between chiefs and councils and citizens were transformed. As a result of the transformation introduced in the Zulu military by Shaka, The Zulu people were no longer able to check his power. The new state became more centralized and authoritarian. Shaka reinforced Dingiswayo's age-grade system. He also increased the time period during which young men served in these regiments. At first, young men worked as shield-bearers for older soldiers. Once they came of age, they were recruited as soldiers

The political and economic power of Shaka rested on the loyalty of his troops. Each unit was led by an *Induna* (head) with the help of a commoner appointed by Shaka. Under his rule, the Zulu developed a new ethos. First, they had a reserved attitude, contrary to the curiosity and begging that prevailed prior to his rule. Second, there was discipline, order, and pride, bordering on arrogance, among his subjects. Finally, political loyalty became an absolute value. People were proud of themselves, and everything in the community was linked to the military. Initiation ceremonies were also linked to the military. Shaka introduced a new way of fighting, as well as the short stabbing spear and the long shield, which protected soldiers more efficiently. Thula Bopela and Daluxolo Luthuli describe the changes introduced in Zululand by Shaka:

[He] transformed the entire fighting psychology of the Zulu army. Warriors, in those days, competed to reach the enemy ranks first, not by running wildly toward enemy lines, but in straight, fast, and disciplined files. Eagerness to join forces with the enemy did not mean disorder in the ranks. The regiments on the flanks, younger men, would move at high speed to encircle the enemy, while the other, and more mature, regiments forced the chest in the middle. The troops in the center marched more slowly than the horns, but once the horns had cut off the chest from retreat, only then would the chest surge forward to complete the annihilation.<sup>16</sup>

During the reign of Shaka, the Zulu Empire was the most powerful in the region. He succeeded in creating a nation out of diverse groups who imagined themselves as Zulu. However, the kingdom had some weaknesses. First, when Shaka's mother died, he forced the whole nation to mourn. He also found excuses to attack groups that were not loyal to him, therefore creating many enemies. Second, power was too personalized and centralized, which created a cleavage between the people and their leader. Shaka ruled over everything and everyone.

Third, in spite of his military conquests, Shaka was naive. For example, he signed a piece of paper giving the area covering present-day Natal to a trader and members of his party for treating his stab wounds. These traders who lived in the area sometimes acted as Shaka's advisers. Shaka failed to realize that his interests and those of the traders were different. The latter wanted Zululand, while Shaka preferred to retain his kingdom's independence. Finally, because power was so much concentrated in Shaka and the military, the only way to replace him was by death. Cracks appeared in the nation when Dingane killed Shaka. As he killed more of his brothers, some, like Mpande, signed treaties with the Boers and the British. Under Dingane, the Zulu kingdom lost even more land to the Europeans when he signed a charter giving Natal to the Boers. Throughout this period, military discipline was relaxed.

Cetshwayo restored the military to where it stood under Shaka. However, the British wanted to "humble" the Zulu Empire. In January 1879, Cetshwayo's army defeated the British at the battle of Isandhlwana. In July of the same year, another war followed at Ulundi—the Zulu were defeated and Cetshwayo was taken prisoner. In 1880, Britain divided the Zulu nation into thirteen kingdoms, each made up of a particular "tribe." The emphasis was placed on these tribes in order to encourage a divide-and-rule policy based on ethnonationalism. Among Africans, the British established a pecking order. Some Africans—such as the Zulu, endowed with an indomitable fighting spirit—were deemed to be superior, while others (like the Sotho) were viewed as inferior. In South Africa, British policy was not haphazard, but was part of a well thought-out plan, which had a clearly defined objective, namely, to divide the people so as to better control them.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, in the colonial government's propaganda, British liberal ideology presented Britain as the savior of these "savage tribes," who would otherwise slaughter each other in the absence of a benevolent British intervention, mediation, protection, and rule.

Although Cetshwayo was restored to power in 1883, the Zulu empire was in decline as a result of power struggles between different factions. Cetshwayo was eventually forced into exile in 1884. Britain annexed the kingdom in 1887, but the Zulu nation that Shaka had created was not totally destroyed. The empire was shattered because the goals of the leaders no longer coincided with those of their subjects'. Instead, the Zulu leaders acceded to British demands, such as forcing the people to pay taxes, and providing labor for the mines and white-owned farms. In 1906, the Zulu rose against the British during the Bambata rebellion.

### THE SWAZI STATE

Sobhuza ruled the northern Nguni on the Pongola River near Ndwandwe. He had age regiments similar to the Zulu. Under his leadership, the conquered people's identity was preserved and their polity and institutions were maintained. Mswati—where the name Swazi comes from—succeeded Sobhuza. The state was governed by traditional chiefs under the leadership of the royal house in which the

queen mother played a more prominent role than the king. She had less formal political power than the king, but great personal influence on her son (the king). For example, she would rebuke the king if he made unwise decisions. Sometimes, mothers would punish their sons. In this manner, they acted as checks on the king's power and compensated for his immaturity. Local chiefs controlled the military, but the regiments moved to the royal house once the men came of age. The commander in chief of the army was a commoner.

The state was a constitutional monarchy in which power was centralized, and conquered people were administratively assimilated. All adult males belonged to the assembly, which assisted the king in decision-making. The assembly was made up of territorial chiefs and commoners who were free to criticize the king at will. This assembly was so powerful that if the king did not show up for a scheduled meeting, the assembly imposed a fine on him. The state was held together by a complex and hierarchical set of loyalties that began at the village level, moving on to the clan, age regiment, and national levels. The queen mother and the king sat at the apex of the power structure. Mswati died in 1868, at which time the queen mother and another prince acted as regents. Mbandzeni died in 1890, leaving a chaotic state. Conflict arose between competing domestic and foreign actors: foreign concessionary companies; the British, who wanted land to establish industrial estates; the Boers, who sought farmland; and Swazi people, who wanted to maintain their independence in the face of foreign encroachment. The Swazi state remained nominally independent, with the British actually in control of all the territory. In 1894, the Swazi state became a British protectorate. It came under British administration in 1910 as Swaziland, along with Basutoland (Lesotho) and Bechuanaland (Botswana). Foreign concessionary companies owned two-thirds of the land seized from—but never returned to—the Swazi people.

The Swazi state had a number of weaknesses that contributed to its downfall. First, in 1845, Mswati gave land to the Boers, who helped him in a war against the Poko in 1864. Mswati's death was followed by a conflict over succession in which the Boers got involved. Throughout his rule, Mswati welcomed Europeans, whom he treated like any other ethnic group; however, they did not assimilate into the community because they did not want to be under his authority. Europeans also maintained contacts—which could be called upon for help—outside the kingdom. Second, as the presence of whites increased in the kingdom, so did that of concessionary companies. Unbeknownst to his advisers, these companies offered Mbandzeni gifts to sign away his kingdom. Before the end of his reign, the king had "signed his entire kingdom away more than once."<sup>18</sup> These treaties gave concessionary companies free access to land, mineral deposits, oil exploration and extraction, and even photography and printing rights.

### THE PHLUTHI

The Phluthi were the indigenous inhabitants of modern Basutoland (Lesotho). Their chief, Motlomi, expanded his diplomatic network by marrying daughters of

diverse chiefs. Motlomi was loved by his subjects and his reign was peaceful. He was regarded as a philosopher-king, and many people came to him for advice. The state was personalized under his rule. Moshesh succeeded Motlomi. To prepare the nation in case of emergencies, Moshesh encouraged his people to store their food in caves. He moved the capital to *Thaba Nchu* ("hill of the night"), which provided a strong defensive position against attacks. The Basuto did not have an age regiment system similar to that of the Zulu. Headmen ruled over small groups that had lost their chiefs. Moshesh's family members supervised headmen's work. Conquered ethnic groups were encouraged to retain their leaders under the king's authority. Unity throughout the state was created through consultation. The Basuto kingdom was made up of different ethnic groups, Shaka's attacks forced most people into starvation, while others were reduced to cannibalism. Moshesh stopped the cannibals from eating his people by offering them cattle. He also allowed them to use the milk from the cattle. These assimilated groups became his strongest supporters. Moshesh gathered many refugees, thus enlarging his kingdom. Under his leadership, the "Basuto Pony" (a type of horse) was introduced for defense against the Korana and the Griqua. The state also faced hostilities from the Boers, who wanted land.

Various weaknesses plagued the Basuto state. For example, Moshesh sent for missionaries, whom he hoped would be incorporated into his state. Missionaries did not recognize his authority. They bought Thaba Nchu and brought more people to settle. Moshesh granted the Boers rights for their cattle to graze on state land on the understanding that they would leave. But they refused to move, forcing him to turn to the British for protection. In spite of the Napier Treaty, signed in 1843, the Boers refused to recognize Moshesh's rule. The state faced increased tension with other groups because of Boer expansion, which was taking the best land. Under the pretense of protecting the Boers, the British attacked the Basuto state on December 18, 1852. Moshesh defeated the British, but he seized on the opportunity to engage in diplomacy by writing to the British, who retreated to await reinforcements. As a result of the letter, the British abandoned the expedition. The greatest challenge facing the Basuto state was to maintain its freedom in the face of European encroachment. It was increasingly at a disadvantage because the state was not allowed to purchase the modern weapons that the Boers and British had access to. When the Boers attacked the state in 1858 and 1865, they burned Basuto farms, forcing the people into starvation. Moshesh was forced to seek British protection. Britain eventually annexed Basutoland in 1868, as a result of which the state lost its independence.

### THE SOTHO, VENDA, AND TSONGA

The Sotho, Venda, and Tsonga occupied the northern area of Southern Africa (Transvaal and Orange Free State provinces of South Africa, Botswana, and Lesotho). The Sotho, as used here, includes all people who speak southern Sotho, northern Sotho, or Pedi and Tswana. Like the Nguni, the Sotho were hunters,

cattle herders, and cultivators. They planted sorghum and millet. They also mined iron ore, which distinguished them from their neighbors. They were also skilled in leather work, and in wood and ivory carving. Most of these items were exchanged in long-distance trade with countries as far as Ghana and China. Like the Nguni, the Sotho did not engage in the slave trade. Tswana chiefs had Sarwa families attached to them as laborers, but they were never sold as slaves. These were people who, for economic reasons, were forced to move from one village to another in search of labor. The Sotho also engaged in trade with the Khoikhoi; they traded metal and leather goods in exchange for cattle. In 1779, Wikar reported about the trade, which introduced diverse items to the community.<sup>19</sup> In the interior, the Pedi traded in copper articles, which they exchanged for ivory. The Tsonga also traded in cured meats and sewn karosses (animal skin).

### POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

The basic political unit was the chiefdom, which included large settlements, cattle posts, and several family members of the chief or other homestead members. The villages were concentrated on hills, which were difficult to access and therefore easier to defend. The authority of the chief was proportional to the size of the population. Once the settlement scattered, the chief's authority weakened. Chiefdoms often split, as inheritance was divided between different brothers. Each brother had personal followers who determined his popularity. If they were many, then breakaway chiefdom formed a new one. Chiefs established their independence by moving away from an older chief's influence, thus establishing themselves in a new territory. This independence did not mean that they were isolated—they still worked with other chiefs. Sotho chiefs set land aside for winter grazing. They also held the land in trust for the people. Women owned cattle, which they received from *lobola* (dowry). Women did not inherit property, but if a father or brother gave a daughter or sister land or cattle, these were respected as the woman's property.<sup>20</sup> Tswana families owned individual plots of land, which could not be used without their permission. Women had their own farms and granaries. Among the Tswana, the rule of law was epitomized by the *Kgotla*, which means both a courtyard and a court of law.<sup>21</sup> Disputes between members of a lineage were settled in the *Kgotla* by arbitration or were sent to the chief's court for adjudication. The major concern of the court was to reconcile differences between the parties in conflict, rather than enforcing the law. Certain crimes (such as murder) were treated as assaults on the chief, who represented the state. Chiefs, who were not themselves above the law, collected fines. Among the Rolong and Kgotla, the king could be tried by his own counselors.

Royal lineages and a nucleus of kinsmen constituted chiefdoms from whom the chief came. Some members claimed common lineages, but others were strangers who had been admitted into the chiefdom. The proportion of foreigners in the population differed depending on the ethnic group. For example, it was lowest among the Sarwa, but about one-fifth among the Ngwato, and still larger in

other groups. The patron-client system was well developed among the Tsonga, where, in addition to cattle, clients received dogs. Clients were expected to bring meat from their hunt to their patrons. Marriages between Sarwa and Tswana were frowned upon.

### THE VENDA

Venda are defined in terms of language, which is closely related to the Shona (spoken in Zimbabwe) and Sotho. According to tradition, Venda chiefs brought the art of making fire with them. Chiefs lived on hillsides, which were closely guarded. When they died, they were buried in special tombs. Invading groups armed with superior weapons and possessing more elaborate institutions often claimed the chieftaincy for themselves. Woven cotton cloth was an emblem of chieftainship; only chiefs were allowed to wear it. The economy was based on agriculture, hunting, and metal working. Women engaged in agriculture, while men hunted. The Venda also bartered iron tools with the Tsonga. They also participated in the long-distance copper trade from their base in Messina.<sup>22</sup>

### THE TSONGA

The Tsonga occupied the coastal belt from Kosi Bay to the Sabi River, south of the ancient port of Sofala. Trade among the Tsonga was based on bartering hoes from the Venda, in return for cloth from the coast, copper from Sotho smiths at Phalaborwa, ivory, rhino horn, gold, and furs. They also traded with the outside world, as mentioned by Vasco da Gama, who found them engaged in copper trade in exchange for linen. In the eighteenth century, the Tsonga were middlemen in the metal trade, where they “commanded one route from the middle Limpopo to Sofala, and all the approaches to Lourenço Marquês (now Maputo), a port from which ivory was shipped at least from 1552 onwards.”<sup>23</sup> They traded in slaves with both the Arabs and the Portuguese. The Tsonga lived in small, independent chiefdoms of 6,000 to 8,000 people, which were made up of diverse lineage groups. Differences in law were tolerated on the grounds that the leaders came from diverse backgrounds. The prosperity of the people was linked to the well-being of the chief. The people perceived the chief’s major function as being that of settling disputes among quarreling members of the community. They assumed “a moral order intrinsic in the universe.”<sup>24</sup> Their villages were not concentrated in one area, but scattered throughout Tsonga country. Each chief sat in court, where he settled disputes between his subjects independently of other chiefs. Commoners were attached to chiefs in a patron-client relationship. The wealth of the people, which they amassed either in livestock or in skins, became the property of the chief, who would, in turn, redistribute it among the community members. David Livingstone noted that the chief “has the choice of everything; but if he is not more liberal to others than to himself, he loses in popularity.”<sup>25</sup> It was in the chief’s best interest to distribute goods fairly so as to maintain his legitimacy and authority.

**SOUTH AFRICA: INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS,  
THE BRITISH AND AFRIKANERS, 1910–48**

Africans fought against both the British and Afrikaners since their first encounters. The last uprising against colonial rule was the Bambata rebellion of 1906. After the Union of South Africa was created in 1910, Africans resorted to other methods of resistance, such as demonstrations, boycotts, and strikes. In South Africa, racial segregation was a “tradition” upheld by Europeans ever since they first came into contact with Africans. To Europeans, African chiefs were despots who ruled over an apathetic and submissive civil society. They conveniently overlooked the fact that African civil society was able to curtail the powers of chiefs. As early as 1884, a member of the Cape parliament warned his colleagues that individual tenure was nothing but the robbery of the common rights of Africans.

Oral tradition shows that Africans were familiar with the public sphere, as well as with democratic governance. Segregationist policies did not create a public sphere for Africans; rather, it restricted it by excluding their voice in both public and private affairs. For example, magistrates encouraged chiefs to send migrants back to the reserves because their pay depended on the number of subjects under their care. Furthermore, the departure of young men for urban centers and mines weakened the power of the chiefs. Under colonial rule, both economic and political powers were centralized at the level of either the magistrate or the European “supreme chief” (magistrate).

The Dutch East India Company introduced segregation in South Africa, which was later refined by Theophilus Shepstone, who was the diplomatic agent of the British colony of Natal from 1845 to 1853 and secretary of Native Affairs from 1853 to 1875.<sup>26</sup> Shepstone introduced separate residential areas (locations) for Africans. His “native policy”—placing African chiefs under British authority—was based on gradual change to protect the interests of natives. According to the 1852–53 Natal Commission, the best way to control Africans was by reducing the power of their leaders. Various permits were required of African chiefs before they could meet with the Secretary of Native Affairs. A deep cleavage developed between chiefs and commoners, African chiefs no longer satisfied the priorities and needs of their people. Shepstone’s policy in Natal had three objectives: (i) to control the military capacity of Zulu kings, which was a threat to British colonial policy; (ii) to use chiefs as suppliers of labor instead of administrators; and (iii) to cut down the cost of administration through indirect rule, in which chiefs and headmen did most of the dirty work.<sup>27</sup> Chiefs and headmen were responsible for collecting taxes, and for forcing families to part with their loved ones as they left to work in mines or white-owned farms. In the peoples’ eyes, chiefs and headmen became illegitimate because they did not respect their interests, nor did they protect them from colonial agents. Shepstone’s “native policy” eventually served as the foundation of apartheid policy.

Not all African chiefs were powerless. Depending on the circumstances, chiefs used their popularity with the people to extract some benefits from colonial powers. The relationship of a chief with colonial powers was also determined



by whether he was a Christian or not. Colonial officials considered chiefs who converted Christianity “progressive,” as opposed to the “red people” (Africans who remained faithful to indigenous beliefs and institutions), who were viewed as backward. Colonial authorities supported chiefs because they believed these chiefs (especially Christian ones) were “improving” the “natives” by introducing them to “civilization.” These chiefs also made colonial administration more efficient, given the small number of colonial agents on the ground. African chiefs knew the culture and beliefs of their people. It was this knowledge that colonial agents used for their own benefit. Since chiefs were no longer accountable to the people, they did not care at all about their plight or condition, and left them mired in disease, hunger, landlessness, and poverty. Instead of helping their subjects, some chiefs shamelessly squandered community resources.

The Glen Grey Act of 1894 aimed at “civilizing” Africans by easing their transition into modern life. According to Ivan Evans, in Transkei, Africans were governed through district councils and location boards. Twelve members (six of whom were nominated by the magistrate) made up the district councils; the other six were chosen by Africans, subject to the approval of the magistrates. Location boards controlled individual locations—they had three members who were approved by the magistrate. The district councils were dominated by chiefs and headmen, though power still rested with the magistrate. The latter used headmen to collect taxes and evict people from land coveted by Europeans, thus creating conflict with the villagers. Corruption was also widespread because headmen insisted on “gifts” for services rendered. Headmen, lineage heads, and sub-headmen also became invaluable “intelligence gatherers for the magistrates.”<sup>28</sup> Headmen and chiefs were caught in a difficult situation because their power depended on the extractive nature of colonial rule that was supported by an oppressive administration: “Direct rule rewarded the chiefs it degraded and discomfited the headmen it exalted.”<sup>29</sup> In Natal, the racial discrimination policy transformed the role of the chiefs. First, their status was ambiguous because while they were supposed to represent the African people, they were paid by the British. Colonial administration was highly hierarchical. Headmen occupied the lowest rank of the social order. In the colonial order, chiefs were ranked between headmen and magistrates. Chiefs got their orders from the magistrate and passed these on to the headmen. Only the powers of the magistrate were clearly defined—those of the headmen and chiefs were ambiguous. Sometimes, chiefs tried to accommodate their colonial overlords as well as the interests of their people; most often, it was the needs of the latter that suffered. In order to stay in power, chiefs increasingly relied on coercion and British support rather than on the consent of their subjects. As a result, they became increasingly illegitimate, authoritarian and divorced from the majority of the population.

In indigenous African judicial systems, chiefs adjudicated on cases with the assistance of elders. Under the new system, the magistrate became all-powerful, being, at one and the same time, judge, jury, administrator, and father figure embodying the law. Chiefs were stripped of the power to hear criminal cases.



Some were allowed to hear civil cases in *Moot*, namely, “consensus based courts where villagers could have cases listened to.”<sup>30</sup> The Powers of chiefs were reduced because villagers had a choice between *Moot* and the magistrate. The role of the chief in the colonial justice system was crucial in reproducing the racial order since his European overlord made the major decisions. For example, in Transkei there were twenty-six prefects whose physical presence was evidence of white conquest over African space. According to Benedict Anderson, “In the modern conception, state sovereignty is fully, flatly, and evenly operative over each square centimeter of a legally demarcated territory.”<sup>31</sup>

As governor of the Cape from 1897 to 1905, Lord Milner entrenched the segregation policies of Shepstone and Cecil Rhodes after the Anglo-Boer war (1899–1902). Milner aimed at achieving two goals in a unified, modern South African state: to make it British and to create a racialized capitalism. As governor of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony (ORC), Milner encouraged British immigration so as to create a middle class that relied on African labor. According to P. Eric Louw, Milner had ten goals that he wanted to fulfill in southern Africa. Milner would restart gold mining, which had been interrupted by the war. Milner resettled Afrikaners whose farms had been destroyed during the war, while others were put in concentration camps by the British. Under the administration of Milner, an Inter-Colonial Council was created to unite colonial Southern Africa (from the Zambezi to the Cape) under British rule. Milner called a meeting, in 1903, of all British representatives in the region to promote the idea of union. To further strengthen his ideal of a union, Milner took over privately owned Transvaal and ORC railways. He founded Transvaal and ORC councils to encourage capitalist enterprise. Milner also introduced local government administration based on the British model. Furthermore, British law and order was introduced in the region through a network of magistrates. In order to administer Africans in rural areas, District Commissioners (DCs) were set up. Milner also strengthened the pass system, which restricted the movement of African movement in designated white areas. According to Milner, native movement had to be controlled by the government in order to ensure order. Furthermore, if a native signed a contract, he or she was bound by it. An agreement between Portugal and Britain aided by white police and magistrates gave South African businesses, mining companies, and farmers access to an unlimited and readily available supply of cheap labor from Angola and Mozambique.

To modernize South African agriculture, Milner introduced agricultural departments to create a commercial agricultural sector. He also introduced free elementary education for whites in order to train the future cadres of a modern state. Educators came from Britain to train teachers. Colleges were also set up. Milner believed in educating Africans as providers of manual labor in a British dominated capitalist South Africa. Milner’s taxation policy aimed at increasing capital accumulation through the mining industry in order to modernize the state. Milner believed that the enormous wealth of the region would amply provide for a British population exploiting African labor. A modern state—based on a British

middle class, but not a proletariat—had to be created by the British and for the British. African unskilled labor would provide the economic backbone of this new state. According to Milner, South Africa could only become a “white man’s country” by: (a) reducing the number of poor white people; (b) encouraging whites to migrate to South Africa; (c) exploiting African labor for development, and (d) increasing capital flow into the country.<sup>32</sup>

Like those of previous British administrators, Milner’s “native policy” was based on the belief that Africans were inferior to Europeans and were only valuable as a reservoir of cheap labor. “Native Policy” also privileged educated Africans who were sometimes used as intermediaries between Africans, Afrikaners, and the British. There were contradictions in this relationship. Educated Africans, as well as chiefs, were subject to public punishments called “dress down.” Psychologically, these dress downs were damaging to the African elite, as they served to remind the masses who was actually in charge (“who is the boss”). Physical challenges to colonial rule were discouraged. According to Nandy, this is not unusual in colonialism, which has “a particular style of managing dissent.”<sup>33</sup> Colonial authorities used the elite when it suited their purpose. For example, the British would ask the African elite to explain to their people why they should pay taxes.

According to Leonard Thompson, “four main tendencies” developed among Africans as a result of foreign invasion.<sup>34</sup> First, the African masses, who were mostly concerned about satisfying their immediate needs, remained embedded within indigenous institutions. Second, chiefs and headmen adapted to their loss of power, which placed them in an ambiguous position vis-à-vis white society. Third, a small African elite held clerical jobs. This elite also accepted the Western premise that the majority of the Africans were “backward.” Finally, Africans who had little education were frustrated. They could not join modern churches nor traditional institutions. Most of these people joined African independent churches which played a crucial role in the fight for self-determination. Class cleavages that had emerged during the initial contact between Africans and foreigners widened. The South African National Native Congress (SANNC) was created in 1912 in order to counter white supremacy. According to its first president, John Langa Langalibalele Dube, once Africans proved their loyalty to the crown, they would be treated as equals to the white minority. During the 1906 Bambata rebellion against the poll tax, *ILanga lase Natal* appealed to *Kholwas* (Western-educated Africans in Natal) to first pay their taxes, then explain to the people why they were needed. In this sense, the elite became the link between the colonial government and the rest of the community.<sup>35</sup> According to Dube, Africans would gain their rightful place in society only after acquiring a Western education.

Conflict developed between the administrative policies of the Cape and Natal colonies. The former preferred direct rule, while, in the latter, native policy focused on molding a “tribal” chieftaincy. In 1927, following the Natal model, native policy was put in place by the Native Administration Act. This act “retribalized” Africans to a degree unknown in indigenous societies. The minister of native affairs became the “supreme chief,” further making a mockery of African

institutions. Among his major administrative duties were the allocation of land and the issuance of passes to Africans. As a result of the administration of the supreme chief, African subsistence agriculture was progressively and systematically destroyed and replaced by European farming using African labor.

### NEGATING AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS: THE MISSIONARY

Foreign domination was supported by its own institutions. For example, churches sent missionaries to every village to ensure that Africans were not only westernized, but also mentally prepared to be colonized by negating their own indigenous beliefs. In South Africa, the church played a crucial role in alienating Africans from their institutions. In a conversation between J. W. Colenso, the first Church of England Bishop of Natal, and African converts in 1854, the latter advised him to be “like an experienced hunter.”<sup>36</sup> Indeed, the missionary came to be like “an experienced hunter” who knew his “game” (Africans) and the methods of converting Africans to Christianity. Missionaries were the only Europeans who lived permanently among Africans. As a result, they were able to scrutinize every aspect of African culture, while negating it in the process. By encouraging obedience, meekness, and passivity among Africans, these missionaries acted as the intellectual arm of the colonial government. They were also best placed to spy for colonial powers. To missionaries, indigenous institutions epitomized “witchcraft,” an evil that only conversion to Christianity would remove. African Christians were encouraged to abandon indigenous religious practices. These Africans believed that “only an educated man will survive and make progress in the future because the white man has created a new world. To survive in that world one needs education and civilization, not Zulu history.”<sup>37</sup> To this end, indigenous institutions were demonized in missionary schools. Missionaries also encouraged their converts to buy British goods, especially textiles and clothing, as they preached against the evils of nakedness.

A cleavage soon developed within society between the small African educated elite—whose interests were closely tied to those of the colonial power—and the majority of Africans, who sought to free themselves of foreign domination. Africans who remained within indigenous institutions believed that educated Africans were traitors. Among the Xhosa, the elite was called *Amaqoboka* (people having a hole) because they opened a hole in the Xhosa community, thus allowing the Europeans to convert them to Christianity. Among the Zulu, this class was called *Kholwa* (literally, “believers”). Although the elite viewed itself as the natural leader of the masses, the majority of the people did not respect them. The people believed that Africans who converted to Christianity were not “normal.” Christianity brought shame to the families of converts and isolated them from the rest of the community. In 1864, Theophilus Shepstone remarked that “the semi-civilised class of [Africans] is looked upon by the mass of the native population as degraded and degenerate.”<sup>38</sup> This attitude also reflected the dissatisfaction of

Africans with foreign institutions that were imposed on them through domination, as they fought against colonialism.

Missionaries believed that Africans had to be isolated for Christianity to be effective: "So long as Kaffirs live in large communities where their own customs and usages operate with the greatest rigour, and where the power and influence of the chiefs are felt with the intensity, so long will missionary exertion be comparatively ineffectual, and just in proportion as the government can arrange to lessen the size of these communities to break up the nationality and clanship thereby engendered, and to bring a youthful Kaffir population in the capacity of free servants into daily personal contact with civilized inhabitants, will be the success of the missionary."<sup>39</sup> As a result of Missionary activity, African culture was systematically and insidiously destroyed in three ways. First, Christianity encouraged young people to disobey their elders who represented, until then, the epitome of African culture. Second, missionary schools became the most important agent in this acculturation process. In the classroom, Western culture was privileged, as children were taught about all the positive aspects and achievements of European civilization. Through this process, children looked down on their elders, as well as on their own culture, languages, and civilization. Finally, families broke down because cultural values were under attack. This impact was obvious to Africans who objected to a local missionary school being started in their area in 1887.<sup>40</sup> Tension developed between the African elite and the traditionalists. According to the elite, such hostility could only lead to backwardness. In 1891, *Inkanyiso* noted "the result is that civilisation is retarded because there is no difference made in the treatment of *kholwas* and that of Kraal Kaffirs."<sup>41</sup> This elite believed that it was civilized, and therefore worthy of equal treatment with whites. Illiterate Africans were referred to as "Kraal Kaffirs," who were not deemed worthy of any rights. Europeans, who called educated Africans "gentlemen Kaffirs"—because they were only "gentlemen" in theory, without rights—despised this elite.<sup>42</sup> Settlers also used "gentlemen" because they believed that the African elite was too arrogant for manual labor, but not adequately trained in such practical fields as agriculture and carpentry. The African elite faced two contradictions: rejection by the majority of the people and its inability to move into "civilized" position. According to Leo Kuper, this elite was also "alienated from the tribal structure of chiefs, headmen (*abanumzana*), and commoners."<sup>43</sup> David Welsh explains further:

[This elite] saw clearly the contradictions upon which justifications of the unequal society rested: Africans were "barbarous" and therefore were not entitled to civic rights; but [civilized] Africans were mostly rascals, prone to crime and receptive to seditious doctrines that questioned the white man's right to supremacy.<sup>44</sup>

Tensions between the Western educated elite and Africans who rejected westernization influenced African indigenous institutions in four ways. First, the elite used all the methods available to persuade Europeans to assimilate it into

“civilized society.” Secondly, the African elite distanced itself from the “Kraal” Africans to prove to Europeans that it was “civilized,” and therefore worthy of equal rights. Third, Africans were forced off of their land to provide cheap labor and thus be dependent on foreigners for their livelihood. As servants, they were in daily contact with “civilized” people, which further alienated them from their own culture and institutions. “Civilizing” the Africans meant different things to the diverse groups involved. For example, the African elite believed that civilization meant uplifting Africans from their “semi-barbarous” state. For missionaries, “civilization” meant converting to Christianity.<sup>45</sup> Finally, the unity of indigenous clan systems—which were bastions of ethnic and national identity—was undermined, as large ethnic groups were subdivided into smaller “tribes,” according to a divide-and-rule policy, which exacerbated intraethnic conflict.

Missionaries taught their followers about the glories of life in heaven, while at the same time emphasizing distinct differences between ethnic groups on earth. To these missionaries, African ethnic groups were representing different nations and tribes, thus reinforcing and recreating ethnic boundaries. For example, Reverend Moffat worked among the Tswana and Reverend Owen among the Zulu. Yet when they spoke of Europeans, missionaries treated them as a homogenous group. According to Thiven Reedy, missionaries believed they were “representing ethnic nations in their important role as mediators between the expansionist colonial administration and the selected chiefs. Their detailed notes, which serves as a basic primary source for the historian, conveyed this belief in neatly bounded cultural ‘nations.’”<sup>46</sup> Many of the changes brought about by missionary activity—such as rudimentary education, European arts and crafts, individualism, and the gradual transformation of the community into a labor reservoir—facilitated colonial domination. Christianity was a protest against elite power and indigenous institutions. With the support of the missionaries, commoners challenged the authority of their leaders, therefore opening up their societies to foreign control. As a result of missionary influence, the nature and structure of the African family also changed, from an extended to a nuclear family. As women became increasingly marginalized in the new system, gender relations also changed.

### GENDER RELATIONS

The capitalist economy that developed in the early 1870s disrupted many African indigenous institutions. Forced labor, taxation, and individual tenure further marginalized these institutions. In 1910, South Africa was united as a modern state based on a capitalist economy in which Africans provided unskilled labor. African indigenous institutions were modified to serve the needs of both colonial labor and the colonial administration. The modern state was based on the British model, complemented by an elaborate system of institutional segregation. In the ensuing confusion, Africans tried to explain their world, to understand the changes, and to reach back to what they had lost. Sol T. Plaatje wrote *Mbudi*, the first novel about Africans by an African, set in the 1830s. In this novel, *Mbudi*

the heroine is a courageous and intelligent woman. She is an equal partner to her husband (Ra-Thaga). Mhudi was a departure from the colonial image that presented Africans as a people without their own culture and history. Poets also wrote about the African past and contrasted it with life in the city.<sup>47</sup>

Gender relations were also affected by foreign contact and institutions. For example, missionary representation of the African suffering woman united both colonialists and missionaries against polygamy. Colonialists saw polygamy as a hindrance to the maximization of African labor. It “spoiled” African men by providing them with surplus labor, therefore discouraging them from seeking gainful employment. The colonial government believed it was an agent of “civilization” that would free African women from the oppression of “tradition.” In reality, the colonial government eroded some rights that women enjoyed. For example, prior to colonialism, Zulu women owned property, which was sometimes given to them by their fathers, brothers or as *lobola* (gift from the family of the bridegroom to the bride’s). Missionaries forgot this important aspect in their view of *lobola*. The economic independence of women was eroded since missionaries believed they were sold. Prior to missionary presence, women also made a living from weaving mats, and as diviners and *inyangas* (medicine women). Husbands also bequeathed their property to their childless wives.<sup>48</sup> The colonial government curtailed the rights of women to act as diviners by forcing herbalists to be licensed at a cost of 3 pounds. Women also occupied decision-making positions in the community before the imposition of colonial rule. These positions could also be inherited. Missionaries transformed the status of African women. The Rev. T. L. Dohne of the Berlin Mission recommended to the 1852-53 commission the abolition of *lobola*.<sup>49</sup> Zulu women had property rights before women in England had any, but they experienced some subordination as the state became more militaristic.

The subordination of women in the colonial order is a good example of the corruption that indigenous customs underwent as a result of foreign domination. The government fixed the number of cows that were to be given as *lobola*, arguing that it was freeing women. In the process, it perverted the function and meaning of *lobola*—Parents lost control over their daughters to the state, and if the marriage failed, they could not return a portion of the *lobola*.<sup>50</sup>

Instead of freeing women, the government added another layer of duties. It also introduced new restrictions. For example, in 1875, the *Natal Witness* published a sworn affidavit by an African woman who ran away to a mission station for “protection” against forced marriage.<sup>51</sup> Missionaries offered shelter for African women who ran away from their families. Women were confined to the home as mothers, daughters, and wives, whose role in society was dependent, passive, and increasingly powerless. They could not inherit property. According to the colonial government once a girl reached the age of twenty, no consent (for marriage) was required from the parents. Most girls were too afraid to report their parents. In 1877, James W. Winter, a former legislative council member, brought out a pamphlet on *lobola* called *Gigantic Inhumanity, of Women Slavery in Natal*.<sup>52</sup>

By 1874, new restrictions on women became apparent, when native law was codified in Natal. It was an aberration of indigenous law that was modified by the government and represented as a way of "civilizing" Africans. This law marginalized the position of women in society by making them inferior to men. They were their dependents, and therefore incapable of owning property.<sup>53</sup> The introduction of the plough in farming benefited men by exposing them to the benefits of the cash economy. Native "law stereotyped women to an extent unknown in indigenous systems."<sup>54</sup> The attorney general of Natal saw no problem in denying African women property rights.<sup>55</sup> He believed that individual tenure (which left women) out was the best way to force women into the labor market. It was also the perfect way of destroying African family values because the more contact women had with foreigners, the more westernized they became. Westernized African mothers did not teach their children any African culture since they believed indigenous institutions were evil. As a result, these mothers reproduced the values of the colonial elite that helped colonial powers. Some mothers used Christianity and its institutions (for example, independent churches) to fight for their rights. The new racial stratification placed women at the bottom of the social pyramid. The tip of that pyramid was occupied by European men, followed by European women, Indians, mixed-race people, African men, then African women.

Missionary education was crucial in reshaping the identity and place of African women in society. Education had its own contradictions; for example, it empowered women by providing them with some economic support and freedom. But it also introduced another layer of subordination. Western education reinforced the public and private divide that was introduced by the colonial government. It also reinforced the subordinate role of women since "decent" ones had to be married to Christian men. "Good" women were daughters, wives, and mothers, but never independent thinkers in their own right. For example, by the late 1860s, missionaries in Natal realized that "semi-educated women had not proved to be the best wives for the native leaders trained by the missionaries."<sup>56</sup>

In the colonial order, women were oppressed on several levels. First, they were oppressed as Africans, second as women, and finally, as members of the lowest socioeconomic class. Capitalism added another layer of restraints and duties to the subordinate position of women. For example, taxes imposed on African families influenced male-female relations as most male members left homes in search of labor. Women became heads of households for long periods from nine to twelve months. In this sense, women played a dual role in the economy.<sup>57</sup> Migratory labor had contradictory effects. In some cases, it strengthened the position of women in the community; for example, they were in a better position to resist against passes in Western Transvaal. On the other hand, women in rural areas were the last to be proletarianized because of their prolonged stay in the countryside. Since Western culture was the epitome of civilization, the struggle for freedom that African women were engaged in focused on achieving equal rights with the white minority.<sup>58</sup> Mass demonstrations by African women raised the community's awareness of their social conditions.



**MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS**

Several characteristics informed African indigenous institutions. First, even though some degree of oppression was present, there was a strong relationship between political leaders and their subjects. Second, a spiritual and religious order informed economic, political, and social organizations. Third, land was under the trusteeship of leaders because there was no individual tenure.

Fourth, communal institutions—such as age-mate organizations—created a strong civil society, which helped both the leaders and the governed to balance power and to maintain order. Fifth, these institutions were at their weakest after the death of a leader or during leadership disputes over succession. Sixth, Shaka Zulu united diverse groups who fought against the British into a distinct “Zulu” national identity.<sup>59</sup>

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## SOUTH AFRICA

### APARTHEID, AFRICAN INDIGENOUS INSTITUTIONS, AND THE ANC, 1948–2007

The transition was business saying: “we’ ll keep everything and you [the ANC] will rule in name . . . You can have political power, you can have the façade of governing, but the real governance will take place somewhere else” . . . It was a process of infantilization that is common to so-called transitional countries—new governments are, in effect, given the keys to the house but not the combination to the safe.

—Yasmin Sooka, South African human rights activist, quoted in Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, 203–4

Policy makers in Washington, Bonn and London are genuinely delighted with the South African transition. They are at a loss, when pressed to elaborate, as to what Mandela should have done differently.

—Heribert Adam, Van Zyl Slabbert and Kogila Moodley, *Comrades in Business: Post-Liberation Politics in South Africa*, 162

IN SOUTH AFRICA, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IS FIRMLY AND EXCLUSIVELY CONTROLLED by the middle class, a small political and business elite whose racial composition has changed over time. Following the transition from apartheid to majority rule in 1994, political power has been transferred from the white middle class (represented by the National Party) to the African middle class, represented by the African National Congress (ANC). The South African elite is composed of a small, multiracial, middle class made up of Africans, Indians, people of mixed parentage (African/Indian/European/Malay), and whites. Politically, this middle class elite includes members of the ANC, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the New National Party (NNP), and the South African Communist Party (SACP). These various parties and individuals all benefit as associates of the white national bourgeoisie and of (local and foreign) capital.

We adopt Fanon’s definition of the middle class, according to which the middle class in developing countries is underdeveloped and has no economic power.

The middle class . . . acts merely as an *agent* of foreign capital. "The national class discovers its historic mission: that of intermediary . . . its mission . . . consists, prosaically, of being the transmission line between the nation and a capitalism . . . which today puts on the mask of neo-colonialism. The national bourgeoisie will be quite content with the role of the Western bourgeoisie' business agent."<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, this class should not be viewed as a powerless victim since it has political power that it can use to manipulate other classes (including the white national bourgeoisie). It is neither homogeneous nor static, as it changes depending on circumstances and the pressures it faces. The African middle class is better educated and has a higher income and standard of living than the rest of the population. According to Fanon, the middle class in underdeveloped countries lacks economic power since it was set up to service the colonial ruling elite. Democracy can only come about once the middle class joins the working class in the nationalist project, which implies a radical break with the colonial past. Democracy could also develop by linking with other capitalist classes. The African middle class has to become *national* like its European counterpart, which was engaged in both material and intellectual production. In South Africa, the middle class is primarily made up of the white national bourgeoisie (both British and Afrikaner).

#### **AFRICAN INDIGENOUS INSTITUTIONS UNDER APARTHEID, 1948-94**

In this study, apartheid is characterized as a refinement of the paternalism that developed under British segregationist policy. Thus a paternalist may be defined as "that person who wants to appear as generous, once racism and inequality have been established and accepted."<sup>2</sup> Thus apartheid was not fundamentally different from the racist colonial order; it is simply the logical continuation of earlier European policies of racial domination. One of the hallmarks of apartheid was control over Africans. It also served as a divide-and-rule tactic that enabled the government to better control diverse racial and ethnic groups within the community. People did not exist as individuals; they existed only as racially defined groups, such as "Native," "Colored," or "White."

Apartheid aimed at creating a sovereign domain within each ethnic group. It viewed African chiefs as the true representatives of the African domain. It also favored chiefs because they made racial domination more efficient. A conference of chiefs and native affairs commissioners held on February 3, 1950, noted that Africans would be taught to love their tradition. They would also be taught patriotism and a sense of community. In 1951, the Bantu Administration Act centralized all "native" affairs in one department. The power and authority of chiefs were closely tied to the state, which was active in "inventing" tradition. Since apartheid leaders believed they were superior, it did not matter that their perception of African tradition was distorted. They purported to know African tradition better than the Africans did themselves.

The Bantu Administration Act was based on the belief that African ethnic groups were heterogeneous. It aimed at introducing "tribal" authority based on a

distorted view of African institutions. For example, in Transkei, chiefs and headmen controlled the territorial administration, which was headed by a paramount chief instead of a white magistrate. At the regional level, a subordinate layer of district councils composed of various "tribal" authorities was set up. Judicial powers and power over land were given to the chiefs. Nine regional district councils were set up, some coinciding with indigenous institutions. The people despised apartheid chiefs, such as Kaiser Matanzima, because they were perceived as puppets of the government. The regime also developed "cultural" groups that promoted African tradition. Various organizations were funded by the state to promote African "culture." The salaries of chiefs were very low compared to that of white administrators, thus encouraging corruption. African chiefs used their new positions as a means of exploiting the poor. By extracting bribes and favors from their subjects in return for services, apartheid agents divorced themselves from the people. As a result of the wide-scale corruption, most Africans viewed Bantu authorities as proof "that the government had found ways to make us poorer."<sup>3</sup>

Bantu authorities accelerated political conflict within and between chiefdoms, a process that had started during the British colonial period. Such conflict was caused by lack of sensitivity to the interests and political aspirations of Africans. The apartheid regime insisted on creating chiefdoms, even in areas that did not have any large populations and where they did not exist before. Constant interference from the authorities in the management of the affairs of chiefdoms weakened their powers, further alienating them from their people. In this new dispensation, it was clear that African chiefs were subordinate to the administrators of the apartheid regime and derived their power from them. This totally transformed the nature of African indigenous institutions, which became meaningless in the eyes of the people.<sup>4</sup>

In 1954, the state outlawed missionary education for Africans. From then on, African education fell under the authority of the Department of Bantu Education. Apartheid education not only divorced Africans from their indigenous culture and institutions, but also reinforced their status as second-class citizens. Education was based on apartheid's premise that Europeans were superior to Africans. According to prime minister Hendrik Verwoerd, the philosophy behind apartheid education was to teach Africans that they were inferior: what was the need "of teaching the Bantu child mathematics" when the child was trained as a servant in white society?<sup>5</sup> The goal of apartheid education was to promote ethnic and tribal identities in order to discourage the emergence of a national identity. Apartheid education used indigenous institutions to reinforce this belief. For example, it encouraged tribal identities to the extent that these were used to separate Africans from each other in order to better control them. Africans had to create their own cultural space separate from Western influence. Toward this end, the apartheid government encouraged the teaching of ethnic languages in Bantu schools. One of the goals of this education was to avoid the emergence of a westernized African urban elite. Such an elite was seen as a threat, as it would eventually demand

political equality (one man, one vote), which would threaten Afrikaner political supremacy in South Africa.

All aspects of apartheid policy emphasized the social, cultural and political inferiority of the Africans. Each race had separate educational institutions that reinforced the dominant master-servant relations of power. The races were also divided along ideological lines. According to Marcus M. Balintulo, these educational institutions played two roles. They legitimized and concretized the racial separation in South Africa. Politically and ideologically, they served as dividing tools because in African institutions, Afrikaner domination was presented as God-given. Politically, the “tribal-oriented pedagogy” was meant to keep the oppressed groups divided. It also aimed at “colonizing the consciousness” of thousands of Africans who graduated from these institutions.<sup>6</sup>

Apartheid used African institutions to serve its purpose. The government presented apartheid as the best way to ensure “peace” among Africans. Without it, Africans would plunge into warfare against each other. Apartheid presented indigenous institutions as static, in spite of the changes they had undergone since their contact with outside forces. Based on the logic of apartheid, these institutions were also the reservoir of “tradition” that kept Africans in their “indigenous” setting. Once Africans left the “traditional” setting, they would be destroyed.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, Western contact or standards of living would “corrupt” Africans. Under apartheid, indigenous institutions were negated and therefore delegitimized in the eyes of progressive Africans because they were identified with poverty and racism. Furthermore, the African elite fought for equal rights. The violent and repressive nature of the apartheid system led Africans to reject its policies, notably with regard to African chiefs and reserves. Africans rightly believed that South Africa belonged to them.

Introduced in 1959, the Bantu Self-Government Act alienated African indigenous institutions because it viewed Africans as “foreigners” in South Africa.<sup>8</sup> Africans were only allowed to live on poverty-stricken barren lands called “homelands” (Bantustans). In these homelands, the apartheid regime appointed and remunerated “traditional” chiefs on whose loyalty they could count. Tribalism was further reinforced in urban centers, where large numbers of African male workers were confined to derelict and unsanitary ethnic hostels without their families and social support systems. The economy was organized in such a way that white-owned firms, mines, and farms always had a ready supply of cheap African labor close at hand. According to the logic of the apartheid system, since Africans were uncivilized, they had minimal needs which were not very different from animal wants.<sup>9</sup> As the (agriculturally barren and unproductive) homelands set up by the apartheid regime became desolate sites of poverty, hunger, and disease, the Africans became further alienated from their indigenous institutions.

Three developments contributed to severely undermine African indigenous political and social systems. First, any cultural trait that was unacceptable to the white minority was considered to be wrong, thus undermining the confidence of Africans in their own culture and traditions. Strangely, none of the African

political movements or parties—neither the African National Congress, nor the Pan-Africanist Congress, or any other—called for the integration of indigenous political systems and institutions into modern governance. Indeed, all the African political movements or parties based their activities on European—rather than African—cultural symbols.

Second, under foreign rule, African indigenous institutions were used to serve as agents of domination, thus further alienating them from the people. The only option left to progressive Africans was to fight against the apartheid logic. Third, European culture was privileged throughout the society, particularly in literature, films, plays, and music. As for African cultural symbols, they were relegated to the ghetto of the tourism sector in the form of tribal villages, where tribesmen (and tribeswomen) performed tribal music and dances for the benefit of tourists. All these contradictions continue to plague contemporary South Africa under majority rule, a subject to which we now turn.

### THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE UNDER ANC RULE

#### POPULISM VS. LIBERALISM

Abrahamsen argues that many newly elected governments in Africa face two irreconcilable constituencies: external donors and creditors and their poor domestic majorities. The first casualty of this dilemma is the democratic process itself. She argues that the form of democracy demanded by donors and creditors (including the IMF and the World Bank) offers African incumbents and elites the possibility of holding on to, or capturing, power, without giving in to any of the demands for social welfare and redistribution at home.<sup>10</sup>

Abrahamsen makes some observations that are quite relevant to the South African situation. Discussing “democratic pacts” as a specific feature of transition processes in Latin America (and South Africa), she notes that such pacts were negotiated among established, highly hierarchical elites and were aimed at reassuring traditional dominant classes that their vital interests will not be jeopardized under democracy (including amnesty from prosecution). In this manner, pacts may entail the marginalization of popular demands for improved living standards, or allow fairly minimal and gradual transformation in gross social and economic inequalities.<sup>11</sup>

Once pacts have been negotiated, power relations between and within the elite, as well as external forces, also change. According to Jeremy Cronin, the local elite is only powerful within the political arena; as a result, it sidelines the development agenda. Instead, its energies are concentrated in competing against other elites with the backing of one or the other external force.<sup>12</sup> Cronin notes that there are no options for the African bourgeoisie. For example, they cannot form their own secret organizations like the *Broederbond* or Randlords (owners of large corporations) to embark on economic self-reliance. For Cronin, the indigenous African elite—as represented by the ANC—does not have any option other than to follow the path opened by the British and Afrikaner elites. According to



his argument, the only option left is for the bourgeoisie to “either choose to be a neo-colonial adjunct or fake its place within a development process led by other social forces.”<sup>13</sup> It should be noted that, contrary to a popular misconception, the ANC government is not a powerless victim of circumstances, nor is it a passive subject in this process. Rather, it is a major and relatively powerful political actor, perfectly capable of making its own policy decisions.

Pallo Jordan argues that the ability of the bourgeoisie to act is “a function of both their choices and the IMF’s. In the context of a particular configuration of those forces, that ability will either be enhanced or diminished.”<sup>14</sup> In essence, the ability of the ANC to transform the economy is limited by IMF and World Bank conditionalities, as well as by the post-cold war global economy that leaves capitalism as the only available option. According to an ex-activist, the ANC is constrained by both local and international interests. It also lacks an ideological commitment. As a result, it uses rhetoric to keep its supporters and to win over new ones. In its efforts to please all, it is “frequently paralysed.”<sup>15</sup> For example, the ANC tries to satisfy the basic needs of the African majority through gradual change, rather than aggressively pursuing radical transformation, such as land reform. The ANC also attempted to win over the major South African trade union, COSATU (Confederation of South African Trade Unions), to its side without adopting its agenda. The trade unions have been co-opted by the more powerful business community, which dictates which interests must be protected. For COSATU, class interests and priorities prevail over racial ones. According to John Pilger, the United States, Britain, and the World Bank welcomed South Africa in the global economy if it followed orthodox economic policies characterized by foreign investment and privatization that would “trickle down.”<sup>16</sup> In order to preserve the interests of both local and foreign investors, only gradual reforms would be allowed under this arrangement. This explains why the South African economy was not radically transformed for the benefit of the African majority.

Heribert Adam further argues that two major South African multinational companies, Anglo-American and Gencor, “unbundled because they rightly expected black allies to share their vision in a deracialised capitalism.”<sup>17</sup> The African elite of the ANC, which had neither an indigenous institutional basis nor its own development agenda, became the perfect agency not only to pacify the masses, but also to promote the interests of the business sector and to pursue its own agenda.

Sampie Terreblanche reveals the complexity of the incomplete transition in South Africa from apartheid to liberal democracy by noting that the ANC made a compromise with the corporate sector during the negotiations. This compromise allowed the corporate sector to act as the engine for ending apartheid’s legacy of economic inequalities. Several disadvantages emerge from this policy orientation:

1. Given South Africa’s history, a “trickle-down” approach cannot work because economic inequalities require an active state that drives policy.

2. The corporate sector is not elected. Its goal is to make profit. By allowing it to impact economic and social policy, and to address inequalities, the government is removed from what it was elected to do: govern for all. Instead, it only serves corporate interests. Elected officials become more accountable to the corporate sector than to the people.
3. A cleavage develops within the society: groups that are linked to the corporate sector prosper, while the majority of the population wallows in poverty. As a result, the political and economic elite gets richer, thereby accelerating apartheid's economic inequalities.
4. According to Terreblanche's argument, "free market" encourages the destruction of traditional values that constituted the foundation of society. Traditional values discouraged individual competition at the expense of the common welfare. Free market benefits the richest and strongest in the community at the expense of the poor and weak.
5. Once the National Party came to power in 1948, Terreblanche notes that it implemented "its policy of affirmative action, or social upliftment" by using "its fiscal powers to tax wealthier English-speakers and increase social spending of Afrikaners." Instead of using its political power to effect change by taxing the wealthiest sectors of the population and increase social spending for Africans, the ANC collects less taxes from the rich. It also encourages the corporate sector to open offshore accounts that further drain badly needed capital from the economy.<sup>18</sup>

The ANC's lack of a coherent development agenda places it in a precarious position. For example, it cannot escape from the two predominant trends now prevalent in the global economy. In order to maintain good relations with private investors (both domestic and foreign), as well as with bilateral donors, the ANC has to prove that it is trustworthy.<sup>19</sup> Because of this scrutiny, the ANC cannot implement radical economic policies that would benefit the African majority. The exigencies of domestic and international business limit the ANC's role in the world economy. Thus it must continually prove its "credibility" to investors.<sup>20</sup> Under the Government of National Unity (GNU), the ANC made every effort to get along with its conservative partners in order to keep foreign investors in South Africa happy. After the National Party withdrew from the GNU in 1996, the ANC did not introduce any major changes. The ANC must appear radical to maintain its support among its poor constituents while, at the same time, adopting conservative policies to satisfy the interests of the business community and of the white minority. According to Heribert Adam and associates four reasons help explain why the ANC's role is not surprising: (i) the ANC assumed power with the support of business; (ii) it is the only organization with a large popular following; (iii) it can appeal to all parties through its rhetoric of moral superiority and forgiveness; and (iv) "the different party elites no longer squabble about ethno-racial identity, but about the most effective methods to control anarchy and potential class warfare of which they all would be victims."<sup>21</sup>

According to Heribert Adam, Van Zyl Slabbert, and Kogila Moodley, in the new South African state, it is not the far right that threatens stability but poor Africans. They note: "In reality, the ANC's historical role is both to represent and control the poor majority. Political stability and economic relationships are not threatened by whites but by impoverished black masses whose lot is unlikely to improve dramatically."<sup>22</sup> Poor South Africans have organized themselves at the grassroots level to demand satisfaction of their basic needs in terms of better housing, sanitation, health, education, and equitable access to water. Social movements continue to put pressure on the ANC to address their demands. The ANC must keep these poor Africans under control to ensure that the business community's interests are protected. The ANC sets the legislative agenda within which these various actors operate and encourages compromises—which usually benefit the strongest parties—between these different actors.

#### ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE

In spite of all the rhetoric on reconciliation, the ANC was set up for failure. First, as a result of the National Party's privatization policy, the ANC did not have any resources to address apartheid's legacy of economic and social inequality. Second, as Allister Sparks has argued, the NP did not provide any guidelines to help the new government. Instead, when Mandela came into office, the administrative staff was nowhere to be found, the files were gone, and state coffers were empty. Third, the economy and security areas remain firmly under white minority control. All the media hype about the "miracle" that surrounded the negotiations for a new South Africa conveniently masked these vital and complex issues. What is remarkable under these circumstances is that the ANC has managed to introduce some changes.

The ANC came to power on a campaign platform that promised a better life for all. In this spirit, it aimed at building one million housing units and providing electricity and water for all. As early as 1993, the ANC stated its economic policy in a letter sent to the IMF and the World Bank, in which it promised to cut down on government spending as conditionality for an IMF loan. The new government was also burdened with paying apartheid's debt to the World Bank, the IMF, local banks, insurance companies, and pension plans for a total amount of R40 billion (plus interest). Since its creation, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) had been under the control of the apartheid (NP) government. One of the IMF's conditionalities for the loan was that the South African Reserve Bank should be independent from the (ANC) government. The independence of the SARB means that parliament has no rights of oversight. The SARB is responsible for determining exchange rates, as well as for the general welfare of the economy. Thus the ANC's ability to transform the economy was constrained by IMF and World Bank conditionalities, and by the spirit of reconciliation that marked the negotiations for the new dispensation. This process culminated in the November 27, 2001, agreement by which the ANC agreed to share power at all levels of

government with the New National Party (NNP). This power sharing agreement provided the ANC with some influence over the Western Cape provincial administration, where it had previously played only a marginal role. In return, the NNP participates in all major decisions, which slows down the transformation process. As a result, change continues to be slow and gradual, as the ANC does not want to appear as too radical in its policies. All major economic decisions are still made by the NNP since all the departments responsible for the economy (trade, industry, and finance) are still controlled by old apartheid staff.<sup>23</sup> As a result, the major challenge of the ANC is to restructure key government departments, a process which it has recently initiated.

To restructure the economy, the ANC adopted the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), a long-term development plan that addressed three key unresolved issues, notably land reform, wealth redistribution, and the rural/urban bias. Furthermore, the RDP aimed at addressing the apartheid legacy in education, housing, health, and development in rural areas in order to meet the needs of the rural poor

The RDP originated in 1994 within COSATU. It was adopted after undergoing seven drafts and much debate and discussions. Through it, labor hoped to guide the ANC through a process that would transform the socio-economic conditions of the majority of the population. It also aimed at improving the economic standards of the lower 60 percent of the population. Growth would be achieved through economic redistribution to address apartheid's inequalities by satisfying basic needs.<sup>24</sup> The RDP "included statements requiring macro-economic prudence that severely limited the ability to achieve those objectives."<sup>25</sup> Had the RDP succeeded, it would have empowered South Africans to control and determine the nature of their economic development. Pressure from business and the ANC's eagerness to please the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) forced it to drop the RDP program in 1996. Both COSATU and the SACP were disappointed by the ANC's adoption of a substitute development program, Growth, Employment and Redistribution, that severely strained the alliance between the ANC COSATU—which threatened a strike against privatization—and the SACP ever since. COSATU criticized the ANC leadership for not adequately consulting with its alliance partners.

#### GROWTH, EMPLOYMENT, AND REDISTRIBUTION (GEAR)

In 1996, the ANC adopted GEAR, which was presented as an extension of the RDP. Based on this logic, GEAR would create jobs and lead to economic growth through redistribution. Why GEAR? First, it was adopted as a result of pressure from the business community, from the SARB, from the Development Bank of South Africa, as well as from key officials within the departments of trade, industry, and finance. Second, there was also pressure from the emergent African elite eager to consolidate its foothold in the economy. Most important were changes in

the global economy and the emergence of the "Washington consensus," an informal donor network including the IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury.

GEAR was introduced to address growth-inhibiting structural weaknesses in the economy. It would boost the slowing economy by increasing investment, labor demand, and job creation, as well as by achieving a degree of structural transformation. GEAR focuses, in particular, on increasing social spending, fiscal reform, and the relaxation of exchange rates.<sup>26</sup> The ANC adopted GEAR without consulting its alliance partners, notably the SACP and COSATU. Unlike what happened during the RDP process, there was no public debate. GEAR was based on SARB and World Bank guidelines. Its basic premise was that "macroeconomic policy should be entirely devoted to stability, and that growth and transformation will come from elsewhere."<sup>27</sup>

GEAR set off a privatization frenzy. Thus, from March 1997 to 2004, the government privatized eighteen state-owned enterprises, raising about R26.8 billion, of which some R12 billion was used to service the national debt. Privatization is focused on South Africa's four giant state corporations: defense firm Denel, telecommunications utility Telkom, power utility Eskom, and transport group Transnet, which have a combined asset value of R150 billion. In May 1997, Telkom sold 30 percent of its stock to SBC Communications (a U.S. firm) and to Telkom Malaysia for R5.6 million. As a result, since 1998, Telkom reduced its workforce by more than a third and in 2000 to 2002, it raised its tariffs to such a level that only 667,039 of the 2.67 million lines installed in poor and rural areas were still in service. Swissair bought 20 percent of South African Airways stock. As a result of the economic slump that followed the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington, this deal fell through. The state plans to sell about 30 percent of Eskom by 2008. As a result, households may expect tariff increases of between 22 percent and 50 percent from a privatized Eskom.

The World Bank praises the ANC government for its prudent fiscal policy.<sup>28</sup> However, this policy is based on the belief that wealth will eventually trickle down to the poor, who, for the moment, continue to be the main victims of GEAR. As Gumede rightly observes, "Wholesale disposal of state-owned assets in developing countries, as advocated by the World Bank, could never work in South Africa and should not be allowed. Irrespective of the arguments made by Western pundits, the road to ruin for many African countries has been mapped by limited control over their own resources."<sup>29</sup> Fiscal revenues have increased as a result of the registration by the government of a larger number of taxpayers (from 2 million in 1994 to more than 5 million in 2004) rather than through increased taxation of high-income taxpayers and of transnational companies.

According to the IMF, South Africa's strong economy had a positive impact on employment in other African countries. The biggest challenge facing the ANC lies in getting the benefits of the economy to trickle down to the poor. GEAR critics note that South Africa needs more foreign investment. According to Mokate, "the problem with the South African economy is not only that investment has fallen

as a proportion of GDP, but that the number of jobs created per rand of investment has also fallen dramatically.”<sup>30</sup> GEAR did not have a clear vision of either an industrial policy or effective job creation. Its goal was mainly to win international credibility, based on the premise that once foreign investment has been attracted to South Africa, the policies designed to maintain these investments are permanent. GEAR also aimed at attracting foreign currency by cutting down on spending. According to Jeremy Cronin, “GEAR was a strategy to solicit passing global traffic. GEAR put us on the curbside. It made us vulnerable to global traffic, and it gives us no protective measures.”<sup>31</sup> GEAR also forces the government to sell its assets to private investors.

Without any additional resources, how will the government meet the needs of the poor? GEAR also calls for less state intervention; yet, South Africa needs a strong state to eliminate the economic inequality inherited from the apartheid regime. Through privatization measures, the status quo has been maintained under different labels. For example, even though high-class neighborhoods in Cape Town and Johannesburg are open to all buyers, few Africans have the financial means to purchase them. Privatization also entrenches white privilege under the bill of rights. The white minority and international actors (IFIs and bilateral donors) present redistribution as a threat to the stability and security of South Africa. Faced with an open, liberal economy, the challenge for the ANC is to create an environment in which there is international competitiveness as well as poverty reduction.

The critics of GEAR note that its implementation has led to increased poverty resulting in racial tensions, as the white minority criticizes the ANC for adopting affirmative action programs for formerly disadvantaged groups. The government has failed to do “what the DP [Democratic Party] accuses it of doing, that is redistributing the wealth and productive resources,” effectively increasing white minority control over the economy.<sup>32</sup> The main difference between apartheid South Africa and contemporary South Africa is that the latter has a sprinkling of Africans in top government jobs. According to Desai, the ANC does not go far enough to ensure a better life for all. If a company fails to implement affirmative action guidelines, the ANC—unlike the U.S. federal government—has no legal power or constitutional authority to enforce compliance. All it can do is to deny state contracts to such companies. This puts additional pressure on the ANC because its affirmative action programs do not satisfy African needs, while at the same time alienating it from the white minority. By adopting such half-measures, the ANC antagonizes labor and the political activists. The labor movement has lost its legitimate ground for protest since its leaders are now in power. Desai argues that government policy allows a small number of Africans to benefit from the new economic dispensation while the rest are left to fend for themselves. Furthermore, those who fail to make it “have an entitlement mentality.”<sup>33</sup> In the following section, we will examine the extent to which the ANC government has been able (or not) to deliver on its promise of providing health care, education,

housing, water and electricity and other essential public services (such as security) to all its citizens, particularly the African masses.

### HEALTH

The new political dispensation has introduced a new perspective that is psychologically satisfying to the African majority in South Africa. In hospitals, white clerks now refer to African women as “ma’m,” not as “Jane” or “Kaffermeid.”<sup>34</sup> However, the material benefits of the new dispensation are not as noticeable as the symbolic ones.

The apartheid regime did not emphasize preventive medicine, such as immunization, nutrition, and sanitation. Instead, it focused on curative medicine. The ANC has introduced a comprehensive immunization program in which three out of four children between twelve and twenty-three months are immunized.<sup>35</sup> To reach South Africa’s poorest 40 percent who live in rural areas, the ANC has introduced tele-medicine. Doctors use television or video conferences to consult with each other over difficult cases. In 2001, the government introduced a unified National Health Laboratory Service (NHLS) to serve the public.

Under the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) program, the ANC has privatized health care, thus exacerbating previous inequalities. Budget cuts in health have also exacerbated disparities between urban and rural hospitals and clinics. For example, a survey of 294 clinics revealed that only 35 percent had a full-time primary care givers. It also revealed that fewer than four in five hospitals in rural areas had electricity and that only 69 percent had potable water. Privatization of health care has also introduced the profit motive among health service providers, to the detriment of the poor. According to a MERG report, “Privatisation reinforces those distortions towards curative medicine, since it is primarily concerned with the paying patient (who by definition will be ill).”<sup>36</sup> Curative care is more expensive than preventive medicine.

The privatization of health services also serves the economic needs of the wealthy in another way: it creates or strengthens economically powerful interest groups that are able to influence government policy in their favor. Privatization also reinforces class cleavages to the disadvantage of the poor. It obviously privileges the wealthy minority since half of the doctors and 20 percent of the nurses, as well as 80 to 90 percent of dentists, available in the country cater to the paying clientele in the private sector.<sup>37</sup> As a result, public hospitals—especially those in rural areas—are underfunded and understaffed. A unified national health service is required to eliminate such glaring disparities.

AIDS, which Allister Sparks calls “an African holocaust,” further overloads the health care system. Of South Africa’s 45 million people, over 10 percent are infected with HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. Every day, more than 1,700 persons are infected by the virus.<sup>38</sup> By the end of 2002, UN-AIDS noted that South Africa had the highest number of HIV victims in the world (5.3 million). HIV/AIDS in South Africa is peculiar because the majority of its victims are young *and*



Africans. Based on current UNAIDS figures, the rate of AIDS prevalence among 15 to 49 year olds is 18.9 percent. There are 5,400,000 HIV positive people in South Africa. The number of women (15 and up) living with HIV is estimated at 3,200,000. There are 1,400,000 orphans because of AIDS-related deaths. In addition, 280,000 children (0 to 14) are HIV positive.<sup>39</sup> The AIDS epidemic further overloads an already overburdened health care system. Once AIDS victims become seriously ill, they can no longer contribute to the economy. Furthermore, they burden their families with the high cost of care. Funds that could have been used to develop other sectors are used to train new personnel, further draining the economy.

In 2000, Lovelife predicted that some companies could lose up to half their workforce to the disease, and that by 2010, 15 percent of highly skilled workers in South Africa will have contracted HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. According to the United Nations, 1,000 of South Africa's 4.5 million HIV/AIDS sufferers die each day.<sup>40</sup> The AIDS crisis could also lower the country's GDP to between 0.3 and 0.4 percent. As a result, South Africa's African population is decreasing at a higher rate than usual because of the AIDS crisis. The mortality rate has dropped from 63 years old to 50 because of AIDS-related deaths. There are some signs of hope: the number of pregnant women on antiretroviral treatment has increased from 15 percent in 2004 to 60 percent in 2007. It should be noted that for some time AIDS figures in South Africa have been controversial.<sup>41</sup> The AIDS crisis creates several problems. First, as a result of AIDS, South Africa's African population is experiencing a negative growth rate. Second, AIDS exacerbates already existing economic and social problems. Thus, in the education sector, the number of teachers who die of AIDS exceeds the number of newly trained ones. Famine and starvation become the norm rather than the exception. AIDS also threatens South Africa with political instability, as victims are totally excluded from policy-making. In a culture where most African communities rely on oral history, important indigenous knowledge is lost forever as older people grounded in tradition die of AIDS.

To address the AIDS crisis, the ANC launched a *Campaign of Hope* on April 17, 2002. It is aimed at educating the community on AIDS prevention. It also joined with Lovelife in September 2002, when the government provided R94 million to be used in AIDS awareness campaigns.<sup>42</sup> Lovelife estimates that AIDS has been rising from 120,000 deaths in 2000 to between 354,000 and 383,000 in 2005, and between 545,000 and 635,000 in 2010.<sup>43</sup> AIDS victims cannot afford HIV cocktail medicine, which is often very expensive. In April 2001, Treatment Action Campaign (a community-based movement), along with the government, won a court battle against pharmaceutical companies that wanted to prohibit the production and sale of (more affordable) generic or substitute medicine. This victory was confirmed in August 2003 when the government allowed antiretroviral treatment for AIDS victims. Clinical trials for an AIDS vaccine started in late 2003. On December 10, 2006, the ANC government announced its five-year plan to fight AIDS/HIV by cutting the infection rate by half.<sup>44</sup> To combat



the AIDS pandemic, the government is involved in private-public initiatives that include mining companies and trade unions.

### EDUCATION

Apartheid education was based on the principle of separate and unequal: best for the white minority, average for the colored and Indians, and sub-standard for the Africans. During apartheid, access to education was the hallmark of class inequality in South Africa. The state increased spending on poor whites to ensure that poverty was not transmitted from one generation to another. According to Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass, between 1948 and 1960, the state doubled its spending on the education of white children, especially in secondary schools. As a result, each generation improved its own position through education. The pupil-student ratio was also reduced. During the early stages of apartheid, the state increased its per-child spending for the education of Africans. However, in 1953, spending on Africans' education was tied to their tax base, which was very low. Seekings and Nattrass note, "By 1960, the number of white students passing matric [high school diploma] was sixteen times the total number of coloured, Indian, and African students who passed. By 1970, the secondary school enrollment rate reached 90 percent among white children; among African children, it had risen to only 16 percent despite growing fourfold in the previous decade."<sup>45</sup>

As a result, government spending on the education of Africans fell from 14 percent in 1953 to 6 percent by 1968. From then on, spending on African education stagnated and the student-teacher ratio increased. Inequality in education between Africans and whites was more noticeable in 1970, when the number of white children in secondary schools rose to 90 percent compared to that of African children.<sup>46</sup> Poor education and job discrimination also negatively impacted the employment opportunities and the level of salaries of the Africans. According to Seekings and Nattrass, white men were paid more than women. The priority given to the education of the white minority further deepened class, gender, and racial differences. The authors note, "By changing the skill composition of the white labour force via public education, the state was able to give white people a large advantage in the labour market, with the result that interracial wage differential widened."<sup>47</sup> In the late 1980s, the apartheid regime began privatizing key government departments, but the education sector was not affected. It was only in 1992 that the government introduced fees for some government schools. These fees affected most African families because of the unequal economic conditions. The ANC inherited this separate and unequal educational system in which the quality of education and educational facilities differed greatly according to which racial group one belonged to. Poor African children were taught by untrained teachers who concentrated on social sciences and the humanities rather than on exact sciences (such as mathematics, physics, and chemistry). In 1994, 36 percent of all teachers and 40 percent of women teachers did not have the officially

required three-year post-matriculation (that is, post-high school) qualification.<sup>48</sup> As a result, the school drop out rate of African children was much higher than that of any other group.

The teacher-student ratio was also higher in African schools. In the Eastern Cape, it was 1 to 51, which was higher than the national norm (1 to 37). School attendance by African children was also lower than that of white children. For example, 21 percent of African children attended preschool, compared to 38 percent of white children. The difference increased with age. Most Africans older than twenty years did not have formal education. Poor provinces also had inadequate institutions. There was also marked gender inequality; for example, by 1995 (a year after the ANC assumed power), 20 percent of African women did not have any formal education, compared with 14 percent of African men. Women stayed longer than men in educational institutions to train for careers in nursing and teaching (generally perceived as female careers). The defining characteristic of the poor was lack of power linked to gendered power relations within households. For example, workdays for women were 25 percent longer than those of men.

The ANC introduced "Curriculum 2005" to replace apartheid education. The new curriculum was difficult to implement due to lack of funds. It required retraining 360,000 teachers. These problems were compounded by massive teacher retrenchment under GEAR. The new curriculum focused on outcomes that would produce "competent future citizens."<sup>49</sup> Critical thinking replaced rote learning. In 1997, Curriculum 2005 was introduced in first grade. It was introduced in grades one to twelve by 2005. Rural areas were the most negatively affected by the new changes due to inadequate teacher training. For example, in Eastern Cape, enrollment in teacher training colleges fell from 200 to under 100 since 1996. Wealthy provinces, such as the Western Cape and Gauteng benefitted the most from the new curriculum. In these provinces, teachers were retrained while maintaining high educational standards. In the Western Cape, R3,950 is spent per child per year, which is 20 percent higher than the national average. The province has twenty-four pupils per class compared to the national average of thirty-seven.

The enrollment of African students in higher education changed between 1988 and 1998. According to Cooper and Subotzky, by 1999, there were "almost twice as many Africans as white students in these institutions."<sup>50</sup> However, these authors further argue that African students tended to enroll in Technikons (i.e., technical colleges) rather than top universities. They also spent fewer years than whites in higher education institutions. As a result, more African men and women in these institutions graduated with qualifications for semi-skilled jobs rather than the highest occupations. In partnership with Western governments, the government introduced the Historically Disadvantaged Institutions' (HDI) project in 1996 in order to improve higher education. The HDI project aimed at building the capacity of former black universities and technikons (technical colleges) while reducing their numbers.<sup>51</sup>

## HOUSING

The ANC also inherited great disparities in housing, which resulted from several factors. First, there was a duplication of services because apartheid's logic required different racially based departments. Second, no single ministry addressed either housing or urban planning needs. Third, there were inconsistencies in policy positions between different government departments, and a corresponding lack of uniform policy regarding housing. Finally, the various sectors—public, private, and community—had no clearly defined role in terms of housing policy.

For the 8 million people who are currently homeless, economic change is the real meaning of transformation. Most people within this group say that not much has changed because they have neither jobs nor houses. The government believes in incremental change through economic growth. If the government does not pursue a more aggressive policy vis-à-vis white minority businesses still providing high-interest loans, how will it manage change? This concern prompted Winnie Mandela to suggest that “instead of the liberation movement taking over South Africa, the opposite happened.”<sup>52</sup> Housing continues to be expensive and scarce, and squatters continue to occupy land illegally. Initially, Nelson Mandela promised to build 1 million houses per year. Joe Slovo, who was the first minister of housing, accepted World Bank advice to rely on small subsidies and bank loans for building houses, rather than on state and community support. As a result, most houses were constructed far from urban centers and with poor building materials. By 1996, fewer than 20,000 housing units had materialized. Joe Slovo's housing policy stated that business would provide low-income housing with government subsidies. To qualify for the subsidies, residents had to earn 3,500 Rands per month. The subsidies ranged between R5,000 and R17,500. Since 1994, the ANC government has spent R10 billion on housing. In 1995, its goal was to give 50,000 subsidies, but only 6,800 were approved. In 1996, only 30,000 subsidies (out of a projected 150,000) were approved further slowing the delivery of houses.<sup>53</sup> This failure resulted from the unwillingness of banks to grant loans to low-income families.

By 1998, fewer than 200,000 low-cost homes were built. Banks financed only 14 percent of the houses built between 1994 and 1999. As a result, there was a housing backlog of between 2.6 and 3 million units. By 1999, the housing backlog had risen to an estimated 3 million units. Prior to the 1999 elections, some people in the rural sector felt that both the ANC and the NP, who dominated local councils, had betrayed their promises about housing delivery. Between 1994 and 2000, the department of housing gave the figure of houses—either under construction or completed—at 996,552. People earning less than R1,500 per month occupied 90 percent of these houses. At the time of writing, unofficial figures reveal that 1,129,000 houses have been built. There is still a backlog of 7.5 million people in need of adequate housing, which is a fundamental human right, according to the new South African constitution.<sup>54</sup> The housing policy of the ANC is plagued by contradictions. This policy has been criticized for failing to build new houses in former all-white suburbs, which have remained intact

with only a sprinkling of African middle class moving in. As a result, most of the 600,000 new housing units have been built close to townships. In order to shorten the travel distance of house servants to their place of work, the ANC government decided to build new houses in (traditionally white) upscale residential areas for low-income groups. This policy was criticized and opposed by the white residents affected. Initially, ANC housing policy emphasized only ownership. This policy did not cater for renters, or people who were too poor, or the homeless. It did not take into account squatters who cannot afford houses. These squatters, who have taken over city parks and graveyards, get service faster than people on waiting lists for housing. Once squatters are given housing sites, they sell them for R1,000 and return to camp in a park, as city life provides them with an economic base. Politically, the ANC is worried about losing support from its base because of long waiting lists and evictions. On the other hand, it is under pressure to show investors that it is capable of prohibiting illegal land seizures. The most effective housing policy should combine rental and ownership. The ANC has tried its best to deliver on its promise of affordable housing for all, in spite of the numerous political, economic, financial, and administrative constraints that it faces.

#### **UTILITIES: ELECTRICITY AND WATER**

As a result of privatization, the capacity of the ANC to deliver services depends on the ability of the customers to pay for them. At least 10 million residents have had their water services disconnected at one time or another. By 2004, 30 percent of the income of people earning R500 per month (about \$300) was spent on water bills. According to a survey by the government's Human Sciences Research Council, since 1994, 10 million people have been affected by water cutoffs.<sup>55</sup> People who cannot afford clean water and proper sanitation evidently face enormous health problems. The widespread installation of prepaid water meters (particularly in townships) has made it impossible for poor families to have access to water.

The government and its agencies—such as Eskom (electricity) and Telkom (telecommunications)—have made major strides in delivering public services, but not all these services are sustainable. Most of the projects need regular funds, which the government is unable to obtain due to limited resources and the inability of some households to pay. Government figures show that 30 percent of services provided are not paid for. It is extremely difficult for the ANC to force poor Africans to pay for services when they were not used to paying for such services under apartheid. During the 2001–2002 financial year, only 667,039 of the 2.67 million telephone lines installed by Telkom in poor and rural areas were still in service. The rest had been disconnected due to the inability of subscribers to pay. The sale of 30 percent of Eskom by the state in 2008 is expected to result in household tariff increases of between 22 percent and 50 percent, and the introduction of prepaid electricity services has now become widespread. In 2001, when ESKOM disconnected electric service for nonpayment in Soweto,

its former workers who were laid off offered to reconnect the service for free. The Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) currently trains people to reconnect service after disconnection.<sup>56</sup> In 1994, during the euphoria of the first democratic government, the ANC promised more than it has been able to deliver. In spite of the apartheid legacy and of the short period discussed here (1884-2007), some notable improvements have been made in the lives of ordinary people. Since 1994, 650,000 new water connections have been made, reaching 6.4 million people. In addition, 1.3 million homes have been wired for electric service. Availability of water has a domino effect throughout society, impacting small businesses, improving health, and resulting in less work for women. Access to water also reduces diseases, as more people get clean drinking water. Since 1994, 1.3 million people have had telephones installed, and five million more people have access to primary health care.

### SECURITY: MILITARY AND POLICE

Throughout the history of South Africa, the military was the main pillar of the apartheid regime. Except in the Bantustans, few Africans were allowed to join the military. For example, the South African Navy only began actively recruiting Africans in 1990, when its uniformed permanent force increased from 1 percent to 16 percent. The excuse given for not recruiting Africans earlier was that they did not want to go out to sea. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is the most sophisticated, and better armed and equipped, military force on the continent.

During the last days of the apartheid regime and the early period of the post-apartheid state, the military *increased* spending on different military units. There was a “66 percent increase from R427.5 million to R 710 million—by far the biggest increase for any government department—and this at a time when health and teaching jobs were cut in the economy.”<sup>57</sup> The increase in military spending resulted from the integration of 9,000 former *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK) homeland and Pan African Congress (PAC) agents into the intelligence department. As a result, the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) now has three times the number of security agents that it had at the height of apartheid. This process of incorporation provided the new regime with crucial military support in its early years. It also meant that the military had a stake in the new regime, thereby making it less likely to overthrow the government. Heribert Adam and associates note that the so-called revolution is better understood as a “purchased revolution” because it bought “troublemakers” who could not be incorporated into the new regime by putting them in the public or private sectors.<sup>58</sup>

The incorporation of former MK, PAC, and homeland soldiers in the SANDF introduced new tensions. For example, race was still used as the criterion for promotion and posting. For some MK soldiers who spent many years fighting for freedom, this was a step backwards. According to Captain Moses Maisela, Nelson

Mandela gave too much leeway to Afrikaners because he left them to restructure the military as they pleased. In July 2003, when Thabo Mbeki and justice minister Penuell Maduna opposed reparations for apartheid crimes, while Mandela attacked reparations lawsuits as “outside interference,” Soweto community leader Trevor Ngwane noted, “Without detracting from those twenty-seven years in jail—what cost him, what he stood for—Mandela has been the real sellout, the biggest betrayer of his people.”<sup>59</sup> As a result of the policies of MK soldiers were systematically assigned to inferior ranks. MK soldiers who had the rank of colonel became simple sergeants under the pretense that they did not know how to use a computer. Maisela admits that “he is extremely disappointed by the politicians and he feels “betrayed.”<sup>60</sup> Those who resisted demotion were fired for failing to follow orders.

Under apartheid, the police force—like other branches of the civil service—served as a reservoir of labor for the white minority, which was paid to exclusively serve its community. As Allistair Sparks shows the police force has five times more inspectors than constables and sergeants. As a result, there are not enough policemen for patrol. Furthermore, new positions are created to accommodate the increasing number of inspectors who supervise other inspectors. This lopsided police force also resulted from the integration of the police forces of former Bantustans. Poor training has added to policing problems. For example, more than 30 percent of the 120,000-member national force is illiterate, and more than 11,000 officers do not have drivers’ licenses. Very few policemen have been trained in fingerprinting, ballistics, and forensics. Promotion, which emphasizes length of service rather than performance, results in an unmotivated police force. In African neighborhoods, the police were despised as the “foot soldiers of apartheid. The transition meant that this same police force would now protect its former enemies.” It was a bewildering experience for both the people and the police.<sup>61</sup> As a result of this process, South Africa became famous (or rather, infamous) for its extraordinarily high crime rate—one of the highest in the world—in which the police plays an active part by either providing information to criminals or acting as criminals themselves.

Some changes have also occurred within the police force. In the new dispensation, the police have reduced inefficiency by solving problems locally. The new regime also encourages alliances with community organizations through policing. For example, the police station in Soweto’s Moroka district has cut down on administrative staff and costs, and it keeps murder and crime statistics low. Yet, most residents still have a negative opinion of the police, whom they do not believe serve their interests. In general, because of the dirty work it did under apartheid—such as asking for passes, evicting people from their homes and jailing them for minor offenses—the police has a bad reputation. While the South African police evolved into a force designed to serve the community, it is still structured along apartheid lines.

## JUSTICE

Terry Bell and Dumisa Buhle Ntsebeza provide a unique insight on apartheid and the politics revolving around the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. By providing a bird's-eye view on the justice system in South Africa, these authors reveal how the past continues to inform the present. Apartheid justice is very much alive in post-apartheid South Africa in spite of the rhetoric of change. Under the new South African Constitution of 1996, the rights of every South African citizen are protected. The reality is that farmers beat up workers for no reason and with total impunity.<sup>62</sup> For lack of an effective system of law enforcement, white farmers ignore most new laws that require them to pay minimum wages, provide schooling facilities, and treat their workers in a humane manner. Farm owners continue to evict and intimidate workers if they vote for a different political party other than that of the farmers. In addition, Africans from the rest of the continent are physically attacked by South African Africans with impunity. Neither the police nor South African politicians have intervened to stop these nazi-style attacks on fellow Africans that have resulted in death in most cases.

Apartheid injustice continues to prevail under South African law, which is a complete travesty of justice for the Africans. In September 1998, an African worker worked a full day for a white man. When he demanded his wages, his employer refused to pay him. The worker reported the issue to the local police, who called the employer. The latter claimed that the African had stolen his goods and was a bad worker. As a result, the worker was jailed for two months after failing to pay what the employer was asking for (R500).<sup>63</sup> A white farmer who beat an African worker and dragged him in his bakkie (pickup truck) and hanged him, grinned at the light sentence that he got (a mere R3,000 fine).<sup>64</sup> Gross human rights violations are not limited to rural areas. In 2003, a white bureaucrat shot dead an African man who insisted that he was a South African national. The latter had gone to the office to obtain his identity card. A culture that demeans women persists. Women are frequently raped and abused as a result of the criminality inherited from apartheid. Women also suffer domestic abuse, as well as labor exploitation; they are not informed about new laws because employers limit their access to these laws. This state of lawlessness encourages poor people to get involved in (public and private) organized crime. The ANC has initiated a reform of the judiciary. Constitutional courts, such as the Khayelitsha Magistrate Court (the second largest in the country) have been set up. Specialized courts that operate on Saturdays to address case backlogs have also been created. The administration of justice varies according to the victim's race or class. Police response in the upscale residential areas (mostly white) of Cape Town is much faster than in the townships. If a wealthy white man is murdered in Constantia, the investigation costs up to R854 without taking into account the rewards offered. In the poorer neighborhoods (such as Heideveld), police spends R290 on murder investigations.



## LAND

Land reform is key to the transformation of South Africa. Without a radical land reform program, apartheid inequalities *will not* be eliminated. According to President Thabo Mbeki, whites are willing to give up political power as long as their wealth remains intact. Transformation cannot take place without deracializing the economy. Land reform has been very difficult because of the stubborn resistance by white farmers. White farmers are hostile to change that may place them at an economic disadvantage. The military has refused to release large uncontaminated tracts of land that it used during apartheid. Some of this land remains unused. The land question in South Africa was a major point of contention during the negotiations. The white minority demanded guarantees that their farmers would not lose land without fair compensation based on market values. Such exchange would be based on a willing buyer-willing seller principle. The ANC based its negotiating tactic on two main assumptions. First, it assumed that there would be enough funds to purchase land for redistribution to African peasants. Second, land owners would be willing to sell their land and to accept land reform as a sign of reconciliation. Both assumptions were flawed.<sup>65</sup> Furthermore, the constitutional clauses protecting private property made it impossible for the ANC to carry out radical land reform. The ANC's negotiating stance was also another constraint, by the promise it made to the De Klerk government that it would not alienate white farmers.

The ANC-sponsored RDP promised to implement a land redistribution scheme, that would transfer 30 percent of the land to Africans within the first five years of its rule. By March 2004, a total of 810,292 hectares of land had been transferred to claimants. Between 1995 and March 2004, 48,825 restitution claims involving 122,292 households were settled. As of the time of writing, 1,098,008 hectares have been transferred, representing 1.2 percent of land used for commercial agriculture. Only 386,000 persons have benefited from restitution programs. Agricultural land has yet to be transferred from 60,000 white farmers to more than 19 million Africans in rural areas and 7 million urban homeless poor people. Only 2.3 percent of South Africa's land has changed hands as a result of land reform.<sup>66</sup>

Soon after the 1994 general election, the government announced its land reform program based on three stages: redistribution, tenure reform, and restitution. Between 1995 and 1997, the Department of Land Affairs' Land Reform Programme (LRPP) supervised land redistribution. The LRPP agenda was to address rural poverty as well as gender inequality. It ran into problems because of trying to fit its strategy within the market-oriented goals of the World Bank, which favors profit over land restitution. Land restitution was further complicated by a lack of funds. Furthermore, the government insisted on paying a flat rate of R40,000 to claimants (former residents of Sophiatown) and fixed at R3,500 the value of a service site in the Karoo. What is odd is that the government does not pay a flat rate to farmers who sell their farms. For example, it paid four farmers in the North-West Province R15 million. Finally, the slow speed of releasing land

to the claimants, which placed women at a disadvantage, added to the problems of the government. Currently, there is a proposed amendment in the Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Bill, which provides the first real opportunity for the state to expropriate land for the purpose of transforming South Africa's unequal system of land ownership.

Land tenure reform addressed land ownership issues—linked to customary and property rights—in the former Bantustans. These reforms aimed at expanding communal rural land ownership. The land reform policy was based on expert advice provided by the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the World Bank, as well as other aid agencies. The DBSA proposed that 30 percent of white-owned land be redistributed within the first five years. Most of the organizations that were sympathetic to the demands of the rural majority (such as the National Land Committee/NLC) were overwhelmed by the numerous experts involved in advising the ANC. The connection between land and justice is laid out in the *Constitution's Restitution of Land Rights Act no. 22 of 1994*, which created a Restitution Commission and Land Claims Court as its implementing bodies. These bodies are limited to hearing dispossession cases as a result of the 1913 Land Act. The cumbersome legal process through which land claimants have to go further complicates the exercise. Added to this problem is the fact that there are often several claimants to the same piece of land.

In 1997, a Land Rights Bill was drafted which repealed all apartheid land laws. For example, regarding land tenure, the Framework Document noted, “the policy of the state has changed so that (individual) ownership is only one of a variety of tenure forms in which security is to be protected.”<sup>67</sup> The ANC government seeks the opinion of African peasants before making major decisions. The ANC also introduced measures to protect people from dispossession. One such measure is *The Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act of 1996* that is primarily a “holding” measure. According to this act, people cannot be deprived of their rights without their consent, except by expropriation. The Minister of Land Affairs issued procedures that require his consent as nominal owner of land. This procedure acknowledges the role of the people in addressing land issues. No land can be sold without the people's approval. However, the rights of the majority were not clearly defined in this document. As a result, the Department of Land Affairs introduced *The Communal Property Association Act*, which establishes a land holding communal property association (CPA) that is accountable to the people. Under this Act, disadvantaged communities and the poor may own land communally. This act recognizes that in areas where the African peasants hold the land, they should be allowed to decide the form of land tenure. These reforms provide some protection to communal rural land tenure.

Problems with land delivery arose because of communication breakdown, information gaps, and lack of coordination between the various departments. Farm workers (estimated at 6 million) are demanding that the government introduces new legislation—which would allow them to own the land that they work on. So far, the government has not addressed these concerns. Instead, it has

promoted the rights of large farmers and business concerns over those of small-holders and farm workers. The land policy of the ANC government has been under heavy criticism. For example, it encourages the purchase of land which is then parceled out to different owners without creating jobs in the rural sector. Most large white farms have remained intact, prompting Winnie Madikizela to note, "What puzzles me most is to see that our government constantly turns a blind eye to the issue of land, the issue which is central to the gross inequalities in all spheres of life."<sup>68</sup> The lack of progress on the land issue is due to the fact that the ANC leadership is essentially interested in creating an African middle class in both the commercial and farming sectors, thus putting the issue of land redistribution on the back-burner.<sup>69</sup>

Mangaliso Kubheka is the national officer of the *Movement of Landless Peasants* (MPST) founded in 2002. According to Kubheka, for decades, white farmers benefited from the free labor of Africans. Now that the government requires these farmers to pay their workers 650 Rands per month, Kwazulu-Natal farmers have fired them under the pretense that they are too expensive. Furthermore, once these farmers chase Africans, they fill their land with crocodiles and rhinoceroses as game parks for tourists. "The events [Robert Mugabe's seizure of white-owned farms] in Zimbabwe have given landless Africans in South Africa hope."<sup>70</sup>

The ANC will have to increase delivery fivefold to meet its target of transferring 30 percent of the land to Africans by 2015. As more and more people get frustrated by the slow pace of land reform, conflict is the most likely outcome.

## THE BENEFICIARIES: RACE AND CLASS

### RACE

Apartheid was a system of political, economic, and social privilege based on class, gender, and racial inequalities. By middle class, we mean people who earn incomes above R72,000 per year (about \$12,000). Most Africans in salaried jobs, such as managers, teachers, and other professionals, make up this class. This section will examine who the beneficiaries of democracy were in terms of race and class. South Africa has the most skewed income distribution in the world. The poorest 50 percent of its people receive about 15 percent of total annual household income, and the poorest 19 percent receive only 1.4 percent of that income. Compare this with the top 10 percent households, who receive 42 percent of that income. While the poorest 20 percent earn under R5,700 a year, the richest 20 percent earn more than R76,000 a year.<sup>71</sup> Only one percent of whites are poor compared to nearly 61 percent of Africans who live in what could be "the size of a white family tool shed."<sup>72</sup>

According to statistics cited by Patrick Bond, African household income declined by 19 percent between 1995 and October 2000; during the same period, white household income increased by 15 percent.<sup>73</sup> By 2003, the number of South Africans living in poverty was estimated to be "between 45 and 55 percent" (20–28 million).<sup>74</sup> Addressing such huge racial and class disparities in wealth and

income will require much more than timid and mostly ineffectual affirmative action programs put in place by the ANC. Moral appeals to the conscience of the rich to share some of their wealth with the poor will not suffice.

The ANC has tried to involve blacks in business through black empowerment ventures. It hopes to transfer business ownership to blacks so as to redistribute wealth to benefit the poorest members of the society. The ANC government set up the Black Economic Empowerment Commission, which recommended that black empowerment should be state-driven. The ANC gives ten points to black-owned businesses that compete for government contracts. This new elite is mainly black and male. These black investment companies (130 in all) face the challenge of spreading the wealth since few blacks control them.<sup>75</sup> By 2002, most black empowerment companies were in financial trouble. Smaller ones could not raise enough capital to sustain themselves, and most of their managers were inexperienced. Financially insecure companies—such as Union Alliance Media, Mathamo, and African Media Entertainment—were not up to par with major companies. The greatest beneficiaries of black empowerment schemes are the political elite. As a result, “the income share accruing to the poorest 40 percent of African earners fell by a disquieting 48 percent, while the share accruing to the richest 10 percent rose by 43 percent.”<sup>76</sup> In 2003, the ANC introduced guidelines on black empowerment that defines it as an “inclusive,” not an “exclusive,” process. Such empowerment would focus on skills transfer and enterprise development, not just redistribution of existing wealth. In September 2003, the government introduced the *Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act*, which provides guidelines on the transfer of skills from whites to blacks. It remains to be seen whether such schemes will actually move beyond the stage of mere window-dressing.

#### CLASS

Borrowing an analogy from Allistair Sparks, the South African economy can be compared to a double-decker bus. A multiracial class occupies the top deck. The working class, whose members are mostly poor, occupy the lower deck. Unfortunately, there are no stairs leading to the upper deck. So the lower class wallows in poverty and disease while the multiracial upper class celebrates its wealth. A government study, carried out in November 2003, noted that “two economies persist” in one country.<sup>77</sup> This can result in frustration and what some have called an entitlement mentality.

The business community contributed to finance the election campaigns of the ANC. The first president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, asked twenty chief executive officers (CEOs) of large conglomerates in South Africa to contribute a million Rand each for the 1994 elections, and nineteen did. Mandela also consulted Harry Oppenheimer about his cabinet appointments. Sandton—an upscale suburb of Johannesburg—remains unchallenged as the most expensive residential area in South Africa, where “5 [percent] of the population control 88 [percent] of the nation’s wealth.”<sup>78</sup> Essentially concerned about its role as

mediator between the converging interests of the middle class, the business community, and the foreign donors, the ANC tries very hard to assuage the fears of these groups, who might be hurt by reforms, while at the same time placating the hopes of the African masses for economic and social reform. Class inequalities among Africans, which increased during the last days of apartheid, have persisted since 1994. The top 20 percent is the class that is benefiting from the new dispensation. It receives 72 percent of the total income. About 10 percent of Africans, 17 percent of coloreds, 54 percent of Indians, and 86 percent of whites—just over 4 million—make up the top 20 percent. The rise of this small elite has led to a 60 percent decline in wealth among the lower stratum of the African population. As a result, the share of the poorest 60 percent in the economy has dropped from 14 percent in 1991 to about 11 percent in 1999. Most black empowerment legislation has benefited the African political elite. As a result, some members of the political elite have used their contacts for personal enrichment and have little regard for the majority. It is tragic the new elite forgot where we've come from.<sup>79</sup> To its credit, the ANC elite has not yet reached the level of wealth accumulation previously enjoyed by the apartheid elite.

Black empowerment aims at including a small class of Africans in the white corporate world, which is controlled by five companies that dominate the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Lawrence Mavundla, president of Micro Business Chamber that represents informal traders, notes that black empowerment only serves "a small group of about 300 black people." Instead of creating jobs, Mavundla argues that giving some Africans some shares in conglomerates means "taking people who are already rich and making them richer."<sup>80</sup> Cyril Ramaphosa and Saki Macozoma, who are partners in a black empowerment deal with Standard Bank, are valued at \$30 million each. Patrice Motsepe (who specializes in gold) and Tokyo Sexwale (who is in banking and diamonds) are South Africa's leading black businessmen. According to Macozoma, South Africa does not have enough black people who can handle the wealth involved in business transactions that require large funds. The only fair way to transfer this wealth from whites to blacks is by giving it to a few black businessmen. Critics note that the ANC should do away with these projects because they increase class inequalities. The critics of Black empowerment note that this program gives the false impression that it leads to the creation of an economically viable middle class, which is not the case. These projects are also used to sell a deracialized capitalism to the majority, as well as to silence the militants who demand genuine economic transformation. William Pomeroy argues that black empowerment projects play a negative role in the economy because they entrench blacks into the white controlled economy instead of building a self-sustaining capitalist class. These projects do not encourage blacks to be innovative by starting their own companies. They also divert the ANC from the goals enshrined in the *Freedom Charter*. Ironically, the ANC, and other progressive organizations, have been silent on "racism in South Africa as if no one wants to draw attention to the fact that *baas is still wearing the nicest*" (meaning: "the boss

is still the boss"; italics in original).<sup>81</sup> Within the ANC alliance, both COSATU and the SACP have managed to join the political elite, but they still use rhetoric that connects them to the majority. According to Heribert Adam, this miracle will continue as long as the tripartite alliance "keeps the lid on the disillusioned poor in the name of unity of the progressive forces."<sup>82</sup> Black empowerment is viewed as unique and valuable by the (local and international) media, as well as by the ANC. Both ignore the way the companies conduct business and the class tension between the small elite and the majority. For example, Motlana, who took over a mining company, retrenched thousands of workers. For every single African who is empowered thousands more become unemployed.

The shameless pursuit of wealth and materialism by the ANC has somewhat blunted the sense of guilt of the white middle class over apartheid privileges. The white middle class benefits from the stability the ANC has created since it came to power. The white elite no longer feels threatened by poor Africans because the ANC keeps the latter in check. Now, both easily mingle in exotic parties and celebrity galas. Such obscene enrichment in the midst of poverty exposes the glaring contradictions within the populist rhetoric of the ANC. Furthermore, the ANC held a celebrity gala in Robben Island, where, for a few thousand dollars, celebrities mingled with former prisoner Nelson Mandela for a fund-raising exercise. But why on earth would the ANC hold a celebrity gala on an island that was used as a penitentiary for the key ANC leadership (including Mandela) during the apartheid era? Heribert Adam, Van Zyl Slabbert, and Kogila Moodley note:

It still remains to be explained why the Island's political prisoners themselves return so frequently. Why do Mandela, Kathrada and Sexwale joke at their place of degradation? Survivors of Auschwitz would reassemble for a memorial service but hardly enjoy visiting their place of suffering and trivialize it as a photo opportunity for the international media.<sup>83</sup>

## CONCLUSION

South Africa provides an extreme case of the systematic negation of indigenous African political systems. In South Africa, the African majority is now ruled according to white minority cultural norms and values. In no sense can such a system be called democratic. In brief, democracy in South Africa is similar to the type of democracy prevailing in any other neocolonial African country in the sense that Africans are not in control of the economy, nor are their political systems based on their traditions, culture, and history. The only difference in South Africa is the complex set of political actors and the presence of a white minority—which closely monitors the policies and actions of the ANC. In spite of these constraints, the ANC has been able to transform the conditions facing the majority of the people in education, health, and the delivery of utility services.

As a result, the ANC cannot act freely because the white minority and international business, which still control the economy, keep a very tight watch over its

activities. Either way, these actors will criticize the ANC leadership because any minor economic change is seen as a threat to property or is dismissed as racism. Furthermore, what model of development and democracy can a (morally and culturally) bankrupt elite, which refuses to distance itself from Western culture, offer? This leadership is so seduced by British and American culture that one observer has referred to the ANC elite as "Afro-Saxons."<sup>84</sup> According to Hermann Giliomee, this remark was in "reference to the new ruling elite, personified by President Thabo Mbeki, who almost represented a new ruling ethnic group. It divested itself of all ethnic distinctiveness, embraced British-American culture, spoke a kind of English replete with 'progressive' sociological terms, and vigorously promoted the interests of the black middle class under the umbrella of 'liberation' and 'empowerment.'"<sup>85</sup>



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# A NEW PARADIGM OF THE AFRICAN STATE

## FUNDI WA AFRIKA

Who killed African Democracy? The cultural half caste who came in from Western schools and did not adequately respect African ancestors. Institutions were inaugurated without reference to cultural compatibilities, and new processes were introduced without respect for continuities. Ancestral standards of property and legitimacy were ignored.

—Ali Mazrui, “Who Killed Democracy?,” 2001

There is a general consensus that the postcolonial state in Africa has failed to cater to the needs and aspirations of Africans. Consequently, the state has become irrelevant and distant from its own citizens. In fact, the African masses are so fed up with the failed postcolonial state that they try to avoid, evade and cheat it, whenever possible . . . there is no doubt that the state is epicentral to development and democracy in Africa. But, only a democratically reconstituted state that is anchored on a pro-people foundation can promote the twin objectives of development and democracy.

—Pita O. Agbese and George Klay Kieh, Jr., eds., *Reconstituting the State in Africa*, xi.

THE MAIN FOCUS OF FUNDI WA AFRIKA (TAILOR OR BUILDER IN KISWAHILI), IS the analysis of the state, defined as a multilayered entity from grassroot organizations to the leadership. The core of the state is the people who reside within its boundaries. Diverse ethnic groups and culture, history, and environment make up the state. Our approach includes historical, political, economic, and cultural analysis; it also looks at the impact of population control on the development of Africa. *Fundi* examines the nature and structure of the African state and tries to answer the following questions: How was the African state shaped? What values inform it, and what type of relationship between the rulers and the ruled does it favor?<sup>1</sup>

The two case studies selected (Congo and South Africa) were chosen because they best illustrate our argument. Though different, these two countries share a number of similarities. Both are extremely well endowed in natural resources;

both are very large (2,344,860 and 1,221,040 square km, respectively). Both are highly sought after by foreign powers because of their vast resources and strategic locations. Congo (the Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC], ex-Zaire) is strategically located at the center of Africa. A stable Congo would transform the fate of Africa. A wealthy and stable Congo can provide electricity to the whole continent, and its mineral wealth and agricultural potential can help industrialize the continent. Under the right leadership, the wealth, resources, and know-how of South Africa, can help as an engine of Africa's development. South Africa is also strategically located, with access to both the Atlantic and Indian oceans. South Africa can act as a destabilizing power in the region if it remains a European outpost and a springboard for the penetration of Western countries into the rest of the continent. In both countries, the very existence and survival of the population is at stake. Indeed, in both countries, depopulation (through war in Congo and through HIV-AIDS in South Africa) has become the norm rather than the exception.

The emphasis placed by this work on indigenous African political systems is designed to identify the still functional elements of those systems and institutions that can be used as building blocks to reconstruct a popular and developmental modern African state. In principle, *Fundi* can be used to analyze any African country such as Algeria, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Sudan, to name a few. *Fundi* can even be used outside the continent to study any former colony in which an indigenous population still exists, such as Brazil, Bolivia, Haiti, Indonesia, or Iraq. All these countries experience basically the same conditions, such as poverty, disease, and conflict—they only differ in terms of degree. In African countries, such conditions are more extreme and the stakes are higher than in most third world countries because of the abundant natural resources in Africa and its small population. We can also use *Fundi* to explain why even though Ethiopia and Liberia were always independent, they were never able to industrialize.

Unless the African state is subjected to much greater, in-depth scrutiny and analysis, African studies will continue to deal with form rather than substance. Thus, if the Japanese state reflects Japanese values, the American state American values, or the French state French values, why should African states not reflect African values? Are African values authoritarianism, conflict, corruption, dependency, disorder, hunger, and war? Indeed, African leaders should heed this wise counsel by Chancellor Williams that whenever they organize as a people, they will discover most of their needs can be found within their indigenous institutions.<sup>2</sup>

In order to meet the specific priorities and needs of Africans, the state must be reconfigured by retaining its positive (and adequately functioning) elements and by incorporating the still functional remnants of indigenous African institutions. In essence, the nature of the African state determines the framework of its economic, political, and social interaction with the (sub regional, regional, and international) environment. Such an approach implies that the state becomes the main unit of analysis and the central focus of our study.

## FUNDI WA AFRIKA AS THEORY

We argue that African state structures and their relationship with Western countries are the root causes of the African predicament. “West” here does not imply that Western societies are homogeneous. They are made up of people of different social classes, races, ethnicities, and religious beliefs. Similarly, Africa is not viewed as a homogeneous geographic, environmental, and sociopolitical entity. For example, West Africa (especially the Sahel region) is very different from east, central, and southern Africa. Under the influence of Islam, most African institutions have thrived alongside Western-imposed ones. Furthermore, Islam and Christianity have affected African culture in different ways. In some cases, the worst of indigenous African culture has been retained, for example, when supernatural powers are used to destroy life or cause conflict. Another disturbing feature is the survival of the caste system (based on socioprofessional specialization) in some regions of Africa, such as Sahelian West Africa. This system is so entrenched in these communities that members of the so-called lower castes (such as griots, blacksmiths, or leatherworkers) are not given much room to grow and prosper outside their own caste. Geographically and environmentally, there are also huge differences between the desert, the savannah/Sahel, and the rain forest.

African states also vary greatly in size, natural resource endowment, environmental features, and population. However, the appalling socioeconomic conditions facing the majority of the population (conflict, low life expectancy, disease, famine, poverty, and unemployment), and the exorbitant privileges enjoyed by the ruling elite—obscene wealth, foreign bank accounts, conspicuous consumption, children studying, and families shopping abroad—are much the same throughout the continent. This predicament puts Africa at the lowest level of economic, political, and social development in the world. One striking feature of the African predicament is that the ruling elite typically constitutes no more than 2 percent of the population, yet enjoys full citizenship rights, as well as freedom from hunger, disease, fear, and conflict. This ruling elite—which maintains an expensive, Western-type lifestyle in the country’s capital city—remains totally indifferent to the plight of the majority of the people, who are at their mercy. *Fundi* contends that one cannot understand the African predicament without analyzing African indigenous political systems, as well as the colonial and neocolonial states, as we have done in the preceding chapters. Successive historical processes such as slavery, imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism (an ongoing process renamed “globalization”) contributed to the creation of the present African state, which reflects the Western state but *fails to perform the same functions*.

We argue that this Leviathan is a monster that functions as an agent of exploitation of the people by both African rulers and the West. The present crisis facing the African state, which manifests itself through AIDS, conflict, foreign indebtedness, eugenics population policies, and undevelopment, makes it impossible for the African state to attain autonomous, self-sustaining development. The present state is not conducive to development because its nature—an exogenous structure without the interests, priorities, and needs of Africans at heart—and

its relationship with the West do not allow for any type of autonomous, popular development. In reality, the African state has been constructed in such a way that dependency on the West is inevitable. The way out of this predicament is to replace the present African state with the still functional positive elements of African indigenous institutions in order to create a state that can be both autonomous and democratic. Such a development cannot occur without the participation of Africans, hence the introduction of *Fundi wa Afrika*. To the best of our knowledge, no one has used such an approach before. Mueni wa Muiu decided to apply it to study the nature of the African state after she observed the building process in a small village in eastern Kenya. The owner of the house determined what the needs of the family were, which he then explained to the builder. Throughout the building process, the builder and the customer consulted each other. Whenever any modifications were required, the builder affected them according to the needs and instructions of the client. Muiu noticed the same process when she took fabric to a tailor for a suit to be made. The tailor would ask Muiu what her needs were, and they consulted each other throughout the tailoring process, which would only be completed when both were completely satisfied with the final product. It is then that Muiu realized that the relationship between Africans and their institutions in indigenous Africa was similar to the building and tailoring processes. In those days, the leaders were attentive to the priorities and needs of their people, and they would fashion the political institutions accordingly. Muiu then decided to study the evolution of these institutions to understand when and how they became externally determined rather than being defined by indigenous factors.

*Fundi wa Afrika* is a new paradigm in African studies. By “paradigm” we mean, following Thomas Kuhn, a model of scientific practice that some particular community acknowledges, for a time, as supplying the foundation for its further practice and attracting a group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity. At the same time, this new paradigm is sufficiently open-ended to leave to this group all sorts of problems to resolve.”<sup>3</sup> Our theory departs from the statist approach in that (a) it analyzes the creation and evolution of the African state (from indigenous to colonial and postcolonial), using a long-term historical perspective; (b) it shows how internal and external events and actors in Africa shaped the state and its leadership; and (c) it prescribes what the ideal state and its leadership (as determined by Africans themselves) should be. As we have seen above, the sociopolitical and economic conditions facing the majority of Africans developed over many centuries and obviously cannot be changed within a short time frame. Political and economic transformation will take a very long time, and is likely to involve conflict because the indigenous and foreign beneficiaries of the present system will fight to maintain the *status quo*.

## FUNDI WA AFRIKA IN PRACTICE

The main practical aspects of *Fundi wa Afrika* may be summarized in sixteen points, as follow.

1. According to *Fundi wa Afrika*, the African state must be reconstructed based on African culture, history, traditions, priorities, and needs (however, these are defined by Africans). It uses history to demonstrate that African political systems were radically and permanently altered after slavery to serve minority and Western needs. To reverse this trend, Africans must first recapture their economies. Such a development implies the control by Africans over the resources within their borders for the *sole benefit* of every African child, man, and woman. The dependency of the majority of the population on religious fatalism, corrupt African leaders, or predatory Western countries will only result in bankrupt development models, moral decay, and poverty. According to Alexis de Tocqueville, "If we reasoned from what passes in the world, we should almost say that the European is to other races of mankind, what man is to the lower animals; he makes them subservient to his use; and when he cannot subdue, he destroys them."<sup>4</sup> Leonard Barnes notes that Western countries have nothing to offer anybody "beyond a punch in the face from their power."<sup>5</sup>

Wayne Madsen concisely sums up America's contemporary Africa policy: "America's Africa policy is morally corrupt. Its commercially influenced orientation has directly promoted ethnic rivalries and some of the worst bloodshed of the 20th century. U.S. military and intelligence involvement in Africa, far from creating a sanguine and stable environment for a 'new world order,' has taken the continent back to another era, namely, the 'old world order' of Western tutelage, tribal preferences, commercial chicanery, and continued underdevelopment."<sup>6</sup>

It is self-evident that the interests of Africans differ from those of Western countries. The former want to live in dignity, economic self-determination, and peace, while Western countries want cheap laborers—who accept an inferior position in a Western-dominated world—and markets for their goods. Western countries also want to exploit African natural resources. Given the nature of the relationship between African and Western states, the former cannot industrialize unless the process is controlled by a small white minority, as is the case in South Africa. Furthermore, conflict, war, disease, and epidemics will depopulate the continent to such an extent that it will never be able to compete in the world economy. According to Stanislav Andreski, African countries and peoples will eventually self-destruct under the combined impact of war, famine, and disease, acting as efficient checks on population growth.<sup>7</sup> In other words, according to some Western experts, the main problem with Africa seems to be the *Africans* themselves. According to this argument, the best option for Africa is to *empty* it of Africans. Other races would then develop the continent.<sup>8</sup> Stephen Smith

makes a similar argument in his book entitled *Négrologie*, published as recently as 2003: “If, by some kind of population replacement program, the population of resource-poor Japan could replace that of oil-rich Nigeria; or the population of France could replace that of the Democratic Republic of Congo, then the future of the ‘giant of sub-Saharan Africa’ or that of former Zaire would be secure. Similarly, if six million Israelis could replace an almost equivalent number of Chadians, flowers would bloom in the Tibesti desert [in Chad] and an African Mesopotamia would emerge in the fertile lands between the rivers Logone and Chari [in Chad].”<sup>9</sup>

2. The first priority of any *legitimate* leader in Africa must be to halt the progression of debilitating diseases still endemic in Africa, particularly AIDS, malaria, sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis), river blindness (onchocerciasis), bilharzia (schistosomiasis), and tuberculosis. This means that leaders will not allow their populations to be used as human guinea pigs by pharmaceutical companies, nor will they spend excessive amounts of money on the military at the expense of their people, as is the case in Botswana, Kenya, Uganda, and South Africa. In four conflict-affected central African countries (Angola, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Gabon), WHO, UNICEF, and the CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) launched the first-ever synchronized massive polio immunization campaign with the aim of vaccinating 16 million children between July and September 2001.<sup>10</sup> Sponsored by the same organizations, the *Measles Initiative* led, in 2006, to the vaccination of 217 million children in forty-one African countries, allegedly saving an estimated 1.2 million lives. A leadership that *abandons its people to disease and exploitation is illegitimate*. What is a legitimate leader? It is one who knows (and is responsive to) the basic needs (food, health, and security) of Africans. Legitimate leaders *listen* to their people, they consult them on all major political and economic decisions. Such leaders also consult with local—as opposed to foreign—advisers who have African interests (whichever way these are defined) at heart. Legitimate leaders do not *steal* from the people. Instead, they protect and defend the wealth of the nation for the common good, a feature that existed in indigenous political systems. Finally, these leaders are chosen by Africans for the freedom and security of African states rather than as puppets of Western masters.
3. Africans should connect the rural (where the majority lives) with the urban areas on the basis of African culture. We argue that no people can develop within a foreign culture. If Africans are to control their destiny, they must do so within their own culture. As Ayittey cogently observes, “the continent is littered with the carcasses of failed foreign systems, imposed on the African traditional body . . . Africa’s salvation does not lie in blindly copying foreign systems but in returning to its own roots and heritage and building upon them.”<sup>11</sup> Africans have to take another look at their history to borrow what worked in indigenous Africa and merge it with modern



institutions. Indigenous institutional safeguards, such as checks and balances on the powers of leaders, would benefit contemporary African states. Thus the Ruwenzururu—a peasant guerilla movement of the Bakonzo and Bamba on the Uganda-Zaire border, active from 1962 to 1980—organized peasant communities into popular assemblies with supervisory powers over state functionaries. The village assembly—which included all adult villagers—had the right to appoint, censure, or acclaim the chief without any state interference or intervention.<sup>12</sup>

Botswana has built upon and modernized the *kgotla* system, whereby chiefs and councilors consult each other until they reach a consensus on matters that are important for the community. Thus cabinet ministers are required to attend weekly *kgotla* meetings. In 1991, a \$25 million government-sponsored Okavango River irrigation project met with such staunch opposition from the people at a *kgotla* in the northwestern town of Maun that the government was forced to cancel the project.<sup>13</sup> In KwaDumisa—a rural “quasi-urban” settlement of 13,000 people in the KwaZulu-Natal province of South Africa—responsibility for the governance of this area falls under the jurisdiction of a young, educated chief who practices political and religious tolerance. The tribal authority of KwaDumisa presides over civil cases, which are handled by headmen (or *indunas*) through negotiations with the offenders. In KwaDumisa, people of any political affiliation may come to the area and hold meetings; this has brought peace to an area where violence was endemic. It is noteworthy that leadership roles in KwaDumisa have been developed by women, who play a major role in the governance of the society.<sup>14</sup>

According to *Fundi wa Afrika*, Africans must realize that only their own initiatives and efforts will change the conditions facing them. Once the political arena has been demystified through political awareness, Africans will identify with a reconstituted state. Such a state becomes *theirs*. They will not steal from it because they have made it. They can change it whenever they choose to because it is based on their interests. This liberating awareness becomes a driving force for improving their conditions. It also removes the dependency syndrome of Africans (whether on leaders, deities, or the West).

*Fundi wa Afrika* does not assume that culture is constant, but views it as a dynamic force that changes according to the evolving conditions. It does not assume that all African culture is valuable, just like not all Western culture is positive. Some aspects of African culture have been used to dispossess Africans. For example, the openness of Africans to strangers has resulted in some people taking advantage of Africans. The trust of Africans in others, who they think have their best interest at heart is a weakness. This aspect of African culture must be discouraged. In other words, Africans must privilege their interests—however defined—over those of others. As is the case for any other society, Africans must rely and build on the best

of their own culture to recreate the state. They must incorporate modern technology into the positive aspects of their culture. Citing Japan as an example, Robert Guest correctly argues that modernization does not necessarily mean Westernization: “Africans face the same challenge now that Japan faced in the nineteenth century: how to harness other people’s ideas and technology to help them build the kind of society that *they*, the Africans, want.”<sup>15</sup> Production must be focused on domestic needs rather than being export-oriented. Such an orientation implies that the first priority would be like in any other modern state: to meet the peoples’ basic needs, particularly in terms of food (subsistence agriculture).

4. Africans must transform their educational systems. Under colonial education, Africans were trained in irrelevant fields that were not informed by their culture and environment. Education was too theoretical. It was too centralized in urban centers, thus neglecting villages. Western education in Africa alienates Africans from their culture and environment. It presents Africans as people without any *positive* tradition, culture, and history—people who were always “backward,” weak, and dependent until Western colonialists and Christian missionaries came to *save* them. This misrepresentation must be countered if Africans are to be free. Civic education will be crucial in creating an African state. Such an educational system encourages students to be innovators and educators rather than passive consumers of information. It can integrate African oral tradition, art, and history with science and technology to prepare Africans to deal with their environment and their economic and social conditions. Such an education would use a new type of pedagogy. For example, instead of students sitting in a classroom facing the teacher, the African circle that was used for story telling could be introduced. Students would sit in circles with the teacher—acting as a facilitator of knowledge—at the center, in the belief that we learn in different ways. Furthermore, education should directly relate to the reality, culture and history of the students rather than alienating them from their environment. Thus colonial education discouraged Africans from studying science and mathematics. The new educational system must emphasize both disciplines. Schools of mines and engineering must be introduced throughout the continent to teach Africans how to exploit their resources. The abridged and popularized version of the eight-volume UNESCO *General History of Africa* can be used as a starting point for teaching history. Compulsory universal education must be introduced throughout Africa. No society can develop without its youth. Any keen observer visiting African countries from Cape Town to Cairo will be shocked by the number of idle youth. *Fundi wa Afrika* argues that any development plan that condemns the youth of a society to social, moral, and cultural decay—such as that currently proposed by the IMF and the World Bank—must absolutely be *rejected*.

5. Without the proper leadership, Africa is lost to Africans. Throughout African history, African leaders were active as either heroes or collaborators. The system of collaboration continues today. The priority of the new leadership must be to empathize and meet the needs of the people. “Democracy” in Africa must serve the interests, priorities, and needs of the majority. Any leadership that does not fulfill this role is illegitimate. Enforcing the popular will must be the guiding principle of a good leader. No leader should abandon its people to indignities justified as the rule of law. Whose law is it, anyway? If such law is a mere pretext to exploit the people, then *nobody should abide by it*. Africans must search their history to understand how leaders were chosen, trained, and prepared for leadership based on tradition and culture. The new African leadership should exhibit the following characteristics. First, this leadership must have Africa and its people as its only priority. Second, it must be chosen from each level (village/town council, national, and federal) based on ideals and principles that the people themselves will decide on. Third, the criteria for measuring the performance of the leaders will be based on what they have done for the people rather than how long they have been in office. Constitutions (whether written or oral) will have provisions that allow the people to remove a leader from office before the end of a term if such a leader is deemed unsuitable or corrupt. Such a leadership can only develop within a reconstituted state and as a result of the transformation of education. This explains why Africans have to achieve this objective without any foreign interference.
6. Any system that condemns women to violence, poverty, and disease must be overhauled. Most indigenous African political systems respected women. But this changed under colonialism. African states must put women back in their rightful place in society as economic, political, and social actors. Women play a central role in Africa’s economy. The majority of peasant farmers in Africa (about 80 percent) are women who—as they did in the indigenous economy—continue to dominate rural markets and trade. Historically, the trade profits of market women were used to finance political activities. In indigenous systems, women had a choice in polygamous marriages. Women should not be forced into polygamous marriages against their will. Democracy is about choice. Lower-income women have been the victims of the IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs, as states drastically cut down their expenditure on health care, education, and other social services. Women have also been affected by globalization because they are the worst paid in the world economy. They continue to constitute the majority of AIDS’ victims. The liberation of African women must be based on the positive aspects of indigenous institutions; it cannot come from mimicking Western feminism. Without women, Africa is lost to Africans. African women will be the driving force of the political, economic, and social development of Africa.

7. In the context of globalization and the world economy, African countries must be selective in their trade policies in order to develop their human resources behind protective barriers. It is crucially important that Africans create their own companies that will operate throughout the federation and will be given preferential treatment over foreign-owned ones. All foreign companies operating within the federation will be required to pay taxes, and humane wages. In a reconstituted state, African leaders have to introduce measures that protect workers against exploitation by transnational companies, such as limited working hours, minimum wages, pensions, and medical insurance. Furthermore, companies operating in these countries must not be allowed to create tax-free zones, which operate as enclave economies and discriminate against the local people. A National Development Fund (NDF) will be created. Each foreign firm will be required to deposit a percentage of its annual revenues—say 10 percent—in the NDF. Instead of relying on foreign experts, African countries working within a reconstituted state will exclusively rely on African expertise (trained within the new educational system). The disconnect between African leaders and African professionals and African civil society/grassroot organizations in contemporary African states is striking. African leaders do not work with African professionals to create policy. Instead, there is tension and competition between the two groups, a process that began with the onset of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. This process can only be reversed within a reconstituted state.
8. In the reconstituted African state, the activities of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) will be circumscribed and strictly regulated. In African countries today, there are far too many NGOs, each operating according to different agendas, often to the detriment of the people. Some of the activities of Non Governmental Organizations—especially those engaged in birth control programs—are highly questionable. In a reconstituted state, laws and regulations will be introduced to ensure that the activities of these organizations conform to the interests, priorities, and needs of Africans rather than those of the West.
9. No development can occur without an efficient transportation system. Roads, railways, and air routes should be planned to connect African states to each other. Communication and telecommunication networks must be geared toward the inter-African movement of people and goods rather than toward the former colonial metropolises. Transportation must be improved so that Africans can easily travel within the continent. Currently, it costs more to ship a car from Dakar, Senegal to Cairo, Egypt than it does to ship one from Japan to Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. Internal transportation will also improve communication between African regions and facilitate trade because goods will be cheaper to transport. Once internal transportation is improved, trade will increase as different regions trade with each other on the basis of complementarity. For example, Senegal imports nearly all its food. Milk and fruit juices come from France, Italy, or Portugal. Fruits

are imported from either Morocco or South Africa. From October each year, lettuce must be imported because none can be produced domestically. In a reconstituted state, countries located in the Sahel can trade with east, central, and southern Africa in various goods. For example, Sahelian countries are known for their beautiful cloth and artwork. They can export these to central, east, and southern Africa in exchange for food. These countries will also trade in minerals. Each region will concentrate on what it produces most efficiently without manufacturing goods produced in other regions. Just as the indigenous system in which different areas—such as forest, savannah, and Sahel—complemented each other, the reconstituted state will be based on complementarity. Regions best suited for agriculture will concentrate on food production, while the Sahelian regions shall focus on textiles, minerals, and fossil fuels and services. Thanks to the freedom of movement of people, goods and capital, expertise will be widely shared by all the states and all the regions.

10. Africans cannot have a reconstituted state without a comprehensive cultural policy in the area of radio and visual arts (including television and film). A uniform policy must be introduced that sets standards for radio and television programming, as well as for film production. A supervisory board will examine each film proposal to make sure that the films produced in (and distributed on) the continent do not denigrate Africans, do not demean African culture, and do not undermine African values. In the reconstituted state, no foreign-owned radio or television station will be allowed to operate, as is currently happening in Botswana, Kenya, and South Africa. Artists, filmmakers, and writers will produce their works in total freedom and without any ideological bias. Foreign soap operas, which seduce the poor with the artificial glamour of Western luxury without providing the means for these people to achieve their goals, should be discouraged.
11. A reconstituted state must protect children and the youth (from birth to age eighteen). The traveler to such countries as Angola, Congo (DRC), Kenya, Botswana, Uganda, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and South Africa is struck by the number of young children who engage in prostitution. In most of these countries, pornographic material is not restricted. Another common feature of these countries is the number of foreign and local men and women who engage in sexual activities with children. Most of these countries have become havens for pedophiles, who get away with activities that are severely sanctioned by law in their home countries. Except for Burkina Faso and Senegal, judicial systems in most African countries have ignored the impact of pedophilia on the fabric of their societies. Most so-called tourism (actually called “sex tourism”) is nothing but sex orgies that destroy children. Heavy penalties must be introduced to punish pedophiles, as well as older men and women, who engage in sexual activities with children. As the incidence of AIDS increases, another very disturbing development is the number of men—in such countries as Kenya, Malawi and

South Africa—who rape babies in the belief that these babies will “cure” them of the dreaded disease. Some have cloaked this despicable practice under the mantel of “African culture.” There are absolutely no instances in indigenous institutions where infants were violated in this manner. Current justice systems do not protect these infants and children. A reconstituted state must impose prohibitive fines on any group or individuals that promote the violation of the lives of children under the pretense of “African culture,” “tourism,” or “religion.”

12. A reconstituted state must also protect girls from genital mutilation, a practice carried over from ancient Egypt and Kush. In some areas of Guinea, the rituals, which mark the rites of passage of girls, have been retained without resorting to the mutilation. African states can still allow the rituals to be practiced but without the mutilations that have caused so much death and suffering. The goal of the reconstituted state is to retain the positive aspects of African culture while acquiring relevant technology for development. It cannot do so without protecting girls from medically unsound and dangerous practices.
13. Most African cities have not substantially increased the electricity, water, and sanitation infrastructure that they inherited from colonial governments. In most cases, facilities have deteriorated since independence. No development can occur without a beautification and sanitation department in every region. The main goal of such a department will be to make sure that water is available, at all times, by creating reservoirs. Furthermore, cleaning programs must be put in place whereby garbage is disposed of properly, and recycling centers are created throughout the region. A cleaning program (similar to that of Shaka Zulu) must be introduced in which each resident is responsible for keeping their private quarters and their cities clean because it is “their” city. There is nothing “traditional” about unsanitary conditions. It is a terrible habit that smacks of irresponsibility and lack of accountability. Africans have always kept their villages clean. Why do they lose this quality when they move to cities? Any beautification and sanitation program should include taking care of homeless people who populate African cities from Cape Town to Cairo. A reconstituted state must build cheap housing for the homeless and provide job training, for example, in crafts and education. In Dakar (Senegal), people, goats, and sewage compete for swimming space in the ocean. During the rainy season, sewage fills some streets for days. In Nairobi (Kenya), Kibera and Mathare have become garbage dumps. Pikine (Dakar, Senegal), Guguletu, and Kayelitsha (outside Cape Town) do not fare better. A state that is managed by the right leadership will not privatize water to the detriment of the poor. Rather, it will tax companies to provide essential public services for the poor. A reconstituted state must make beautification and sanitation a priority. People must be rewarded for planting trees, creating parks, and making both private and public spaces clean.



14. Africa cannot be secure without a continental army based on redrawn borders (see Fig. 10.1). Each state will contribute a contingent to a standing federal army to protect the continent. This army will be in a better position than international agencies to respond quickly to internal emergencies and to help relocate refugees. Government institutions will draw on African indigenous methods of conflict resolution. They will open avenues for resolving conflict before it arises by providing basic resources that currently force many people into conflict such as land, food, health care, and shelter. The presence of an African federal army will also reduce the role of foreign and domestic mercenaries that continue to wreck havoc in these states. Furthermore, each state will maintain its own youth service (a type of national guard), but will rely on the federal army for its security. The army will not be used to oppress citizens; instead, it will be fully integrated in, and be in



Figure 10.1



the service of, the community, hence the need for a mentally decolonized military leadership firmly rooted in African traditions and values.

15. The African “debt” must be totally written off, and a moratorium on debt repayment declared. Ordinary African men, women, and children cannot be held accountable *ad vitam aeternam* (for ever) for a debt incurred by their unelected elites in pursuit of their own enrichment, and without the consent of the African people. African leaders themselves are personally accountable for repayment of the debt incurred vis-à-vis their Western lenders and overlords. In this sense, it can be truly said that Africa and Africans owe absolutely nothing to Western countries or their agencies. If anything, *it is the West that owes Africans reparations* for the millions of human lives lost and billions of dollars of mineral wealth plundered, and revenues extracted, during five centuries of European predation and exploitation through slavery, imperialism, colonialism, debt repayment, neocolonialism, and globalization.
16. One cannot discuss the reconstitution of the African state without examining its various fragments. First, there is the divide between the indigenous and the modern sector and between various African states with different colonial experiences and traditions. Second, ethnicity has been so politically manipulated by both colonial agents and the postcolonial elite that it has become a major source of conflict. Following indigenous notions of identity that respect humanity in spite of differences, Africans must learn to tolerate difference as a source of strength. A state that creates conditions for foreigners and local politicians to pay Africans to engage in mass murder, armed robbery, and rape is in cultural and moral decay (as happened in Kenya (December 2007-April 2008) will not be allowed in the Federation of African states). An educational system that emphasizes an African identity will play a key role in transforming ethnicity from an agent of division of the people to one of unity. People can still identify themselves as Arab, Luo, Maninka, Yoruba, or Zulu, as long as that identity is not used to create conflict. Once an African identity is privileged over an ethnic one, Africans will be ready to control their destinies as they live in peace and dignity. Third, a vast gap exists between Africans in the diaspora and those on the continent. Both must have open dialogues to encourage communication and an understanding based on cultural, as well as other, differences. Africans must seek other groups in the diaspora who have the same goals to reconstitute the state. Africans in the diaspora who support the new state could invest in these states or settle there if they wish to. Fourth, a divide exists within the African continent between rich and powerful states (such as Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa) and poor and weak ones (such as Comoros, Djibouti, Gambia, the Seychelles, and São Tome and Príncipe). This divide also exists between the forest, the savannah, and the Sahel as well as between the urban and rural areas. A reconstituted state must complement all these areas as they work together. Fifth, the current

African state suffers from a fragmentation of knowledge.<sup>16</sup> In contemporary African states, there are three types of elites that neither communicate nor complement each other. First, the indigenous elite trained in oral tradition, for example, griots/praise singers, and medicine men and women. Second, a Muslim/Arabic elite trained to write in Arabic and African languages, as well as a Christian elite. Finally, colonialism introduced its own elite trained in English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish at the expense of indigenous languages. A reconstituted state must create avenues where all these elites communicate and work toward the same goal. Unless there is a complementary relationship between these three elites, there can be no economic and political and cultural leadership in Africa.

### FROM THE OAU TO THE AU AND NEPAD

Different African states must unite within a Federation of African States (see FAS map 10.1) to create internal markets for African goods and economies of scale. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that the Organization of African Unity (OAU), at its fifth extraordinary summit meeting in Sirte (Libya) of March 1–2, 2001, formally adopted an African Union, complete with a Pan-African Parliament, Court of Justice, and African Economic Community. Unfortunately, what has emerged from the Sirte meeting is not a United States of Africa, but another pale imitation of the European Union, designed to further open it up for exploitation. As has happened throughout history, with the support of the West, African rulers have mortgaged the continent and its future to various organizations. During this process, various factions emerged, thus demonstrating the inability of African rulers to think and act independently of their Western sponsors. Such factions included one led by Algeria, Nigeria, and South Africa (with the support of United States and the European Union), on the one hand, and the very few which sided with Libya, on the other hand. The Libyan faction called on a self-reliant United States of Africa in the spirit of the pan-African project of the late Kwame Nkrumah. The Algeria, Nigeria, and South Africa camp won the day. The African Union was finalized in Maputo (Mozambique) in July 2003. It is deliberately modeled after the European Union (EU) with a Council of Ministers, a Commission, a pan-African Parliament, and an African Court of Justice, while the secondary model is the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) as formalized in the *Kampala Document* of the Africa Leadership Forum, then led by President Olusegun Obasanjo of May 1991.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a merger of two previous initiatives: the millennium Action Plan for African Recovery (MAP), launched in February 2001 and sponsored by Thabo Mbeki (South Africa), Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria), and Abdelaziz Bouteflika (Algeria), and the Omega plan of Abdoulaye Wade (Senegal), which morphed into the ECA's Compact for African Recovery, which eventually became NEPAD. NEPAD's objective is to

eradicate poverty through a new partnership between Africa and external donors regrouped within the “Strategic Partnership for Africa.” It has identified eight sectors for priority action: good governance, infrastructure, education, health, agriculture, new information and communication technology, energy, and market access. A total of US\$64 billion has been earmarked to finance this program, to which the United States has committed a \$6 billion aid package. NEPAD has now been merged into the AU’s development program. NEPAD is fatally flawed in many respects. First, it is definitely not (as its sponsors claim) an *African* initiative, supposedly African crafted and African owned. In fact, NEPAD is modeled after the U.S. Marshall Aid Plan for the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. NEPAD is also certainly not people-oriented: it was designed without consultation with African parliamentarians, NGOs, and civic associations, and it is managed by a small clique of African leaders—the G-4, or Group of four: Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa—excluding other African countries and political leaders. NEPAD is essentially a neoliberal project based on the accelerated liberalization and privatization of African economies, with Western economic, financial, and technical assistance and support. It is a mere “poverty reduction” program that dovetails with similar programs promoted in Africa by the international financial institutions (International Monetary Fund [IMF] and World Bank), notably the IMF and World Bank’s poverty reduction programs, Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), and the Highly Indebted Developing Countries (HIDC) initiatives. It is also congruent with such bilateral free-market aid, trade, and investment initiatives as the U.S. Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA).

The AU and NEPAD cannot succeed because they are conceived from above (by the leadership) without popular input or support. They do not question the nature of the African state since they accept it as legitimate. To borrow from Claude Ake, development based on these institutions is development against the people because they assume Africa can only develop by following the Western path in spite of its dismal performance. In addition, the AU and NEPAD are Western-inspired and conceived, and thus not informed by African culture, history, and environment. Being managed by a small clique (the G-4), NEPAD promotes inter-African conflict and works against African unity. Finally, the goal of the AU and NEPAD is to remove the symptoms of the crises in these countries (poverty reduction) without addressing the root cause of the crises, namely, the nature of the African state. In other words, the sole purpose of these institutions is to open Africa up for better exploitation by Western firms at the expense of the African peoples’ interests, priorities, and needs.

### THE ECONOMY IN THE FEDERATION OF AFRICAN STATES

Economic independence based on the exploitation of Africa’s resources, with a view to improve the standard of living of Africans, can only occur once the map of the continent is redrawn and the *right* leadership chosen *by Africans for Africa*.

Obviously, economic independence cannot be achieved without a rearguard struggle from the contemporary beneficiaries. In the Federation of African States, all economic activities will be geared toward four main goals: improving the standard of living of the majority of the people; building infrastructure so Africans can travel safely from Cairo to Cape Town; social welfare programs that protect all people and strengthening the federation. In this spirit, particular emphasis will be placed on interstate trade within the federation. For example, FAS members that produce oil will sell it to other members, while they, in turn, will purchase food items or textile products from these states. State corporations—manned by adequately trained managers, technicians, and engineers—will be set up to manage and control key sectors of the economy, such as utilities (water, electricity, and telecommunications) and mining.

### GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN FAS

What will Africa look like by 2108? Africa will have one constitution and a common foreign defense policy. Instead of the current fifty-four states, Africa will be divided into five super states (see Figure 10.1). The new state of *Kimit* includes: Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, and Western Sahara, plus the Arab population of Mauritania, Northern Sudan, and Northern Chad. *Mali* will include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo, plus the African population of Mauritania. *Kongo* will include Congo (DRC), Congo Republic, Cameroon, Southern Chad, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tome and Principe, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. *Kush* includes southern Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia-Somaliland, Kenya, Tanzania, Zanzibar, Seychelles, and Comoros. *Zimbabwe* includes Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Malawi, Mozambique, Madagascar, Mauritius, Lesotho, Swaziland, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The new federal capital city will be called Napata. It will not belong to any of the five states. These states will make up the *Federation of African States (FAS)*. Each region will have a key player, based on population and resources, for example, Kongo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa. *FAS* will be protected by a federal army made up of diverse members from the five states. All external economic relations will be conducted by the federal government. Economic and political power will be decentralized, giving people more input in the day-to-day activities of the federation.

The leaders of each of the five states will meet thirty-six times a year. They will meet in Napata twelve times a year. The other twelve times, these leaders will meet in each one of the states on a rotating basis, based on alphabetical order, with the other twelve meetings being held in their own states. While in a particular state, leaders will meet with the people in town halls, as well as in the village council of a particular state, so that they can know that particular state's

needs. These meetings will be crucial in decentralizing power between rural and urban areas, therefore encouraging a bottom-up approach, where leaders learn from the people.

Power will be decentralized: each unit will check the power of the other. Power will start from the village councils, made up of the local people. This will be followed by a regional council of elders, then a national council that will be followed by the federal council of presidents. According to *Fundi wa Afrika*, the continent will be divided into five regions. These regions will make up the Federation of African States (FAS, see Fig. 10.1), which will be governed by five rotating presidents on the basis of a federal system. National ideals, values, and goals based on African culture, history, and environment will inform every aspect of governance. Unlike liberal democracy that privileges corporate, sectional, and elite interests over those of the majority of the people, Africa will have a popular democracy—based on accountability and responsibility—that will be organized from below. Democracy will only be meaningful in Africa if it allows the people—both those in rural and urban areas—to decide on their destiny, rather than allowing corrupt leaders based in capital cities to do so. Since each section of the population will have representatives at all levels of government, power will be decentralized and the people will determine their destiny based on their interests, priorities, and needs.

In FAS, governance will be based on a bottom-up approach, where most of the political power will belong to the village councils of each state, composed of 120 members elected directly by the people. The people's council (composed of 600 members, 120 per state) shall meet twelve times a year at the federal level. Elections will be based on proportional representation, where the election of a candidate will depend on the actual number of votes. Members of the village councils would be in office for terms of seven years each, renewable indefinitely. Each would represent the village council at the federal level. Each state's governance is entrusted to a state village council, made up of 200 members (also elected directly by the people on the basis of proportional representation). These members would be in office for two three-year terms (if reelected). State village councils would work within the ideals of FAS, as laid out in the its constitution. The next level would be the council of elders, which would be in office for a maximum of three five-year terms. The council of elders would have 100 members (chosen directly by the people from diverse professional and age groups) from each state. A state's council of elders would be in office for a maximum of two four-year terms. The council of elders will be responsible for advising the house of vice presidents and the president. The third branch of government will be the judiciary, made up of individuals skilled in indigenous as well as some Western law (where it applies). Village, provincial, state, and national courts (High Organ) will make up the judiciary system.

The penal system will be based on rehabilitation rather than on retribution and incarceration. FAS will totally prohibit the death penalty. People convicted of crimes and minor offences will be rehabilitated through community service—such as building/repairing roads, schools, public buildings, or wells—for a specific

period of time, depending on the nature and seriousness of the crime. Discrimination in any form will be punishable by law. Any FAS citizen will be allowed to travel and settle freely throughout the federation, regardless of ethnicity, national origin, race, class, or gender.

Five vice presidents will make up the fourth branch of government. Each state will elect one vice president. Candidates for the vice presidency must be elected by the constituents of the state, based on proportional representation and on FAS ideals, as stated in the constitution. The vice presidents will serve for an initial eight-year term to be renewed once. The fifth branch of government will be made up by the presidency, which will rotate from state to state, based on alphabetical order. Three presidential candidates from a particular state will be chosen from, and by, the village council. They must win a national election in all five states. The candidate receiving the most votes will become the president. Each president will serve an eight-year term, renewable once. Political power will be like a pyramid, with the base holding the most influence (see Fig. 10.2). The people shall have the right to remove any elected official from office before his or her term is over, by referendum. The Federation of African States will have a constitution that will specify the structure, rights, duties, and powers of each branch of government. Members of the village councils, council of elders, and judiciary will draft

## GOVERNANCE IN FAS




Figure 10.2

the constitution with the assistance of the citizens. The people shall approve the constitution by referendum.

Without political and economic unity among African states, and without a political system based on the interests of Africans and informed by indigenous institutions, there can neither be a united Africa, nor an African renaissance. As the preceding discussion amply demonstrates, this calls on Africans to take control over their own development. Kwame Nkrumah correctly observed in the early sixties: "We in Africa have untold agricultural, mineral, and water-power resources. These almost fabulous resources can be fully exploited and utilized in the interests of Africa and the African people, only if we develop them within a Union Government of African States."<sup>17</sup> Africa's unity is still essential for development, peace, and security. Godfrey Mwakikagile notes, "If the future of Africa lies in federation, that kind of federation could be a giant federation of numerous autonomous units which have replaced the modern African state in order to build, on a continental or sub-continental scale, a common market, establish a common currency, a common defense, and maybe even pursue a common foreign policy under some kind of central authority-including collective leadership on rotational basis-which Africans think is best for them."<sup>18</sup>

On the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday, former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere left these words of wisdom for the benefit of Africans: "Africa . . . is isolated. Therefore, to develop, it will have to depend upon its own resources basically, internal resources, nationally, and Africa will have to depend upon Africa. The leadership of the future will have to devise, try to carry out policies of maximum national self-reliance and maximum collective self-reliance. They have no other choice. *Hamna* [meaning: "there is none" in Ki-Swahili]"<sup>19</sup>

Africans must be incredibly bold and innovative if they are to, at last, control their natural resources and their destiny. They are definitely up to the challenge.



## CONCLUSION

# TOWARD A FEDERATION OF AFRICAN STATES (FAS)

Is Africa a victim of exploitation or marginalization? The short answer must be that it is a victim of both . . . Africa suffers acutely from exploitation: every packet of Kenyan tea sold in New York, every overpriced tractor exported to Nigeria, every dollar of interest on ill-conceived and negligently supervised loans to African governments (interest that accrues to Western banks)—not to mention every diamond illegally purchased from warlords in Sierra Leone or Angola—benefits people in the West at the expense of Africa's impoverished populations.

—Colin Leys and John S. Saul, “Sub-Saharan Africa in Global Capitalism,”  
in John S. Saul *The Next Liberation Struggle Capitalism,  
Socialism and Democracy in Southern Africa*, 20–21

As part of the reconstitution of the nation-state project in Africa, governments have to recapture their economic policy-making responsibilities from the multilateral financial institutions . . . It is not conceivable that the current challenges to the nation-state in Africa could ever be fully addressed if control over the destiny of the countries of the continent and their economies rest with multilateral agencies exercising unaccountable transitional power.

—Liisa Laakso and Adebayo Olukoshi, eds.  
*Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa*, 36

We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe . . . Let us decide not to imitate Europe . . . So . . . let us not pay tribute to Europe by creating states, institutions, and societies which draw their inspiration from [Europe] . . . If we wish to live up to our peoples' expectations, we must seek the response elsewhere than in Europe . . . we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man.

—Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 312–16

THIS BOOK INTRODUCES A NEW PARADIGM, CALLED *FUNDI WA AFRIKA*, in the study of African politics. This paradigm is based on a thorough critique of contemporary theories and approaches of the African state. We used *Fundi* to analyze the emergence and development of a number of African indigenous political systems and institutions.

The onset of slavery in central and West Africa in the fifteenth century thoroughly transformed indigenous political systems and institutions. Consent and consensus were replaced by predation, force, and violence. War, fear, and insecurity replaced peace, safety, and security. Henceforth, supernatural powers were used for evil rather than for good, to destroy rather than to build. This negatively affected the traditional role of leaders as intermediaries between the ancestors and the people, between the dead and the living, and it permanently destroyed the basis of the legitimacy of the leaders.

Colonialism in Africa accelerated and deepened the divide that developed between leaders and citizens during the era of the Atlantic slave trade. “Independence” was in name only. An infrequently discussed issue in African studies is the presence of foreign military bases in the so-called independent countries of Africa. These military bases serve four main purposes, which are: (i) to protect economic interests; (ii) to gather intelligence to repress any movement that calls for self-determination; (iii) to protect puppet leaders against an uprising of their own people; and (iv) to intimidate the people by presenting an all-powerful image of “empire”—often renamed “globalization”—in contemporary Africa.

China has entered the fray. A pattern reminiscent of the imperialism of the late nineteenth century—though in a somewhat less aggressive form—is currently developing. Chinese traders are investing in the African informal sector, where their cheap wares undercut local entrepreneurs. In Zambia, copper mines have been signed over to Chinese firms; workers toil for twenty hours a day, seven days a week. These workers earn less than \$2.00 a day. Given the enormous profit these companies are making, it can be safely predicted that they will enter into more deals with Zambia. In Guinea—which is the second world producer of bauxite after Australia—Chinese firms have also signed deals with the ruling elite. There is a positive aspect to the Chinese role in Africa’s economies. Chinese firms usually offer much better contractual deals than Western firms for the construction of roads, bridges, and harbors. This development opens some bargaining opportunities for African countries.

*Fundi* uses a long-term historical perspective to present an exhaustive, panoramic view of the issues at stake in Africa’s economic, political, and social development so that Africans can get out of the African predicament. The development treadmill is a process that recycles bankrupt ideas for the sole purpose of allowing the West to access African resources, labor, and markets. Used in this manner, history becomes a weapon. History helps us learn from the experience of past generations—positive and negative, good and bad—without dismissing such events as “useless” or “primitive.” History also sets a clear pattern: fragmentation of states, of institutions, of knowledge, of values, and of a whole process of learning.

What kind of civilization, what type of development decree, that the resources of Africans do not legitimately belong to them? What kind of civilization allows the coercion, oppression, rape, brutality, mutilations, mayhem, murder, and genocide of the days of slavery and colonialism to continue unabated at the dawn of the twenty-first century? It is interesting to note, in this regard, that the practice

of using porters and slave labor, and of cutting off people's arms, hands, legs, and feet as an incentive to produce more rubber in King Léopold's Congo Free State (CFS) in the late nineteenth to early twentieth century has being carried over to the present day by the combatants of Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front (RUF). According to Meredith, during the 1991–92 civil war, the RUF routinely conscripted civilians to work as slave labor in mines or as porters, called "mules." The civilian "mules" were required to carry up to 100 kilos of equipment each. Not surprisingly (and just as in the days of the CFS), as one journalist observed, "the life span of a mule was not long." Furthermore, hacking off arms, hands, legs, and feet of helpless villagers—men, women, and children, alike—as retribution for "aiding and abetting the enemy," became a RUF trademark.<sup>1</sup> What kind of "civilization" allows children—between the ages of seven and fourteen—to be massively recruited as soldiers in various civil wars (notably Liberia, Sierra Leone, northern Uganda, southern Sudan, and the DRC)? René Maran neatly captures the essence of European "civilization" from the point of view of its African victims: "Civilization, civilization, pride of the Europeans and graveyard of innocents, you build your kingdom on cadavers. You are the force that prevails over the law, you are not a guiding light, but a wild fire."<sup>2</sup> Under the present circumstances, even the best leaders would be unable to successfully undertake a process of institutional transformation designed to improve the socio-economic conditions of the majority of the African people. Even in South Africa, given another choice, South Africans would not have elected Nelson Mandela. The same method that the British used with Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya—groom him for power while he is still in political detention—was effectively used by Afrikaners in the 1980s. As Meredith observes, "Mandela's secret talks with government officials had convinced them that he was a man with whom the white establishment could do business . . . Like other white communities in Africa, they [white South Africans] had come to accept the old adage: give them parliament and keep the banks."<sup>3</sup> It was under the leadership of Nelson Mandela that the African National Congress negotiated away its economic and military and security rights, thereby hammering the last nail on the coffin of Africa's independence.

The authors reject the procedural and minimalist conception of liberal democracy (also called electoral democracy)—with its emphasis on multiparty elections, electoral competition, and civil and political liberties—as inappropriate in the African context.<sup>4</sup> Instead, we argue that what Africa needs is popular democracy. By popular democracy we mean a type of democracy: (i) in which people have effective decision-making power; (ii) that places emphasis on concrete political, social, and economic rights; (iii) that puts as much emphasis on collective rights as it does on individual rights; and (iv) a democracy of incorporation, that is as inclusive as possible.<sup>5</sup>

At the time of writing, the state in most African countries has become irrelevant because most people try to avoid it at all times. The proposition made by *Fundi* is not far fetched because, in practice, Africans are already in the process of integrating on their own terms. A reconstructed state will respect Africa's

history by creating centers of culture and learning. The series of tragic events that have marked European intervention in Africa—the trans-Atlantic slave trade, imperialism, and colonialism—will be commemorated throughout the continent and the African diaspora. A day should be set aside to remember the suffering of all (and collaboration of some) Africans under trans-Atlantic slavery so that such a holocaust and massive forced displacement of population will never happen again. The millions of victims of imperialism and colonialism—through military conquest, armed repression, forced labor, conscription, and participation in two world wars—should also be remembered. Similarly, the millions of Africans who died for freedom in the national liberation struggles should be honored. The final holiday should celebrate Africa's freedom so that Africans may cherish it and defend it at all costs.

*Fundi* calls on Africans to get rid once and for all of their (economic, technological, and cultural) *dependency syndrome*, and to cease to be supplicants in international economic forums and institutions, going around with begging bowl in hand.<sup>6</sup> The perceptive analysis of the Congolese situation by the late Roman Catholic Archbishop of Bukavu, Archbishop Emmanuel Kataliko applies, *pari passu*, to the whole African continent:

Foreign powers, with the collaboration of some of our Congolese brothers, organize wars over the control of the resources of our country. The resources, which should be used for our development, for the education of our children, to cure our illnesses, in short so that we can have a more decent human life, serve only to kill us. What is more, our country and our people have become the object of exploitation. All that has value is pillaged and taken to foreign countries or simply destroyed. Our taxes, which should be invested into the community, are embezzled . . . All this money, that comes from our labor, is directly taken by a small elite that comes from we don't know where . . . [and] means that some of our compatriots don't hesitate to sell their brothers for a dollar or ten or twenty.<sup>7</sup>

In what amounts to nothing less than a recolonization of Africa, Western states and international agencies—notably the United States, the United Nations, and the World Bank—arrogate themselves the power to take over the economic management, security, and administration of a select number of African countries categorized as “failed states.” In an article on Mozambique, David Plank explains the concept of “recolonization”: “the most likely successor to post-colonial sovereignty will be neo-colonial vassalage, in which Western powers assume direct and open-ended control over the administration, security, and economic policies of ‘deteriorated’ states under the banner of the U.N. and various donors.”<sup>8</sup> In a speech pronounced in Maputo in 1990, during the early stages of the formal negotiations process with Renamo, President Joachim Chissano of Mozambique lamented the fact that his country did not get any substantial aid in return for abandoning Marxism and Socialism under strong U.S. pressure.<sup>9</sup>

As John Saul rightly observes, “The key to this shift was . . . the re-colonization of Mozambique . . . the process still left a Mozambique dependent in its poverty

and its vulnerability on the behest of the World Bank, the IMF, and the external aid community. And it left a leadership that had certainly lost touch with the aspirations of ordinary people.”<sup>10</sup> A Mozambican member of parliament (MP) explains how, in 1995, parliament actually met not in Maputo, but in Paris, during the donor meeting. Another MP explains that unlike other countries and parliaments, “we accept that our budget is really set by donors at the annual Paris conference. We accept that our priority is to develop a donor-acceptable budget.”<sup>11</sup> In the DRC (then Zaïre), Western donors exasperated by Mobutu’s predatory rule and financial mismanagement sent, in November 1978, a retired *Bundesbank* official, Erwin Blumenthal, who assumed effective control of the central bank of Zaïre. Frustrated by the Mobutist ruling clique in his attempts to introduce some measure of transparency and sound management practices, Blumenthal left in disgust in 1979.<sup>12</sup> In Liberia in 1987, in an attempt to clean up the country’s chaotic finances, the United States appointed a team of seventeen operational experts—the Opex mission—to take over control of the ministry of finance, the central bank, and other key government offices. However—as in the Blumenthal mission in Zaïre—the Opex team’s efforts to eliminate the numerous scams they identified, and to establish new controls, were constantly thwarted, and they decided to cut short their mission. In their final report published in May 1989, they noted, “[President Samuel K.] Doe’s Liberia was managed with far greater priority given to short-term political survival and deal-making than to any long-term recovery or nation-building efforts.”<sup>13</sup> Following the British intervention in May 2000 to “restore law and order” in Sierra Leone, British personnel took up key posts in government, the central bank, and the police, and began the task of rebuilding a national army. In addition, the United Nations peacekeeping force was increased to 18,000, one of its largest operations in the world.<sup>14</sup> Strangely, this evokes the situation prevailing in Tanganyika (later Tanzania) at the time of independence: “In 1961, the year of Tanganyika’s independence, every senior civil servant in Dar-es-Salaam, every provincial commissioner and 55 out of 57 district commissioners were still British expatriates.”<sup>15</sup> In September 1992, senior managers of international nongovernmental aid agencies operating in Somalia were advocating military intervention. As Philip Johnson, president of CARE-US put it, “the international community, backed by UN troops, should move in and run Somalia, because it has no government at all.”<sup>16</sup> In our case study of Congo, we showed evidence of direct U.S. involvement in, and support of the joint Rwanda/Uganda invasion of eastern Congo of 1996–97, as many U.S. Special Forces agents, as well as the U.S. military attaché, were spotted among the AFDL rebels in the combat zones. U.S. Special Forces managed the AFDL’s entire communication system, and an American diplomat, Dennis Hankins, was posted to Goma in April 1997 to act as liaison between Washington and the AFDL leader, Laurent-Désiré Kabila (see Chapter 8). Following the April 2003 Sun City Peace Accord, the political transition process, the peacekeeping operation and peacemaking process in Congo are all firmly controlled by the West, specifically by the United States in the person of Ambassador William Lacy

Swing. Ambassador Swing—who was able to hone his supervisory skills as tutor to the late president Samuel Doe while he was ambassador to Liberia in the early 1980s—had the dual responsibility of chair of the International Committee for the Support of the Transition (CIAT), which acts as a major advisory body to the Congolese government, and leader of the United Nations Mission in Congo (MONUC) up until October 2007. The 18,931-strong MONUC—the largest peacekeeping force in UN history—includes military, police, as well as civilian support and electoral assistance staff. The European Union (EU) is another key actor in this process. In June 2006, a German-led EU reserve force of 1,450, named *Eufor-RCD*, was deployed in Congo to support MONUC and provide additional security during the elections of July 30, 2006. In brief, in Congo, at present, political and economic decision-making rests firmly with the CIAT and MONUC (both chaired by Western envoys) in a Euro-American condominium over Congo reminiscent of the Franco-British condominium over Egypt during the first decades of the twentieth century. Congo thus offers another perfect illustration of the process of recolonization currently under way in Africa.<sup>17</sup> At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Africa continues to serve as the playground of all manners of foreign visitors in search of quick profits, cheap thrills and moral redemption:

Poor Africa, the happy hunting ground of the mythomaniac, the rock star buffing up his or her image, the missionary with a faith to sell, the retailer of dirty drugs or toxic cigarettes, the editor in search of a scoop, the empire builder, the aid worker, the tycoon wishing to rid himself of his millions, the school builder with a bucket of patronage, the experimenting economist, the diamond merchant, the oil executive, the explorer, the slave trader, the eco-tourist, the adventure traveler, the bird watcher, the travel writer, the escapee, the colonial and his crapulosity [misdeeds], the banker, the busybody, the Mandela-sniffer, the political fantasist, the buccaneer and your cousin the Peace Corps volunteer. Oh, and the atoner, of whom Thoreau observed in a skeptical essay: ‘Now, if anything ail a man so that he does not perform his functions . . . if he has committed some heinous sin and partially repents, what does he do? He sets about to reforming the world.’ Thoreau, who had Africa specifically in mind added, “Do you hear it, ye Wolofs?” These people have been in and out of the continent since the beginning of the 19th century, much earlier if we include the Arab slave traders and the tourist Herodotus. A common denominator in this assortment of foreign visitors-high-minded pests and exploiters alike-is their wish to transform themselves while claiming they want to change Africa.<sup>18</sup>

Africans, is this the Africa we want? How many more of us will have to die as a result of senseless wars before we realize that our own salvation and that the solution to all our problems lie not without, but within ourselves? Let us move beyond mere survival; let us refuse to remain passive victims of a perceived pre-ordained fate and let us become the initiators and agents of our own development. Indeed, as Fanon urges us to do, let us create a new African. Therein resides the secret of Africa’s resolution of its predicament, and the key to its future development.

# NOTES

## INTRODUCTION

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  10. F. Anfray, “The Civilization of Aksum from the First to the Seventh Century,” in *General History of Africa. II: Ancient Civilizations of Africa*, ed. G. Mokhtar Paris: UNESCO, 1981), 362–80; Y. M. Kobishanov, “Aksum: Political System, Economics and Culture, First to Fourth Century,” in *General History of Africa. II: Ancient Civilizations of Africa*, 381–400; Christopher Ehret, *The Civilizations of Africa*, 208–15.
  11. B. H. Warmington, “The Carthaginian Period,” *General History of Africa. II: Ancient Civilizations of Africa*, 447.
  12. Ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, ed. N. J. Dawood, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), vii–xiv, 123–261; Ibn Khaldoun, *Histoire des Berbères et des Dynasties Musulmanes de l’Afrique Septentrionale*. 4 vols. (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1999 [1925, 1927, 1934, 1956]). The major sources on the history of state formation in the Western Sudan during the period from the sixth to sixteenth centuries used in this survey include the following: Edward W. Bovill, *The Golden Trade of the Moors: West African Kingdoms in the Fourteenth Century* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1995 [1958]); Daniel Chu and Elliott Skinner, *A Glorious Age in Africa* (Garden City, NY: Zenith Books, 1965); Sékéné-Mody Cissoko, *Tombouctou et l’empire songhay. Épanouissement du Soudan nigérien aux XV<sup>e</sup> et XVI<sup>e</sup> siècles* (Dakar: Nouvelles Éditions Africaines, 1975); Robert O. Collins, ed., *African History in Documents: Western African History*, vol. I (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1990); Basil Davidson, *The Lost Cities of Africa*, rev. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970); Basil Davidson, *African Civilization Revisited: From Antiquity to Modern Times* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1991); Cheikh Anta Diop, *L’Afrique noire pré-coloniale* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1960); Said Hamdun and Noël King, eds., *Ibn Battuta in Black Africa* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1994 [1975]); Joseph E. Harris, *Africans and their History*, rev. ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1987); Joseph Ki-Zerbo, *Histoire de l’Afrique noire d’hier à demain*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Hatier, 1972); Nehemia Levtzion, *Ancient Ghana and Mali* (New York: Africana Publishing, 1980); Nehemia Levtzion and Jay Spaulding, eds., *Medieval West Africa: Views from Arab Scholars and Merchants* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 2003); Madina Ly-Tall, *Contribution à l’histoire de l’empire du Mali (XIII<sup>e</sup>-XVI<sup>e</sup> siècles)* (Dakar: Nouvelles Éditions Africaines, 1977); Elikia M’Bokolo, *Afrique Noire: Histoire & Civilisations; tome I: Jusqu’au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris: Hatier, 1995); Djibril Tamsir Niane, *Sundiata: An Epic of Old Mali* (New York: Longman, 1965); D. T. Niane, *Le Soudan Occidental au temps des grands empires, XI<sup>e</sup>-XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1975); Margaret Shinnie, *Ancient African Kingdoms* (London: Edward Arnold, 1965); the relevant volumes of UNESCO’s *General History of Africa* (Paris: UNESCO) are vol. III (1988): *Africa from the Seventh to the Eleventh Century*, ed. M. El Fasi and I. Hrbek; vol. IV (1984): *Africa from the Twelfth to the Sixteenth Century*, ed. Djibril Tamsir Niane; and vol. V (1992): *Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century*, ed. B. A. Ogot.
  13. Levtzion and Spaulding, ed., *Medieval West Africa*, xxviii.
  14. Basil Davidson, *The Lost Cities of Africa* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 87.

15. "Al-Bakri," in *Medieval West Africa: Views From Arab Scholars and Merchants*; Edward William Bovill, *The Golden Trade of the Moors: West African Kingdoms in the Fourteenth Century* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1995).
16. It is interesting to note that a similar process (*kivuu*) existed among the Akamba people of what is today called Kenya. A hot iron was placed on the tongue of the accused—if it burned, he/she was guilty; if it did not, the accused was innocent.
17. Daniel Chu and Elliott Skinner, *A Glorious Age in Africa* (Garden City, NY: Zenith Books/Doubleday, 1965), 13–50; Basil Davidson, *The Lost Cities of Africa*, rev. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 81–90; J. Devisse, "Trade and Trade Routes in West Africa," in *General History of Africa*, vol. III: *Africa from the Seventh to the Eleventh Century* (Paris, London & Berkeley: Unesco/Heinemann/California, 1988), 367–435; Nehemia Levtzion, *Ancient Ghana and Mali* (New York: Africana Publishing, 1980), 16–52; Elikia M'Bokolo, *Afrique Noire: Histoire & Civilisations; tome I: Jusqu'au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Hatier, 1995), 96–128; Margaret Shinnie, *Ancient African Kingdoms* (London: Edward Arnold, 1965), 44–51.
18. Ivan van Sertima, *They Came Before Columbus* (New York: Random House, 1976); Pathé Diagne, *Bakary II (1312) et Christophe Colomb (1492) à la rencontre de l'Amérique* (Dakar: Sankoré, 1992). The archeologists who began excavating a site adjacent to modern Djenné (in present-day Mali) are Susan and Roderick McIntosh from Rice University. This is reported by Howard W. French, *A Continent for the Taking: The Tragedy and Hope of Africa* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 165–7.
19. Madina Ly-Tall, *L'Empire du Mali (XIIIe-XVIe siècles)* (Dakar: Les Nouvelles Éditions Africaines, 1977), 159–61.
20. Said Hamdun and Noel King, eds., *Ibn Batuta in Black Africa* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1975), 58.
21. Daniel Chu and Elliott Skinner, *A Glorious Age in Africa* (Garden City, NY: Zenith Books/Doubleday, 1965), 13–50; Basil Davidson, *The Lost Cities of Africa*, rev. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 81–90; J. Devisse, "Trade and Trade Routes in West Africa," in *General History of Africa*, vol. III: *Africa from the Seventh to the Eleventh Century* (Paris: UNESCO, 1988), 367–435; Nehemia Levtzion, *Ancient Ghana and Mali* (New York: Africana Publishing, 1980), 16–52; Madina Ly-Tall, *Contribution à l'Histoire de l'Empire du Mali (XIIIe-XVIe siècles)* (Dakar: Les Nouvelles Éditions Africaines, 1977); Elikia M'Bokolo, *Afrique Noire: Histoire & Civilisations; tome I: Jusqu'au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Hatier, 1995), 96–128; Margaret Shinnie, *Ancient African Kingdoms* (London: Edward Arnold, 1965), 44–51.
22. M. Abitbol, "The End of the Songhay Empire," in B. A. Ogot, ed., *General History of Africa*; vol. V: *Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century* (Paris/Oxford/Berkeley: Unesco/Heinemann/California, 1992), 300–26; Daniel Chu and Elliott Skinner, *A Glorious Age in Africa* (New York: Zenith Books, 1965), 79–113; Basil Davidson, *The Lost Cities of Africa*, rev. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 98–103; Sékéné-Mody Cissoko, "The Songhay from the 12th to the 16th century," in *General History of Africa; IV: Africa from the Twelfth to the Sixteenth Century*, ed. D. T. Niane (Paris: UNESCO, 1984), 187–210; Sékéné-Mody Cissoko, *Tombouctou et l'Empire Songhay: épanouissement du Soudan Nigérien aux XVe-XVIe siècles* (Dakar: Nouvelles Éditions Africaines, 1975); Adam Konaré-Ba, *Sonni 'Ali Ber* (Niamey: Institut de Recherches en Sciences Humaines, 1977); Nehemia Levtzion, *Ancient Ghana and Mali* (New York: Africana Publishing, 1980), 84–93; Elikia M'Bokolo, *Afrique Noire: Histoire & Civilisations; tome I: Jusqu'au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Hatier, 1995), 96–128; Margaret Shinnie, *Ancient African Kingdoms* (London: Edward Arnold, 1965), 56–66; the quote is in Shinnie, 65.



23. B. M. Barkindo, "Kanem-Borno: Its Relations with the Mediterranean Sea, Bagirmi and Other States in the Chad Basin," in *General History of Africa*; vol. V: *Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century*, ed. B. A. Ogot (Paris: UNESCO, 492–514; D. Lange, ed., "The Kingdoms and Peoples of Chad," in D. T. Niane, ed., *General History of Africa*; IV: *Africa from the Twelfth to the Sixteenth Century* (Paris/London/Berkeley: Unesco/Heinemann/California, 1984), 238–65; Elikia M'Bokolo, *Afrique Noire: Histoire & Civilisations*; tome I: *Jusqu'au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Hatier, 1995), 96–128; Margaret Shinnie, *Ancient African Kingdoms* (London: Edward Arnold, 1965), 67–75.
24. Sundiata A. Djata, *The Bamana Empire by the Niger: Kingdom, Jihad and Colonization 1712–1920* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1997), 24.
25. G. N. Uzoigwe, "The Warrior and the State in Pre-Colonial Africa," in *The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa*, ed. Ali A. Mazrui (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), 23.
26. Jean Bazin, "Recherches sur les formations socio-politiques anciennes en pays Bambara," *Études Maliennes* no. 1 (1970): 33–38; Sundiata A. Diata, *The Bamana Empire by the Niger: Kingdom, Jihad & Colonization, 1712–1920* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1997); Lilyan Kesteloot, *Da Monzon de Ségou, épopée Bambara*. 4 vols. (Paris: Fernand Nathan, 1972); L. Kesteloot, *Biton Koulibaly, fondateur de l'empire de Ségou* (Dakar: Nouvelles Éditions Africaines, 1983); Viviana Paques, *Les Bambara* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954).
27. E. J. Alagoa, "Fon and Yoruba: the Niger Delta and the Cameroon," in *General History of Africa*; vol. V: *Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century*, ed. B. A. Ogot (Paris: UNESCO, 1992), 440–44; Robin Law, *The Oyo Empire c. 1600–c. 1836. A West African Imperialism in the Era of the Atlantic Slave Trade* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977); Robert Smith, *Kingdoms of the Yoruba* (London: Methuen, 1969).
28. Robert B. Edgerton, *Warrior Women: The Amazon of Dahomey and the Nature of War*, (Boulder: Westview, 2000), 94; see also Joseph E. Harris, *Africans and Their History* (New York: Penguin, 1987).
29. J. F. Ade Ajayi, "Conclusion: Africa on the Eve of the European Conquest," in *General History of Africa* vol. VI: *Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s* ed. J. F. Ade Ajayi (Paris: UNESCO, 1989), 773–74
30. E. J. Alagoa, "Fon and Yoruba: the Niger Delta and Cameroon," in *General History of Africa*; vol. V: *Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century*, ed. B. A. Ogot (Paris: UNESCO, 436–39; Stanley B. Alpern, *Amazons of Black Sparta: The Women Warriors of Dahomey* (New York: New York University Press, 1998); Robert B. Edgerton, *Warrior Women: The Amazons of Dahomey and the Nature of War* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000).
31. Walter Rodney, *A History of the Upper Guinea Coast, 1545–1800* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 258.
32. *Ibid.*, 264.
33. Fernand Braudel, *Civilisation Matérielle, Économie et Capitalisme, 15ème-18ème Siècle*; vol.3: *Le Temps du Monde* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1979), 552 (translated from the French by Guy Martin, as elsewhere in this work); on slavery, see Lars Sandstrom, *The Exchange Economy of Pre-colonial Tropical Africa* (London: C. Hurst, 1974); Robin Law, *The Oyo Empire c. 1600– c. 1836: A West African Imperialism in the Era of the Atlantic Slave Trade* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977); Walter Rodney, *West Africa and the Atlantic Slave Trade* (Dar-es-Salaam: East African Publishing House, 1970); J. F. A. Ajayi, "The Aftermath of the Fall of the Old Oyo," in *History of West Africa*, vol. II, ed. J. F. A. Ajayi and M. Crowder (London: Longman, 1974); Chinweizu, *The West and the Rest of Us: White Predators, Black Slavers and the African Elite* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1975).



34. Hugh Thomas, *The Slave Trade: The History of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1440–1870* (London: Papermac/Macmillan, 1998), 796.
35. J. E. Inikori, "Africa in World History: the Export Slave Trade from Africa and the Emergence of the Atlantic Economic order" *General History of Africa: V Africa From the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century* ed., B. A Ogot (Oxford, Berkeley & Paris: Heinemann/University of California Press/UNESCO, 1992), 102.
36. J. F. A. Ajayi, "Africa at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century: Issues and Prospects" *General History of Africa: VI Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s* ed., J. F. A. Ajayi (Oxford, Berkeley & Paris: Heinemann/University of California Press/UNESCO, 1989), 5.
37. Chinweizu, *The West and the Rest of Us*, 30.
38. J. E. Inikori, "Africa in World History: the Export Slave Trade from Africa and the Emergence of the Atlantic Economic order" *General History of Africa: V Africa From the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century* ed., 106–8
39. J. F. A. Ajayi, "Africa at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century: Issues and Prospects" *General History of Africa: VI Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s*, 5
40. Rodney, *West Africa and the Atlantic Slave Trade*, 16.
41. Chinweizu, *The West and the Rest of Us*, 36–37.
42. Pathé Diagne, "African Political, Economic and Social Structures During this Period" *General History of Africa: V Africa From the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century* ed., 42.
43. George B. N. Ayittey, *Indigenous African Institutions* (Ardsley-on-Hudson, NY: Transnational, 1991); Basil Davidson, *The African Genius: An Introduction to African Cultural & Social History* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969); C. Magbaily Fyle, *Introduction to the History of African Civilization*, vol. I. *Precolonial Africa* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1999); Daniel T. Osabu-Kle, *Compatible Cultural Democracy: The Key to Development in Africa* (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview, 2000).

### CHAPTER 3

1. On the impact of Western discourses in shaping the negative image of Africa in order to justify its exploitation, see, in particular, the insightful analysis of Kevin C. Dunn, *Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of Identity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). What Dunn says of the Congo, in particular, equally applies to Africa in general: "many Western observers in the 21st century still conceptualize events in the Congo [Africa] by employing colonial images and hundred year-old racial stereotypes and by privileging Western definitions of the state, sovereignty, and security . . . how one imagines the Congo [Africa] frames how one understands the events there . . . These representations have political consequences . . . By persistently employing images of the Congo [Africa] as chaotic, backward, and uncivilized/uncivilizable, external actors . . . have worked to forcefully replace existing sociopolitical practices and systems of knowledge with Western-scripted notions of sovereignty, modernity, and development . . . The extent to which the people within the Congo [Africa] now find their country violently fragmented, preyed upon by external actors, and marginalized by international inattention can be directly traced back to historical constructions of their identity" (5–6); Bernard Magubane, *The Making of a Racist State: British Imperialism and the Union of South Africa 1873–1910* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1996).
2. John Barrow, *An Account of Travels into the Interior of Southern Africa in the Years 1797 and 1798*. 2 vols. (London: Cadell & Davies, 1801–1804), 1, 57.

3. Chinua Achebe, "An Image of Africa," *Research literature*, 9, 1978, cited in Jean and John Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution: Colonialism and Consciousness in South Africa*, vol. 1 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 87.
4. Joseph Harris, *Africans and their History* (New York: Penguin, 1987), 23; Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change, From Hawaii to Iraq* (New York: Times Books, 2006), 84.
5. Sven Lindqvist, "Exterminate All the Brutes" *One Man's Odyssey into the Heart of Darkness and the Origins of European Genocide* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996).
6. Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Washington, DC: Howard University, 1982), 97; Joseph Ki-Zerbo, *Histoire de l'Afrique noire* (Paris: Hatier, 1978), 218. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that some contemporary "revisionist" authors are rewriting history to present the "Oriental" or "Arab" slave trade as equal, if not worse, than the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Thus, Jean-Pierre Foirry, in a book published in 2006, asserts, peremptorily (but without corroborating evidence), that while the Atlantic slave-trade involved 14 million Africans, the Oriental slave trade affected some 14 to 15 million Africans; he also states (wrongly) that "the two types of slave trade were closely interconnected" (Jean-Pierre Foirry, *L'Afrique: continent d'avenir?* [Paris: Éditions Ellipses, 2006], 51–52).
7. Rosa Amelia Plumelle-Uribe, *La Férocité Blanche; Des non-Blancs aux non-Aryens: Génocides occultés de 1492 à nos jours* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2001), 22.
8. Carol White, *The New Dark Ages of Conspiracy* (New York: New Benjamin Franklin House, 1980), 29–30; on imperialism, see Rosa Luxemburg in *The Accumulation of Capital* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1951); Rudolf Hilferdig (1877–1941) in *Finance Capital* (New York: Routledge, 1988) agreed that imperialist expansion led to violence—he emphasized the use of violence to create labor in the colonies; J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (1904) distinguished late nineteenth-century imperialism from previous ones in two ways: competition of several empires against each other and predominance of finance capital over mercantile capital; he rejected the idea that capitalism would help improve the conditions facing poor peoples; Vladimir Lenin, in *Imperialism: The Highest stage of Capitalism* (New York: International Publishers, 1916), argued that during this period, imperialism was characterized by the domination of monopolies and finance capital (banks); Stanley Aronowitz and Heather Gautney, *Implicating Empire: Globalization & Resistance in the 21st Century World Order* (New York: Basic Books, 2003), chap. 1.
9. Albert Memmi, *Portrait du colonisé, précédé de Portrait du colonisateur* (Paris: Folio-Actuel/Gallimard, 2002), 89, 94; on tribalism, see Conor Cruise O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back: A U. N. Case History* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1966), 238–40.
10. "Records of Maji Maji Rebellion 1905–1907 cited in Robert O. Collins, ed., *Documents From the African Past* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 2001), 306.
11. Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, *Le Congo au temps des grandes compagnies concessionnaires, 1898–1930* (Paris: Éditions de l'EHESS, 2001), 171–77.
12. Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya* (New York: Henry Holt, 2005), 256.
13. *Ibid.*, 258.
14. Sven Lindqvist, "Exterminate All the Brutes" *One Man's Odyssey into the Heart of Darkness and the Origins of European Genocide*, 123.
15. Joseph Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*, ed. Robert Hampson (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), 20.
16. Sven Lindqvist, "Exterminate All the Brutes," 141, referring to a speech by Lord Salisbury, prime minister of England (May 4, 1898).

17. Charles Darwin, *The Voyage of the Beagle*, chap. 5, cited in Tariq Ali, *Bush in Babylon: The Recolonization of Iraq* (New York: Verso, 2003), 185.
18. John Ruskin at an inaugural lecture at Oxford University, 1870, cited in Anthony Thomas, *Rhodes: the Race for Africa* (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 88; see also Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa*, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Carroll Quigley, *The Anglo-American Establishment: From Rhodes to Cliveden* (New York: Books in Focus, 1981); Bernard Semmel, *Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought 1895–1914* (New York: Doubleday, 1960).
19. Carol White, *The New Dark Ages of Conspiracy* (New York: New Benjamin Franklin House, 1980), 28.
20. The classical exposé of this view, for Britain, is A. D. Roberts, *The Colonial Moment in Africa: Essays on the Movement of Minds and Materials, 1900–1940* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), and for France, is Jacques Marseille, *Empire colonial et capitalisme français. Histoire d'un divorce* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1984). For an opposite view of the impact of colonialism, see E. Torday, *On the Trail of the Bushongo* (London: Seeley, Service, 1925); Claude Ake, *Democracy and Development in Africa* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996); A. G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa* (London: Longman, 1973); Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, *A Modern Economic History of Africa* (Dakar: CODESRIA Book Series), vol. 1, *The 19th Century* (1993); Jean Suret-Canale, *Afrique Noire occidentale et centrale*, vol. 2, *L'ère coloniale, 1900–1945* (Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1964); Basil Davidson, *Modern Africa: A Social & Political History* (London: Longman, 1989).
21. Walter Rodney, "The Colonial economy" in *General History of Africa. VII: Africa Under Colonial Domination 1880–1935* in A. Adu Boahen, ed. (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), 338; Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, *Le Congo au temps des grandes compagnies concessionnaires, 1898–1930* (Paris: Editions de l'EHESS, 2001), 143.
22. J. F. A. Ajayi, "Conclusion: Africa on the Eve of the European Conquest," *General History of Africa. VI: Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s*, 789; Conor Cruise O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back: A U. N. Case History* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1966), 238–40; Abdul Rauf Mustapha, "Copying with Diversity: The Nigerian State in Historical Perspective" in *The African State: Reconsiderations*, ed. Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002), 153.
23. Uma O. Eleazu, *Federalism and Nation-Building: The Nigerian Experience, 1954–1964* (Devon: Arthur H. Stockwell, 1977), 77.
24. D. K. Fieldhouse, *Black Africa 1945–80: Economic Decolonization & Arrested Development* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1986), 55.
25. D. K. Fieldhouse, *Black Africa 1945–80*, 29.
26. Leonard Barnes, *African Renaissance* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1969), 21; Stanislaw Andreski, *The African Predicament: A Study in the Pathology of Modernisation* (New York: Atherton, 1968); David Lagergren, *Mission and the State in the Congo* (Uppsala, 1970); on King Léopold II and the Congo, see also Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1998); Crawford Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
27. D. K. Fieldhouse, *Black Africa 1945–80*, 35.
28. Guy Martin, "Francophone Africa in the Context of Franco-African Relations," in *Africa in World Politics: Post-Cold War Challenges*, 2nd ed., ed. John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), 167; G. Martin, "Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 33, no.1 (March 1995), 1–20; and G. Martin, "France's African Policy in Transition:

- Disengagement and Redeployment,” in *France and South Africa: Toward a New Engagement with Africa*, ed. Chris Alden and Guy Martin (Pretoria: Protea Book House, 2003), 93–110; see also Antoine Glaser and Stephen Smith, *Comment la France a perdu l’Afrique* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2005).
29. Guy Martin, “Francophone Africa in the Context of Franco-African Relations,” in John W. Harbeson & Donald Rothchild (eds.).
  30. Chinweizu, *The West and the Rest of Us: White Predators, Black Slavers and the African Elite*, 167; on constitution signing, see EIR Investigative Team; Tony Rowland, *The Ugly Face of Neocolonialism in Africa* (Washington, DC: Executive Intelligence Review, 1993); on industrialization, see Stanilav Andreski, *The African Predicament: A Study in the Pathology of Modernisation*.
  31. D. K. Fieldhouse, *Black Africa 1945–80*, 46–48.
  32. John Darwin, *Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat From Empire in the Postwar World* (London: 1988), 174; Brian Crozier, *The Morning After: A Study of Independence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 17–18; K. A. Busia, *The Challenge of Africa* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962); Irene Gendzier, *Development Against Democracy: Manipulating Political Change in the Third World* (Washington, DC: Tyrone, 1995); Claude Ake, *A Political Economy of Africa* (Harlow, UK: Longman, 1981). For a detailed analysis of the population factor in Africa in historical perspective, see Chapter 4 in this volume.
  33. “Sins of the Secular Missionaries,” *Economist* (January 29–February 4, 2000), 27; in some districts in Kenya, population centers have been created within a radius of forty kilometers of high schools. Kenyans are paid a small fee to bring others to get contraceptives. Some of these children are as young as thirteen years of age; on Africa’s economic crisis, see Thandika Mkandawire, “Crisis and Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in *IMF and the South: Social Impact of Crisis and Adjustment*, ed. D. Ghai (London: Zed Books, 1991); see also World Bank, *Africa’s Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1989); World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa from Crisis to Sustainable Growth. A Long-term Perspective Study* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1989); on Dean Debbasch in Togo, see Vincent Hugeux, *Les sorciers blancs: Enquête sur les faux amis français de l’Afrique* (Paris: Fayard, 2007), 237–62.
  34. Bjorn Beckman, “Empowerment or Repression? The World Bank and the Politics of African Adjustment,” in *Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Adjustment: The Politics of Economic Reform in Africa*, ed. Peter Gibbon, Yusuf Bangura, and Arve Ofstad (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1992), 87, 92; as a result, 70 percent of school age children in Niger are not in school. Pan African News Agency, <http://www.Africannews.org/pana/news/109991103/feat1.html>. For a detailed analysis of the impact of SAPs on women, see Pamela Sparr, ed., *Mortgaging Women’s Lives: Feminist Critiques of Structural Adjustment* (London: Zed Books, 1994); Fantu Cheru, “New Social Movements: Democratic Struggles and Human Rights in Africa,” in *Globalization: A Critical Perspective*, ed. James Mittleman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 145–64.
  35. Marina Ottaway “Statement Before the Senate Subcommittee on Africa,” June 8, 1999; on Kagame and Museveni’s role in the Congo conflict, see the chapter on the Congo in this volume; “Many Armies Ravage Rich Land in the ‘First World War of Africa’” Ian Fisher and Norimistu Onishi, *New York Times*, February 7, 2000, 1, 8–9; on Africa’s “new leadership,” see Marina Ottaway, *Africa’s New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction?* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).
  36. Mercy Muigai (an unemployed Kenyan woman) at the G-8 Summit meeting in Kananaski, Alberta (Canada) June 26, 2002, as reported in *The Washington Times*, June 28, 2002, A17.

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## CHAPTER 5

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  11. World Bank, *The Berg Report* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1981), 3; Alex Thompson, *Introduction to African Politics* (London: Longman, 2000), 172; see also World Bank, *Accelerated Development for Africa; An Agenda for Action* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1981).
  12. Pamela Sparr, ed., *Mortgaging Women’s Lives: Feminist Critiques of Structural Adjustment* (London: Zed Books, 1994), 1; see also T. Mkandawire, “Crisis and Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in *IMF and the South: Social Impact of Crisis and Adjustment*, ed. D. Ghai (London: Zed Books, 1991); World Bank, *Africa’s Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989); World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long Term Perspective Study* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989).
  13. Nicolas van de Walle, *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 188, 214–15.
  14. Patrick Bond, *Talk Left, Walk Right: South Africa’s Frustrated Global Reforms* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2004), 80.
  15. Rita Abrahamsen, *Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa* (New York: Zed Books, 2000); 118–19; on Zambia’s job losses, see Neo Simuntanyi, “The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Zambia,” *Third World Quarterly* 17 (no. 4): 831–37.
  16. “BIAO-CI sold for 5.6 Billion Francs,” *Panafrican News Agency*, January 26, 2000; on Chevron, see “Chevron Today,” quoted in Leonard G. Horowitz, *Death in the Air: Globalism, Terrorism & Toxic Warfare* (Sandpoint: Tetrahedron Publishing, 2001), 99.
  17. Neville Gabriel, of Jubilee South Africa, quoted in Patrick Bond, *Talk Left, Walk Right*, 88.
  18. Fantu Cheru, “New Social Movements: Democratic Struggles and Social Movements in Africa,” in *Globalization; Critical Reflections*, ed. James Mittelman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 153.
  19. Manthia Diawara, *In Search of Africa* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 145–46.

20. Michael Barratt Brown, *Africa's Choices: After Thirty Years of the World Bank* (Boulder: Westview, 1997), 26–27.
21. Bill Martin, “Waiting for Oprah & the New U.S. Constituency for Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy* vol. 25, no. 75 (March 1998), 14.
22. Amadou Toumani Touré, keynote address, Colloquium on “L’Avenir des Opérations de Paix en Afrique,” Chaire Téléglobe-Raoul Dandurand en études Stratégiques et diplomatiques, Université du Québec à Montréal Canada (May 26, 2001).
23. Chinweizu, *The West and the Rest of Us* (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 36–37
24. Bill Martin, “Waiting for Oprah & the New U.S. Constituency for Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy*, 16.
25. “Africa’s Own Mussolini,” *The Economist* (February 24, 2000), 48; “Zimbabwe: Friends Say Stop,” *The Economist* (December 9, 2000), 53; *New York Times*, editorial, September 22, 2003 and October 19, 2003.
26. Frantz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre* (Paris: Francois Maspéro, 1961), 149, 152, 154; Amilcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea: An African Peoples’ Struggle* (London: Monthly Review Press, 1969).
27. Walden Bello. *Dark Victory: The United States Structural Adjustment and Global Poverty*, 69.
28. John Perkins, *Confessions of an Economic Hit Man* (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2004), xvii.
29. *Ibid.*, 17.
30. *Ibid.*, 15.
31. *Ibid.*, 15–16.
32. Antoine Glaser and Stephen Smith, *Comment la France a Perdu l’Afrique* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2005), 163–68.
33. Francois-Xavier Verschave, *L’envers de la dette: Criminalité politique et conomique au Congo-Brazza et en Angola* (Marseille: Agone, 2001), 113–16. Note that all this information came to light during a public trial of Elf-Aquitaine in France, which resulted in the indictment of (among others) former CEO Loik Le Floch-Prigent (who later became adviser to president Sassou N’Guesso); see also Xavier Harel, *Afrique, pillage à huis clos. Comment une poignée d’initiés siphonne le pétrole africain* (Paris: Fayard, 2006), 21–36.
34. Joseph Fletcher, “Chronic Famine and the Immorality of Food AID; a Bow to Garret Harding,” *Focus* 3, no. 2 (1993): 44.
35. D. Ghai and C. Hewitt de Alcantara, “The Crisis of the 1980s in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean: An Overview” in *The IMF and the South*, ed. D. Ghai (London: Zed Books, 1991), 14–17, cited in Ankie Hoogvelt, *Globalization and the Postcolonial World: The New Political Economy of Development*, 182.
36. *Ibid.*, 182.
37. Mkandawire and Soludo, *Our Continent Our Future*, 35; Alex Thompson, *Introduction to African Politics* (London: Longman, 2000), 176.
38. W. J. Breytenbach, *Whites in Africa: Where, Why, What Now?* (Cape Town: University of Stellenbosch/Institute for Future Research no. 5 (June 1990), v.
39. Mkandawire and Soludo, *Our Continent our Future*, 36.
40. J. D. Sachs, *Sources of Slow Growth in African Economies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Institute for International Development, 1996), 20; F. Stewart, *Adjustment and Poverty: Options and Choices* (London: Routledge, 1995); Kevin Lissakers, *Banks, Borrowers and the Establishment: A Revisionist Account of the International Debt Crisis* (New York: Basic Books, 1991).



41. "Whatever Happened to the National Summit on Africa?" interview by Charles Cobb Jr., <http://www.allAfrica.com>, August 3, 2001.
42. Antoine Glaser and Stephen Smith, *Comment la France a Perdu l'Afrique* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2005), 112.
43. Claude Ake, *Democracy and Development in Africa* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996), 118–19; Sebastian Mallaby has observed how the continents' development plans are written by "experts" in Western institutions who never stop to think how it would be for them if they lived under those plans; see *After Apartheid: The Future of South Africa* (New York: Times Books, 1992), 60.
44. Vittorio de Filippis, "Le Senegal mord à l'hameçon," *Libération*, November 27, 1999. President Laurent Gbagbo of Côte d'Ivoire fell out with the French when he introduced American firms (Cargill & ADM) in the cocoa sector and competitive bidding between the French (Bouygues) and the Chinese for the construction of Abidjan's third bridge; he also threatened to cancel Bouygue's exclusive contract for the delivery of water and electricity. All the major French multinational firms (Bouygues, Bolloré, EDF, Saur, etc.) are used to obtain contracts without competitive bidding, while major French multinational banks (Société générale, BNP & Crédit Lyonnais) have a monopoly over the Ivorian banking sector; Aminata Traoré, *Lettre au Président des Français à propos de la Côte d'Ivoire et de l'Afrique en général* (Paris: Fayard, 2005), 44, 61.
45. Sarah Bracking, "Structural Adjustment: Why it Wasn't Necessary & Why it did Work," *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 80 (1999): 216; Eva Jespersen, "External Shocks, Adjustment Policies, and Social Performance," in *Africa's Recovery in the 1990s: From Stagnation to Human Development*, ed. Giovanni Andrea Cornia et al. (New York: St. Martin's, 1992).
46. Pan African News Agency, [www.Africannews.org/pana/news/10991103/feat.html](http://www.Africannews.org/pana/news/10991103/feat.html); "The Rulers, the Ruled and the African Reality," *The Economist* (September 1997), 49.
47. Rita Abrahamson, *Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa*, xiv–xv.
48. Kofi Anan, "The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa," [www.un.org/ecosoc-dev/geninfo/afrec](http://www.un.org/ecosoc-dev/geninfo/afrec), cited in Ankie Hoogvelt, *Globalization and the Postcolonial World: The New Political Economy of Development*, op. cit., 175; see also S. Lone, "Confronting Conflict in Africa," *Africa Recovery* (August 1998), 20.
49. Nicolas van de Walle, *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 231.
50. *Ibid.*, 231.
51. Herman Cohen, senior advisor, Global Coalition for Africa, 1997, 19, cited in Bill Martin, "Waiting for Oprah & the New U.S. Constituency for Africa," 17; Michael Chege, "Remembering Africa," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 1 (1992): 2.
52. William Pomeroy, *Apartheid, Imperialism, and African Freedom*, 74.
53. Editorial, "Business in Africa," *Financial Mail* (March 5, 1999), 60.
54. Michel Chossudovsky, "'Exporting Apartheid' to sub-Saharan Africa," *Review of African Political Economy* vol. 24 no. 75 (September 1997): 389–98, 393. Quotes in the original.
55. *Ibid.*, 392.
56. General Roméo Dallaire, quoted in Boubacar B. Diop, Odile Tobner, and F.-X. Verschave, *Nérophobie* (Paris: Éditions des Arènes, 2005), 152.
57. Jon Jeter, "A Peaceful Invasion: Thousands of Blacks Occupy White-owned Farms in Zimbabwe," *The Washington Post*, March 30, 2000, A19–20; see also Rachel L. Swarns,





- 1978); Jan Vansina, *How Societies Are Born: Governance in West Central Africa Before 1600* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004); Théophile Obenga and Jan Vansina, "The Kongo Kingdom and its Neighbours," in *General History of Africa: V: Africa from the 16th to the 18th Century*, ed. B. A. Ogot, 546–87.
3. W. G. L. Randles, *L'ancien royaume du Congo*, 146–48
  4. C. Didier Gondola, *The History of Congo* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2002), 26–28; Jan Vansina, *Kingdoms of the Savanna*, 37–42; Obenga and Vansina, "The Kongo Kingdom and its Neighbours," 546–50; Randles, *L'ancien royaume du Congo*, 21, 27.
  5. C. Didier Gondola, *The History of Congo*, 14–16, 26–35; M'Bokolo, *Afrique Noire: Histoire & Civilisations*, 143–49; W. G. L. Randles, *L'ancien Royaume du Congo*, 27–33, 57–63; Jan Vansina, *Kingdoms of the Savanna*, 42–45.
  6. Basil Davidson, *African Civilization Revisited* (Trenton NJ: Africa World Press, 1991), 223–24 (emphasis in original).
  7. C. Didier Gondola, *The History of Congo*, 31–35; W. G. L. Randles, *L'ancien royaume du Congo*, 105–25; John K. Thornton, *The Kingdom of Kongo: Civil War and Transition, 1641–1718* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983); Jan Vansina, *Kingdoms of the Savanna*, 45–69.
  8. *Ibid.*, 35–37; Thomas Q. Reeve, *The Rainbow and the Kings: A History of the Luba Empire to 1891* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 23–40; Jan Vansina, *Kingdoms of the Savanna*, 70–72.
  9. Thomas Q. Reeve, *The Rainbow and the Kings*, 46, 48.
  10. C. Didier Gondola, *The History of Congo*, 36–38; Ndaywel è Nziem, "The Political System of the Luba and Lunda: Its emergence and Expansion," in *General History of Africa. V: Africa from the 16th to the 18th Century*, ed. B. A. Ogot (Paris: Unesco, 1992), 588–99; Thomas Q. Reeve, *The Rainbow and the Kings*, 41–48; Jan Vansina, *Kingdoms of the Savanna*, 72–74.
  11. Ndaywel è Nziem, "The Political System of the Luba and Lunda," 599, 601–7; Thomas Q. Reeve, *The Rainbow and the Kings*, 107–8. C. Didier Gondola, *The History of Congo*, 38–39; Jan Vansina, *Kingdoms of the Savanna*, 78–97.
  12. Ndaywel è Nziem, "The Political System of the Luba and Lunda: Its Emergence and Expansion," in *General History of Africa V: Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century*, ed. B. A. Ogot (Paris: Unesco, 1992), 588–607; Jan Vansina, *Kingdoms of the Savanna* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), 80–83, 197–99, 246–48; Jan Vansina, *How Societies Are Born: Governance in West Central Africa Before 1600* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004), 209–10, 256–58.
  13. Jan Vansina, *The Children of Woot: A History of the Kuba Peoples* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 3–4; Jan Vansina, *How Societies Are Born: Governance in West Central Africa Before 1600*, 206–60.
  14. J. Leclant, "The Empire of Kush: Napata and Meroe," in *History of Africa, II Ancient Civilizations of Africa*, ed. G. Mokhtar (Paris: Unesco, 1981), 278–97; A. A. Hakem, "The Civilization of Napata and Meroe," in *ibid.*, 298–325; Sheppard wondered: "What has made the Bakuba so superior do you think? I don't know. Perhaps they got their civilization from the Egyptians—or the Egyptians theirs from the Bakuba" (William Sheppard, "Into the Heart of Africa," *Southern Workman* 22 [1893], 187).
  15. William Sheppard, "Into the Heart of Africa," 182–87; Emil Torday and T. A. Joyce, *Notes ethnographiques sur les peuples communément appelés Bakuba, ainsi que sur les peuplades apparentées: Les Bushongo* (Tervuren: Musée Royal de l'Afrique Centrale, 1910); Jan Vansina, *The Children of Woot*, 4–6.
  16. Jan Vansina, *The Children of Woot*, 6–7.

17. Jan Vansina, *Le Royaume Kuba* (Tervuren: Musée Royal de l'Afrique Centrale, 1964), 87–90.
18. *Ibid.*, 91–96.
19. *Ibid.*, 153 (Guy Martin's translation from the French, as elsewhere in this chapter).
20. *Ibid.*, 126–29, 147–53; Jan Vansina, *The Children of Woot*, 127–50.
21. *Ibid.*, 143–47; Jan Vansina, *The Children of Woot*, 150–52.
22. Georges Balandier, *La Vie Quotidienne au Royaume du Congo du XVIe au XVIIe siècle* (Paris: Hachette, 1965), 35
23. W. G. L. Randles, *L'ancien royaume du Congo, des origines à la fin du XIXe siècle*, 47.
24. Georges Balandier, *La vie Quotidienne au Royaume du Congo*, 34–5
25. *Ibid.*, 36
26. Jan Vansina, *How Societies Are Born: Governance in West Central Africa Before 1600*, 259.
27. W. G. L. Randles, *L'ancien royaume du Congo, des origines à la fin du XIXe siècle*, 146–48.
28. Jan Vansina, *How Societies Are Born: Governance in West Central Africa Before 1600*, 252.

## CHAPTER 7

1. George Martelli, *Leopold to Lumumba: A History of the Belgian Congo, 1877–1960* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1962), 18.
2. The classic exposé and denunciation of King Léopold's atrocities in the Congo is provided by the British publicist and pioneer human rights activist Edmond Dene (E. D.) Morel; see, in particular, his *Red Rubber: The Story of the Rubber Slave Trade which Flourished in the Congo for Twenty Years, 1890–1910* (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1919); and *The Black Man's Burden* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969 [1920]), 109–26. For a recent, critical reassessment of Léopold's rule in the Congo, see Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998).
3. G. Martelli, *Leopold to Lumumba*, 163.
4. Thomas Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa, 1876–1912* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1991), 591 (emphasis in original).
5. G. Martelli, *Leopold to Lumumba*, 169.
6. Michela Wrong, *In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu's Congo* (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 48.
7. E. D. Morel, *The Black Man's Burden*, 121.
8. *Ibid.*, 122.
9. *Ibid.*, 123.
10. *Ibid.*, 125 (emphasis added).
11. *Ibid.*, 109.
12. Ch. Didier Gondola, *The History of the Congo* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2002), 79.
13. René Lemarchand, *Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo: The Politics of Fragmentation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), 40.
14. Yves Bénot, *La mort de Lumumba, ou la tragédie congolaise* (Paris: Éditions Chaka, 1991), 26 (translated from the French by Guy Martin, as elsewhere in this in this book).
15. Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1985), 37.

16. Michel Merlier, *Le Congo, de la colonisation belge à l'indépendance* (Paris: François Maspero, 1962), 37; Yves Bénot, *La mort de Lumumba*, 20; on forced labor in the Belgian Congo, see also Jules Marchal, *Forced Labor in the Gold and Copper Mines: A History of Congo under Belgian Rule, 1910–1945* (Popenguine: Per Ankh, 2003); J. Marchal, *Lord Leverhulme's Ghosts: Colonial Exploitation in the Congo* (London: Verso, 2008).
17. R. Lemarchand, *Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo*, 75.
18. L. Le Febvre de Vivy, *Documents d'histoire pré-coloniale belge* (1955), quoted in Michel Merlier, *Le Congo, de la colonisation belge à l'indépendance* 15.
19. Lemarchand, *Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo*, 191.
20. *Ibid.*, 46–47; L. Lopez Alvarez, reporting from Brazzaville, gives an estimate of 500 deaths in Léopoldville (in Yves Bénot, *La mort de Lumumba, ou la tragédie congolaise* Yves Bénot, *La mort de Lumumba, ou la tragédie congolaise*, 55); Ch. Didier Gondola cites an official Belgian report mentioning forty-seven deaths, plus 330 Congolese and forty-nine Europeans injured in the Leopoldville riots; the same author notes that the MNC estimated the casualties at 530 deaths (Ch. Didier Gondola, *The History of Congo* [Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2002], 111 and fn. 1, 114).
21. Thomas Kanza, *Conflict in the Congo: The Rise and Fall of Lumumba* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972), 82.
22. *Ibid.*, 170.
23. Conor Cruise O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back: A U.N. Case History* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1966), 238–40.
24. M. Merlier, *Le Congo de la colonisation belge à l'indépendance*, 317.
25. Lemarchand, *Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo*, 206; the reference to a “new tribe” is derived from a personal communication from Professor Jan Vansina to the author.
26. *Ibid.*, 99.
27. M. Merlier, *Le Congo de la colonisation belge à l'indépendance*, 315.
28. Yves Bénot, *La mort de Lumumba, ou la tragédie congolaise* (Paris: Éditions Chaka, 1991), 72.
29. The full text of Lumumba's independence speech is reproduced in Colette Braeckman, *Lumumba, un Crime d'État* (Bruxelles: Les Éditions Aden, 2002), 67–71.
30. M. Merlier, *Le Congo de la colonisation belge à l'indépendance*, 304–5.
31. Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 316.
32. *Ibid.*, 290–93.
33. Thomas Kanza, *Conflict in the Congo: The Rise and Fall of Lumumba* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972), 104.
34. Patrice Émery Lumumba, address to parliament, July 15, 1960, as reported in Yves Bénot, *La mort de Lumumba*, 132–33.
35. Thomas Kanza, *Conflict in the Congo*, 296.
36. Ch. Didier Gondola, *The History of Congo*, 123, 125.
37. The decree by which President Kasa-Vubu dismissed Prime Minister Lumumba was actually drafted by the Belgian minister of foreign affairs, Pierre Wigny, and the official legal notice in which the decree was published, was actually printed in Belgium! (Colette B. Raeckman, *Lumumba, un Crime d'État* [Bruxelles: Éditions Aden, 2002], 34).
38. Colette B. Braeckman, *Lumumba*, 27–28; De Witte, *The Assassination of Lumumba*, xiii–xiv.

39. The term was used by Belgian minister of African affairs d'Aspremont Lynden in a telex message to Ambassador Rothschild in Elizabethville, dated October 6, 1960 (Braeckman, *The Assassination of Lumumba*, 84).
40. *Ibid.*, 39–42.
41. Ludo De Witte, *L'assassinat de Lumumba* (Paris: Karthala, 2000); translated in English by Ann Wright and Renée Fenby as *The Assassination of Lumumba* (London: Verso, 2001); see also Colette Braeckman, *Lumumba: un Crime d'État* (Bruxelles: Les Éditions Aden, 2002), which contains the following conclusion from the Belgian parliamentary commission of enquiry into the assassination of Lumumba: "It may stated with a fairly high degree of probability that on 17 January 1961 between 9:40 and 9:43 p.m., Lumumba was assassinated execution-style in the bush, five hours after his arrival in Katanga" (90).
42. Ludo De Witte, *The Assassination of Lumumba* (London: Verso, 2001), xxii; a Belgian Parliamentary commission of enquiry into the assassination of *Lumumba* acknowledged Belgian responsibility in this affair and prompted the Belgian minister of foreign affairs, Louis Michel, to offer official apologies to the Congolese people, together with symbolic monetary compensation to Lumumba's descendants (see Braeckman, *Lumumba*, 73–99); Lumumba himself was well aware of the fate awaiting him; thus, he prophetically told Kanza on November 26, 1960, on the eve of his escape: "I shall probably be arrested, tortured and killed. One of us must sacrifice himself if the Congolese people are to understand and accept the ideal we are fighting for. My death will hasten the liberation of the Congo, and help to rid our people of the yoke of imperialism and colonialism" (cited in Thomas Kanza, *Conflict in the Congo: The Rise and Fall of Lumumba* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972), 310).
43. Madeleine G. Kalb, *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa, from Eisenhower to Kennedy* (New York: Macmillan, 1982), 194, 196.
44. Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 533–66. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that following the Battle of Ambwila, in which the Portuguese defeated King Antonio I of Kongo, thus permanently compromising the independence of the Kongo state, the kingdom was divided from six into twenty-six provinces; the Congo now has eleven provinces, to be increased to twenty-six (each with locally elected provincial assemblies), according to the new constitutional provisions.
45. *Ibid.*, 358, 396.
46. A top U.S. government official under the Johnson and Nixon administrations, Roger Morris, revealed that Mobutu received close to \$150 million from the CIA during the first decade or so of his regime (Michela Wrong, *In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz*, 206–7).
47. Thomas Kanza, *Conflict in the Congo*, 112–13.
48. Cléophas Kamitatu, *La grande mystification du Congo-Kinshasa: les crimes de Mobutu* (Paris: François Maspéro, 2ème édition, 1971), 97–99; Young, *Politics in the Congo*, 379–80; Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1985), 60–61, 165. In his recently published memoirs Larry Devlin documents in painstaking detail the way in which he influenced, organized and manipulated Congolese politics in general, and the Binza group and Mobutu in particular (Larry Devlin, *Chief of Station, Congo: A Memoir of 1960–67* [New York: Public Affairs, 2007], 97–99).
49. Ch. Didier Gondola, *The History of Congo*, 144–45.

50. Michael G. Schatzberg, *Mobutu or Chaos? The United States and Zaire, 1960–1990* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1991), 32–35; Young and Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, 164–84.
51. Michael G. Schatzberg, *Mobutu or Chaos?* 42–3.
52. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History* (London and New York: Zed Books, 2002), 147–48.
53. *Ibid.*, 150.
54. M. Schatzberg, *Mobutu or Chaos?* 44–46.
55. G. Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila*, 160.
56. M. Schatzberg, *Mobutu or Chaos?* 54–58.
57. Michela Wrong, *In The Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu's Congo* (New York: HarperCollins/Perennial, 2001), 203; see also Ch. Didier Gondola, *The History of the Congo*, who notes that, in the late 1940s and 1950s, the U.S. opposed Congo's independence on the grounds that it would jeopardize U.S. access to the Congo's minerals (120); also Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila*, 29.
58. Michela Wrong, *In The Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz*, 202, 295, 303; Michela Wrong, who cites two different estimates (\$14.5 and \$14 billion) notes that “the \$14 billion estimate . . . is immediately suspicious because of the way it exactly mirrors the amount Zaire today owes it foreign creditors” (303); Colette Braeckman gives an estimate of \$15.6 billion (Colette Braeckman, *L'Enjeu Congolais: L'Afrique centrale après Mobutu* [Paris: Fayard, 1999], 325).
59. G. Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila*, 186, 188; on the democratic transition and the CNS, see *ibid.*, Didier Gondola, *The History of the Congo*, 155–62.
60. Honoré N'Gbanda Nzambo Ko Atumba, *Ainsi Sonne Le Glas! Les Derniers Jours du Maréchal Mobutu* (Paris: Éditions Gideppe, 1998), 67; U.S. Ambassador Daniel H. Simpson had declared in November 1996: “Zaire is no longer a priority and a strategic concern for the U.S.” (quoted in Jean-Claude Willame, *L'Odysée Kabila: Trajectoire pour un Congo nouveau?* [Paris: Karthala, 1999], 173–74).
61. Honoré N'Gbanda, *Ainsi Sonne Le Glas!* 295–306.
62. *Ibid.*, 306–22; Michela Wrong, *In The Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz*, 279–82; note that Wrong's account of these events draws heavily on N'Gbanda's own account.
63. Michela Wrong, *In The Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz*, 253.
64. Howard W. French, *A Continent for the Taking: The Tragedy and Hope of Africa* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 216.
65. Honoré N'Gbanda, *Ainsi Sonne le Glas!* 129–30.
66. Colette Braeckman, *L'Enjeu Congolais*, 402–3.
67. Howard W. French, *A Continent for the Taking*, 211, 216.
68. *Ibid.*, 213.
69. *Ibid.*, 210, 219.
70. Colette Braeckman, *L'Enjeu Congolais*, 403.
71. *Ibid.*, 161–63; *The Minerals of the Democratic Republic of Congo* [[http://www.euromin.w3sites.net/Nouveau\\_site/gisements/congo/GISCONe.htm](http://www.euromin.w3sites.net/Nouveau_site/gisements/congo/GISCONe.htm)]
72. Colette Braeckman, *Les Nouveaux Prédateurs: Politique des puissances en Afrique centrale* (Paris: Fayard, 2003), 175–76.
73. *Ibid.*, 197, 244; UN experts determined that, in 2000, the Rwandese army exported—via its state subsidiaries Rwanda Metals and Eagle Wings Resources—100 tons of coltan per year from Ituri; the price of coltan had increased from \$60–80 to \$380 per pound between January and December 2000 (Braeckman, *Les Nouveaux Prédateurs*, 199); Gondola explains the recent coltan “craze”: “coltan . . . is a highly heat-resistant metal. It is vital for the manufacture of electronic components that control the flow of current



inside miniature circuit boards, which are found inside almost every laptop, cell phone, VCR, pager, and hand-held video game machine. Skyrocketing demand for coltan in late 2000 created a temporary worldwide shortage of the mineral . . . The result was a tenfold increase in the price of coltan on the world market” (Ch. Didier Gondola, *The History of Congo*, 177).

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80. Colette Braeckman, *Les Nouveaux Prédateurs*, 173, 176–77.
81. Ch. Didier Gondola, *The History of Congo*, 170–71.
82. Speculating on the identity of those responsible for L. D. Kabila’s assassination, Gondola concludes: “It seems more plausible that Kabila’s death was part of a large, well-orchestrated plan. This plan was probably masterminded by one or more of the foreign governments that still control Congo in a bid to replace him with a more amenable figurehead” (Ch. Didier Gondola, *The History of Congo*, 173).
83. Colette Braeckman, *L’Enjeu Congolais*, 98–102.
84. Colette Braeckman, *Les Nouveaux Prédateurs*, 184; Ludo Martens, *Kabila et la révolution congolaise: Panafricanisme ou néocolonialisme?* Tome 1 (Anvers: Éditions EPO, 2002), 243–45.
85. Ludo Martens, *Kabila et la révolution congolaise*, 245.
86. Braeckman, *Les Nouveaux Prédateurs*, 184–86.
87. Ludo Martens, *Kabila et la révolution congolaise*, 232.
88. Colette Braeckman, *Les Nouveaux Prédateurs*, 187.
89. A new development in Congo’s mining sector in 1996–97 is the emergence of small and medium-size (Australian, Canadian, or South African) firms with little or no mining experience, and mostly engaged in financial and real estate speculation, acting as fronts for the majors (Anvil Mining NL, Ashanti Goldfields, Barrick Gold Corporation, Diamond Fields Resources, Eurocan Ventures, Russel Resources Group, South Atlantic Resources); typical of these minors is *American Mineral Fields, Inc.* (AMF) of Hope, Arkansas, headed by Jean-Raymond Boule. Boule and AMF concluded, in April 1997 in Lumumbashi, three mineral agreements—for copper, cobalt, and zinc—worth about \$1 billion with L. D. Kabila’s ADFL, which received a \$50 million advance for its war effort on this transaction (Braeckman, *Les Nouveaux Prédateurs*, 183; Willame, *L’Odyssée Kabila*, 79–93).
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## CHAPTER 9

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## CHAPTER 11

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