It took nearly two years of formal talks to remove the obstacles in the path of multi-party negotiations. However, it was not until nearly ten months after these agreements were reached that such negotiations actually started. Nonetheless, multi-party negotiations were finally a reality. The major stakeholders began preparations on their negotiating positions and positioned themselves for an outcome that would suit them best. In doing this, the parties faced some of their most difficult challenges.
One of their immediate difficulties was honouring the agreements founded on the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes and the D. F. Malan Accord. The effect of these agreements was to create the necessary conditions for multi-party negotiations to take place. Unfortunately, however, the country was now in the grip of the spectre of third force' violence, a factor that presented parties, and particularly their political leaders, with their most serious test yet. In dealing with the problem of violence, the parties would learn an important lesson in political negotiation, that the government cannot be both player and impartial referee at the same time.
Against all odds
By April 1991 the process of negotiation was under threat once more, and as before, the cause of the problem was the unrelenting spiral of violence. De Klerk made it his explanation for the delay in commencing multi-party negotiations. The ANC did not accept this, and on 5 April 1991 issued De Klerk with an ultimatum. This ultimatum came in the form of an open letter, demanding that the Ministers of Defence, Magnus Malan, and Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, be removed. The ultimatum also required the government to meet these demands by no later than 9 May, failing which the organization threatened to suspend all constitutional talks. The ANC also made specific demands regarding the security forces, and called for the removal of all officers directly involved with the CCB and other hit squads, and the dismantling and disarming of all special counter-insurgency units including the CCB, Koevoet, and Askaris.
The ANC argued that the government had to accept responsibility for the violence, and questioned the government's failure to bring it to an end, since, in the ANC's view, it had the capacity to do so. The ANC also argued that there was evidence of the state's complicity in the violence, and the IFP was accused of playing a role as well. In explaining the ultimatum to diplomats, Mandela confirmed that what the ANC was really looking for was an act of good faith by the government, as there was a growing perception in the ANC that the government was dragging its heels.
The response of the IFP was equally harsh as Buthelezi angrily threatened to opt out of the negotiations and raised the spectre of civil war. The effect of the exchange served to inflame national debate. The government attacked the ANC ultimatum and accused the organization of shifting the goalposts and derailing the negotiation process.
On 12 April 1991 the ANC unveiled its proposed constitutional principles in a discussion document, which to some extent had the effect of shifting public focus away from the prospect of a total breakdown. It was also a display of serious intent and commitment to the negotiations. The discussion document called for a unitary, non-racial, and democratic state with a bill of rights. There would be an elected president as head of state and a prime minister as head of the cabinet. The judiciary would be independent, and would have the ability to set aside laws that were unconstitutional; in this way, the constitution's sovereignty would be protected. The document also envisaged a two-house parliament composed of a national assembly and a senate elected by way of proportional representation. The document finally called for comment and debate by all. The most striking aspect of these proposals was their similarity to those of the NP. While there remained major differences in approach, it became clear that there was a convergence developing between the two perspectives. This provided a basis for further negotiation."
The government also produced new proposals on both process and substantive matters. While it still rejected the idea of an interim government, it accepted the need for some transitional arrangement to give extra-parliamentary formations a voice in the legislature and executive." In making this concession, the government's chief negotiator, Gerrit Viljoen, insisted that the government would at all times retain ultimate authority throughout the transition and that it had no intention of abdicating power. According to Viljoen, government objected to a surrender of its power and authority to the interim structure, a view supported by the leader of the DP, Zach de Beer. Viljoen made it clear that:
The continuous, complex and most responsible business of governing a nation remains the task of the National Party government until such time as the proposed changes have taken place. The same applies to the present constitution and its instiÂtutions. The Government will continue to govern and the National Party will negotiate. ... The lawful institutions of government and administration, set up according to the valid constitution and laws of the land, will continue to provide sound government and administration. ... But there are four possibiÂlities of acceptable transitional arrangements.
Firstly, the mooted negotiating forum might itself acquire the stature and capacity to influence the legislative, executive and administrative processes directly and with great authority - but its primary task will remain the achievement of consensus on a new constitution.
Secondly, an informal, influential leadership corps could emerge during negotiation, which might even develop into a formal structure.
Thirdly, the Cabinet could be expanded, with the approval of the negotiating forum, to include a relatively broad spectrum of competent South Africans.
Fourthly, multi-party working groups specialising in various fields of government could emerge and provide guidance in the transitional period to the established Government institution.
On the question of power-sharing and minority rights, Viljoen said:
There is no possibility of its [the government's] simply disappearing from the political stage and handing over to one or other potentate or group with no experience of what the governance of a sophisticated country involves. South Africa is not a colony that is now becoming independent; it has been constitutionally emancipated for decades. A system in which the arithmetic majority is effectively given all political power for a period is unacceptable and unworkable. There must be a balance between one person, one vote, and the effective protection of minorities.
There could be a head of state and a head of government, elected by each house, or the Swiss model could be followed, providing for a collective multiparty college with a rotating chairman.
The government's strategy was one that would allow it to emerge from negotiation with as much of its power intact as possible. Ironically, it insisted that a new government did not need the structural power that the National Party had itself relied on for more than four decades. While the government's views accorded with those of the ANC on most issues, the major differences lay in the treatment of minorities. Viljoen continued:
As an instrument of minority protection, consideration should be given to a central legislature comprising two Houses. In this way a balance will be achieved between universal voting rights and majority power in the one House, and minority rights protection through special representation and decision-making power for minorities in the other House, a multi-party compilation of the legislative authority (or Cabinet) and a spreading of the powers that are concentrated in the office of the President.
There should be a chamber of minorities in which special voting procedures and raised majority requirements could operate in decision-making over sensitive, fundamental issues. Structures of self-determination by individual communities must serve as a fundamental building block of minority protection. Where a local community can identify itself on non-racial grounds and through voluntary association, it must, if it so chooses, be allowed to establish its own community structure. This structure would deal with community matters, including aspects of education, welfare, surroundings and culture. Such structures must be able to generate their own funds.... Powers should be devolved to regions as far as possible.
Towards the end of April 1991, President F. W de Klerk carried out one of his most successful international visits to Europe, and returned confident with the praise he received. However, he was also aware that he was returning to one of the most serious crises to threaten the process, for the deadline set by the ANC ultimatum was drawing near, and there were still disagreements, accusations, and counter-accusations over the release of political prisoners.
One of the more serious obstacles to negotiation remained the dreaded Internal Security Act, but on 2 May 1991 De Klerk confirmed that it was to be drastically amended. However, he was keen to address the ANC's demands in a way that would not appear a sign of weakness. A week later De Klerk held separate discussions with Buthelezi and Mandela in the hope that it would be possible to hold a summit on violence. In this way, De Klerk could show that he was seriously addressing the question of violence. However, despite broad agreement that a summit on the question was necessary, it was not to be: on 18 May the ANC announced that it was pulling out of constitutional talks with the government and out of the summit, because the ANC opposed the peace conference's being called by President P. W. de Klerk; as Joe Slovo explained: 'implicit in it is the inference that the state is an impartial body standing above the violence and is calling all those connected with it plus a broader section of the community to discuss it. We dismiss the implication'.
The editorial in the Star on 22 May 1991 pointed out that De Klerk had made a basic negotiating mistake:
It is this: in the lead-up to negotiation - especially between suspicious parties - process is everything. How the protagonists are lured to the negotiating table is as important as what happens when they get there. Judged by that yardstick, De Klerk made two elementary negotiating errors.
He called the conference unilaterally and without consultation. And he virtually declared himself the referee, though dearly, in the eyes of other parties, he is a participant, even an 'accused'. It was an invitation to breakdown.
The ANC called for a two-day general strike, mass protests, a consumer boycott, and a day of fasting, in solidarity with political prisoners, but did not sever all its contact with the government and continued to take part in the joint working groups on prisoner releases, repatriation of exiles, and the suspension of hostilities. On 20 May De Klerk and King Goodwill Zwelithini agreed to measures prohibiting the carrying of dangerous weapons in public places." The only exception to this rule was for weapons carried for strictly 'cultural' purposes. This was a significant breakthrough towards peace.
On 31 May 1991 white South Africa celebrated its 30th anniversary as a republic. In marking this day, De Klerk made an impassioned plea in support of constitutional change, acknowledging that had it not been for the violence, the country would be well on the road to negotiating its future. Early in June, the twelve members of the European Community gave the South African government a tough warning to end the political violence in the country, the strongly worded reprimand coming in a demarche, a diplomatic protest. To be even-handed, the IFP and the ANC were also sent the message.
It was also at this time that statutory apartheid was finally scrapped, in compliance with a commitment made by De Klerk to the international community, and paving the way for the lifting of sancÂtions and embargoes by several countries, including the United States. In June, the ANC held its first legal National Congress to elect and hand its new leadership the organization's mandate on negotiation. The congress also elected Cyril Ramaphosa as the new Secretary-General of the ANC.
The Inkathagate scandal
Just as the dust from the storm caused by the ANC ultimatum had settled, there was another controversy. Documentary evidence came to light of covert funding by the government of Inkatha and the arming and training of its membership in offensive actions against the ANC, in a series of revelations that came to be known as the 'Inkathagate' scandal. There were also further revelations about the SADF's involvement in 'death squads' and the ongoing violence, which served as proof that the government was talking peace and waging war at the same time. De Klerk's personal credibility was even called into question, and he was faced with his worst crisis since taking over from P. W Botha.
While Buthelezi denied any knowledge of the payments, Adriaan Vlok admitted that they had taken place. The revelations took their toll on the financial markets."" Even the Bush administration in the United States demanded that the government take all necessary steps to restore the 'integrity of the negotiating process'. These revelations served to add credence to two of the ANC's demands: for the removal of Magnus Malan and Adriaan Vlok from the cabinet, and for an interim government. There was now no doubt that the government could not be a referee and a player, nor could it be solely responsible for managing the transition.
South Africans, however, were to learn that there is nothing better to focus the minds of negotiators, and often speed up the process of negotiation, than a crisis. This was a lesson and an experience that would be repeated on several occasions throughout South Africa's lengthy process of negotiation.
Interestingly, not even the ANC called for the resignation of De Klerk, which might have been the case in any other country. At the end of July, De Klerk responded to the crisis, justifying the covert programmes on the basis that they had been implemented while the ANC was still banned. He promised greater control of state funds and explained the steps he had taken to ensure the impartiality of the security forces. He also confirmed that the government had no desire to be both player and referee. On the question of an interim governÂment, he endorsed the need for transitional measures to overcome this problem.
Vlok was shifted to the post of Correctional Services and Malan to that of Forestry. This was also a useful opportunity for De Klerk to reshuffle his cabinet to prepare effectively for negotiation. De Klerk announced:
Today, I wish to commit myself once again to transitional arrangements, which will ensure in a constitutionally accountable manner that the government is unable to misuse its position of power to the detriment of its discussion partners in a negotiating process. I have an open mind on alternative methods. However, any steps in this connection have to result from negotiation. As far as I am concerned, they may be the first item on the agenda of a multiparty congress.
The response of the ANC was swift. Its National Executive Committee met in an extraordinary session to review the situation, identified the crisis facing the De Klerk government, and surmised that it was at its weakest. The ANC wished to capitalize on this weakness and speed up the process of consultation towards the formation of a patriotic front, while it was also imperative to move quickly towards an all-party congress and extract as many compromises from the government as was possible. To this end, the ANC shifted its focus from the obstacles identified in the Harare Declaration and the demands contained in its April ultimatum to the issue at hand.
For the ANC, the revelations moved the issue of an interim government to the top of the agenda, while it was also recognized that control over the security forces was crucial to safeguard the transition. A means had to be found to ensure that the security forces would not pose any threat. This assessment took into account the 'significant degree of consensus' reached in bilateral discussions over the previous two months. According to Ramaphosa, 'We are more convinced than ever that the De Klerk government is the obstacle that stands between us and the resolution of SA's problems. We still want obstacles removed but the best possible way is the removal of the government itself'.
According to Slovo, there were no real obstacles to the ANC's participation in an all-party congress: 'We will be faced with obstacles until the end of time. Subject to consultation with our allies, we are dearly prepared to move towards an all-party conference and that all-party conference must discuss the creation of an interim government'.
Mandela welcomed the changes De Klerk had made to his cabinet. He felt that the ANC and the government were moving closer to each other, and said:
We are happy if the government is optimistic about the all-party conference, because despite all the problems that have arisen, we still feel that negotiation is the correct solution for South Africa. But we are not going to go into negotiation blindly. The government must carry out its responsibility and it must agree to a mechanism, which will ensure that we'll not have a similar scandal to the Inkathagate scandal. And the only mechanism we see which will give this assurance is the immediate installation of an interim government. That is the only mechanism, which can be adopted to ensure that we can now proceed confidently with negotiation....
De Klerk is responding to our demands. He may not have met those demands to the full, but we must take into account that he has taken some action. He has removed these two Ministers from the portfolios they had. That is what we asked them to do. It may well be that the fact that they are now in charge of minor portÂfolios is a matter which we may not like to take any further.
There is no reason why the government should not accept the idea of an interim government. We are already moving close to the government on this question. De Klerk has said he is prepared to discuss interim arrangements along the lines of a government, which embraces the major parties in the negotiating process. We are not satisfied with that. We want him to go further. The idea of an interim government with sovereign powers over all the organs of government and not co-opting certain individuals is our demand. We are not prepared to be co-opted into the existing structures of government. We want a transfer of power from this government to an interim government. That is the only way we can solve the problems that have been raised by the Inkatha scandal.
In the meantime, the PAC deputy leader, Dikgang Moseneke, confirmed the PAC's willingness to engage in a 'pre-constituent assembly conference'. After several months of horse-trading with the UNHCR and the NCCR the government finally agreed on 16 August 1991 to grant a general amnesty to all exiles, paving the way for their return home, in an agreement that opened the way for the UNHCR to set up its first offices in South Africa. The UN described this agreement as a 'ringing endorsement' of the reforms taking place in the country.
Negotiating positions on substantive matters
Meanwhile, in preparation for holding a special Federal Congress on 4 September, the NP appointed Stoffel van der Merwe to the new created post of Secretary-General to streamline the party's negotiating effort. 39 It also produced a discussion document containing constitutional proposals, but these proposals were effectively no more than a refinement of P. W Botha's 1988 constitutional proposals. At the same time, the DP also made public its constitutional proposals.
For the first time the constitutional proposals of the ANC (published on 12 April 1991), the NP, and the DP (both on 29 August 1991) were laid out side by side. This was an important moment in the history of South African constitutional development. Historically, it marks a shift in political conflict from competing forces to competing constitutional visions. The dominant terrain of struggle between previously warring parties was now clearly located in the arena of constitutional debate, and the period of 'talks about talks' had come to an end. On the whole, the five obstacles identified in the Harare Declaration had been removed, and a climate in which multi-party negotiation could begin had been achieved. The negotiation thus far was between the ANC and the NP, but both the form and the content of negotiation were to change dramatiÂcally, for they would now appear within a multi-party framework. While there was substantial debate as to what ought to be negotiated, in essence the issue remained one of levelling the playing field between parties contending for political power and constitutional perspectives.
The National Party's constitutional proposals
The National Party's proposals relied on a unitary state, though with strong federal characteristics. The NP also maintained three branches of government: an executive, a legislature, and a judiciary. A multi-party executive college that would consist of between three and five members of the strongest parties in the first house of parliament, and making its decisions by consensus, should head the state. These parties together should command a majority of the representatives in this house. The chair of the executive college would operate on a rotational basis. A multi-party cabinet appointed by consensus by the executive college would implement its policy. However, the proposal did not include a view on the future of the TBVC independent homelands.
There would be two houses of parliament. The power of the majority in the first house would be limited by the requirement of an increased majority on some 'sensitive' matters, for which the agreement of the second house would be needed. The second, smaller, house would be the seat of power for minorities, and would represent the proposed nine regions. Each party that achieved more than a specified minimum support level in elections for the legislature in that region would have equal seats for that region. While the first house would pass ordinary laws by a simple majority, the second house would have to approve all legislation amending the constitution, affecting regions or minorities, or initiating laws affecting the specific interests of minorities and regions. Elections for the first house would be by proportional representation, which did not, however, rule out the possibility of some parallel constituency representation. (The proposals cited the German example to support this argument. In terms of this example, only half the seats in the legislature are chosen according to a winner-takes-all system in single-member constituencies.) The NP also supported the argument that the constitution be the supreme law and sovereign, and allowed for a court to set aside laws that were inconsistent with the constitution.
Each of the nine regions would have a legislature. A mixture of direct elections on the basis of proportional representation in constituencies and possibly indirect election would choose the members of the legislatures from representatives of local authorities. Each region would also have an executive committee, which would operate on a similar basis to that of the national executive. The regional and local authorities would enjoy real autonomous powers and would have their own tax bases, while there would be a justifiable bill of rights. In addition, the Auditor-General, Public Service Commission, and Reserve Bank would have greater autonomy, while an independent and objective ombudsman would be appointed.
The ANC's constitutional proposals
The African National Congress envisaged a united, democratic, non-racial, and non-sexist country including the TBVC independent homelands, with a strong central government. As in the NP proposals, there would be three branches of government: an executive, a legislature, and a judiciary. The president would be the head of the executive and head of state, but the proposal was unclear about the election of the president. A prime minister, who would act in consultation with the president, would head the cabinet, with the president appointing both the prime minister and the cabinet.
The ANC's proposal also allowed for two houses of parliament. The first would be a national assembly elected by proportional representation and universal suffrage; primary legislative power would be vested in this house. The second house would be a senate, also elected by universal suffrage, but on a different electoral system allowing for regional but not ethnic representation. The senate, as guardian of the constitution, would refer constitutional disputes to the appropriate courts, and have the power of review. It would be able, where appropriate, to delay legislation from the national assembly but not to veto it. There would be an independent electoral commission that would supervise elections, and there could be both national and regional electoral lists, with regions given, for example, half the available seats. Despite the possibility of having two lists, voters would cast only one vote.
A constitutional court appointed by the president, possibly on the recommendation of a judicial service commission, would be responsible for the interpretation of the constitution. The constitution could be amended only if either two-thirds of the national assembly or two-thirds of voters in a national referendum supported it. The constitution would be supreme, and there would be a justifiable bill of rights and freedoms, including economic rights. A human rights commission would investigate violations and a public service commission would oversee recruitment, promotion, and dismissal, and would implement an affirmative action programme in the public service, while an independent ombudsman would investigate complaints against the public service.
Regions would be based on the distribution of the population, the availability of economic resources, and urban/rural balances. Central government would control external relations, defence and security, general economic fiscal and tax policy, national policy frameworks, and resources for social upliftment and the removal of historical imbalances in society.
Negotiating positions: matters of process
While there may have been a substantial convergence in the two constitutional proposals, there remained two fundamental areas of conflict: the emphasis on minorities, and the extent of the devolution of power. Unfortunately, the excitement generated by the apparent convergence in thinking masked crucial areas of disagreement.
The first related to the development of the NP's ideas. The NP's 1991 proposals still attempted to provide constitutionally entrenched guarantees to the white minority; it did, however, seriously grapple with moving the emphasis from race to class and cultural minorities. Furthermore, the latest proposals made a fundamental leap in favour of constitutional supremacy and a bill of rights, a development that represented a major development in NP thinking and brought the NP's constitutional proposals in line with those of the DP. From this point onwards, there was little fundamental difference in the proposals between the two parties.
The second crucial area of disagreement related, as it had so often before, to the process leading to a new constitutional order. The remaining issue was who would manage the transition period, and how, which was arguably the most pressing political imperative in the country at the end of 1991. There were four proposals: an interim government (ANC), a transitional authority (PAC/AZAPO), a transitional government (DP), and transitional arrangements (NP). Each of these proposals would lead to different results. The position of the IFP was a little more curious, since it offered no competing proposal. The IFP's Walter Felgate merely stated, 'We reject entirely the concept that a multiparty conference or all-party congress is being convened in order to establish an interim government'. The IFP insisted that only a multi-party conference could arrive at an agreement that there should be an interim arrangement.
National Party proposals on transitional mechanisms
The NP proposal allowed for political organizations to influence government decisions by advising it in a fashion similar to that of the President's Council, or the 'Great Indaba' that had been proposed by P. W. Botha in 1988. Such an arrangement would operate within the prevailing constitutional framework. The envisaged multi-party structure could also involve various working groups on specific problem areas, with the effect of creating some form of power-sharing. The government would remain ostensibly in control. The overall objective of the NP would be to allow for broader participation in the transition process.
PAC and AZAPO proposals on transitional mechanisms
The PAC and AZAPO envisaged a transitional authority that would have its participants approved by the liberation movements. These participants would comprise credible and neutral people who were mostly South Africans, but would exclude the government. International bodies would have to endorse the composition of the transitional authority. Such a structure would not take any joint responsibility for public administration and would not implement any apartheid law, though a primary function would be to oversee the security forces. It would have a strictly-defined and limited mandate. The structure would remain in existence for a specified period of time only and would invite international monitors for the elections. The overall objective of the PAC and AZAPO was to secure free and fair elections for a constituent assembly.
Democratic Party proposals on transitional mechanisms
The DP proposed a transitional government that would have its composition decided by the multi-party conference. It would consist of a 'council of leaders' to advise the state president, and oversee state expenditure, the security forces, and public broadcasting. It would also provide for participating local structures, supervise the reintegration of homelands, appoint specialist commissions to resolve particular issues, and broaden the representativeness of the judiciary, the public service, and the armed forces. As in the NP proposals, multi-party committees would advise cabinet ministers on the abolition of certain aspects of the constitution and implement an interim bill of rights. The overall objective would be to secure even-handed preparation for the elections.
ANC proposals on transitional mechanisms
The ANC proposed the establishment of an interim government, which would represent only the major players. These would have equal power, and the interim government would be the supreme legal authority. This would necessitate a transfer of power. The interim government would also control the security forces, the public service, and public broadcasting, and would design the electoral process of a constituent assembly. It would be in existence for a specified period of time only, during which it would devise and implement an interim bill of rights. Finally, it would also be the responsibility of the interim government to remove obstacles to negotiation and supervise the transition. The overall objective of the ANC proposal was to secure a swift transfer to majority rule.
There were several points of general agreement. Except for the IFP, it was settled that an interim authority would be in place while the constitution was negotiated. There was also tacit agreement that the NP could not be both referee and player at the same time. Such an interim authority would last for as short a period as possible.
The differences, however, were more substantial. There were essential questions that had to be addressed: the constitutional framework within which the interim authority would operate (a concern of the NP); whether it was necessary for such an interim authority to be elected at all (a DP proposal); and what authority such an interim authority should have - whether it should act as a government with effective authority, or only have limited responsibility (NP, PAC, and AZAPO positions). These were the issues that were to dominate the negotiation agenda during the next phase of multi-party negotiation.
The National Peace Accord
August 1991 saw significant progress in dealing with the question of violence, in an initiative led by the Consultative Business Movement (CBM), an organization representing a section of business and church leaders. The 'National Peace Initiative' resulted in the signing of the first ever multi-party agreement, the National Peace Accord, on 14 September 1991. This breakthrough paved the way for bilateral meetings between the ANC and the NP to consider the convening of die all-party congress. The editorial in the Sunday Star on 22 September 1991 summed up the situation as follows:
South Africa is up to its neck in committees, working groups, Minutes and Accords, all aimed at preparing the way for one thing - the start of real negotiation over the sharing of political power.
That, in itself, is remarkable - and two years ago, when F. W de Klerk took over as President, the events of today were unthinkÂable. In the past two weeks we have taken two important steps on the road to democracy: last Saturday's Peace Accord and this week's declaration by leaders of the Government, the ANC and___Inkatha that these three major players are ready for 'real' negotiation as soon as possible.
South Africa desperately needs these negotiations. Each wasted day brings more unnecessary violence, more senseless killings and immeasurable hardship to hundreds of thousands of innocent and helpless people. Until the negotiations get under way and there are signs that they are likely to succeed, the world will stand back; and although there may be some investment, the massive capital inflow we need will be withheld. Until the world regains its confidence in South Africa our economy will continue to stagnate and the vicious cycle of unemployment-poverty-crime-violence and more unemployment will continue. The more this happens, the harder negotiation will become as an embittered people begin to lose faith in their leaders.
On 25 September 1991 the PAC and AZAPO agreed to join the ANC at the all-party congress and to push for the formation of a patriotic front. According to Mac Maharaj, there was consensus regarding me agenda of the patriotic front conference: 'In particular this means that the three organisations arrived at consensus with regard to the All-Party congress or the pre-constituent assembly conference. Consensus was arrived at with regard to the modalities of transition, the agenda (for the congress or conference), which would include the items: interim government or transitional authority, modalities for constituting a constituent assembly and principles that would underpin a constitution.
Preparing for multi-party negotiations
By the end of September 1991 there was already an informal agreement that the all-party congress be held in November. The agreed agenda items were the formation of an interim government or transitional arrangement; the principles of SA's new constitution; the modalities of setting up or electing a constituent assembly or negotiating forum; and the role of the international community with special regard to sancÂtions. It was during this period that the government became embroiled in another conflict, this time with the labour movement, and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in particular, over the introduction of value-added tax (VAT). COSATU opposed the introduction of this tax because it would affect the poor most. The issue reinforced the demand that the NP should not manage the transition alone. The public debate that ensued became more acrimonious after the ANC's Secretary-General suggested that the ANC would consider reneging on international loans made to South Africa. For his part, Mandela argued that the ANC would also consider nationalization of some industries, a suggestion which caused much consternation. This led the leader of the DP, Zach de Beer, to call upon the ANC and the NP to share power and co-operate for a period of up to five years 'to get the economy moving again'.