

NOTES OF MEETING WITH CHRIS HANI, CHIEF-OF-STAFF AND DEPUTY COMMANDER OF UMKHONTO WE SIZWE, AND STEVE TSHWETE, POLITICAL COMMISSAR. 3rd. JUNE, 1988. LUSAKA ZAMBIA.

They both made it clear that the "elimination" of black collaborators was a top priority for MK. This included the selective elimination of black candidates in the October elections if political methods failed to persuade them not to stand. But the necklace, although it had served its purpose as a spontaneous expression of people's anger, was no longer acceptable as it was. It was essential that there should be control and discipline in the struggle. It was also the ANC's objective to completely collapse the October local council elections and make it impossible for a black candidate to stand.

"We must declare war - political and physical - with all blacks who collaborate with the Government. No black must be able to collaborate in the open. They must be forced to do it only under the cover of darkness. 1988 is a crucial year for the ANC."

"If they are able to blunt MK it will be a major setback. The political leadership has asked us to step up the armed struggle."

"WE WANT TO PREVENT THE RESTORATION OF THE SORT OF GOVERNABILITY THAT BOTHA WANTS TO RESTORE. WHAT THE PEOPLE DESTROYED BETWEEN 1984-1986 WAS A MAJOR VICTORY. THE REGIME DEPLOYED TROOPS AND POLICE TO DESTROY WHAT THE PEOPLE HAD BUILT UP ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES SUCH AS STREET COMMITTEES AND PEOPLES' COURTS. THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED IN ONE GIGANTIC STEP TO RESTORE WHAT OUR PEOPLE DESTROYED. THE REGIME IS FEELING CONFIDENT IT CAN BRING BACK THE TRAITORS AND RESTORE THEM TO STRENGTHEN ITS POSITION IN THE TOWNSHIPS. THE ANC IS COMMITTED TO ABORTING THE OCTOBER LOCAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS."

Hani said he was disappointed with the capture of the Broederstroom cell but added that Pretoria was "lucky" that they had not been successful in their mission. "We salute the comrades arrested there because they showed a readiness to endure the hazards of an underground struggle." He indicated that the group was on a long-term mission (2 to 3 years). This was distinct from medium-term missions (around 6-12 months), to train cadres and set-up infra-structures, and short-term missions to hit specific targets and leave. Cells normally consisted of 2 or 3 rather than 4 people. They were also under instructions not to do anything that would run counter to the political objectives of the Congress. Circumstances sometimes forced long-term cells to withdraw sooner than planned. Tshwete confirmed that the Pelindaba nuclear plant had been a target of the group. They were also doing reconnaissance for the possible shooting-down of military transport planes taking troops to the operational area and other military aircraft. Tshwete confirmed that Paul Annegarn (MK codename Jerry) had left the group in November last year because of personality differences with the others. He had stayed in Zambia until March this year but this could not be admitted publicly because Kaunda had publicly denied that Annegarn had been to

Lusaka. He was now head of logistics in one of the military camps in Angola, a responsible position. He was wearing a military uniform and was happy, Hani said. He had not contravened any military code. He denied any knowledge of a detention camp called Quatro but admitted that detention camps existed for convicted spies and criminals within ANC ranks. Convicted people were sent to re-education camps where they could "regain their self-respect." Hani was prepared to bring Annegarn to Lusaka for a media interview but planes from Luanda only come in once a week on Tuesdays. Hani did not offer an explanation of how the Broederstroom cell had been betrayed and said that MK was still investigating the case.

Tshwete, responsible for the political education and orientation of MK soldiers, indicated he was heading a new program within MK to improve internal discipline and morale and the level of political education. When recruits arrive in the camps they are imbued with a sense of the camps history. This is underscored by the name of the camp which is usually named after Congress heroes. (There is a David Rabkin camp, a Barbara Hogan camp etc.) Since the Kabwe conference in 1985 all Congress members were expected to undergo a 3-month crash-course in the camps. Basic training for a soldier is 6 months during which he is taught small arms use, conventional drill, topography, armed combat, communications, compass and map-reading, etc. After 6 months the soldier can go for specialist training to East Germany (armaments engineering) or the Soviet Union (military academy.)

Hani said Parliament and parliamentarians responsible for enforcing apartheid laws were targets of MK and the recent bomb near parliament was an indication of that. If we decide to go for Vlok, it would be hardlines if Helen Suzman got caught in the crossfire. He said, however, he would welcome people like Helen Suzman, Wynand Malan and Jan Van Eck in a post-liberation parliament.

On Heinrich Grosskopf, accused by the SA police through the media of being responsible for the Krugersdorp bomb blast which killed 3 people, Tshwete said he and colleagues were busy talking to Grosskopf in Lusaka the day SA newspapers were proclaiming him the culprit and announcing a manhunt. In fact, he was not responsible for Krugersdorp but his cell, the remainder of which is still in the country, did do last year's Johannesburg magistrate's court in May last year and the bomb at Witwatersrand Command in July last year. Grosskopf was now at a military academy in Moscow undergoing further training and regarded as a "loyal and courageous" cadre within the Congress. The rest of his cell are blacks.

On the possibility of the ANC having to forfeit its camps in Angola as part of a regional settlement, Hani said it was his personal view that if the price of the ANC losing its camps was Swapo in power in a free Namibia and SA troops out of Angola and Namibia, he would be prepared to pay it. (Although he stressed Angola had not raised the subject with the ANC.) The official line is that ANC supports the current diplomatic initiative and is ready to make any sacrifices required of it.

Angola was not a Frontline state offering infiltration routes into the country. MK was fast becoming a people's army

trained by MK officers and, therefore, MK was no longer dependent on an African base. "We could just as well run the operation from the German Democratic Republic or Cuba," Hanı said.

Hanı said it was not a problem to get weapons into the country but it was difficult to keep up with the growing demand - especially for grenades - by youth in the townships. Since the February 24 bannings there had been a tremendous upsurge in the demand, he said. There is no other way for the youth to express their opposition.

Hanı said MK would not respond to Pretoria's assassinations of its senior officials by assassinating SA ambassadors abroad. "We don't want to emulate Pretoria's methods." But he said striking in city centers was justifiable armed propaganda, as long as it was not intended to kill civilians, and sanctioned in principle attacks on white MP's from the National and Conservative parties and members of the Afrikaner Resistance Movement. Also white security policemen and 'hanging judges'. He said MK units were thoroughly schooled in the physical and political conditions of the area they were assigned to and briefed on specific targets. They were also briefed on the strength of anti-apartheid organisations in the area and their relationship with each other and with local communities. They were also briefed on local politics and the presence of state security structures. Creativity was encouraged and it was accepted, since the conversion to a people's war 1983-85, the members of the cell were in the best position to judge what sort of action was appropriate at any time, bearing in mind Congress guidelines that civilian deaths should be avoided. (It is generally accepted though that an increase in civilian deaths is inevitable. Hanı said it took about a week for the commander of a unit to report the details of an action it had carried out. Hanı said ANC was responsible for all the recent bombings but had not yet received a report on the Roodepoort bomb. Hanı defended the 1983 bomblast at air force HQ in Pretoria, which killed 19 and injured about 217, as in line with Congress policy. He also defended Zondo, who blew up a supermarket in Amanzimtoti in 1985, on the grounds that he was very angry with the SADF for a raid on a neighboring state. He said that the Pretoria bomber who blew himself up outside a cinema May was an experienced cadre who had been in the country 3 years. He was on his way to another target, and was not going to blow up the cinema, when the bomb detonated by mistake and blew him up. An investigation was still under way. Tshwete said it was no longer possible clearly to identify military and police targets. Often SADF recruiting centers, security police interrogation rooms and joint management centres (JMC's) were situated in buildings containing department stores and offices. Even the Carlton Centre might contain such an office. Or the Standard Bank outside which the bomb exploded in Roodepoort. Whites should be made to feel unsafe anywhere until they abandoned apartheid and landlords ensured that tentacles of the security establishment were not in their midst. (Clearly, this is a response to the acknowledged efficiency of JMC's and the joint security management system.)

Hani layed much stress on what he called 'armed propaganda'. This included bombs in city centres aimed to show whites that MK can strike anywhere but not intended to kill civilians. Where possible, military or police-related targets should be chosen. In this category Hani also

mentioned selective strikes against parliament, reactionary MPs and judges and white policemen. Also in this category was attacks on targets which were the focus of anti-apartheid protest. For instance, if workers were involved in a dispute with employers it would be considered legitimate and useful for local MK operatives to direct a bomb attack at the employers premises or installations. Likewise if a particular company was siding with the government in a workers dispute an attack would be regarded as appropriate. Also in the category of armed propaganda are the landmine attacks in northern Transvaal and incursions across the border into northern Transvaal and Venda. In April Hani cited one such contact between an MK unit and the SADF. He said the unit had put up stiff resistance and had broken out of encirclement. He admitted MK casualties but was vague about damage inflicted on the SADF.

It was clear that MK was looking for a spectacular hit before the end of the year (like Pelindaba) and planned to escalate the quality, quantity and intensity of armed attacks to shatter white security and boost black morale.

Hani conceded that the training of cadres inside the country had created certain communication problems and had affected the level of skill of operatives. SA authorities could detect communications but were not able to intercept ANC codes.

Tshwete conceded MK military command HQ was in Lusaka although this was never admitted publicly. Hani said he did not anticipate SA attacks in Lusaka and warned that the ANC would hit back. It would have enormous repercussions, he said.

Tshwete claimed ANC had trained pilots who were flying aircraft in friendly countries such as Ethiopia.

Hani was very heartened by the evidence in the Messina trial of support from the local people for MK operatives. Also Ashley Forbes trial. Hani said the ANC knew who those giving trials clandestinely were. (X1 = September, X2 = Sylvester, (X3 and X4.)

They appeared very concerned about the reported existence of Z-squads abroad who sought to assassinate ANC officials. Hani said the assassination of Dulcie September and attack on Albie Sachs in Maputo were classic examples of 'soft targets.'

Hani said MK/ANC was coming under increasing pressure - both in the international community and within South Africa - to further blurr the distinction between hard and soft targets. He did not substantiate this.

On the black homelands, Tshwete indicated that the situation on the ground in the northern homeland of Venda had improved significantly since the death of Chief Minister Patrick Mphahlele. He also said the ANC had all but won a recent tussle with Chief Kaiser Matanzima of Transkei over the succession of the chief of the Tembu's. It will go to an exiled son of Sabata Dalinyebo, now studying in Harare. On Transkei, Hani said he would be content if military ruler General Holomisa did not do Pretoria's work for them.

There is little doubt that the hardline military men like

Joe Modise (MK commander), Hani and Tshwete have gained influence as the Pretoria crackdown under a national emergency has eliminated alternative political channels and government has become much more brazen in killing and abducting ANC operatives in neighboring states and even in the capitals of the Western world.

The ANC decision-making process, however, would seem to offer some check against the military men gaining total control of the organisation. An elaborate system, not entirely unlike Pretoria's state security management system, seeks to ensure political objectives are co-ordinated with the military struggle.

National Executive Committee.

This is the highest decision-making body made up of the 30 NEC members who include Modise and Hani. It only meets twice a year. The National Working Committee (of the NEC).

From the NEC the decision is referred to the Politco-Military Committee PMC [or to one of two PMC committees (1) The Political Department or the External Co-ordinating Committee (ECC)]. The PMC consists mainly of NEC members and its function is to translate decisions in principle (eg. escalate the armed struggle and abort the October elections) into specific plans of action. These decisions are then referred to the various ANC departments: Military Command (Modise, Hani and Tshwete), Treasurer-General, Secretary-General, International Department, Department of Information and Publicity, Department of Education, Department of Political Education, SA Congress of Trade Unions (Labour), Woman's league, Political Department, Economics, and Legal and Constitutional. Any plan of action which might exceed NEC guidelines should be referred back to the NEC. Sometimes the NEC finds PMC decisions exceeded its scope and should have been referred back.

On the question of succession Thabo Mbeki pointed out that at the Kabwe conference in 1985 the overwhelming majority of the 250 delegates, elected indirectly on a regional basis, were post-1976 recruits. Before 1976 there were only about 1 000 ANC members in exile. After 1976 this rocketed to 9 000 and a further 4 000 - 5 000 left between 1984 and 1986. It is the full conference which, in terms of the ANC constitution, must elect the next leader. The next consultative conference is in 1990. Mbeki said that there would be enormous pressure on the then 74-year-old Tambo to stand again in the interests of unity. While Mbeki is the choice of Tambo and the old-guard someone like Hani could well emerge victorious given the composition of delegates.

The shabby so-called ANC HQ is deceptive. Other departments are housed in about 15 buildings spread throughout Lusaka and are well-guarded and secured and well-organised and run.

Hani said only a free and democratic South Africa should be allowed to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes.

''That is why we attacked Koeberg and that is why we will deal with Koeberg and Pelindaba when we have the capacity to

deal with them. Pelindaba is an important target and scientists working there do so at their own risk.''

Hani expressed confidence that support for the ANC in the Frontline States was solid in spite of mounting SA attacks and pressure on them. ''There are no signs that they are about to surrender to SA. Zambia, Tanzania and Angola have been very firm in supporting us. We don't think Africa is about to stop supporting us. We have never been given transit facilities in a neighbouring state. We have done it clandestinely but it has not stopped us penetrating deep into the country (East London, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth.) Training people's units inside the country has become the cornerstone of our approach. What is significant is the rapid growth of units inside the country. Our commanders are sometimes overwhelmed by the sheer numbers wanting to join MK. We have improved our infiltration routes even though our traditional routes have been blocked. Our strategic approach has been to open up as many routes as possible.

SAM-7 missiles would not be used against civilian planes but against military transport planes, fighters and military and police helicopters.

SADF was strong in a conventional sense but its tanks and fighter planes were worthless against guerrilla tactics. The guerrilla army is the struggle of the weak against the strong. They will face a protracted guerrilla struggle involving many units which have the support of the people. We are unstoppable. MK had been instructed to make an important contribution towards ensuring that the October elections fail. I don't think the leadership will accept any excuses on the part of MK if we fail to ensure a massive boycott of the municipal elections in October. Candidates will be dealt with. (All Hani speaking.)

Hani said the ANC has set the rural/homeland areas as a top priority and a lot of attention was being paid to these areas. cf Bophuthatswana coup, 2 coups in Transkei, progress in KaNgwane (Enos Mabuza).

''Through out landmines, through our systematic attacks, we generate interest in the ANC and MK more than by distributing one or two leaflets,''

Hani said.

More whites are joining the ANC, Hani said. ''There is not just a supportive role for whites but also a plan for actual physical participation, he said.

ENDS

## HOW CONGRESS POLICY HAS CHANGED.

### TARGETS CONSIDERED LEGITIMATE.

1961 - 1976.

Hard targets including electricity pylons, military installations and structures, economic installations and structures, government buildings, particularly those involved in the implementation of the pass laws and apartheid administration in the townships. Strong emphasis on avoiding civilian casualties. Very few occur.

1976 - 1981.

In addition to the above Congress begins armed attacks on the property of black 'collaborators' such as councillors and policemen. For the first time there are armed attacks on police patrols and police stations, security force vehicles and property. Attacks on government and council buildings administering apartheid and court buildings increases marginally. The first attacks on 'civilian' targets such as factories, hotels, supermarkets and shopping centres begin but civilian casualties are minimal. In its most daring attack on a military target Congress guerrillas bombard Voortrekkerhoogte military HQ in Pretoria with rockets.

1981 - 1983.

Dramatic increase in the incidence of attacks on government targets, military and economic installations and infrastructure. No increase in attacks on 'civilian' targets. During this period Congress scores major sabotage hits at vital Sasol oil-from-coal plant in Transvaal, and in 1982 against the then incompleting nuclear power station at Koeberg near Cape Town. In May 1983 a massive bomb outside airforce headquarters in Pretoria kills 19 people and injures more than 217. Congress leaders say it was justified because most of those killed were employed by the military and the bomb was clearly aimed at a military target. This is a landmark in the process of acceptance within Congress ranks of the inevitability of civilian casualties. Nelson Mandela is reported to have regretted the consequences of the blast and indicated that the civilian casualties were a mistake.

1983 - 85.

The Congress begins its transformation from a guerrilla war conducted by insurgents to a so-called 'people's war' in which the insurgents train units from recruits inside the country. It soon becomes difficult to distinguish between actions conducted by insurgents and locally trained 'comrades'. Congress begins 'armed propaganda' with attacks on commercial and economic targets which are the subject of 'people's' action (eg strikes, boycotts) Militant townships comrades, in a spontaneous outburst of anger which deviates from Congress policy, begin executing suspected black collaborators with the notorious necklace method.

1985 - 87.

Congress consultative conference in Kabwe, Zambia faces enormous pressure from post-1976 delegates to blur the distinction between hard and soft targets. Conference resolution re-affirms Congress policy of concentrating on military, police and economic targets but notes the inevitability of civilian deaths in an escalating conflict. White farmers who are co-opted into SA Defence Force civil defence units on the northern borders are regarded as hard targets, or legitimate soft targets, marking another landmark on the road to escalating civilian casualties. The first landmine attacks, claiming white farmers and their families as victims, begin and escalate sharply in 1986 and 1987. Attacks on 'civilian' targets - factories, hotels, shopping centres and supermarkets escalate claiming more civilian lives. The first major attack on a soft target occurs in Amanzimtoti where a bomb at a supermarket kills five civilians and wounds 61. Congress leadership distances itself from the attacks but acknowledges the anger that led to it. The first grenade attacks on MPs from the mixed-race and Indian houses of parliament occur and grenade attacks on policemen and soldiers escalate. Dramatic increase (12-fold) in the killing of black collaborators such as black councillors, suspected informers and policemen. In 1986 there is a 3-fold increase in the number of shoot-outs between ANC guerrillas and police.

1987/88.

Congress enters the era of armed propaganda. Leadership of Umkhonto We Sizwe justifies armed attacks in city centres, on civilian buildings containing SADF recruiting offices, police interrogation centres and agents of the security management system. Also attacks on parliament, right-wing MPs and officials involved in the implementation of apartheid, reactionary judges who hand down death sentences at political trials, white security policemen. MK leadership also sanctions the use of SAM-7 missiles to shoot down military planes, including transport planes, helicopters and fighter planes but rules out attacks on civilian planes. Congress leadership, however, insists organisation will not indulge in indiscriminate killings and is not about to embark on a campaign of terrorism. It also rules out any blanket mandate on assassinations and says it does not indulge in counter hit-lists. Each attack must be considered by operatives on its merits and must be justified afterwards. Congress rules out revenge attacks on South African diplomats in foreign capitals following spate of assassinations of ANC officials, one in Paris and an abortive attempt in Brussels. The notorious 'necklace' method is ruled out as an unacceptable method of dealing with black collaborators but its role as an expression of spontaneous black anger is acknowledged.

ENDS



CONCLUDING NOTES ON CHRIS HANI INTVU.3RD JUNE 1988.

Inkatha.

Hani said it had been decided that local operatives would be recruited and trained in Natal using small weapons to kill the Inkatha warlords and members of the Inkatha central committee who were responsible for equipping and training the warlords' private armies. He said there had been some successes but the key warlords like Sabelo (sic) were still at large. He said the warlords had to be eliminated because they were not prepared to discuss peace. "We accept the ordinary Inkatha member is not aware of the action of the warlords. We don't just attack someone because they are Inkatha. We want to use political pressure to win over the rank-and-file of Inkatha." He said Gatsha Buthelezi was not a target for assassination. The strategy was to isolate him politically so that he would die a natural death. Thabo Mbeki gave details of his meetings with Oscar Dhlomo between last year but said they had broken down due to breaches of trust on Dhlomo's part, apparently under Buthelezi's direction. Mbeki said the Zulu King had indicated privately that if the grouping of anti-apartheid homeland chiefs (Contralesa) could show that it was gaining the majority support from Zulus he would switch his allegiance to that group. The ANC did not have a problem with Inkatha but with Buthelezi.

ENDS

INTERVIEW CHRIS MARTIN TEMBISILE HANI, CHIEF-OF-STAFF AND DEPUTY COMMANDER OF UMKHONTO WE SIZWE. 3-6-88. LUSAKA, ZAMBIA.

AND STEVE TSHI  
POLITICAL Comm

Q: THE AUTHORITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA CLAIM THEY ARE WINNING THE BATTLE AGAINST THE ANC'S ARMED STRUGGLE. ONE OF THE CLAIMS IS THAT INSURGENTS ARE KILLED OR ARRESTED WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF CROSSING THE BORDER. IS THAT TRUE?

HANI: That is a lie. We have got units who have been acting and operating actively for sometimes more than a year. And we have been quick to repair setbacks. Take the question of Cape Town. There was a lot of excitement when they said they had arrested a command in the Western Cape, when they arrested people like Yengeni, Jenny Schreiner and others. But it took us less than a month to repair that damage and to build units in the Western Cape. And to swing into action. We now have a presence virtually - and this is not an idle boast - in all the cities of South African in terms of trained MK comrades. We have also spread to the Bantustans. It is known that we have acted in the Ciskei, in the Transkei. We have been active in Bophuthatswana, in the northern Transvaal, in Venda and surrounding farms. In terms of our landmine units we have been very active in the eastern Transvaal. There is no time when the South Africans have been able to stop us. But what is significant is the rapid growth of units already inside the country. In fact our comrades are sometimes overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of people wanting to join MK. But, of course, caution here has also got to be exercised. The enemy here is also busy trying to infiltrate. We have got to strengthen our security organs inside the country in terms of defending the existing units. But there has never been a problem of a lack of cadres wanting to join MK inside the country. And there has, in fact, been a marked improvement since the clamp-down on organisations. Because Botha has actually said: you guys, we are not allowing you to fight non-violently. So people have no other option but to look for MK and they are looking for MK. And they are beginning to find MK.

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Q: WHAT ABOUT THE CLAIM BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN AUTHORITIES THAT THEY HAVE SUCCEEDED IN BLOCKING MK'S INFILTRATION ROUTES?

HANI: We have even improved our infiltration routes. There has been a significant improvement in terms of the infiltration routes we have organised over the past two years for getting into our country. This is because we have spent a lot of time on it. We have opened new routes.

Some of our traditional routes have been blocked and the enemy has also arrested some of our comrades. In the course of interrogation and torture comrades break down and release information. So, for us to survive, it has become important to create a number of routes. So there is no time that we can say that - because of Nkomati<sup>2</sup> or because some cadres have been arrested

\* THE NKOMATI

- therefore we must wait. Our strategic approach is to open as many routes as possible. And we know that the enemy has got problems about blocking those routes. They have got manpower problems. It is a long border, thousands of miles, right from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean. South Africa literally has got to patrol a border of thousands of miles. Despite their mobility - and we grant them they are highly mobile, highly sophisticated - but some of the terrain is just rugged. It is not easy to watch every

NON-AGGRESSIVE  
WITH MOZAMB

individual coming in. And now South Africa is faced with the big task of fighting an intervention in Angola, in Namibia, in Mozambique, destabilisation in Zimbabwe. America in Vietnam found it difficult to cope with. So despite the successes - and South Africa has achieved some relative successes - as things are moving definitely things are beginning to swing in our favour. There is nothing dramatic about it. But we have got every reason to feel very optimistic about the future.

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Q: BUT ARE YOU NOT STILL FACING A FORMIDABLE ENEMY WITH CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH?

HANI: We are. South Africa is a formidable enemy. They are not about to be paralysed. They still have got a lethal capacity to deal with us. But, granted that, the past few years have been very difficult for the regime. Now they are faced with an ANC which is becoming stronger. They are faced with an Umkhonto we Sizwe which has grown over the last 26 years. Grown in terms of sophistication, grown in terms of numbers who are involved. Grown in terms of support internally amongst our people. Grown in terms of striking capacity, too. And Umkhonto we Sizwe, is actually now attracting not only black South Africans but also attracting white South Africans - they are not big numbers - who realise that the future belongs to a movement which is confronting apartheid - both politically and physically. They have come around to accept the fact that apartheid won't just be destroyed through talking but, since it is a violent system, it must be destroyed by revolutionary violence.

STEVE TSHWETE (MK POLITICAL COMMISSAR): And I think we might even add here that, in spite of its formidability - that is a superficial perception, they look like that - but there is a contradiction there. They have got a strong economy to boost that army. They have got sophisticated weapons. They appear, in terms of conventional warfare, to be quite a formidable enemy. But faced with the type of war that is facing them right now in South Africa, they immediately become weak. Because what do you do with an army that is ideologically divided. An army in which even some of its members are beginning to realise they are fighting a lost cause. An army that is not commanding the support of the people inside the country. And you compare those disadvantages with the advantages that we are enjoying. We have got a big part of the 28-million blacks in the country behind our army. Old and young, everybody supporting our army. Which explains this phenomenal growth we are enjoying. On the other hand there is decline, there is fragmentation, there are mutinies within the SADF itself. There is even agitation in the white community against involvement in the SADF. I mean this war resistance inside the country is growing organically. It is not static. It is growing by the day. The scales are not tilting in favour of the SADF even within the white community itself. And with the escalation of the war the economy, which

supports the war, is bound to be affected.

HANI: Because we are a guerrilla army basically it is a struggle of the weak against the strong. For instance take the bombers. Our units in Johannesburg, or Pretoria, or Cape Town. There are not 5 people at a time. Its 2, its 1 its 3. So (Defence minister Magnus) Malan is faced with a dilemma. How does he deploy his battalions against those people. How does he use his tanks. How does he use his G5 or G6 artillery

tanks against us in the heart of Johannesburg. We don't hold positions and we shall never hold positions for a long time, so they won't know where we are. So the superior pieces of artillery, the sophisticated Mirages, the helicopter gunships, the navy, they are not going to be effective against us. You see, we are going to hit and run. We are going to involve for a very long time small units, very mobile units. We are going to hit them where they are weak. And as soon as they regroup and come together we will be running away. And this is a problem that the South Africans are going to face - a protracted guerrilla struggle involving many, many units, small units throughout the country. And it is going to be expensive for them to be able to destroy and flush out those units. We will be strengthening our units to act against installations, the transport system of the country and they are going to find it very difficult to guard each and every pylon, each and every one metre of the South African railway system.

TSHWETE: For a single blast, like the recent one in Roodepoort, they marshalled a whole platoon and fenced the area with barbed wire. It is expensive for them. All this for a single guy who is gone, in the township, or in the city itself, or staying in one of the suburbs. He may even be employed by (Defence Chief General J.J.) Geldenhuys as a garden boy. (sic) = WACKER.

Q: WHAT DO YOU PLAN FOR THE OCTOBER ELECTIONS WHICH ARE CLEARLY A MAJOR TARGET FOR MK?

HANI: We want to prevent the restoration of the sort of governability that Botha wants to restore. The establishment of municipal councils, especially in the black areas, the restoration of what the people destroyed in 1984, 85 and 86. We see the municipal election as one gigantic step by the regime to restore what our people destroyed three years ago. And that destruction of that system of puppet administration constituted a major victory for our people. In the place of this puppet system our people were experimenting with new people's administration. Street committees, peoples organs of power, peoples courts. Despite their initial weaknesses people were experimenting with democratic institutions. This was a spring<sup>4</sup> in terms of the South African struggle. We know that the regime came in, deployed its troops, deployed the police and went out of its way to systematically try to destroy what the people had achieved. And we know that lots of these peoples' gains were actually ruthlessly destroyed. The regime now is feeling confident that it can bring back the traitors and instal them and strengthen the position of the regime in the townships. The ANC is clearly saying: no, never will we allow you to set up puppet administrations again in the old way. So, the ANC is committed to aborting the municipal elections in October. And it is going to use both political and military methods to stop that. We shall not allow puppet organisations to campaign for the elections nor to set up

\* LEAP FORW

candidates to campaign for these elections. We shall use political persuasion. We shall mobilise our people against them. But we shall also use revolutionary violence or forceful persuasion to stop blacks from collaborating. Those who are about to collaborate, or have serious intentions to collaborate, we want to warn them that they are doing that at their own risk. There is still some time for them to reconsider that their future as blacks lies not with the system of apartheid oppression but lies with the ANC and the

ANC programme of the Freedom Charter. For us in Umkhonto we Sizwe we have been given clear instructions by the leadership of the ANC to organise a capacity so that we make an important contribution to the failure of the forthcoming elections in October. And I don't think the ANC is going to accept any excuses on the part of MK if it fails to achieve this objective. Excuses from us in the army, if we don't do everything - together with the mass democratic movement - to ensure that there is a massive and resounding boycott of the coming municipal elections in October. Any candidates taking part in those elections will be actually dealt with. Election meetings will be disrupted and broken down. Why should they be allowed to participate in elections against the background of the banning of those 18 organisations? There is a clampdown and obviously this clampdown is intended to create space for these people who are betraying our cause to instal themselves as an organisation of credibility. But we know that they do not command any support. But we won't be satisfied even with a 6% poll. We don't want them even to get 10% or 8%. We want a collapse of the municipal elections because they should be the farce, which they are, in the eyes of our people and, also, in the eyes of the world. Because Botha has got his own gallery - Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, (Helmut) Kohl and others. He is selling to his supporters abroad that he is restoring democracy to the blacks. He has been speaking vaguely, I don't know how many times, to allow blacks to participate in the election of a president, that there must be blacks in the Cabinet. He refuses to be explicit. But, Botha cannot preside over changes in South Africa. He is part of a repressive and evil system. So, he cannot preside over change. And we are saying that genuine change in South Africa must involve those who are genuine about bringing democratic changes in our country. And Botha is not one of them.

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE BLACK HOMELANDS? HOW WOULD AN ANC GOVERNMENT DEAL WITH THE REALITY OF HOMELANDS?

HANI: At one time the Bantustans<sup>\*</sup> were regarded as the final solution to the problems of our country. Verwoerd thought that he had brought about a master-stroke. Others after him continued with the Bantustans granting bogus independence. But those Bantustans have become now areas where Botha has got lots of problems. Coups are not a sign of stability. They are signs of serious instability, contradictions and conflicts. And, ironically the first Bantustan has had about two coups, the pride of the Bantustan policy, Bophuthatswana, has had a coup and the restoration of (President Lucas) Mangope<sup>\*</sup> was possible only because of South African military intervention. Botha is even helping us to radicalise and politicise people in the Bantustans. What do the people of Bophuthatswana think of Mangope. They see him as Pretoria's boy carrying out the errors of Pretoria. George Matanzima<sup>\*</sup> is running all over South Africa even to Austria. The other homelands are reluctant to opt for independence. (Chief) Gatsha (Buthelezi)<sup>\*</sup>

\* GOVERNMENT - BLACK TRIBAL HOMELANDS:

\* PRESIDENT THE NOMINALLY INDEPENDENT BOPHUTHATSWANA

\* DEPOSED PRESIDENT THE NOMINALLY INDEPENDENT HOMELAND OF

himself is afraid to opt for it. (Enos) Mabuza himself has declared that he is not prepared to opt for independence. The situation - even in the Bantustans - is a situation of crisis.

CHIEF MINISTER C  
SEMI-AUTONOMOUS  
KWAZULU HOM

This creates a favourable climate for the ANC and also for Umkhonto we Sizwe. Because we also, as Umkhonto we Sizwe, are paying a lot of attention to the presence of MK in the rural areas. After the Kabwe conference there was a critical appraisal of the fact that we were developing in the urban areas but we were weak in the rural areas. We want

CHIEF MINISTER  
SEMI-AUTONOM  
NORWLAND OF  
KANGWA

to correct this imbalance. Already there are programmes - both for the ANC and the army - to develop themselves in the rural areas, in the northern Transvaal, the Transkei, in the Ciskei. In the northern Transvaal already we have been involved in some armed propaganda actions. In Bophuthatswana we have been involved in an armed propaganda action where we took on some units of the SADF. As a result of the reports, people in those areas are speaking about the ANC. If you have been following the trial in Messina the local population was sympathetic to the courageous cadres of the ANC. They were cooking food for them. The priests were holding services for them. And there was a clear politicisation of the black population in an area where the ANC was never really known. So, through our landmines, through our systematic attacks we generate interest in the ANC and MK more than probably distributing one or two or three leaflets. Because the white man there has always been regarded as a colossus but now they (the blacks) are saying: who are these people who are beginning to attack the baases. Who is this boy who says: my only regret is that I have not completed my task.

He towers above the judge because he shows no hatred for the whites as human beings but he articulates hatred for the system. It is going to be talked about for a very long time in the northern Transvaal. Who are these nine boys in Venda who fought the SADF, fighting helicopters and others, for more than 12 hours in April, who inflicted casualties and were able to break out of encirclement. I am sure the SA media did not report the battle. Who are the boys coming from Katlehong who fought in Dwarsboom and Zeerust, fighting three engagements. The ordinary people of Botswana are still talking about Mafeking and other places. We make it a point that if we send people to Bophuthatswana there will be a small nucleus of people who speak the local language so that we are not isolated from the people. We must be able to talk to the people. But we will also send Xhosas to Bophuthatswana. They must know Bophuthatswana. It is part of the building of a national consciousness. But of course we will send them together with people who come from Bophuthatswana. Similarly, to the northern Transvaal we send a combination of Venda, Zulu and Sotho-speaking comrades.

ANC  
CONSULTATIVE  
CONFERENCE H  
IN KABWE, Z  
IN MAY 19

A NOMINAL  
INDEPENDENT HO

TOWN IN A  
TRANSVAAL NEAR  
WITH ZIMBAB

APRIKAWER  
USED BY BLACK  
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CAUSE.

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE ARREST OF THE BROEDERSTROOM CELL RECENTLY WEST OF PRETORIA. WAS THAT A MAJOR SETBACK FOR YOU?

Q: We don't want to give ammunition to those who are holding them nor do we want to improve the case for the prosecution because they are going to be tried. But all I can say in the words of the president, who made his statement on the way to Addis Ababa, that that was not just an isolate development. It is part of our establishing units inside the country, including white units, to fight against the system. It is part of our long-term development. We have got short-term and long-term development. But long-term development is also relative. A unit can be sent for long-term development but might be forced to swing into action.

ANC PRES  
OLIVER R.

because of the political situation inside the country. Our cadres are encouraged to read the political situation and to act together with the people and to respond to the excesses of the regime. We have embarked on a tactic of establishing these units, improving their arsenals so that they improve their capacity to act effectively against South African troops. Of course, it is important to acknowledge that the arrest is a setback but it is a setback from which we will recover. A lot was gained through the setting up of that

group and similar groups. We are already studying the lessons of this particular setback in order to correct some problems and setbacks with units already existing inside the country. I think the other positive thing is a message to the whites in South Africa that it is not just a supportive role for whites in saying: I support the ANC. But there is a place for actual physical participation and we salute the comrades who have been arrested there because they have shown a readiness to endure the hazards of an underground existence and struggle. (Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok won't tell us how long had they survived in South Africa because that is also important.

^ THERE

CONTD.

SECOND PART OF INTERVIEW WITH CHRIS HANI, CHIEF-OF-STAFF AND DEPUTY COMMANDER OF UMKHONTO WE SIZWE. 3-6-88. LUSAKA, ZAMBIA.

[ By JOHN. D. BATTERSBY ] (CONTD.)

(HANI) They had been there for some time. Much more than 6 months. And they were able to establish radio communication. The fact that they could receive weaponry of that calibre. It is the first time the Boers have ever been able to discover our SAM-7 missiles and mortars. But it is not the first time we have had them. We had similar weapons in the northern Transvaal encounter but the Boers were unable to capture them.

Q: WHAT DO YOU PLAN TO DO WITH SAM-7 MISSILES? BRING DOWN CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT?

HANI: No. We are not planning to deal with civilian aircraft. We are not about to shoot a Boeing 707. Those missiles are intended against military planes, against helicopters, against fighters and against military transport planes. It is no secret. We are unlike them. We will never use them to kill civilians passengers. We are unlike them who just go into a country and bomb as they have done in Angola — where they have just bombed refugee camps. For us, those sophisticated weapons are going to be strictly used, and, our comrades are told strictly used against military planes.

- THE SA RES

Q: WAS THE PELINDABA NUCLEAR PLANT A TARGET?

HANI: I would rather not comment on the targets. But in principle Pelindaba is a place where the government is carrying out important nuclear research and we know that South Africa has got no peaceful intentions in terms of nuclear research. It has got military intentions. Nuclear weapons or nuclear capability in the hands of a reactionary regime like the one in South Africa, like the one in Chile, Paraguay. Nuclear capability in the hands of dictators is a dangerous thing. They shouldn't be allowed to have it because, put against the wall, they will use it against the people of South Africa. It is only a free democratic South Africa that should be allowed to carry out research in



nuclear energy because a free and democratic South Africa will have no interest in using force and violence to impose itself on the people. Because they will be there as a result of a mandate given by the people of South Africa. That is why we attacked Koeberg. And that is why we will deal with Koeberg and Pelindaba when we have got the capacity to deal with them. So, Pelindaba is an important target and scientists working there are doing so at their own risk.

NUCLEAR  
STATION NEAR  
TOWN, DAMAGED  
CONSTRUCTION IN  
BY MK CADRES.

Q: YOU SAID ANY METHOD WILL BE USED TO ELIMINATE COLLABORATORS. DOES THAT INCLUDE THE CONTROVERSIAL NECKLACE METHOD THAT WAS USED BETWEEN 1984-86?

HANI: No. The movement is clear on the question of the necklace. The movement says no to the necklace because we think it is not the right method of dealing even with your worst enemies. There are ways of dealing with your worst enemies: the gun, the weapon, for instance, the pistol, the grenade. We don't think you should have a spectacle where you roast a human being. It is not nice even to kill him but in the interests of the struggle in our country we have been forced to kill them. But we don't want to make a public

demonstration of killing somebody. So we are not about to go back to the necklace. The necklace was used for good reason. I am not blaming those who used the necklace. It was a sign of the spontaneous anger of our people which was generated by the system. People thought that the necklace was the best method to discourage. But the ANC has intervened and said that the necklace as a method of dealing with opponents is not the best method. And, secondly, we want to impose discipline even in our struggle despite the fact that we are fighting. It should be a disciplined fight. There should be command and control. So we are afraid of the dangers of certain methods getting out of control - not that control is always possible in a difficult situation like ours. But as a movement we always want to exercise control. It might be difficult to exercise that control but we always try our best.

Q: WAS THE NECKLACE SOMETHING INVENTED BY MK OR WAS IT SOMETHING THAT AROSE SPONTANEOUSLY IN THE TOWNSHIPS?

HANI: It was invented by the people, by the youth who were responding to a situation of escalating violence, a situation of brutality and this was the answer to it.

TSHWETE: In fact, even the people themselves, copied from the enemy. The enemy was the first to burn people, it was the police.

HANI: And the leaders like Steve and others saw them on TV video coming here to intervene to stop the necklace to say some people are saying thanks for the intervention, notorious traitors. The necklace was a sporadic development. It served its purpose. It was an emotional thing. Somebody was not given a fair trial. People would pounce on you. But I don't think we are about to see the re-emergence of the necklace.

Q: WHAT HAPPENED IN PRETORIA WHEN AN ANC CADRE WAS BLOWN UP OUTSIDE A PRETORIA CINEMA? WAS HE GOING TO BOMB THE CINEMA.

BOMB BLAST  
MAINLY W/ -  
PRETORIA C  
APRIL.

HANI: He was on the way to a target - not the cinema - but

the bomb blew him before he reached the target. The regime, for propaganda purposes, said the objective was the cinema. He was going for another target. He was a very experienced and disciplined cadre of the organisation. In fact, his death was quite a severe loss for us. He was a cadre who had been in the country for more than 3 years.

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE RECENT BOMBS IN JOHANNESBURG? WERE THESE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANC POLICY? HAVE YOU HAD CONFIRMATION THAT THERE WERE DETONATED BY ANC CADRES?

→ SOME A  
NOT TO HAVE  
DIRECTED AT  
TARGETS.

HANI: We have had confirmation that those operations in Pretoria and Johannesburg were carried out by MK units. We have got concrete confirmation from the commanders and commissars of those groups. I don't think they constitute a departure from our position of intensification, of armed propaganda, and a position of demonstrating to our people that we are still very much around. And also they are demonstrating to the whites in SA they are going to live without security as long as Botha is there.

Some of the blasts are important in terms of armed

propaganda and encourage an embattled people <sup>who</sup> they are not allowed to organise freely in their trade unions and in their mass democratic movements. Thousands of their followers and activists are in prison. So, for us, the momentum of the struggle must not be lost. Bombs are also an active weapon in mobilising our people, in reviving their hopes, in destroying despondency. And now for the youth in the townships, for the workers they will say: there you are. It is not only Botha calling the shots. Our movement is also there. And so sometimes a small device placed there - it is not intended probably to kill so many people - but those workers rushing to park station will walk tall and those who are despondent will say: what am I doing for the struggle. He will think about his street committee. He will think about his activity in Sayco and the trade unions. He will think about: what am I doing for the ANC cadre who comes in to place that bomb. Shouldn't I begin also to form an underground and to look for the ANC. So, the bombs are also political methods of mobilising the people.

\* SOUTH AFR  
YOUTH CONGRESS  
ANTI-APARTHEID  
ORGANISATION

Q: IS THAT WHAT YOU WOULD CATEGORISE AS ARMED PROPAGANDA?  
YAS.

HANI: They were to tell the whites that we are able to creep and crawl next to you. That be careful, and this is not just a threat, we are growing and we shall be able to do something big within your areas. That the state of emergency, that your deployment in the townships has not stopped us from being able to move into the city, to create problems for you. There is a big psychological battle to win the minds. Botha and others are investing lots of money in this war of the hearts and minds. We are also engaged in that war of winning the minds and support of our people. We have no problems about that support but we want our people to say I am not only for the struggle but I are prepared to participate. That, in spite of all these comrades coming out to do these things. For instance, over the past few years there has been a growing support of our parents for our struggle. I have been with Umkhonto for quite some time. Not a single parent has ever expressed regret for the loss of a son in the interests of the struggle. We have met many parents here. They have come to talk to us. They have encouraged us. And that is a new development. Very, very

IN FAVOR

\* 27 YEARS.

→ LUSAKA, Z  
ANC H

positive. These are parents of MK -adres killed inside the country.

Q: WHAT IMPACT TO YOU THINK THE KILLING OF BLACK CIVILIANS HAS WHEN THEY ARE CAUGHT IN THE BOMBING?

HANI: I think among the blacks there is a broad understanding. I know a few blacks were maimed at the time of the landmine blast in the eastern Transvaal. Their response was: I am sorry that I lost a leg but I know that that action was not intended for me. This has been the attitude of our people everywhere. They are not targets for those bombs. They are not, they never have been, they will not be targets for those bombs. But they know that because they move around together with the whites that it is possible, and it can never be ruled out, that some of them will even pay with their life. And we want to say to them that we are sorry that some of them die in these actions and at the right moment, when the ANC becomes the government of South Africa, something will be done for those families who suffered losses for the cause of the struggle. The victims of a war that has been imposed on us by the regime. Our people should know the fact that blacks that die in this sort of thing - the ANC is not responsible. It is the system, it is the regime. Vlok must not try to apportion blame.

\*LAW AND  
MINISTER ADR  
VLOK.

Q: WHAT ABOUT WHITE CIVILIANS?

HANI: The death of white civilians is regretted too. I don't think we have any interest in the death of white civilians. But white South Africans, for a long time, have been complacent. They have allowed the future of South Africa to be decided by a vicious clique. And we regret that they die in the course of this confrontation between us and the forces of the regime. Now within that, you see, there must be some soul-searching. There should be among white South Africans. How long are they going to sacrifice loss of limb to maintain a system that deprives the overwhelming majority of the right to a vote, of the right to a proper house, to proper medical attention, right to proper education? Instead of being hysterical and tending to blame us, whites must begin to deal with the government they vote for. That is not our intention that we place the bombs and they get killed but the whites have got a big contribution to make towards the elimination of violence in our country. Are they developing a Masada complex and saying that everything must go up in flames? Do they want the future generation, both black and white, to inherit a wasteland? We have been forced to use bombs, to use AK and grenades, forced by their own government, the government they vote for. It is part of history that for years - for more than 50 years - we were a non-violent organisation. We have been pushed too far by the regime to defend ourselves, to defend the right to get freedom. Before we turned to revolutionary violence we have turned so many cheeks.

TSHWETE: We continued to turn our cheek even after we opted for armed struggle in 1961, influenced perhaps by the long tradition of non-violent struggle by the ANC. Even after we had opted for armed struggle we still believed that we could still win our liberation with our own bare hands. That was the attitude of the ANC for over 20 years. The ANC was concentrating on hitting isolated pylons avoiding hitting at human beings, even enemy personnel. It was in 1983 - the Pretoria bomb blast - that the ANC planned a deliberate

\*ATTACK  
AIR FORCE

- 19 KILLED 2

assault against enemy personnel. So for over 20 years we have always been throwing these signals to the white community that this is our position. And in the meantime the so-called white civilians in our country have been expressing complicity in this crime of genocide against our people. When they crossed the borders into Lesotho in 1982, massacred women and children and even innocent Lesotho citizens. An opinion poll was held after the raid and over 90% of the white population said: well done, boys. Even as recently as the later years when South Africa engaged in these cross-border raids in Botswana, in Mozambique and in Zambia there has been this applause from within the purview of the white community in South Africa. And in the meantime, even inside South Africa, when for instance the Pretoria women went on a very peaceful demonstration they were mowed down in Mamelodi. There was no comment from the white population. The Langa massacre in Uitenhage. Absolutely no protest. The detention of children. Nothing of any sort from the white community. But once now a single white civilian is involved (Paul Annegarn) there is a whole outcry. There is an element of racism in it. That blacks are not civilians. That the SADF and the police can just main and kill at will in South Africa. But one person and you get a

\* 19 SHOT BY  
NIGHT WATCH  
1985.  
WHITE TWO  
WHO LEFT BR  
CELL IN NOV  
LAST YEAR.

hell of an outcry. In the outlook of the fascist clique, civilians are only whites in South Africa. Even what the farmers are doing in the northern Transvaal is racist. They are taking the ordinary black labourers and farmworkers as mine sweepers before the boss goes out. He would call upon a farm labourer to drive a tractor using them deliberately as minesweepers. We are looking at these things. And those are some of the positions that we intended to influence with our armed struggle. We are talking to our white compatriots. We are calling on them to renounce Botha because he offers no future for them at all. That the future for all South Africans lies in our struggle for a non-racial, democratic country.

Q: HOW WOULD YOU WANT WHITES TO DEMONSTRATE THIS SUPPORT IN PRACTICE? BY BOYCOTTING ELECTIONS AND STRUCTURES?

\* AUTHOR OF A  
"THE SOLUTION."

TSHWETE: As I said to a businessman (Leon Louw) in Dakar: why don't you take a stand to begin with by ensuring that the products you manufacture are not available to the SADF and the police force. Ordinary industrialists are actively supporting the regime. Why don't you say for instance that we are not going to be a party to the extortion of rent by taking stop-orders for the reduction of rent from our employees at the firms where they are working.

\* CONTAINED IN DRAFT LEGISLATION  
BETWEEN THE RENT BOYCOTT.

OR THEY SHOULD SAY:

HANI: We are not going to be rushing to the Supreme Court to apply for interdicts to prevent the trade unions from protesting against repressive legislation.

TSHWETE: What we want is public manifestations and demonstrations about, for instance, what South African troops are doing in Angola. What are we doing in Angola maiming and killing innocent children? It is pathetic what the SADF is doing in Angola. People are not aware of what is happening there. If the people (victims) were white people they would be taking differently.

HANI: Why are they (the whites) not coming and saying: this man Mandela has been in jail for 25 years. This is enough. Release him. Release Mandela and others. That has lost momentum now. They are accepting the reason that Botha is

putting forward the incarceration of Comrade Nelson. Why are they not campaigning for their release? People are not being tried, but kept because they belong to the mass democratic movement. But what are they doing about the question of the redistribution of the wealth of the country? The whites are not even pressuring the industrialists significantly to pay the same salary to their black and white employees. What about removals? Why are they not saying to Botha: respect the verdict of the Supreme Court in the case of Moutse? And KwaNdebele independence. When it suits him Botha rushes to Parliament even to invalidate the decision of a Supreme Court despite the fact that we are told that the judiciary is independent. There is a lot that the whites can do to demonstrate their support and goodwill for the struggle.

RURAL BLACK  
INCORPORATED B  
INTO SEMI-AUTON  
HOMELAND OR KW

TSHWETE: We are not saying to them that they must take our positions and endorse the concept of armed struggle nor even to rally themselves fully behind the Freedom Charter. But to adopt such strategies as will complement the strategies of the broad mass democratic struggle in South Africa. To make South Africa ungovernable. To say that apartheid is a criminal system. They must say so, like the international community is saying so. And like all criminal systems it

\* MILDLY SOUTH  
AFRICAN BLUEPRINT  
A NON-RACIAL  
AFRICA.

needs to be stopped.

HANI: For instance, why are they saying there should be no sanctions against South Africa? Tutu is saying that this is a last peaceful measure to pressurise the government. But the howl and cry against Tutu from the white community. In other words whites expect people to fold their hands and not to struggle. To allow Botha to continue with his stampede against the people of South Africa. The ANC has never said this is the only form of struggle that the ANC is carrying out. The ANC allows for a multiplicity of forms of struggle. It appreciates other forms of struggle even though they are forms of struggle we don't have high regard for. Come, contribute. Raise a finger. But the majority of white South Africans are not raising any finger for democracy.

\* ANGLICAN  
ARCHBISHOP D  
M. TUTU, I  
PEACE LAUR

TSWETE: Another problem is the occupation of the classrooms in the townships by the SADF. When these things are screened on their (the whites' TVs) it is a distant thing. Something happening in Beirut or Guatemala. That is the attitude of the whites in South Africa. They have been cocooned to that extent. You get that attitude with the majority of whites in spite of the fact that progressive formations have emerged within the white community. Such as Nusas, Jodac, the Congress of Cape Democrats, Idasa and a multiplicity of others. But they (the whites) feel very much cocooned. They go to their cinemas and beaches and have their picnics on the farms, that sort of thing. The whole thing out there is something very distant and they are not affected by it. That sort of attitude.

NUSAS = NA  
UNION OF S  
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JODAC = JOHAN  
DEMOCRATIC  
COMMITTEE  
IDASA = INS  
FOR A DEM  
INTERNATION  
SOUTH AFR

HANI: They say: the blacks are alright. It's only a few radicals. That's the myth they are perpetrating.

TSHWETE: It must be driven into their minds - by the termination of the good life in their midst - that there is a struggle going on in South Africa.

ENDS

THIRD AND FINAL PART OF INTERVIEW WITH CHRIS HANI, CHIEF-OF-STAFF AND DEPUTY COMMANDER OF UMKHONTO WE SIZWE. LUSAKA, ZAMBIA. 3-6-88. [By JOHN D. BATTERSBY] (CONTD.)

(HANI:) Part is selfish self-interest in terms of a good life. Their life is good, it is not destructed. They go to their cinemas, they go for their braai vleis, they go to their five-star hotel. That is why they are supporting the system. It guarantees a happy life for them, a sweet life. And part of our campaign is to prevent that sweet life. Then they must enjoy their sweet life so that Botha must not only deploy SADF forces in the townships but must deploy even within Johannesburg, within Cape Town to prevent us from doing anything there.

Q: DOES THAT NOT MEAN YOU HAVE GOT TO TAKE THE WAR INTO AREAS WHERE YOU HAVE NOT WANTED TO TAKE IT BEFORE LIKE PUTTING BOMBS IN CINEMAS, IN RESTAURANTS - THE AREAS WHERE WHITES ENJOY THE GOOD LIFE?

HANI: No. Some of these targets like administrative offices, like special branch offices, like police offices, homes of some of the policemen, are in the urban areas and some of these reactionary judges who have been dishing out these death sentences against our comrades. The Sharpeville Six are being sentenced to death because they were present at the demonstration against Dlamini. There is no evidence that they participated. They are guilty by association and they are sentenced to death. We shall select those targets which are within white areas and there is no way the whites won't open their ears and hear an explosion or get to know that so-and-so has been eliminated by an MK unit because he is an officer in the special branch or in the SADF. That is the kind of armed propaganda which shows that we can hit and that it is dangerous to hang around the Carlton Centre because there might be an office there that would be a target for the ANC. So the best thing is to move and to barricade myself in my nice house in lower Houghton.\*

There  
\* upmarket  
Suburb of Johannesburg

TSHWETE: Or even to hang around Standard Bank as was the case with the Roodepoort bomb because there might be an office of the security branch in the top floor of the Standard Bank.

HANI: We all know that these offices where some of our people are tortured are in some of these multi-storeyed houses in Johannesburg and Cape Town. Sanlam Building for instance.

Q: ARE YOU NOT WORRIED THAT, SO FAR, THE REGIME IS USING WHITE FEARS TO THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE AND BOLSTERING THEIR RANKS AND THOSE OF THE EXTREME RIGHT-WING?

HANI: My response to that is that the National Party has been in power for 40 years and they have been returned with increased majorities. They were in power before the ANC opted for armed struggle. Whites continued to vote for the National Party. So, I don't accept the argument that because the armed struggle is being escalated they will seek the protection of Botha. While it is true, on the one hand, that Botha's demagoguery in terms of raising this security aspect, earned him some votes, it also brought about a polarisation not in our interests. The whites are now believing that Botha is

\* SMITH AS  
PRESIDENT  
BOTHAN.

DR ANDRIES  
TREURNICHT, 2  
OF THE FAR R  
WING CONSERVA  
PARTY.

not doing a good job. They are not coming to us. They are going to the right-wing. Treurnicht and the Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB) got half a million votes last time. But more than 20% still voted against the National Party because they didn't think Botha was doing a good job. Now, if we sustain our armed activities, and we must sustain our armed activities, then the only correct lesson that can be drawn by people who think is that Botha is not protecting them. Has Botha brought about security for them in terms of MK activities? My answer is no. The Institute of Strategic Studies in Pretoria itself admits that in 1987 the ANC carried out the biggest number of operations. And we can say we are still very much in business. We shall continue to escalate because everything that Botha does like, for instance, clamping down on an organisation, sends a clear message to our people that there is no alternative but to fight. If the whites are going to choose the security of barricades and burglar bars how long is that security going to be regarded as genuine security? Will ultimately, with intensification of the struggle, not multi-national companies withdraw from South Africa. They are investing in South Africa because Botha has, so far, been able to provide security and so-called peace and law and order. And we are determined and committed to preventing that climate. And it is not only ourselves. The trade unions are fuming. They are angry because the victories they achieved are being also destroyed. That is why Cosatu and Nactu are going for acts of protest against the coming legislation. Ultimately, it is important for the whole movement in South Africa - the mass democratic movement - to convince, not just through talking but through action, that Botha's security is no security at all for the whites. It has no future. It is not going to take us five years. It will take us many years. Ultimately, some of them will take the chicken path and run away from South Africa. When they reach a point where they feel apartheid is too costly in terms of lives they will run away with their children. They have been cocooned. They don't see it. But our intention is to make them see it. So that when they are maimed and they are in hospital others will go there to visit them and will say: this is the price apartheid. We must make apartheid expensive and costly in terms of financial resources and in terms of lives. It must be made painful. At the moment it is very sweet for them but it must be made painful and bitter, especially for the whites. It is bitter for the blacks. For the whites it must be made very painful and bitter. That no amount of the sentencing of McBride and others to death will stop us from carrying the war.

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TSHWETE: And the war is not going to be fought on a straight line. It is going to go up. It must be seen to be going up and moving towards its climax. It is not just going to be a question of more activity and more operations in 1988 than in 1987. But also we must at the end of the year say that we have got to this point now in our struggle and we hope that within this period we will have achieved that - and that towards the victorious conclusion of our struggle. We want to have it terminated. We want to have it victoriously concluded. We don't want to fight that war for eternity. That is why we are summoning every resource that we have to see to it that it is war. War must be war in South Africa, that is our point. Once everyone realises that there is war going on in the country then Botha will start thinking because then he will have been nudged by his own people. They will know what is happening now: apartheid is no longer protecting us. Because at the moment he does not feel

sufficient push from within his own tribe inside the country. He is arrogant. Even his ambassadors are telling the world: do your damndest. Because he does not feel sufficient push from within his own tribe inside the country. So, escalation then entails a lot for the white community in South Africa. The quality and intensity and regularity of incidents must be escalated.

HANI: We have been given a mandate by the movement to ensure that there is literally a cascading of military operations this year and beyond. But this year is politically crucial. It is crucial in terms of Botha normalising things. He wants to impose his constitutional tinkering on us. And we say: no. He does not respect our voices. He silences us. They are investing a lot in the strategy of winning hearts and minds. We want to ensure that he doesn't win. We want this counter-insurgency strategy of these JMC's national security management system to collapse.

Q: ALL THIS WOULD APPEAR TO ASSUME A HIGH LEVEL OF DESTRUCTION IN SOUTH AFRICA, BEFORE THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA CAN BE BUILT?

HANI: Unless a miracle happens. And I don't see a miracle happening. The Nats are intransigent. They are arrogant. They are contemptuous. They don't want us to solve the whole issue peacefully. They don't want to listen to us and the mass democratic movement. They prefer imposing their own leaders on us. They want to impose their own terms which are unacceptable to us. And as long as they adopt that attitude there is no alternative but to continue that struggle. A luta continua. And to add that victory is certain.

Q: DOES THIS NOT MEAN YOU WILL INHERIT A WASTELAND?

HANI: The onus is on them. We are prepared to see a wasteland if that is the price for our freedom. We are not going to be putting on gloves because we are afraid of a wasteland. We don't want a wasteland but if it comes to a question of Botha wanting to reduce the country to a wasteland we are not going to say: no, we accept our slavery because we don't want to inherit a wasteland. We would like to stop this fight at any time but it must be a genuine settlement, at least democracy.



TSHWETE: That is why we have not confined ourselves to what we are doing inside the country. We have even appealed to the international community for sanctions. We believe sincerely that they will help making Botha move before that wasteland become a reality.

HANI: We are saying to the whites: fellow countrymen. Let us join together and save our country from this madman (PW Botha) so that it remains a prosperous country. There is peace for all of us. It is a big country. We accept that you are fellow South Africans who must rule this country together. We are not asking the monopoly of ruling South Africa as blacks. It is not a racial struggle. We are not saying: power to the ANC but power to the people of South Africa. We are not advocating a one-party state. We are advocates of parliamentary democracy. But not fascist and racist parties. There certainly would be a place for (Helen) Suzman\* in a South African parliament. The PFP would be

there. Liberals would be there but certainly not racist and fascist parties. Wynand Malan\* and others will be there. The people of South Africa must decide in a democratic poll who must rule South Africa. Of course, we want to rule. We think we provide the best programme for the people of South Africa.

TSHWETE: And to our white compatriots who are leaving the country, we would have preferred a situation where they had rather stayed inside the country and join forces with their compatriots inside South Africa. They must participate in changing that society.

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