Chapter 2: The Nature and Character of Vigilantes in Kwazulu-Natal

2.1 Introduction

Before embarking on the nature and character of vigilantes in KwaZulu-Natal, it is important to clarify certain aspects that are most important in understanding vigilantes in KwaZulu-Natal. At first, vigilantes came in the form of clans. As things progressed with the formation of trade unions and political parties such as the UDF and COSATU, vigilantes became linked to different parties. The IFP had the "Amabutho", or warriors¹⁸. It was believed that COSATU and UDF vigilantes were called comrades. A vast majority of vigilantes had no formal education; therefore they were illiterate in a way. Most of them joined the vigilantes as a way of survival, since they were unemployed. For them, being part of the vigilantes meant they were going to achieve something and forget about their unemployment. Others joined the vigilantes due to the mob psychology, with the believe that it was nice being part of the vigilantes. Some others joined vigilante activities because they had no choice, in the sense that their families and next-of-kin's lives were in danger if they refused to be part of the vigilantes.

Vigilantes in KwaZulu-Natal consisted of people from all different ethnic groups, and blacks in particular. The age group of vigilantes mostly ranged from 16 year old boys to middle-aged men. Youths found themselves being part of the vigilantes due to their inability to think for themselves and understand things properly. This happened because they were either dropouts or had no education at all. To them, traditional culture was the most important aspect and thus the reason they became part of the vigilantes. The mob psychology to the youths who became part of vigilante activities was a serious cause for concern. Parents' inability in KwaZulu-Natal to provide proper guidance to their children played a role in the massive increase of vigilantes in that region. It should be noted with interest that the political situation in KwaZulu-Natal had an influence on the nature and character of the vigilantes.¹⁹

Vigilante attacks in KwaZulu-Natal took mostly two forms: hit squads and crowds. Hit squads were small groups of men with fairly constant membership. They usually struck specific targets with sophisticated weapons (guns, grenades, fire bombs, whips or home-made pangas). Sometimes they abducted their victims. Others were attacked in their homes. Some vigilantes went masked, but the identities of many were known. The members did not always all know one another; leaders brought them together. Their targets could be some section in a community, groups of specific people, specific houses or individuals. Hit squads struck on both weekdays and weekends, suggesting that members were either self-employed or it was their duty to conduct vigilante activities. Crowds usually attacked on weekends, implying or meaning that they were composed of workers who were unable to take part in attacks during weekdays, since they were at their places of work. Both types of vigilantes were almost or entirely male dominant.²⁰

Vigilantism was just one side of an often-violent struggle for power. Vigilantism had its own distinction, which according to those who were engaged in it, was a way of defending themselves in a way, they thought was best. The most important distinction can be identified through the different "styles" of violence of the two sides. Since the fury of 1985-1986 abated, opposition violence usually involved small groups of lightly armed youths, striking at specific people in minority segments of the community. Furthermore, it was alleged that vigilantes had generally enjoyed loyal support from the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature and in some cases the SAP and the SADF were alleged to have aided vigilantes, while also acting vigorously to restrain the opponents of the vigilantes.²¹

Competition for land between clans also constituted another basis for vigilantism in KwaZulu-Natal. In this form of factional organisation, men who received land from a chief traditionally owe him military loyalty. In rural KwaZulu-Natal, this obligation was the source of vigilante activities. It was another issue that the IFP exploited. In urban townships and informal settlements, particular leaders who were appointed by the chief himself controlled men. The best organised, but rarest form of vigilantism, was the private army. To finance it, a levy was imposed on all the households of a shantytown. The Lindelani settlement on the northern fringes of Durban offers a useful case study. It sprang up around 1985 and by 1986 had 120 000 inhabitants. From the start it fell under the control of an IFP warlord²², Thomas Shabalala. Land was annexed in a violent way. In 1987, an attack was launched from Lindelani into neighbouring Ntuzuma, driving people from their homes and burning it down to acquire new land for settlement. Those who received the land in the neighbouring Ntuzuma owed military loyalty to Shabalala.

Vigilantes under Shabalala were also financed with money from the community. In 1988, Lindelani residents had to pay protection money to Shabalala. Additional payments had to be made in order to run a business. The community furthermore had to fork out R400 required by Shabalala to open his shop. As if that was not enough, all the businesses in Lindelani were under the control of Shabalala by 1988. However, it should be noted that Shabalala was not a mere gangster. In order to maintain his authority in Lindelani, he depended upon the compliance of the provincial go­vernment and in return he delivered the settlement to the IFP.²³ As a result of this strong power base that the IFP had built in Lindelani through Shabalala, the ANC was unable to operate in the area. Shabalala's power made it easy for him to become a member of the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature. Equally, Shabalala retained good relations with the security forces. His IFP impi's (vigilantes) could be seen armed with SAP-issued rifles and transported in KwaZulu-Natal SAP vehicles. The Lindelani case study offers a practical example of how vigilantes had people living in difficult circumstances. Their way of doing things was bad for the citizens of KwaZulu-Natal.²⁴

Social scientists like Dough and Mike Morries were quoted inNo blood on our hands by Antony Truluck, as arguing that the roots of vigilantism and political violence, together with its characteristics, were deep-rooted in the economic structure created by apartheid, which, with the breakdown of apartheid, had given rise to a competition for scarce resources.²⁵ At most it could be said that in KwaZulu-Natal, the limits of the IFP's redistributive capacity imposed by white domination left it over-reliant on force. Thus, over time, vigilantism tended to become counter-productive, or at best a wasting asset without genuine social reform. This was the reason why some historians like Nicholas Haysom believe that vigilantes in KwaZulu-Natal did not know that their actions were causing social imbalances in the society, because their aim was social destruction and the carrying out of orders by their superiors without questioning it.²⁶

The Goldstone Commission believed that the nature and characteristics of vigilantes in KwaZulu-Natal were mainly due to the economic, social and political imbalances that had resulted from apartheid and a police force and army who were instruments of oppression. They were therefore being perceived as unfair and biased. The Commission attributed the forming of vigilantes to a way of fighting a system that was not favourable to them. Surprisingly, the Commission said nothing about the vigilantes who operated together with the security forces in thwarting the efforts of democratic forces in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands.²⁷

2.2 The IFP and the Vigilantes

By August 1985, political violence had left large areas in black township settlements in KwaZulu-Natal gutted and destroyed. The violence had further polarised the black society, exacerbating a split between the youth and IFP supporters. Throughout August 1985, sporadic violence and daily clashes between the SAP, vigilantes and youth continued to occur. Several homes were destroyed in the process. Vigilantes destroyed areas targeted by the IFP as anti-IFP. Prince Gideon Zulu, a member of the KwaZulu-Natal legislature and an IFP member, was said to be in the forefront of identifying the homes that were supposed to be destroyed. In this manner, it could not be disputed that the IFP and the vigilantes were co-operating together in executing acts of violence, mostly involving innocent people. Though the IFP stated that Gideon Zulu was acting in his personal capacity, the writing was on the wall that the IFP and the vigilantes were working together in KwaZulu-Natal in committing acts of violence.²⁸

In fact, vigilantes went beyond acting against arbitrary looting, and their actions took a distinctive political tone. Vigilantes initially moved into Umlazi on 7 August 1985. By the weekend, carloads of "Amabutho" were arriving at the townships from various parts of KwaZulu-Natal. By the end of August 1985, the IFP local branches had organised vigilante groups to do house-to-house searches for goods. The IFP praised the role played by vigilantes and stressed the fact that they were strongly needed in KwaZulu-Natal to calm down the fears of political violence in communities most affected by the violence.²⁹

The death of Griffiths Mxenge, a civil rights lawyer, in 1985 led to the continuation of violence in KwaZulu-Natal. The ANC, despite the fact that his death was blamed on unknown assassins, clearly stated that the IFP was well aware of who the killers were. By so implying, the ANC was stressing that cooperation existed between the IFP and vigilantes with regard to Mxenge's death. In response to the ANC allegation, the IFP started a recruitment campaign aimed at bolstering the membership of the organisation. The recruitment campaign had been a response by the IFP to what it perceived as a threat to its authority and claim to represent the Zulu nation, namely the growth of other organisations in the townships. During the IFP recruitment drive, various accusations were made that the force and intimidation that were applied when people refused to join, along with retaliation by IFP vigilantes, usually organised by the local strongman, warlord or chief, had led to the fact that violence in many areas became virtually uncontrollable. The violence was sparked by the strong link between the IFP and the vigilantes.³⁰

TheSowetan asserted that the patronage or leadership of vigilantes in KwaZulu-Natal was largely composed of members of the KwaZulu-Natal Legislative Assembly and township councillors, who were members of the IFP. They used the IFP as a base for canvassing support for the ideology of bringing about change through non-violent means, whereas secretly they were involved in vigilante activities. The focus of the vigilantes and the IFP was to thwart any possible threat to their endeavours. Moreover, the IFP's claim to non-violence eroded with each vigilante atrocity. On the other hand, it could be stated that the IFP's stance of distancing itself from vigilante activities, which was met by "black anger", demonstrated the point that the public was well aware of the coalition between the IFP and the vigilantes.³¹

On 26 August 1986, theDaily News reported that 300 well-armed men led by two members of the KwaZulu-Natal Legislative Assembly, namely Prince Gideon Zulu, David Nzuza, had attacked mourners at a weekend funeral of people who had earlier been killed during the unrest. Several mourners were injured of which at least two were admitted to hospital. IFP men told the press they had just come from a peaceful IFP rally at the Umlazi stadium, and were marching on the road shouting the traditional war-cry "Usuthu", singing, waving their weapons and banging sticks on shields. However, despite the fact that the IFP men obviously aimed at misleading the press into believing that they came from a peaceful rally, some high ranking IFP officials were identified among the vigilantes who attacked the mourners. The attack on mourners, together with the presence of high-ranking IFP officials amongst the vigilantes, allegedly opened another possible collusion between the IFP and the vigilantes. The collusion was specifically pointed out by theDaily News,which regarded it as evidence of the as another form of strong ties between the IFP and the vigilantes.³²

More attacks of similar nature were to occur. On 21 January 1987, a group of men armed with AK rifles, suspected to be IFP vigilantes, gunned down 12 people, including seven children, in KwaMakutha near Amanzimtoti. They were killed in a cold-blooded manner at about 2 am. Some people in the area believed that the killing was directed at those who were rumoured to be disillusioned by the IFP with regard to its role in political violence. The UDF later alleged that the IFP leader, Mangosutho Buthelezi, gave orders for the attack, since he was afraid of any breakaway in the area within the ranks of the IFP. This alleged action by Buthelezi left many speechless, especially since innocent children were killed in the process. Moreover, it seemed to confirm what many observers believed namely that Buthelezi himself, together with his party, had a direct link with vigilantes.³³

On 2 February 1988, Ntando Ngubane was taking his girlfriend to the airport, when men in a blue taxi stopped him. He identified them as vigilantes from Lindelani. They were armed with homemade guns, knives and sticks. Ngubane later stated to theDailyNews that the vigilantes had forced him into the taxi. Inside there was a young girl who was crying bitterly. He was asked if he was a member of any organisation in KwaZulu-Natal. After stating that he was an IFP supporter for fear of his safety, he was left off the hook. The young girl inside the taxi was believed to be part of the breakaway youth movement linked to the UDF. Ngubane was told to spread the message in his place of residence, that should anyone try to act against the IFP, the vigilantes would take care of the situation.³⁴

In July 1990, a petition was handed to the Pietermaritzburg District Commissioner's office by the regional chairperson of the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal, Harry Gwala, during a march to protest security force action. The petition claimed that the SAP was systematically instigating a clear path for vigilantes to operate within IFP structures. According to the petition, the IFP knew about the activities of the vigilantes and who they were. It was alleged that the only thing protecting the vigilantes' identities, was that they were under the protection of the SAP. Therefore, the vigilantes found enough room to manoeuvre in carrying out acts of violence in KwaZulu-Natal.³⁵

An interesting scenario in the history of violence in KwaZulu-Natal was that whenever there was tension in the region whereby the IFP seemed to lose ground, Buthelezi would add his miscalculated comments by stating that should any member of the IFP be attacked, the IFP would just have to retaliate. Buthelezi further caused an uproar when he stated that the IFP had some secret weapons enabling them to tackle their attackers. In the light of this, it could be alleged that Buthelezi knew about the existence of vigilantes and that they were attached to his party. The only stumbling block on the whole issue of vigilantes and the IFP was that Buthelezi did not want to come clean with the kind of relationship his party was having with vigilantes.³⁶

In October 1990, armed vigilantes from Ndatabayathe, outside Ngwelezane, were involved in a confrontation with refugee youths at the Empangeni taxi rank. This attack was the culmination of a steady stream of harassment of youths in the area by vigilante groups from the outlying tribal areas dominated by the IFP. In March 1991, a major clash occurred between two heavily armed groups of youths from the refugee camp and IFP supporters led by vigilantes in what became known as "The Battle of the Forest". Two IFP supporters were killed in the clash.³⁷

With the IFP's dependency on vigilantes to do their dirty tricks, it became costly to maintain the vigilante groups. IFP leaders from other areas then asked the constituency to help finance the vigilantes. In other words, the public were asked to pay the bill for the daily running of vigilantes. This was supposed to be done irrespective of the family being anti-IFP or not. Those who resisted the financing of vigilantes were either expelled from that community, harassed or brutalised. The togetherness of the IFP and vigilantes had by now became a constant thorn to many people's lives in KwaZulu-Natal.³⁸ In broad terms, the KwaZulu-Natal vigilantes had exploited the political violence in rural areas, townships and informal settlements to make money out of the business of killing and intimidating. This was done in close collaboration with the IFP. A resident's own safety was dependent upon paying his levy to the local strongman or vigilante group. The vigilantes had both the political and material interest in disrupting any peace initiative, since they fed off and survived on the likelihood of violence that might have been sparked by a political motive. The vigilantes executed all their acts with the financial backing of IFP and the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature.³⁹

KwaZulu-Natal witnessed some of the most savage mob action in the history of South Africa. Most of the incidents were laid at the door of the "Amabutho". In many of the incidents the "Amabutho" instigated over the years, it was alleged that somehow members of the IFP were involved in one way or the other. The IFP on the other hand claimed that the "Amabutho" had performed a useful social function, or that they had been provoked into violence. In other cases, the IFP empathetically denied any links between the "Amabutho" and themselves. It appears from the study of vigilantes and violence in KwaZulu-Natal, that the features of both urban and rural vigilantes were present in KwaZulu-Natal, with the support of the IFP. It cannot be disputed that towards the first general election in 1994, vigilantism and political violence reached an alarming frequency, and to such an extent that elections were nearly postponed in that region. It was not surprising then that the vigilantes felt betrayed by the IFP and in particular Buthelezi when he announced that his party was going to take part in the election after all. It can only be assumed that the reason why they felt harshly done with was that the outcome of the results could swing in any direction amongst the political parties in KwaZulu-Natal. As such, the protection they enjoyed during the reign of the IFP would come to an end, and they would therefore get exposed.⁴⁰

2.3 The IFP and the Vigilantes versus the ANC and the UDF

The conflict that had crystallised between the IFP and the UDF/COSATU alliance and its affiliates was on the rise by 1986, especially because the political power of the IFP became challenged. The alliance and its affiliates were regarded as a threat to the KwaZulu-Natal Legislative and the IFP. Every new move or campaign of the alliance was met with hostility, which at grassroots level often took a violent turn. Those involved in the ensuing bloody strike in 1986, were mostly workers and youths. After the suppression of the Black Consciousness Movement in the latter part of the 1970s, the IFP's power as the major political group in KwaZulu-Natal remained unchallenged. The emergence of the UDF in 1983 and COSATU in 1986 changed this position. The IFP was finding it difficult to accept that its hegemony was seriously threatened. More to it was the fact that both the UDF and COSATU were one way or another linked to the ANC. The ANC was the organisation that the IFP hated the most.⁴¹

The endemic killings as a result of the conflict between the IFP and the UDF/COSATU factions in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands, and, perhaps above all the proliferation of the horrific necklace killings, brought the growth of political violence into a wider public consciousness. During those years, anti-IFP members were sought and killed, mostly in IFP-dominated areas. The IFP forced people to join its ranks against their will. IFP comrades mostly targeted COSATU and UDF meetings and disrupted them. It was difficult for the UDF members to survive in IFP-dominated areas. IFP attacks on UDF, COSATU and ANC members plunged the KwaZulu-Natal region into political turmoil.⁴²

In a policy speech in 1986 in Ulundi, Buthelezi stated that the UDF and COSATU were spending thousands of Rands to establish a violent force to oppose the IFP, but that they would never succeed. Many observers believed this was what the IFP was doing, and not the UDF/COSATU alliance. Buthelezi further accused the UDF of hiring people to do research on the war, and then using the evidence to attack the IFP. According to Buthelezi, people were offered R50 when they joined, and schools that were UDF-led were in most cases responsible for disrupting classes and causing chaos in KwaZulu-Natal.⁴³

In August and September 1986 things turned ugly when IFP supporters embarked on forced recruitment campaigns in a number of townships around Pietermaritzburg. Violence had simmered in the area since 5 and 6 August 1986, when township residents heeded the UDF/COSATU call for a stay-away to protest against the all-white parliamentary elections in KwaZulu-Natal, which supported and favoured the IFP. A number of bus drivers, members of the COSATU-affiliated Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), were allegedly attacked by IFP-supporting vigilantes. It was followed by sporadic attacks on UDF and COSATU members throughout the rest of the year. It was however only in 1987 that the conflict escalated into a full-scale struggle for control of the Pietermaritzburg townships. There were numerous allegations that the recruitment by the IFP was accompanied by force and demands for money. As vigilante violence escalated and affected the communities swung their support over to the UDF and COSATU alliance, defence committees were set up in many areas, and the balance of forces were turned against the IFP supporters.⁴⁴

On 21 January 1987, a suspected IFP vigilante group gunned down 12 people in KwaMakutha near Amanzimtoti, at the home of Willie Ntuli. The sole adult survivor of the attack, Anna Khumalo, did not live long to tell the tale. The violence was so tense that Victor could not return home to bury his father and brothers.⁴⁵

The UDF president, Archie Gumede, was overcome by grief and wept: "So many people have been killed in this country, in particular KwaZulu-Natal; it is now beyond our perseverance. If the Lord could only hear our prayers". He pointed out that 18 youth, mostly children without knowledge of politics, but whose relatives had been UDF supporters, had lost their lives to political violence within 18 months. Gumede also stressed that the UDF would not bow to the IFP's tactics of killing UDF supporters and members through vigilante activities.⁴⁶

Violence in Natal started to turn ugly and nasty when constant attacks on bus drivers by IFP supporters started occurring. On 10 May 1987, a bus driver by the name of Simon Zulu, was shot and killed by the brother of a well-known IFP chief. His friend survived the attack, and as a result, TGWU bus drivers became terrified to go out on routine trips. Alfred Ndlovu, another bus driver belonging to the TGWU, was saved by a passerby from being attacked. The passerby alerted him that IFP supporters had formed a roadblock. He could have been one of the victims of violence by IFP members. The bus drivers therefore developed an ideology and firm belief that IFP-related officials were conducting a systematic campaign to eliminate TGWU bus drivers in the area, because the TGWU had been identified as supporting COSATU. Hence, as COSATU was affiliated to the UDF, and the UDF was sympathetic to the ANC, their supporters were being eliminated.⁴⁷

Between September 1987 and January 1988, vigilante activities had their biggest effect in different regions throughout KwaZulu-Natal. Bloodshed surged especially around Pietermaritzburg. With only 2 000 members in the area, the IFP launched a forcible door-to-door recruitment campaign in Pietermaritzburg in September 1987. Realising the intimidation and brutality of the IFP and vigilantes, angry pro-UDF residents formed defence committees and fought back. They gained ground until December 1987. However, in January 1988, powerful IFP strikes recaptured the city's semi-rural periphery, but the UDF turned back crowds that tried to invade the townships. During the remainder of 1988, the fighting shifted into a war of attrition, and knives and guns repeatedly flashed in the city streets. In smaller towns south of Pietermaritsburg and in Durban, young UDF supporters began to organise, arm and drive out IFP leaders in their areas. The invasion of UDF-dominant areas by the IFP and vigilantes, in particular in Pietermaritzburg, led to the increase of political violence and vigilantism. The reason was that the UDF wanted to defend its territories and thwart any IFP threats. On the other hand, the IFP wanted to maintain itself as the dominant political organisation in KwaZulu-Natal.⁴⁸

A surge of violence that continued for three months from the end of 1988 left a total of 691 people dead. This was mostly in the Pietermaritzburg region. Between December 1988 and February 1989, incidents of politically linked violence by the IFP, including numerous deaths, were also reported from most of the areas in Durban. As was the case in the Pietermaritzburg region, the conspicuous feature of the violence in the Durban areas was the political rivalry that existed due to the growing antagonism that the IFP felt against the UDF/COSATU alliance. People who wished to remain neutral, were often caught up in the violence.⁴⁹

In April 1990, 15 UDF youths were killed near a school at Umzumbe, allegedly by IFP supporters. Retaliatory killings occurred and the South Coast death toll for April rose to 46, while in May approximately 55 people, mostly belonging to the UDF/ANC alliance, were killed. Towards the end of 1990, reports circulated that a combi had brought loads of weapons to IFP supporters and that a base at Mbotsha was being established. It was from this base that counter attacks were launched on the surrounding ANC-controlled areas. A cycle of large-scale attacks now occurred in which ANC supporters were driven out of rural areas by IFP supporters. They were driven out for the fact that they might try to establish a strong base in order to challenge the hegemony of the IFP in rural areas.⁵⁰ It should be noted that during this period, the UDF had all but ceased to exist. Only young comrades still identified themselves with the UDF.

The violence on the South Coast started when chiefs and indunas felt that the UDF and later the ANC intended replacing them with civic and village committees. This feeling was fuelled by the general popularity of the ANC among the youth. In response, the IFP started moving into communities with force and intimidation. This was done to communities suspected to be ANC-dominated. Consequently, the violence intensified, since the ANC wanted to establish itself as a full force and a party that commanded a strong support in KwaZulu-Natal.⁵¹

During July 1990, approximately 100 houses belonging to ANC supporters were attacked by members of the IFP, and an unknown number of persons were killed. Hundreds of people fled the area. Several houses were extensively damaged by the attackers. These attacks by IFP supporters resulted in a very serious political violence that caught innocent people off-guard. Violence between the IFP and the ANC displaced many families. Lives were lost in the process. Families starved because breadwinners could not go to their places of work due to the ongoing violence between the IFP vigilantes and the UDF/COSATU/ANC alliance.⁵²

Two years later, on 2 July 1992, the violence in KwaZulu-Natal reached a new phase when workers responded to a call by the ANC and COSATU for a nationwide one-day strike at the start of the week to protest action highlighting the continuing carnage in KwaZulu-Natal. The action sought to emphasise the faction fighting between the IFP and the ANC in which more than 3000 people had been killed. It was believed that in KwaZulu-Natal alone, more than 10 000 workers responded to the call. The organi­sers of the protest demanded, among other things, the lifting of the state of emergency in KwaZulu-Natal, and the dismantling of the nominally self-governing KwaZulu-Natal Legislative Assembly.

In September 1992, the violence in the Pietermaritzburg region flared up anew. After an IFP rally in KwaMakhuta on 30 September, large groups of armed IFP supporters attacked the ANC-controlled Ashdown area, damaging properties and assaulting residents. The conflict in Pietermaritzburg was a bitter one, because the issues at stake were bigger than simply the control of several townships. The main issue that led to the attack was the deep-rooted hatred that existed amongst the IFP members since the formation of the UDF. During October 1992, conflict in the Pietermaritzburg region seemed to escalate. Violence became almost an everyday occurrence. Regular skirmishes between IFP gunmen and ANC supporters took place. It was believed that Buthelezi knew about the violence that was taking part in KwaZulu-Natal. Henceforth, it was believed that he was the cause of the violence when he refused to take part in the upcoming 1994 election, at least until international observers were allowed in KwaZulu-Natal.⁵³

2.4 Conclusion

The nature and character of political violence and vigilantes in a way unfolded many things, in particular the clandestine way in which vigilantes operated. This chapter also reveals the counter-accusations that existed amongst different parties and intensified the violence. The monopolisation of KwaZulu-Natal by the IFP was affected by the coming into being of COSATU and the UDF in that region. According to the leaders of the IFP, the two organisations (COSATU-UDF) were very much of a threat in the ruling of KwaZulu-Natal. The IFP believed that the influence of the two parties in KwaZulu-Natal was going to shift the balance of power, which indeed happened eventually. The illiteracy in KwaZulu-Natal amongst middle aged men and the youth did not help matters. These people could not distinguish between right and wrong. They were governed by mob psychology and this led to their inability to think for themselves. The nature and character of vigilantes also influenced KwaZulu-Natal in a very destructive way, moreover because the people of KwaZulu-Natal were constantly fighting instead of building unity along political lines.